General Approach - Vietnamese Grammar Project

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General Approach
Phonetics and
Phonology Traditionally, grammars of specific languages have been
Morphology
concerned with questions of word-formation and only more
occasionally with questions of sentence structure. For example,
Theoretical
in older grammars of classical and Modern Indo-European
Research
languages, such as Classical Latin or Russian, one finds extensive
Monograph
discussion of noun declensions and verb conjugations, nowadays
(Draft Sections)
often referred to under the label inflectional morphology, even
Other
more traditionally as accidence. Generally however, there is very
Publications
little mention in these more traditional grammars of the syntactic
Sitemap
or phonological properties that generalize across the lexicon. By
Recent site activity implication, and in popular understanding, grammar is equated
with morphosyntactic variation. Because Vietnamese has virtually
no inflectional morphology and a fairly rigid word-order, it is
sometimes claimed—often by Vietnamese speakers
themselves—that Vietnamese has ‘no grammar.’ This is a
misconception. As is the case for any natural language,
Vietnamese has a rich and complex grammatical structure:
indeed, for reasons discussed in Duffield (2011, in prep.),
Vietnamese grammar is one of quite special scientific interest. Its
apparent simplicity in inflectional morphology contrasts with
relative complexity in other areas of grammar, for example, in its
system of lexical compounding, in less obvious areas of syntax,
and in its sound system (phonology). The aim of the present work
is to provide an accessible English description of the main
aspects of this grammatical structure, presented in such a way
that it will be useful both to theoretical linguists as well as to a
less theoretically-minded audience, including language learners,
applied linguists and educationalists.
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The strangeness of grammar: universal

vs. language-particular features
Over the last fifty years, there have been two main theoretical
approaches to language description: a monadist, or RELATIVIST,
approach on the one hand, a UNIVERSALIST approach, on the other;
see Steiner (1972) for useful discussion. As with many scientific
oppositions, the terms Relativist and Universalist define
end-points on a continuum, rather than a binary opposition:
most theoretical linguists are more-or-less universalist,
more-or-less relativist. The relativist approach to language,
which developed in the context of behaviorist work in philosophy
and psychology, informed much linguistic work up to the
nineteen sixties, particularly in North America. Broadly speaking,
relativists are impressed by the apparent differences and diversity
in lexis and language use. The most extreme expression of the
relativist position is summed up in the (now infamous) quotation
of the American structuralist linguist Martin Joos: the view that
languages ‘… differ from each other without limit and in
unpredictable ways Joos (1957).’; see also Gumperz & Levinson
(1996). Although this view of language became less fashionable
in linguistic circles for several decades following the rise of
generative grammar—especially after Chomsky (1959,
1965)—and what has been termed the ‘cognitive revolution’—it
has always remained popular; recently, there have been attempts
to rehabilitate it in more scientific work, as shown by the
following quotation from Evans & Levinson (2009):
‘A widespread assumption, growing out of the generative

tradition in linguistics, is that all languages are
English-like but with different sound systems and
vocabularies. The true picture is very different: languages
differ so fundamentally from one another at every level of
description (sound, grammar, lexicon, meaning) that it is
very hard to find any single structural property they share
(Evans & Levinson 2009).’
Universalists by contrast, whilst recognizing the undeniable

surface differences that exist, are more struck by the formal
commonalities to be found across the world's languages. More
precisely, most universalists are impressed by the commonalities
in the grammars—the implicit rule-systems—of the world’s
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languages, rather than of the languages themselves. This is an

important distinction, negligence of which has often led to
heated, but ultimately futile, debate.
These structural commonalities across unrelated grammars are

all the more striking when there is no obvious functional or
ecological reason for them. Thus, while it is not surprising that
all grammars include devices for signalling the force of an
utterance (as a question or statement, command or request), or
that spoken utterances are always temporally sequenced (we
don’t produce all of the words in an utterance simultaneously,
leaving it to the listener to decode the result), it is surprising—to
give just four examples—(i), that many historically unrelated
languages exhibit a constraint to the effect that a finite verb (or
auxiliary) must appear as the second syntactic constituent,
whereas no language shows a ‘verb-third’ or ‘verb-fourth’
constraint; (ii), that discontinuous dependencies in many
languages appear to be governed by the narrowly defined
abstract structural condition known as C-COMMAND; (iii), that
many languages—including possibly Vietnamese, see Nguyen
(2011)—require the use of semantically empty subjects in certain
grammatical contexts (e.g., English: ‘*is raining’); (iv) that many
unrelated languages—including Bagirmi, Russian and Mandarin
—prohibit the co-occurence of negation with certain types of
aspectual morpheme, as illustrated in (1)*
Recurring formal peculiarities such as these attract attention not

merely because they recur, but also because of their implications
for language acquisition. Barring pathology, children acquire
correct knowledge and use of such abstract rules remarkably
early in the course of language development: this in spite of the
fact that they are rarely—if ever—given explicit instruction about
these implicit properties. [1] More importantly, the surface
information that is available to children is consistent with a much
wider range of logically possible grammatical rules than children
ever seem to hypothesize. Expressed slightly more technically,
the input to children vastly underdetermines their final-state
grammatical knowledge.
Crain (1991) articulates clearly the logic of formalist arguments

about grammar acquisition in terms of a distinction between,
respectively, unavailable structures, and unavailable
interpretations. Since this distinction will be appealed to in the
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present work, it is worth briefly recapitulating his presentation

here: see also (Crain and Pietroski 2001).
Crain points out that two types of linguistic context present a

logical learnability problem for children: those contexts in which
a sentence, a form-meaning pair, is excluded for purely formal
reasons, even though its interpretation is perfectly accessible;
and those in which one or more or the logically available
interpretations for a given sentence form is excluded. These
contexts are illustrated schematically in (1) below:
(1) a. {form1, meaning1}, {*form2, meaning1}
b. {form1, meaning1}, {form1,*meaning 2}
An example of the first restriction in English is provided by the

contrast between subject extraction from complement clauses
with and without the complementizer element that: in (2a),
movement of the wh-element who from the embedded position
in which it is interpreted to the front of the clause is acceptable;
in (2b), however, it is not, at least in most English varieties.
(Notice that no similar restriction is observed with extraction
from the object position: Who did you say (that) Mary loved?)
(2) a. Who did you say had stolen the car?
b. *Who did you say that had stolen the car?
A similar ‘intervention effect’ can be observed in Vietnamese

causative constructions. As discussed in various places on this
site—see also Duffield (2011, in press)—there are two kinds of
analytic causative construction in Vietnamese: the more direct,
‘simple’ causative involving làm, illustrated in (3a), and the more
indirect causative, involving làm plus cho (an element that
normally translates as ‘give’ but which in this context functions
very much like the English complementizer that); this is
illustrated in (3b). Though normally these show very similar
behaviours, the two types of causative behave syntactically
differently with respect to reciprocal binding (that is to say, in
cases where there is referential co-indexation between the higher
and lower subject): as the minimal contrast between (4a) and (4b)
shows, reciprocal binding is blocked by the presence of cho
(resulting in grammatical unacceptability, while remaining fully
interpretable).
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(3) a. Tôi làm thang-be ngã.
I make boy fall
‘I made the boy fall (I tripped the boy.)’
b. Tôi làm cho thang-be ngã.
I make give boy fall
‘I made the boy fall (I caused the boy to fall).’
(4) a. Họ làm nhau khóc.
they make each other cry
‘They made each other cry.’
b. *Họ làm cho nhau khóc.
they make give e.o. cry
‘They made each other cry.’
An example of the second, interpretive, constraint schematized

in (1b) is provided by the co-reference constraints on the
interpretation of pronouns. In the English sentences in (5a) and
(5b), the pronoun she may be interpreted as co-referential with
the noun-phrase Sarah (though, of course, she can also be taken
to refer to some other unnamed person). In example (5c) she and
Sarah cannot normally be understood as coreferential (the
sentence remains grammatical with a non-coreferential meaning.
The examples in (6) show that a parallel constraint is observed in
Vietnamese:
(5) a. Sarah said she had left her notebook on the train.
b. When she thought about it, Sarah realised her

notebook was left on the train.
c. She thought that Sarah had left her notebook on the
train. (*, if coreference is intended).
(6) a. Cô Thuy nói là cô ấy rất bận.
PRN DEM say that PRN DEM very busy
‘*Thuy says that she is very busy.’
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b. *Cô ấy nói là cô Thuy rất bận.
PRN DEM say that PRN Thuy very busy
‘*She says that Thuy is very busy.’
(* = ungrammatical with intended coreference)
The fact that all languages appear to obey abstract, sometimes

quirky, constraints of this type, taken in conjunction with the
inductive gap between the surface data available to children and
final-state grammar they acquire, has encouraged many linguists
to attribute knowledge of the core properties of Universal
Grammar (UG) to genetic inheritance. For such nativists,
knowledge of UG is part of our genetic endowment. At a stroke,
this solves the learnability problem, since nothing about these
quirky constraints needs to be learned in the normal sense (that
is to say, through attentional mechanisms reliant on
environmental exposure). Nowadays, it seems fair to claim that a
majority of theoretical linguists accept some form (and degree) of
nativism. This does not mean, however, that most linguists would
agree with the Chomskyan perspective (even assuming there is
such a homogeneous position among generative researchers).
For the crucial empirical question is not whether some kind of
ability is innate but rather what kinds of innate ability shape
language development, and how far do these abilities determine
the shape of end-state grammars? For example, a key question
in linguistics and language acquisition is whether grammar
acquisition is facilitated by DOMAIN-SPECIFIC knowledge—that is,
grammatical knowledge in the narrowest sense—or by more
GENERAL COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS (for example, constraints on the
sequencing of incoming information, attentional preferences for
whole objects, etc. For a general discussion of these issues, see
Pinker (1984), Jackendoff (1995, 1997), Elman et al. (1996),
Dresher (1997); Pullum (2011)
To balance the discussion, which has tended towards the

Universalist view thus far, four points should be made
immediately. The first objection to this kind of universalism that
many of the strange formal principles mentioned above are not
universal in the most obvious sense; namely, they do not appear
to obtain in ALL languages. Consider again the obligatory use of
expletive (non-referential) subjects in English (e.g., the it in ‘John
believes it to be a fact that pigs have wings’). It is generally
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assumed that null argument languages such as Vietnamese do

not have such expletives—though see section 6.4.3 below, also
(Nguyễn and Hoàng 2011). And even in languages more similar
to English, such as German and French, expletives are required in
some subject positions and but are excluded in others, with
subtly different constraints holding for each language; see, for
example Bobaljik (1999). Universalists have two responses to this
objection: either to propose that the universal in question is
‘parameterized’ such that grammars/language learners will select
among one of two privative values, giving the presence or
absence of the property in the end-state grammar. In this case,
the rule is universal in the sense that all grammars can be
described by reference to it. The alternative is to accept that
demonstrated non-occurrence of a rule in a given grammar
excludes it as a candidate for universality; the constraint in
question may then be relegated to language-particular status, or
may even be treated as falling outside of grammar (narrow
syntax) entirely. Both of these strategies have been applied at
different times to the Verb-Second (V2) constraint, briefly
mentioned above, which applies in many Germanic languages;
see Gibson & Wexler 1994; Rizzi (1995).
A second relativist objection is that formal rules that seem to be

arbitrary may simply be misunderstood as such. It is at least
logically possible that constraints that appear to be dysfunctional
under a particular description serve an important communicative
or processing function when one considers a wider set of
grammatical and extra-grammatical factors. [2] This objection
reflects a more general concern among relativists that the search
for universals too narrowly restricts the range of phenomena that
some linguists consider in their descriptions. Related to this,
relativists observe correctly that even if one could reliably identify
abstract universal properties of the grammar of a given language,
all of the non-universal rules of particular grammars would
remain to be described and decoded. Particular grammars, as far
as we know, cannot be exclusively genetically determined; that is
to say, they are not entirely describable through the application
of innate principles with a learned lexicon; rather, grammars
seem to emerge through the interaction of innate specifications
applied to bare lexical items (the CORE GRAMMAR), combined with a
substantial periphery of pre-compiled, often idiosyncratic,
syntactic information (the PERIPHERY), all of which interacts with
language-processing constraints and explicitly taught
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information. [3] Thus, direct analogies to genetics may be

misleading, even if there is a genetic basis for certain aspects of
grammar acquisition: in the case of language the role of extrinsic
factors—including general historical developments, contact
phenomena, and individual differences in language
experience—is much too large and complex to be ignored. See
Newmeyer (2004), for discussion. If this is the case, then an
adequate grammatical description must attend to language-
particular properties at least as much as to universal ones.
Finally, the relativist might object that, as a matter of practice, it

is harder to detect real formal differences among grammars if
you don’t expect to find them, and, as a consequence of this, fail
to develop the tools to look for them. Adopting relativist
assumptions is arguably a useful working practice, even for those
who would support universalist claims.
Abstractness in description and

explanation
The approach adopted here attempts to strike a balance between
two goals that theoretical linguists set for themselves. On the one
hand, it aims to provide an accurate description of the rules of
Vietnamese grammar, one that treats Vietnamese in its own
terms, and does not seek to impose categories taken from
descriptions of very different languages; in particular, I aim to
avoid the charge of Eurocentrism, which is so often levelled
against English or French treatments of Vietnamese grammar,
sometimes with justification; see Nguyễn (2010), for discussion.
On the other hand, our aim is to understand exactly where
Vietnamese fits within the range of possible human languages:
which properties of Vietnamese grammar hold in virtue of its
being a natural language (UNIVERSAL rules), which properties are
common to a subset of human languages including Vietnamese
(PARAMETRIC rules); and which features or properties appear to be
exclusive to Vietnamese itself (LANGUAGE-PARTICULAR rules). These
different rule-types do not of course come labelled as such: to
the native-speaker of Vietnamese or of any other language,
putatively universal aspects of their grammars have no special
status vis-à-vis language-particular or parametric properties. To
investigate Vietnamese from this perspective then, necessarily
involves both implicit and explicit comparisons with other better-
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studied languages. Therefore, in each section of the grammar, an

effort is made to provide relevant points of comparison with
other languages and language families.
Chomsky (1965, and subsequent works) refers to the goals of

grammatical theory in terms of DESCRIPTIVE ADEQUACY and
EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY, respectively. Chomsky’s concern until
recently was primarily with explanatory adequacy, that is to say,
with fixing the abstract properties of Universal Grammar. Indeed,
Chomsky frequently has frequently dismissed the study of
particular languages (E-language) or even particular grammars as
having little theoretical significance. Although I adopt many of
Chomsky's general assumptions about the purpose of linguistic
inquiry—I believe that there is something like a Universal
Grammar, and that one of the goals of linguistics should be to
determine these essential properties—the approach that I will
take here differs from that of many generative grammarians in
several respects.
In the first place, this work is considerably less abstract than

most theoretical research (including my own more theoretical
work): I will present much of the discussion of syntax and
semantics in terms of sets of sentences (constructions) paired
with interpretations. There are two reasons for this. The first is
that current syntactic analyses with their attendant formalisms
tend to be astonishingly ephemeral and theoretically parochial:
the data may not change much over a decade, or even a century,
but the analyses change with the seasons. Moreover, even if the
current version of generative grammar were approximately on
the right track as a theory for describing our implicit grammatical
knowledge, it is vanishingly improbable that we have hit upon
just the right theory in such a short time. For this work to have
any kind of shelf-life requires a more superficial type of
description. Furthermore, if this work is to be of value to
researchers working in other frameworks, it needs to be
accessible to them: to elaborate the descriptions presented here
by adding notation such as ‘interpretable formal features,’ which
are only current in one particular theoretical framework, would be
to blur rather than clarify generalizations for other researchers.
An additional reason to adopt a more superficial, data-oriented

approach is due to my own conceptualization of what Universal
Grammar means. Within generative grammar, there have been
two ideas about formal universals, broadly speaking. On the one
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hand, there are those who view formal universals as properties

that hold of every natural language grammar: on this view, if a
formal property is universal, then by definition, it exists in the
grammar of every language, and in the mind of every speaker of
the language that grammar generates. This view might be termed
STRONG UNIVERSALISM. Linguists who subscribe to this view
generally are less concerned with cross-linguistic work; they
often also tend to subscribe to a strong view of the Innateness
Hypothesis. (Of course, if these linguists are correct and have
properly determined the formal universals in one language, then
there is really no need consider cross-linguistic differences for
the purposes of theory development, since, modulo
parameterization, close inspection of any single language will
suffice). [4]
An alternative view of formal universals, which until the advent of

Optimality Theory was the more common one among generative
phonologists, is that Universal Grammar provides a fixed
inventory of phonological and syntactic rules, from which
languages choose different options. Let us call this
smorgasbord-type approach the Weak Universalist view. Weak
Universalism, which I adopt here, provides for at least two kinds
of parametrization: grammars may differ from one another
because they have different parametric values for the same rule
(this is the only type of parameterization available in moderate
versions of current Minimalism); or, because one grammar
contains a rule that the other lacks. An example of the first might
be different bounding nodes for subjacency; an example of the
second might be whether or not the EPP—the requirement that all
clauses contain subjects—applies in a given language; see
McCloskey (1999a). For those who subscribe to the weak
universalist position, cross-linguistic work is absolutely crucial. I
discuss some aspects of this position in the next section.
Even if one were to adopt a strong universalist approach, there

would still be good reason to do careful cross-linguistic work.
One way to appreciate this is by considering the following
thought experiment—which may be tragically close to being
realized; see McCloskey (1999b). Suppose that at some future
time, only one human language remains: English, and Mandarin
Chinese are perhaps the most plausible candidates as ‘sole
survivors.’ For the sake of argument, let us say that the
remaining language is English. Now suppose that future linguists
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are interested in determining the universal properties of

grammar. Since every aspect of English grammar, including
several thousand basic lexical items, will be present in the mind
of every adult language user, it would be possible to claim that
UG was exactly the grammar of English; furthermore, one could
claim an innate basis for all of these properties, up to the
specification of lexical entries. Such a claim would not be true,
but in the absence of language users with different grammars, it
would be empirically unfalsifiable. Given the speed of language
extinction over the last two centuries, it is an increasingly urgent
task to document the remaining diversity before all counter-
evidence is lost. [5]
A final reason to adopt a weak universalist stance and with it a

less abstract approach, is quite simply that it is more interesting;
by which, of course, I mean more interesting to me. The focus of
much recent work within the Minimalist framework has become
incredibly narrow, even by generative standards: to the extent
that any universal principles that remain are presented at a level
of abstractness so far removed from language data that their
descriptive value is virtually negligible. As an example of this,
consider the (universal) derivational constraint in (7) below (from
(Chomsky 1993)):
(7) Minimal Link Condition
F can raise to target K only if there is no legitimate

operation Move F' targeting K, where F' is closer to K.
In earlier versions of Minimalism, this formal constraint served to

restrict possible word-orders by strictly delimiting the extent to
which constituents may be displaced from the position in which
they are (thematically) interpreted. One of many consequences of
this derivational constraint is to prevent ‘topicalized’ constituents
from appearing between the canonical subject position and the
tense-bearing element in both English and Vietnamese, as shown
in (8) and (9) below:
(8) a. That book, he put on the table.
b. Quyển sách này, anh ấy đễ trên bàn.
(9) a. *He that book put on the table.
b. *Anh ấy quyển sách này đễ trên bàn.
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But this constraint does not by itself account for the fact that
topicalization is much more frequent in Vietnamese than in
English (Vietnamese is a so-called ‘topic-prominent language)
nor, as importantly, does it account for the fact that topic
arguments in Vietnamese — as is also the case in Japanese, for
example — need only satisfy an ‘aboutness relation’ to the
position topicalized on, whereas English topic arguments must
replace the entire constituent; compare (9a) and (9b), see also
Rosén (1998) for discussion of this phenomenon.
(10) a. *This office, the door is usually closed.
b. Cái phòng này thì cửa thường dóng.
CL room DEM TOP door usually close
‘*This office, the door is usually closed.’
Nor does a condition like the MLC explain or predict the

obligatoriness of SOIV order in Vietnamese in sentences where
the object is to be interpreted as a universal quantifier: compare
the examples in (11); see section nn, also Duffield (2007, in
prep.). A less abstract description of argument fronting should at
least mention these facts; a description aiming at descriptive
adequacy will seek to relate these facts to other formal properties
of the language(s) under investigation. (Such a description can of
course make reference to abstract principles such as the MLC,
but that cannot be the whole story.)
(11) a. Anh ấy tự nào cũng nhớ.
PRN DEM word which also remember
‘She remembers every word.’
b. Cô ấy ai cũng quen.
PRN DEM who also know
‘She knows everybody.’
c. Anh ấy bao giờ cũng đến muộn.
PRN DEM what time also arrive late
‘He is always late.’
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Typological Considerations
This work also has typological goals. Language typology is the
study of (non-genetic) language classification; an authoritative
work here is Comrie (1981, 1989); see also Whaley (1997). This
study will pay special attention to one particular kind of
typological classification, namely, that relating to formal
parametric variation in syntax and semantics. The goal here is to
determine how best to situate Vietnamese grammar relative to
other superficially similar languages. [6] As mentioned above, I
assume that there are two distinct ways in which
parameterization can work, and through which languages may be
meaningfully classified. First, languages may be classified
according the categorical presence or absence of a given set of
rules or properties: let us call this ABSOLUTE PARAMETERIZATION (AP).
Alternatively, a language may be classified by considering its
‘parameter-settings’—the choices it makes among different
feature-values for the same universal parameteric rule: call this
RELATIVE PARAMETERIZATION (RP).
Whether absolute or relative parametrization is more

enlightening to the description is dictated in advance. Rather, this
depends crucially on the degree of abstractness of the typological
description, as well as on what may be termed the ‘explanatory
depth’ of the parameter; cf. Comrie (1981), Atkinson (1990). Both
of these notions can be appreciated by considering some
examples. Consider the following assertions that could be (have
been) made about Vietnamese, and which are examined in much
greater detail below:
· Vietnamese is a Tone Language
· Vietnamese is an SVO Language
· Vietnamese is a “null-subject” language
· Vietnamese is a “serializing” language (see Collins

1994).
· Vietnamese is a [-Pred+Arg] language with respect to

Chierchia's Nominal Mapping Parameter ((Chierchia
1998)).
Each of these statements serves to classify Vietnamese in one

way or another, systematically grouping it with some languages,
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distinguishing it from others. The first two statements may seem

to be instances of absolute parameters: either a language makes
use of pitch distinctions to differentiate lexical meanings (as
Vietnamese does), or it doesn't (as is the case for English);
likewise, the basic word-order of a language is either Subject-
Verb-Object (English, Vietnamese), or something else (Japanese,
for example, is an SOV language). In fact, neither statement is
without problems: with respect to the first property, there are
languages that exploit tone in a very limited way (so-called ‘pitch
accent’ systems, such as Swedish and Japanese); with respect to
word-order there are languages with more mixed word-order
patterns, for which it is much harder to determine what ‘basic
word-order’ might mean. Furthermore, many of the theoretically
interesting questions one might ask about word-order concern
'micro-parametric' variation among varieties that are basically
rather similar: for example, differences between Chinese and
Vietnamese (both superficially SVO) in terms of
verb-incorporation in complex predicate constructions: see
Duffield (2011, in prep.), Duffield & Phan (2011).
But suppose for a moment that these classifications are clear-cut.

What do these typological descriptions tell us beyond the fact
that Vietnamese is like English in one respect (having SVO order),
but different in another (having tones)? In such cases, the answer
seems to be: very little. What we want to know instead is whether
there are systematic differences among various tone languages,
or languages with SVO word-order; whether, for example,
systems that exploit a six-way tonal distinction (for example,
Northern Vietnamese) are subject to different phonological
constraints than those which have only four-way tonal contrasts
(Southern Varieties); or whether all SVO languages behave
similarly with respect to some logically independent property,
such as adjective or adverb placement. In other words, most
absolute parameters only make for interesting typological work
when we can ‘look inside’ the parameter, or when the statement
is implicationally linked to some other set of grammatical
properties. This is part of what is meant by explanatory depth:
knowing that a grammar has some property p, named in the
parameter, allows the linguist—and, perhaps more importantly,
the language learner—to predict the existence of some other
property q. As Comrie (1981, 1989) points out, this implicational
prediction may only be probabilistic rather than logical—it might
be that having p simply increases the likelihood of property
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q—but, as long as these properties are in principle independent

of one another, it is still explanatory.
The notion of explanatory depth become clearer when relative

parameterization is considered. Consider again the third
statement above: Vietnamese is a null-subject language. Within
generative theory, a null-subject language is one in which
omission of the subject pronoun in a finite clause still yields a
grammatical sentence. As the examples below illustrate, Italian is
a typical example of a null-subject language, whereas English
does not generally allow subject omission in finite clauses:
(12) a. (io) ho veduto Gianni.
I have.1sg.pres seen G.
‘*(I) saw Gianni.’
b. *I said that had seen John.
In (12a), the Italian subject pronoun may be freely omitted,

whereas in the translation and in the English sentence in (12b),
omission of the subject is impossible in regular finite contexts.
Considering only this narrow fact, Vietnamese could be classified
as a null-subject language, patterning with Italian, rather than
English, since subjects can generally be omitted if the referent is
clear from the preceding discourse, especially in subordinate
clauses. Yet, as discussed below, subject omission in Vietnamese
is subject to different constraints from those operative in Italian,
or even Chinese; see Cao (1998), Rosén (1998).
In earlier generative work, however, the null-subject parameter

was understood as having somewhat greater explanatory depth.
Chomsky (1981), developing previous observations by Perlmutter
(1971), amongst others, proposed that the null-subject
parameter involved a clustering of formal properties comprising:
subject omission
free subject inversion in simple sentences
long wh-movement of subject
empty resumptive pronouns in embedded clauses
apparent violation of the ‘*that-t filter.’
lack of expletive (non-referential) pronouns.
So construed, the explanatory depth and predictive power of the

null-subject parameter was considerable. Unfortunately, this
15 of 20 3/13/13 12:23 PM
particular construal turned out to be empirically untenable:

subsequent research revealed languages—even varieties of Italian
—where the implicational relations among these properties did
not hold as predicted: see for discussion, Jaeggli & Safir (1982),
Huang (1984), (Gilligan 1987), (Rohrbacher 1993), amongst
others. Notice, however, that the apparent empirical failure of
this formulation of the parameter does necessarily invalidate its
explanatory potential. On the contrary, the hypothesis that
certain properties may be universally linked helps drive a
program of empirical research on particular grammars, so that
we can arrive at a better understanding of which grammatical
properties are inherently linked and which are only contingently
related in a particular language; see also Trinh (2010), Duffield
(2010).
Furthermore, even if every relationship between properties of a

proposed parameter turned out to be accidental, the proposal
would still have heuristic value, in that it would alert us to
possible formal connections which otherwise might be
overlooked. Hence, in this work, examination of possible
relationships among ‘null-subject’ properties in Vietnamese will
contribute to typological research in two ways: on the one hand,
it will help to determine more precisely the range of possible
null-subject grammars; on the other, it should yield greater
knowledge of formal implicational relations within Vietnamese
grammar itself. This is true whether or not the null-subject
parameter has any real grammatical status as a universal. The
same is true of the other parameters to be considered here.
Implications for Language Acquisition

The more we understand about the intricate similarities and
differences among different grammars, the better we are able to
determine the constraints on cross-linguistic variation; in turn,
the better equipped we are to understand one of the central
problems of Language & Mind: the question of how language is
acquired. There are two main theoretical problems in Language
Acquisition (both in First and Second language acquisition): the
logical problem, and the developmental problem; see Atkinson
1990, for discussion. The logical problem is concerned with how
language learners, acquiring a particular grammar, converge on
very similar knowledge of that target grammar, in spite of wildly
16 of 20 3/13/13 12:23 PM
differing experience, and highly indirect evidence. The

developmental problem is concerned with explaining the
developmental stages encountered on the path to a mature target
grammar, and with describing the interaction between developing
linguistic competence and development in other areas of
cognition. In first language acquisition, which is almost invariably
successful (barring pathology), researchers have tended to focus
on the logical problem; in second language acquisition (SLA),
where, at least superficially, successful convergence does not
seem to be guaranteed (though see White 1989, 1996, 2003 for
an opposing view), developmental questions—and the related
issues of Interlanguage grammars—are more often to the fore.
Any full explanationof acquisition should address both aspects of
the problem.
Although this work is not about acquisition per se, I will try to
incorporate acquisitional issues into the general discussion.
Whenever a parametric difference is uncovered in any area of the
grammar, I will consider what the triggering evidence might be
that would allow a language learner to acquire that difference, as
well as the problems of learnability which might arise, especially
for second language learners. I shall also discuss relevant work
examining L2 learners’ knowledge of Vietnamese parameter-
settings; for example, Phan (in prep.); (Duffield and Phan 2011).
In this way, the grammar may be of some use indirectly to
language learners, as well as to language teachers.
Conclusion
Summarizing this introductory section, the goal of this work to
offer a theoretically-informed, comparative, and relatively
concrete description of Vietnamese grammar, focussing on the
syntax and semantics of the language.
The description is THEORETICALLY INFORMED in the sense that

it investigates, for Vietnamese, the types of questions
about structure and interpretations that are central
concerns of generative theory. It is nevertheless intended
primarily as a description rather than an analysis (even
though every adequate description presupposes an implicit
analysis, and an accompanying theoretical framework.
The work is COMPARATIVE: it is assumed that some—perhaps
most—formal aspects of Vietnamese grammar are
17 of 20 3/13/13 12:23 PM
non-arbitrary, and derive instead from universal

properties. One of the tasks of the investigation is to tease
apart the universal from the language-particular in
Vietnamese, and this necessitates comparison with formal
properties in other languages.
Finally, it is intended that description should be relatively
CONCRETE: that is, it should be no more abstract than is
required to allow for cross-linguistic generalizations. To
the extent that this description is successful, it will shed
light on two further issues, namely: the typological
question of the place of Vietnamese in a formal taxonomy
of languages, as well as the acquisitional question of how
Vietnamese can be successfully acquired.[7]
Notes
[1] This is due in part to the fact that most native-speakers

—other than theoretical linguistics—are completely unaware of
the true rules of their grammar; those rules they are aware of e.g.
to never split infinitives, to not end sentences with prepositions
—those they are aware of—are often incorrect normative
proscriptions, rather than accurate characterizations of
grammatical constraints. See below; also Pinker (1994).
[2] See O'Grady (1997), for example, for a discussion of subject-

object extraction asymmetries along these lines.
[3] For one elaboration of this view, see Culicover (1999); also
Jackendoff & Culicover 2000).
[4] Radical Minimalists in fact deny that there is any

parametrization of universal principles whatsoever: the strongest
interpretation of the Minimalist thesis (SMT) is that all grammars
are formally identical (not merely very similar). See Boeckx
(2006); for an opposing view, see Roberts & Holmberg (2005),
Holmberg (2010). For further discussion of these issues, see
Duffield (in prep.a), Chapter 2.
[5] Of course, Vietnamese is hardly the most threatened of

languages: with an estimated 80 million native-speakers and a
relatively young population, its medium-term future is secure.
18 of 20 3/13/13 12:23 PM
Nevertheless, even here, a general tendency towards increasing

standardization means that dialect differences are being eroded,
with consequent impoverishment of intra-language diversity.
[6] The very mention of similarity, of course, begs the question

addressed here, since it implies some apriori classification;
however I hope that such notional classification is harmless, as
long as it is recognized as such.
[7] There is almost no language acquisition research available on

Vietnamese in English. Only a handful of (unpublished)
dissertations have been produced to date: these deal primarily
with Second Language Acquisition or bi-lingual learners of
English see, for example, Guerra (1989), Pham (1989). In
addition, some applied EFL/ESL research has appeared, which
discusses L1 transfer effects; these articles deal only tangentially
with the structure of adult Vietnamese, and usually focus on
phonological and morphological difficulties in the L2 (e.g., Riney
1988). With respect to first language acquisition, there simply no
good data available on how Vietnamese is acquired by either
monolingual or bilingual children, barring the briefest of
mentions; for example, in Truong’s (1993) mention of
Vietnamese-Dutch interlanguage Truong, V. B. (1993).
Vietnamese. Community Languages in the Netherlands. G. Extra
and L. Verhoeven. Amsterdam:, Swets & Zeitlinger:
301-318.
This lack of data might not be such a problem if Vietnamese

grammar were essentially identical to that of other better-studied
Asian languages, such as Cantonese or Mandarin. This is not the
case, however: as this grammar demonstrates, Vietnamese
grammar differs in significant formal respects from other
superficially similar languages: see also Bisang (1992), Duffield
(1999, 2007, in prep.), Rosén (1999), Simpson & Wu (2000)
amongst others. It is therefore essential for both theoretical and
descriptive reasons to gain a better understanding of how the
language is acquired.
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The strangeness of grammar: universal

‘A widespread assumption, growing out of the generative

Universalists by contrast, whilst recognizing the undeniable

languages, rather than of the languages themselves. This is an

These structural commonalities across unrelated grammars are

Recurring formal peculiarities such as these attract attention not

Crain (1991) articulates clearly the logic of formalist arguments

present work, it is worth briefly recapitulating his presentation

Crain points out that two types of linguistic context present a

(1) a. {form1, meaning1}, {*form2, meaning1}

b. {form1, meaning1}, {form1,*meaning 2}

An example of the first restriction in English is provided by the

(2) a. Who did you say had stolen the car?

b. *Who did you say that had stolen the car?

A similar ‘intervention effect’ can be observed in Vietnamese

(3) a. Tôi làm thang-be ngã.

I make boy fall

‘I made the boy fall (I tripped the boy.)’

b. Tôi làm cho thang-be ngã.

I make give boy fall

‘I made the boy fall (I caused the boy to fall).’

(4) a. Họ làm nhau khóc.

they make each other cry

‘They made each other cry.’

b. *Họ làm cho nhau khóc.

they make give e.o. cry

‘They made each other cry.’

An example of the second, interpretive, constraint schematized

b. When she thought about it, Sarah realised her

(6) a. Cô Thuy nói là cô ấy rất bận.

PRN DEM say that PRN DEM very busy

‘*Thuy says that she is very busy.’

b. *Cô ấy nói là cô Thuy rất bận.

PRN DEM say that PRN Thuy very busy

‘*She says that Thuy is very busy.’

(* = ungrammatical with intended coreference)

The fact that all languages appear to obey abstract, sometimes

To balance the discussion, which has tended towards the

assumed that null argument languages such as Vietnamese do

A second relativist objection is that formal rules that seem to be

information. [3] Thus, direct analogies to genetics may be

Finally, the relativist might object that, as a matter of practice, it

Abstractness in description and

studied languages. Therefore, in each section of the grammar, an

Chomsky (1965, and subsequent works) refers to the goals of

In the first place, this work is considerably less abstract than

An additional reason to adopt a more superficial, data-oriented

hand, there are those who view formal universals as properties

An alternative view of formal universals, which until the advent of

Even if one were to adopt a strong universalist approach, there

are interested in determining the universal properties of

A final reason to adopt a weak universalist stance and with it a

(7) Minimal Link Condition

F can raise to target K only if there is no legitimate

In earlier versions of Minimalism, this formal constraint served to

(8) a. That book, he put on the table.

b. Quyển sách này, anh ấy đễ trên bàn.

(9) a. *He that book put on the table.

b. *Anh ấy quyển sách này đễ trên bàn.

(10) a. *This office, the door is usually closed.

b. Cái phòng này thì cửa thường dóng.

CL room DEM TOP door usually close