A

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY

Winter 1988-89

Volume 16 Number 2

167

Joseph

Cropsey

On Pleasure

and

the Human Good:

Plato's Philebus

193

J. P. Geise & L. A. Lance

Deliberate Belief
Joseph Conrad
and

Digging
Origin

Holes:
of

and

the

Problem

Restraint

21 1

Heinrich Meier

The Discourse

on

the

and

the

Foundations of Inequality among Men

229
247

Frederick J. Crosson Drew A. Hyland

Mill's Dilemmas

Republic. Book II,

of

and

the Origins

Political

Philosophy
as

263

John Alvis

Philosophy

Noblest

Idolatry

in

Paradise Lost

285

Theodore A.

Sumberg
295
Christopher Bruell

Machiavelli's Castruccio Castracani Xenophon

and

his Socrates

Editor-in-Chief

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lilLCl X3 IT ClcIlIoii
winter

1988-89

JL

volume 16 number 2

Joseph

Cropsey

On Pleasure Philebus

and

the Human

Good: Plato's
167

J. P. Geise & L. A. Lange Deliberate Belief and

and the

Digging Holes:
Origin

Joseph Conrad
1 93

Problem

of

Restraint
and the

Heinrich Meier

The Discourse

on the

Foundations
21 1

of Inequality among Men

Frederick J. Crosson
Drew A. Hyland

Mill's Dilemmas

229
and

Republic, Book II,

the Origins

of

Political

Philosophy
John Alvis

247
as

Philosophy Sumberg

Noblest

Idolatry in

Paradise Lost 263 285 295

Theodore A.

Machiavelli's Castruccio Castracani Xenophon

and

Christopher Bmell

his Socrates

Copyright 1989

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

On Pleasure

and

the Human Good: Plato's Philebus

Joseph Cropsey
The

University

of Chicago

Plato's Philebus is said, under the encouragement of its subtitle, to be about pleasure; but how far it is from being simply about pleasure, or even primarily
about

pleasure, may be

seen

from the development

of

the argument toward and

sight

then

vastly beyond the

problem of species as

that problem is brought to

"pleasure"

by

the variety concealed within the apparent unity of

itself. The dis

course unfolds through

the themes of finitude and

infinity,
to

of mind and cause

in

the whole, and

closures about
or to virtues

eventually to the meaning

morality.

and status of

Good. Philebus's dis

regimes and politics

Good

emerge without thematic reference

and

The Good,

of course

good,

is brought to light in

so comprehensive a

way

comprehending the human as to induce or compel an

insight into
which man

the articulation of human existence with the nature of the whole

in

is fated to know, experience, and perform good and its privations. Man, Good, and the Whole are within the scope of Philebus. The dialogue begins without indication of its setting in time or place and
without

any
and

suggestion of a reporter who

had

participated

in it

or who

had

re

ceived the report of

it from

some other who

had. It belongs to the

world as a

whole;
phatic

it is the effectually avowed sense Platonic, as a dialogue

Socratic. There
are three

product of

"reported"

by

its author, in the most Socrates himself is in an

of whom

em
em

phatic sense

interlocutors,

Philebus is

by

far

the least active. The exchanges, with few exceptions, are between Socrates and

Protarchus,
is before the

a technical

young man associated with and influenced by Philebus. Philebus hedonist who says very little, having resigned from the discussion

work

itself begins, explaining himself

called

as afraid of

dite,

most

truly

Hedone,

whose preeminence

is

about to

offending Aphro be assaulted.

The dialogue is

named after

the participant who

has

next

to nothing to say and

who contributes to the argument

the

proposition

pleasure

is the

good

which

is edifyingly exploded by Socrates. As the discourse will make clear, though, the devastation of the claims of pleasure is not absolute, and in the resolution
of the wider problem of the

good,

means will

be found to harmonize conflicting

will reflect or re

claims, to

produce a

kind

of philia on

the plane of good that

peat a reconciliation of opposites on the plane of the whole, a reconciliation

in

dispensable to the
the peculiarity
of

constitution of

the universe.

Tentatively,

one might explain

whole as a

the title as an adumbration of Plato's view of the

at the

A lecture delivered
printed

Carl Friedrich
permission of

von

Siemens Foundation, Munich, March 24, 1987,

here

with

the generous

its Director, Dr. Heinrich Meier.

interpretation, Winter

1988-9, Vol. 16, No. 2

168
scene of

Interpretation
indispensable
their
concession

to cosmic forces that enter into good but that

and so

can make
sure.

contribution as or

long

far

as

they

are subordinated

to

Mea

Thus Measure,

Number,
Number

will enter our and

field

of view and will

and

from time
are

to time dominate

it,

as

the

Numberless, Finite
is taking

Infinite,
before be

drawn in their Casual

arrays

into the

search

for Good.
place an

remarks

(i6ab)

reveal

that the discussion

anonymous audience of ciates of

young Philebus. Their youthful

also

males who seem

to be pupils,

friends,
would

or asso

openness

to hedonism

under

standable; so

their

youthful

enthusiasm for worrying the similarities and

differences among things, to the distraction of everyone around them, gently ridiculed by Socrates but shown by the end to have a solemn significance. The
youthful audience

is

a paradigm of apparent contradiction: out of pleasure or eros

the vitality of
reason or

humanity
dialectic.

spring the twin impulses toward

opens

and

of

stating for Protarchus's benefit the own: Philebus the difference between Philebus's position and Socrates
the conversation

by

root

Socrates'

says

that pleasure

is the

good

for

all

living

things while

Socrates

maintains the supe

riority of noetic facility, roughly wisdom, for all those to whom it is available. Philebus thus proposes a good that strongly draws to itself every living thing,
the untaught and the unteachable alike, in a
mate

testimony
of

existence

and

perhaps,

as

later

speeches

to the unity of Socrates himself

Socrates'

all ani suggest of

(42c^.),

the unity

of all

corporeal

existence; while
and

conception

good points to

disjunction, disparity,
against
be"

fracture, humanity

set apart and man

kind itself divided

"who
are and will

itself to had in

degree that becomes

measureless when all

are

mind as

those who may or may not to one ex

tent or another share in Good.

Socrates
entire

now proposes

the general line of

inquiry

that will in

fact

shape the

investigation: to

consider whether enjoyment or

thinking is
or

most condu

cive to man's

two that

happiness, or whether it is not rather some is best; and in the latter case, whether pleasure
be
noted

combination of

the

thought
of

is

more

nearly
the

related to

the combination of the two of them. The form

this odd

question should

Finite

and

carefully because it will reappear when Socrates joins the Infinite in a combination without asking which of the ingredi

ents more
cmcial.

gument

nearly resembles the sum of them, though the answer is clear and At any rate, Protarchus accepts this formulation of the terms of the ar and Socrates proceeds to the criticism of pleasure, apotheosized as
the name preferred

Aphrodite
the name
sion of

by

Philebus

and the goddess

or as

Hedone,

by

which she

is

unicity

given

by

tmly known. Socrates argues that the impres the word is illusory, concealing differences
most
"pleasure"

that verge on contradiction among the concrete pleasures. He might

a similar point

have

made

frains from differences

by referring to the doing so. Protarchus

he evidently

two

names of

the goddess, but he

tactfully
position

re of

insists that

pleasure

is pleasure, regardless

which

considers

accidental.

Protarchus's

is

On Pleasure

and the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

one we might expect pleasure

169 Socrates the

pro

troublingly

similar to

the

to be taken

by

ponent of the eternal

Ideas:

is One, the

pleasures are

Many,

and

the

way to know the being and the they are One. For the first and
Socrates'

nature of the
not

Many is through the way in which the last time in Philebus, the strong drift of
simple
even

argument

is away from the

the serious authority of multiplicities

sovereignty if those include

of

One

and

towards

mutual contradictor

ies.

Socrates
kinds

now makes plain

that the importance

of

the differences among the

of pleasure

lies in the fact that

some are good and some are

bad,
and

thus tac

itly indicating a reason for overriding bility conventionally associated with

this
"Parmenidean"

the familiar issue of

being

intelligi

Socrates'

teaching

on

the Ideas. (Compare

with

concession to the arguments against

Socratic Idealism

the speech of the genos, meros.)

Eleatic

[Parmenidean] Stranger in
purposes of

More important for the is

Statesman 263 on eidos, man's happiness than par

not

ticipation in
self a

a single eidos or class which all

participation

in Good. But is

Good it

contradictory multiplicities will come to a harmonious beatitude through participation in it? It is worth knowing, at the beginning of
one's

One in

reading of Philebus, that Good itself is left at the end as an amalgam of discrete ingredients dependent on a principle of combination (measure) by
whose

alchemy Good is

constmcted.

There

will

be

no uncompounded

unity

that dominates the universal pyramid of

multiplicities

by

In

order

to elicit Protarchus 's agreement that

pleasure

standing at its apex. is heterogeneous with

too to the

regard

to its goodness and

badness, Socrates

offers to subject wisdom

question

regarding its

multiplicity.

Protarchus is deceived
Socrates'

and charmed

by

the

appearance of equal wisdom

concession regarding treatment, not noticing that is limited to its possibly consisting of unlike parts, even mutually con

tradictory
could continues

parts,

with no reference whatever

to the possibility that any

of mind passed
must

of

them

be bad. This

small

duplicity

on

behalf

by declaring by bringing

that their purpose now

over, Socrates be to determine whether

pleasure or wisdom or neither of proceeds plicit

these but rather some third is the good. He

wondrous

to the surface the

(thaumaston)
and and

assertion, im
are one.

in

what as

they have been

commonplace

saying, that

one of

is many
unity

many

He
one

dismisses
thing's

the

illustration
or

multiplicity in

being

both

heavy

and

light,

its

being

compounded of at a

the dismissal itself appears the

and

problematical

because

many parts; but later point the issue of

of

heavy

and

light

or the great and small will

loom in the form

the

more

less, One, namely, Good,

the dialogue's

the Infinite or

Numberless,

while

the

composition of a presumptive at

out of a recognizable

achievement.

multiplicity will be Still, for the present it suits

not as

the peak of
purpose

Socrates'

to

focus
pass

on the conception of

unity

it

arises

from things that

come

to be

and

away but

as

it

comes to view when applied

to such things as man, ox,

beauty,

and good.

than the inclusion of

More striking in this selection of examples of eternal things animal species is the obtmsive jumbling of things high

170
and

Interpretation
on

low,

the principle
when

referred

to in so many words the search

course

by

the Eleatic Stranger

without

(Statesman 266d)

he

speaks of

for

truth

heed to the

dignity
will

of the things considered.

Of

the possibility

must

be faced that
even

what will come

to light through an investigation of the unities or

neutral

the

Ideas
re

have

morally

cast, reflecting
concern.

neutrality

of the whole

itself

garding Socrates

a matter of great
now sets

human
what

forth

he takes to be the ruling

that such a

questions about unity.

First,
things

whether

it is to be forever

accepted

thing truly is. Next, how

these

which are

one and

the same,

stroyed, can be so
and also

firmly

the same one.

coming to be nor being de And then how this One is to be in one

neither whether

in the infinite multiplicity

or maintains

of the generated things

it is bro defend

ken up among them very

much

itself in

some sort

of

isolated distinctness:
when

the

question

thrust upon the

youthful

Socrates

he

must

the Ideas against old Parmenides.

But Socrates does

"what
is?"

not

refer

to Ideas here

(15),

rather

to one and

Many

not

but "how
striking.

many,"

in

anticipation

of the emphasis on measure that will soon

measure or

be

And the

emphasis on
or

limit in

will

itself be

a response to the encroachment of

the limitless

infinite
The
table

on the
order

One.
which

Socrates
places

presents

the serious questions about unity is

of

no

for the fact that it

the

issue

accepting the

being

of

the

One be
the One.

fore the
The

questions about the

difficulties inherent in the

prior to the character of

character of

existence of

Unity
to

may be
that

Unity, but

the question

whether we should accept

being

would

testify

its

being before knowing being deserves attention. It

anything

about what

in its

appears to receive that at

immediately (i5d) when Socrates remarks that we say that the same One and Many, generated by speech, circulate and have circulated, always, of
tention

old, and now in every

single

thing

that is uttered, and that

it

neither ages nor

dies in us, neither commencing nor ceasing but apparently inhering in speech itself. In light of this remark, the reason that we may or must regard the ques tion of our accepting the being of One before considering or knowing anything
concrete about
we

have

no choice

it is easily understood: but to do so. As One

and

we accept

it

because,
language

as

speaking beings,
ever-present

one might

say, without the

and ever-active

Many,
reason

there could

be

no

and thus no speech.

It is to be
mount ment

noted

that this

for human

acceptance of the

One is

not

tanta

to a

proof of

the One's cosmic or universal existence,

for it is

an argu

from human

convenience rather

than

from

the nature of things.

More

ex

actly, if

a requirement

for the human

good could

be

understood without

any

doubt

as

having
unity

an existence

self, then we could

absolute

dictated absolutely by the nature of the whole it know positively that the Whole and Man are in a state of
articulation, beyond any
case would
world rather

and

perfect us.

mere

"neutrality"

of the
ex

Whole in

regard

to

The

be significantly different if the One

than or even

isted in

and

for the human

the world of the Whole.

Socrates'

differently

than it

does in

answer to the

first

serious question about

On Pleasure
One falls
whole.

and

the Human Good: Plato's Philebus

171

short of

indicating

the perfection of the relation between man and the

Saying
moves

nothing that bears visibly

a path of

on the

last two

serious

questions, Socrates
major element of and

on, presumably

on a continuous

path, to introduce a the greatest efficacy

the

dialogue,
origin,

inquiry

that

is

of

divine

or

hu

man

and

is indispensable to

all

the arts. It is that all the

within

spoken-about

things arise out of one and many and have

them

innately
to

the finite and

posit one we

infinite;
in

and

that, things

being

so

ordered, it is up to
and

us always

idea

each case and to search

for it
to

to find

it, for it is
are

there.
or

Then if

grasp
what

this,

we must go on after one

two, if there

two,

to three or to

ever number until we can understand the original

that it is one
satisfied with
number panies

and

many
and

and

infinite but
before
ends

also

unity in its oneness, not only how many. We must not be

must arrive at a particular

"many"

simply between one

but, he insists,

we

infinity

we settle

for the

the unity in things. Socrates

this seminal discourse

infinity by
and

that accom

criticizing

the wise men of

his time

who pass

heedlessly
fall into
will not

between unity become

infinity, disre
Socrates, for
himself
with

garding number, and in import of this definition

the

so of

doing

eristic and miss

dialectic. The full

dialectic

clear until

benefit

the use of

understandably examples. The examples

?"
. . .

of the

confused

Protarchus,

explains

will show

that dialectic is the art of answer

ing
also

"What is

with

"how

many?"

The definitive

example as
we

is sound, say

which

is

of course some one thing. of

It is

infinite,
on
of

or

would

a continuum
a

infinitesimals. One
and

could
or a

break in

the

infinity by designating
and

duality,

namely, high

low;

trinity
music.

high,

medium,

low, but

with

these alone there would be no art of

Necessary to be known are the intervals and harmonies, and the move all of these determined in finite quantities by ments of the body that follow measure and number, including the rhythms of motion of the body, namely, dance. While our knowledge of anything is on the level of a sense of its infinity
or

infinite gradation, it

we

do

not understand

it. Socrates does

not make explicit

the equally consequent conclusion from his illustration that we do not under
stand when we

know it

as a

One.
"sound,"

Starting with unity, e.g., the unity of infinity of sounds but must find the finite

one number of of

may

not proceed

to the to un

them that

is the

key

derstanding. Likewise, starting with the infinity number of sounds before pronouncing a unity.

sound,

one must

find the for do

go

Socrates'

explicit reason

ing

through the argument in the reverse direction

closer

is

that

doing

so will

draw the
with

discussion
pleasure,
reverse

to the large

purpose of

the conversation, which has to

so

wisdom and good. of

How it does
the

is

a matter of great concern.

The

illustration is that

infinity

of sound and

the transition thence to its

unity through the finite

number of origin.

the letters of the alphabet. This transition too

was

is

of

divine

or

human

As Prometheus

the only one named in the

musical

illustration,

so the Egyption Theuth

is

the only one mentioned

by

name

172
as the

Interpretation
inventor
of

letters

and

the science of letters. He

observed

the

infinity

of a

sound, the multiplicity

and of the vowel sounds and the consonant sounds, also

in

way not a finite There We

of

made

clear, distinguished

the silent letters. He

the science of

reduced all

these to

number of

letters

and

generated

letters,

or grammar.
and

would

have been

no science or

intelligibility

in the One

the

Many

without the

intermediation

of

Number.
question whether what an

cannot

take up the difficult

Egyptian inventor

writing
of

generated was a tme alphabet or was rather a system of

spoken words and

hieroglyphs

that captured the sounds of

then became

meaningless sym

bols

those sounds, as letters are. But

we cannot avoid

the implications of the

fact that the Egyptian alphabet,

speech,
through
as

whatever would

it may be, is
extracted are

extracted

from Egyptian
and

the

Greek

alphabet

be

from Greek,

so

on

from the multiplicity be

Russian, Hebrew and of languages,

As

Sanskrit. Alphabets
the

human inventions drawn

"speech"

conventional manifestations and exem

plars of natural speech.

one might

say, the

natural

One

of

would

unintelligible and of no effect

if it

were not reduced actual

number, some finitude or measure, of

by human agency to a languages; and there would be no

understanding the sounds of each language as such, and of course no writing it down, if its sounds were not identified and reduced to a number. I wish to
stress the arbitrariness of

that reduction, a

point

that comes to mind as one no

tices the regional

be

and

Infinity
uct

dialects into which the pronunciation of any language might language every probably is divided. The number between One and that is cmcial to understanding is, in the definitive illustrations, a prod
human

of

determination
we

affected

with

arbitrariness

as

well

as

with

de finiteness. As
primal

learned earlier,
or need

out of the

capacity for

speech comes the

drive toward

speech, not as

rational

for the One; and as we see now, out of that same discourse but as sound produced through the mouth in for the Number that
the One to the concrete intelligible. It would be

the mode of utterance, comes the drive toward or need

fructifies the One

as

it

reduces

going too far too fast to say that Number replaces Unity as the ground of intel ligibility, but it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Number presses hard
against

Unity

for the distinction.

repeats

At this point, Philebus

the

the question he had raised

bearing

of

the present discussion on the matter

each of

previously as to before them. Socrates re

plies that the

issue is just how

is

one and

many, and how

each

is

not

them, presumably pleasure and wisdom, immediately infinite but is of some num

to

ber. Protarchus reasonably takes this to mean that Socrates might wish to go on determine the number of kinds of pleasure and wisdom; but in his speech to Socrates, Protarchus opens the possibility of the in some other

pursuing

unnamed way, should gives the

Socrates

choose to

do

so.

discussion

inquiry Surprisingly, Socrates abmptly

direction. He vaguely
recalls

what appears to

be

a new

hearing that neither pleasure nor wisdom is the good, but that some third thing is. If that is so, then pleasure cannot triumph, and there is no need to distin-

On Pleasure
guish

and

the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

173
promises

its kinds (eide),

or as we would now

say, its number. Socrates

us

that what

follows

will

help
for
a

to explain this, to

astonishing casting

aside of the

laborious
ery
nal of

preparation

taxonomy

of pleasures and wisdoms or

the discov

the number of each. As

Unity
is

was challenged

by Number,
is
now

that

is,

cardi chal

number

(two, three, four),

behind the

so cardinal number

about

to be

lenged

by

ordinal number: which

second and which

is third

as pleasure and

wisdom are ranked

other

thing

that is the good,

which

is identified

provisionally as the combination of pleasure and wisdom. Socrates begins the new argument by laying down that
fect in the
sense

the good is the per

that anyone possessing it would need nothing more in order to be happy. From this it is easily made to follow that neither pleasure without mind nor wisdom without pleasure is the good. If either were sufficient, it

every plant and animal as its way of life, so far as possible, throughout its life (22b). From this remarkable pronouncement we
would chosen

be fit to be

by

seem

invited to

consider that

there is some absolutely

of

"good"

strict sense of

that removes it from the realm

mand that

the peculiarly human and that satisfies a de

single object

it apply, if in

not to

every
is

kind

of

thing
it

that grows. On these terms,

a good that

either mankind will

in the universe, then to every have to settle for

gnats and mosses of the

and participate
world or will

modest enough

for the

have to find

and

dwell

with a good

that it prescribes to itself or to define a

is

prescribed

to it

by
is

some power

that can or

wishes

human

good.

The

explicit aim of the next part of the argument closer to the combination of
wisdom would

is to determine
of

whether

pleasure or wisdom

the two

ing

to

Socrates'

illustration,
Mind
closest

be if

mind

them, as, accord proved to be the cause

of the combination.

would not

then

be itself the

good

but,

as cause of the

good, it
present

would

be its

kin,

as,

mutatis

mutandis,

would pleasure.

For his
new

purpose, Socrates declares that he

a principle

needs a new

instmment. That

instmment is

for

investigating

all things

by

quadripartition,

accord a com

ing

to the

doctrine that everything in the Whole is

either

infinite, finite,
One
and

bination
places a

of

both,

or the cause of such a combination.

which

This

quadripartition re

tripartition,
could showed

in turn
as

replaced

the bipartition
of

Many,
suffi

which

in turn

be

regarded

the first analysis

which

the Whole Infinite.

nor

Socrates
cient

that

neither

Many,

he

calls

infinite,

One is

without

the intermediation of
on

Number,

thus

introducing

the tripartition

that guides all investigation

the way to the good. In the present quadriparti

tion, the argument evolves away from Unity in two distinct ways. First, One is no longer an element of the taxonomy; and second, the number of elements in
the the

taxonomy is
growth

now

larger than

ever.

It

might
will

be

appropriate
until

to

mention

that

in the

number of elements

continue

the good itself is

reached.

Lest it be thought that the

primal

disjunction
the infinite

of

One

and

Many

has been

simply

superseded,

Socrates

proposes of

to move on

by

seeking the

One

and

Many, i.e.,

the

nature or

definition,

and

the finite.

First, in

what

174 way
or

Interpretation
in
what sense

is the infinite
Socrates

many? means

The

defining

examples are

the hotter

and the

colder,

by
are

which

to illustrate
number or

an endless more and

less,
The

the opposite and contradictory of a definite

more and

quantity
while

or measure.

less

always

advancing

and

not

at

rest,

stays still.

Thus the

"many"

or essential

plurality

of the unnumbered
rather

definite quantity is not its

being
that

composed of an

unimaginably large quantity but

its

being

charac

terized always, unceasingly,

by

more

and

less. Otherwise stated, something

as more or

belonged to the infinite could,

the way in which hotter and

as

such, be known exclusively

less, in
Hot
or

colder

and vanish

Cold. One may wonder whether into their unlimited comparative

may suggest Hot and Cold

correlates.

but

can give no clue

to

proper

do

not collapse

If

at

this point a witness

to the dialogue were to be dissatisfied because the principle of explanation

seems to

apply only to
reminded

adjectives and not to substantives,

"good"

he

might

be

reassured

by being
(25a)
or

that

itself is both

an adjective and a substantive.

Socrates

summarizes the

discussion

of the

Unity

of

the Infinite

by

that whatever appears to us to become more or

placed

less,

as more or

saying less hot

to

cold, should be

in the

class of

the infinite as in a
must

Unity, according
impress

the earlier argument in which we said that we that are scattered and split up, as far as
some one nature.

bring

together all things

on them

is

possible

for

us to

In the

earlier speech referred

to at i6d, Socrates
and to

is preparing
that the

the

mediation of of

One

and

Infinite

by Number,

do

so announces

division
ways

everything between finite and infinite makes it necessary for us al to posit and search for the one idea of things that lies within. This rela
mild

tively

formulation for

man's

contribution
use of

to the positing of the

One is

strengthened

by

the transition

from the

the verb tithemi, posit, at i6d to

sign of

episemaino, to set the mark, seal, stamp, or

the One on the confused

as

Infinite (25a). The Socrates

same

part of what emerges

strong locution is used also in the Statesman 258c, gradually as Plato's critique of the One.
arrived at

claims to

have
or

the

from

which all

limit

definiteness is

Many and the One intrinsically absent.

definiteness is
a

of

the

infinite,

that

It may be thought

paradoxical

that what is in itself without

subject to

definition,

as

the Infinite has just been shown to be

by having

unity
upon

assigned to

it in the

form

of some

one nature
can

that we strive to

impress

it. Apparently, the

thought or

Infinite in

being

be transformed into the Finite in far

as a

reason or

speech, in that

or so

One

can

be imposed

upon

it. It is

one of those

things spoken about to which we are compelled as

dichotomy
and what

of

One

and

Many. If there is

some

speaking beings to apply the tension between what is in being

is in thought, that tension

only by the best What

thought or
of our

from the far

side of as

power, as

be managed, resolved, or overcome thought, human thought brought to bear to possible, kata dvnamin.
can

we now seem to

know is that the

Many

of

the

Infinite is the
as well as

more and

less in the infinitesimal

that can exist

and

innumerable

manifold

only

as more and

less;

while the

thereof, the things One of the Infinite is the thought

On Pleasure
or

and the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

words which report

175

the speech that utters the thought in

the membership in

the class of the more and

less.
to speak about the Finite. The things opposite to
more

Socrates finds it easy now the Infinite not subject to

namely,

equality
are

and the equal, the

less, but rather to their opposites, double, and all relation of a number to a
and

number or a measure to a measure.

which

By

these

illustrations
to us that

and

the

locutions in
means

they

expressed, Plato

makes clear

by

the Finite he

what exists as a

finite

or rational

number,

a ratio

between two

commensurable

quantities that are pressed as a

numbers, between
number.

which

a relation exists

that can

be

ex

definite

By

means that existence of which symbol of the relation

ence and the

its opposite, the infinite, Plato then evidently the paradigm would be such a quantity as pi, the
such

between two
of a

incommensurables two,

as

the circumfer
the symbol of
of the unit

diameter its

circle,

or

the square root of

Vl,

the relation between two such

square and

incommensurables

as the

diagonal

any

of

sides. considers which

As
which

will

appear, Socrates

Finite is many, kinds of things that many

the
explanation
of

by taking
latter he
in

up the

belong Unity

himself now to have discussed the way in is to say that he has shown by example the among the Finite. Instead of completing the
of the

Finite, he
is

passes on

to ask what sort

idea the third

which

class

has,

the one that

a mixture of collected

the Infinite and the

although

Finite,
what

now says

has

not

been

into its Unity,

is to follow

might produce which

that effect. The mixed or third class of things

of number

contains those

the

definiteness

has been

added to and evi

dently
sense

predominates
more and
Socrates'

over the

indefinitely

large
and

multiplication of possibilities

between
of

less courageous, more examples from health,

"infinite"

less purple, is

and so
when

on, in the
"number"

which

restored presents

intervenes to banish the

and

or

disorder that
added

itself

as

illness;
and

from music,
and

wherein

the Finite

is

to high and low (i.e.

and

higher

lower), fast
cold and posites would cribes as a

slow, for the

climate.

perfection of

music;

from the

moderation of

hot in the

To

use the addition of

Number to the Limitless

moderation

Op
as

trope for expressing the superiority of

waste a great effort on a

to extremes

be to

very
and

modest outcome.

But Socrates

by

name

health, beauty,

strength,

this limitation of the

unlimited

by

number

many great beauties of the soul to a limitation that could come to

be only if
sure and

two

the

mutually contradictory things, the Finite and Infinite, or mea incommensurable, could be combined under the influence of the moderating
power of

harmonizing
its
surely
ored.
Finite"

or

cause,

which would

impose

measure on
as

opposite and thus

as

apparently transform the third class

into the Finite just

the mixture of the colored and the colorless would

perceive
now

inevitably

be

col

We

might emerge

why Socrates hinted that the missing "Unity of the in the definition of the third class of things, the combina

tions of Finite and Infinite.

Apparently, it is
exist as

of

the nature of the

idea

of

the

Finite

or of

Number itself to

the dominant counterpoise to an opposite

176
principle

Interpretation
in the

Whole,

Whole that is

constituted

by

the Infinite incommen that

surable-irrational as well as

by

the principle of

measure and control

brings
to

things to their

proper

sizes, amounts,

and conditions.

Inevitably, if

we are

understand our world, we will wonder about the power that brings together the

contradictory reconcilables to form a combination dominated by, if not indeed converted into the more potent but still limited ingredient, yet under such con
ditions that the At this
union must always appear precarious. point

(26b), Socrates

gives the

discussion

historical

or political

bearing by
universal

remarking that a goddess intervened at some time to put an end to

and wickedness and unlimited nomos and

insolence
order,

pleasure-seeking

by

impos
is

ing
so

law

and

taxis,

which

belong

to Finite. The universe

ubiquitous

strangely

constmcted

that its

powerful

impulse,

in

all

animals,

namely, the
so that the

innately

unlimited

thmst toward pleasure, requires to

be

restrained

fact

possible

heavy

almost universally believed to accompany the infinite is in only when the seductive infinite is subdued to the finite, over resistance. Law is the finite for us; it is also the alternative or even the

happiness

antithesis to nature
political

according to the distinction rendered venerable in philosophy between physis and nomos. The very order of our

classical world

is

deep in mystery, but mystery that would be greatly attenuated if the cause of the mixture of Infinite and Finite were manifest to us. Socrates will turn to the
Cause next, but only
the third or
perhaps all
class.

after

speaking

of

the

Many, i.e.

the concrete members of

everything bom of the limitation of the unlimited things. He does not stop to make explicit the One of the mixed
mixed class:

There is little

need
of

to do so for once he has

characterized

the concrete

many, the definition

the One would simply repeat that characterization: the

One is Idea
part

what

is

seen

in the in

Many
which

and made

into

speech while the

Many

are

the

instances

of that same observation and speech

in

concrete manifestation.
"participate"

The

as a separate

being

the concrete existences

plays no

in the

quadripartition

Infinite-Finite-Mixture-Cause. The One

as alternative

to

Many, in the formula

of

One-Number-Infinite,
and

is

replaced

Cause

Mixture, by

Infinite-Finite (or
continues.

the cause of the duality Number)-Mixture-Cause, as Plato's

a

by Mixture and the duality, in the formula

critique
of

the

One

Cause is

what produces

the members of the class of mixture, and the best

life is
mine

a mixture of pleasure and wisdom.

The

interlocutors'

task is

not

to deter

the best

life,
in

which proved

to be easy, but to decide which of its two in

gredients stood self.

second

place, that

is, in

second place
and

The

mixture

is

a composite of

infinite

behind the mixture it finite. Pleasure belongs wholly

or

in the

class

of the

infinite. Socrates in the

moves class of

to make the argument turn on

whether mind and wisdom are proceeds

the finite

the

infinite,

and

he

by

gaining

assent to the proposition that the whole

itself is

mled and

ordered not

thought

of

by unreason or chance but by wisdom. Protarchus, appalled at the denying this, agrees to it so hastily on the evidence of the heavenly

On Pleasure
bodies
that

and

the Human Good: Plato's Philebus

177
acceptable

Socrates

cautions

him

against

adopting thoughtlessly the

This noted, Socrates begins the investigation of Cause by himself referring to the nature of the bodies of all living things, that is, the na ture of fire, water, air, and earth. His point is that fire as it is in us is the paltry
received opinions.

counterpart of the great

of which

fire

of the

Whole

by

which our and

fire is nourished,
with

out

it is

generated and
other

by

which

it is mled; Whole

similarly

water, air,

and earth.

We are, in

words, naturally, spontaneously, automatically in

on the plane of

perfect and absolute concord with the

body. As

somatic

beings,
vant
with

we are one with

the Whole

and are mled

by it

unqualifiedly.

Now it is

Socrates'

task to establish our relation to the Whole on the plane that is rele

to soul or
no

Cause. His

proof of

the presence of soul in

our

body

is

achieved

difficulty by
say that
our position:

the simple means of asking Protarchus

whether

they
to

should not a

body
under

has
of

a soul.

That admitted, Socrates

moves next

us must so

surprising be understood
soul, he
and

instead

arguing that, as the quadripartition of body in the identical quadripartition of body in the Whole,

the presence of soul in our

reverts

body

must

be

understood

by

reference

to a uni
their

versal

instead to the
which

quadripartition of

Finite, Infinite,

Mixture,
One
at

Cause,

the fourth

is in

all

things and

which provides us replaced

with soul and with

those things that are good for the body. As Cause

soul

the earlier stage, it now replaces

in the forward

movement of

the

argument. and

His

argument

for Cause

goes

beyond

soul to what provides

both

soul

the good of the

could

body,

to what he calls the

totality

of wisdom.
exist

How, he

asks,
the

there be missing from the other components that that single one
which

throughout

heavens,

he

calls the most

beautiful

and glorious na

ture? Would it not be better if

and enough seasons and

we said

that

in the Whole there is

But

much

infinite
and

finitude,
is
most

and a not contemptible cause which orders

the times

could not come

into

justly called wisdom and being without soul. And in

and a royal mind were

mind.

wisdom

and mind
you would

the nature of Zeus

say that

a royal

soul

brought into

being

through the

power of

Cause,

and other noble

things in the others according to how each

likes best to be
the

spoken of.

Thus

we

know that

mind always mles

the

Whole,

as

ancients said. prior

and

The totality of wisdom that mles so widely is not soul but is it is not the wisdom of the god but is responsible for the soul
prior also

to soul,

and mind of a

god, is

to

god.

But Cause,

or

Wisdom

be

without

soul,

although soul

does

not produce

must therefore and

be

a condition of

the existence

Mind, could not come to Cause, rather the reverse. Soul of Cause if Cause, qua wisdom
and

mind,
and

were

to come into being.

word,

but that
the

product

according to the is here presented

Cause, in any ordinary signification of the it by Socrates, is prior to its product; meaning
given

as

productive

Cause

qua wisdom and mind

necessary to its own productive cause, if is such a thing as comes into be

must mind

ing. Cause
have
and

qua productive

depend

on mind.

is primordial; but if productive of a cosmos it Absolute Cause should be both different from

178
as

Interpretation
its producer,
with and

being
is

it

should

be

guided

by

mind,

perhaps while

being

co

extensive

mind, to the end that its

product

be

a cosmos,

and order.

If

there

no mind without

soul, and the cosmos is a

product of

intelligent

Cause,

then soul must

be

coeval with

Cause. Then it

would

be misleading to

represent

Cause

as

unconditionally
will

primordial. subside

Our perplexity

not

if

we

do

not

clarify to

ourselves

what we

mean or should mean

by

Cause. We

might mean a mere

capacity for producing an effect If we meant this, and in doing

efficient

or a product or a so meant

efficiency or power or change in the state of things.

to adhere strictly to the notion of an

cause, which is an entity distinct from any other to which the

form

and

the end of its products are

either mere

intellectually

present, then

we should

have to

admit

the separate existence of such an intelligent companion or the

chance,

were our axiom we were

the orderliness of the cosmic product of

activity of Cause.

But if
ever

by Cause

to mean not mere efficiency

not

is

primordial

to an orderly cosmos,

admitting the need

but the totality of what for a collabora

separate adjunct

tion between efficiency and any other

indispensable because

entity,

then we would have adhered to the strictest

and

absolute sense of

Cause,
from

in

so

doing

would

have

made

unnecessary, indeed repugnant, the hypothe

and

sis of soul which

bears intelligence

is

opposite to

body. If

an escape

the

difficulty

were sought

by

ensouling the cosmos

itself, making it

an animal

possessed of superfluous

self-directing intelligence, then Cause would be rendered immediately by what would amount to a denial that the cosmos was

its

own

in

need of a power that not

both transcends here

choose

and precedes

it for its coming into be

ing. Socrates does

as was said

to take that direction

argue

but,

on the

contrary,

above, he unexpectedly fails to

with our somatic of

the

existence of soul

in the

All

by

analogy
as

Cause
moved

the

amalgamation

integration in the Whole, moving instead to the Infinite and the Finite. As he previously

cautiously toward presenting the One as if replaceable acterization of the Many, so he now appears to de-emphasize
the

by
a

the

mere char

discrete

soul of

All,
but

a separate not of the

intelligence

external

to and

decisive for the in its

good of the cos

mos

body

of the cosmos,

installing

place that which makes

possible or accomplishes

the harmonious
of the

conjunction of universe.

irrational

and rational

that are
ground

the

inmost irreducibles

Whatever it is

that is the

of,

reason

for,

producer of

self whether

in the capacity
"whatever"

the

reconcilable opposites

solely by it in the capacity of an essence shared by that drives them into mixture because are what they
of agent or

that reconciliation of opposites.

they

are,

that
not

is

primordial

self-subsistent

Cause. If, however, working in the

and mind

Cause is for

to be understood, cannot

be

understood except as
essence of

presence of mind as

distinct from the intelligible both

objects,

all

purposes means

soul, then Cause can never be conceived as uncondi

as

tional.

In presenting Cause
not so much

unconditional
as

and

dependent
us to

upon

soul,

Socrates is

contradicting himself

compelling

look

at a question

that stands before all serious theology.

directly

On Pleasure

and

the Human Good: Plato's Philebus

179

Everything
that mind

said

is intended to
or

conduce to the conclusion that mind rules and

class of wisdom

belongs

belongs
called

quadripartition that

is life

more or less or virtually to that one Cause. Hence it follows that mind or of the

the

lies

closer than pleasure to the place ahead of the

highest

four classes,
which

and

thus stands

in

second

of pleasure

the

infinite,
good

is

what was

to be shown.

Socrates has determined

the order

of goodness

between

pleasure and mind not

by

establishing first
is its
power of

what

is

meant

by

number as the criterion of mind on

superiority

and

erecting Finite or definite arguing as if the decisive quality of

but

by

limiting

the unlimited or
represented

the unnumbered

and

irrational,

imposing number by pi. It is not at

and thus reason all clear

how
can

pi

can ever

be mastered, for it belongs in the is demonstrated

nature of

things; but that it

be

somehow subdued

by

the simultaneous existence, in

a condi

tion of evident reconciliation and mutual the

dependence,

of the circumference and

Perhaps the numbering power of mind is demonstrated in the fact that the irrational is made by mind to appear as if it were a
of a circle.
"number" "pi"

diameter

number, namely
nated than

through an act of mind that cannot the

be better denomi
some

by

use of of a

figure

used earlier

plurality the idea

For

rationalizing

unity.

by Socrates: stamping upon At any rate, number or Finite is

for Good.
to

at the

present stage of the argument the surrogate reasons not

stated, Socrates

moves next and

investigate the coming into

said

being
thos)

of pleasure and mind each of them comes

in what,

through what passion or affect (pa

to be. The satisfactory discussion of pleasure is

to require the inclusion of pain, and the

esis of pain.

inquiry

will

begin in fact
assertion

with

the gen

Socrates

opens the
origin

investigation according to

with

the

that both plea

class

sure and pain

of

have their

nature

in the third class, the

the mixture of Infinite and Finite. Since he argued earlier that pleasure be
class of

longed to the
that

the

Infinite, his
is

assertion

here has the

clear

implication
through
point

its

being

in

one class

compatible or consistent with

its

becoming
immediate

another.

Whatever that

might portend of

in general,
and of

Socrates'

is
to

that the third class

is the locus

harmony

health,

which are subject

disruption

and restoration

ing

place, or a

according to whether dissolution or a repletion is tak a movement against the natural displacement or restoration

condition or a movement towards

it. Since

a movement of return clear

is

unintelligi

ble in the

absence of a movement of

displacement, it is
pain

that the discussion

of pleasure

is impossible in

without

considering

if,

as will soon

appear,

plea

sure originates comes to

state

bodily

motions of a natural

direction.

Every
so

ensouled

being
in

be according to nature out of the infinite and finite, is also its harmonious or measured state in the sense that In light
of what

that its natural

each

is

present

some right amount.

number

has

gone

before,

that must mean that some

has been

applied

to something capable of

being

present as an

more

or on

less. The illustrations

Plato's
ger
part

of this

highly

abstract

doctrine indicate

intention

to

explain pleasure and pain as counterparts of somatic states:

hun

is

dissolution

and a

pain, eating a repletion and a pleasure; excessive cold

180

Interpretation
on a painful congelation of

brings

the moistures, the

return of the parts

to their

natural places and separation sure and pain what as

is

pleasure.

Plato has

provided an account of plea

how they come about or come to be is its coming into being, as before he explained the One
of continues and

in terms

"what it
as the

is"

as and of

Many

he

to speak of the
rather

Infinite

Finite

than of

living body and

and

other things

as

compounded

soul.

But there

are pleasures and pains of other sorts and origins.

There

are

the

pleasures and pains that arise within the soul

itself,

those that come to

be

when

the soul looks

forward to

pleasures and pains

that lie ahead. In the

briefest

of

remarks, Socrates lets it be understood that the

pleasures and pains of

the soul

itself fore

are mere shadows of anticipation

derivative from those

aesthetic accom

paniments of small

bodily
that

motions

leaving

the subject of
"pure,"

already described as pleasure and pain. Be their genesis, Socrates characterizes both kinds of
unmixed with

pleasure as

is,

pain,

by

which

he

cannot yet mean

of

arising independently hedonic movement that follows the

Still
asks

of pain since pleasure

has been defined in terms

the

perturbation of pain. as such

inquiring
nor

whether pleasure

Protarchus to

consider whether a

is simply choiceworthy, Socrates living being in whom neither the dis free from
plea
con

rupting

the restoring motions were occurring would not be

sure and pain at the moment.

On this basis Socrates from

affirms

that there is a
of

dition devoid
that there
ner.

of pleasure and pain prevent one

alike, and takes the next step

is nothing to

living

life

of the mind evidence

asserting in that man

For this astonishing

assertion

nothing resembling

a reminder of

the point made much earlier that anyone

living

such a

is offered, only life would

be entirely without feelings of pleasure or pain. In the earlier passage (2ide), Socrates made the joylessness of such an apathetic life a reason for rejecting it
in favor
against
of

the

mixed

life
is

of pleasure

and

mind.

its

desirability

now adduced

in

support of

The reasoning that argued its possibility a non sein terms

nature, that could cease

quitur made conspicuous

by

the recent

definition

of pleasure and pain with

bodily motions, harmonious and inharmonious only in death. In fact, the impossibility of such a
of

cessation of the

flux in

liv

ing body
the

will

be

granted

freely by

Socrates

at a much

later

point

in the dia

logue (43a). At any rate, that gods probably feel neither joy nor its opposite is weakest of arguments for the possibility of a human life without either. Socrates reverts now to the pleasures of the soul itself, connects their origin
with

memory

and

declares it necessary to clarify

to

perception

(aisthesis) before

grappling ways: in one,

while

with

memory.
what

the

in the other, the

Socrates, the body is affected in two According body suffers never reaches the soul for its awareness, vibrations (seismon) of the body reach the soul's con
which

sciousness to produce

sensation,

Socrates defines
The

as the shared experi

ence and shared motion of

body

and soul united.

soul

does
of

"forget"

not

those things of

which

it

was never

aware, it is simply oblivious

them,

while

On Pleasure

and the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

-181

or

it is only the perceptions that it has once entertained that it can either remember forget. Memory is the preservation of perception, which involves the body's

motions.

Memory
which

seems

to constitute a pool or
own

fund

of such
when

stored

tions, from

the soul can on its

"recalls"

initiative draw
than

it

wishes

percep to do

so, and when it does so, it

"remembers."

rather

Socrates

stresses

the importance of the distinction between remembering and recalling for the

bearing
soul's
what

it has

on

the pleasure of the soul apart from the

guides the

body,

and also the

desiring. Socrates
and

discussion

next

to the subject of

desire,

it is

how it

originates.

by hunger and thirst, emptiness calling for replenish yearning for opposite states, for example to be filled while being actually empty. Since it is the body that is empty, the locus of de sire must be the soul, for the body cannot and the soul therefore must envision
exemplified
means a
ment.

Desire is

Desire

the

state opposite

to its actual one. This is possible for the soul because it has

the power to recall the perceptions or sensations of past states,

example

in the

present

the sensation of the body's

cognizant of a state other must

being full. It belongs only to the soul to be than its actual state, but that other state is one that
time. There is no question
all

have been

experienced as actual at some other

of a all as

free

or speculative

intelligence
not of

at work.

From

this Socrates infers that

desire is hunger

of the

soul,

the
of

and

thirst are typical

body, although, as he fails to mention, so far desire, to that extent the body commands the
as

soul's ways

desiring. Socrates remarks,

striving tme, would mean not only that Socrates had been converted to the doctrine of flux in a significant degree but also that the wise desire to be foolish. It would
be better to
understand

towards the opposite of

if casually, that every living thing is al its actual state (35a), a statement that, if

this remark,

which

helps to

present

the soul as always

make of the future a copy of the pleasant past recollected, as re particularly to states of the soul and body in their intense symbiosis. Socrates now proclaims that the discourse has shown that the appetite, the de

seeking to

ferring

sire, the mle in every

power of recalling. soul's

living thing
are

belongs to the

soul

by

virtue of

its

having

the

For the

second

time, Protarchus does

might

not point out

that the
and

needs of

recalling desiring the body. Had he done so, Socrates

and

responsive

and ministerial to the states

have been induced to

make

explicit that

soul,

whose

hegemony is

now

being

argued, differs in

a significant

respect

him

and

from Cause, the mling element in the quadripartition that preoccupied that seems to have dropped out of sight. Soul is not nous, or mind,
or

intellect. It is only that capacity for participating in, retain ing, and recalling the vibrations of the body that it experiences as sensations and that it can transfer from the past, as the discourse will soon show, to the
reason, wisdom,

future

as an

image

of

things to come.

If, therefore, Socrates

shown

will

leave

unqual

ified his

assertion

that the argument has

that soul mles

because the memory

that projects our delights and thus mles us

every living thing belongs to the

182

Interpretation
would

soul, then he
gument:

have found

an

extraordinarily

pregnant

meaning in the
avoid

ar

we are mled

by

our

propensity to pleasure and to

pain, more

fundamentally,
For the

to seek our preservation and avoid our destmction.

stated purpose of

drawing

an

inference regarding the way

of

life,
and

Socrates turns to the empty

and all

sensations of pain and pleasure that relate to

preservation and

being

full
of

the others connected with the

considers

destmction
and

liv

ing

things.

He

the transition between

being

empty

elicits

the thought that

one

may be

pained

by

his

present state

but

cheered

the anticipation of
a pain

his coming relief. Socrates describes one that is expected to be followed by a pleasure as

who

is

being full, by affected by

(en meso)

"between"

pleasure and pain.

middle

It is noteworthy that he does not adduce such a being in the to illustrate the freedom from both pleasure and pain to which he re speaking of the present subject, namely, the way of life, most divine way of life would be the one free from both
the
rather

ferred

earlier when

maintaining that the

pleasure and pain. sure and

Here, in

pointedly

somaticized

discussion is in the

of plea
middle

pain, he describes the

man or other

living thing

who

condition as man and

partaking Socrates

at once of

both (36b). The distinctions

of soul and

body,

beast, become blurred

affiliates

as

the mechanical etiology of pleasure and pain

progresses.

the soul's vision of relief with hope and thus with

a

pleasure; the absence of such

hope

with pain.

With this, Socrates begins

long
ble

passage of or

the discourse aiming to establish that

we are capable of

pleasures and pains can

be tme
of

false. As

tme and

false opinions,

so we are capa

the anticipations of pleasures and pains

which anticipations are

them

selves pleasures and pains of the soul

opinions. source

that are connected with tme and false

The

opinions that
and

lodge in

our souls

like

words and

images have

their

in memory

perception,

and

in the feelings (pathemata) (39a), thus

sharing
cause
sure of

an origin with

the pleasures and pains of the soul alone. Perhaps be

they

exhibit a shared

being by

virtue of their common

becoming,
the

plea

the soul

is

vulnerable to the

falseness

of

opinion,

and where

vulner opinion

ability appears holds up to the

most

clearly is in the

visions of

the future that false

contemplation of the

soul, misleading it into the

pleasure of an

ticipation of that which is either

wicked or

nothing

at all.

Addressing
ship
of

the

reason

that some men are shown true

images

and are

thus

in

spired with tme

hopes

or

pleasures,

Socrates finds

the explanation in the friend

the gods

opinions and the

good are all
await

for the just, pious, and good man. We may thus tmst that the hopes and the anticipations of pleasure of the just, pious, and

tme, specifically the hopes that they have for the pleasures that them in heaven. But Socrates has shown nothing by way of a demonstra
any
of

tion

of

these teachings

on

the

helpfulness

of

the gods. The opinion that

our right opinions are gifts of

the gods to the pious must

of

stood

in its

relation with the

doings

Socrates,

who

eventually be under before our eyes is himself

hedonistic
and pains.

endowing Protarchus
opinions and thus

and perhaps others with a correction of their

helping

to save them from false pleasures

On Pleasure
Socrates
ness,

and

the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

183

now proposes

that the only badness of pleasures lies in their false

a conclusion

to which he has been pushed

by

the near reduction of plea

sure to
were

opinion,

of course

in the

soul.

As

one might

say, if the soul's mind

would not exist

only wisdom, then the opinionative underside of wisdom to falsify pleasure. Protarchus is not prepared for the radical
pleasure and

intertwining

of

knowledge,

and protests

that wickedness must have something to

agrees that present
of

do

with at a

the badness of

pleasures.

Socrates

they

might

take the point

up

later time, but he dismisses it for the

soul compares

in favor

of an argument pleasures
and

showing that the

pains,

the

magnitudes

expected

projecting its recollections of past states of body under the influence of the deceptions introduced by remoteness in time, as the eye is deceived by dis
tance
out

in

space.

Thus truth
It has large

and

falseness
been kind

can attach another

to pleasures

and pains with

infection from

opinion

but through

failing

of the mind, of pleasure

namely,

miscalculation.

by

now

made clear of

that a

life

is

neces
mind

sarily in
cluded

some

measure a

life

of the

mind, understanding

by

not wisdom alone

but the

other powers of truth

and untruth that must

be in

in

an animate

intelligence. How
and

might one understand the

issue between

"the life

pleasure" mind"

of

"the life

of

if the two
greater

are

inseparable?
of pleasure and

Still
pain

not

content,

Socrates

sees a

way into

falseness

than has yet come to light. He would like to know what

follows from the

and

admitted

fact that

pain

and pleasure

have their he asks,

origins what

in the disruptions

restorations of our natural somatic state:

restoration were

if

neither corruption nor

taking

place,

dismissing
for

Protarchus's

objection that that would

be impossible
sure nor pain.

and

eliciting the conclusion that there would then be neither plea

a condition absence of

Thus,

both

pleasure and pain would

be the

cessation of motion

in the body. Socrates

always

makes reference

to the wise
a

men whose

saying is that everything is

would seem

in flux

upward or

downward,

dictum that
reminds

to obviate any rest from pleasure or pain. But Socrates

are changes within our

Protarchus that there

bodies,

of which growth an argu

is the

prime

example, that are below the level of our consciousness

ment reminiscent of the earlier one that

distinguished the die

out within

bodily

motions

that

find their way to the

nents of

soul

and those that

the

body. The

propo

the

physics of universal

flux

cannot convert their

insight

about the mo

tion of

body

throughout the

whole

into

a tmth about pleasure and pain,

thus

into

a tmth about

human life
the wise
refuge

or

its

goodness. give of of

Having

noticed

pleasure and pain,

life only the two possibilities from both problematic, he pursues his purpose
men

who

demonstrating

that

life has three

possibilities:

pleasure, pain, and neither. In or

who reduce

der to proceed, he

must confront

the theorists

the true possibilities

to only one, namely pain. Pleasure, they teach, is merely the absence of pain. These are men who are said to be cunning in matters of nature, and also partic

ularly hostile to Philebus, that is, to hedonism. Their position is a curious one, for while they deny that pleasure is anything, they are repelled by it through

184

Interpretation

some natural mistaken of an

disgust,

and

they hate its

on

power.

Socrates

considers

them to

be

in their theory but

the

right

track in their

morality.

The

wise men

flux

upheld a physics of motion

that

Socrates does from it,

not

refute, but

they drew
misoheSocrates'

untenable, unedifying
with an

moral conclusion moral

while

the present
under

donists begin

edifying

instinct that

will

prove,
project

guidance, to be inconsistent

Socrates'

with physiology.

will, at best and

to the extent possible, articulate the

good.

facts

of nature and

the facts of the human

Describing

the

misohedonists

as

comrades-in-arms,

Socrates

proposes

to

Protarchus that they track the gins in the definition of the nature This
proves

allies'

disgust

with pleasure all

the way to

its

ori

of a class of and

to mean

locating

anything,

things, in particular, pleasure. thus pleasure, in the thing's most is in the

concentrated

form,

which

in the

case of pleasure

body

in

reaction

against or relief of

the most

concentrated pain.

man's worst moments are

his

times of most

intense

bodily disorder,
itself,

tense pleasure is pleasure the

and pleasure

say in feverish illness. If the most in itself arises out of pain itself, then
pain

misohedonists'

point seems relief

to have been demonstrated: pleasure is nothing

but the
est"

from

or the absence of

bodily
of

in disease. in speaking
wished

Socrates does
and

not criticize

the apparent nonsense

of the

"great is to
make

"most

intense,"

or the

origin,

be

proved.

He

will explain much

something later (15a) that he has

argument

whose nonexistence

only to

use of the misohedonists while

making his

that some pleasures are il

mixture with pains.

lusory

and

unreal,

and others exist not proved

"allies"

purely but in

Since de

Socrates had already the reasonings of his

in his

own name and without

affecting to discover
correction of a

that pleasure resulted

from the

cay from the natural norm, it is hard to see what he thinks his argument gains from the witness of these extremists whose merit is a moral predilection. From
this point
of

(45d) forward

to 51a,

Socrates'

argument will consist of a correction

the

misohedonist view

that pleasure

is simply

nonpain of

the body.

Socrates begins the striking anatomy of pleasure that follows with a showing that some pleasures are mixed in that they are in both body and soul and some
or soul.

in that they are also mixed with pain, while some lodge in and are of only body Because of the peculiar mixing together of pleasure and pain at the

same

time,

as

in the

pain of an

itch

which

lies

deep

in the

body

and the plea

sure of the

scratching

which relieves

only the surface, it is possible for the

of

same mixture

to appear to its host as pleasure or pain. Socrates carries this

theme forward through the

and also of
which

investigation

the pleasures and pains

as

of

the

body
in

the

body

and

the soul

together,

in the

case

discussed

earlier

the

body is in

one state and

the soul anticipates the opposite state, pro

a pleasant antithesis to the actual distress. Socrates explains that he will say what he did not say when the latter case was first discussed, namely, that in the utter enormousness of the and frequency of occasions when

viding

now

body

soul

diverge in these directions, there is only

one mixture of pain and pleasure.

On Pleasure

and the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

185

More pointedly than ever, Socrates argues an ontology that seems to defy logic: mutual contradictories can exist simultaneously, at least in an animate

being,

and

their coexistence is called a One. Is

as

Unity

a name

opposites,

if

Being

were a coin with

One

on

the one side

for plurality of and Strife on the

to

other, everything
ward order or

always

being

in

motion upward or

downward, advancing

decaying

from it?

Socrates
a

proceeds to the pains and pleasures of the soul

by itself,

showing in

tour de force of psychology how the pains of anger and other passions com
with

bine

the pleasures

of

the same, arguing in an extended passage that men

take pleasure in the ridiculous lapses from self-knowledge of their

at

friends

while

the same time enduring the pains of envy. He

brings
of

this exposition to
as

its

cli

max not

in

summary

of the argument:

in threnodies

mourning
of

in tragedies,

only

on the stage

but in

all

the

tragedy

and

comedy

life,

pain and plea

sure are mixed

together at once, as also in

myriad other

things (50b).

Having body and

consider

anatomized soul

the mixtures of pleasure and pain

in body, soul,

and

together, Socrates finds it

He begins
that pleasure

natural and somehow

the

unmixed pleasures.

by

necessary to repeating his disagreement with

those

is anything more real than cessation of pain, tme as it might be that many pleasures as he has shown do have that character. tme Socrates replies that Asked what are pleasures, they are those connected
who

deny

with

the beautiful colors, shapes, odors, and sounds, delightful

when perceived

but

not missed or yearned

for painfully
not

when

they

are absent.

He

explains

that

the shapes that he has in mind are

the shapes of animals or paintings, that

mimic

is,

not

the shapes of the

natural

things or the artifacts that

them, but the

emphasizes of

geometric

ones, in

perceptible manifestation and not as objects of contempla

tion; indeed,
the

manifested

in

products of of
such

the

woodworker's art. which

He

innate, everlasting beauty

that

things,

is the

source

the

unmixed pleasure

they

give.

After the

pleasures of

the sense of smell and

sound, Socrates adds the pleasures of knowledge if they do not originate in hunger for knowledge or in the pains of such a hunger. From this we under
stand

that the philosophic

life, driven by
relieves

conscious wonder and earnest yearn a

ing

for the knowledge that but it

are

the distress of confusion, is not

life

of

unmixed pleasure position of

rather resembles comedy.

human
a

existence altogether
exchange

in its

com

tragedy
make

and

In

brief

(52ab), Socrates
that those that arise

and

Protarchus

clear that

the feelings

of pleasure and pain

they have
out are

been

discussing

the

natural and spontaneous

ones,

not

of thought or reasoning about things. The pure pleasures of sensible

beauty

free

gifts to us

from nature; the

pleasures of not

philosophizing

are neither pure nor

natural; the loss of knowledge is

that causes
pain and

the accompaniment of a disarrangement

restoration

that calls out for the to

alert us

that brings pleasure. Na

as a

ture does not

sound an alarm

to the loss of knowledge

good; as
or
are

merely natural beings, we diseased obliviousness.

would sink

painlessly into the

that there
are

stupor of

senility
that

Socrates'

proof

pleasures

1 86

Interpretation
to refute the
misohedonists
contention

unmixed with pain serves

that pleasure

is only he had

a release

of philosophic

from pain, but it has gone further in implicating the question inquiry. We would be satisfied with our grasp of his meaning if
this part of his
argument with

not closed

the

remark

that the pure plea

sures of

knowledge

belong

not at all

to the many but only to exceedingly

few.

What can he mean except that to a very few human beings it is given to know without desire or painful effort, as if truth were simply and directly to appear to
them as a beautiful odor or sound
of an effortless
might present

itself, but having

It

the character

insight into the

noetic

beauties

of the world?

could not plausi

bly

be

said

that the natural

world

is

a great machine

inclined to the
the reverse.

realization

of the multitude of mankind's purest

pleasure;

almost

Now

(52c) Socrates

makes a remark

that ostensibly summarizes and in fact reservation, that,

those

breaks into the

ately
with well

argument.

He says,

with much

having

moder

discriminated the
go on

pure pleasures and

impure, they may

measured.

to

add

that the turbulent pleasures

fairly correctly (say those

called

the

that come

scratching an intense itch) are unmeasured while the opposite kind are The former, in body and soul, are of the class of the infinite, the lat

ter of the measured. We have been brought

back to the

quadripartition of the
contradicts

first

part of the

dialogue, but
unlimited.

the

return

is

jarring

because it

flatly
is in

the repeated and uncompromising assertions

(27c 31a)

that all pleasure

the class

of

the

Protarchus

accepts the new position without objec

tion. It would appear that the introduction of the distinction between mixed and
unmixed or pure and

impure has had

decisive influence

on the characteriza

tion

of pleasure as either

finite

or

infinite:

not pleasure as such

but the kind

of

pleasure

determines

whether

it is finite

or measured.

According
or

to the authori
or a mixture of

tative quadripartition, everything whatsoever is the two compounded

infinite

finite finite

by

Cause:

mixture means mixture of

and

infinite. As

the investigation of pleasure was driven

forward

by

the argument that pleasure

is only
with

surcease

pain, and

from pain, pleasure came to be portrayed as very often mixed the leading distinction that emerged was between the mixed and

the pure pleasures, the former

pation rather than

being

indeed

a relief

from

pain even

if

by

antici

surcease, the latter pure primarily

in

being

unmixed with

anything other than themselves, accompanying the unsought perception of purely beautiful things, enjoyed with a tranquil satisfaction. The pure pleasures in this last sense are pure in the sense of as calm, serene, controlled
"good,"

in brief,
of

moderate

or

measured

and

they

recommend

themselves

self-

evidently as good with respect to a human being's happiness. The application finite to infinite in general is in the interest of the order of the cosmos and all its constituents,
As the

including
draws

in that

order

if

not

tion of matter in ways that guard the world

argument closer

simply meaning by it the articula from being populated by monsters.

of

to the final definition of good, the analysis

are appropriate to the

pleasure must

be

cast under

headings that
or

definition

of

the conditions of human

happiness

the good for man. The pure pleasures

On Pleasure
must

and the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

187

have

a place

from

admixture with pain

in contributing to human good; their very purity or freedom is the basis or condition for their moderateness or
and

freedom from
that it would
of

frenzy

ecstasy

alike.

Socrates had

long
best

since pronounced

not

be necessary to investigate the kinds

that the

of pleasure

for the task

determining
It
now

whether pleasure or wisdom was second

after their combi

nation.

appears

unity

of pleasure
or

fractured,
or

to be replaced

by

duality
"unity"

is radically and double duality: mixed is

compelled

decisively
and pure,

unmeasured and measured.

The

of pleasure
of

to give way,

to be superseded, in the interest

the

good.

Alternatively,
a unity.

man's good would of

for understanding the human be unattainable by him if pleasure were

project

effectually
not a one.

It is

the greatest

importance

to mankind that pleasure

is

Now Socrates

moves

(52d)

toward the definition

of

the human

good

by

as

similating to each other the tme and the pure, and then describing the pure form first of pleasure and then of wisdom. As the purest white is also the truest
and most

beautiful white,

so

the purest pleasure and the

purest

knowledge

are

the truest of their

analysis to run

kind,

and

thus

belong

to good

and so we might

imagine the
argument
which

quickly to its

conclusion.

But Socrates injects into the

not

the thought that pleasure

participates

in Becoming,

in Being,

by

he

presumably

means

that one is necessarily,

by

virtue of what pleasure

is, ap

proaching it, passing through it, or leaving it behind. Of such things he says they are always for the sake of something else, as a means is for the sake of an
end: also

Becoming

is directed toward Being,

pleasure

and what

has the

status of an end

has

the character of good. Thus

understand

does

not
of

belong
or

to the good.

It is hard to

how this depreciation does

not

pleasure, even or especially

in

pleasure's purest

form,

carry knowledge

thinking down

with

it

too, for the

purest pleasure

those unsolicited

is precisely that which accompanies the presence of insights or knowledge gained without any admixture of pain
such

ful desire for it. Moreover,

and, as
we

saw,

can pass away.

knowledge itself certainly comes into being It belongs fully as much to the realm of be
that it engenders, but its

coming

as

does the disparaged is

not

pleasure

failure

to qual

ify
life

as an end

only

suppressed

by

the

argument

but is tacitly

contradicted

when

Socrates

presents the

life

of purest

thought as most choiceworthy

we cannot

the
notice

of

Being
rather

and

Good. For the moment, falls

short of

do better than to
pleasure

that if the

purest pleasure

Good because

belongs to Be

coming

than

Being,

then the purest knowledge or thought must

be

able

to survive the same test if thought is to prove to be good. Before going on to

subject mind and

knowledge to the test, Socrates unqualifiedly

argues

the

folly

of the

hedon

ism that

would make pleasure so

good as

to make the man who

feels
We

pleasure the good man,

ignoring

such virtues as courage and moderation.

are

left to
in

wonder whether

the wise man as such is courageous and moder

ate and

all ways good

virtuous,

or even whether

he

would need

to be in order to

be thought

by

this criterion.

188

Interpretation
are sciences that are useful and others that are

Socrates discovers that there purely theoretical, then there is also the
cal entities or

as

there is

an arithmetic and a

geometry for carpentry and

philosophical mathematics which recognizes

(presumably

points,

lines,

and numbers rather

only identi than how many men from this that the
the eager efforts

horses in two

armies).

It is

given

to Protarchus to

conclude

most precise arts are

the ones that arise in

connection

with

(horme)

of the really philosophic, who presumably generate the most precise, hence presumably the purest knowledge. But it proceeds from their horme and hence is not an unsolicited insight but produces a pleasure in them preceded by a

desire,

lack,

a pain.

Perhaps it is for this

as
not

reason

that Socrates now nomi

other.

nates

the dialectic

power

to be judged behind any

Dismissing

Protarchus 's

argument that

Gorgias

would regard rhetoric as most powerful and good with tmth and

best, Socrates insists

fulness
good or advantage.
man

on

associating
present

purity

rather than use

If the

line

for

would

be

and thus perhaps even

of

his

disturbingly survival. Having

of reasoning were to be pursued, the disjoint from man's practical advantage prepared

for the

mutual affiliation

dialectic, knowledge,

and

arts and their practitioners who exist

tmth, Socrates is in in the realm

something
of of

a position to
of

disparage those

opinion, "and even if

they

think themselves to be their

investigating

nature, know that all through

lives they investigate the things

this cosmos
do"

how they

come

into be

ing, how they

posed realm of

are acted upon and what

they

(58e-59a). Thus

we are ex

to a mighty distinction between nature and cosmos, the former the objects of contemplation, the latter

being

the

being

the

world of cause and

effect,
ture. It

of what we

now, in

accord with

Kant,

call the world of

the laws

of na

is in this cosmos, this orderly world of experience, that all things are in a state of coming to be and passing away, of ubiquitous flux and thus of ungraspability. Therefore it can be said that the purest knowledge is of the
eternal, changeless, and unmixed things
this
or of

their nearest congeners

and

belongs

with wisdom and mind.

The

search

for the

purest

knowledge has

ended:

it is knowledge

of the pure.
assigns

Immediately (59e), Socrates

ter of demiourgoi
or artisans

to

himself

and

Protarchus the
in

charac

whose

task

is to
be

produce a mixture of wisdom

act

(phronesis)

and pleasure.

He

appears to

demonstrating

that the dia-

lectically
useless

achieved

knowledge into

about the purest pleasure and the purest, most

knowledge is itself
the pure

useful

combining sure or knowledge

life

a mixture.

humanly advantageous purpose of Repeating the issue, which is whether plea

good,
and

for the

comes closer to the

repeating
repeats at

also

that the good is

neither the

that which leaves no need unsatisfied,

Socrates

last that
Their

of mind without pleasure nor of pleasure without mind would suffice

nor pleasure

for

any man; thus neither wisdom

now

is the
must

good.

purpose must

be to discover
a

Good,

which

they know

be

sought

in

or as a mixture.

If Good is

mixture, it belongs to the

class of the

impure,

the things that are

On Pleasure
touched with

and the

Human Good: Plato's Philebus

189

Becoming

and are passed

by by Being

the things that cannot

be

because they are forever changing. Of course what Socrates the demiourgos will confect here as good life will exist neither in the realm of na
grasped

ture,

where

the eternal and pure have their

and politics would

being,

nor

in the

mere

cosmos,

where rhetoric

be

required to gain

it

an

actuality among
alone
nor

men,

who might

in any
again

case

be

unequipped to

live it.
pleasure mind ascent

Having

gained

the admission that

good

neither

alone constitutes

the good or the

life, Socrates begins the final

toward the tme good

for

man

(61). We know from the

good

beginning

that the good

life habit

which

is

so

indistinguishable from the

that
good

that we fall easily into the

of

thinking
mean.

istence
prove others

has meaning only in reference to human ex depends for its coming to be on good mixing, whatever that might
Although
some

to

kinds

of

knowledge

are

tmer and higher than

because they pertain to the beings that most tmly are, they are insufficient to life, and to them must be added the humbler knowledges that be

long
must

to the human sphere,

even of

though

they

are

tinged

with

falseness;

and also

music and

every

other

kind

knowledge. Of the pleasures, the

pure and

tme

be

accompanied

by

the necessary ones, presumably because there

not perpetuate

would

be

no

human kind if it did

itself through seeking the

the
ones

pleasure

that is preceded

by

longing. The

admissible pleasures are of

that comport
man and

with what we can whole.

divine to be the idea

the good

by

nature

in

the

good

These things granted, with all their implication for the qualified good of the for man and for all, Socrates calls next for the inclusion of tmth (64b) in

has already been required to admit something of the false. Hardly any formula of edification could be more routine and thus more empty of particular meaning than the bare imprecation of the tmth. Socrates lifts his
the melange that
call

for the tmth

and

above

inanity by describing
what comes

tmth as indispensable to the be

exists.

coming
what

the existence of
we

to be and

We

might not

know

tmth

is, but
follow

is in

soon to so

will reveal what

know that it is necessary for becoming and existing. What is necessary for becoming and existing, and

revealing will shed light on tmth, and on good and beauty. Before that, though, Socrates declares that their present discourse seems to him to have
wrought,

figuratively,

an

incorporeal
of this

cosmos that will mle

of

body: the fabricated idea

world

dissolving
pression of

the rational principle or truth

nobly an animate into being, existing, and coming world. This ex phenomenal of this
the

Socrates',

which rounds off a major portion of

dialogue,

should

be

considered alongside

the

earlier passage cosmos

(59a)

in

which cosmos was world of

dispar
and of

aged

by

comparison with

nature,

being

this

becoming

being

acted upon and of of practical

making, indeed the

realm of

the

arts and

knowledges
with

that are

benefit to human beings,

contrasted

explicitly

the

realm and

faculty

of

tmth,

said to be appropriated to eternal things, unmixed

190

Interpretation
argument

things. The
cosmos as

is

drifting

toward the

adaptation of

tmth to

eternity in the
more con

distinguished from eternity

appear

simply.

What this

means

cretely will Socrates Protarchus

passage

in

what

follows.
section

opens the are now

final

of

the dialogue
the good

before the
proposes

gates of

by suggesting that he and itself (64c). To facilitate their

what

within, he

the decisive the

mixture

question:

that

is in

or of

"the

mixture"

(presumably
but
now with

always

of all

wisdom and some

pleasures,

the late

addition of

"tmth")

seems

to be

most venerable and most

emphatically the

cause of

its

being

universally liked. The

answer comes

forth:
and of

measure and proportion are indispensable to the

being

of

the

ingredients

their combination. But as

we

being

and

becoming
is the in

of what

have recently learned, tmth is necessary for the is and exists. We may therefore say provisionally
of combinations:
at

that tmth

measure

and proportion

right

amount,

and

right amount

relation to other amount,

sum of all

i.e.,

best,

commensurability.

So far

as the cosmos

is the

becomings

and

durations,

a compound of com

pounds, its tmth and cause is

other name

measure.

But to

measure

is joined proportion, the

or proportion

for

which

is

commensurability.

Commensurability
amounts
relation

is

the relation between two

able

measured or

finite

both

of which are measur

by

the same

measure.

But,

as

in the

between the

circumference

and radius of a circle or

the perimeter and diagonal of a square, there exist irra

that

tionalities or self, a

incommensurabilities
perhaps

testify

to a limit that

binds the truth it

limit that indicated

"why"

the things in the cosmos do not en

dure forever: the tmth

of the cosmos

is

a mixture of reason and unreason.

From his declaration that

and

measure and proportion are

indispensable to things

their mixtures Socrates now

(64c) draws
in the

a consequence: since measure and

proportion are everywhere assimilated to

beauty

and virtue, the power of good

may be good is

said to

have fled for

refuge

nature of

the beautiful. It

is

as

if the

being
and

hunted from

one

apparently

safe place

to another, each concep

tion of it proving insecure in turn, the latest

being
in

the identification of good as

else

beauty

thus as
now

measure

and

proportion.

Whatever

has been

made

clear, it has

been

revealed that we are

pursuit of the good.

and

To this point, Socrates has drawn both truth

measure and proportion.
or

beauty

into the

sphere of

He

says now with

(65a), "If

we cannot catch the good with

and

in

one

idea, let

us

take

it

three, beauty, proportion,

these as good,

truth, saying
mix
too."

that these considered as one might most correctly, of all the things in the

ture, be

regarded as

cause,
of

and through a

it has become

so

Apparently,
a

the Idea

Good is

triplex made one, and the common ground to

which the three are reducible

is

measure or proportion.

The Idea

of

Good, itself
measure or

mixture,

must

be

subject to the rule that

its

central

ingredient, i.e.
measure and

proportion, is dominant in its

three considered one
us

own constitution.

Only

proportion,
them

or made one

by having
of

a single
as an

Idea

stamped on of

by
lie

(p. 174 above), lie

within the

Idea

Good

ingredient

it

and also

On Pleasure
within make

and

the

Human Good:
in

Plato'

Philebus
or

-191

it in the it
and

qualified sense

which cause

is

"in"

"of"

the mixture to

its

components endure as components and as composite.

Reverting

now

(65b)

to the original dyad

of pleasure and

wisdom as

"the

mixture"

superior

to each of

its components,

and

reverting

also

to the old

ques

tion whether wisdom or pleasure stands closer to the good that neither of them

by

itself

can claim

to

be, Socrates

proceeds to compare each of them

in turn

with each element of

the composite that

is the test

or standard, which

is beauty,

tmth,
the

and measure.

In

doing

so,

he

will without explanation again restore

(65c)

"truth"

lately

added and removed

to mind

(nous)

and pleasure as

the goods

to be tested, thus producing the puzzling situation in which truth

would

have to

be
As

compared with
will

itself

since

it is

put

in both the test

act

and the

thing

to be tested.

be seen, though, Socrates in

does

finally drop
he

"truth"

from among

the goods to be tested (mind or wisdom, and pleasure) with no more explana tion than accompanied mind, the two

its

recent

insertions.

Rapidly

"shows"

that wisdom or
closer

being
and

used

interchangeably, is
each

much

than pleasure to

tmth, measure,
tions and

beauty,

in turn. Now he has

completed

his demonstra

is ready to pronounce the good. As is to be expected, he passes from the thing to be tested to the thing by which it is to be tested in seeking the highest or first among the goods. The first
choice of eternal nature proportion and what

is

measure and what

belongs to it,

and

the second is
and

belongs

to

it,

which

is beauty,

perfection

(to teleon),

all modes of proportion. Third, after the threefold criterion that sufficiency has been reduced to a dyad by the subsumption of beauty under proportion, comes mind and wisdom
not

(nous

and phronesis).

or incidental, as if, however exalted it self-subsistent being. Today we would say or it did not have a distinct be, may of it, to convey that meaning, that it is not a thing. It remains unmentioned in

in

a manner that could

deviate far from the tmth, he be called casual

says, thus

Acknowledging this, one will introducing tmth in its own name

the

fourth

rank of

good,

which consists of

sciences, arts,
than
pleasure

and right opinions

things of the soul that

resemble good more

does; i.e.,
on

resemble

measure and proportion more

than

pleasure

does.

By insisting,

through the ex

plicit application of the ordinal numbers chief criterion of attention to what

in the ranking,
and

the

duality

of

the

good, namely,

measure

proportion, Plato/Socrates

calls

I have

referred

to as a demotion of the One and, simultane

ously,

of

the

irreducibility
so now

to

each other of measure and proportion or commen

surability.

As

number or measure

form Cause,
measure and
apart"

dominated the infinite in combining with it to incommensurability asserts a silent influence in keeping
apart.

commensurability
such

Certainly,
with

not

all things

that are "kept

are we

"incommensurable"

are

as

each

other; but

what

to

think of two the unity of

such as metron and summetron, good with their

together

forming

good,

troubling

intransigent duality?
pure pleasures unvexed with pain are ranked

Finally, in

the

fifth place, the

192

Interpretation

in

relation to good:

finally

but

yet not quite

finally, for
it

Socrates

refers

to the

sixth

judgment

of their

discourse,

with which

will cease.

What is that
precedes

judg
the

If it exists, it is to be found in the short passage that the dialogue, a passage that Socrates introduces as a third
ment?

the end of

presentation of

argument.

He

reminds of mind

the view that pleasure

is the

good and of

his

own

judgment that
and

that mind

is better but that something would be closer than pleasure to

the

else might

be

superior to

both,

that third. With particular em

phasis

he

reminds of

ineligibility
is
not

of

both

mind and pleasure

to

be deemed These three

"the

good"

because

each

self-subsistent, sufficient,

complete.

attributes are

the ones

named

in the

immediately
This
was

preceding (66b)

elaboration of

the second highest good or component of good: proportion,

ness or and sufficiency.

beauty,

complete

from the very beginning the deci perfection, sive criterion of good, sine qua non, known as such by Socrates and applied by him equally against nous and hedone. It appears that the sixth judgment is the
one

that determines the second criterion of good to be also first. As if to

help

us to see

the direction of the argument, Socrates is made to refer to the suffi

were proved or measure.

ciency of the reasoning by which wisdom and pleasure ficient: not enough, falling short in amount, number,
points

to be insuf

Proportion
relation

to measure and measure points to proportion.

They
in two

exist

in

to

each other

like the twin bodies

of a

binary

star,

a one

and two

in

one.

If

geometry is the science that encompasses measure and proportion, one might agree with the judgment that the diligent study of geometry is an appropriate preparation for inquiring after Good.

Socrates
or

closes with a remark

that depends for its force on the

dissimilarity

disproportion between
were

man and all other animal

ing thing
tude of

to rank pleasure as the good

man another good

is better.

Precisely

while

life. Though every other liv itself, still it would be tme that for saying this, he speaks of the multi

mankind whose

judgment is the in

same as that of the

beasts,

opposite to of

what comes
man and ment

forth from the

revealed

muse of philosophy. or

The tme

incommensurability
by

beast is

through philosophy, at

exactly the same mo

a pro
returns

that mankind itself

is

revealed as composed of parts separated or

found

incommensurability
the beginning.

irrationality. The

end of

the dialogue

to

and perfects

Deliberate Belief
Joseph Conrad
J. P. Geise
Clarkson

and

Digging
of

Holes
Restraint

and the

Problem

and

L. A.

Lange

University

I: INTRODUCTION

In
come

an era when

the liberal tradition is questioned on every side, it has be

increasingly
of action not

important to inquire

about

its

prospect

for theoretical

re

newal.

In fact, this undertaking is less

one central

an academic exercise

than an essential
well-being.

form

to a continued sense of civility and

Hence, it is
ary lines in

surprising to find scholars

looking

across

traditional disciplin

an effort

to address the current problems in liberal theory. And

while much profitable work

has already been done

by

those willing to ply eco

nomics, sociology,
erature

and

the allied social sciences, it is nevertheless tme that lit

has much to offer as a tool for reorienting the liberal tradition. The is particularly tme when the literature under consideration is of the cali Darkness.1 For in ber of Joseph Conrad's fin-de-siecle novella, Heart of Conrad's tale one finds not only a masterfully crafted story, but also a powerful
the problem literalism's recurring theoretical dilemmas of constmcting the grounds for self-restraint within a system of selfish atom ism. One finds something else as well; one discovers in Conrad's treatment of
evocation of one of

Marlow the hint

over,
a solution

of a solution

to this preeminently liberal dilemma. It

echoes

is,

more

that not only

ideas
In

articulated of such

by

Aristotle

and

Kant,
as

but

also one

that foreshadows the arguments

and

contemporary liberals

James Fishkin

William

Galston.2

threefold: to explore the nature of

case with relevance

this, the point of this paper is Conrad's case for restraint, to compare his
view of

those proffered

by

earlier

Conrad's

conclusions

liberal theorists, and, finally, to have for contemporary liberals.

ask what

II: LIBERALISM AND RESTRAINT

There
the task
I.

is,
of

"liberal"

of

course, nothing uniquely

passionate man.

or

especially
were well

modem about

restraining

The Greeks

aware of

this

Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness and The Secret Sharer [New York: New American Li brary, 1950]. All page references included in the body of this paper are from this edition of

Conrad's
2.

work.

James Fishkin, Beyond Subjective Morality [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984]; William Galston, Justice and the Human Good [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980].
interpretation, Winter

1988-9, Vol. 16, No. 2

194
chore,

Interpretation
as were

those working

within

the

republican tradition.

The fact remains,

though,
eralism.

that the need

For,

at

the advent of lib pressing least in its Anglo-American guise, liberalism abandoned the

for

restraint

became

more

with

traditional means of containing

means were perceived of a

passionate

man

or,

more

to the point, these

to be inefficacious. In other words, liberalism's rejection

moral, teleological vision of man, its assault on practically all

promotion of a

forms

of

value-cognitivism, and its

radically hedonistic psychology bined to make the task of restraining man both pressing and arduous. It is not surprising, then, that so much of liberal thought can be read
effort to

com

as an

find

way

of

reining in the

passions.

Hobbes,
was

of

course,

proposed

to

do this
men

by

who

made

creating life "nasty,

of

an external

power.3

Since it

passion-driven, masterless

bmtish,

short,"

and

took the

form

constructing

a political master. much

restraining them necessarily Though less blunt about the

light.4

matter, Locke saw his responsibility in to create a political

men were prone.

the same

He, too,

sought

body

that could adjudicate the conflicts to

which passionate

But the Hobbesian

approach

to restraining the

passions proved

less than

sat

isfactory.
confronted

On the

one

hand,

it

was

not

clear

that

Hobbes'

sovereign

by

subjects

in the full

possession

of their right
other

to self-preserva

tion
state

was

up to the task demanded of him. And on the

Hobbes left
men was rather uninspiring.

hand,

the moral
sovereign

in

which

After all, the

did

not so much eliminate or alter men's passions as

he

manipulated

them. It

was men's passionate

fear for their

meant

own

lives that kept them in

sovereign

their place.

And

this,
In

as

Rousseau noted,

that

Hobbes'

turned his subjects

into

hypocritical

and alienated slaves.

view of

this, it is
the

understandable passions.

that other thinkers

would seek a regard are

differ

ent means of

taming
of

Most noteworthy in this

to
that

the efforts the pas

of

those,

such as

Adam Smith,

who sought

redirect and transform

sions.

Smith,

course,

suggested

is

man's passionate self-regard could

would

be

channelled

into

economic will of

pursuits, then several distinct benefits

Hobbes'

ensue.5

First,
and

the arbitrary

sovereign could

be

replaced

by

the neutral

impersonal
men

constraints of civil society.

quite

Second,
in the In the

society's pressures would

which served

induce

to produce,

in

spite of

themselves, those things

present place of

the common good.

Third,
men

and most pertinent

context, their pur

suit of material wealth would transform men.

unruly

and unpre

dictable passions, behave

"interests."

would

acquire

And

while

these

interests
men not

were not as grand as

the

classical

ideal

of virtue,

they did,

at

least, lead

to

with moderation and civility.

In short, interested men, though

he

roic, would
3.

be sociable, reliable,

and restrained.

T.

4-

Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson [New York: Penguin Books. 1968]. J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. T P. Peardon [Indianapolis:
1952].
1974].

Bobbs-

Merrill,
5.

A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations [London: Penguin Books,

Deliberate
An

Belief and Digging

tack was taken

Holes

195
Papers.6

analogous

by

Madison in the Federalist

Re

calling both the republican practice of pitting the passions against one another and the Scottish-Realist efforts at transforming the passions, Madison spoke for a regime which, in setting "ambition against would produce some
ambition,"

thing better
in short, be
If Smith

than the agglomerated willfulness of

a regime which might produce a

individual

citizens.

It would,

few

citizens sensitive to matters of

greater moment and

that those of unalloyed greed.

Madison

expected

their

institutional

schemes

to contain the

passions and produce a more

humane populace,
that the
men.7

others were not so sanguine.

"interests"

Rousseau's First Discourse

tamed the passions

suggested

pursuit of

not was

only

but

also

belittled

In short, there

nothing

ennob

politics

for material gain, nor was there anything virtuous about a devoted to parcelling out the GNP More troubling, though, was the possibility, intimated by Rousseau and pursued by his successors, that liberal,

ling

about the quest

interested

but

also

men would produce a society that was not only dangerous. In this regard, both de Tocqueville

predictable and and

banal
were so

J. S. Mill

concerned

that the

liberal

social

order, based

on

interest,

would

become
man.8

powerful and pervasive

that it might
when

overwhelm

liberalism's isolated
career as a

So
of

by

the

late 1890s,

Conrad began his

writer, the tradition

Enlightenment liberalism
was pressured

was under pressure on at

least two fronts. On one,

to was a repudiation

it

by

those who doubted the adequacy of the eighteenth-century

challenge amounted

compromise with of

Hobbes. What this

as

liberalism's early assumption, in veiling theory of the

hand"

A. Hirschman has
the

put

it,

that a "counter-

passions"

combination with

workings of some
men.9

"in

visible

was sufficient

to harness self-seeking, hedonistic

Hobbes'

In short,

many

suspected

that

neither

reliance on

litical
tified.

power nor

Smith's faith in the

inhibiting

the restraining capacity of po force of civil society were jus

front, some saw the threat to liberal society differently. Follow ing Rousseau, Tocqueville, and J. S. Mill, these observors did not so much
On the
other

fear that liberal

produce

atomism would
of moral

lead to

social

disintegration
of this

as

that it would

kind

compression.

For followers

persuasion, the

problem with

liberal individualism

was not

just that it bred selfishness, but that it

occurred

it

encouraged a social

isolation which,

when

in the

context of a so

ciety increasingly subject to bureaucratic organization, created the conditions for mass tyranny. With his usual acuity, de Tocqueville framed this issue very
"servitude"

clearly: the

danger liberal society

confronted was a

of

[a]

regular,

6. A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay,

The Federalist Papers [New York: New American Li Roger Masters [New York: St. Mar

brary,
7.

1961].

J. J. Rousseau, The First

1964].

and

Second Discourses,

ed.

tin's

Press,

8. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. R. D. Heffner [New York: New American Library, 1956]; J. S. Mill, On Liberty [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978]. 9. A. Hirshman, The Passions and the Interests [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977].

196

Interpretation
kind,"

quiet and gentle

the preconditions for

successful

which were

(as Rousseau had

pre-

sciently suggested) the

invasion

and organization of

the personality

by

society

itself.10

Ill: FAILED POLITICS AND CORRODED SOCIETY

arises as
other

Given the variety of challenges to liberalism at century's end, the question to how to locate Conrad on such a spectmm of discontent. How, in
words, is
one to

interpret Conrad's depiction idea

Although

of madness and mayhem at us about

the

fringes

of empire?

And what, in turn, does that depiction tell

of restraints? a

his

preoccupation with the

would seem
mism of

cursory

review of

the plot

to suggest some straightforward answers to these questions, opti

not survive a close

this kind does

reading

of

the text. For example, at

first glance, Conrad's story

treatment
of

appears

to be a riveting, if not wholly unfamiliar,

manifold

the theme of society's

much

tainly

there is

in the

novel

to

justify

such an

susceptibility to collapse. Cer interpretation. For one, the

"civilization"

story's narrative moves

between the

conditions of contrasts which are

and

the reali

ties of savagery. In
nore.

doing

so, it invokes

impossible to

ig

Moreover, Conrad underscores these contrasts by having his main charac ter, Marlow, explore such related issues as the historical terrors of empire and
the policing function of society. But we Conrad has in mind. For even as Conrad
need not conclude that this reminds of
of

is

all that

his

readers about men's granted

fatal
and

pavement"

tendency
heaps

to take the "solid those residents

society for
clear

(p. 122),

"sepulchral"

scorn on

cities who

"assurance

safety"

of perfect

(p. 150), it is

live mindlessly in the that Conrad has other busi

ness to conduct

in the Heart of Darkness. In

other words, while

Conrad, like

social

Hobbes, is interested in alerting his readers to the vulnerabilities of organized life, this is not the only theme at work in the book. There is, for exam

ple, the

disturbing

problem raised

by

the often-neglected

last

part of the story,

the problem raised

by

Conrad's curiously late development

center of

of

the character of

Kurtz.

Kurtz,
ness.
"facts"

of

course, is the frenzied

reader

Conrad's tropical heart of dark

the story some
of

Yet the
about

leams only
reader
on

at the end of

the unsettling
not

him. The
gone

leams, for
of

example, that Kurtz is

prolonged
men

ordinary influence
is

man

bad

account

of the metropolis.

There

are such

simply an isolation from the saving on the road to the heart of

we are

darkness, but Kurtz is

not

not one of

them. On the contrary,

told that Kurtz

ordinary, just

as

nothing that

he does in the interior

kind
of man

of

Africa is "ordi
a creature that

nary."

Kurtz is, Marlow reports,

contributed to

a particular

he is

"[a]ll Europe
social
10.

making"

(p. 123). He

is, in

short, a preeminently

being.
De

Tocqueville,

op. cit., p. 304.

Deliberate

Belief and Digging

not

Holes
Marlow

197
or the reader much

Of course, it does

take

either

time to realize

how little this actually means, how pitifully few resources this special status ac tually confers on Kurtz. For what makes Kurtz extraordinary is not just his spe
cial status as society's

total

lack

of

darling, or his prodigious lack of restraint, but rather his substance. Kurtz, it turns out, is "hollow at the (p. 133). In
core"

fact, he closely
course.

resembles

Rousseau's
man, but

nightmare

vision

in the Second Dis

talent. Kurtz has
one
a

He is socialized,

civil

with one supreme

genius one

for role-playing; he is the

another.

ultimate chameleon. perceived

To

man, Kurtz is

thing, to another,

He is

by

different

people at one and

the same time as a poet, a painter, as a musical genius and a

could,"

formidable, if

a journalist reported to Mar wholly ecumenical, political talent. ("He (p. 151).) In short, he is what Kant low, "get himself to believe
anything"

might

have termed

stituted

by

completely heteronomous being. Both motivated and con things outside himself, Kurtz becomes, to the partners of the trading
a

company,

one of the

"best

and the

brightest,"

one of the new

a man who

breed. To his In

tended, Kurtz is simply wards him by what [is] best in

"great."

He is,

she

adds,

"[draws]
of

men

to

them"

(p.

155).

Clearly ily

Kurtz's Intended

offers she

the most

telling description
or

him. Yet luck

for her, Marlow tells us,

she

does

not see the

However, if
sponsor

cannot

imagine

the

irony harrowing things

the implications of it. this emptiness

might

in

one who

is

obsessed with

"immense

plans"

and who

tries to execute the calamity to contrast

sav
"mere"

them in a stunning

"solitude"

(p. 133), Marlow does. He has

can generate and

seen

that a man "hollow at the

core"

he has been

able

that with the elementary restraint exercised

ages.

by

the cannibals,

by

In light

of

this portrait of

Kurtz, then, it

would seem premature

to sug

gest that the

its

mles of

Heart of Darkness is simply about the failure of society to make civility hold under the conditions of nominal savagery. Rather, the
also about society's potential

Heart of Darkness is
man a

for creating
other

a certain

kind

of

type of

man now

become

all

too familiar. In

words, for Conrad,

moral void

Kurtz

seems

less

a symbol of the

failure

of social norms

to hold in a

than evidence of society's (all too perverse) success in emptying him of sub
stance.

What is tragic

about

this,

of

course, is that the

man whom all most

Europe
of men

helps to
and

make and to whom

it hands its favors is both the ferocious

about
of savages.

banal

the most

unrestrained and

What, then, does

we

all

this

imply

Conrad's

view of restraints?

What

are

to make of his

several examples of

the exercise of restraint

in particular,

those

illustrated

by

the accountant on the coast,

throughout the tale?

by

the cannibals on the steamer

and,

finally, by Marlow
wants

What is in

immediately
a

clear

is that
in
the

Conrad

to discourage us from understanding his depictions of

restraint

orthodox terms.
seventeenth-

Consequently,
annihilation

when

he

engages

literary

variant on

and

eighteenth-century strategy

of social

deconstmction, his dra

theoretical result
correc-

matic

act

of social

does

not

yield

the

usual

namely, a

pure, if hypothetical,

state of nature

for

which a clear set of

198

Interpretation

tive measures can be imagined.

Rather, Conrad

makes more ambiguous use of

this staple of the liberal imagination.

which emerges out of the pages of the In the first place, the "state of the models established by the preem of follow Heart of Darkness does not any Hobbes' inent liberal, contract theorists. Conrad's Belgian Congo is neither
condition of unrelieved personal
community.
nature"

danger,
a

nor

Locke's

state of

mde, but

lawful,

Nor is it Rousseau's haven

of natural

ignorance
an

and equilibrium.
wreckage-

On the contrary, Conrad's Congo is

strewn

fetid

ruin:

attenuated,

fact,

string of depraved

outposts stretched

along

miles of

dense jungle
society.

mix of violated nature and

decayed

though the heart of

darkness has many

of

the hallmarks of

river. It is, in Consequently, al a wilderness, it is,

finally,
have
rupted

an environment

tainted and transformed

by

societies and cultures which

not

so much collided or collapsed

informed

one another as

they have, first,

cor

and, then,

in

on one another.

Of course, if Conrad's Congo

cannot

is, in

part, a political min, it follows that he

strategies

rely

on

the

kinds

of

defensive

favored

by

his

predecessors.

Unlike Hobbes, Conrad ical. Consequently, he

with which

cannot cannot

meaningfully derive from such

contrast the natural with

the polit

a contrast a set of restraints or the

to circumvent the

dangers,
is

the

insecurities,
is "civil

amorality

of

man's

nature.

Moreover, if

politics

not

the solution to the special kind of

society."

"demoralization"

in Conrad's Congo,
understood

neither

For, like

poli

tics, it is society
ness.

pursuit of economic self-interest

in the eighteenth-century sense of the organized which has helped create the heart of dark

No

one who

other than a

indigenous to Conrad's Congo is there for any reason hope for gain. (Marlow may, of course, be the exception here, as is
not

come to cash
whole

may the beardless Russian boy. However, everyone else, Conrad intimates, has in on the ivory which trickles out from the interior.) In fact, the
place, Marlow tells us, has
about

it the "taint

of

imbecile

rapacit

(p.

89).

But,
aceas

quite

clearly, rapacity
are

and economic

self-interest, those
center

old

liberal

pan

for disorder,
is

not enough

to

make the

hold. In

other words, still

even greed

not motivation enough

to urge men to

labor in the jungle's

a actual

On the contrary, everything Marlow sees along the river is (p. 91), he tells us, but, in (p. 83). Men make a "show of
ness.
work"

"muddle"

fact,

nothing is done. Or, when something is done, like the blasting for the railway line on the coast, it is done to no effect. What is real here, Marlow suggests, is but simply the desire to "earn (p. 91). Hence, the suspi cion emerges that in the heart of darkness greed is overwhelmed by inertia. In short, the quest for material gain fails to be what eighteenth-century liberals hoped it was namely, a passion that would first stir men to meaningful action
percentages"

not work

and

then lead them to a restraining

extension, then,

dependence
from
be
all

on other men.

By

what emerges

this is the realization that the

conditions of

Conrad's Congo

can neither

evaded nor

transcended in any

of

Deliberate

Belief and Digging

Hobbes'

Holes

199

the usual ways. Neither

political order nor

Smith's

economic

institu

tions suffice to channel the passions that are

Conrad's Congo is

not

an

loose in the heart of darkness, for liberal condition. And so, it cannot be ordinary,

overcome in an ordinary way. In fact, the climate depicted by Conrad in the Heart of Darkness is nearly that described by Rousseau in his Second Dis course as the logical outcome of the evolution of social inequality. It is a con

dition in

which

denatured

men

are

sources, in

which social

creatures,

suddenly forced back on their habituated to a life of externals, are

own

re

made to

perform without reference

to an external context, to external rules, or to the

censorious eyes of others.

plains

This is,

of

course, a perilous condition, and it ex

why Conrad

makes so much of the

issue

of restraint.

Restraint,

under san utter con

the key to becomes the very essence of endurance moral physical. What men have in the face of and ity and survival, both collapse in the face of failed politics and corroded society are, Conrad these circumstances,

cludes, two things: "deliberate course, is

belief"

holes."

and
means

"digging

The problem,

of

deciding

what

Conrad

by

them.

IV: WORK AND BELIEF

Among
vella,
work

the

forces for
or

restraint which
holes"

Conrad has Marlow discuss in the

easiest

no

work

"digging

is the

to understand. And yet, even

is

not without

becomes

clear

primarily as abound in the heart of darkness, and although they explain why men have come to be there, Marlow discovers early on that, in the Congo, there is no necessary
that there
relation

its ambiguities. For certainly one of the first things which in the Heart of Darkness is that Marlow does not value work an economic activity. In other words, although economic desires

between

work and

the hope

for gain,

the chief stimulus to

civil society's

economic activity.

Indeed,

after a

while, he comes to suspect

is

an

the Central

Station, for
can

inverse relationship between them. After a short stint inland at example, Marlow declares that, on balance, men do not
men would rather

like to

work

(p. 97). Most

"laze

about and

think of all the

mere

fine things that

act of

be

done"

(p.

97).

In fact, Marlow observes, work, the

exception

something"

"accomplishing
and this

(p. 83), is the

darkness
tion,
the

is tme in

spite of an atmosphere of
buccaneers"

in the heart of rampant greed. What is

more, the greediest, the "sordid

seem

of

the Eldorado

Exploring

Expedi

to have the least

aptitude

for

work.

Even

by

the

modest standards of

jungle,

Marlow notes, these

and

men appear

incapable

of

doing

anything.

Mere

dilletantes
summon qualities
victims.

thieves,

greed

has

unfitted them even or serious

for

survival.

Unable to

up hardihood, audacity, courage, "wanted for the work of the

Their
unfitness costs

world"

(p. 99)

any of those they become the jungle's

rapacious and

intention

them their
work

lives.
the cause

However, if

an

inability

to

is fatal to the truly

200
of

Interpretation

thing,"

dissipation in the merely greedy, a proven ability to work, to "do some is clearly the source of whatever safety there is for men in the heart of

darkness. The question, of course, is how anyone there comes to engage in this saving form of action. The answer, if we are to take Marlow's account of
things seriously, is simple. Men vival,
or either work

reflexively for the

sake of sur

they

work

consciously for

virtuosity's sake.

Very by

early in the story, Marlow, fresh from the continent yet already rattled the trip down the coast and his first grim impressions of the Coastal Station,
Although he has
not

meets the accountant.

been

"in-country"

very long, Mar

per

low has been there

vades

long

enough to recognize

that a "great

demoralization"

the heart of darkness and that this

"demoralization's"

first casualty is the

"miracle"

capacity to act. He has also been there long enough to recognize a when he sees one (p. 83). The accountant is, Marlow tells us, a "sort
sion": a

of vi

starched,
of

ironed,

and

bmshed

creature whose years

"got-up

shirt-fronts were

character"

achievements

(p. 83). Three

at the

station, Marlow de

clares,
person,

and are

the

man still observes

the amenities.

Moreover, his books, like his

nevertheless wor accom

the object of scmpulous and undistracted attention (p. 83). If he

looks like

"hair-dresser's For in the

dummy,"

Marlow

decides, he is
"muddle,"

thy

of respect.

middle of a general

he has "verily

something"

plished

(p. 83).

tant. For

good reason to mention this early encounter with the accoun he leams something from this man that will help him survive the trip inland. Specifically, he leams the value of uninterrupted, reflexive attention to
anything.

Marlow has

something,

He leams, too,
accountant's

about

the

diversionary

value of work.
"backbone"

That he

comes

to see the
of

fastidiousness
appreciate

as evidence of

is the result,

finally,

his coming to

just how improbable it is to

while

care about clean cuffs and accurate accounts accountant

in the jungle. And so,

the

may not be one of Marlow's more significant acquaintances in the heart of darkness, he has, nevertheless, a special claim on Marlow's memory of that place. He is the first person to show Marlow how an unreflective atten
tion to surface
103)-

details

can

help

one elude

the

ravages of

reality (pp. 83-84, saving diversion, takes. On the

If Marlow himself has

occasion

to fall back

on work as a which

he is

not

terribly

particular about

the actual form

this

work

contrary,
and

what concerns him is the way in which it is conducted. Like Kant, like J. S. Mill, Marlow is especially concerned with the frame of mind one brings to one's In this regard, Marlow finds that work must be in formed by a "singleness of one which relieves the worker of the
work."

intention"

burdens

of self-consciousness. useful

The

accountant's

work, for example, is

neither

immediately

(to

anyone other than

himself) nor, it seems, particularly

parody
of

self-conscious in character. Less a virtuoso performance than a mad

1 1.

Mill,

op.

cit., p. 56.

Deliberate
business in its
as

Belief and Digging

about

Holes
of

201 habit. Yet in its very routineness,

usual, it has

it the flavor

singleminded

dismissal

of

the reality of life on the coast, it is an effective

strategy

of survival.

Much the
(p.

same

thing

can

be

said of the work

done
are

by

the

natives aboard

Marlow's

steamer.

The cannibals, Marlow tells us,

work

"men

with"

one could work

104).

cutting dead their store of hippo

and at

wood meat

for fuel.

They They
their

eat

steadily lumps

at

keeping
they

the boat afloat

when

of

lavender dough

spoils, and,
of

although

starving,

observe an un

imaginable

restraint

in the face
each other

fellow

passengers.

They

do not, Mar

low observes, "eat

before my

eyes"

(p. 104) nor, he marvels, do

of

"pilgrims"

they

eat

the

onboard. unafflicted

ful and, seemingly,

They are, simply enough, men by elaborate consciousness.

routine,

use

So too,
tive

until

"partner"

his untimely death, is the steamers helmsman, Marlow's na (p. 124). He too does something. Very simply, he steers. And if
work

this capacity

for

does

not save

him, it is because, for

his

an

instant,

the

helmsman
103).

abandons

his

concern of

for the "mere incidents

intention,"

surface"

of the

(p.

He loses his "singleness

work"

reflexive sense of

the "right

way

of

going to
117).

(p.

single moment's conscious

For this momentary lapse from routine, for a satisfaction with a Martini-Henry rifle, he pays with
108).

his life (p.

opens

Seized

himself up to the
a

by a sudden "creepy

fit

of of

self-consciousness, the helmsman

the jungle (p. 107).

thoughts"

Inadvertently,

he fronts
dling"

reality which, Marlow has

109).

assured

us, is beyond the power of "med

(p.

In

doing

so, he relinquishes the saving, the restraining diver

a tree swayed

sion of

the surface and becomes "just like Kurtz

by

wind"

the

(p.

124).

What
value

this, then, is that work to be life-sustaining. Rather it need only be a

we
all
streets"

leam from

need not

have

economic
men

routine which

keeps

"off the
pose. what

a routine capable of a

holding

men's attention to some pur

In

sense,

what

Conrad has Marlow tell

Work is

us about work
at

is

reminiscent of

Voltaire had Candide tell his little household

satire
of

the

end of

the

eighteenth-

century

the same

name.12

diversion,
of

venting depth. It

the unsavory or

"creepy"

consequences of

way of circum meddling beyond one's

is, in

short,

verting their
planted

gaze

relieving men of the burden of themselves by di from the horror around them and by keeping their shoulders
a

way

firmly

against

the

wheel.

And yet, in the novella, Marlow himself is an exception to this simple mle about the diversionary character of work. Like the accountant, the cannibals,
and the unlike

helmsman, Marlow

too

works: and

he is

absorbed why.

in
In

a surface routine.
other

But

happens to save, it is a saving diversion undertaken consciously. For him, work is a virtuoso performance, himself and for the opportuundertaken both for the chance it offers to
routine which
"find"

them, he knows that he is Marlow is not simply a reflexive

he knows

words,

work

for

12.

Voltaire, Candide [New York: Modern Library,

1956].

202 nity it

Interpretation
affords

him to

construct

his

own

reality (p.

97).

Sometime

during his

Marlow decides to work, and to make of his work stay at the Central Station, routine. And the way he goes about doing this, surface something more than a his approach makes "deliberate ultimately, invests his work with
belief"

work the expression of a conscious

judgment

about what

it

means

to be

human.

In short, in
devils"

a moral wilderness

"pilgrims,"

(p.
of

86),

weary

variously inhabited by common thieves, "flabby by defeated and domesticated savages, and
works

finally,

course,

by Kurtz,
122).

Marlow

to be a

civilized man

a man of

self-restraint

(pp. 106,

immediately striking about Marlow's view of work as a conscious performance is, of course, the special kind of danger it involves. Unlike the ac
What is
countant, the cannibals, or the the "vengeful
aspect"

helmsman, for
.

example, Marlow cannot escape

of

the heart of darkness

On the contrary, the demands

of

virtuosity require that he be keenly aware of the jungle's "treacherous (p. 102). In the midst of his routine, he confesses, he can "feel its mysterious
watching"

appeal"

stillness

him (p.

103).

suppose,

which makes

Marlow

grateful

And it is this unremitting presence, one must for the surface-truth of work and which
routine alone

persuades
man.

him that,
confirm

over the

long haul,

is

not enough

to save a

As if to

this, he
steamer

speaks

bluntly

about

the

jungle's

unexpected

blan

dishments. As his

toils inland to

Kurtz, for
routine are

example, both the

river's

brooding
frenzied
(p.

quiet and

Marlow's finely-honed

ululations of natives

along the banks. What is

provoke

suddenly at first

shattered

by

the
and

horrible

"unearthly'

episode, though, soon becomes the occasion for

rapturous

insight

105).

The cries, Marlow tells us,

from

within

him the "faintest

and the na
"inhuman."

response."

trace of
tives'

Initially
contortions

the "terrible frankness of that

noise"

Yet seem ugly and way to the feeling that all this is not inhuman, but. rather, eminently human. And that possibility, in turn, is posi like yours tively riveting to Marlow. "[J]ust the thought of their humanity It raises the "dim suspicion of there being a he admits, "thrilled
savage
unnerve

him; they

soon

enough, this

first impression

gives

"

you."

could meaning in (that noise) which you dangerous what is about conscious is he concludes, that,
. .

comprehend"

(pp.

105-6).

And

apprehension

in the

heart of darkness. Yet in spite of the

comes to understand
pulse

provocative

nature of

this

incident,

in

spite of what resists the

he

from it

about

the "mind of
dance"

man,"

Marlow

im

to "go ashore for a howl and a

more

(pp. 105-6). Unlike

either the un
surface-

fortunate helmsman or,

truth of his
work

terribly,

Kurtz, he

neither abandons the

(p.

106)

nor

informs his

virtuoso performance.

concentration raises

the question

with the "deliberate belief that Of course, the fact that he does not break his of what it is that keeps Marlow to his work. It

breaks faith

raises the question, speak of

too,

of what

Conrad,

and

hence

Marlow,

mean when

"deliberate

belief."

they

Deliberate

Belief and Digging

belief,"

Holes

203

Considering
sion of should

the occasions in the novel which give rise to Conrad's discus

"deliberate
clear almost

two things

about

the

nature

of

Marlow's belief is Conrad's way

be

immediately. First, "deliberate

meaningful

belief"

of

relativity of the heart of darkness. What he settles on in this regard is hardly novel, yet it is de manding enough. It is simply that it is a belief in the need for restraint which
some action
utter makes men

injecting

basis for

into the

human, just

as

it is the

exercise of restraint under adverse condi

and

tions which distinguishes men

from fools

from

angels

(p.

122).

What

should be equally clear, given the fact that the heart of darkness is a (p. 98), is, second, that the actual void of law or "external
checks"

condition restraints

which men observe

do

not

derive automatically from

belief"

either received values or

natural

impulses.
when

On the contrary,
tuoso performance

the "deliberate closely, it

which proves

informs Marlow's

vir

is

examined

to be one

consciously

erected
with moral

in the
out a

painful

isolation

of the such

Central Station. It is
do"

a response to

"solitude

policeman."

For in

condition, Marlow assures us, the familiar

notations of a

society

kind

or

"simply the "whispering

won't

(p. 106). Without the

opinion,"

of public

without

"warning the "holy

voice of

ter

ror of scandal and gallows and power of

lunatic

asylums"

(p. 122), without, in short, the

society,"

the Leviathan or the pressures

clothes,"

of

"civil

fine sentiments, like

off at the

"[acquisitions
shake"

and

become

chimeras.

"They fly

first

good

(p.

106).

Put

bluntly, fine

sentiments can never sustain the man who

wink"

"knows"

what

the mind of man is capable of and "can look on without a

needs

(p.

106).

That man, Marlow argues,

needs

ments."

He

"deliberate

belief"

something more than "fine he needs an "inborn

whose

senti

strength

The
oblique,

reason a man

for this is is

clear.

Unlike the fool

glance

is

timid and

someone who can

evil"

who can see

its "hidden

look squarely into the heart of darkness, (p. 102), and yet act in spite of it. He is also, knows that,
under

Marlow
not

reports, someone who

on the

these circumstances, he can

rely

more secure

restraining influence of dimly place or time. He knows that he bom

not of externals,

remembered mles requires a

from another, A

less

perishable ground
man

for

action

one

but

of

his

own sense of self.

is,

therefore,

someone who cultivates the self-knowledge which comes through a

work"

devotion to "obscure, back-breaking man is a presence which emanates in

(p.

122).

What

such work yields a

"voice"

whose speech

(p. 106). and, therefore, unable to "be Marlow concludes, stems from the fact that it derives its authority
chimeras or
ill"

silenced"

is truly human That it cannot be silenced,

not

from
or

dreams
a

or

hollow egotism, but from something

sense of

real.

For "good

then, it is

compelling

his

own

reality

and voice, a private convic

tion of purpose bom out of

work

fidelity

to the

modest

lessons

gleaned

from

actual

in the world,

which permits

Marlow to

exercise restraint.

Because

of

this,

row"

he he

can
can

hear the "fiendish

which

feel its fatal

attraction and yet

the heart of darkness throws out to him, reject its spectacular promise of a "howl

204
and a

Interpretation
steamfor the less dramatic, if saving, act of tending his "leaky (p. 106). Certainly, the same cannot be said of the novel's only other

dance"

pipes"

virtuoso: the same cannot

be

said

for Kurtz.

V: DELIBERATE BELIEF

There is,

of

course, something
work

circular

in Conrad's

having
and

made

belief the

function

of

work,

the active

expression of

belief,

both the basis for

whatever conscious restraint

discouraging

to

find

is to be found in the heart of darkness. But if it is circular argument at the bottom of Marlow's virtuoso

performance, it is

still more

discouraging

to consider the alternatives.

Certainly

Conrad's straggling cast of characters in the novella suggests that there are strikingly few options for those who have no wish to be fools, no hope of be coming angels, who would act in the world and yet not become Kurtz. Yet, if it is tme, as Marlow (like Aristotle) tells us, that fools and angels are in no danger of being "assaulted by the powers of (p. 122), that it is only
darkness"

men who are susceptible

earth"

to contamination
are we

by

the

"sights,

sounds and smells of

of

the

(p. 122), how

to understand Conrad's use

the word

"man"

in this
ters'

context?

Moreover, in

the

face

of

formidable differences in his

jungle differences

charac

response to the moral wilderness of the

pilgrims'

which range

from the weary "insane to the accountant's busy rou tine, from Marlow's impressive resistance to the "sights, sounds and smells of the to Kurtz's lavish passage "beyond the bounds of permitted aspira
earth"

ineffectualness"

tions"

(p. 144)

can

we,

finally, believe
a man case

holes"

that

belief"

are enough

to

keep

What

seems to

be the

from going is that Conrad

and "digging wrong"? "terribly neither cedes all

"deliberate

his

characters

equal weight as men nor permits work

well.

informed

by

belief to

serve everyone

Throughout the story, for example, Marlow makes a fundamental equally distinction between the status of the "weary and that of almost every one else. Even after the calamitous events at the Inland Station, when the pil
pilgrims"

grims recoil

throw him into an "unwanted

partnership"

with

Kurtz, Marlow does

grateful,
as

not

from their feeble his "choice

slander.

Rather he

accepts

it,

he says, to infer from

"men."

be

offered

nightmares"

of

(pp. 138, 146,

as

141).

One

can

this that

Marlow, at least, views What they are instead, we leam,

Moreover they
one whose essence

the pilgrims
are

something less than

a counterfeit

"flabby

devils,"

a species of counterfeit practice

men.

are counterfeit men

who

form

of

restraint

is

"appearances"

a certain vague attention

to

(pp.

94, 113).

In Marlow's opinion, the

pilgrims are creatures

incapable

of

any

sincere

be

lief. Their specialty is the public, for example, they

superficial observance of accepted social

engage

forms. In
Kurtz a

in

polite

displays

of concern

for

Deliberate
man whom

Belief and Digging

and envy.

Holes

205
subject

they fear

In private,

they

his

name

to extravagant

calumny (pp. 91, 99-102). What this kind of hollow pretence produces at close range, Marlow implies, is simply a feeling of revulsion, its long-range
effect,

however, is

quite

different. The

pilgrims'

inability

to generate

or express

sincere conviction or

to engage in an

less to

an atmosphere of vileness

honest day's work, Marlow decides, leads than one of insane ineffectualness. Indeed,
"business"

from the first to the

a sense of

last,

the sight of them at their

invokes from him

"lugubrious

drollery"

(p. 38).

Having

no real purchase on their situa

pilgrims"

operate within a nar any way of acquiring it, the "bewitched a "special row band of behaviors. They either wait for something to happen or they fill the empty spaces of the heart of darkness act of creation

tion nor

perhaps"

with an aimless

barrage

of shells.

That Conrad
seems

pilgrims"

perceives the clear.

"weary
lack that
clear.

to be less

men

than "small

souls"

perfectly

That he believes the

men who

accountant, the cannibals, and the helmsman to be men, but

self-consciousness which might make

them

fully human,

seems
of

The problem, What

confront we

of

course, is to decide

what

Conrad thinks

equally Kurtz.

discover is that Kurtz, unlike Marlow, is someone who has tried to the awful reality of the heart of darkness without benefit of convic
would

tion. His capacity for choice and his exercise of judgment are radically im
paired.

And they are, Marlow (p.

122).

have

us

believe, because Kurtz's

rather on raw

charac
. .

ter is based not on something

[self]"

real or

palpable, but

"devotion

to

What

makes

this especially problematic, Marlow continues,

is that Kurtz's "devotion to

the product

self"

is less

a reflection of actual achievement than

of popular approval

(p.

119).

In

other

words, his egotism is a hol

low sham, little

more than the unstable extension of

own

images he is
so

of

themselves through his

a creature of

"gift

expression

of

his ability to reflect (p. 119). Because

others

thoroughly

opinion, he is less

a virtuoso performer than a

talented actor. He is simply

lines. Consequently,

what

assuming roles and at learning brings him to the Inland Station is less a studied con
someone adept at

viction about or practical plan

for combining trade

and

philanthropy than

an

trading ability pany who wish to promote their African interests in this way. The tragedy of this, Marlow observes, is that in the jungle Kurtz's
quence

to make himself the instmment and voice of those in the

com

elo
on

finds

no suitable audience. since

Quite literally, his

at the

moral sentiments

fall

deaf
no

ears.

And

he is

a man

"hollow

core,"

someone who possesses

"real

presence"

outside of

the

approval which others give

"voice."

him, he
an

proves

quite

incapable

of

generating any convincing

a
of

Lacking
meaningful

audience, he
of action.

simply cannot translate his own words into short, Kurtz is defenseless against the terrors
once

plan

In

the heart of darkness.

once

solitude,"

"taken

counsel with
responds

the great

having

heard its

Having "fascinating
of the

whisper,"

Kurtz

by

earth"

(p. 143),

and passes

playing his strong suit. He "kick[s] loose "beyond the bounds of permitted

aspiration"

(p.

206
144).

Interpretation

Society's

darling

becomes the jungle's darling. He becomes,

man, but a
reflection of

until

his

last

act of

judgment,
"initiated

not a

the

jungle, its
(p.
133).

voice and

servant

an

wraith

from

the

back

Nowhere"

of

What Marlow's story

portant volves

makes

clear, then, is that

alone

while work

is

part of what makes a man a

human being, it

is

not sufficient.

Equally

necessary im

is

conscious or

deliberate belief. To be

fully human,

in

other

words, in
must nec

both

action and choice.

essarily
133)

work

to some

However, if Conrad believes that men conscious end, there must be some "small
to act on a
meaningful
wrong"

matter"

(p.

which enables a man

belief. In short, just

as work

alone cannot save a man neither can work

in the heart of darkness from going "terribly belief. Without a real, substan just kind of informed by any
seems to

tial

belief, Conrad
corruption.

imply,
up

one either

labors

dumbly
be in

with an almost

animal-like patience to

keep

appearances, or one succumbs to an all-encom

passing

To

act meaningfully,
belief"

then,

one must

possession of an

animating idea, an "unselfish self (pp. 69-70). In short, one

Although Conrad is

that goes beyond the mere promotion of

must

have

a principled and moral will.

never explicit about what makes

for

such

deliberate be independence

lief,

one can

infer from his

seems

portrait of
case

Marlow that it is

a certain

of mind.

What

to be the

is that it is the
work

self-constituted nature of

Marlow's belief
restraint

which makes

it the fit basis for

wilderness. sad

and, therefore, the

key

to
al

in the face

of a moral

The

question of

why Marlow,

among the jungle's independence is left singularly

most alone

residents,

possesses senses

this disposition toward

unresolved.

One

from the

comments of

the story's anonymous narrator that Marlow's background has prepared him to
embrace and act on some substantial

idea. But Conrad

never

tells us this di

rectly, nor

ought we

to assume that Marlow

all

is the
sure

exemplar of unlike

any

particular

social group.

Rather,

the reader knows

who are

for

is that

Kurtz,

the pil

grims,

or

Marlow's

coworkers

passions, to
cess and

"lying fame,
(p. 146),
or

sham

variously distinction [and]

enslaved all

to their boundless

the appearances of suc

power"

to unthinking routine, Marlow is a decision-taker

capable of an

elementary
the

act of restraint.
points

haps,
along

one with

of

telling

That he is the only such man is, per in this fin-de-siecle novella. It may also be,
chief

his

portrait of

Kurtz, Conrad's

nization, bureaucratic routine,

and an exotic and

warning to a new age lethal unrestraint.

of orga

VI: CONCLUSION

What relevance, then, does Conrad's tale have for contemporary liberals? In what ways does the Heart of Darkness shed light on our condition? At one

level,
ates

the answer to these questions is that

Conrad's

novella

forcefully

reiter

the warnings of others.

commercial nexus of civil

For example, Conrad, like Rousseau, thinks the society is an inappropriate brake on the passions.

Deliberate

Belief and Digging

he is

Holes

207
the moral
compression that attends

Following Mill,

also concerned with

liberalisms's susceptibility to the force of opinion. But most importantly, Conrad, like de Tocqueville, suspects that liberal societies may generate a
whole new

breed

of men.

He is afraid, in
operate

other words, that

passionate,

self-

interested men,
ethos, will ter of

when

they

in

an environment

devoid

of a secure moral
of

lose any
the

sense of themselves.
vision of

He is frightened, in short,

the

spec

Kurtz, by

"hollow
provocative

What

makes all

this especially

is that the very

conditions which

define the heart of darkness are, with growing frequency, being These societies, too, it is said, are to liberal societies in
general.13

attributed character

is surely built into the liberal vision of man, it is also one that has, in the past, been contained. Now, however, the moral restraints which once tethered the passions have
ized

by

the

prevalence of greed.

And though this

motive

decayed.'4

The authority
of

of the state

has been

enfeebled

by

challenges

to the

legitimacy
lost
much

any

public

of

their

force. So, too, have men's ethico-religious sentiments capacity to restrain. For though these sentiments still
"neutral"

abound,
civil

they

speak

nipulated

society no in the

discordantly. Even the purportedly longer confine. Rather, they are seen as

constraints of constraints

to

be

ma

service of self.

and political capital of

In short, many observers allege that the ethical liberalism has been spent. Hence, liberalism, left to its
to rely
upon

own

the state's
such a

devices, is laws,
rather

unable

the passion-restraining
or

authority

of either

gods'

the

commandments,

the economy's invisible hand. In

and

situation, liberal society takes on a

forbidding

foreboding

aspect.

It

becomes

like

heart of darkness.
than

But Conrad does

that others laid out in than create an

more

simply

reprise

in dramatic form the

concerns more
con

sociological or philosophical analyses. condition

And he does

imaginary

that happens to mirror the character of

temporary liberal

societies.

For

with

his

portrait of overcomes

Marlow, Conrad depicts

its dangers: his

man who survives the

darkness. Marlow

moral sen

sibilities are not overwhelmed.

perspective,
world. straint.

what

Nor is he left empty and hollow. Seen from this Conrad has provided is a model of survival in the liberal
to supply Nonetheless
as an

Sadly, though, Conrad fails

Perhaps
none can

be

given.

what

etiology for Marlow's re is telling is the degree to

a

which
will.

Marlow's restraint, ineffable

of

it may be, looks like

the
virtuous man.
realizes must

Kantian

act of

It partakes, too,
paradigms
of

Aristotle's
moral

sketch of

For like
decide

each of

these
must and

rational,

agency, Marlow

that, "[fjirst, he
on

know [that he is
on

doing

virtuous

actions]; second, he

them,
a

decide

them for themselves; and, third, he

must also

do them from

13. In this regard, consider Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis [Boston: Beacon, 1973]; and William P. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy [Los Angeles: University of California

Press,
14.

1982].

Fred Hirsch, Social Limits

to

Growth [Cambridge: Harvard

University Press,

1976].

208
firm
and

Interpretation
state."15

The foundation for Marlow's restraint does, af unchanging ter all, rest within himself. It is his own will which withstands the natural and
passionate

hedonism
and

of

the

jungle,
of

the self-interested, economic attractions of

the pilgrims.

the

ivory,

the social
regard

flattery

So, too, is his

restraint prac

ticed
aim.
with

without

for

external

reward.

And he

pursues this aim relentlessly. standards

Not utility, but self-control, is his Thus, when Marlow acts in accord
also conforms

Conrad's
and

for

"humanity,"

he

to the expectations

of

Kant

Aristotle. He behaves

as a rational and moral

being.

more to it than this. For in Marlow, Conrad has not only deliv figure confronting all the failed or failing forms of liberal man. He has also described Marlow in the profoundly empirical way. As such, the example of Marlow can be used to invest Kant's moral agent and Aristotle's "great-

Yet there is

ered a

man"

souled
no mean

with a concreteness

that enlivens these philosophic

ideals. This is

tant and
pared

achievement, for Kant's rational agent has always seemed rather dis abstract. So much so, in fact, that more than one thinker has been pre

to dismiss Kant's scheme as simply an idealist's fantasy. And Aristotle's

virtuous

man,

while never so

abstract, has

remained a

figure hard to
"empirical"

place

in

the here and now. But if Kant's ideal appears unduly refined, and Aristotle's
somewhat

anachronistic, the

same cannot

be

said of their unreal or

realiza

tion in the Heart of Darkness. There

about

is, in

short, nothing

incredible

Marlow. Nor is there anything about him which is remote or untimely. What Marlow's journey to the heart of darkness suggests, then, is that there for
a

are safeguards

liberal

the moral reserves of

these safeguards are though

universe. However, these can only be found within individual human beings. Of course, it is also clear that hard to establish, and they are even harder to sustain. For

work and routine will often

deflect the passions,

In short,

and

though commerce
of

and public opinion can channel restraints

the behavior of interested men, none

these

is completely
the polity's
of a

reliable or sufficient.

neither society's conven

tions

nor

then, the security

and

the

autonomy of liberal political

will adequately restrain liberal man. Ultimately, liberal society depends on the sense of purposiveness those who inhabit it. In this respect, at least, the durability of

laws

universe rests on the presence and

not

res which are

themselves

the products of
imperative"

liberalism.16

vitality of values Some other

and mo commit

ments, be

they

to a "categorical

or

to a telos of virtuous action,

must undergird

liberal

man.

Perhaps it is unsurprising that Conrad's tale should imply such a conclusion. For by the time Conrad wrote, liberalism was, as we have seen, under consid
erable which

outside pressure.

What is noteworthy, though, is the

reiterated

Conrad's judgment is

today,

and reiterated

frequency with by self-professed

extra-

15. 16.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985],

A
similar point

p. 40.

regarding liberalism's

need

atomistic moral vision

is

central to the argument of

empirically situated and Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of

for both

an

Justice [Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press,

1982].

Deliberate
liberals.

Belief and Digging

aside such

Holes

209
examples as
on a

Setting

obvious, substantiating

John Rawls

and

Alan Gewirth,

each of whom grounds

his liberalism

Kantian, deontolog

ical base, or the examples of Robert Nozick and Bmce or the turn, invoke either the notion of
"rights"
tice"

Ackerman,
of a

who, in

"technology"

"perfect jus

to

sustain their

views, it
and

alisms of

James Fishkin
addresses

especially appropriate to look at the liber William Galston.17 In Beyond Subjective Moral
seems

ity, Fishkin

the task of

finding

"objective"

minimally

basis for

ethico-political

the nihilism so
alism's

from succumbing to decision-making apparent in the heart of darkness. Stymied in his quest by liber
one that will restrain us

too-frequent association with a

asserts the need

thoroughgoing
in the

value

noncognitivism,

Fishkin

for

a transformation

character of metaethical

judgment.18

He calls, in short, for a revolutionary change in the way liberal ism deals with moral issues. Only such a step beyond the traditional parameters
of

liberal thought

will

both

preclude a

dangerous

ethical subjectivism and pro save

tect liberalism from its detractors. In short, liberalism is to

itself

by

incor
to dis

porating
cover

extraliberal norms. sets

Similarly, William Galston

with,

out, in Justice

and the

Human

Good,

the bases for a sound, liberal

conception of

justice. What he

concludes

however, is
of

a neo-Aristotelian appeal.

derstanding

justice

rests upon an antecedent appreciation of the

Galston finds that any sensible un human good;

in short, it rests on a conception of the telos of man. Without such a concep tion, Galston avers, there can be no feel for the appropriate direction for human
action.

Nor
a

can there

be any polity only

sense of

the necessary

boundaries
foster.

on

behavior.

Hence,
ble
Here

just

and good

needs citizens possessed of a purpose and capa

an agreed upon telos can

of a self-restraint that
again one

finds

an echo of

Conrad's

conclusions.

For both Fishkin

and

Galston's

arguments call

for the development

of citizens who are able

to look

beyond themselves,
are

who can recognize

the need for self-restraint, and who are

prepared to stmcture their own

way

of

acting in the

world.

Of course, if they

to create that "small

matter"

which will allow them to

be

fully human,

then

such citizens

must,

as

aries and premises of

Anglo-American liberalism. In

Conrad suggested, look beyond the traditional bound fact, they might do well

to look at Marlow. After all, it

is Marlow's
commitment

sense of

himself, his
within

cognizance of restrains

the

world about

him,

and

his

to working
of

it that

and saves

him.

Only by

nurturing this way hope to

being

in the

world

developing
agency darkness.

citizens who can meet these standards of purposive and

only by humane

can

liberal

societies

secure themselves against

the heart of

17. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971]; Alan Gewirth, Human Rights [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982]; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia [New York: Basic Books, 1974]; Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970]; James Fishkin, op. cit.; William Galston, op. cit. 18.

Fishkin,

op.

cit., pp. 153-57-

The Discourse

on the

Origin

and the

Foundations of
Work*

Inequality Among Men

On the Intention
of

Rousseau's Most Philosophical

Heinrich Meier
Carl Friedrich
von

Siemens Foundation, Munich

Rousseau in the Confessions among

greatest all

called

the Discours

sur

I'inegalite that
manifest

piece

his

writings not

in

which

his is

principles

"are

made

with

the

boldness,

to
of

audacity."1

say
the book
reading.

That does

not

mean, to be sure, that

the

complete

boldness
the

obvious or

immediately
also we venture

discloses itself in

its full

measure at

first

The Confessions

tells us that when we

concern ourselves with

the Discours sur

I'inegalite

into

a work

that,

according to the
it."2

pronouncement of

its author, "found in among them

who

all

Europe only few

to talk about

readers who understood

it,

and none

wanted

We are, then,

warned. sur

If the Discours Rousseau

on

his

part

I'inegalite found only few readers who understood it, left no doubt that he had from the outset written the book
who

for "the
number

few,"

for "those

know how to

for "a very

at

small

of

readers."3

More exactly, the Discours is directed his

two

very

different,
he is

at

two unequal addressees: Rousseau directs his discourse at the tme

whom

philosophers,

he

acknowledges as number of

sole

judges, but
who will

at

the same time

well aware of

the large

listeners

hear his discourse

and whom

he

can reach with

it. To the

inequality

of the addressees correspond

the unequal ways of

addressing them. Other

vulgar
readers.4

objects

for

reflection are given

to

the philosophers than to the

What

must appear

dark

and

erig-

*Lecture held

on

April 30, 1987,

to

at

the

invitation

of the

Department

of

Government

of

Harvard

University. The

author wishes

express sincere

thanks to Professor J.

Harvey Lomax,

Memphis

State University, for translating the text into American English. 1. Confessions, IX, (Euvres completes (Paris: Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1959vols., Vol. I, p. 407. Hereafter cited as OCP. All page numbers that appear in the text
notes without

1969),
or

4 in the
sur

further

specification refer

to the

edition

Diskurs iiber die Ungleichheit I Discours

sdmtlichen

I'inegalite. Kritische Ausgabe des integralen Textes. Mit Materialien

tiert von

Fragmenten

und ergdnzenden

kommennach den Originalausgaben und den Handsehriften neu ediert, ubersetzt und Heinrich Meier. (Paderbom: Schoningh, 1984). FN refers to the commentary in this edi tion. The translation by Roger D. and Judith R. Masters entitled The First and Second Discourses (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964) has been consulted in order to render Rousseau's French into

English.
2.
3.

Confessions, VIII; OCP I,

Lettre Cf.
a

p. 389.
complete

Jean Jallabert
et

of

March 30, 1755, Correspondance

p.

(CC),

ed.

R. A. Leigh

(Geneva: Institut
4.
p.

Musee Voltaire, 1966) Vol. 3,

FN
213.

115.

172 and

interpretation,

Winter 1988-9, Vol. 16, No. 2

212
matic

Interpretation
can offer

to the many

the

few insight into the fundamental its boldest thoughts.

sur

principles of

the text and induce them to think

The very

conception

of

the Discours

I'inegalite

presupposes

from the

very beginning a fundamental intellectual inequality of men, mately

of characterized of

inequality
and

an

inequality

that results

from the

by

consequently from an inequality that is ulti s Rousseau as natural. For the adequate understanding

the

book,

its

rhetoric and of still

its intentions, this

that

presupposition signifies

the

following. The

view

widespread

has had the

strongest

historical
and

influence, namely
foremost
anism, is

the assessment that the Discours sur I'inegalite

is first

a moral, not to say moralizing, treatise intended to promote egalitari

more apt

to block access to the central core of the enterprise that

Rousseau begins in the Discours, than to disclose it. The theoretical insight into the fundamental inequality
appropriate expression

of men

finds its

most

in the

exoteric-esoteric

double

aspect

that characterizes

the Discours
ing,"

sur

I'inegalite through

and

through. With the "art of careful writ

with and

the presentation that consciously veils,

by

encoded

allusions, Rousseau accommodates

speaking in abbreviations himself to the in principle

problematical character of a public

treatment of philosophic and scientific sub

of men that

jects. It is precisely
ter

out of

the

inequality

this

problematical charac

arises,

which

Rousseau

himself brought to light,

beginning

with

the

Discours

sur

les

sciences et

les arts,

with

increasing

forcefulness in

ever new

discussions revolving
society.

around

the tense relationship between philosophy and

In the Preface d'une

autumn,

seconde

lettre

Bordes,

which

Rousseau

composed

in

1753 I'inegalite but

immediately
never

before he began working on the Discours himself published, Rousseau writes:

sur

It is only successively and always for few readers that I have developed my ideas. It is not myself that I have spared, but the truth, in order to transmit it more surely and
to make it
useful.

Often I have
a word

given myself a great

deal

of pain to

try

to enclose in

sentence, in a
reflections.

line, in

dropped

as

if by

chance, the

result of a

long

series of

my readers must have found my discourses poorly linked entirely disjointed, for want of perceiving the trunk, of which I showed them only the branches. But it was enough for those who know how to un derstand, and I have never wanted to speak to the
most ot

Often

together

and almost

others."

What Rousseau intimates here In the

about
sur

the character of the philosophical

publica

tions that preceded the Discours

retrospective view of the

I'inegalite holds
he

no

less for the Discours.

the Discours that in it

Confessions,

said of

5. See pp. 66 and 270-72; cf. Premier Discours, OCP III, p. 29; Reponse au roi de Pologne, OCP III, pp. 39, 41; Lettre a Grimm, OCP III, p. 64; Lettre a Le Cat, OCP III, p. 102; Du Contrat social I, 9, OCP III, p. 367; Emile (OCP IV), I, pp. p. 324; p. 266;

247,

II,

IV,

537;

OCP I,

p.

123;

Confessions, I,
p.

p. 5. added.

6. OCP III,

106.

Emphasis

The Discourse
he

on

Inequality
his

-213

"completely
of

developed"

principles

for the first

time.7

Three

years after

the appearance of the

Discours, in

the preface to the Lettre a

d'Alembert

the
ex

first text

Rousseau that,

although

it is

addressed to a

philosopher, turns

appears the remark that in this work the concern for plicitly "to the Rousseau is "no longer to speak to the small number, but to the public; nor to
make the others
sur

people"

With the Discours my thought Rousseau does "speak to the small number"; in I'inegalite, unquestionably
explain
clearly."8

think, but to

the faire

penser

les

autres

he

appropriates

to himself the basic

maxim of

every

exoteric presentation.

Nevertheless, Rousseau's Discours has evidently ees. This is the case not only in that general sense in
publicly disseminated text has to take into principle be read, beyond the "real ing. In the
case of the account

not one which

but two

address
of

the author

every

that his publication can in

addressees,"

by

all who are capable of read

Discours there is the

additional

fact that the double

set of

addressees corresponds to

the double set of intentions that underlies the book.

The Discours is first

philosophers of meant

of all and as a whole a

a

discourse to the few. It

and

addresses

the stamp of for the young or future dience."9 But he expressly

zens of

Plato

or

Xenocrates,
"to the

it is

without question

philosophers who might also

"speaks"

many."

be found among the "au He speaks to the citi

to
whom

Geneva,
"the

to the "human
voice

race,"

finally
made

even to those savages

heard."10

not even speech

heavenly

has

itself

All

mere

figures

of

aside, that the

grounded

is emphatically directed to a second addressee is in the fact that the Discours is a decisively philosophic book and at
speech
political

the same time in the precise and full sense a

book, judging by its

ob

ject

as well as

by

its intention. The

plane on which

the philosophic, real analy

sis occurs

that Rousseau performs in the work, is

on

overlaid

by

the plane

of po

lemical presentation;
political

this polemical plane the critical potential of Rousseau's

philosophy

unfolds.

the two different planes (which

The masterly alternation, back and forth, between must be carefully distinguished if both are ade

quately to be understood) constitutes the central element, clamping everything back together, in the complicated rhetoric that is decisive for the Discours alto
gether.

One
and

must examine

the eulogies and the condemnations, the exhorta the

tions

the

admonitions,

impressive

images

and

the

graphic

contrasts

all of which originate

concrete

in the

plane of polemical presentation

in

the light of the

descriptions Rousseau develops

on the plane of the

philosophic,

real analysis.

Otherwise,

the reader mns the

risk

of

remaining

prisoner of slogans and of

falling
p. 388.

victim to the rhetoric of the Discours where

7.

Confessions, VIII; OCP I,

a

8. Lettre

Mr. d'Alembert

sur

les spectacles,

ed.

M. Fuchs (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1948),

and the

p.

8. Emphasis
9.

added.
pp.

Exordium,

72

ff.;

cf.

Leo Strauss, Persecution

74, Note

Art of

Writing (Glencoe,

III.:

Free Press, 1952),

10.

p. 36.
pp.

Dedication,

8 ff., Exordium,

p.

X,

p. 318.

214

Interpretation

only the insight into the polemical meaning of Rousseau's rhetorical devices would lead to the things themselves. At the most, he in this way can really do

justice to

one

intention

of

the text.
plane of presentation

Just how indispensable it is to distinguish between the

and the plane of the
philosophic analysis

cited and most controversial passages of

may be illustrated in one of the most the book: in Rousseau's praise of the
praise

jeunesse du

monde.

Numerous interpreters have deduced from this

that

Rousseau's "real
sophic

ideal"

is

savage

society,

while

to others, to the more philo

natures, his

praise of

the jeunesse

du

monde appears

to be

an

odd, for the

eign

body

that more or less fills them with

which

perplexity. with

In the final

section of

Exordium, in
Discours.
the
reader

he

addresses
whatever

himself,

pathetic

discours dans le
mentions

to man, "from
will

seek

the age at

land he may which he would

would

be,"

Rousseau

that

wish

that the species had

"perhaps"

stopped;
go

and

that the reader,

time,"

furthermore,

like "to be

able to

backward in

and

that this sentiment

must

become the

criticism of

the

contemporaries
"foreseen"

(p.

74).
when

by him,

Rousseau does everything to nourish the sentiment he first extols the age of savage society as the "happi
and calls

est and most

durable brought

epoch"

it the "best
the

state

for man";

and then sets

before the

reader's eyes the about

dismal

picture of and

consequences

that the "great

revolution,"

by

metallurgy

agriculture,

will precipitate

in the

history
without

of mankind
should

(p.

192).
consideration

What

be taken into

in

order

to

interpret these
ourselves

assertions

capitulating to Rousseau's

rhetoric? shown

We limit

to five sugges
para

tions.

(1) As Rousseau has amply

text, in the
state

in the

immediately

preceding
and

graph of the
man,"

that he subsequently characterizes as the "best for

the "vengeances had become terrible and men

reader who considers

bloodthirsty

(p.

190).

The

the concrete anthropological descriptions of the

can make

various stages of
ity."

development
state

his

own

judgment
faculties"

about their qual

"developed"

(2) In the "best

The

for

man"

not yet

"all

our

are

(p. 206); for that (p.

192).

development,

the occurrence of a "fatal

is

needed

praise of savage

society thus

underlines the antiteleological con

ception of the

Rousseauan

reconstmction of
as

history. (3) The

characterization of

the epoch of savage society the literal translation of

Lucretius'

the "veritable youth of the

world"

contains, with

novitas

mundi, the

most unmistakable reference

in the

book to

De

rerum natura

(V, 780, 818, 943),

the "original

patter

for the Discours. De

tioned

"atheistic,"

rerum natura, proscribed as

is

nowhere men

by

name

in the Discours. When the heathen

the "happiest
and most

epoch of the novitas mundi

is
a

passed off as

durable

epoch,"

Christianity
of the

emerges as

decline,

as one of

the "steps toward the

of

decrepitude

(p.
a

194).

(4) Rousseau's eulogy

11.

the "best state for

man"

is accentuated, in

way that

Cf. Rousseau's

characterization of the primitive state of nature at pp.

136 and 190.

The Discourse
no other passage

on

Inequality

-215

in the text is, in its turn

by

means of

Note

XVI,

which refers to that of the

praise

and

which

contains the

subject

for the frontispiece

whole work.

The first

sentence of and the

Note XVI brings

ends with the

Christianity
of a

and

the Chris
who

tian mission
renounces

into play,

Note
of

discourse
376).

Hottentot
and

"paraphernalia"

the
renounces

European

"forever"

civilization

for his

"entire life discourse

the Christian the

religion"

(p.

Rousseau

adds to this

of no

the savage

final discours dans le Discours

not a word of

his own,

commentary, but merely the comment "See the

on

frontispiece."

(5) It
or

is tme that
man of

the plane of polemical presentation, Rousseau mostly contrasts

the civil state with the sociable savage, the

and

Hottentot,

the

Carib,

the

Indian,

that

he

often

intentionally

savage and the sociable savage.

But his

blurs the distinction between the solitary philosophic analysis leaves no doubt development from solitary
a slave

that the anthropologically most radical change is the

man

to sociable man. Rousseau uses the adjective sociable exactly three times

in the Discours: in
comes evil
others

becoming

sociable,

man

becomes

(p. 92), he be

(p. 166), he henceforth only knows how to live in the opinion of (p. 268). All these characterizations are inseparably bound with one an

They describe one and the same thing. The philosophically decisive break between solitary man and sociable man precedes the, jeunesse du monde, and Rousseau takes pains, in the section directly preceding the praise of savage
other.

society, once again to call the

reader's attention

particularly to the necessity

of

making On the Rousseau

the

an exact

distinction (p.

190).

plane of makes

the polemical crossing of swords with European civilization,

the position of the savages

his

own.

In the final

paragraph of

Discours, he borrows
and concludes

the criticism that

Montaigne directs through the reality of the French monar the book: What dismays the
"that
a

mouths of some savages at

the

political and social

chy,

therewith the Second Part of

savages, "that

man,"

a child commands an old

and

handful

of people most nec

are glutted with superfluities while the

things,"

essary may be

defined."

starving "is manifestly against the law of nature, in whatever way it This assertion applies no less to the scandal that Rousseau
or

multitude

lacks the

silently supplementing the savages filled the savage visitors of France

Montaigne (the "third

thing"

that had
to

with

dismay

had

"escaped"

Montaigne,

his chagrin) cile leads a

places
wise

in the

center

in his enumeration, namely, that "an imbe

of

man."

The "sort

inequality
and

that reigns among

all civilized

peoples'

contradicts

the "natural the "natural

law"

nature"

the "law of
no

together (pp.
with

order,"

270,

272).

It

violates

but is

less incompatible

the the

political order of the good commonwealth that

has in

history

superseded

order"

"natural
recurs

order"

or

that can and

political

should replace

the "natural

anew after

it

in history. The
the Second

thrust of the Discours

with the

is

expressed

in the

praise

savages'

of savage society,

in the identification

(extended)

criticism at

the end

of

Part,

and,

most

Hotprominently, in the discourse of the

216 tentot,

Interpretation
which

the

frontispiece highlights

as the

discours dans le Discours. But

pursues with

the political intention is only one intention that Rousseau book, and it is professedly not his crowning intention.

his

What holds tme for the

sophic

political

intention, holds
which

all

the more for the philo

makes manifest

intention: The

artistic

discourse in

Rousseau

his

principles, is "more
of the
of

than it may appear at first glance. The boldness Discours discloses itself in its full extent only through a careful study
work.

audacious"

the rhetoric of the

Rhetorical

elements

determine the
text
of
"topography"

complexion of
of

the Discours more than that of

any

other theoretical

Rousseau. None
in

his

other

books

exhibits a political-philosophical
of

of comparable written

significance

to that

the Discours

sur

I'inegalite

France, dated

from the Savoyard Chambery, dedicated to the Republic

ens" race."

published

in Amsterdam
presented

which was

formally
of

of

Geneva, but is
will

"in the Lyceum

Ath
"hu

to the philosophers and from there

be brought to the
such an

ears of the external

man

No

other

book

by

Rousseau has

intricate
parts

form,
the

such

multipartite

stmcture, whereby all individual

out

of which

Discours is

composed are

firmly

bound into the

rhetoric of

the text as a whole,

all

and receive their respective

functions therein. I

cannot

delve into

those

mat

ters in detail here. I

from elaborating the profound consis tency inherent in the fact that the text in which Rousseau makes manifest the principles of his philosophy "with the greatest is also his most rhetor
must also refrain
boldness"

ical

text.12

Allow

me

instead to

provide a sketch of

Rousseau's

principles as

they become

visible

when, starting from Rousseau's

rhetoric and always work.

taking

it into account,
"If

one attempts

to forge ahead to the heart of the

one observes the natural constitution of

things,

man seems

evidently des
of the present
all."

tined to be the

happiest

of

creatures; if

one reasons on the

basis
of

state, the human

cleft

species appears

to be the most
expresses

deplorable
p.

The

deep

(which Rousseau trenchantly

in

fragment,

natural possibilities of man on praved existence on the other

the one hand and

418) between the the historical reality of his de Rous

what

hand is the

great challenge with which

philosophy is a pattern of thinking that takes the previously characterizing as "my described cleft radically seriously, anthropologically speaking. He derives from
system"

seau's

comes

to grips. In the center of

Rousseau

never tired of

12.

There is

a more

tion of the

Discours. The

ating lengthy passages Discours. The first fragment

massive,
this attack. A brief sketch

detailed discussion in the introduction, and in the commentary, of my edi volume presents for the first time a complete reproduction of two illumin which Rousseau suppressed in the final from a fair copy of the editing
contains a

harsh

criticism of absolutism, the second an attack, no

less
in

on the spiritual power of the

on

priests; Rousseau intended to have the Discours

precedes this challenge of
of

culminate

For the interpretation

of

genealogy of religion these best-documented cases

the

priestly

authority.

Rousseauan self-censorship

and of their
and

meaning for the reading

of

the Discours altogether, I can only refer again to the introduction

commentary

of

the edition mentioned.

The Discourse
this cleft the
access to

on

Inequality

-217

decisive formulation

of

the question, in order to gain theoretical

condition.

the problems of the

human

In the

following,
of

we will call
a

this

pattern of

thinking "the

conception of the anthropological

difference,"

proposition realized

that takes its bearings

by

the optimal possibilities

human

nature

in the

history

of

the species and realizable

during

the life of an individ

ual;
the

loss, burial, depravation, deformation, or alienation

and that conceives

the

or miscarriage of these possibilities as

of man.

Contemplating
departure the
where

the anthropological
of

difference

means

taking

as one's point of

readiness

human

nature

to become depraved. At the point

Rousseau for the first time

the

speaks of

his "sad

and great

system, the fmit

and of

of a sincere examination of
nation,"

nature of

man, of his faculties

his desti
to elevate

he touches in the
"how

same

breath

on

the specific precariousness of man,

and emphasizes

much

it is to be feared that
we

by

dint

of

desiring

ourselves above our nature,

sur

may fall back beneath

that that very

it."13

In the Discours

I'inegalite, Rousseau
from the

shows

faculty

that

fundamentally
belong

distin
makes

guishes man possible

other

living beings, namely perfectibility (which

of all other

the historical development

faculties that
his

to man ex

clusively), is at the same time the "veritable

miseries

source of

(p.

490).
and

Perfectibility
for the

is

at once the

basis for the difference between "in the

man and

beast

anthropological

difference. Man's historical development into

which

man and

the process of his

rant of

deformation,
are not

long

mn makes

him into the ty

himself

nature"

and of

same origin. supposes

But they
the

identical. The

(p. 104), have, anthropologically speaking, the critique of depraved existence pre
of a nondepraved existence of man.

the natural possibility

Contemplating
the
conditions of extends

difference means, therefore, asking about fortunate human existence. The significance of this question
anthropological

further than it may seem to leads to the insight that the evils that
not without

at

first

glance:

If

man's own

self-knowledge

afflict

him from

are

his

doing,

that "it is unhappy";

difficulty
himself,

that we have succeeded in making

ourselves so which

if it turns
mony

out that nature

does

not not

bar

man

life in

he is in har

with

that

it has

treated him
man

worse

than the other

living be

ings;
ture the

or
can

if the
be

"demonstration"

that

is

good

by

nature, succeeds; then na

conception of

"justified"

(p.

300).

key
to

function belongs to the

man's

anthropological

difference, both for

With
regard
stock"

self-knowledge

and

for the

nature."

"justification
gets

of
own added

from his
have

progress we

to or

both, it is necessary that "what man be distinguished from "what circumstances and his Both presuppose that changed in his primitive
state."

succeed, "through all the

changes original

that the

succession of

times and of things

man

must

have

produced

in his

in seeing

"as

nature

13.

Preface d'une

seconde

lettre

Bordes, OCP III,

p.

105.

Rousseau

uses

the

word systeme

there no

less than five times in two

pages.

218

Interpretation
him."

formed

Both

make

it necessary to
490).

compare the

homme de I'homme

with

the homme

naturel

(pp. 42,

Contemplating

the anthropological

difference Discours
state of

means to return

to the

undistorted nature of man.

Rousseau

attempts to accomplish
reconstruction of

this task in the First Part

"veritable,"

of

the

through a detailed
nature of the

the

"first,"

"primitive"

human

species. and of

He

strips man
artificial order

"of

gifts"

all supernatural

that he

"could have
quired

received"

"all

faculties"

that he "could have ac

progress,"

only by long emerged from the hands

state of a sesses no or

in

to consider him "as he must

have

nature"

of

(p.

78).

The

state that

he describes is the
reason, that
pos

solitary being that idea of God or of

and

possesses moral

neither nor

language
any death is

nor

duties

concept of right, property,

unknown.

dominion,

for

whom consciousness

of

The life

of

natural man that seau

Rousseau describes is consequently the life

all

of a

beast. Rous
the

for the first time expressly species as a bestial state, with

tails.14

reconstructs the state of nature of

human

the consequences this reconstruction en

only digs deeper than the philosophers prior to him who, when they investigated the foundations of society, "all felt the necessity of going back to the state of but without ever it (p. 68). He
not
nature"

Therewith he

"reaching"

not

only brings the

enterprise of

his

predecessors

radically to

an

end, in

order of

to turn against them the results that he attains.

the

By beginning

his depiction

development him

of man with the condition

animate, he
man

expresses a

decisive

change

of perspectives: as

Rousseau

conceives

conceives

nonanimal

or monster;

he

sees

man

in his animality before he in the horizon of the

beings,15

things in common that tie him to the

other

living

and regards

from

that standpoint the differences that divide him

nature. man's

from those beings. Man is

part of

The danger

of arrogance

elevation over nature.

is from the very beginning connected with He makes himself into the tyrant of himself by

making himself into nature's tyrant. He is conquered by nature by seeking to it.16 subdue His depravation is the great wound of nature. Against this back

it may appear less the measure for human existence

ground
man

"astonishing"

when

Rousseau

no

longer
what

seeks

to gain

from the

other

living

by taking his bearings by beings, but by returning to what

between
he
asks about the

distinguishes
before the And it may and, in view
glance at

existed

start of appear of

the difference in

man as well as

man and nature.

less astonishing

when

supporting

stratum casts

its

peril

through the progress of human

distinctiveness,

his

the overlapping, natural universal.

The

same change of perspective that

leads Rousseau
causes

to reconstruct the state

with

of nature of man as a state of

animality
106,
160,

him to break

the

state-of-

14.
added

See particularly
with

pp.

96,

104,

i;i,

334. 336, 348. 350, 362. 370.

assertion

Rousseau
will

the

boldest, longest,

and central note of the

functions"

Discours to the
(p.
104).

"Savage

man

therefore begin
15. 16.

the purely animal

Compare the meaning that Rousseau ascribes to sensibilite, sensitivity (p. See inter alia pp. 78, 92, 104, 194, 206, 300ff.

58).

The Discourse
nature

on

Inequality

-219

theories

of

his

predecessors

in

second,

most

fundamental,
starting
point related

respect.

Rousseau does

not conceive the state of nature as and

the

(always

necessarily directed toward its overcoming

state)
of a goal-directed

civil negatively development. Instead, he seeks in the state of nature a state in which man could have remained (p. 166). The state of na ture that the First Part of the Discours describes is self-sufficient. There are no
"eternally"

to the

endogenous

factors that drive

the

out of

it;

there

is

no

teleology

at work that

fixes

its be

end and

final transition to
unlimited
arisen,"

civil

society; its static character appears to

of

also never

potentially have

were responsible

duration. Accidents, external causes "that could for men's departing from the etat
primitive state

d'animalite. Rousseau
The
state of nature

examines the state of nature as the natural state of man.

becomes the
occurred.

development that has

the
state of nature are
him"

The

"conjectures"

only in the light of the historical that Rousseau forms about

rounding
state

(p.

72).

"drawn solely from the Because the state of

history"

nature of man and the nature

beings

sur

has become
of

"historical"

through contingent circumstances,

knowledge
108).

it does join the

not

depend

on

the "uncertain testimonies of

(p.

Thus, by comparing
Rousseau
can

and con

trasting

the

essentially historical

stages and events that

state of nature

and the civil state of the present with one another,

immediately
both,
speak

juxtapose the
of two

state of nature and the civil state and, with a view to

real"

"facts

given as

(p.

168).

The
means

central

statement

of the

the simultaneity of
of

how seriously Rousseau the unsimultaneous, toward which he aims his pre
makes
clear and
which

Notes

sentation

the

state

of nature

he

supposes

methodically.

(This

statement

is

central

in the literal

sense as well as with respect

to its significance

for the be

anthropological approach of the

Discours altogether.) Rousseau lets it

the
continuation of

understood there that

he expressly
After

regards

the state of
reader

nature

in time

as

possible.

more

exact

researches,

he lets the

know, it beasts,
savage

could turn

out that various

living

beings described

by

travellers as

under

the names pongos, mandrills, orangutans, are in truth authentic,

who persist
"

men,
336).

in the

state of nature of

the species up to the present

day

(p.

The
17.

static character of the state of nature

is based

on the

autarky

of natural

elevenplaces this assertion exactly in the center of the sixth section of the of the the nineteen Notes of central note part is the which for its Tenth Note, paragraph-long p. lxxxviii, and in connection Discours. (Cf. further the reference to the "numeration of the therewith p. 94. On the meaning of the Notes in general, see p. 62 along with FN 73 and p. 170

Rousseau

Notes,"

FN 213.) The philosophical radicalness of the enterprise of reconstruction that Rousseau in the Discours is actually illuminated by nothing more than the fact that Rousseau con "whose siders it possible that the pongos, orangutans, etc., could be "in fact veritable savage had not "had an opportunity to develop any of its race, dispersed in the woods in ancient along
with

undertakes

men,"

times,"

virtual state of

faculties, had

nature"

the light of
70).

in the primitive any degree of perfection, and was still found discovered by the travellers who reported about it (p. 326). Compare in Note X Rousseau's assertions in the Exordium about the character of his researches (p.
not acquired was when

it

220

Interpretation balance.

man, whose needs and whose capacity to fulfill them are in a state of

This balance is

made possible not through a paradisal abundance

but through
the physi
power

the fact that the needs of the solitary homme sauvage do

not exceed

cally of imagination "paints

cient, because he

necessary.

"Fanciful

needs"

remain unknown

to

him, because the

he is

nothing"

to his

mind's eye.

Psychically

self-suffi

maintains no

individualized

relationships whatever to

his

own

kind,
wish

since the sentiments of

preference,

love, striving for

on

recognition,
underlies

or

the

to mle are foreign to him. The animal obtuseness that

of

the

self-

sufficiency
ties do
an

the individual

also

insures that

their own the natural

inequali Whatever

not set

into

motion

any dynamic

on the

level

of

the species:

individual may invent or discover, whatever he may acquire or collect, per ishes again with him. For lack of communication and tradition, there occurs no knowledge
always
or stockpiling of material goods worth mentioning. begin their efforts, from generation to generation, at the

accumulation of

All individuals
same

level. The autarky of the solitary existence thus causes men nature unequal to be treated equally sub specie naturae and to be
more

who are equals

by
a

in

fundamental sense, as subordinates of universal laws. All can develop their individual faculties in like manner, but to all the narrow limits apply, that
are set to the

development

of the

human faculties All are,

as

long

as that

development
subject

occurs outside of all communalization.

without

distinction,
order"

to

the law of the stronger, which

is decisive in the "natural

the
natural preconditions

and regulates
of

the conflicts, but

as

long

as

for the solitary way

life itself keeps

all

are given is capable of establishing no relations of mle, and thus in independence. For all, finally, the strict law of selection has invio lable validity. Nature treats men of the state of nature "precisely as the law of

Sparta treated the

who are well

children of the citizens:

and makes all which

it

renders

constituted,
state of

the others

perish"

strong and robust those (p. 80).

be

Man in the
cause
with

nature,

is

static

because

autarkic and autarkic

animally obtuse, is good. He is good in the sense of being regard to his biological viability, his vigorous health, and his
not ripped

well-bred
untom exis

tence,
He

by

is, further,

good

any dissensions, at one with itself as well as with nature. in the sense that he is morally innocent or irresponsible,
world of natural events
order."

because he lives, short of good and evil, in a everything happens according to the "natural

in

which

And finally, he is good because he is not evil. Man's being evil essentially grows out of his weakness, particularly out of that weakness that is implied in his dependence on an alien
will, on other persons, on their opinions,
age of

intentions,

and sentiments.

The

sav

the solitary state of nature,

and

however, is

not weak and and

dependent, but
as

strong
ance

independent. He is
is just
as

self-sufficient.

His desires
spirit of

his faculties bal he is from is

his

the scales. He
of

distant from the

dominion love for "does

the spirit

servitude; the amour-propre, that transmitted through comparison to other living

sort of

oneself that

beings,

not speak to as

heart"; he knows

no

ressentiment.

Because he "regards himself

the

sole

The Discourse
spectator

on

Inequality
as

221

to observe

him,

the sole

being

in the

universe to take

interest in

him,
his

as

the sole judge of his own merit, it is not possible that a sentiment that
source

has its

in

comparisons
and

soul."18

Hate

the

ousy and malevolence immediate amour de soi, the

state of nature can

making, could spring up in demand for revenge, pride and superciliousness, jeal are foreign to him. His behavior is determined the

he is

not capable of

by

natural sentiment of self-love.

Thus

men

in the

"do

each other a great

deal

of mutual violence when

derive

some advantage

from

it"

they
one

(p. 370),

without

reciprocally corrupting
the

another and without self

forfeiting

their

fundamental independence,
good.
"human"

being

one

in

a self-centered

whole, that lets them be

The solitary
man requires

is good, but is not a man. Man's becoming hu the loss of the immediate autonomous, self-centered wholeness.
savage
of

The development

the faculties that natural

man possesses en

puissance,

po

tentially, is tied to the fact that his physical broken apart in history. In order to
natural perfection.

and psychical

"perfect"

Man

can

become

speech,

and

morality, only through men's

sociable.

being landing

self-sufficiency is himself, man must forfeit his that has at its disposal reason,
in

dependence, only
of

through

his

becoming

Rousseau

sketches

the genealogy

Second Part
real,"

of

the

Discours,

where

with a view our

sociability in the to the other "fact given as

faculties"

the civil state of the present, in which "all

are

developed
which

he

attempts

to illuminate the historical process in the course of

the

homme

naturel

is transformed into the homme de I'homme. His

association,"

"report"

leads

from the solitary state of nature through the first loose and limited gatherings as a or a "sort of free the founding and differentiation of fam
"herd"

ilies

as

the result of a "first

revolution,"

the rise of savage societies, the forma

tion of particular nations united the "great

by

manners and morals and

characters, through

revolution"

that metallurgy and agriculture

establishment of political or civil societies, which put

nium contra omnes.

brought forth, up to the an end to the bellum om

from the
partition of

The

war of all against all resulted

the

land,

the division of

labor,

and

the

ultimate

split of

society into the hostile

at

camps of the

rich

on the one

hand

and

the poor on the other. A "hypothetical

history
limit

governments"

of

follows,

which ends

in

"look"

the

rise

of

despo

tism. This is not the place to go into Rousseau's

ourselves to two points that are of special

presentation

in detail. We

interest for understanding the in the

course of

underlying principles. The most radical change that namely his development from
"prefers"

man undergoes

his history,
con

solitary to

sociable

being, is tightly

nected with the ascent of the sentiments of preference.

age

himself

and

his

needs above all

When the solitary sav happens this spontaneously, else,

Note XV, p. 370. Here I cannot go into the wide-ranging theological consequences of Rousseau's conception of man's being good or evil, Rousseau's analysis of amour-propre and his derivation of ressentiment from dependence on, or opposition to, an extraneous will. Note XV is
18.
,
"himself."

suited to

induce the

reader

to think through these

matters

222

Interpretation
Natural

unreflectively, without a comparative reference to other individuals.

man

is led

by

his

sentiments of

The de soi; he follows the "simple impulse of of comparisons. preference, in contrast, presuppose the drawing
amour

nature."

These

sentiments require

distinguishing

the

particular

from the

universal,

be

coming
an

conscious of one's

ments of preference are

Own in coming to terms with the Other. The senti bound to faculties the development of which requires
in the

"immense

time"

space of

history
names

of the species.

But

with

these senti

ments, the
timents

decisive step in the

preference
love"

genesis of

de

Rousseau

sociability is accomplished. The sen in the first place love, and jealousy
psychical

that "awakens with

break up the

autarky

of

the primitive, the

beastly
sonal

state of nature.

The first individualized

actions and

relationships

are

first

per

dependencies. The

the reactions of the others no longer ap

pear as mere natural events. of

They

are

interpreted

and evaluated

in the horizon

preference, of

one's own

interest

and one's own

judgment. Everyone begins

"to

consider others and

to want to be considered
on

himself."

Everyone

appreci

ates others and would

like

his

part

to be

appreciated.

"As

soon as men

had

begun to

appreciate one another mutually, each claimed to

and

the idea of consideration was

formed in their minds,

possible with

have

a right

to

it,

and

it

was no

longer
188).
es

impunity

to be

lacking

in

anyone"

consideration esteem

toward

(p.

To

appreciate means to

evaluate; low
relationships

is

supposed

along

with

high

teem.

The individualized

that emerge

from the

sentiments of pref and envy, are

erence, from love and jealousy, from amour-propre, from pride affectively no longer indifferent and morally no longer innocent.

They

are me

diated through opinion,

ation, of
public

and

the

opinion

"of the

others"

in the form

of consider
striv

esteem, produces the first moral or social inequality. The

wish

ing

for prestige, the

of

to be respected, to be preferred over others, is the taken into the

internalization
man

this

inequality, its being

thinking

and

feeling

of

himself. With this striving, the

center of man's existence reached

begins to

shift en

outward, until sociable man,

having

the end

of

his development,
himself,"

tirely determined by amour-propre, and "always "knows how to live only in the opinion of
the sentiment of

outside of and

finally
speak

others,"

he "so to

draws has.

his

own existence

from their judgment

alone"

(p.

268).

Sociability
It
opens

shows

the same Janus face that the

history

of man altogether
nature,"

up for him

possibilities

that "lift him far above

and

it

exposes

him just thereby to the risk of falling back beneath nature. Sociability makes the individuals dependent, but it simultaneously helps them to develop their in

dividuality

in

unprecedented ways.

The

comparative regard

for

others and me

diation through opinion, both of which define the existence of sociable man, take from him the immediacy and the behavioral security of the solitary savage, but they
the
also allow of

him to

shed the savage's

beastly

obtuseness.

They

establish

his upbringing and education, but no less the possibility of his possibility being totally outside of himself. The consequences of amour-propre, which has

the

key

role

in the logic

of

sociability,

are

just

as

two-sided as opinion,

by

The Discourse

on

Inequality

223
and

which amour propre propre

takes its

bearings,

imagination,

through

which

amour-

is

activated.

the highest as well

The energy of amour-propre can be placed in the service of as in that of the lowest affair. We owe to amour-propre
among men,
our virtues and our
philosophers"

"what is best

and worst

vices, our sciences

and our errors, our conquerors and our

(p.

256).

The
enables

change of perspectives expressed

in his

conception of the state of nature

Rousseau to

watch with the greatest penetration and the

the loss and the gain,

the

new prospects

for freedom

increased risks,

progress and

decadence
capac

in the unfolding

of

history. The

same shift of perspectives gives

him the

ity

to

sides sition

grasp and analyze, on the basis of his anthropological principles, both in their internal connection. In particular, the shift puts Rousseau in a po
to point out the repercussions that the "external
relationship"

of man

to

nature

has for the "internal

relationship"

of men

percussions nowhere

become

more

conspicuously

among themselves. These re visible than in the wake of

the "great

revolution"

precipitated

tion brings about the most

by metallurgy and agriculture, which revolu important break in the history of the homme socia
in the
with

ble, namely
stood which

the

founding

of political society:
watered

place of the cleared

forests

"smiling

fields that had to be

the sweat of men, and in

crops"

slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow with the in the (pp. 194-96). The dialectic of dominion and servitude begins
of man

relationship

to nature

as well as

in that

of man

to

man

with

the pur

suit and pervasion of preferences, particular points of view mediated through

gout, opinion, imagination.

upon

The

coercion

that

men exert on nature

by forcing
that

it

(by

means of

agriculture, through

continual

work) the

predilections

are most to their taste

(p. 194), is

reflected

in the

relationships of possession

that arise out of the cultivation of the land. The influence of this coercion con tinues in the competition of the
conflict"

haves

and

have-nots

and

in the "perpetual

that arises between the right of the stronger and the right of the first

occupant.

Only

the process of

civilization

set off

by

the Neolithic revolution

confers upon the passions and the makes the erection of civil aid of nature

dependencies
unavoidable.

of men the material

force that
to the
war."

society

Human

art must come

in

order

to put an end to the "most horrible state of

stage of

The

"natural

order"

in this developmental

the human faculties is no longer

capable of pre

capable of

guaranteeing the
species'

survival of

the species, no longer

min, and must therefore be suspended by a social order of venting the laws. An equality that is established by men and based on convention replaces the equality that existed sub specie naturae between the by-nature-unequal men in the natural state. All members of political society are in like manner subju gated to the human law, all bear henceforth the chains of the civil state that de
"irreversibly."
make"

stroys natural
mate,"

freedom
remove

It is
the

possible

"to

this state "legiti

men who

but it is impossible to
his

chains

themselves

from the

live in it.
Rousseau
with
reconstmction of

human development

and of the

history

224
of civil

Interpretation
society any Man
seeks neither

to regain a lost

"ideal"

nor

to track down a

Golden
out

Age Fall
of

of of

sort.19

The

state of nature was no

idyllic paradise,

and no sinful

underlies

the historic development of the

distinctively

human
of

the natural

universal.

Rousseau takes

pains

in the Second Part

the Dis

cours

"to

consider and
reason

bring
while

together the different accidents that were able to

perfect

human

deteriorating
such a

the species, make a

making him sociable,

the
world

and

from

distant

being evil by beginning finally bring man and

(p.
166).

them"

to the point at which we see

real

On the level

of

the

philosophic,

analysis, this bold

enterprise conduces

to

an appropriate char

acterization of

the anthropological difference.

The two-sidedness
appears

of

historical

change,

which

in the different

aspects

decay,

progress or

corruption, is
at

not abridged whole of

respectively by Rousseau to
man"20

to be perfection or
a movement of

decline. When, in

looking

the

the historical process from which the

"free, perfected, and consequently corrupted loss, miscarriage, and deformation, what is thereby become "for the first, the most urgent, the
us"

emerges, he emphasizes

expressed most

is that these have

concern.21

oppressive of

With the
grows.

broadening

of the

human possibilities, the danger

and

the bad reality

With the advancing domination of nature tication of man, depraved existence is becoming
more

increasing self-domes increasingly probable for ever

the
not

individuals. It becomes

more

probable, but it does

come the universal

destiny
men

of

everything that bears a human

evil.

necessarily be face. Only by be

coming

sociable

do

become

are not therefore all together and

attainments

When they have become sociable, they always or essentially evil. On the other hand,
enrichment

that signify

an

enormous

for individuals because

consequences

of

their particular
and

faculties

and qualities can good

have fatal

for

nations

for the

species.

What is

for Socrates

need not

be

good

for Athens
nations

or

for

mankind.
with

While the development

of enlightenment

among
a

goes

along
sults

the

development
not

of the

vices, "always in the same

proportion,"

this
re

conjunction

does

from the
Cf. Cf.
p. p.

natural

by any inequality

means

apply to

individuals
that

distinction that
to

of men and

Rousseau, according

his

19.
20.

288, FN
362.

353. speaks of

Rousseau

I'homme libre,

perfectionne ,

partant

corrompu

in

the

Lettre

Voltaire, CC IV,

p. 39.

21.

Discours
civil

In the Contrat social, Rousseau starts from the philosophical principles established in the sur I'inegalite in order to provide an answer to the question of how the of the legitimate." state can be "made Rousseau places the emphasis in accordance with the sub
"chains"

ject

matter of the work

differently

than in the
man

tive changes, when he tages "given

declares: Although

Discours, but without making the deprives himself in the civil state

slightest substan
of several advan

him

by

nature, he gains in return such great ones, his faculties exercise and
sentiments

develop
such a

themselves, his ideas expand, his

point

become nobler, his did

not often

whole soul elevates

itself to

that,

if the

abuses

of this

new condition

degrade him below

that from which

he

has emerged, he
and

ought

ceaselessly to bless the

happy

moment that

tore him forever away from

man."

that made out of a stupid and obtuse animal an

intelligent

being

and a

(C. S.

it, I, 8. Em

phasis

added.)

The Discourse
own

on

Inequality

225
made,"

pronouncement,

"always carefully
grasp

"none"

whereas

of

those who

attacked

him "was

ever able to

it."22

The historical development triggered

environment of

by

natural

events,

by

changes

in the
of

the solitary savage, has

destroyed the

original

balance
"first"

the
of

state of nature.

But that development has

neither

not robbed man of

the

possibility
and

achieving fore the

fortunate existence,
revolution
man

in the

epochs

before the

be

"great"

(epochs in
nature),

which a new

balance

arose

in the

rela

tionship between
common

and

nor after a
happened"

cess
man

utility ought never to have that led to the establishment of faculties

But
makes political

"fatal accident, which for the (pp. 192-94), set off that pro The development
of

civil society.

the hu

society,

laws,

and government

into

compelling
of

requirement, from one ascertainable

cies. upon

"moment"

on, in the

history

the spe

society does not have to devolve, necessarily and hopelessly, the despotism in which Rousseau's "hypothetical history of
political

governments"

culminates.

Nor

must

it

always and

incurably decay
'finance'"

into

society

of particular

interests in
seeming
cause are

which

the "slave's

word

provides the
spirit of

two completely different things, the

relationships of

tone, dominion
and

being
of

and

and servi

tude impregnates the the paralysis

of

men, and conformism

lack

tension

the political virtues. In such a society, the universal com

petition of egoisms on merchant

the one

hand,

and

the changeability, mediocrity, and

mentality that

characterize public

life
the

on

the

other

hand,

prevent citi

zens

from

identifying

with

the whole,

with

common

cause,

with

the

repub

lic. There

are political alternatives

contradiction with can

to the depraved

existence of

the bourgeois

who, "always in
nations and

himself,

always

his

duties,"

be

good neither

wavering between his incli Civil himself nor for for

others.23

society

can offer

its

members

the eudaemonia of a
can acquire a

political existence.

In

a good

find society himself in the totality of the nation. It can make his amour-propre serviceable for the common good, and through love of the fatherland can even transform Between the citizen and his fellow that amour-propre into a "sublime
commonwealth,
civil

form

that allows the citizen to

virtue."

citizens

it

can attach the

bond

of social

friendship,

and

fasten it

by

means of

public education, national

common traditions.

festivals,

and cultivation of manners and morals and

Civil society can keep him free of personal domination by in which he himself subordinating him only to the dominion of the general will, citoyen who actual into a man transform can political shares. In brief, society

izes

and experiences

his

identity

as an

inseparable

member of an unmistakable

body

politic,

who confronts

the other

citoyens as an equal

by

strict

right,

and

services

whose rank

is

measured

exclusively

"according

to the

real

that he

renders to the state

22.
23.

(p.

382).

Lettre

Christophe de Beaumont, OCP

concept of

Rousseau introduces the meaning

of the

the
of

IV, p. 967. Cf. Discours, p. 194 bourgeois, in the full and precise

and

FN

241.

anthropological

and political

term, in Book I

the Emile (pp. 249-50).

226 The

Interpretation
good commonwealth

is bound to

natural and

historical preconditions, to

the coming together of various

favorable

circumstances that are not given

in

every

place

and

at

every time and cannot be created

commonwealth remains

by

human

art at will.

Therefore,
Rome
world of

the good

the exception.

Yet Sparta
arises

and

attest

for the

past

that the

good commonwealth not

only

from the
re

theoretical schemes, but has taken definite historical shape as the

action.

sult

of political of the

The Republic
institution"

of

Geneva indicates that

an

approxi

mation

"legitimate

is

not

impossible in the
in the

present,24

and

philosophy
kind"

itself
at

a result of
prepare

"progress

or corruption

history

of man

can
edifice."25

least

the ground

for the future

realization

of a

"good

Nature has
thropological

not

treated man worse than the other

as

living

beings.
the

difference

its guidepost, just

an examination of

Using the history of

an

the

human

species shows

that for the solitary savage in the

as possible as

primitive state of nature

a nondepraved existence was

it is for the Carib, the Hot

society.

tentot,

or

the American Indian

living

in

savage

In the

civil

state,

nondepraved existence
with

is

attainable

the

moi commun achieves a

life in
no

for the citoyen, who through identification which he is in harmony with himself.
less
attainable

But

a nondepraved existence
one another and a wholeness

is

for

lovers,

who recognize

themselves in
new

autarky, to

find their way, amidst an alienated society, to a that bears its own center within itself; or for the

philosopher,

who actualizes

of a promeneur solitaire on the existence

his self-sufficiency in the contemplative existence fringes of society. All forms of nondepraved

have this in common: they all allow while unfolding faculties that the actualization of identity. The concrete stamp of a particu vary markedly lar identity must be different for Socrates and Cato; it must vary for Lycurgus and Diogenes. The possibilities have a wide span, because the "human race of
one age

is

not the

human

age,"

race of another

and

because

men are

by

nature

24.
which

The Dedicace

la Republique de Geneve
the Sparta
of

not

Geneva,

similar to

Lycurgus,

gives witness to the

only has this demonstrative function, in fact that there was or is an thing, the
in

alternative to the process of

decline,

of progress
of the

into despotism. The Dedication has two further

one address
which

functions

within the

total composition

Discours. For
citizens

the

Citoyen de Geneve

speaks to

his Genevan fellow

in

order

to extol the republican maxims of

his fatherland before

can present

all the world

serves the author as a strategem under the cover of which

he

the politically

most explosive principle of

the

book,

for the

other

function, Rousseau

pursues with the

pp.

Dedicace the
and

sovereignty of the people. As intention of himself influencing po

the
attempt at

litically
cal

the relations in his

hometown. (Cf.

8-40

426-48.) The

exerting

politi

influence has for its part a theoretical significance that extends beyond the immediate historical concern insofar as it shows what task Rousseau assigns to political philosophy with a view to the political practice of a concrete community, and how he conceives the rights and the duties that the
philosopher as citizen
25.

has

vis-a-vis

his

nation.

Rousseau simultaneously intimates, with his hints devolve upon philosophy in the future, whence the
principles of 250 and 262.

at

the positive
of

political

function

that can

"boldness"

his

own political

philosophy,

Discours, derives its justification. Cf. pp. 58, 60,

the

measured

by

the

and

224

with pp.

The Discourse
unequal.

on

Inequality
of an

227

The fortunate

existence of a

Hottentot differs from that

that of a

Genevan from that

"Orangutan."

They

coincide,

of a Spartan, however, in the

basic
self

characteristic of

being

oneself

in

a self-centered whole.
of

This

being

one
cir

is different according to the measure or cumstances, but is not

"lower"

the respective capacities and

"higher"

and

does

not

depend

on

the devel
perfection

opment

in

history

of

"all

faculties."

our

In this respect, the historical

perfection.26

is only an apparent homme naturel, who lives in and takes his

of

the

individual

The development from in the

satisfaction

immediacy
has
at

of the

sentiment of posal

his

present

existence, to

homme de I'homme,
does
is

who

his dis
on

reason, morality, and historical consciousness,

not

depend
to

sinful

Fall

of

Man. But the development from homme

"deficiency,"

naturel

any homme de histori

I'homme likewise does

cal
"justified"

not redress a

and

by

no means a

necessity if

on men

the way to man's salvation.

Nature

would

also

have been
anthropo

had

remained

in their

natural state eternally.

The
of

logical difference is thus for

us

withdrawn

without

losing thereby
of

any

its

weight

sub specie naturae

into the innocence

becoming.

26.
with

Cf. the opening

p. advice

sentence of p.

206,

which refers

to the time after the "great

savages

the assertion of

Cf. Rousseau's

See further Rousseau's discourse to the in C. S. II, to the "barbarians and

194.
fish-eaters"

in Note IX,

p. 318.

11.

Mill's Dilemmas
Frederick J. Crosson

University

of Notre Dame

John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty is acknowledged to be a classic in the literature of liberal democratic theory. It addresses concerns which continue a

century
position without

and a quarter

later to be
which

considered

both important

and endangered

in

our society.

One thing
to a

has

changed over that

time, however,

is that the

themselves, seem to "go contemporary American reader, while in the essay Mill clearly and correctly understands himself to be arguing a case which is by no means yet generally conceded. Perhaps it is not unfair to say that this shows
argues
and even

Mill there

for,

the arguments

saying"

that he won
wanted

his

case.

But Mill

also

lost, in important
he
was

respects, the

case

he lib

to argue, because of the way in which

forced to formulate his

on

arguments.

There is

deep

ambivalence

in his thought

the subject

of

erty,

an ambivalence which reflects

the ambiguity of his

ways at a

attitude of

toward demo
want

cratic society.

He found himself drawn both

time

transition,
retain

ing

to secure

liberty

of

discussion

and

action, wanting also to

the many for guidance.

traditional

wisdom and

to provide for the

of

need of

In the formulation
seen

in the internal inconsistencies into

yield

his arguments, the traces of this which he is led,

to
conventional

ambivalence can and

be

in
us

which

he is
when

forced to

priority

finally

freedom. It is instmctive for

wisdom, to

today,

the arguments for freedom are the

of

reflect on

the logic

the argument at a time

when

the alternatives

had

not yet

been

occluded.

As

Mill himself observed, if

we cannot an

do this

our conventional wisdom

tends to

become

dead dogma. There is

irony lurking

hereabout.

The overall object of his essay is "to assert one very simple namely, "that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
collectively, in

princ

or

interfering

with

the

liberty

of action of

any

of

their

number

is

self-protection."

This is not, for Mill,

an anarchic principle:

he

acknowledges

that both negative

since

and positive mles of conduct

"all that

makes existence valuable

may legitimately be imposed, to anyone depends on the enforcement

people."

of restraints upon the actions of other

people"

In

past

centuries, those "other

were the mlers of

the

political

community,

and the pursuit of

liberty
be

led to

constitutional curbs on their actions. and

But

now government

belongs to the

people,

it is harder for

the people to see that their powers also need to

restrained.

The essay

undertakes

to demonstrate to the new collective

sovereign

the potential benefit of such

pmdent self-restraint.

On

Liberty

has been

called

"a defense

democracy"

of

liberty

against

(Sa-

interpretation, Winter 1988-9, Vol. 16, No. 2

230

Interpretation
that is inaccurate since as a
utilitarian

bine), but
absolute

Mill is aiming

at

the usefulness

for

democratic

people

of

their allowing maximal

action.

showing indeed

liberty

of

discussion

and of

(self-regarding)
of

There

are three

issues
are:

where

the ambivalences in Mill's position are clear

and traceable.

They
are

the case

for

liberty
and are

thought and
scope of

discussion, for

the

place of tradition

These issues
tions to

in social institutions, interrelated, but they

for the

democratic liberty.

sufficiently distinct in his formula

allow of separate analysis.

I
A familiar

argument

for protecting freedom

will

of speech

for

all shades of opin

ion is that only with a chance to be heard

such protection and

the as-yet-unrecognized tmth

have

to exhibit

its

ascendancy.

As Milton

wrote

in the

Areopagitica:
.

though all the winds

of

doctrine

were

let loose
and

to

play

upon the

earth, so truth

be in the
strength.

field,

we

do

Let her

and

and open encounter?

her injuriously by licensing prohibiting falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to the worse in free Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing. [Complete
to misdoubt
p. 561.

Prose Works of John Milton, Vol. II (Yale, 1959),

pp.

Subsequent

references:

501, 565.]

The

metaphor of contest

spectator's role

exhibits

here may seem to leave unclear whether there is any in assaying "put to the or whether truth unqualifiedly its strength by forcing falsehood to admit its defeat. Is the outcome of
worse"

the contest

decided

by

an expert

judgment,
to be

or

is it simply

an evident

fact that

false doctrine is driven from the field?

The
answer

to this

question seems

unclear

in the Areopagitica. Per

haps

hint is

given

by

the

fact that Milton

not

cites

Christian

emperors of

Rome
until

to prohibit the
works were

approvingly the practice of the books even of those they took

to be "grand

heretics"

such

"examined,
prior

refuted

and con
on

demned in the

councils."

general

He

was

opposing

censorship

the

ground that virtue and confidence

knowledge

require

the exercise of contending, and his

is in truth

and virtue

winning

out

in the field
public

of public

discussion.
clear

That he thought the issue determinable through

the

discussion is

from

fact that he thought it subsequently justifiable to suppress were "impious or evil absolutely, either against faith or
is for the
or of

such works as

His defense
doctrine

expression of

"neighboring
its

differences

in

some point of

discipline."

Milton's argument, in
1
.

conventional

form, may be

articulated as

follows:

It is better to have true than false

present opinion

opinions.

2. Your

may be false.

Mill's Dilemmas
3. Tmth

231

not-yet-known will

have

no

opportunity to

overcome

falsehood,

if

we silence

the expression of

differing ("neighboring")
in

opinions.

Therefore,

we should not silence

advance the expression of

differing
the above

opinions.

Mill's
as a

argument

is

similar

to this, and many readers

would accept

summary

statement of

his he

position.

What

makes

his

argument

distinct,

however, is

the way in

which

reformulates the second and

third

premises:

la. It is better to have tme than false 2a. Your

present opinion

opinions.
and you cannot

may be false

be

certain whether

it

is

or not.

3a. The

"opportunity

of

exchanging tmth for

any
opinion.

error"

will not arise

if

we si

lence the
The
can a

expression of

problem which arises

from the

conjunction of a situation

these reformulated premises

we

easily be seen if we think of free discussion and exchanged

in

which

have taken
a new

part

in

our original

opinion

for

one

which

emerged

in the
we

course of

the debate. Have

new opinion

we exchanged error

for tmth? Possi

in 2a de

bly. Can is

know that the

can

is tme? Not if the

added phrase
we

correct.

We

indeed

exchange one opinion

for another, but

still out

cannot

confirm that the new opinion scribed

is tme. We are, in fact,

in the

situation

by 2a,

and

the exchange proposed

by

3a turns It

to be illusory.

Is 2a

an accurate

formulation

of

Mill's

premise?

appears so on the

basis

of

statements such as

the following:
sure

We

can never

be

that the opinion we are

(229) [All
Complete
which

page references are to

endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill,
1977)].

Vol. XVIII (Toronto:

University

of

Toronto Press,

liberty
us with

justifies

can a

being

contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms human faculties have any rational assurance of being right (231).
of

To

any proposition certain while there is anyone who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those
call
who agree with

us,

are

the judges

of

certainty

and

judges

without

hearing

the other

side

(233).
the
opinion which

it is

attempted

to

suppress

Those

who

desire to

suppress

it,

of course,

deny

authority may possibly be true. its truth; but they are not infal

by

lible (229).

If 2a is Mill's premise,
complete

and

if it is accepted, then it
not

seems to

follow that

freedom

of

discussion, i.e.,
then only

refusing to allow the expression of

our present opinion
some

any opinion, is the

without our

pmdent program.

For if

may be false
where we

knowing it,

by

entering into

situation

may exchange it for a desired state of having

tme (or

more

tme)

opinion can we progress opinions.

toward the

tme rather than false

232

Interpretation
question
of

The
dom

is

whether this argument constitutes a one

satisfactory
tries to
error

justification

for freedom
of

discussion. On the
as an

hand,
of

the

argument

justify

free
has

discussion

indispensable
be

means of

exchanging

for tmth. On

the other

hand, it

aborts

any possibility

knowing

that that exchange

taken place. This

would

an undesirable enough conclusion.

But the

reformu
we shall

lated

argument

exchange tmth

has a corollary consequence: it is equally likely that for error, if we cannot recognize the coinage.
which

This possibility,

Mill does

not

explicitly consider, is

excluded

by

the Miltonian argument on the ground that if the tmth is in the

veal

field, it

will re

its

power

(i.e.,

we will recognize

it). It

seems either a curious omission or

a suspicious one

that Mill does not address the exchanging of tmth for error as

a possible outcome of

free discussion. He
be tempted to

considers three conceivable situa

tions in which
opinion:

we might

refuse

free

expression to

the

opposing

1. Our 2. Our 3. Our In

each

opinion
opinion opinion

is false. is tme. is partially tme.

will

case, he tries to show, it

be to

our advantage

if

we allow

free

ex

pression to

the opposing opinion. Either:

1. We 2. We
we

will will

"give the tmth

us"

a chance of

reaching
our

(232),

or
of

have the
to
gain

chance to

improve

understanding

the tmth

hold,
or

"a

clear apprehension and

deep feeling
opinion,

of

its

tmth"

(252),

3. We may increase the

extent of

truth

in

our

since

"it is only

[sic] by
tmth

the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the

supplied"

has any

chance of

being

(258).

Each

of

these arguments requires, to be persuasive, the implicit

assumption

that

the exchange will generally go only in one direction. But thus far we have been
given no grounds

for

believing

that this is the case and no

means

for

ascer

taining

that

it is. he

conceding that we can know that the desired exchange has taken place? Because if he conceded that, he would be conceding that we could recognize the truth (as that which won the contest) and then there would
resist

Why does

be nothing to say for the false opinion. We are in mathematics, "where there is nothing
of

would

be in

a position such as we

the

question"

access to public

at all to be said on the wrong side (244). The wrong opinion could then, in principle, be denied discussion. Hence to concede this would be to fall into the

hands

of his opponents. So Mill stands fast on the claim that, while our opinion in fact be may true, we cannot know it to be so. Whether Mill is aware of the difficulties with this argument for absolute and

Mill's Dilemmas
unlimited

233 discussion be to
and

freedom his

of

merely

preserved a

discreet silence, be

cause

to admit them would

notice

strengthen say.

the

forces

of

darkness,

or whether

they

escaped

is hard to

never

to say that tmth will emerge

He is certainly careful in his wording from free discussion, but only that it can. for advocating freedom
reason of

Consider, then,
sion:

a second possible ground

discus

if

we cannot

determine in
or

particular cases whether

the opinion which wins

acceptance

is tme

false,

perhaps

there is some

to think that,

whether

we can recognize

it

or

not, tmth

will always

prevail, just

as yet unknown gal

axies will

be

governed

by

the

inverse-square law. But Mill denies

that there are

any

a priori grounds

for assuming that the tmth

will always win out over

any

odds:

the dictum that tmth always triumphs over persecution is one

of

those pleasant

false

hoods

which men repeat after one another

till

they

pass

into commonplaces, but

which all experience refutes

(238).

It is

a piece of

power

denied to

idle sentimentality [sic] that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent error of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake (238).
possible

So thus far two

proved unhelpful.

defenses

of

the utility of free discussion have to be tme, what we can

If

we can never

know

our opinion

hope for from free discussion is that be tme

rather

our opinion after also

discussion

will

de facto

priori grounds

the

most we

any a for thinking this to be so: tmth doesn't always win. So perhaps can aspire to is that our opinions will in fact be largely tme rather
posteriori reasons

than false.

However, Mill has

denied that there

are

than false. Do we have any a

to think that this is tme?

Mill does think that

our opinions are more correct than not:

Why

is it, then,
there

that there

is

rational opinions and rational conduct?

which must

be

unless

among mankind [sic] of If there really is this preponderance human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost
on the whole a preponderance

it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. The whole strength and value, then, of human
state

desperate

judgment
liance stantly

depending
be

on

the one property, that

it

can

be

set right when right are

it is wrong, kept
con

re

can at

placed on

it only

when

the

means of

setting it

hand (231).

It is

not

just that

we change our

mind, but that it is "set

right."

How does

that come about?

"Wrong
that

opinions and practices

gument,"

provided

facts

and arguments are

and ar gradually before the brought mind, i.e.,

yield

to

fact

is willing to listen to what can be said against the current opinion. Indeed anyone who has done this, who has sought out objec tions and difficulties to his position, "has a right to think his judgment better
that a person or a
multitude

than that of any person,

process"

or

any multitude,

who

have

not gone through a similar

(232).
made

Progress has been

in replacing

"wrong"

"rational"

opinions with

opin-

234 ions.

Interpretation
opinions"

(Presumably
our

"rational

can't mean
"right"

merely "opinions
we

arrived at

reason,"

by

using

it

must mean

opinions.) How do
claim

know that has been

such progress

has been be
a

made?

If

our

belief in the

that progress

made

is

not to

blind

faith, it

must rest on evidence

that the process of

free

discussion

by

its very

nature produces

the rectification of our opinions (a priori

justification),
can see

without our

being

able

to discern that

they

are

right; or, that we

that in fact it has worked,

i.e.,

we can recognize at

least

some of

the

tmths

which

it has

accumulated

(a

posteriori

justification). As

noted

above,

Mill

rejects

any

notion

that, in the

nature of

the case, tmth will always win out.

progress
and weakens

He therefore
all

strengthens

his

argument

for

his

over

logic

by

proceeding to

affirm

the

second

disjunct. We do indeed know

many (once-controverted)
The
real advantage which

opinions

to be tme:
consists

truth

has

in this, that

when an opinion

is true, it
there

may be
will

extinguished once,

twice,

or

many times, but in the

course of ages

generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favorable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has
made such

head

as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress

persecution

it (239).
those

But, indeed,
pleasant

the dictum that truth always triumphs over

which men repeat after one another

is

one of

falsehoods

till

they
with

pass

into

com of truth

monplaces, but
put

which all experience refutes.

. .

History

teems

instances

down

by

persecution.

(238).
sentence can

It is hard to

see

how this last

be

otherwise

interpreted than

as en
view

tailing
which ways

the factual claim that Mill has a

(large?)

number of opinions

in

he

recognizes as truths and about which

it is tme

that

they have
would

not al

triumphed over persecution.

get

How does he
on the one

himself into this inconsistency? Because, it

perceives that the argument

seem,

hand he

for free discussion

in the

cannot

be

made unless we can see

that free discussion

and

does,
we

long
fact

mn, to

result

in the in the

ascendancy
essay,
and

of what

is tme,

that in

fact

have

come

see

that many

opinions are true.

On the

other

hand he is led to

deny
to

this

elsewhere

this for two reasons.

One,

mentioned

above, is that it

would seem

justify,

or at

least to disarm

objections

to,

not

allowing free
certain,

expression to opinions we

know to be false:

To

call

any

proposition

while

there is anyone
assume

who would
we

deny its
and

certainty if
those the
other

permitted, but who is not permitted, is to

who agree with

that

ourselves,
without

us,

are

the

judges

of

certainty, and judges

hearing

side

(233).
reason

The

second

is that he is impressed,

or

wants

his

readers

to be

im

pressed, it

by

the claim that

is as evident

in itself,
than

as

any

amount of argument can make

it,

that ages are not

subse-

more

infallible

individuals

every

age

having

held many

opinions which

Mill's Dilemmas
quent ages

235
not

have deemed
general,

opinions,

now

will

only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once gen

eral, are rejected

by

the present (230).

Passing
any
that of

over

the question whether this claim is self-evident and as certain as

amount of argument can make

it,

the argument seems as

of sense-perception.

inconclusive

as

Descartes

ception can

of another

reliability Any be judged to have been illusory only by relying on the verdicality perception. Hence the illusory character of some perceptions cannot
particular per

against the

provide a ground

larly
are

for concluding that all perceptions may be unreliable. Simi in Mill's case, the only way in which we can know that earlier opinions

false is
It
might

by knowing
be
objected

that their negations are tme. that this criticism

misreads

the last quotation, since Mill

is there
false"

careful

to speak of "opinions which subsequent ages

general,"

have deemed false

and of
opinions.

"opinions,

now

rather

than speaking of

and tme

That

is,

the objection correctly notes that his point

which

is formulated in
held then

descriptive language
or now.

does

not entail an assessment of opinions we consider

But this

objection is

narrowly based, if

the quotation cited

. .

earlier,

"History

teems with instances of tmth put down

by

persecution

So

the objection cannot

be that Mill

always eschews

the

assessment of opinions

in

terms of their tmth or falsity.

Perhaps
about

we

could of

maintain

the objection

"instances

truth"

is

an

incautious

or

by responding that this imprecise expression and

taken for the truth
.

remark should

have been

stated as

"instances
."?

of what was

."or

"in

stances of apparent tmth

But then

what sense could

be

made of a passage quoted

earlier, viz, "The

real advantage which tmth

. .

has

consists

in this, that

when an opinion

is tme

"? Could this be

more

vantage which an opinion

carefully and precisely expressed as: "The later deemed to be tme has ", or as "The
.

real ad real ad

vantage which an opinion now mulate such

an

alternative

generally held has expression to see its

the claim

."?

It

suffices

to

try

to for
of

futility

for the

purposes

Mill's

argument: not

only

would

lose any
of

appearance of

being

evi

dent, but it
knowledge
Mill is
this

would undercut

his corollary thesis

dilemma
which

the progress of mankind's

of what

is tme. he
muddles

confronted with a
now

through,

now

hom,

that. But the dilemma

is

of

his

own making.

He

makes

grasping it by

posing the issue of free discussion in stark and extreme form: freedom of discussion or assumption of infallibility.

either complete

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not
exist absolute and unqualified adjectives can

be

used

(226). [One may wonder whether these last two legitimately in the context of a utilitarian argument.]
and

Complete
which

liberty
us

of

contradicting

disproving

our opinion

is the very

condition

justifies

in assuming its

tmth (231).

236
To
if
call

Interpretation
any
proposition

certain,

while

there

is

anyone who would

deny

its certainty
.

permitted

is to

assume

that

we ourselves

are

judges

of

certainty

(233)-

The

weakness

whether

in posing the dilemma in this way can be exhibited by asking in fact it is the case that, although "the interests of truth require a di
opinions"

versity of der best to

(257),

the

diversity

has to be,

should

be,

unbounded

in

or

serve

the likelihood of reaching the tmth. Mill cites the practice of

the physical sciences to support his case:

If

even

the Newtonian philosophy

were not permitted

to be questioned, mankind
now

could not

feel

as complete assurance of

its

truth as

they

do (232).

physical sciences

But it has been amply have

"anyone,"

shown that
operated or

in fact this is

not the manner

in

which

the

do

operate.

Helpful

opinions
and

do

not come with

from
what

but from those properly prepared, informed

and places a premium on what

familiar

is already known, cussion. Mill's position

only those are permitted access to the media of Willmore Kendall

convergence called

dis
the

"dispersal
progress.

opinion"

of

as

distinguished from the

necessary to
what

To
we

summarize:

Mill

wants

to argue that because we cannot be sure that

we should allow

think is tme
and open opinion

is really tme,
a

every

challenge

to be made in

free false

discussion to

our opinion

for

tme opinion

only thus will the exchange of our become possible. But this argument is inter

nally inconsistent, for if we cannot recognize a tme opinion when we see it, then we cannot know whether we are exchanging tmth for falsity or vice versa. The
argument

is

also

inconsistent

with

his historical

conclusion

that tmth gen

erally triumphs in the long mn, since this claim requires recognizing a large number of tmths. So Mill shuttles back and forth, drawn by the logic of his ar gument to admit that tmths can be recognized, held back from conceding that because it
How
seems

to

else might

placing such tmths beyond challenge. freedom of discussion be justified? Conceivably,

justify

one might
common

appeal to an

"abstract

right"

to

freedom

of

expression,

a natural

right

to all men. He declines this

path:

It is

proper to state that

I forego any

advantage which could

be derived to my
regard

argu

ment

from the idea

of abstract right as a

utility

as the ultimate appeal on all

thing independent of utility. I (224). ethical questions

.

Conceivably,
unanimity
ages sion

one might

defend freedom least

of

discussion

of opinion or at

a consensus sufficient

necessary to reach to be regarded as the

as

tmth. But Mill is too aware of how error has been to accept such surrogates.

considered

the tmth in past

of

Lastly,

one might consider of

of

freedom
what

discus
of

necessary for the purely practical purpose action the community will follow. But in terms
opinions to get a

deciding
utility,
of

course

we need

only two
political

majority efficiently

the practice

the American

Mill's Dilemmas
system. warrant relate

237
Mill
would not

More

importantly,
of

be

satisfied with such a pragmatic

for freedom

discussion: he
rather

remains a

traditional

figure in wanting
the

to

dialogue to tmth
constmal of of

than to action.
and

If this

Mill is fair his

correct, he has
which

posed

issue

of

de

fending
from
was

freedom

discussion in terms
of

leave him

no consistent escape

dilemma. One

attempts to resolve the problem, as noted

we

above,

to maintain that while

cannot

know
the

an

opinion

to be tme when it
which

emerges, it is the case that de

we

facto, in

long

run, the tme opinions

opinions.

hold

accumulate and predominate over the

false

This thesis bears

on received

a closer examination

in its

relevance to the reliance of a

society

opinion, particularly in educating its youth.

II
As has been observed, Mill thinks that there is
ance

on

the whole a

preponder

among

mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct.

As

mankind
will

improve,

the

number of

doctrines

which are no

longer disputed
of mankind

or

doubted
most

be constantly

on the

increase;

and the
of

well-being

may

al

be

measured

by

the

number and

gravity

truths

[sic]

which

have

reached the

point of

being

uncontested

(250).
and

But if this is both inevitable

indispensable,
it
will

not all of

its

consequences are

for that

reason

beneficial. However tme

an opinion

frequently and fearlessly discussed, (243). ing

tmth"

be held

as a

may be, dead dogma,

"if it is

not

fully,
liv

not a

When there

be found who form an exception to the apparent unanimity any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that tmth
are persons to of the world on would

lose something
would

by

their silence (254).

What tmth

lose,

or rather what persons who and

hold the tme into its

. . .

opinion would

lose,
only

is

better understanding

deeper

penetration

meaning.

So

not

should the received opinion

contested"

be "suffered to be positively

vigorously

and ear

nestly
and even

(258),

we

should

encourage

diversity

of opinion

eccentricity (269).

One
sal of

wonders whether this view which

is tmly thoughtful,
promote will

and whether the

useful

"disper

opinion"

it

seems

to

really be
about

for

a society.

One

wonders the more when

Mill

comes

to speak

the relevance of tradi

tion for the

training
be

of

its

youth and of

its

citizens.

it

would

absurd

to

pretend

that

people ought came

to live as if nothing
as

whatever as yet
prefera-

had been known in the

world

before they

into it;

if

experience

had

done nothing toward showing that

one mode of

existence, or of conduct,

is

238
ble to

Interpretation
another. and

to know

Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in benefit by the ascertained results of human experience (262).
cultivation of

youth as

It is through the

[the

most passionate

love

of virtue and the sternest

self-control] that society both does its

duty

and protects its

interests

(264).

He unambiguously

qualifies

these statements

by

saying that they apply only to

young people, and that when persons reach the maturity of their must be allowed to pursue their own good in their own way. So in young
effect

faculties, they

he

removes questions about

the proper kind of

of

people

should

have from the

of

realm

upbringing which free discussion. At least, that human

experi
evi

seems to

be the import

recognizing "the

ascertained results of

ence."

Tme,
dence is This

the statement

reinforced

by
not

is in the indicative; no one does the comment that it would be

unequivocally inconsistent
all received opinions

deny

it, but its

"absurd"

to maintain that

experience cannot exhibit ascertained results. position

is

with what

he has
and

said earlier

about the need to cussed.

have

fully, frequently
committed.
of

fearlessly
one

dis

But it does

seem

to

manifest an ambivalence which

stems, once again,

from two disparate

confidence

views or

to

which

he is

On the

hand, his
convic

in progress,

in the improvement

mankind, involves his

tion that on the whole there is a preponderance of rational opinions and conduct

among mankind,

and

this seems to be the basis of

his

assertion about the ascer

tained results of experience. On the other

experience can never

hand,

those accumulated results of

sole ground

be

pronounced

secure, because the

for

confi

dence in them is that they have

Complete
which

not yet

been

refuted.

liberty
us
with

of

justifies

can a

being

contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms human faculties have any rational assurance of being right (231).

So it appears that the absurdity of pretending that "people ought to live as if must nothing whatever had been known in the world before they come into be tolerated, indeed encouraged, in order to keep us from believing that the as
it"

certained results of

human

experience are ascertained.

To

put

it

more courte

ously

and perhaps more and

fairly,

one must

decide

whether confidence

in the
to

cor-

rigibility

hence

progressive

improvement

of mankind

is

sufficient

make

reliance on the

"ascertained

results"

of experience reasonable, or whether the

on

reasonability
The beliefs

of such reliance rests

which we

only

the results

being
to

not yet refuted.

have

most warrant

for have

no safeguard
unfounded.

rest on

but

a stand

ing
but

invitation to have

the whole world to prove them

and

If the

challenge is not

accepted, or is accepted
we

the attempt

fails,

we are

far

enough

from certainty

still,

the

best that the existing

the question

state of

human

reason admits of

(232).

To

summarize:

anything

about what

it is

good

know (not merely can we assume) for human beings to become? Have we ascer
we

is, do

tained anything which

is beyond

question

about

how

we

should

shape

the

Mill's Dilemmas

239
society, for their good and for that of

minds and characters of members of our

To say no is to say that nothing is settled, nothing is known for society sure about the good for man, that every generation is in essentially the same position with respect to how to become fuller human beings, that no progress is
as well?

discernible
so

with surety.

is to

place some

Mill rightly calls such a response things beyond the range of fruitful opposition
can

"absurd."

Yet to do

or contradic
and

tion.

Further discussion
our

indeed deepen
of what

our

understanding
about

increase it

incrementally
cannot

comprehension
complete

is tme

these things; but

results of

lead to the

overturning
not

of the

"ascertained

human

experience."

But this

conclusion

seems

to

Mill's frequent be held may be

assurances elsewhere

concur with the sweeping character of in the essay that nothing can legitimately

as certain unless we are

wrong.

constantly ready

and

willing to think that

we

Should

we encourage

the vigorous and earnest contesting of the

ascertained results of challenge ceases or

human

experience

because their surety contesting

rests

only

on such

is it

absurd to think that

some results of experience

to be useful and tends to become obfuscatory, to cloud our

insight

rather

than to sharpen

it?

Ill

The third dilemma in

one most

which

the essay On

Liberty

is

entangled

is

perhaps

the

deeply

rooted,

not

his
yet

sense of the

its

significance of

superiority has often been

of some minds to others.

passed over.

merely in Mill's argument, but in his character, in It pervades the essay, and It is
not a

dilemma inherent in
the es

the

his argument, but one emergent in say, in the disparity between the case he argues

logic

the

rhetorical situation of

and the audience

to

which

it is

addressed.

At the

for

beginning of his considerations, before proceeding absolute liberty of opinion and conduct, he carefully notes
he is
about

to
the

his

argument of

limits

the

case which
of their

to

make.

It

applies not

"only

to human beings in the

children or

matu

faculties"

rity low the legal

(224). It does

apply to

young

people

be

age of

adulthood, or to those

who need supervision and protection

from themselves

and

others,

or

to backward states of human society which may

legitimately
Liberty,
sion. own

be

ruled

despotically
has

for their

own good.

as a

principle,

no application
capable of

to any

state of

things anterior to the time

when mankind

have become

being

improved

by

free

and equal

discus

But

as soon as mankind

have

attained

the capacity of

being

guided to their

improvement

by

conviction or

persuasion,

compulsion

is

no

longer
of oth

admissible as a means to their own good, and ers

justifiable only for the security

(224).

240

Interpretation
of

Maturity
discussion
suasion. profit

their faculties
of

capable of

being

improved

by free

and equal

...

being

guided

to their

own

improvement

by

conviction or per

These

phrases suggest a picture of a

society

of rational

adults, able to
or

individually

from soberly considering the

them.

reasons

for thinking

acting

which are

laid before

The

picture

is

at variance with a number of caustic

comments strewn throughout society.

the essay

on

the abilities

of most people

in Mill's

on

judging

any matter not self-evident there it for one who is capable (231).
that

are ninety-nine persons

totally incapable

of

miscellaneous collection of a

few

wise and

many foolish individuals

called the public

(232).
strongest
of

But

by

far the

deprecating

of

"the

vulgar"

(271)

comes

in the

con

text of his discussion

.

individuality:
of things throughout the world

the general

tendency

is to

render

mediocrity the
the

ascendant power

public opinion are

mediocrity I am not complaining

as a general

name of among by in England chiefly the middle class, that is to say collective Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves. mankind.

Those

whose opinions go

of all this.

I do

not assert state of

that anything better is compatible,

mle,

with

the present low

the

human

mind

(268).
present a view of
when men

say is that these comments seem to society different from that envisaged in speaking of a time are "capable of being improved maturity of their

The least

one might

"in the

faculties"

by

free is

and equal

discussion."

The

contrast

can

be

sharpened

by

adverting to what Mill says

of

about the role of custom.

The "free development

and

individuality

one of

the

well-being,"

leading

essentials of

it is

important, indeed
living."

necessary for that,

that there "should be different

experiments of

Where

not the person's own character

but the traditions

one of

or customs of other people

of

are the rule of conduct, there

happiness,
He
who

and quite

the

is wanting chief ingredient

the principal ingredients

human

of

individual

and social progress

(261).

tice either in

does anything because it is the custom makes no choice. He gains no prac He who lets the world, or his discerning or in desiring what is best.

own portion of

it,

choose

his

plan of

life for him has

no need of

any

other

faculty

than the ape-like one of imitation (262).

individuals"

Yet
who

few

pages

later, in

the course of praising "exceptional

"should be

encouraged

in acting

differently

from the

mass,"

he

asserts that

the reason for this is that

it is important to it may in time

customs more

give

the

freest

scope possible to

appear which of these are

uncustomary things, in order fit to be converted into customs

.

that

worthy

of general adoption

(269-70).

There only

appears to

be

an

inconsistency here,
due to
a

for in this

case of

the different
argument.

statements about custom are not

break in the logic

his

Mill's Dilemmas

241
rather

The difference is traceable

to the fact that the argument has shifted

lev

els, and that while Mill seems to be pursuing the same line of reasoning with

he began, he has in fact added a dimension to it which radically changes its import. The earlier statements about "capable of being improved by free and equal made it sound as if he were going to defend freedom of
which
discussions"

speech and action

for the

sake of the sensible use which men

although

in

general could

and would make of

it. But

he

can

hardly

be

unaware that that

is the

sense which most would place

which

(and have placed) in the

upon

it,

that is not the sense

Mill has in

mind.

The

shift occurs

in

a single paragraph

middle of

the chapter

on

indi

viduality, and it is important enough to quote the whole paragraph.

Having
man

said that

the cultivation of

individuality is the same thing individuality which produces

here
close the

with

development,
produce,

and that

or can

well-developed

it is only hu
said of

beings, I

might

argument; for

what more or

better

can

be

any
the

condition of

human

affairs than that

it brings human beings themselves

nearer to

than that

best thing they can be? Or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good it prevents this? Doubtless, however, these considerations will not suffice to it is necessary further to
show that
out

convince those who most need convincing; and

these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped

those who

to point

to

do

be in

some

desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it
not

without

hindrance (267).
an audience of

If Plato had had to defend the Republic to

not

the many, he might

have

spoken was

dividuality"

liberty and of "in very differently, although his very different (Cf. Rep. 456e). However that may be, it be
conception of

comes clear of

that Mill is

defending

freedom

of thought and action

for the

sake

those few exceptional individuals

who are able

to benefit

from it,

and that

that

is for him

sufficient

justification for it. But because he lives

and writes

in

democratic society in
tion. He must
show

which

he

seeks

to

persuade

those

with power

the many

to allow the necessary

that

freedom, he is

compelled

to add a secondary justifica

freedom for the

exceptional

the many, who are, of themselves, incapable of

need

individuals may benefit benefitting from it. It is the

evaluations of

for this

second

justification

which

leads to the disparate

for the

custom as a guide to action which were cited above.

How

can a

freedom

which

favors the few be

good

many?

In the first
always

place, he says, the many

might

leam something from the few. It is

life."

the

few
and

who

discover

new

tmths and "set the example of more enlightened conduct

better taste

and sense

in human
would

These few
a stagnant

are

the "salt of the earth;

without

them, human life

complementary

become
the

pool"

(276). But this

role

requires a

one on

part of

the

many.

No

government

by

democracy

or a numerous

aristocracy

ever

did

or could rise

above
guided

mediocrity except in so (which in their best times they have

far

as the sovereign always

Many

have let themselves be

the counsels and

done) by

242

Interpretation
of a more

influence
or noble

highly

gifted and

instructed

one or few.

The initiation The honor

of all wise

things comes and must come

from individuals.

and

glory

of

the average man

is that he is

capable of

following

that

initiative
thus

(269).

The
as

reason

for Mill's

differing

statements about custom

becomes clear,
not

does

a common

misreading

of

the

essay.

From the

beginning, he has
individual (or
society

been
most

concerned

to defend the benefit of freedom for every

rather

even

individuals), but
thing they
allowed

to defend the position that only a

can allow

which

offers such

freedom to the few

can

(some) human beings

it
must

to come nearer
re

to the best

be.

Pursuing
few

this defense in a democratic society

quires an attention such

to the

rhetorical context: will profit

be

shown

(if possible) that

au

freedom

to the

the

many.

But Mill flatters his

dience in the opening

the
name of all

chapter

by letting
pages of

it be

understood that

the citizens (all those in the

Thus,

when

in the opening

On

"maturity of Liberty he speaks

he is speaking in their faculties").

of

his
of

argument as guided

applicable

to a time

when mankind

"have

attained the

capacity

being

to their own
stands

improvement
"guided"

by

persuasion"

conviction or sense

the term

in the
sense

in

which

(224), he surely under it is used in the last (indented)

to their
own

quotation, and

not

in the

that

they

could guide themselves

improvement. On the contrary, Mill clearly did not believe that most people were capable of profiting individually from sharing in free and equal discussion
or

freedom

of

action, but

rather

that

by

allowing those

capable of

der

such conditions to
more

do so,

and

by

"ape-like"

exercising the may be in terms

which appear

profiting un faculty of imita

out"

tion, "customs

worthy
couch
of

of general adoption argument

struck

(270).

Why

then

did he

his

to be

defending
he
not

the benefit of

liberty

discussion

and action

for

everyone?

At

one point

concedes that such unlimited scope

(excluding

only children, etc.) is

logic

ally
If

required.

not

the public, at

least the

philosophers and

theologians who are to resolve the those difficulties

difficulties

must make

themselves

familiar

with

in their

most

puzzling form

(246).
a

The Catholic Church, he observes, "makes who can be permitted to receive its doctrines
accept them on
trust."

broad

separation

between those
must

on conviction and

those who

It thus

allows

"to the

elite more mental culture, though

mass."

freedom, than it allows to the tries, in theory at least, the responsibility must be
not more mental

But in Protestant

coun

borne

by

the individual.

Besides, in

the present state of the world,

which are read mankind are

by
be

the

instructed

can

it is practically impossible that writings be kept from the uninstructed. If the teachers of

to

cognizant of all that

they

ought

to

know, everything

must

be free

to

be

written and published without restraint

(247).
as

In times past,

illiteracy

and

the

use of

Latin

the language of learned dis

course served to restrict

the open discussion of

received opinion and custom.

In

Mill's Dilemmas
our

243

day,

widespread

literacy

and

the use

of

the vernacular make this

use of

restriction

practically impossible to implement. (In fact, the Prohibitorum sought to extend this "broad
which

the Index Librorum

separation"

beyond the time in

Protestant country, to be practically possi Hence the case for the of freedom of discussion and action for the ble.) utility few capable of profiting from it must willy-nilly be extended to all. He acknowledges that this is not an unmixed blessing. The harm which indi

it

seems

to

Mill, writing in

viduals

may do themselves, when this freedom is individually of profiting from it, is an

afford

granted

to those
which

not capable can

"inconvenience"

"society

to bear

for the

greater good of

human

freedom"

(282). Mill

attempts

to

mitigate

the unfortunate consequences of this

inconvenience

there is any moral quality to the harm which an

individual may incur

moral

by denying by purely
vices

that

self-regarding actions, i.e., he denies that there are any sphere of self-regarding conduct (279). But it would take

in the in

us

into

another

quiry to pursue this issue. This

ultimate

dilemma may be

analysed as

follows:
are capable of

1. Human

excellence and

although

not

many

it

requires

thinking
ideas

and ways. and

choosing for Hence it

one's

self, not simply

following

customary
the

requires

free

and

unconstrained

inquiry,

questioning 2. But most men

are

challenging better off

of received tmths.
when

they follow
few.
to
access

custom or model

them

selves upon a more

highly

gifted one or

3. In

an open and

democratic society, the

themselves
cannot

liberty

necessary for the

all.

few to

develop
a

be had

without

allowing it to

Moreover in
cure

democratic society only the

the many that

consent of

the many can se

the requisite openness.

must persuade and action

4. So Mill

they

can

benefit from freedom

of

discussion

by

acquiring
of

new models and more

guided"

prehension of

the) tmth, i.e.,

"being
as a whole will

(or better ap to their improvement.

Hence he
erty, and

must

deny

that the many will be morally harmed

by

such

lib
to

must argue that

society

benefit (in

contrast

classical political philosophers).

5. To

argue such a case

candidly is to

embrace

the janus-faced task of pres

enting the case for human

excellence

to the judgment of a collective me

diocrity. Quite
the very judgment

apart

from the

ambiguous

rhetorical

situation

requires

flattery of the opening pages, implicitly presupposing the good

"incapable
judging"

of the ninety-nine percent who are

of

on

any

matter not self-evident.

Socrates, in

the

Apology, did
expect

not expect

to

win

his

case.

He

was correct.
so?

Why

then

did Mill both

argument

(or

hope)

to succeed and in fact do

of

Because the
the claim

for the distinction

only

the few and the many rests upon

that the few

are not

capable of

but do in fact

possess greater in-

244
sight

Interpretation
and

into the tme

position

the good (even if this

be only Socratic
rendered

wisdom).

But
not

Mill's

on

the earlier dilemmas

has

dubious, if it has

wholly subverted, the possibility of such insight. If no one's opinion

more assured

is any

than any other opinion, then we are all in the situation of the

many: all opinions are equal

because

none of them can

be

shown

to be

simply
we us

tme. The

Mill's essay is that he lost by succeeding. irony Mill's essay On Liberty has powerfully influenced the way in which

final

of

to
a

day
way his

think about freedom of discussion and action. But it has

which

influenced
the

in

Mill did

not

intend. His

whole argument

is

against

equality

of

opinions and the conformism which the

argument

democratic

ethos tends to produce.

But

has become for this

a commonplace to support the seems

ions. The

reason

equality of all opin to lie in the dilemmas which he confronted in

that we can ever know that our opinion

the course of articulating his

case.

Because he felt his defense

compelled

to

deny

is

tme or that the opinion

of the

which we oppose of

utility

freedom

of

is false, he was obliged to formulate speech for all in terms of the weakness He
recognized that this was an

of our cognitive power rather than

its

strength.

inadequate defense, and so he dence that, over time, rational

ones.

appealed

to

a confidence

in progress,

a confi

opinions and conduct preponderate over

wrong
we

But in

order to ground this confidence opinions once

he

was

forced to

claim

that

know that many

secuted are

held

are

erroneous,

and that opinions once per

tme.

In making this claim, he comes up against the edge of the abyss which later thinkers, Nietzsche and Weber in particular, will enter; one with the joyful in
tent to claim, one
with

despair.
affairs

If there really is this preponderance which there must be unless human and have always been, in an almost desperate state (231).

are,

Suppose that

not

merely is the tmth hard to know, but that there is

philosopher

no

final

tmth to know about the world, or alternatively about values as distinguished

from facts. Then the

becomes

legislator,

and

free discussion is

only the arena of the will to power. Mill is still sufficiently influenced
tradition in which he stands to believe that there is a tmth to be though he wavers on its knowability. His
the
conviction rests more on

by

the
al

known,

his faith in

knowundeniability of progress than on a conviction of, for example, the ability of human nature. The foundation on progress is not only logically

weaker, but also empirically, because one may

ress

come

to wonder whether prog

is

so manifest as not a

to be reasonably denied.
of

In offering know that our

defense

freedom

of

discussion based himself

was
with

on

our

inability

to

opinion

is tme, Mill
on

aligns

the empiricist tradition

not on

going back to Locke, whose there is a human nature but ciently to

political

teaching

based

the denial that

nature suffi

the denial that

we can

know that

guide ourselves as a

community

toward the life of

well-being.

But

Mill's Dilemmas
Locke
sessed

245
we could
which

at

least thought that

all

know that there society

are natural rights pos respect

and

by

men,

rights

political

must

protect.

Mill's

utilitarianism undermines attached neither

any

such appeal nor

to rights, and so his political

thinking is
The

to arche

to telos.

not been simply to find flaws in understand how it is that those flaws are not merely but to to his argument, try errors, slips, correctable in the second edition so to speak, but rather how they
purpose of

these

reflections on

Mill has

follow from the fundamental

equality.

ambivalences

in Mill's

attitude toward

democratic

Republic, Book II,

Origins
of

and

the

Political
Hyland

Philosophy

Drew A.

Trinity

College

As has from the

often

been observed, Book I

the work, reads
as

of

Plato's Republic, if taken in isolation

"aporetic"

rest of such

remarkably like

one of the earlier or

Euthyphro.'

dialogues,

the

Charmides, Lysis, Laches,

and a number of
"definition"

The topic

in the Republic is
crates'

"justice,"

"definitions"

are asserted

by

So

interlocutors,

each
"succeed,"

is in

turn subjected to
sense of

Socrates'

elen
an

chus, the dialogue does

not

in the

finding

acceptable

definition. Nevertheless,
are

at the

conclusion, the interlocutors (and the readers)

better

off than

they

were, since now, at

what

aporia. effort

they do not Moreover,

to make the

know,"

but

realize

their

least, they do not "think they know ignorance; they are left in philosophic

happens, Socrates closes Book I, in an apparent interlocutors feel better, by taking the blame himself for the
as often

failure to
retic, so

achieve a successful so

definition (Republic

354b-c).

So far,

so apo

"early,"

"Theaetetan."

What

makes at

the Republic virtually

unique not

interlocutors,

least two

of

them, do

among such dialogues is that the let Socrates go home at this juncture,

but insist that he stay and defend more adequately his refutation of the pro ceeding assertions of Thrasymachus. Glaucon and Adeimantus, younger broth
ers of

Plato,

transform a

typically
do

short aporetic

dialogue into the job defense.

monumental

Republic
and

by by demanding

asserting their
that he

recognition

that

Socrates'

elenchus was

inadequate
thus ac

a more adequate

of

They

notoriously difficult task, which more famous rhetoricians such as Thrasymachus or Protagoras find next to impossible, of turning the tables on
complish the

Socrates
his
two
own.

and

making him speak positively, developing and To be sure, he does so in his usual context of a but
no one

defending "city

a view of with the

"dialogue"

brothers, (369a) of the Republic is primarily Book II, however, belongs at least
see

fails to

that the setting out of the

in

speech

Socrates'

doing.
to Glaucon and Adeimantus as it
of

as much

does to Socrates. Not only are they the efficient cause dialogue, but they establish the terms, the context, in

the continuation of the

which

Socrates

will

have

to develop the more positive view of the succeeding books. They do so, with Glaucon taking the lead, by developing a more adequate defense of a position
"later"

It

should not

be forgotten that it is

also similar to the

writing.

Theaetetus, reminding

us that

Plato did

"abandon"

not

this possibility in his later

interpretation, Winter 1988-9, Vol. 16, No. 2

248

Interpretation

similar to

origins of account

Thrasymachus', and by grounding that defense in an account of the justice, of the polity, and indeed of human nature itself. Because that is so clearly determinative for the rest of the Republic, it will be worth
to examine it
shall
Socrates'

our while often

and

initial

response

to it more

closely than is

done. For, I

argue, Book II

contains

to a remarkable extent a state

ment of

many of the fundamental controversies of political philosophy. Glaucon begins by distinguishing three kinds of goods and asking Socrates
which

to say to

class

he believes justice belongs. The distinction Glaucon

clear.2

draws is both

subtle and not

that we would choose

cause we

especially to have not because

own sake

The first

class

is "a kind

of good

we

desire its consequences, but be

the plea the enjoyment in

delight in it for its harmless

and

such as enjoyment and all

sures which are

leave

no after effects other than

having

them.3

The

second class

"we like both for its

own sake and

healthy"

for

what

comes out of

it,

such as

thinking

third kind of good,

medical

for

which

and seeing and being Glaucon lists as examples

(357c). The
exercise,

gymnastic

treatment, and the other activities from which money is made, are "drudgery but beneficial to us; and we would not choose to have them for themselves but for the sake of the wages and whatever else comes out of
them"

(357c-d). The distinction, especially between the first two, is made somewhat obscure because in each case the measure, enjoyment, or delight, would itself
seem

to be an

"effect"

and so

belong

to the second

class.

It has been plausibly

suggested

that the first class

must refer

to goods whose good effects are "in

themselves"

and exerted within

the soul of the possessor, whereas the second

includes

goods which

"in

conjunction with other

things, have

additional good

effects."4

which

While the distinction itself may be somewhat vague, the point towards Glaucon drives is relatively clear. He asks Socrates to which of the three

classes second

he

supposes

justice belongs

and when

class

of things notes

"liked both for itself

Socrates predictably puts it in the and for what comes out of

would put

it"

(358a), Glaucon

that most people, on the contrary,

it in the
for their
that

third class of goods which are

good consequences.

drudgery

in themselves but

pursued

The

challenge to

Socrates therefore becomes to

show

justice is indeed in the justice in the third

challenge to
itself"

second class.

However,

since those who would place

class agree about the good consequences of

justice,

the real

tice "in

Socrates lies in showing, in contrast to the common view, that jus is a good and not drudgery. This is the force of Glaucon's other demand that Socrates
show

wise extreme

that the

just man,

stripped

of the

2.

cism,

ed.

David Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's in Plato's Republic: Interpretation and Criti Alexander Sesonske (Belmont, California: Wadsworth; 1966) pp. 66-81. See especially
of

Republic,"

pp. 70-72.

3. Republic 357b. Unless otherwise noted, I shall follow the translation Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

Allan Bloom, The

4.

Sachs,

op.

cit., pp. 71-72.

Republic, Book II,

good consequences of will nevertheless

and the

Origins of Political

Philosophy

249

siderable

justice, that is, with the reputation for great injustice, be happiest (358a, 36ia-d). In any case, it is a matter of con scholarly controversy whether, in the ensuing books, Socrates even
much

takes up this precise challenge,

less

whether
which

What he does do is dictated

thmst of

by

the way in

he successfully meets it. Glaucon now presents the

his

position.

Glaucon develops his

"what kind
of

challenge

in three
and

ways

thing they say justice is,

and the polity.

(358c-d). First, he sets out where it came (358c). That

from"

is, he

presents us with what we shall see

is

an

extraordinary

account of

the ori

gins of

justice

Second, he
of

supports the common view that

jus

tice belongs to the third class

goods, that "all those who practice it do so

good"

unwillingly, as necessary but not

are
of
say"

(358c),
man

and

right to do so, for "the life of the unjust the just man, as they (358c). Glaucon's stunningly at length:
compact account

is,

after

third, he argues that they all, far better than that

of

of the

origins

justice is

worth

quoting

They

the bad

say that doing injustice is naturally good, and suffering injustice bad, but that in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it; so that, when they do injustice to one another and suffer it and taste of both, it seems profitable to those
to set

who are not able to escape the one and choose the other

down

a compact

among themselves
to set down their

neither

to do injustice

nor

to

own

laws

and compacts and

it. And from there they began to name what the law commands law
suffer

ful

and

what

just. And this, then, is the genesis and being of justice; it is a mean between is best doing injustice without paying the penalty and what is worst suf

fering

injustice

without

being

able to avenge oneself.

good

The just is in the

middle

be
a

tween these two, cared for not because it is

want of vigor

but because it is honored due to

able

in

doing
down

injustice. The

man who

is

to do it and

is tmly

a man

would never set

a compact with anyone not to

nature of

do injustice

and not to suffer

it.

He'd be

mad.

Now the

justice is this

and of this sort, and

it naturally

grows

out of these sorts of things (258c- 359b).

noting the profoundly alienated and negative character of teaching Glaucon sets out. As the first line makes clear, the natural order of things is radical injustice; justice is an imposition on this natural order by those
can

We

begin

by

the

incapable
call

of

flourishing
of

within

its

context.

The
"war

natural

order,

what we might
all,"

Glaucon's "state

nature,"

is tmly

of all against

and more set ac

than one commentator has noted the affinity

out and made

with

famous in

Hobbes'

Leviathan.5

subsequently Glaucon's view implies, in

will not

the

position

cordance with

it is

functionally

Thrasymachus', identical to legality,

that justice is indeed a human convention, that that "the

strong"

feel themselves

Journal of the History of E.g., R. E. Allen, "The Speech of Glaucon in Plato's Philosophy, XXV, No. I (Jan. 1987), p. 5. Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), acknowledges the connection but qualifies it. See especially p. 88.
5.

Republic,"

250

Interpretation

bound

by

defined by, Perhaps

its strictures, and that it injustice.

"natural"

originates

as

the negation of, and so

is

more

light

can

be

shed on

Glaucon's

position

if

we

think through

the conception of the human situation

implicit in it. I begin

of this

with an outline of

two
call

fundamentally

different

characterizations

situation, which I shall

to the

our

respectively the relational and the very nature is determined by the quality humans. What I
am

atomistic.6

According

first view,

of our relations with

the world and

other

is

a given set of relations, or the am a

potentiality thereof.
these are
of the

If I say, for example, that I

words most

teacher, husband,

father, American,
situation

naming the specific relations which constitute who I am.

of this conception of the
as

One

famous instances
of

human

is Aristotle's
of

"definition"

human beings

"the

political

animal."7

The thrust

this char

acterization

is that humans do if

not

polities,

but that it is
we are

part of our

merely happen from time to time to gather in essential nature to do so. We would not be the The
same

beings that

we were not political.

is true

of

Marx's famous

formulation

Thou that "There is

early in / and but the I of the primary word itself, only I-It."9 I-Thou and the I of the primary word In each case we see a characteri zation of our very natures as relational. This view is almost always presented
of us as or of

"species

beings,"8

Buber's

assertion

no

I taken in

positively
nents of

by

its

proponents, as

in the three
of

cases

mentioned; but it is worth

noting that
the

such an

understanding
view as

human

nature can

be

criticized

by

propo

"atomistic"

entailing

an excessive

dependence

on others, a

lack

of

autonomy

or self-reliance.
"atomistic"

According

to the second,

view, a human

being

is naturally

an

or who, to autonomous, independent, radically self-interested be sure, may enter into relations with others, but where such relations will never be essential to, literally definitive of, the individual. That is, our nature

"monad"

"atom,"

is entirely intrinsic. Probably the best example in istic conception of the individual is the
which, at least originally,

all of of

"ego"

Descartes'

philosophy of the "ego

a

atom

cogito"

does

not even

know

whether

it has

body,

much

less

whether an external world exists

to which it might be essentially related.

But its

predominance
of

in the thought

of

Thoreau, Emerson,

and certain representatives

conception

"existentialist"

the

tradition suggest the strong appeal of this

"self-reliance,"

in

our

tradition. In its positive versions, such a conception of the individual em autonomy,

phasizes

independence,

and

as

such

is

often

pre-

6. For

a more

detailed formulation

of these

two standpoints and their significance, see my The

and 5.

Question of Play (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984), especially Chapters 4 7. Aristotle. Politics, Book I. Chapter 2, 1253a.

8. Examples

of

this notion can be found in T. B.

1963).

Bottomore, Karl Marx: Eaily

Judenfrage' "

Writings (New

See especially "Bruno Bauer, 'Die pp. 13, 26. 31; "Eco nomic and Philosophic Manuscripts of p 127. Perhaps the most explicit and succinct for mulation is in the famous sixth "thesis on Feuerbach": "But the essence of man is no abstraction in herent in each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social
1844,"

York: McGraw Hill,

9.

Martin Buber, /

and

Thou,

trans.

R. G. Smith (New York: Scribner's. 1958)

p. 4.

Republic, Book II,

sented as a
strive.

and

the

Origins of Political
as a situation
point

Philosophy
of

251

desirable way to be, indeed

toward

which we should

Its

negative possibilities,

however,
an

toward a sense

isolation

and

a self-interest so radical as to
mental alienation

imply

indifference towards

and even a

funda

from

other

humans.10

As I hope my
influence
lectic"

examples

suggest,

these two views

have

exerted
of

strong
noting

on our

tradition,

and a worthwhile

study

could

be done

their "dia

in the

history

of western culture.

But

we can return

to Book II

by

that, clearly, Glaucon

presents a prototypical version of the atomistic

view, in
others."

cluding within it the Human beings

ventions which of
alienation.12

negative consequence of radical alienation are alienated and

from
of

"naturally"

selfish; the establishing

are

the

con

lead
I

us "not

to do

injustice"

impositions

on

the natural order

want to emphasize

ical

situation

arises out of a
"natural"

here that, according to Glaucon, the polit situation of fundamental negativity or limitation;
alienation, and self-interest, all of which is

there exists a

injustice,

founded in

deeply

atomistic conception of the

individual. It is to

counter this

initial negativity, to turn limitation into possibility, that Glaucon develops his

understanding of the "social tional justice. If humans were

ral

contract,"

the origins
not

of

the polity and conven

limited

by

our atomistic alienation and natu

injustice,
not
need

we

ity,

conventional

presumably would justice.

not need a social

"Justice"

contract, not
a response

need a pol

is thus

to a specific

version of

human

nature and a specific

form

"natural"

not part of our original

nature, not

of negativity in that sense.

and

limitation. It is

Glaucon's

second thesis

is that those

who

do justice do

so

only for the good consequences that accrue from is, that justice belongs to the third category of goods
support

a reputation

unwillingly and for justice, that His

chief
arch-

outlined earlier. presented

for this

claim

is

the myth of

Gyges. Gyges is

as an

typical

human being. Thanks to the

whenever

acquisition of a magical

him to become invisible in

a situation where

the collet

ring which enables is turned inward, Gyges is placed risking the negative conse he does all manner of injus

he

can

do injustice

without

quences thereof.

Freed from those

consequences,

tice with a vengeance. The clear implication is that we would all behave ac

cordingly,

and

therefore that the only reason we are just is because we fear the

io.
frage',"

Marx draws
pp.

out these 26.

sees

implications especially

well.

See

op. cit.,

"Bruno

Bauer, 'Die

Juden-

13, 25,

11.

R. E. Allen

this

in

passing:
"

Glaucon "tends toward Op. cit.,

p.

a view of

human intercourse

which

is remarkably
12.

atomic and

isolated.

6. only
version of an

It

is worth

noting that Glaucon's is

most

hardly

the

originally

atomistic state

of nature.

For the

ings in the

state of nature as
civil

challenging alternative, radically atomistic but

consider

Rousseau,

who characterizes

human be

not alienated, and construes the movement

from

the state of nature to

the

relational.

Second

Discourse"

human nature from the atomistic to society as necessitating a change in In my judgment Rousseau is deeply ambivalent about this change. See e.g. "The in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses (New York: St.
pp.

Martin's Press, 1964),

106,

no,

127-35, especially

pp.

I33"34:

Of

the

Social

Contract,
p.

trans. Charles Sherover (New York: Harper &

Row,

1984),

all of

Book I but especially

18.

252

Interpretation
getting
caught

consequences of
of

doing

injustice. Justice is in the third category If Gyges

can

goods,

not at all a good

in itself (359d-36od).
clear enough. right

The
cal of

point of

the Gyges story is

then Glaucon is

be taken

as

typi

humans,
do

surely

that

justice is

not

something that
We thus really

we would

without

fear

of punishment

for

doing

unjust acts.

are, as his account of the origins of the polity suggested, atomistic

alienated
with

beings,

from

each other and

naturally

unjust.

The Gyges story is consistent

the earlier account of our origins.

point

Glaucon's third

is

an elaboration of the second.

natural

The

people who are

just,

who control under

duress their

tendency

to do injustice and do so

only from the fear of punishment, are right. Justice really is in the third cate gory, drudgery in itself, pursued only for its consequences. To bring this out

Socrates, Glaucon develops his two of the utterly just man who, however, not merely misses the rewards usually associated with a reputation for justice but, to the contrary, has a reputation for
and to culminate challenge

his

to

"statues"

the greatest injustice and is treated accordingly ments, and

companied
on

with

the harshest of punish

whose

the

other

by

clever

hand, a massively unjust man intelligence, so that he both avoids

of a reputation

injustice is

ac

the usual penalties for

only away the usual consequences of justice and injustice but reversed them, Glaucon asks Socrates to show that, notwithstanding, the just man would
stripped

injustice

and enjoys

the benefits

for justice.

Having

not

be happier than the The import

of

unjust

(36oe-362c).
powerful

Glaucon's be

images is
the two

again

of points should

underlined.

First,

fairly clear, but a number statues dramatically emphasize

that, freed

the thesis that justice is usually pursued, and injustice eschewed, exclusively

because

of the consequences associated with them respectively, and of the

would

from those consequences, the thesis

the
origins of

Gyges story,

and of

the account of

the

social

contract,

be

sustained.

strained

tendency is

to be unjust and alienated from each

are grounded

Our natural, uncon other. Glaucon's three

cmcial account of the

theses hold together coherently, and

origins of

in the

the polity and

the

conventional not

justice.

Second,
Socrates

fact that Glaucon justice

and

associated with

only strips away the consequences usually injustice but reverses them makes the challenge to

more extreme

than

its

earlier statements suggested.

The

account of

the

three classes of goods suggested only that Socrates needed to tice was a good in
sequences.

establish

that jus

itself,

that

is,

that

it

was

desirable

without appeal

to its con

With the
even

presentation of

Glaucon's two statues, he is

asked

to

show

further that

if the did

respective reputations were

reversed, and in

particular

that if the just

required

man

not

enjoy the usual consequences of justice (all that was

of

by

the earlier
of a

formulation for

goods) but

was saddled with would

the

negative

consequences

reputation

utter

injustice, he

nevertheless

be

happier that the

that

unjust man with a reputation

meet

for justice. It is

at

least

arguable rather

Socrates

never even attempts to

this extreme challenge, but

Republic, Book II,

proceeds

and the

Origins of Political

Philosophy

253

to

alter

the expectations of Glaucon and Adeimantus. On the other

noted that

hand, it
indeed

should

be

he

might

fail to

meet

this challenge but succeed in

show that

meeting the earlier one that

a good

informed the discussion, to

therefore
not

justice

was

"in

itself"

and

quences.

It is

not obvious

desirable merely for its good conse that the only way to do that is to meet the extreme
an example nevertheless

challenge of

the two statues.

Third,
of

as

just

such

Bloom nicely points out, Socrates himself might be a just man with a reputation for injustice who is

happy.13

one

He may thus be a sort of existential proof which renders a dialectical unnecessary. There is surely some plausibility to this. On the other hand,

it

should

be

noted

that the kind of

justice that Socrates

seems

to exhibit is

significantly different from the justice that supposedly will be exhibited subse quently by the philosopher-kings. Their justice will presumably be accom plished by mling with perfect justice in the light of their comprehensive knowl
edge

of the Ideas; they will be wise, and mle in the light of that Socrates, however, "minds his own business and does not interfere

wisdom. with

the

very different way, by avoiding politics as much as possible and pursuing the life of a questioner and quester after wisdom, who in the recognizes his lack thereof and seeks after it, in a word, a business
of

others"

in

"philosopher"

literal

sense. account of

Glaucon's

the origins of the city emphasized that people agree to

of

obey the law out of fear of suffering injustice; once established, the efficacy the laws, he supposes, will depend on their success as a deterrent. His story

of

Gyges
fear
of

showed

that

Gyges,

and

by

implication

most

humans, freed from the

statues

punishment, will do

almost

reputa strong emphasis on for injustice. In short, his account generally emphasizes as the chief moti vation to justice the dire consequences of being caught in unjust acts. His

again place

any manner of justice. And his two the dreadful consequences of having a

tion

brother, Adeimantus,
the same

now enters and supplies the converse emphasis, not are

but

with

gory but for the

He thus is
wants

of goods.

final point, that justice belongs People praise justice and

impressed
show that

in the just

second

but the third

cate

not

for its inherent

qualities

various rewards that come with a reputation most

for justice (363a ff.).

by

how

pleasant

the

reputation

for justice is,

and

Socrates to
for

in fact justice is

no

less

pleasant

in itself than is the justice in

that jus

reputation

justice.14

Whereas Glaucon

wanted

to be shown that

itself is "worth the

tice in
at

trouble,"

Adeimantus demands that Socrates

show

itself,

without reference

to the benefits of good reputation,

is

no trouble

all, but

than

Glaucon1

sense, his demand is even more extreme intrinsically impossis. Together, the task may well be so formidable as to be
pleasant.

In

13. 14.

Bloom,

op. cit., p.

347.
p.

Both Strauss (op. cit., Glaucon

and

90)

and

Bloom (op. cit.,

pp.

342-43)

point out

the

differing

em

phases of

Adeimantus,

and connect

them plausibly to differences in their respective

characters.

254

Interpretation
Socrates twice indicates that he believes it is impossible to
set

ble,

and

meet

the

demands

before him (362d, 368b). In tmth, he does not, at least not explicitly. What he does is change the expectations of Glaucon and Adeimantus. In a masterful rhetorical stroke,
Socrates
shifts

the

brothers'

attention to a project even more

intriguing
focus

than

possible response to their explicit challenge:

he invites them to found

shifts the

a city. of

By
the

introducing

the famous city-soul analogy

(368d) Socrates

discussion to the

nature of the city and the justice to be found in it. The Repub lic thereby becomes the monumental work of political philosophy that it is. This tack enables Socrates to respond explicitly to Glaucon's earlier account of

the origins of the city

speech"

with a

very different
"tme"

account of

his

own.

He constructs

"in

(369a)

"healthy"

the

or version of

city (372c). This construction pres

ents an altogether
of

different

the nature of human

and the

being

and

the origins

the polity than that presented

by Glaucon,
follows:
comes
you

differences,

when made

explicit, reveal some of the decisive controversies in

political philosophy.

Socrates begins his

"Well, then, I
self-sufficient

account as

said,

city, as I

believe,

into

being

because

each of us

isn't
to

but is in
of a

need of much.

Do

believe there's

another

beginning

the

founding
"None
at

all,"

he

said.15

"So, then,
ners and

when one man

takes on another

for

one need and another

for

another

need, and since many things are needed, many

men gather

in

one settlement as part

helpers,

to this

common settlement we give

the name city,

don't

we?"

"Most

certainly."

"Now, does
share,
"Certainly."

one man give a share

to another, if he does
himself?"

give a

share,

or

take a

in the belief that it's better for

"Come now, I said, let's

make a

city in

speech

from the beginning. Our need,

as

it

it."

seems, will make

"Of

course."

The city
nature,

originates

according to Socrates because

self-sufficiency,

of

our

lack

of

our need of each

something about human other. That is, and explic

itly

contrary in the contrast between Glaucon's

tions of human
nature as

to Glaucon's account, we are

and and

relational

by

nature.

We

see posed

Socrates'

accounts those
which

two concep
earlier.

atomistic

relational

outlined

Moreover,
each

and, crucially, from the very

not

other

in alienation,

as

beginning, human beings encounter Glaucon insisted, but in the spirit of coop
alienated and
non-

eration.

If

we

take the two pairings, atomistic and relational,

can see

alienated, we

that there are four possible

accounts of

the

origins of

the

15.

Adeimantus here
account of

either

forgets,

or

terly different

the

origins which we

quietly indicates his disagreement have just discussed.

with,

his brother's

ut

Republic, Book II,

city, the two extremes

and

the

Origins of Political
Plato
be:
presents

Philosophy
mouths of

255
and

of which

in the

Glaucon

Socrates. Those
I
.

accounts would

state of nature

in

which

human beings
human beings

are atomistic

and, when

they do they do
of

encounter each

other, alienated. This is

Glaucon's
the

position.

2.

state of nature

in

which

are atomistic

but,

when

encounter each view

other, nonalienated.

Possibly

best

example we

have

this

is that
A

set out

by Rousseau,
in
which

and made

famous in his

notion of the

"noble

savage."

3.

state

of nature

human beings

are

relational

but

alienated.

Something bring about

move

like this

seems

to be Marx's view,

where

the conditions of scarcity

the necessity of alienation, which must in turn be overcome as we

toward the telos of

history,
which

where we will

be

relational and nonalienated.

4.

state of nature

in

human beings

are relational and nonalienated.

This is the

account which position

Socrates formulates.
pole to

Socrates'

is thus the
which

Glaucon's
rise

as an account of

that funda

mental

human

condition mouth of

might give

to the city, to
and

politics.

Plato
of

puts

into the

Glaucon the

most pessimistic

into the

mouth

Socrates the
the city.

most optimistic account of

the

human

situation and the origins of

Still, in both
itation
or

cases we see the confrontation of an original experience of

lim

the city.

negativity which must be turned into possibility by the founding of For Glaucon, the original limitation or negativity was our natural alienation which led us, in the state of nature, to do all manner of injustice to The city, the
social

each other.

contract, is

a constmct

to ward off this original

tendency. With

Socrates,

the

limitation,

the negativity,

is

quite

different. We
response

lack autonomy;

we are not

self-sufficient;

we need each other.

Our

to

this,
so

our effort

to turn limitation into possibility, is to

gather together

into

cities

that, in the spirit of cooperation, we may enhance the lives We lack, we need, we seek ways to overcome those lacks
only
recall

of each other. and needs.

We

need

Plato's Symposium to

recognize

the phenomenon to

which

Socrates here
cal; it is

alludes as that aspect of

human
of

nature which

leads

us to

be
to

politi
which

institutions,"

our eros.

Not just the formulation

"laws

and

Diotima
gather

called our attention

in

the Symposium

(209b), but the very impetus to

at

in cities, is founded in
an eros which, at as

our nature as erotic.

But it is

least

until

Glaucon breaks in If
we are

372c, is

portrayed

by

Socrates

strikingly easy to
clothing, comfort,

satisfy.

cessities of

food,

and shelter

simply furnished with the ne that it, furnished with reason (369d),

able,

even mstic

we will

be

content, or so Socrates seems to suggest.

To

accomplish this

comfort, this

enhancement of our

lives together, Socrates

introduces the

cmcial principle of

the division of labor at 369c:

Now,
in

what about

this? Must each one of them put

must

his

work at

the disposition of all

common

for example,

the

farmer,

one

man, provide

food for four

and

256
spend

Interpretation
four
times as much time and

labor in the

provision of

food

and then give

it in
a

common to others; or must

he

neglect

them and produce a

fourth

part of

the

food in

fourth

part of

the time and use the

other

three parts
to share
auton

for the
in

provision of a

house,

clothing,

and

shoes,

minding his
369c-

own

taking the trouble business for himself?

not

common with

others, but

(all'

di'

hauton

ta

houtou prattein?)

370a, my

emphasis).

According
of events

to

Socrates,
out of

the principle of the

division

of

labor,

that most

decisive

in the but

economic

history

of

the world, arises not out of an original

of each other.

alienation

the cooperative effort to enhance the lives

Once again, an initial limitation is confronted and transformed into possibility, done not as a control over our capacity for injustice, as Glaucon would have it, but in the
spirit of cooperation. chosen at

But Plato has

the

his

words
second

Republic for
the

least the

carefully here, and time cannot fail to

of
of

anyone who note

in the

passage

is reading just

quoted

first

occurrence

in the book

the phrase which I emphasized,

business."

"minding

one's own
"definition"

This is,

course, to become the core of the

subsequent

the dialogue. But the opposite sense tice.

we can also not

justice (433a, 433b, 433d, 434c) which is to inform fail to note that it is here used in precisely than the one that will be given to it as the principle of jus
of will

Justice,

that

is,

be formulated
that of

as

"each

one

minding

one's own on the

busi
of

others"

ness and not

interfering

with

in the

sense

founded

first

the alternatives suggested

by

Socrates in the
division

above

quotation, to wit, that in

or

ac

cordance with the principle of the

of

labor,

"one person,

job,"

one
well

each person will pursue one's own since

designated activity, presumably do it

it

will accord with one's particular receive

abilities, contribute that activity to the

whole, and

the other necessities of life

from the

work of

the

other citi

this inter following a similar principle. Justice, thus makes each citizen radically, pretation of "minding one's own indeed irrevocably political, contributing to the welfare of others but also ut terly dependent on the help of others for sustenance. quoted above at By contrast, the sense of "minding one's own 370a is entirely different. Here, minding one's own business implies doing ev
zens who will

be

constmed on

business,"

business"

erything for oneself, that is, making

whatever

one's

own

food,

clothing, shelter,

and

else,

and

therefore neither contributing to the

welfare of others nor

depending
of

at all on

the

help

of others

for

sustenance.

This latter interpretation radically

apolitical, a

minding

one's own

business thus
atomistic

would

make one
whom

fundamentally
would

autonomous,
extrinsic

being

for

be entirely
Republic1''

to one's nature and

not

welfare.

any It is

relations with others

therefore that this interpretation is

of

the one pursued in the

seems to

hardly surprising "city in

instance

speech

the

(though Socrates himself

be

a virtual

of

16.
who

Rousseau

would seem

to agree. Consider The Social

a people ought

Contract, Part

2, Section VII: "He

as

dares

undertake

to give

institutions to

to

feel himself capable,

it

were, of

Republic, Book II,

it). But that
in the two
reiterated

and

the

Origins of Political

Philosophy

257 For
see

should not possible

blind

us to the provocation of

Plato here

presents us. we

interpretations

"minding

business"

one's own

precisely the two fundamental conceptions of human

the one
which makes us

being

earlier

discussed,

fundamentally

relational, the

other which

characterizes us as

naturally atomistic. The Republic will now pursue the rela tional interpretation in great detail. But we should not forget its important, and
alternative.17

unrefuted,
political sense of

To

put

the

point

differently, justice in
will now

the explicitly

business"

"minding

one's own

be

emphasized

in the

Republic.

However,
for the

we should not

forget that its Socrates

apolitical sense will speak

is limned, but
of

passed over

most part

in

silence.

in behalf

the po

litical

version while relational

The

himself exhibiting the alternative. interpretation that is pursued is acknowledged, if tentatively,

and then supported

by

Adeimantus
the

(370a)

by

Socrates

with a

strikingly strong

statement of

uniqueness of each

human being's talents:

that, in the first place,
your

"I

myself also

had the thought like

anyone

when you spoke

each of us
men
is."

is

naturally
are apt

not quite

else, but

rather

differs in his nature; different

for the

accomplishment of

different jobs. Isn't that

opinion?

"It

(37oa-b).

The

principle of the

division

of

labor is thus

said

to

be founded in the

natural

differences in human
principle

nature rather articulates

than, say, in
other

economic conditions.
ramifications as

But the
not

Socrates here
of which

has

important

well,

the

least

is that it

offers us our of

first

clue as to

why the later "noble

lie,"

that there are three

activities

kinds

souls, gold, silver,

a

and

bronze,

each suited

for different

(415a if.), is in fact

and

lie; it simply fails

of

to take adequate

account of the genuine

"city in

speech"

will

diversity complexity therefore be founded on principles (the lie

human

nature.

The later in

of metals

each individual, who in himself is a complete and indepen changing human nature; of transforming manner his life and his greater of a into part dent whole, whole, from which he receives in some

being;

altering man's constitution in order to istence for the independent and physical existence
of man of

strengthen

it;
in

of

which we

substituting a social and moral ex have all received from nature. In a

to
endow others.

word, it is necessary to deprive

are alien to

his

native powers

order

him The

with some which more

him,

and of which

he

cannot make use without

the aid of

thoroughly
acquired

those

natural powers are

deadened

and

powers, the more solid

can

and perfect also

destroyed, the greater and more durable are are the institutions; so that if each citizen is
the rest, and if the force
of all
acquired

the

nothing, and
the whole

be nothing,
the highest

except

in

combination with all

by

be

equal or superior

to the

sum of

the

natural

forces it

the

attain."

is

at

point of perfection which

can

may say that legislation Social Contract, trans. The (Rousseau,

individuals,

we

Charles Sherover (New York: Meridian Books, 1974), P- 65I suggest that the ambivalence present in this paragraph is
17.
ported

reflected

in the Republic itself.

who

In the Charmides

at 161b

ff.,

sophrosyne

business,"

atomistic thesis, that it means doing and making everything preting it as an extreme version of the An Interpre this passage, see my The Virtue of Philosophy: of for oneself. For a longer discussion 1981), pp. JiStation of Plato's Charmides (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press,

by Critias,

as

"doing

one's

own

is defined, first and Socrates

by

Charmides

is

then

refutes

this definition

by

sup inter

258

Interpretation
which

particular)

ignore the

realities of

human diversity, ignore,

one might

say,

the complexity of human eros. Can

it therefore be genuinely just?

city (370b-372c) on the "one per basis of the division of labor and the
abilities.

Socrates
son,
one

proceeds

to build his

"healthy"

job"

principle established on the

agreement

regarding the
city,

diversity

of

human

It is

an

idyllic,

peaceful,
sail

cooperative

comprised of

craftsmen,

farmers, tradesmen,
from the city
which

merchants,

ors,

and wage earners.

Those

activities absent are no

are perhaps more

striking than those

parently the

present

in it: There
be
a

doctors,

may be

related to

the implication that this

will

city

of vegetarians.

There

are no

soldiers; ap
of

spirit of cooperation which

informs the internal

are no

functioning
and

this

city

will extend

to

other cities as well.

There

educators,
that

philosophers. seems to

There is

no

government; the to "from

state

simple principle

certainly no informs the city

each ac as

be something
no

close

each

according to his ability, to away it is

a classless society.

cording to his arise. There is I

use

needs."

The

has

not so much withered

failed to
but

competition,

no alienation;

these

phrases not
spirit of

only to describe this rustic and idyllic city,

since

also

to invoke the to some

of

Marx,

there

are clear similarities would

in

Socrates'

city
sympa more aus

Marx's

aspirations.

But Marx, I think,

be entirely in

Glaucon's strongly worded objection to the city which the tere Adeimantus seemed to find acceptable; this is a city of pigs:

thy

with

"If

you were

providing for
should

city

of

sows,

Socrates,

on what else would you

fatten

this?"

them than

"Well, how
"As is

it

be,
he

Glaucon?"

said.

conventional,"

said.

"I

suppose men who aren't and

cline on couches and eat

from tables

have

relishes and

going to be wretched re desserts just like men

have

nowadays"

(372d-e).

Socrates'

response

to Glaucon's bold

interjection is his

remarkable.

In

order

to

this, only interjection might be. "A bold idea, you best of men. But let us examine what you say to see whether it is Whereupon, we might predict, the usual So
appreciate
we need consider what usual response
true."

to this sort of

cratic elenchus would

fact he did

ensue, showing Glaucon that he thought he knew what in know. But nothing of the sort occurs here. Instead, strikingly, Socrates accedes immediately to Glaucon's objection:
not

"All

right,"

I said, "I

understand.

We are,

city, but

also a

luxurious city,

comes

as it seems, considering not only how into being. Perhaps that's not bad either.
see

For in considering such a city too, we could probably injustice naturally grow in (372c).
cities"

in

what

way

justice and

What,

we must now

ask, could be
that
view

so

important,
questioner

so

powerful,

about

Glaucon's
not so

objection

that

Socrates,

famous into

of all

opinions, does

much as call

Glaucon's

question

but

accepts

it immediately?

However boisterously, Glaucon here introduces into the discussion a deci sive notion. The city so far constructed by Socrates and Adeimantus is founded

Republic, Book II,

on an

and

the

Origins of Political
erotic

Philosophy

259
eas

idle,

and

idyllic,

pretense, that human

ily

satiated, that

shelter, we will

if only we be satisfied,
and

meet our elemental needs no

striving is so simple, so for food, clothing,

sense of

and

longer

erotic

in the

forms

of

incompleteness is far

striving to
eros

overcome them.

experiencing Glaucon knows better.

deter

other

Human

eros

more

complex,

more

manifold; one might say that it is

not such

polymorphously
will

perverse.

Again,
erotic.

is

that

we experience a

"incompletenesses"

minate number of

be satisfied,

no

longer

which, if only they can be overcome, we Instead, eros is indefinitely expanding. The

satisfaction of certain needs our eros will not

be

so

only leads to the development of others. Because easily satisfied as Adeimantus and Socrates pretend, be

cause,

as

Glaucon implies, individual

later

our

efforts to

isfaction

of one person's

continually seeks new objects, sooner or satisfy our desires will come into conflict; the sat desires will only be accomplished by the suppression
will

our eros

of someone else's, and

there

be

a problem of

justice in the luxurious

city.

For there is
asks

no problem of where

justice in the

healthy

city.

When,

at

37ie, Socrates

Adeimantus

in the

cannot

find it, and,

we now

healthy city justice is to be found, Adeimantus see, for a good reason. On the pretense of an easily
into
conflict.

satisfied eros our

need

desires

will never come

present at and

There

will

thus be no

for justice, and, if it is

as a

all, it
so

arises

need,

as

demand,
that

be virtually invisible. Justice becomes visible, only when human

will

desires

into conflict. By recognizing the sufficiently they greater complexity of human desire, Glaucon prepares us for a turn to the real human situation in which justice is a problem, in which it arises as needful.
expand

come

We thus leam from

tice arises as an

a comparison of

the

healthy

and

issue,

as

need, only

out of a condition eventual

with

luxurious city that jus where desires are

of

sufficiently

complex as to conflict.

As the

"definition"

justice,
or

"minding

one's own

business

and not

interfering

the

attests, justice necessarily involves the

pulses when arises

control of one's

business of natural desires

others

im

the satisfaction thereof involves the

suppression of others.

Justice

in

a situation where eros must

and

be

suppressed.
or at

There is thus
aspect of

an

inherent
na

conflict

between justice is

human nature,

least that

human

ture

which

our eros, and we begin to see why the Republic as a

whole

leaves

us so skeptical

that a

"perfectly just

city"

could ever come

into being.

From this standpoint, there is no such thing as a just city which is character ized by the unconstrained pursuit of all one's desires and aspirations. Justice,
again, requires the
ment of
control of one's

eros;

sophrosyne

is

an

inseparable

require

"definition"

justice,
closely
or

and we can see

related

why the

eventual

of sophrosyne

seems so

to that of justice (43od ff.).

In

response

to Glaucon's challenge,
"fevered"

Socrates develops
subsequent contrast of

what

he
the

calls

the

"luxurious"

city, which, in the

books
the

of

Republic,
the lux

will

itself have to be city

purged

(399e). A brief

healthy

and

urious

will enable us

to see some of the consequences of an acknowledge

character of

ment of the

indefinitely

expanding

human

eros.

260

Interpretation
will grow much

The luxurious city

all

larger due to the introduction into it

"beyond the

of

necessary."

those activities, pastimes,

will

and products

Predictably
beau
in
and
a

there

be

a plethora of artists and artisans of and cooks.

the unnecessary, such as

ticians, barbers,
cludes

More surprisingly, teachers head

list

which

"wet nurses, govemnesses,

beauticians, barbers,
additions perhaps

relish-makers,

cooks"

(373c)

as

unnecessary but luxurious

to the city.

Meat

will

be

added to the diet the citizens, and, related, doctors will now become more important members of the community (373c-d). And now, in a decisive passage at 373d, Socrates recognizes that a consequence of the pursuit of un of

necessary desires
enough

will

be

scarce resources.

The city

will

be

unable

to produce
needs of

to

meet not

its

citizens.

It

will

have to

just the necessary but the continually expanding go to war against its neighbors.
neighbors'

"Then

must we cut off a piece of our

sufficient

for

pasture and

tillage,

and

they in
said.

turn

land, if we are going to have from ours, if they let themselves

go

to the

unlimited acquisition of

money, overstepping the

boundary

necessary?"

of

the

"Quite necessarily, "After that, "Like

that,"

Socrates,"

he

won't we go to war as a consequence,

Glaucon? Or how

will

it

be?"

he

said.

"And let's
that
we

say whether war works evil or good, I said, but only this much, have in turn found the origin of war in those things whose presence in cit
not

ies

most of all produces evils

both

public"

private and

(373d-e).

In his

earlier account of

the origins of the city, Glaucon had described an origi

"natural"

nal, pre-political situation characterized

ward each other. more
Socrates'

by

tendency
the

to

injustice to
much

"state He

nature,"

of
now

healthy

city, had been

idyllic,

more peaceful.

indicates that

alienation and

injustice is
lux

not an original situation with

humans but

a consequence of the pursuit of

ury, or, as I have put

generated
cepted.

it,

of the pursuit of the

indefinitely
upon and

by

eros,

which

Glaucon had insisted

assume, plausibly,
with

expanding desires Socrates had ac sufficiently boun doing injustice

without

Socrates

seems to

a natural world

tiful to supply us

adequately

the necessities of

life

without

to others, but not sufficient to meet our

conflict.

indefinitely
implies,

expanding desires
can

Our

greed

for the unnecessary, he

only be

satisfied

by in

justice

and war.

To fight these wars, an army will be needed. Utilizing the now established "one person, one job," Socrates easily persuades Glaucon of the necessity of a professional army (374a ff.) and launches into the elaborate task of training and educating first the soldier class, then the
principle of
"philosopher-kings"

who will mle

the city,

rhetoric

immediately
internal

Socrates' task that will take up the next several books. shifts to to emphasizing the necessity, first, of an

defend
tions

army

the city against

invasion (374a) and, subsequently,

its
own citizens
an

an

as an

police to

(410a,

4i5d).

army that func But we must not

forget

that the

originating impetus for

army is to

wage wars of aggression

Republic, Book II,

against other
cities.18

and

the

Origins of Political

Philosophy

261

Within the city in speech, justice as "minding one's own business interfering with the business of may be pursued. But it is clear from the beginning that this city will be at best indifferent, and proba
others"

and not

bly

straightforwardly unjust, towards the ask, can such a city be called just?

citizens

of other

cities.19

We

again

As I have tried to show, Book II,

Glaucon
and

and

especially the
response

challenge

to

Socrates

by
ac

Adeimantus

and

his initial

to them, is in a fundamental

way determinative for the

counts of

rest of

the Republic. A number of alternative

the origins of political things are offered, alternative accounts of that

context of

limitation

or

One

of those possibilities

negativity to which the city is a transcending response. is pursued in the rest of the Republic, without, how
of the alternatives.

ever, a corresponding
tives are simply
never resolved

refutation

Those

unrefuted

alterna

left behind, in

silence.

As such, the

problematic of

Book II is

in the Republic; it

remains as a great

provocation.20

Only by ignoring
as

that provocation can we

tion"

say that this

book is intended

Plato's "solu attempting to

to the problem of politics.

rethink

By

accepting the

provocation and

the development of the

dialogue in the light

plumb some of

of

the set of alternatives

presented

in Book II,

we

may hope to

the depths of the political

problematic,

presented as such

by Plato,

and without solution.

18.

Bloom,
The

op.

cit., p. 348.

individual soul, if we apply the analogy, troublesome indeed. See my "Plato's Thiee Waves and the Question of forthcoming. 20. I borrow this very apt term from Mitchell Miller, "Platonic Provocations: Reflections
19.
consequences of this

for

"city-soul"

the

are

Utopia,"

on

the

Soul

and

the Good in the

Republic,"

in Platonic
of

(Washington,

D.C.: The Catholic

University

Investigations, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara America Press, 1985), pp. 163-93.

Philosophy
The

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost

John Alvis

University

of Dallas

After Satan Milton depicts

subjects:

and

his followers

conclude angels

their deliberations in

Pandemonium,
speculative

some of the

sinful

congregating to discuss

Of

good and evil much and

they

argued

then,

Of happiness Passion
Vain
and

final
and

misery,

apathy

wisdom all and

glory and shame, false philosophy (11.562

65).

There is

sufficient reason

to inquire into the comprehensiveness of Milton's

terms in the appositive phrase which echoes

man spoil you
"false"

Colossians
deceit."

2:8

"Beware lest any

"vain"

through philosophy and vain

a

Do the

adjectives which

and

distinguish
"tme'

defective kind

of speculative

activity to

one

might oppose all

philosophy, or do the epithets apply to the entire genus,

considered
of

philosophy

as such

being

misleading,

false

root and

branch? A

con

sideration of

Milton's

portrayal

temptation and

fall

supports the argument

that Milton is presenting

wisdom.

a categorical

criticism of aspirations

to philosophic
question

Furthermore, by
ideal
of which

arguing that Milton means to call

into

the
of

classical

the philosophic

life,

one

may

account

for those features

Paradise Lost
rather

than scriptural

clearly Milton's own invention texts. To the Genesis story of man's first disobedience the
as their source most characterization of

have

poem adds

(1)

deep
of

the first

man and

woman,

(2)

much-

elaborated

drama

temptation erected upon the terse biblical narrative of Eve

beguiled
set

by

the serpent,

the middle third (Books

(3) a lengthy digressive prelude to the fall comprising V-VIII) of the narrative and depicting a conversation
which

in Adam's bower in
with

the participants are Adam and the angel Raph

ael,

Eve

as silent auditress

for in

part of

the discussion. These three areas to

of

Milton's inventiveness
through the way tmst
which of

operate

concert
reveal

develop

a critique of

philosophy his dis

Milton intends to
enjoined

the speculative life as noblest rival to

fidelity

by

Old

and

New Testaments. Milton

characterization of

works as

of philosophic ambitions

into his

Adam

incipient

philosopher, he makes Satan's deception of Eve depend upon Satan's enticing her to aspire towards philosophic superiority, and he so interprets God's inter

diction

against
of

eating from the tree

that

he

adds to the

Genesis

account an

in

dictment
1.

philosophy
one can critics

which amounts

to an indictment in
without

principle.'

Although

hardly

read

Paradise Lost

tual

impertinency,

have been generally disinclined to

sensing the danger in Adam's intellec see in Milton's portrayal of the fall an

interpretation, Winter 1988-9, Vol.

16, No. 2

264

Interpretation

I. THE FORBIDDEN TREE AND NATURAL LAW

Milton
of

as a test requiring the submission intellect to faith. In the Christian Doctrine he infers a purpose for the in
conceives
recorded

God's "sole

command"

junction
It
was

in Genesis

2:16-17:
commanded as a test of
order

fidelity,
might

necessary that something should be forbidden or and that an act in its own nature indifferent, in
manifested.2

that man's obedience

be thereby

Milton

conceives

law

a precondition

for

obedience,

fidelity,
they

and

liberty, for

un

less beings

capable of choice are subject

to some law

cannot attest their

fidelity. Raphael

says

the angels receive commands not in order to produce

works which otherwise could not and steadfastness

be

accomplished creates

but in

order to

test their love

(viii. 239-40). God

liberty
and

for the

angels

by devising
human

occasional commands which can

be disobeyed,

similarly, to

permit

beings the demonstration kind

of

of an unconditional

love God

must establish a special

law. With
adds

regard

to the particular command given

qualification: a

Adam, thing

we

notice

Milton
nature

the important

God

must

forbid

"in its

own

indifferent."

Indifferent is

theological term signifying that the matter

status under

governed good nor

by

the law

is,

apart

from its

the

law,
he in

a matter neither regard to a

bad. If

one should ask

why the command

must

thing

indifferent,
law. It perately
or

the answer is in order to distinguish the divine edict from natural

would not

have

served

for God to have

required

Adam,

say, to

live tem

to treat Eve justly. For then be clear whether

the philosophic life.

would not

however punctiliously Adam had obeyed it he obeyed from a love of God or from a love
example the

indictment
offered

of

See for

interpretations

of

the

first disobedience

Sons of God (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 109-58; John Spencer Hill, John Milton: Poet, Priest and Prophet (London: Macmil lan, 1979), pp. 121-40; Louis L. Martz, Poet of Exile: A Study of Milton's Poetry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 120-41; John T. Shawcross, With Mortal Voice: The Creation
and the
Lost"

by

Hugh MacCallum. Milton

of

Paradise Lost (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1982); Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in "Paradise (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 241-71; Northrop Frye, The Return of Eden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). pp. 60-88.
upon the background of contemporary ideas and emphasizes the com Milton's denigration of all unsunctified learning in, Milton and Forbidden Knowledge (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1955). My approach adds to Schultz's an account of the bearing of the issue of forbidden knowledge upon dramatic incident and

Howard Schultz dwells

of

prehensiveness

development, particularly
Adam's turn to
the

philosophical speculation.
posed

issue

as

I have

the classical philosopher

relationship between Adam, Eve, and Satan set up by regard to Eve, John M. Steadman perceives it: "Eve's imaginary apotheosis bears a significant resemblance to that of For Stoics and Neoplatonists alike, knowledge contemplation of
At least in
through
philosophy

the alteration in the

heavenly
184-85.
2.

things and
and

purification

conducts

the

souf

back

"

to

the

skies

Milton's Biblical

Classical

Imagery

(Pittsburgh: Duquesne

University Press,

19X4),

pp.

Major Prose,

The Christian Doctrine, trans. Charles R. Sumner, in John Milton ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York: Odyssey. 1957), 1, 10.

Complete Poems

and

Philosophy
of

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost

265

his own body, in the case of temperance, or from love of Eve's justice were commanded. In order to permit the unambiguous declara if good, tion of love for God, man must conform to a divine mle that has no other
the good of
ground

for its

existence

but the divine

will.

To

see more

clearly

what causes

Milton to say the act forbidden must necessarily be an act indifferent we need only imagine an Adam, who, upon being informed that he must abstain from
the fmit of one tree asks, Why?

One

must suppose

God's reply

would point of

to

the necessity of His positing some ator, Adam must abstain, and tion of

arbitrary faith. Moved for no other reason. A more

by

love

his Cre in the

extreme

demonstra
as

love

might come of

homicide
suffices,
erwise

proposed

by

enjoining God in the Abraham-Isaac

will

conduct opposed to natural

story.

law,

matter

indifferent
oth

however,
nature.3

to

distinguish the divine

from

nature while

leaving

intact Milton's dictum that the law Milton

and
writes

the law of
nature so

God does necessarily agree with that prelapsarian man "had the whole law of
of
needed no precept

implanted

innate in him, that he

to enforce its

observance."

From this Milton

concludes that
of of

"if he

received or

commands,

whether

riage, these commands

of

respecting the tree formed no part is

knowledge,

any additional the institution of mar

the law of nature, which

is

sufficient
whatever

itself to teach

whatever

agreeable to right
must

reason, that is to say,

is

intrinsically
is

good.

Such

commands

therefore have been founded on

or

what

called positive commands or

right, whereby
what

God,

any

one

invested

with

lawful

power,

forbids

is in itself

neither good nor

bad,

and what

therefore would not have been obligatory on any one, had there been no law to
it."

enjoin or prohibit alone and a

This distinction between

law

grounded

in God's

will

by nature may account for the anomaly of Milton's God's referring to the interdiction upon the tree as his "sole (111.94 and vm. 329). The God of Genesis does not say his forbidding the tree is his
command"

law decreed

only command, and, moreover, Milton's God has in fact imposed other imper atives: Adam must propagate his race, must govern Eve, must exercise domin ion
over

his

physical

surroundings

and must control

his

appetites

"lest

sin

Surprise

thee"

(vm. 546-47).

By

"sole

command"

Milton

must understand an

its obligatory force to God's personal sanction rather than to its consistency with a scheme of things discernible through reason. For the duty to abstain from the tree is the only moral obligation Adam
edict that owes could not

have deduced
made

by

his

own

lights but

must

leam through

revelation.

Since God has

the

fmit

of

the forbidden tree attractive to the senses

(compare Genesis 2:9 and 3:6 with PL ix. 735-36), Adam without the express interdict would reason that he might taste of it subject only to temperance. Eve
echoes the

Father

when she

tells the serpent that

of

God left the interdiction

"the rest,

as

the

"command / Sole Daughter

wise enjoys the widest

his

voice"

(ix.654)

and she supposes she other we

liberty

allowed

by

reason:

live / Law to

3-

CD (1,10).

266

Interpretation
(654-55). The tree signifies the only in law in Eden, the only dictate deriving authority from the the Legislator rather than from the self-evident intrinsic fittingness of
Law"

ourselves, our Reason

stance of a positive
will

is

our

of

the conduct stipulated

by

the law.
of obedience must appear

Even though this

pledge

somewhat

capricious

(why

make

the tree

conspicuous and attractive revelation.

if

not to tempt

disobedience?) it
Because God

conveys an

important
nature

For the

mere existence of

the prohibition of

something by has expressly

arbitrary sets bounds to conferred upon Adam dominion

nature and reason.

over all

inferior creatures, Adam

not made mani or

might plausibly conceive himself an absolute sovereign were it fest that his will must submit to limits set not by circumstance of

by

the nature

things but

by

a superior will.

The

revelation of a edict also

higher

will which

does

not

propose man's

to give reasons

for its every

declares the bounds him to

placed on name the

capacity to

grasp

the good. Adam's intelligence enables

species of

animals, to regulate his own appetites, to govern

Eve,

and to

infer

God's

goodness and omnipotence

from imprints left

upon

the created world.

At

the utmost, Adam possesses an understanding sufficient to

cies

direct

all other spe

toward ends he perceives proper to the economy of the whole; such

or

is his his

permitted, delegated, dominion (vm.375). Adam must delegated power for making provisions to God's absolute

nonetheless refer and

finally

inscruta operating

ble

providence.

He

would not

know God intends

not

a special providence

apart

from laws

of nature

did

God

remind

Adam continually through the

and

exclamation made

by

that

tempting
with

tree centrally located next to the Tree of

Life, constantly beckoning

tle,
he
yet

its alluring fmit

trespass"

its

even more

alluring ti

bearing

always

its "no

pointing to purposes held

refrains

by

God

which

Adam

cannot penetrate.

So
a

long

as

Adam he

acknowledges

his tmst in

providence

cannot

from violating the tree fully grasp. However

clearly he thinks he discerns God's design through its vestiges in created be ings, he must yet admit there is a depth beyond this depth which remains un

knowable. Even the

angels encounter this

depth
of

when

they find

themselves pre

sented with a revelation apart

the

begetting

the Son

which seems altogether

from any unfolding of an abiding order of nature, or in moments when intuit (as Raphael has) that the behests God sets them to obey aim at no they purpose beyond testing their love. So long as Adam acknowledges this inexpli
cable

depth

of

the divine

will

he

acknowledges a constraint upon philosophy.

For philosophy founders if it cannot attribute rational grounds to God's ways. If the Ultimate Cause declares a purpose in essence arbitrary, the principle of
will

then rises above the principle of rationality, and

philosophy

the effort to
must sub set

supplant opinion ordinate

gels at

by knowledge
simple

regarding

the nature of the whole

itself to

tmsting

obedience.

We know from the trial

the an

the moment of the elevation of the Son that Milton's God's favored

proof of

love from

rational creatures

is this
on

acceptance of

his dispositions

on

tmst. The trial of the

forbidden

tree

is

the level of mankind, the same sort of

Philosophy
trial that the

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost

267
angelic

Father's

announcement of the

begetting
after

had been for the

intelligences.

This is fideism God's

not

to say Milton's God requires

the manner of Tertullian a

which glorifies

goodness and of

in embracing absurdity. Milton establishes evidence of Adam's awareness of that goodness adequate to show
obedience to

that the tmst required

by

the unexpected behest is not itself illobedience

founded. God

requires no

leap

in the dark. But faithful beyond the human

does

require

an act of reverence which extends

reach of speculative reason not

wisdom, for
of

God's

ultimate will remains opaque to so to

just in the degree

its depth but,

say,

on

its

surface

also, inasmuch as it requires an assent

not conditional upon anyone's

the one authoritative

prideful mission

its propriety. Faith in philosophy as life becomes, therefore, eo ipso a delusion, a way from God's law to one's own light. True wisdom requires sub turning of the intellect to a divine will which, by refusing to explain itself, de

determining

of

clares

itself

irreducibly

a will rather than a rational principle.

II. RAPHAEL'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE FALL

Departing from the Genesis low immediately upon God's

seems

narrative,

which

has the temptation

episode

fol

placing Adam and Eve in the garden, Milton to traduce his argument (Reason of Church Government, Book II) re
of scriptural

garding the superiority

sive

to classical

poetic models and

by inserting,

in

accord with precedents set

by

Homer's

Odyssey

Virgil's Aeneid,

an exten

digression requiring four books. Obviously the action could proceed di rectly from Satan's soliloquy in Book IV, in which he considers God's com
mand given

Adam

and

Eve,

to

his

seduction

of

Eve in Book IX. The

the relation of
course the
war

chief

issue

posed

by
to

the stmcture of Paradise Lost

is, then,

its discur

sive middle

its

more active

beginning

and end.

Of

intervening
Be
a

books do

permit

two important digressive subjects, the

an

in heaven (v-vi)

and creation

(vn), but

interesting
of

dramatic

momentum gathers as well.

sides

affording

accounts

battle

and

creation

the

central

books

present
action

drama

executed somewhat

in the
in

mode of

Platonic dialogue
materials

finding

its

in

discursive

thought. Yet although Milton's

eventuates a new

for this drama

Eve

are

discur
and

sive, discourse

disposition

of the chief
and

characters,

this

realignment and

interaction

of

Raphael, Adam,
from the
show

contributes to the

fall.
with

It is

not

extravagant

to infer

progress

of

Adam's discussion

Raphael that Milton

means

to

lations

which

identify

ultimate

fatefully setting forth upon specu happiness with the philosophic life. Adam in
Adam's
more philosophic than

clines towards

his fall because he becomes

in his first

innocence.
The terms for sustaining first innocence in Paradise Lost are unambiguous: not to eat of the tree whose fruit brings knowlkeep God's "sole
command"

268

Interpretation Not
clear at

edge of good and evil.

all,

however,

are the

terms upon which

Adam

and

God than they

Eve may improve their estate and arrive at a closer now enjoy. Yet the first parents surmise a more God
comes

familiarity
perfect

with

felicity.
re

They
sides

realize their vision of

fitfully

in Eden,

and

they know God

in heaven where,

as

they leam in

the course of the poem, angels surround

his throne to enjoy a beatific vision more constant than their own occasional face to face meetings with the Deity. Milton's Adam and Eve live in the am

biguity
God,
in the
comes

of this

unanswered question:

Should they

expect a closer union with

a more

constant,

unmediated vision afforded

by

movement

from Eden to

heaven? Milton finds

course of

occasion

Raphael's visit,

up twice, first near the Raphael and then, elliptically,

ment of the await our

destiny during which the question of Adam's future beginning of the conversation between Adam and
near

to treat this issue of man's prelapsarian

the end of the angel's stay.

The first treat

issue (v. 494-503)

parents

presents

Raphael's

conjecture of what should

first

if they

continue obedient.
elaboration

Raphael founds his

conjecture

on a metaphysical scheme

the

of which

immediately

precedes

his his

hypothesis
in both
own

of man's eventual ascent

to heaven (469-94). Because the

material

passages provokes and

Adam

and

Eve to try interpretations,

will return at

each after

fashion,

because the

imagery

the crisis of the action, it

may be useful to set down the well-known lines. In reply to Adam's concern for the appropriateness of the food Eve has offered, the angelic guest Raphael
explains:

O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom All things proceed, and up to him return, If not deprav'd from good, created all
Such to Indu'd
perfection, one

first

matter all,

with various

forms,

various

degrees

Of substance, and in things that live, of life; But more refin'd, more spiritous, and pure, As
nearer to

him

plac'd or nearer

tending

Spheres assign'd, Till body up to spirit work, in bounds Proportion'd to each kind. So from the root Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves More aery, last the bright consummate flow'r Spirits odorous breathes: flow'rs and their fruit
several active

Each in their

Man's nourishment,
To To
vital spirits

by

gradual scale sublim'd

aspire, to animal,
give

intellectual,
and

both life

and

sense,

Fancy

understanding,
or

whence the

Soul

Reason receives,

and reason

is her

being,

Discursive,
Is

Intuitive; discourse
latter
most

oftest yours, the

is

ours. same.

Differing

but in degree,

of

kind the

Philosophy
Wonder
not

as

Noblest
what

Idolatry
as

in Paradise Lost

269

then,

God for

you saw good

If I To

refuse

not,

but convert,

you,
men

proper substance; time may come when With Angels may participate, and find No inconvenient Diet, nor too light Fare:

And from these

corporal nutriments perhaps

Your bodies may Improv'd by tract

at of

last turn
time,

all to spirit,

and wing'd ascend

Ethereal,
Here If
ye

as

or

in

may at choice Heav'nly Paradises dwell;

we,
and retain entire

or

be found obedient, firm his love

you are

Unalterably

Whose progeny

(v. 469-503).

one

Before commenting on this passage I should record one assumption and state fact regarding the dramatic context and authority of the speech. My as sumption is that at least in the first part of his discourse (down to the prophecy
at

commencing

493) Raphael

speaks whereof

he knows

and wherefrom

we, the

readers, as well as

Adam,

the immediate addressee, can receive instmction.

The first part, consisting of Raphael's account of being and its gradations, evi dently conveys reliable information since it accords with details Milton states
on

his

own

authority

as narrator while

nothing in the

passage contradicts

better

authorities

(God,

the

Son,

scriptural texts).

My

stipulation of

fact

regards an el

ementary matter which, because it is usually ignored, deserves emphasis: al though Raphael explicitly addresses Adam, Eve remains present for one portion
of

his instmction;

she takes

in Raphael's

metaphysical

and eschatological

dis

courses on the

ladder

of ascent

from

matter

to God. Milton makes the point of

and

specifying the
out

moment she

leaves her husband

her

guest

to converse with

her,

and

that departure comes much later (at vm.40) when Adam turns the
astronomy.

discussion to

Hence

one supposes that

having

listened to Raphael's
revela

reports and conjectures,

Eve (just like

Adam)

must

interpret Raphael's We

tions (and Adam's replies) that confronted

with

by

whatever resources she possesses.

shall see scene she

Satan's

similar

hypothesizing
but that her

in the temptation

interprets audaciously
own

and wrongly,

misprision resembles

Adam's

of Raphael's teaching. or misunderstanding understanding For Raphael's discourse leaves an important issue unclarified, thereby in advertently tempting Adam and Eve to make their own clarifications. Materi als

adequate

for

man's

complete are at

happiness, including
hand. But
a partial

means

for

improving

upon

Edenic satisfactions,
Raphael
will

by

cultivated?

offer

only
of

exactly and how explanation, and his effort pro

what means
which

duces

the more doubtful

"monism"

portion

the speech. In the lines

document how

Milton's
material
all

the

angel relies on an

illustration (479-87) to hierarchical

a
and

explain

being
yet

reveals a character at once

continuous,
rises

matter

through

aspiring to

spirit.

His illustration,

living

plant,

from dark

270

Interpretation
still more rarified

root, through lighter green stalk, through

rives which at

leaves,
an

until

it

ar

its

most

tenuous

corporeal

form in "the bright

consummate

flowV

"Spirits"

exhales

(479-81). The illustration

serves

also stands
spirit

literally

as an

instance

of coarse matter

rising

by

an analogy but degrees to spirit,

which

is nothing

other

than the same

first

matter much

attenuated.

In

reading through this passage we tend to retain the wide analogy and to
the precise literal instance. We think
symbol of

discard
as a

the appropriateness of the

rooted

image

for macrocosm, the tree

of

being

in

matter and

flowering
figure kinds

in
of of

spirit,

and

then we shift to the microcosm and note how well the

speech survives

the transition, serving as

an emblem of man's several

soul

(vital,

animal, rational) enabling his ascending

perfection.

grades of

ganic

function to intellectual

If Adam

perceives

activity from or in Raphael's illus

tration nothing other than a

soul,
we can of

diagram for the tripartite

his

organization of the

human

sympathize with

anthropomorphism.4

Yet danger lies in the

with

direction

glecting the
petite moves ample

identifying rationality too emphatically duty to govern in order to better concentrate

and

speculation,

ne

upon

satisfying
wants

the

ap
ex

for knowing, him

to be

Adam's

response

to the next part of Raphael's speech

somewhat closer to
understood

just that

peril.

Although Raphael
with

his

literally, Adam's

enchantment

the delights of
of an alle

speculation will gorical

drive him to discard the

philosophy.

physical

illustration in favor

tribute to

Reason, according
and

to

Raphael,

constitutes the essential

being

both

of men proper (488-

angels, and,

whether

considering the predominately intuitive form

proper to

to angels or the

predominately discursive form

human beings

90),

reason

in

man and angel partakes of

the necessity shared

by

all active ma

terial beings in that it requires energy,

nutrient.
stand

hence, fuel, hence food, hence

vegetable

By

this route we return to Raphael's example of the plant and under

why it cannot be a figurative plant. Angels consume various sorts of heavenly food which Milton imagines to be provided in Homeric abundance
and

(v. 426-30

632-35)

and which serves

for the

angels

the same function of

fueling

the ratiocinative powers that the fruits

needs

of the garden serve

for Adam

and

Eve. Because Raphael really

gests and turns

to

incorporeal

substance the

energy to converse he really eats and di food Eve sets before him (v.428shares with
upon

30).

This

recognition of the
and

rationality he
common

Adam

their common
sustenance

materiality,
4.

therefore their
such

reliance

nutritional

Familiarity
the

with

imagery

in

more conventional

poetic

contexts
also

dulls
seem

one's

sense

of

Raphael's literalness, but

phasis on

acquaintance with

Milton's

other

poetry may

to warrant

em

allegory
flow'r"

to the exclusion of the

"unsightly"

letter. One may

"darkish"

remember that

in Comus
at

much was

made of the plant

Haemony

in its root,

in its leaves but

Hermes had

its

"bright

top bearing
Odysseus

a
as

golden

(629-33)

said to resemble that

moly

which

given

Circe's charms, yet "more (636). In Elegy I Milton associates moly knowledge (85-90), and, therefore, the efficacy of haemony as a countercharm employed against Circe's son (Comus) accommodates a reading of Thyrsis's herb as another emblem for in
an antidote against with
med'cinal"

tellect

functioning

as

the

governing

part of

the

soul

Philosophy

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost
human

271
and then to

leads Raphael first to

regimen

acknowledge

hospitality

deduce the

tions

whereby Adam may find his way to heaven. The upshot of his deduc is that by frequent association with angels, partaking of their finer diet,
so

Adam may
and

improve through "tract

/
Etherial."

time"

of

that his

body

will

turn to spirit

"wing'd

ascend

Raphael

envisions some process

whereby the

gross

matter of

Adam's

body

will

be

raised

to the fifth element

(ether,

see

vn.

243-44

and vi.

660)

at which point

ethereal angels and participate

he may, if he chooses, join the already in their more constant beatific vision.

chaos

The continuity of being asserted in Raphael's monistic ascent of matter from to God Himself requires one to understand with unusual literalism Raph Heaven is
and

ael's conjecture.

a place populated

by

beings

whose

bodies

are ex

traordinarily bright
other rational

buoyant. Human beings

same

will

levitate
bad

to

heaven if they but

an exact

take their nourishment

from the

fifth

element substances as nourish those

time"

beings,

the angels. "Tract of

is

not a

pun

expression of gradual etherealization

indicating

a physical process:

the opera
span

tion of the
of
time.5

digestive tract

upon ever more refined nutrients over a metaphysics

lengthy

Baulked

by

unfamiliar

reading
wants

which accommodates a more

may familiar dualist ontology, but if Raphael

one

prefer

the allegorical

to

be

understood

figuratively

from his
an

mission of

forewarning. If it

were selected

he has blundered strangely and strayed merely for its usefulness as

of ascent concern
would

analogy Raphael's image of the plant and drously ill-chosen, for if Adam's paramount

appear

won-

should

consist

in

re

fraining from eating of a particular tree that by eating a fmit presently untasted
tan's line. In fact
ael on
we recall

it

would appear unwise now

to tell him

his

mission

he may rise to heaven. That will be Sa it has already been his line: the Father sends Raph just after Eve recounts the dream in which Satan suggests
upon

she eat of

the tree and causes her to imagine that

eating

she

flies to

heaven (v. 37-87). Milton's adding Eve's dream to the Genesis narrative car ries his suggestion of a sad congruence between Satanic malice and the specu lative
notions encouraged

by

excursus upon

future dignities. Satan in the dream has

Raphael's well-meaning, but possibly imprudent, even employed language

and

tolerably
Thyself
a

close to

Raphael's, "Taste this,

not
Heav'n"

Goddess,

sometimes

/ Ascend to

be henceforth among the Gods / to Earth confined, / But sometimes in the Air, as we, (v. 76-79). Raphael inadvertantly assists Satan
with angels

by authorizing
in the
sion of

the idea that the way up to companionship

effects of

changing diet. Without the

and

preparation afforded
proposal

by

may lie his discus

angels, men,
would

their common

food, Satan's

in the tempta
might

tion scene
come since

lack

plausibility.

Why
not

should anyone

believe he
with

be

divine his

by

eating?

It's hard

to charge
with

Raphael

inattentiveness The thought

conjecture cooperates so

uncannily

Satan's

malice.

5.

Compare

Anchises'

account of

the

purification of souls and

their release

from

bodily

con

finement, Aeneid,

vi. 724-48.

272

Interpretation
Milton any
means to suggest the

occurs that poses

through

intermediary
near

other

understanding God's pur than God's own Son. However well-

difficulty

of

disposed, however
a

to the divine
a

mind

may be any
subject,
even

other

mediator, he is
to

as
er

created,

material

being,

finite

medium effect.

if

not

intellectual
and

ror, to

misjudgments

of rhetorical

A fortiori

churches

synods of

merely earthly intellects consistent with Milton's pendency

ever more

will prove so much

the less reliable, a view

obviously

course

in the

religious prose towards a

Protestant inde

individualistic

and unmediated.

III.

ADAM'S PROCLIVITY FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC

LIFE

changing habitude from earth to heaven does none theless differ from Satan's suggestion in Eve's dream by commanding obedi

Raphael's

conjecture of

ence as

the condition

Adam had in

and

Eve

misled

for ascent, whereas Satan had prescribed daring. Hence later exonerate themselves by charging God's messenger them. Adam may lead himself astray, however, when he seizes
cannot

upon

Raphael's

suggestion as

if it had He

amounted

to an invitation to participate
etherealiza-

a philosophic symposium.

responds

to the conjecture about

tion with this tribute:

Our knowledge, and the scale From centre to circumference,

In

Well hast thou taught the way that might direct of Nature set
whereon

contemplation of created things steps we

By

may

ascend

to

God (508-12).
contemplation; his scheme was dietary. Yet Adam
tract of time phrase, and
"wing'd"

Raphael has jecture figure

not mentioned plant

interprets Raphael's

illustration,
to the
one

con extended

fancy

as

though all of these elements were

features

of an

of speech reducible

ideal

one's thoughts

through contemplation.
man's

attaining perfection by elevating Implicit in his interpretation one sees

of

this chain of
sensation

inferences: (1)
his

faculties bespeak

hierarchy

ascending from

up to speculative reason (the plant image

by

virtue of

speculative powers man was created

angelic and

allegorically rendered); (2) fit for association with

account of rea

those higher

intellectual beings,

divine (Raphael's

son as the common possession of men and

angels);

(3)

the mind when engaged

in

contemplation spirals upward through realms ever more abstract and general
ascent

(as

suitably likened, Adam supposes, to

and

"wing'd"

flight); (4) habituation

concerns

activity insensibly gradually away from bodily (Raphael's notion of gradual etherealization); (5) once perfected in intellectual virtue, man, having finally become a suitable companion for his in tellectual betters, will live in their midst sharing in the sort of philosophical
weans man

in

speculative

conversation

Adam

enjoys

just

now

with

Raphael (this

explains

the angel's

Philosophy
expectation

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost
to

273

of

Adam's
while

self-powered translation

heaven, indeed Adam later

will

rhapsodizes,
attain

"For

sit with thee

seem

in Heav'n [vin.210]); (6) he

the topmost reach of the ascent when, after preparation

of

by

the

stepwise

operation

the speculative

faculty, he

conceives

God,

the ultimate idea or

archtype of all
things"

lower forms (what

else could
forms"

Raphael

mean

by

stating that "all

source?).

distributed among "various

anticipates and

tend back to their divine

Adam thus
sium,

the course of philosophic eros portrayed in the Sympo

Phaedrus,
what

Phaedo,

the

paradigm which

inspired the

praise of

learn
of of

ing

in Milton's Seventh Prolusion

proved

and supported the elder

Egerton brother in "old

schools

Comus in
Greece."

to be

an

ill-founded

confidence

The
urged of

proper attitude we

have

seen
all

displayed early in the

the

poem when

Adam

Eve to join him in referring

joy

of

their condition to the goodness

their Creator (iv.41 1-39). In the same spirit of gratefulness Adam

had

once

addressed

essentially the same issue

of a geocentric

cosmology

which

he later

approaches with

in

a more

critical, philosophical spirit as he concludes his dialogue

asked

Raphael. When in Book IV Eve had

why

stars should shine while

human beings sleep Adam had eventually to

"unanimous"

replied with several considerations

the sum of

which was grateful acceptance of

God's

arrangements.

Their

conversation

led

a prayer of

thanksgiving (720-35) in
views of

which

their souls blended

(736). Our first

Adam

the spirit Milton enjoins in his theological

him conducting thought in treatise where he declares that "Obe

show
knowledge"

dience
trine,

and

love

are always the at the end of scientific

upon

best
the

guides to
middle at

(On Christian Doc

an

xiv. 24).

Yet

books Milton depicts

Adam

who

having ing to grow

indeed,
records

enkindled more

his

interest

Raphael's fire

now allows

his think

critical of

resolving problems, an Adam who has become, God's arrangements. Milton's dramatic indication of Adam's

intent

philosophical earnestness

is the

passage at the

beginning
That

of

Book VIII

which

his

hanging

rapt on

Raphael's last
silent

words so
(1-4).6

that he thinks the angel

passage

continues to speak after

a certain

he has fallen
more

is

not without

edness registers such

grace

local charm, but a in Adam's

"that
won who

troubling indication
become
to wish her

of philosophical abstract

having
saw

oblivious of

Eve. Eve departs

not

with

stay"

(43). But it is Milton better

clear

whether

Adam

and

Raphael desire to detain her

or whether

compliments
voices

in the

mode of poetic

hypothesis. I think the latter

In any event,
neither

alternative
nor

the

pathos of the situation.

Raphael

Adam

moves

to de-

6. These lines
the

were contrived as

Book VII

of the

made

dramatically

the transitional splice made necessary by the decision to divide 1667 edition, making Books VII and VIII (1674). But the interlude has been functional. Merritt Hughes comments:

The

words sounding in Adam's ears may be an echo of those of the incarnate Laws that Socrates hears ringing in his ears and obeys at the close of Plato's Crito.
rapture

Yet Adam's
disobeys.

does

not

make

him

more attentive

to

God's law, for in

the next

book he

274

Interpretation

tain Eve and neither alludes to her departure as the philosophic conversation re
sumes.

Thus,

even

before the disagreement

which separates

Adam

and

Eve

on

the morning of the

once of

day

of the Fall a rift in their unanimity begins to appear

Adam

undertakes science

in the
as

mode of an

dispute
and

rather

than in the mode

prayer.

Milton depicts

Adam

intent

abstracted

Glaucon

or

Phaedms

who neither

invites his

spouse

to join the conversation nor speaks of

their common

condition

to their guest, nor even takes much note of her depar

abstruse"

ture as he enters "on studious thoughts

(40).

The

same ardor that causes

Adam to forget his

manners also moves

him to
con mat

place new versation

ter.7

topics of discourse before Raphael in his anxiety to prolong now that I have you here let me pick your brain on this other
subject

The further
of

Adam

proposes

after

Raphael has

checked

him in his

pursuit

questions

regarding

celestial

topic in
ond

having more obvious relevance query is fully as critical as that of the

a

differs from the astronomy for conduct. But the spirit of the sec
motions

first. Perhaps

more

critical, for in his

confessing
now alarms

doubt

of native strength
who suspects
Nature"

sufficient to withstand sexual

means

desire he

Raphael

Adam

to charge
moves

God's

work with a

serious ethics

fault. "Accuse

not

(561). When he

well consist with

Adam only brings nearer home a doubt of his earlier subordination of speculation to

from astronomy to God's dispositions that cannot

prayer and thanks

giving.

At the

moment

Adam

confesses

to Raphael his unsettling passion for

Eve he does better

so no

longer from the

posture of a servant of

by

asking Of

counsel of

his

superior.

He

rather adduces

God seeking to serve his experience of

of

passion

as

evidence

composition.

sexual

prompting him to desire he says:

first I felt.

question

the

fittingness

his

native

here

passion

Commotion
Superior Against the

strange, in

all enjoyments else

and unmov'd, charm of

here only weak Beauty's powerful

and

glance.

Or Nature fail'd in me, Not

proof enough such

left

some part

Object to sustain.
perhaps

Or from my side subducting, took More than enough (530-37).

The
tion

concern
more

Adam here

reveals

to the angel is

related miss

to their

earlier conversa
we

intimately

than has been noticed. We

the point if

think of

7. On Adam's unslaked thirst for speculative knowledge, see C. A. Patrides, Milton and the Christian Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 118- 19. Patrides observes that Adam's ranging among topics and persistence in questioning Raphael goes beyond his claim of seeking knowledge solely to praise God, "the more / To magnifie his works, the more we (vn.96know"

97).

Schultz

puts the right emphasis on the unscasonablencss of

Adam's

curiosity:

"once

warned

Raphael's lecture

by

that he needed to study perfect obedience he stood in mortal peril, Adam was in no case to open the question period (Forbidden foolishly with the digressive topic of

astronom

Knowledge,

p.

182).

Philosophy
Adam's

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost

275

complaint on a

bilized

remedied

by

only as that of an imperfectly instructed Neoplatonist immo lower rung of the ladder of love, a predicament that might be learning how to ascend. Adam in fact thinks he knows how to rise
. .

("In
way,

contemplation

By

steps we

may

ascend to

he is

perplexed

by

an arrangement of

things that

God"). But, knowing the does not encourage sub

limation,

or at

least does

not encourage

transcendence so
voices

thoroughly

as

Adam
a

conceives other arrangements might. perspective

Adam

his

present

misgiving from

he

assumes

he

shares with

Raphael,

their

unanimity regarding the being. If it be for

man's es

dignity
true,
as
sential

of reason as the excellence

distinct to human

and angelic

Raphael has
and

said and

Adam agrees, that

reason accounts

being

if

reason aims at

knowing,

why,

sure

that

competes with

the pleasure afforded

by

then, does man desire plea knowledge? Accessory desires

lead eventually to abstract But passion especially intellectual delight yet in a

such as

delight in the

reports of the senses which

knowledge may
erotic passion

conduce well enough to rational ends.

transports the soul as

intensely

as

direction
to
such

opposed

to the transports of speculative thought. If

strange"

he

must

be

subject
well

"commotion

Adam thinks

man seems

not to

have been

designed for his

ture intended to

proper

task of intellectual reflection. Adam objects that a crea

fulfill himself

by

knowledge has been

given a

body

unneces

sarily inclined to distraction. Because this question of design, of fittingness, takes precedence in Adam's mind over the practical question of what he should

do, he

proceeds

immediately

to inquire into the

even

sexual activities of

those

other

intellectual beings, the angels,

Adam's

though Raphael

has just

responded

to

confession with a vehement practical admonition.

Raphael's pointedly ignoring questions he considers insufficiently practical warns Adam not to underrate the efficacy of reason as the self-governing fac
wisdom (vin.173), Raphael seeks si in his urging a with reasoning as speculation preoccupation to moderate Adam's multaneously and to raise his estimate of reason as the arbiter of action and seat of temper

ulty.

As

"lowly"

earlier

of a nongeocentric cosmology resembles his psy confidence. Raphael has that tendency in in undermine its to chology tendency view when he points out the likelihood of earth containing more of "solid than all the immense universe surrounding it. He steers Adam away

ance.

For Adam's hypothesis

good"

from concluding that if the ity as the center of God's

earth moves about

providence.

the

sun

it therefore loses

author of

Adam's danger lies in the direction

diffidence

of

his

own proper over

governing capacity
confidence

authority, diffidence regarding the authority of his his feelings, doubts which in turn undermine his

in the

Tightness of

his authority

over

Eve

and

hence impair his

abil

ity

to act responsibly towards her.

Raphael

sees

that Adam has set

reason

against reason

by

placing

emphasis on

than acknowledging
erns will.

reason's more

rationality employed in learning rather important function as the faculty which gov
speculation

Milton's God,

by

contrast, never refers to

108).

but does iden

tify

reason with choice

(in.

276

Interpretation
seeks

What Adam

ultimately to learn through the

questions

he

poses about

macrocosm and microcosm

is the final

cause of all

being,

the purpose

inherent

in the

arrangement of

the whole, cosmic and human taken together. He wants

right

to learn whether then the

he is

physical cosmos

in supposing that being subserves reason. If so, should exist for man, its rational pinnacle, and within
all elements should contribute

the individual human

of

being

to the full realization

the speculative rational faculty. If this were positively manifest all of cre

ation would

clearly
not

proclaim

its telos. Adam

manifest,

telos appears

unequivocally him to doubt he is right to pursue

reveals his perplexity that nature's but that perplexity does not cause speculation into final causes wherever they

may lie. This very

with respect

urge

to seek out final causes in nature may

be inordinate
that

to man's unquestionably proper end of obedience.

"pleasure"

In Book III Milton has the Father declare it to be His

human

beings be

fashioned that they pay their obedience freely rather than, as all lower creatures do, obey by necessity. There is no purpose behind God's will.
so

To

suppose there

of created

may be a more intelligible beings is to obscure the immediate

will whether one understands

purpose
and

immanent in the makeup

the divine

overriding obligation to obey its dictates or not. To make the right

to gov
warned

distinction

and restore proper order with speculative reason subordinate put

erning reason, Raphael had Adam that knowledge

must

the issue
subject

as

clearly

as one can when

he

be

to temperance (vn. 120-30).

The difference between boundless

now urges

philosophic eros and the reason such unqualified

Raphael
as

Adam to heed is that for

lovers

of wisdom

Socrates the desire to know is properly illimitable

tus of a transcendent standard

and rises

therefore to the sta

by

reference

to which all other desires receive

pur eros

their limits. Temperate desire for

suit of wisdom no vice. provides

understanding is no virtue, excess in the The properly illimitable character of philosophic Socrates
a measure

for Diotima

and

whereby

all

inferior desires

for

pleasure, for power,

honor,

or whatever

range

themselves as subordinate to
results

an altogether superior authority.

In the Socratic accounting temperance

from

philosophy: the philosopher remains satiated

impassive to

all other pleasures

just
con

because he finds himself

by

the

joys

of understanding.

Training

in

tinence,

that painful control of passions

by

self-discipline,

prepares the mind

for philosophy, but once loves wisdom transforms

therefore ceases to
product of

well embarked on

its

quest

for

truth the soul which

of

rigors of self-discipline

into delight

learning

and

feel

pain

in its

regulation

of the

lower desires. The

by

indifference
el's

the philosopher's setting his heart on intellectual treasure is his towards other pleasures. The distance, therefore, between Rapha
"lowly"

recommended
as
with

wisdom

and

philosophy
or not

whether

finally

redi

rected,

Socrates,

to

issues

of conduct

appears

in Raphael's

treating knowledge itself

somewhat
petite

as a pleasure subject to

regulation.

Raphael indeed

depreciates

science

by likening
as

the appetite for

and needs no

for

food, "Knowledge is

food,

knowledge to the ap less / Her Temperance

Philosophy
over

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost

277

Appetite,
(vii.

to know / In

measure what

the mind may well contain, /

Op

presses else with

Wind"

surfeit,

and soon

turns / Wisdom to
place of

Folly,

as

Nourishment to
as

126-30).

God's law takes the inferior

knowledge

the measure

whereby to set bounds to every human ophy falls to the level

to the
of those

endeavor.

From this

perspective philos

or

instrumental
The

goods

properly

subject

rigorous control of

law. Adam

misunderstands

if he thinks only
reader

recondite

cosmological

theorizing falls
angels on

under regulation.

may

remember at
upon must

this point

fallen
but

the outskirts of Pandemonium who theorized

not cosmic

moral perplexities.

Discipline
and

of

the will, not speculation,

must

ultimately raise his soul toward his thirst for speculation.

God,

Adam

first leam to discipline

IV

SATAN'S ANTICIPATION OF SOCRATES

Satan

exhibits no
engaged

inclination toward

philosophy.

Milton

never

depicts God's

adversary
or

in free

speculation as

attempting to put the best face on first moments of consciousness muse

and

distinct from calculating his chances, his defeats. Both Adam and Eve in their
upon

their origin (compare vm.273-78

iv.451-12),

yet

Satan

never wonders what accounts

for his

existence.

In

his soliloquy at the beginning of Book IV he acknowledges his creation by God of although he disputes Abdiel's asserting his creation by the "secondary the Son (vi. 853-55). But no acknowledgment of contingency impels him to
hand"

consider the nature of

his Creator

or

the order of the created universe. Satan

lacks the disinterested inquisitiveness, the capacity for wonder, required for philosophy, and his self-absorption causes him to be oblivious to any subject
not

clearly

adjunct to

his

projects. of

why

although

he is ignorant

God's

Satan desires glory not wisdom, which is purpose in forbidding the tree it does not

occur to which

Satan actually to eat as opposed to pretending to have eaten the fmit promises knowledge. His fall proceeds from no aspiration so nobly
hunger for
understanding.

tragic

as

Still, if he
conceives

cannot can

forget himself imagine

what

long

enough

to

enter

into free thought, Sa

to know and
and
pre

tan nevertheless

it is like to bum

with ardor

Eve. Instead

how to employ the attraction of philosophizing to tempt Adam of aspiring to knowledge Satan employs the deception of
wisdom so

tending
ceived

to desire
our

that

dom latent in
Uriel (111. 670 -76),
ceives

first he

parents.

he may work upon a genuine desire for wis He had pretended scientific intents when he de
wanting
to
admire

with

his

lie

about

God's
zeal

new

creation

and

perfects the simulation of

philosophic

when

he de

Eve. This
of

second

temptation depends upon

state of

Satan's seizing
Adam
and

upon possi as

bilities We
can

deceit inherent in the imperfect

characterize

Eve
of

knowers.
potential

Satan's strategy as an exploitation properly for impious self-sufficiency latent in the philosophic life.

the

278

Interpretation
calls our attention
account of

Milton

to the inventiveness

of

his Satan

by departing
die"

from

the Genesis
serpent

the serpent's lie. Whereas in the Genesis narrative the

denies the veracity of God's word, "you shall not (3:4), Milton's Satan explains why Eve should not fear death even if she dares not go

flatly

the length of

believing
God

God to have lied. Milton's

seeks

more subtle

tempter says:

you need not think

to deceive

you

in threatening death but that he

has only declined to explain what death entails. Dying means a change of state on the scale of being. In this case the change is upward for the better because
greater

knowledge

will permit you

to enjoy the condition of angels.

Milton's

Satan

can make a plausible case

just because he has taken the

appearance of the

reasoning speech or not in the degree they are here exhibited. Milton has thus devised a telling explanation for a detail all but opaque in the Genesis story. Whereas the Biblical account assigns no cause behind the serpent but merely
serpent, a creature
possessed of such powers

either not possessed of powers of

vocalizing snake abmptly appear with his suggestion that Eve taste of the tree, Milton asks us to believe that Satan took the shape of a beast in order to
a

has

offer

Eve

concrete proof of
signification.

his

contention

that God's threat of

as serpent points to

death bears

metaphorical

Satan disguised for his

speak and reason as evidence

which argues of

own ascent

his ability to from bestial to human, a fact

for Eve's

elevation

to the angelic level

by

proportional operation

the forbidden fruit. But besides the argument from analogy Satan persuades
a consideration still more characteristic of the philosophic tradition. says

by

Gath

ering himself, (ix. 670-71), he launches into

Rome"

Milton

like "some Orator

renown

'd / In Athens

or

free
as

an argument which will convince

Eve,

Socrates

will convince

Simmias in the Phaedo, that death

offers a consumma

tion of the

life

of

thought:
that

he knows
Ye Eat thereof, Yet
are your

in the

day

Eyes that

seem so clear,

but dim,

shall

Op'n'd

and clear'd and, ye shall

perfectly be then be as Gods, Evil

as

Knowing

both Good

and

they know (ix. 705-9).

Eve that

If Satan had dared to

would equal

suggest to

by

God

as

Supreme Being,

she would

eating of the forbidden fruit she have remained unpersuaded.

"Gods"

the ethereal merely that she will resemble spirits which Eve knows from Raphael's discourse. She knows the an already gels share with human beings a rational nature superior to man's reason only in being less impeded by the human's grosser corporeality. Moreover she has also learned from Raphael that by habituating themselves to the diet she and
promises
angels'

But instead he

Adam may grow wings, become thoroughly ethereal, and thereby be equipped for consorting with these higher intellects. One observes how similar are Sa tan's false promises to Raphael's speculations, and how closely they anticipate thought ascribed to Socrates, as Satan reassures:

Philosophy
So
you shall

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost

279

die perhaps,

Human,
And

to

put on

Gods,

putting off death to be wisht,

than this can

by

Though threat'n'd,
what are

which no worse

bring.

Gods that Man may not become As they, participating God-like food? (713-17)

So death is nothing
Socrates Eve is
will

other with

than the translation Raphael had the culmination of philosophy.

hypothesized

and

no

both

capable

identify lovely inanity, but on the contrary Milton as narrator certifies her of the lofty speculative hours Adam shared with Raphael and in

clined

to enjoy abstmse conversation. She is certainly not so unintelligent as to

be

unable

to penetrate a sophistry that cannot explain God's threat so as to re

move makes

the danger of

disobeying
the

His

clear command.

But Eve's intelligence

speculation.

also she

her
of

susceptible to

attraction of

intemperate

Asleep

dreams
such

soaring to the clouds on the wings of meditation because she harbors

waking hours. As Alecto works upon a passion already smoldering in Tumus and Amata, Satan in Milton's counterpart to Virgil's temptation scene works upon a passion already present in Eve. Her earlier

desire

during

query

about the purpose of wasted starlight

documents
can

philosophic

tecedent to

Satan's dream

suggestion.

Satan

now

at

once

curiosity an dispel God's

threat and emancipate Eve's appetite

argument that the

for

speculative

knowledge

intellect in the
Socrates'

act of

knowing

so transcends

by offering the bodily limits as

to make the activity of philosophizing a practice of dying. Satan thus antici

pates the essentials of
explanation

that "those who really apply them

in the right way to philosophy are preparing themselves for dying and death
selves

directly

and

of their own

accord

forward to death
quence

all

their

lives

"8

they have actually been looking Because God foretells no bad conse death, for His declaration to have fact, death must
death
as a

to man's eating of the tree

rather

other

than

the force of an interdiction

than simply a statement of

would not view

be

regarded as a
or even as

fearsome

thing.

Socrates

fearsome

thing
sary
and of

disagreeable. And if

some god

declared

dying

to be the neces

consequence of

knowing
choice

good and

evil,

he

would choose

to

know,

ac

cepting the
his life. Besides
moves

consequence.

Apology. It is the

Philosophy

Such precisely is the choice Plato and Xenophon depict him making every day rivals the gospel in its claim to remove the sting of false hope

he defends in the Phaedo

mortality.

beguiling

Eve

with a

of

immortality, Milton's Satan

also

her to desire philosophy as an instmmental power useful towards main taining or improving her place in a marriage that since Raphael's visit has be
gun to resemble a stmggle.

Eve

wants

to prove she deserves Adam's respect

by

showing

she

loves that

which

he has demonstrated he loves

perhaps even more

than he loves her. For Satan has already

8. Phaedo, 64a, trans. Hugh Tredennick.

made clear what species of

knowledge

280

Interpretation
from the forbidden fmit. This is his
Milton's further
second refinement upon
refinement of claims

she should expect

the unsuccessful dream seduction and

the

temp

tation

recorded

in Genesis.

By

his

own

tasting Satan

to have mastered

exactly that

range of cosmological reflection which

Eve has

witnessed

in Raph

ael's conversation with

her husband:
or

Thenceforth to Speculation high

deep
mind

I turn'd my thoughts, and with capacious Consider'd all things visible in Heav'n,

Or Earth,

or

Middle,

all

things

fair

and good

(ix.601-5).
of

Satan's inducement

recalls

Milton's description
the
occasion

Adam's avidity for instruc

tion in Book V when

he

seized

Given him Of things

by

this great Conference to know

above

his World,

and of

their

being
he
saw

Who dwell in Heav'n Transcend his

own so

whose excellence

far

(454-57).
now

After

she

eats, Eve's first thought regarding Adam is that

means

to speculative knowledge she will

more

be

able

"to

add

what

possessing the wants / In

a certain

Female sex, the

that Eve

to draw his

Love"

(821-22). It
of

makes

for

irony

having

observed

Adam forgetful
now reaches

her

presence

during

his

scientific

conversation with odds

Raphael

too far in her attempt to make

up the

between feminine
Adam

charms and the much superior charm she

has

seen exer

cised upon

his visiting philosophic companion. As Milton has refash ioned his Genesis materials, Eve succumbs to a twofold temptation: of desiring

by

knowledge

of ultimate nature

in

excess of temperate

bounds,

and of

desiring
She

philosophy
wants

as a power

to be employed towards

securing Adam's
rather

affection.

to ground their

union

in

philosophic

hitherto been grounded, in Socrates

dom.
and

mutual prayer

than, as it has companionship and obedience to God's will. If she

of

could succeed she would achieve the

ideal

friendship

proposed

by

Plato's

by Aristotle,

the idea of

collegiality in

a mutual pursuit of wis

PHILOSOPHY IN THE MOMENT OF DISOBEDIENCE

Paradise Lost
of

appears to offer
moment

irreconcilable

statements
will

Adam's fall. At the

Adam declares he

regarding the cause follow Eve in eating the

fruit the

narrative voice points out

he
Against his better But

scrupled not
not

to eat

knowledge,

deceiv'd,
charm

fondly

overcome with

Female

(ix. 997-99).

Philosophy
From this

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost
of sudden

281
although

we might

infer that Satan's lure

knowledge

it has

everything to do with Eve's fall contributes little to Adam's. Yet earlier,

God,
to

foreviewing
[Satan]
but
first"

the

fall, had laid it down

and after

that "Man

falls deceiv'd /

By

th'other

(hi. 130-31),
each

his transgression Adam twice

refers

his

particular

sin, identifying solely aspiring to forbidden knowledge (xii. 179-80; 558-60). A detail Milton adds to the Genesis narrative indicates he wants us to think of Adam not
time
error not
with with

his

fondness for Eve

as

simply
what

passive

in

joining

Eve but

as

inventive in

ing

he

resolves upon

the moment he sees

discovering reasons for do Eve bearing her plunder from

the divine command, that consists in seizing upon
speech

the tree. Right or wrong he will side with his

wife against

but he has

evading Eve's story of the serpent's having the forbidden apple. Adam does not
fallen
angel's

one

hope

of

bad

outcome and

raised

himself to human face

by

eating

perceive at

that the serpent must have been a

value:

disguise but takes the tale

he
yet

lives,
as

Lives,

as thou said'st and gains to of

live

Man

Higher degree

Life, inducement strong Proportional ascent, which cannot be

But to

Gods,

or

Angels Demi-gods (ix. 932-37).

away death by equating dying with translation to a higher order of existence, just as Eve had surmised following Satan's suggestion. What Sa tan does not know is that Raphael has laid groundwork which makes his soph
Adam
reasons

istry

convincing.

Adam

adopts

the

serpent's

likely

story

about

death because it
chain of

accords with

Raphael's

suppositions about movements

up the

being.

Although

not so gullible as

Eve

and therefore more

desperate than blithe in his

transgression, Adam risks disobedience in

prove

the hope that the

fmit just

might

the

means

to the "proportional
angelic guest.

ascent"

through diet of which he has

lately

heard from his for her

This false

speculation provides a sufficient

makeweight to

decide Adam's
with

choice

in favor

of

following

Eve

rather

than

interceding
theorizing

the Father. Philosophic

ways:

ambition

contributes, then, to
pursue cosmological

Adam's disobedience in three

it inclines him to

at the expense of moral clarification;

it interposes between Adam

and

his stewardship by inducing him to neglect Eve when she requires instmction from Raphael as well as his own tutelage; it offers him a false hope at the last moment when the fall could yet be averted. So it is no surprise that Milton bor
rows an

image from
of

Platonic dialogue to

mark

Adam's delusion

with

the

imprint

perhaps
after

the most distinctive poetic phrase employed the speech

and

Socrates. Just

displaying

Adam's desperate tmst in

by rising by
them

Plato's

sublimation and as selves

Earth"

Adam

Eve devour the

fmit, Milton

says

they feel

preparing for divinity by "breeding wings / Wherewith to scorn the (ix. 1009- 11). Their false imagination anticipates the Phaedrus with its

282

Interpretation
of

fantasy
through

souls

philosophy.

sprouting wings in the first stage of divinizing themselves This Socratic fancy receives a further correction from in
place of

Adam's
walking.

manner of repentance which

flying

aloft emphasizes

humble
error

The

folly
leam,

of

Milton has Adam

Henceforth I

realize when

achieving autonomy through philosophy is the in the expulsion episode he says:

is best,

that to obey

And love

fear the only God to walk As in his presence, and on him sole depend (xn.561
with

-63).

Milton is echoing the

He hath
shewed

prophet

Micah:
what

thee, O man,
and to

is good;
and

and what

doth the Lord

with

require of

thee,

but to do justly,

love mercy,

to

walk

humbly

thy God (6:8).

Once Adam has

set

the

duty

of obedience over

the desire to leam the natures of

things, he is in position to be granted a further light whereby he sees that death indeed is the entry to a more abundant life but only for those who prevail
through obedience:

suffering for Truth's sake Is fortitude to highest victory, And to the faithful Death the Gate
of

Life (xii. 569-71).

Michael further

ratifies

Adam's insight

by

dence in the

mode of obedience over speculative

emphasizing the superiority of pru knowledge even on the suppo

sition that the

latter

might

extend

boundlessly:
attained

thou

has
th'

the sum

Of wisdom, hope Thou knew'st All Or

no

higher,
all

though all the

ethereal

Stars

by

name, and all

Powers,
Sea (xn. 575-59).
to deprecate science and even

secrets of the
works of

deep,

Nature's works,
n.

God in Heav

Air, Earth,

or

Part

of

learning

the sum of wisdom

is

learning

theological speculation ("works of

thought that

might

distract

one's

God") for the sake of setting aside every mind from obedience to God's will. From his
to disparage all but practical forms of

fall Adam thus knowledge.

gains wisdom

by learning

VI. SUBLIMATION WITHOUT PHILOSOPHY

However instmctive for him, Adam's fall is fall. Although

will a condition

not

for that

cause a

fortunate

indeed be

attained after
man's

allowing Adam's transgression, that is

perfection.

man more perfect union with

his Creator
sin

not

because

is

necessary to

advance

Terms for human improvement

evi-

Philosophy
dently
had

as

Noblest

Idolatry

in Paradise Lost

283

independent of any future atonement by a Messiah had been established from the beginning, for Milton's God at the moment He announced creation
also announced

His

plan

for

an

apocalypse, saying He

would:

create

Another World,

out of one man a

Race

Of Men innumerable, there

Not here, till

to

dwell,

by

degrees

of merit rais'd
at

They Up hither,

open

to themselves
under

length the way

tri'd,
and

long

obedience

And Earth be

chang'd to

Heav'n,

Heav'n to Earth,
(vn. 154-61).

One Kingdom,

Joy

and

Union

without end

In this

speech one

observes, besides the

of a
.

promise of

translation to a still better

paradise,

God's

conception

graded under

excellence

("degrees

of

merit")

and rec

slow-rising
ollection of

ascent

("at length

long

obedience tri'd").

Raphael's

this speech appears to have been the

spins

material out of which

he

ex

temporaneously
tween earth and

heaven

his hypothesis regarding Adam's future once he has attained through diet and

commutings

be

association with

angels a suitably etherealized body. One recognizes a revised, and presumably better considered, interpretation of the Father's prophecy when, rebuking

Adam's
grees of

confessed passion
merit"

as a

ladder

of refined

for Eve, Raphael loves:

refines
seat

at

the last

expounds

God's "de

Love The thoughts,

In
and

heart enlarges, hath his

the scale

Reason,
which

and

is judicious, is

By
Not

to

heav'nly

Love thou

may'st ascend,

sunk

in

carnal pleasure

(vm. 589-92).

Elevation lect

by

enlarged and sublimated exercise of

notion of

love here, raising

perhaps too

belat
intel

edly, replaces the

levitating by
Is this

diet

or of

the speculative

by

its

own

exertions.

ascent

through refining love the way God

Himself is the
refined

understands the proper process of

rising through degrees? If so,

what

connection

between

successive

trials of obedience and a succession of

not

loves? Is there but

a mode of

refining love

by

a series of speculative ab

stractions
will?

by

successive renunciations of the will out of regard

for

holier

Had God

expected

Adam to

rise toward

pering his fondness for Eve's charms whether Had God expected additionally that Adam should discipline his
tions either to
conceive

progressively tem bodily, sociable, or intellectual?

self-fed

heaven

by

inclina

the

scope and purpose of

the

stars or

to discover the

makeup
stowed

of the

human

soul?

What does Adam enjoy that he

might rise above

other than these natural goods of

beauty,

companionship, and knowledge be

by

God? Milton's

reconstruction of

Adam's

situation

in Areopagitica

seems pertinent:

284

Interpretation
God therefore left him free, set before him a provoking is but choosing in his ever almost eyes; herein consisted his merit, herein the right of his
praise of

reason

object,

reward, the

his

abstinence.

God's

providence

before the fall,

good
which

as

afterwards,

aimed at

tempting

man

by

profusion

of created

must

be

embraced

only to the

extent that

savoring the good intimates the

nunciation

goodness of

the Maker. Thereupon a way of re

becomes
the

obligatory.

This

regimen of affirmation

followed

by

renun

ciation reveals

plan of

God
temperance,

who, though he

command us

justice,

continence, yet pours out be that

can

fore

us even to a profuseness, all

desirable things,

and gives us minds

wander

beyond

all

limit

and satiety.

Gratitude for God's

His plenty
seems makes

abundance coupled with self-control accepts

in the

enjoyment of

for the disposition God

constitute progress

for

proof of man's

obedience,

proofs which

in turn

up the
of

grades of

to formulate Milton's adjustment

the classical

ascending love. This ideal of sublimation to

scriptural standards.

After the fall evidently the same determination of merit persists because in when the Father foresees the economy of salvation, He lays down these terms for men who heed God's implanted "Conscience":
Book III,
Light
after

light

well us'd

they

shall attain

And to the

end persisting, safe arrive

(196-97).
upon acts of

Illumination

of the

intellect therefore follows

obedience,

not upon

successive abstractions or rational sublimations. explanation of

Viewed

against this corrective of con

the terms proper to

graded

ascent, Adam's overvaluing

templation stands forth clearly as does his undervaluing the governing power of

rationality in its capacity to regulate not just the lower affections but also "minds that can wander beyond all limit and Adam's philosophic ar
satiety."

dor has

undermined

his

reason

in the

sense of

the

deliberative, governing fac

and responsible mle of role of

ulty enabling both obedience towards higher authority his proper subordinate. Milton's Christ will fulfill his

New Adam
what

by
it

demonstrating

over

the course

of

the

action

of

Paradise Regained
with

means to progress

from light to light

well used

and, consistent

the lesson
will

taught negatively in Paradise

withstand

Lost,

the last of the worldly temptations he

nature

is the temptation to divinize human

1v
.

through philosophizing

(Paradise Regained,

27 1

84)

Machiavelli's Castruccio Castracani

Theodore A. Sumberg

God loves the

Machiavelli

powerful and uses slender

them to punish the powerless. So writes

of

in his in
to
a

biography

Castmccio Castracani,

soldier-

statesman who

himself

superior

larger setting than fourteenth-century Lucca would show Philip of Macedon and Scipio Africanus. Praise so high and

God so astonishing arouses curiosity in a little-known work cu heightened the claim that it contains Machiavelli's "fundamental riosity by But why read it if he put everything he knew in the Prince and Dis
a view of
thought."1

courses as phy?

he

wrote

in their dedications? Does he

after

add

Written in 1520,
must

he had

prepared

his

major

works,

anything in the biogra including the Art

of

of

War, he
Of

have had

some purpose

in narrating the life

Castmccio,

which

is exactly
unknown

what we will

try

to

uncover.

parents,

an abandoned newborn

boy

is found

at

high

grasses

in the

garden of a priest

by

his sister,

a childless widow.

dawn among Himself

of the noble

Lucchese

family

of

Castracani,

the priest

baptizes the
care

boy

with

his

father's

name of

Castmccio. No
whom

child enjoyed more names

loving

than that given the

pagan

by

priest and

sister,

Machiavelli

Dianora,

perhaps after

fertility easy delivery. Now, the Castmccio Castracani known to history (1281-1328) was a legitimate child orphaned when 19 years old, but in the biography Machiavelli makes him a foundling whose birth and discovery
goddess of
and recall

the

legendary

origins

of

Romulus

and

wants to place

Castmccio among the

great

Moses. Machiavelli apparently founders of new political orders.

Moreover, in having Castmccio rise from

avelli

pit to pinnacle of

leadership

Machi

discloses the full distance

some

of political advancement a

that is open to wily

encouraged

aspirants;

readers, starting from

higher point, may be

to

to do

likewise. Machiavelli dedicates the

biography
His

two dear young

friends, fellow
helps
ex

Florentines
plain much.

with political ambitions.

choice of youthful readers

Of course, Machiavelli aims at bright young men throughout his writings, identified specifically as such in the last paragraph of the Art of War and toward the end of the introduction to Book II of the Discourses. He thus
seems to put
aged

himself

against

Plato

who

Athenian
shows

stranger call political

in the Laws (685a, 712b, 769a) has the discussions an old man's game. But the bi
a

ography
gle

worthy

of one's

young men that politics is best efforts.

serious, grim, life-and-death stmg

1.

Leo Strauss, Thoughts

on

Machiavelli (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958)

223.

interpretation, Winter

1988-9, Vol. 16, No. 2

286

Interpretation
grows

Castmccio
and

high

spirit.

His

adopted

up fast into a robust good-looking lad of quick intelligence father soon directs him toward a priestly career but

in

vain.

Francesco
tmccio
the

Playing on the streets of Lucca, the youngster attracts the eye of Guinigi, soldier-leader of the city, who in due course invites Cas to join his household. Pressed by Castmccio himself, the priest gives up
old

fourteen-year

to his second

adopted

father,

who

brings

out the

young

ster's natural talent

After

for manly sports, including horsemanship. time Guinigi has his adopted son join him in a battle in

which the

youngster excels.

Guinigi,

who

will

die shortly,

puts

Castmccio in

charge of
after so

the military forces of Lucca which

Castmccio leads
18 years of age

with success

in battle

battle. Machiavelli "great

which eager

reports that at

Castmccio has become

honored"

and

that

he is

able

to contend

for the

leadership

of

Lucca
men

in fact

amidst popular acclaim and

he

soon gains.

High-spirited young

for honors

glory

could

hardly

imagine

a more meteoric rise to emu

late.

Young
his horse

and

brimming

with

spirit, all eyes fixed

on

him, Castmccio
Such
a man

mounts

and passes moves

his troops in

review without a word.

is born to
mark

lead. What
on events.

him? He

sees no purpose

in life

other

than to put his

He

welcomes

he

exercises

his

great strength of spirit.

difficulties because in stretching himself to the utmost His fierce energy naturally captures the
superiority
a of ancients over modems no

will of other souls

for

great collective enterprises.

Machiavelli

stresses the

throughout his
great

writings, but not here.

captains of old. men to

Castmccio,
at

modem, is in
at all

way inferior to the

Great deeds lie

not nostalgia.

hand

times. Machiavelli calls his young

action,

I Castmccio is
bom in battle he is the first to
soldiers alongside of

soldier:

mount and the

last to
afar.

dismount;

and

he leads his fellow

them,

not

from

battles rashly, being aware of their great risks. In fact, as Machiavelli reports, he never attempted to win by force when he could win by fraud. At Pistoia, for example, after promising safety to leaders of rival fac
not enter

But he does

tions

Castmccio betrays both

both
sides.

at the right
cites

moment, capturing
renown."

or

killing

the parti
not

sans of

Machiavelli

the view of

Castmccio

that

"victory,

the manner of victory, would

bring

you

He is faithful to these

words

in his

long string of victories. Machiavelli describes battles in so much detail that the biography reads al most like a sequel to the Art explains Castmccio of War, but he
rarely

leads Lucca into

Art of War (n)

war.

To free it

of

tyranny? No. To free it

of

why foreign domina

tion? No. He is merely

of

carrying out at the right moment the prescription giving the law to others instead of receiving it from

of the

them.

Machiavelli'

Castmccio Castracani
presumably
so

287
animated,
you win

Since

all governments are

only if
of the

you

are

smarter,

faster,
of

stronger.

Moral
old

scruples never stand

in his way,

as

if he

never

heard

century-

doctrine

just

war.

Nor does he
marches

show

mercy to the vanquished; nor

does

he

respect neutrality.

He

Machiavelli

reports

with

detail,

after

easily into the fortified town of Serravalle, inducing one of its principal citizens to
alone

kill the leader

above

of the town

long

left

by

rival

towns. Those who stand

reward.

the

battle in contempt,
not spare

contempt and

death be their

Castmccio does
positions gained. against
whole

anybody, according to

Machiavelli, in protecting

Hence his

mthlessness

him in Lucca

and occupied

in putting down conspiracies directed towns. On one occasion he even wipes out
might aspire

families in Lucca
ambitious

who

in his judgment

to

its leadership.

Several

families in Pisa

suffer the same

with

fate.

Only

death defeats him. Covered

sweat after a
off

catches a chill

strong coming days later. His death is remarkable in being the only banal event in his life. It is also remarkable because it is the only time in 44 years that fortune abandons
him. Perhaps

from

wind

the Arno

and

hard day's battle, he dies of fever a few

having

a premonition of restless

early death he
which

pushed

himself into

life

of ceaseless action.

All

Machiavelli

stages a

young deathbed scene in

men will understand

the sentiment.

his lieutenant

and nonadopted son of

Castmccio instructs Pagolo, Guinigi, former leader of Lucca. This ex

one respect:

tensive speech

is

remarkable

in

at

least

looking back,

Castmccio

expresses no remorse over

anything done

take leave with so easy a conscience?

How many people can Unburdened, he joins company with

or even said.

Machiavelli's blame for

great

other great

founders

of new

orders; the

act

may

accuse

but the
of a

result will excuse

(Discourses

1 9).

And

so

Machiavelli

excuses

Romulus

killing
on

his twin brother. Castmccio, in contrast,

nonconsanguineous

visits not

death but

favor

his

brother,

as we see presently.

Upon his deathbed Castmccio does admit, however, weakening Lucca's security by expanding its dominion
may be forgivable however as the flowing energy. But Castmccio does
product of
an

the tactical error of too much.

The

error

urge prudential

exemplary leader's over withdrawal in order that

Pagolo may

strengthen

Lucca's security; how far to

withdraw

is left to Pagolo's
to fellow soldiers

unprincipled estimate of political advantage.

At death's threshold Castmccio

also makes a

brief

speech

binding
gets

them

by

oath

to

loyalty

to his chosen successor. And so

Castmccio in his son,

Pagolo

off

to a good start.

In

fact, Pagolo's

rule continues

which is a very long period of dynastic for the notoriously faction-ridden towns of continuity stability Tuscany. So Castmccio is eminently successful in solving the great problem of

grandson

and even great grandson,

and
political

orderly

succession

a problem that

has tripped up many

married and

great captains of old

and modem times.

The Castmccio Castracani

of

history

had

children.

Why

in the

288

Interpretation
does Machiavelli kill him
off childless?

biography
and

would name

him his successor,

which would require

Having a son, Castmccio killing Pagolo, his family

Castmccio'

his partisans, very probably causing civil war in Lucca. So to crown s success, even after his death, Machiavelli makes him a bachelor
dynasty. An exclusively political tie is meant Machiavelli has Castmccio refer to Pagolo as figliuolo mio and of sangue
starts

who nevertheless
when

a new

nostro.

Like Romulus

and

Moses,

the Castmccio of the

biography

leaves

as

his
Pa

sole

progeny Machiavelli

a new political order of

narrates

that upon

long dying Francesco

years

life.

Guinigi had
And
upon as

entmsted

golo

to the care of

Castmccio, five
an
action

his

senior.

his death Cas

to be out of

tmccio keeps
character.

his word,

But Machiavelli's

account

morally includes

so

praiseworthy

several occasions

in

which

Cas

tmccio, in not keeping his word to living men, brought about their death. Political advantage alone seems to determine faithfulness. At the outset of the
Machiavelli tells the two young dear friends that he will place them before the azioni virtuose of Castmccio. Such actions are simply what profits the leader.

biography

II
Machiavelli (Discourses
n
claims

that writers

conceal events

that reflect

ill

on their

country

Int.). The

opposite order

tactic informs his biography: he castigates

Florence
his

without

mercy in
admits

to open it up to new leadership. His audience,

audience at

principal

audience, his immediate

his time that he

rence?

loving

more

than his

soul.2

any rate, was the Florence of How does he punish Flo

He

shows that

puny Lucca, Florence's

superior

perpetual

no

less than three times, the

forces
even

of

rival, defeats in battle, Florence, even when aided by

self-defense

the troops of the

King

of

Naples. Lucca

forces Florence in its

to pay annual tribute to that unloved King. Machiavelli even gives exact casu

alty figures for the one-sided victories of Lucca: in one battle, for instance, Florence lost 20,231 soldiers and Lucca only 1,570. What could be the source
of such

tention of
minded

detail? Not military records of course; the figures simply reveal the in Machiavelli, in his time, to sting Florence to action in being re of its defeats by Lucca two centuries earlier.

humiliation that Lucca visits upon Florence is the celebration of a but two miles from Florence so close that its proud citizens could victory hear the dmnken carousing of Castmccio 's troops in dividing the booty. Feel
worst

The

shame,

Florence,

and restore sharpness

to

your sword!

Needless
2.

to say,

Machiavelli
April
1527.

weaves

much

imagination into his

report of

Letter to Vettori

16

Machiavelli'

Castruccio Castracani
account

289
in his

Florence's defeats. The

he

gives

History

of Florence (ii

6) is

very different. Florence loses some and wins some, including once when even without battle it forces retreat upon a Lucca led by Castmccio. Machiavelli
chooses

his facts carefully in the biography. for the victories of Lucca, also according to the biography, is One that it fights with its own citizens; Castmccio Florentinus never admits merce
reason

nary soldiers into his Castmccio of history

Upon
nization

army.

Here is

another piece of

deliberate falsification: the

and

served as a

mercenary to
to

Venice, Lombardy, France

changes

England. Machiavelli knows

when

be

silent.

becoming
the only

the leader of
reform

he

carries

he deems important. Laws

suggestion

and

its military orga because it is the only one out, presumably institutions he leaves untouched, without any

Lucca, Castmccio

however that they merit praise. The traditionally unstable autocracy of Lucca before Castmccio could even be set down as radically defective. It certainly lacks the republican tradition of liberty that was the pride of Florence.
what counts in battle is military spirit and skill under adroit leadership. Nor does Castmccio try to reform the people of Lucca because as they are they go with him to victory after victory. Elementary passions, violent images,

But

brutal appeals,
strong-willed

booty

all this carries

a

the people

forward in

obedience

to a

leader. Yet

large

mass of

infantry, heavily

engaged

in frequent

politically assertive. Machiavelli does not discuss this development, but he creates a leader it would not embarrass. After
combat,
will

in time

make people

all, there is nothing scure",

and

of

the snob in

Castmccio, his

origins are

"low

and ob

he fights

shoulder-by-shoulder with

his fellow
noble

soldiers.

Moreover,
in

in putting down conspiracies, he wipes out several certainly endear him to the commoners, as well as

families,

which would

strengthen their obedience

fear. Tme, the Castmccio-Pagolo line may changes are a common, if not inevitable,
affairs.

one part

day be overturned, but such of the mutability of human

of get

In any case, the

biography

contains no about

hint

the emergence of a con to the new order

rather

stitutional republic of stability.

It is

how to

than about its character.

Machiavelli
such

also reports

that Castmccio

grew

up to be

a gentile uomo.

As

he

would appeal

to readers who

also are

gentlemen;

and as a gentleman

he

would also gain political allies

among the good

we

tunes to him.

Everything is
have

good,

families willing to tie their for remember, that leads to political advan
courtiers of

tage. But Castmccio is very different from the

avelli

his time. Machi

de'

may

even

portrayed

him

as a

deliberate rival

of

Lorenzo

Medici

(1449-

1492), ideal

at

the time

for young Florentine

support of use of

noblemen.

Lorenzo's
mania

courtly manners, collecting festivals are

man of the

thirst

for learning,

the arts, poetizing,

for
for

manuscripts and art all alien

objects, civilized

leisure,

and passion

to the austere,

single-minded

Castmccio. Florence

needs a

sword,

not a man of

letters,

unless the second calls

for the first.

290

Interpretation

III
While only fourteen years old Castmccio enjoyed an autoritd regia among playmates. The expression is odd for one so young. Machiavelli may be
nature

his

suggesting that
also points
out

has

a part

that the priest

in making Castmccio fit to gave up Castmccio because in Castmccio's

rise

rule.

Machiavelli
natura

of

la

del

fanciullo. If

nature

is indeed

present

to

leadership,

then title

to mle rests with the wellborn

by

nature, not with the wellborn

by
be

convention.

The

biography is
a

about a

deserted infant

of unknown parents who challenges encouraged

and conquers

kings

and nobles.

All

ambitious newcomers will

nobody favored only by nature starts a new line of rulers. Working in mysterious ways, nature is arbitrary, giving much to some, little to others. Fortune governs the distribution of its gifts, which is one reason why fortune counts for so much in our lives. Castmccio gets high cards throughout
that

his life, but

most

what

is

remarkable about

the opportunities that come

with

him is his ability in exploiting to the ut his way. It is his virtu, his personal force,

working

fortune,

that carries him to the summit of leadership. Fortune and

virtue, working together or at cross purposes,

fix the life

of all people.

Fortune is the only suprapolitical appear in the biography. Entering battle Castmccio

force in human

affairs.

The divine does

not

never pleads

for divine

help,

and

winning he

never

thanks God. The absence of prayer and thanksgiv

certainly once, but only in irony, Allied to the Emperor, in that deed
city. claim that

ing

was

not common

in

fourteenth-century
joke, in
a slight

Italy. Yet God does incident

reported at

appear

almost as a

length.

King

of

Rome, Castmccio helps him

suppress a revolt

The Emperor Rome but

rewards

him, putting
God. The

onto

his brocaded

toga the

Castmccio

served the will of via the

word of

the Lord cometh

in
re

out of

ports, is

at

Emperor, not the Pope, who, Machiavelli Avignon. Absent the Pope, Rome is a city of divine sanction.
Machiavellian
not wickedness.

The
prince
makes

episode contains a second piece of

his hero

admires

and

serves

is German,
trait in

The only Italian. And Machiavelli

and

him redheaded, for local pride.

hardly

a common

Tuscany,

hence

no

basis

IV
Even
nature's

darling

needs the right

kind

of

education,

and

Castmccio is
eccle-

exemplary in this respect. While fourteen years old he abandons "libri for weapons. It is the turning point in his life, his first step in scaling the heights. It may also be the step that Machiavelli wants others to take, and
siastici"

so could also

be the turning

point

in European life.

Machiavelli's Castruccio Castracani

In putting
not

291

his

soul.

churchly books for weapons, Castruccio exercises his body, Emptied of conscience, the soul shrinks and even tends to disap
aside

pear.

We

are thus on the road

regard

to the

materialist statesman
moral and

but body. In do
without

to education, the
period of

fashioned

doctrine that there is nothing by Machiavelli can

philosophical, that Plato
pre

the

long

training,

scribed over

for

political

leadership.

Young

men

in

hurry

will

not choose

Plato

Machiavelli.
ever read

If Castruccio

anything, Machiavelli reports, he

read of wars and of

the deeds of the greatest men.

them.

The

biography

By reading about them he himself becomes like itself has this purpose. Its author calls Castruccio a
He is
politics as

esemplo."

"grandissimo

Socrates is

philosophy.

The biogra

phy is

persuasively

vivid portrait of a model man.

as

Writing history is like writing a manual for actual or would-be princes, and such it troubles itself less with recording the past than with guiding the fu

ture. The whole truth of the past

being

unknowable

in any
of

case

(Discourses

history writing facts.3 Of is certainly innocent of any rigid fidelity to the course, Machiavelli is no innovator here: the Gospels, for example, were prob ably written to create and guide Christians, not as a literal record of the deeds
even

Int.), it is

legitimate to

subordinate the

to didactic mo

tives. The

biography

and words of pressed

Jesus. The success,

not

the tmth, of the Gospels probably im

Machiavelli. casting a stone at traditional philosophy how to live in favor of presenting the real
central

Famous is Machiavelli's boast

that he will avoid

telling

people

tmth of things (Prince 15). But the

thrust of the

biography
no

is to

show

actual or aspirant princes that a new education will

power.

lead them to
sins

gain and

hold

So if

exhortation

is deprecated, Machiavelli
that

less than Plato. light

Machiavelli
while

can yet point out was at one

Plato's Republic is

never saw the

Castmccio

time a man of flesh and

account a real not

blood; but
to be

the

day didactically
of reader of never

imaginative
If both

element

in Machiavelli's

overlooked.

philosophers are
will

hortatory,

difference

yet exists. almost

The

the Republic

be
be

sad that

its beautiful

scheme will

certainly
so much

exist, while the reader of the

short a

biography,
a

where one man

does

in

so

time,

will

uplifted

in hope

hope that

will sustain attempts at

man

imi

tation. But Machiavelli is

to

not naive: an great and

extraordinary

is

needed

one akin

legendary

figures

for

longlasting

political

success.

Yet lesser

figures seeking

more modest success should not

be discouraged.

3.

The

real

Castruccio died in

at

47

years of age

but Machiavelli
of

puts

it

at 44.

Why? He
order

gives
show

Castruccio
facts

the same span of time he gives to

more no more time.

King Philip
and

Macedon

and

Scipio in

to

that his hero did

Other differences between the

biography

and

the known

are pointed out

by

Pasquale Villari, The Life

Times

of

Niccolo Machiavelli (Scribner's,

New York, 1891)

n, 302-8 (translation).

292

Interpretation

V
The ending is curious. It consists of Castmccio. Almost all are brief, trivial,
sayings

that Machiavelli attributes to

anecdotal.

When

someone was noted

boast

ing

that even

drinking
To

much

he did

not get

dmnk, Castmccio
a

that an ox

does the

same.

a man

wordy in asking

favor Castmccio

suggests

another man when another

favor is

sought.

Most

sayings are of

the same

sending tenor,

making one wonder The most curious

tion to the
points
man.

about

their function in the book.

aspect

Castmccio is

is that taken together, the 34 sayings bear little rela great for his deeds, not his words, Machiavelli
or

out, so either give him no words

of most of

only It

words of an uncommon

tone.

The lightheartedness

them is even radically out of character with the

of the man. side. can

heroic

ambition and

great captains also sayings

military glory have their light

be argued,

of

course, that
added the

If this is correct, Machiavelli

simply to fulfill the biographer's role of drawing a the same motive perhaps is Machiavelli's attention to the
of

rounded portrait.

Of

physical appearance

his hero. All this

suggests a

book

meant

for

a wider audience

than Machi

After all, it costs no more than one hour's easy reading. In appending the sayings Machiavelli fits his biography into the humanist mold that mled literature at the time. And by making it familiar it might
avelli's tracts.

thereby

gain

welcome

gians who since might even

among the noblemen, poets, philosophers, and theolo Petrarch were caught up in the revival of letters. This welcome
aim

facilitate Machiavelli's
the

to undermine, in the rival figure

of

Castmccio,
counters the

humanist ideal
for

of civilized

leisure. If so, the little

biography

pretty literature

of the

day,

and as such

is

also an expression of

contempt of the philosopher

men of

letters.

Do the 34 sayings, taken together, throw light on the private, as against the public, man? Very little with one notable exception: Castmccio replies thus to a

friend reproaching him for allegedly being taken in by a young woman with whom he lives: "You are wrong. I have taken her, not she His eros is di
me."

rected
man

only to mling fearful only of

we examine

people.

The beautiful in

all

forms simply has

no

hold

on a are

losing

his keen taste for

action when the great

days

come.

If

the sayings,
31
of

we

We find instead that

the 34 come
Laertius'

find nothing biblical or medieval in them. from The Lives of Philosophers of

Diogenes

Laertius.4

raphy but in the Art of War (1).

tions and reasonings
of

Machiavelli knows this writer, citing him not in the biog book reports the opinions, explana

famous

philosophers amidst much trivial

repeats the

banter

on

their

lives, known or imagined. Machiavelli in the contempt of silence.

4.

banter

while

leaving

the rest

Discussed in Strauss,

op. cit. 223-25.

Machiavelli's Castruccio Castracani

Most
of the 31

293
come

sayings,

few

lightly

changed,

from the lives

The

of

the

Cynics. Is Machiavelli enrolling Castmccio in this Castracani

suggests a

school?

family

name of

the sixth saying also equates

military-camp dog and a dog is the symbol of the Cynics; dogs and philosophers, so Castmccio may indeed

be

of

this tribe. He also shares their

and abstract reasoning. and

hostility
On the
not

to conventional prejudices, con

templation,
centric

other

hand, Castmccio is
and above all

no ec

tramp

he

glories

in

fame,
with

pleasures,

he is

not

apolitical, a

decisive difference

the school cited.

Is Machiavelli
tactics, derisive
them

joining

this school with

and penchant

his biography? He likes their for didactic

exaggeration.

shock

iconoclasm,

Also like

he is
at

no

laughing
aetatus

"astronomizing Thales for falling

school

soul"; he probably

sides with

the Thracian girl

at the stars (The-

into

a well while

looking

up

174a).

Yet Machiavelli
cited, for

would not

even with

the

such an alliance would

ally himself with philosophers, not direct youngsters to phi from philosophy to politics. does Castmccio become?
rather a
captain-

losophy,

while

his like

aim rather was

to turn them
of

Starting
Not
a

almost

a great

figure

legend,

what

philosopher, not a prophet,

a

not a

saint: great

he becomes things,

statesman,

superlatives.

very Castmccio is the

as

great man who

did very

to repeat

Machiavelli's

new

type of human excellence.

As keen-witted phy
and

anyone, Machiavelli knew the splendid charm of philoso

seductive

therefore its

power over

bright youngsters,
to give it up
men

as

well

as

its

unchallenged preciates

authority, along

with

theology, in traditional
youngsters

education.

So he ap
of politi of

the

difficulty
and

of

persuading
of cast

in favor

cal ambition. an energetic

Hence his tactic wily leader

placing young in the mold

before the exciting life

of

Achilles, Alexander,

and

Caesar.

Xenophon

and

his Socrates

Christopher Bruell
Boston College

This

paper

has

simple

thesis:

that

Xenophon's

account

of

Socrates
gen

deserves erally longest

more respectful attention

from those interested in Socrates than it

of a

receives

today. The

paper consists writings want

of

the four Xenophontic

brief summary of the mostly devoted more or less explicitly to

Socrates,
eral

the Memorabilia. But I

what might

to begin

by

considering in
these

very

gen

way Far more obviously than Plato, Xenophon calls attention in his writings to his own relationship with Socrates. He claims frequently, Plato only once, to have been in his
present at the

be

responsible

for the

current neglect of

works.

Socratic

conversations

he

reports. and on

He

often

comments,

Socrates'

own name, on
never

words and

deeds,

his life

as a whole,

something Plato made on him in

work

does;
that

and

he

sometimes

talks of the impression

calls

they

particular.

In

accord with

"Memorabilia,"

is,

"Recollections,"

this, he his

his longest Socratic

of

recollections

Socrates;
add

there

is

no

parallel

to this
with

in the Platonic dialogues. One

the possible exception
mentioned of

might are

that
en

whereas the

dialogues,

the

Laws,

devoted

being only three times, almost in Xenophon's works include not only the Education of Cyrus, devoted passing to the founder of the Persian empire, but also the Anabasis of Cyrus, whose
tirely
real

to Socrates

Plato himself

hero,
of

the rescuer of almost ten thousand

Greeks from

extreme peril

in the
in

heart

of the

Persian empire, is Xenophon himself.

All

this would seem to

justify
his

an expectation on our part of association with

finding

Xenophon's tation, if
recounts
of some of

works an account of

Socrates. But this

expec

entirely disappointed, is fulfilled in a surprising way. Xenophon only two episodes in what must have been a complex friendship duration. The first was a conversation which took place in the presence
not and spendthrift

Crito's son, Critoboulos, a lazy, fun-loving Socrates, despite or perhaps in part because of
with:

youth,

whom

these qualities, liked to spend

time

Tell me, Xenophon, Socrates began, didn't you consider Critoboulos to moderate human beings rather than the bold, to those with forethought
the thoughtless and
reckless?

belong
rather

to the than

Certainly, Xenophon Originally

vember
prepared as a

replied.

lecture,

which was

delivered

at

St. John's College in Santa Fe in No

1985.

interpretation, Winter 1988-9, Vol.

16, No. 2

296

Interpretation
consider

Well,
would

him

now

to be hot-headed
and

and

heedless in the

extreme:

this

fellow

tumble head-first
what

into daggers

leap

into fire.
you think such

And him?

did

you see

him doing, Xenophon said, that fair

things of

Didn't this fellow dare to kiss the But if that is the

the risk.
reckless

most

and

blooming

son of

Alcibiades?
to

deed, Xenophon
what

said, I think I

myself would submit

Wretch! Socrates
someone spend a

said.

And

do

you think you would suffer

from

kissing
no

beautiful? Would

you not at once

be

a slave rather

than a
to care

lot for harmful pleasures, be deprived

good,
and

of the

leisure

free person, for anything

ble

and

be forced to take seriously

said.

what not even a madman would

take

seriously?

Heracles! Xenophon And

aren't a mouth

What terrible

power you ascribe you

to the kiss.
which

are you surprised at

this? Socrates said. Don't

know that spiders,

half-obol in size,
and

crush

human beings

with

pain, through a touch of the

alone,

Yes, by

Zeus! Xenophon
said.

drive from them the capacity to think? said, for spiders inject something through the bite. You think that the beautiful don't inject something don't see it? Don't you know that this beast they
when call a

Moron! Socrates

they kiss, just because beauty in his bloom is

while

you

so much more terrible than spiders that spiders must

touch,

this one,

without even

touching but if
drive
to

one

only

sees

it, injects
advise

something,

though quite

far away,

sufficient to

one mad?

But I

you,

Xenophon,

whenever you see someone

beautiful,

flee

with all possible speed.

Xenophon

often comments

favorably
refrained

on the effectiveness of

Socratic

exhorta

tions. For some reason, he

from

doing

so

in this

case.

The

second episode

is

recounted not

in the Socratic

writings

proper, but in

the Anabasis. Xenophon had received a letter

from

friend

inviting

him to

ac

company the friend on an expedition being organized by Cyms, the younger brother of the then Persian king. Xenophon took the letter to Socrates and
consulted with

him

about the trip.

Socrates
with

was worried

that association with

Cyms
have

might get

Xenophon in trouble

Athens,

since

Cyrus

was

thought to

given enthusiastic assistance

advised

to Sparta in its recent

war with

Athens. So

Socrates

Xenophon to

go to

Delphi to

consult with the god about the

trip. Xenophon went to Delphi and he put a question to

gods should

Apollo: to

which of

the

he

sacrifice and

pray in

order

to make the

journey

he intended to

make
noble

in the

noblest and

best

manner and to come returned asked

manner.

When Xenophon
not

back safely having acted in a to Athens with Apollo's answer,

whether

Socrates blamed him for

make the
and

having

first
had

it

was

better for him to decision himself

was com with

trip

or

not;

instead, Xenophon
proceed

made the chief

had

asked

the god only about the

means. with

As
the

result, Socrates
accordance

pelled god's

to advise Xenophon to

trip in

the

instmctions.
account of

The

his

association with

Socrates that Xenophon

conveys through

these stories is somewhat surprising in any case. It is all the

more

surprising for

Xenophon
its
apparent

and

his Socrates
with

297

inconsistency
have

the impression conveyed

by

the features of his

Socratic

works we

mentioned:

the stories seem to indicate that Xenophon

very great weight on his relationship with But perhaps that impression was in need lightly. took it
did
not place rection.

Socrates,

even

that he

of qualification or cor was not en

More precisely,
to

what

the stories indicate is that Xenophon

Socrates'

tirely
serves

receptive

advice.

Beyond that,

as

his life

as a whole also

to suggest, Xenophon did not regard the Socratic life

as a model

the philosophic

life
to

pure and simple

assume

that he

expected

the same to be tme

for him to follow in every respect. It is safe of many of his readers as well. from them
of philosophic

This

consideration

may

help

to explain another feature of Xenophon's So protreptic, ex

cratic works:

the almost total absence

philosophize of

hortations to

the sort found in abundance in the Platonic dia

logues. In their place, hearted but

of some

we

find

in Xenophon's Symposium
critique of

witty
or

and lightat

no

less
most

telling

the

Socratic

circle,

least

of

its

conspicuous

members.

"philosophers,"

"philosophize"

occur

(The very terms infrequently in the Socratic writings.)

"philosophy,"

Xenophon had

precise

protreptic entails.

understanding of what the absence of philosophic In the fourth book of his Memorabilia, he presents a cari It is
a caricature

cature of such a protreptic. converted

because its object, the

boy

to be

to philosophy, is about as unfit for philosophy as a nature can be. the

presentation of

Nevertheless,

this defective case provides some basis for

figuring
his

out what a nondefective protreptic might require.

An

appeal to the po

tential convert's concern for

conscious or

justice, followed by a thorough-going critique of unconscious conviction that he knows what justice is, would

to play a very large role here. Now Xenophon refers rather frequently in his Socratic works to the Socratic examination of justice; but he gives us rela
appear

tively few
treatment

examples of
of

it. More generally, he does little to

our eyes and ears: or

bring

the Socratic

justice to life before Plato's Republic

there is no Xenophontic

counterpart to

Gorgias.

differences in mind, an admirer of Xenophon from former times distinguished between the sublimity of Plato and the "natural and simple
with such
genius"

Perhaps

of
vulgar."

Xenophon, "comprehended by so (Shaftesbury, Characteristics I 167)

in the light
rogues
. .

few

and so

little

relished

by

the

comment
man

of a somewhat

It is tempting to understand this mischievous remark of Montesquieu: "Hu very decent

people:

beings,
and

individually,
would

are en masse

they love

morality;

say that this is seen admirably well in the theater.

One is
one

certain to please the people with the sentiments that

certain

is

to shock them

by

those

it

reproves."

morality avows, and (De V esprit des lois xxv 2)

But

one must think of the

of

higher,

the more sublime, rather than the low mani

festations

the disposition described

by

Montesquieu

of

Glaucon

and

Adei

mantus rather than

then prior to

Babbit. If philosophy itself is the tme opposite to vulgarity, falling in love with philosophy in the proper way, the future phi
can't

losophers

themselves

be entirely free

of vulgar concerns

and

tastes;

298

Interpretation
have to
appeal

philosophic protreptic would therefore

to those concerns,
and

if only

for the

leading inevitably partake of the vulgarity it seeks to cure. Xenophon's abstaining, or his having his Socrates abstain, from any serious protreptic effort thus has the
sake of
addressees

its

beyond them;

in

doing

so, it would

perhaps

incidental vulgarity

advantage of

enabling him to

present a

Socrates remarkably
presents

free
very
all

of

of

this sort. To put this another way, Xenophon doesn't bend

readers

much

to make the better part of his

like the Socrates he

to

and, for this very reason,

the
more.

they

may, if

they

come

like him

at

all, like him

But Xenophon does

make accommodations respect than

to a different version

of vulgar

ity, going
not

much

further in this

only the better part but also the vast majority of

might use

Plato does. In seeking to his readers that

convince
Socrates'

conviction on a capital charge was absurd,

Xenophon if

uses arguments of a sort

that any sufficiently clever lawyer

confronted with such a

jury. In

particular, he
who neither

goes as nor

far

as

he

can

to

present

Socrates

as an

ordinary fellow

thinks

does anything

out of

the ordinary, and as a lover of the

of

demos

and

his fellow

man and a great

benefactor
or

those who associated with the predisposition of

him. That is, Xenophon bids his many

of

readers

accepts

them

to judge Socrates according to a standard he elsewhere iden

benefactors."

tifies as a vulgar one: "The majority, as it seems, define as good men those
who are their

(Hellenica

vn

3.12) He

goes even

further

by

hav

ing

his Socrates, in his ordinariness, Xenophon's Socrates

profess a number of relations

kindred opinions, for

name of

example the view that certain

ship.

mercenary

deserve the

friend

says to an acquaintance on a certain

,

occasion, "On

account of

the present bad state of affairs

good

friends

can now

be

purchased

cheaply."

quite

Xenophon's better believe

we are

readers can't

help

noticing

such

vulgarity;

and, remote as we

today from
it. Too

the

needs which

dictated its use,

obvi

they
ous

can't

help being
they

offended

by

refined

to tolerate

Xenophon's

vulgarity,

are not refined enough

to observe the quiet evidence of his

delicacy

and good taste.

The Memorabilia is divided into forty-four chapters, ber

of parts

which

fall into
go

a num

or

sections

(cf.

Strauss,

Xenophon'

Socrates). I'll

through

less in order, feeling free however to skip around from time to time. In the first two chapters, Xenophon takes up directly, and refutes, the two-fold charge on which Socrates was convicted and put to death. The ref
these sections more or
utation of

the

impiety

charge

requires, in Xenophon's view,

at

least the
that

appar with

ent

denial that Socrates

was concerned with natural

nature of all thinr
-

philosophy

is,

the investigation of the

and

in

particular

the state of the cosmos

the necessities

by

which each of

the

heavenly

things comes into being. And

the Memorabilia itself
engaged

while

Xenophon
other

gives a number of

indications, both in
was

and

in his

Socratic writings, that Socrates

with

indeed

in

natural

philosophy, together

activity, the bulk

of

information regarding the manner of his philosophic the Memorabilia is silent on this subject. It shows us

Xenophon
Socrates
not

and

his Socrates
philosophic

299
stu

in his

dents,

relatives,
views

companions of various on
personal

activity proper, but in his relations with sorts, fellow citizens and others,
as economic and
political matters.

ex

pressing
shows us

as

well means

Or it
phi

something

of what

it

to be a philosopher

by

showing how

losophy
cerned. as a

affects a number of matters and relations with which we

too are con

And it
of

was perhaps

Xenophon's interest in the

his
cautious reluctance

question of

philosophy
Memora

way

life

as well as

to say very

much about

Socrates'

philosophic

activity

proper

that gave

his

recollections or

bilia this form.

The
refutation

of

the corruption charge requires Xenophon to take up not

undoubted

Socrates'

only
companions.

own

law-abidingness, but his

approved of would

effect

on

his young
and

Socrates himself

was of

the opinion that those of his companions

who accepted what

he himself for

be

good

friends to him

to each other throughout their

lives. Xenophon
whether

gives us some

evidence, in the
at

Symposium
as

especially,

doubting
hand,

this was always the case

least

far

as some of

those

most eager

to accept what Socrates approved of were

concerned.

On the

other

some partial
might

nonaccepters, if the

example of

Xenophon himself Socrates. This

ter conquering
of

represents

this class,

have been

quite good

friends to

question reminds us of
all of

Xenophon's

other great

hero, Cyms. Af
the peak

Western Asia

and

power,

wealth and

honor, Cyms
he took

paused

elevating his friends to reflect on his

almost to

own situation.

He

thus came to the realization that he had no enemies so dangerous to him as those very
even

friends;
him

and

precautions commensurate with the

danger. But

if

Socrates'

expectation was always

borne out,

were

those who were good

as
well?

friends

to

and

to each other always good

friends to the city

more

Xenophon

admits

that

Socrates dearest:

made would

his

companions

attached

to him

than to their nearest and

this not

have held tme

also with regard

to their attachment to the city?

phon conveys

According

to another suggestion which Xeno

was put

through his Education of

of

Cyrus, Socrates

to death

for

alienating facts that

and able or partial
Socrates'

the affections

the young.

Leaving

even this question

aside,

a problem

would still

be

caused

by

the

the

Socratic

circle could not

have been limited to those

of,
and

fully

willing

to accept

what

Socrates be

approved

that not every

nonaccepter

accepter could

expected

to be a Xenophon.
at most

At the minimum, times,

a number

companions must
of youths who were still
not yet

have included,
yet

if

not all

only

potential philosophers and

who, therefore, could

fully
had

accept what

they didn't
advance

fully

understand.

Beyond that,
and

could

even

Socrates know in

which

youths

all that the philosophic

gifts

life

requires?

among the Do the

gifted

well-disposed

proper

disposition

and

the

necessary intellectual
even with

always coincide?
cases?

Could Socrates Did he

always avoid

associating
this?

clearly unpromising

always wish

to avoid

The troubles
gether,
were

which these questions point

and

to, both

individually
most

and

taken to

bound to crop up

did crop up

conspicuously in the

300
cases of

Interpretation
Critias
and

Alcibiades,

notorious political criminals who with

were, at one
of

time or another, closely

associated

Socrates. In his treatment

these

cases, Xenophon

dutifully
least,

tries to follow the line laid down

after

by

his Socrates: company and is bound up

Critias

and

Aclibiades became bad only

at

Socrates'

leaving
and example

even, partially

as a result of

Socrates'

entirely with their rejection of not due to any quasi-acceptance divide

Socrates'

leaving it; teaching

the

their criminality

of

that teaching.
classes:

it is certainly Xenophon goes so far as to

ones and

companions

into two

bad

like Alcibiades
did

and

Critias
Crito

(only

those two names are given

of these

in this context)
names

the good ones like

men who

and

Hermogenes (seven
and

are

given),
never

not

abandon

Socrates

who, throughout their

lives,

did

or were even ac a

cused of
well.

doing

It
the

makes

anything bad. But this line of us wonder why Socrates would

to begin with. That

argument ever

succeeds wanted

little too

have

to associate

"baddies"

with

is, it leads

tions we have already raised. Xenophon gives,

us toward raising the ques in his Symposium, a beautiful il

one

lustration
tioned
"baddies,"

of

the

problem

by

contrasting Hermogenes,

of the

aforemen

"goodies,"

with a man named

Charmides,

who must

be

classed with

the

since

he

was

later to become

a quasi-partner

in

crime of

Critias.

Both Hermogenes

and

Charmides
with

were guests at

the banquet which

and others.

is described
will suffice

in the Symposium, along

Socrates, Critoboulos,

It

to mention one episode of a more

fully

drawn

characterization and comparison. was

Sometime

after

the

drinking

had commenced, Critoboulos Socrates had

flaunting

his

ex

treme infatuation or love for the

the conversation to task regarding

recounted

him for kissing, in boy earlier. Hermogenes took offense and took Socrates
criticized

Critoboulos'

disgraceful

condition:

"I think it is

out of charac made so con was

ter, Socrates, for

senseless

you

to overlook the

fact that Critoboulos has been

by

love."

Socrates defended himself

own association with

by

Critoboulos'

saying that

dition far
to

predated

his

him. In

fact, Critoboulos

gone

in love

when

his

father,

Socrates'

companion could

already Crito, turned him over

Socrates to

see whether

Socrates

hitherto he

stared at
never

the

boy

help. "And he is already much better: stone-like, like those who look at Gorgons, and,
now

stone-like, he
mides

left him. But

I have already is it

seen

him

blink!"

Char

had been

listening

to this exchange, which concluded

of

with some

Socratic
you

remarks about scare

the dangers

kissing.
the

"Why

Socrates, he

asked, that

us,

your

friends, away from

beautiful,

while you yourself

saw

in the

grammar school

in the

same

Critoboulos?"

when you were both yes, by Zeus searching for something head against bare shoulder against the bare shoulder of book, head, To which Socrates replied, "So that is why I have felt pain in

that shoulder for more than

as

five days and seem to have some sting in my heart, beast. But now, Critoboulos, I declare publicly, before these by that you are not to touch me before your beard is as full as the many witnesses, hair on your To come back to the Memorabilia, Xenophon indicates
if bitten
a
head."

there that Socrates had a very high regard for

Charmides. The

wish

to

associate

Xenophon
with natures

and

his Socrates

301
Socrates'

politics,

as

like his would, by itself, account for Xenophon grants, even in the course of his
the

willingness to teach
response

to the

cormp

tion charge, that he did.

The
reason

six chapters of

Memorabilia

which

follow the first two

suggest a
Socrates'

for the

apparent

inconsistency
was

noted

by

Charmides between
continent and could

words and

his deeds: Socrates

exceptionally

therefore

safely
voted

permit

himself temptations

others could not.

These

six chapters are

de

to showing how

Socrates,

through conversation and example,

benefited

his

companions

especially

with regard

to their

becoming

pious and continent.

They include a number of exhortations to continence with respect pleasures including the one addressed to Xenophon himself and,
phon

to
as

bodily
Xeno

tells us,

Socrates

showed

himself

still more continent

in his deeds than in

we

his
are

speeches.

So impressive,

not

to say oppressive, is this continence that

led

increasingly

to wonder what

it is for; or,
the

as one of virtue

the exhortations ad
return

mits, continence
minute

is the foundation

of virtue: one of

it isn't

itself. To

for

to Xenophon's

Symposium,

ways

in

which each

the guests at that

elegant

banquet

entertained

themselves was

by

stating,

in turn,

what

he

was most proud of and then

defending
of

his boast

or claim.

The occasion,

need

less to say, did

example,
Socrates'

not require

that those boasts

claimed most

to be proud

his

skill as
an

be entirely serious. Socrates, for a pimp. But Antisthenes, one of

ardent admirers

and

proud

of

his

wealth.

When his turn

came

extremely poor man, claimed to be to defend this apparently absurd he

possessed

boast, he
he had
stood

explained that

he

meant

the wealth

in his soul,
clear, he

wealth under

acquired

from Socrates. As his longish

statement makes

by nothing Later in the evening, Socrates found

this thenes. He accused
tiful

"wealth"

so much as the extreme an occasion to

Socratic

continence.

playfully

chastise

Antis

Antisthenes,
soul.

who claimed

to love

him,
the

of

loving

his beau
that

body

rather

than his

In the

same context,

fact

emerged

Socrates did his best,

with

by

the use

of one pretext or

another, to avoid
stresses what

conversing
the

Antisthenes. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon

Socrates, in

Symposium, called his bodily beauty: his continence and kindred qualities. Nevertheless, in various ways, he lets us see glimpses of other things.
For example, Socrates had
a number of conversations with a sophist named
section we are

Antiphon
think,"

which

Xenophon includes in the

asked on one of

discussing. "Do

you

Socrates
not

these occasions,

"anything
not

is

more responsible

for my

being

a slave

to my stomach, or to sleep or sex, than that I have

other things more pleasant than

furnishing

hopes that they

will

these, which delight be beneficial

always?"

only in the use but by And on another he said,

"For myself, Antiphon, as another takes pleasure in a good horse or a dog or a bird, so even more do I take pleasure in good friends. And if I possess some

thing good, I teach it, and I bring them together with others by whom I think they will be in some way benefited toward virtue; and I go through the treas ures of the wise men of old, which they left written in books, reading in
com-

302

Interpretation
and

we take it out my friends; and, if we see something good, hold it to be a great gain if we become beneficial (or friends) to one this, Xenophon says, he thought Socrates to be blessed.

mon with

we

anoth

Hearing

In the two
viduals who

chapters which

follow this section, Socrates

to deal
with.

gives advice

to indi
a

have difficult One his

relatives

In

each

case, Socrates has

connection with the parties concerned and thus a personal stake

in the

good

be

havior he
who

urges.

of the

addressees

is

Socrates'

eldest

son,

Lamprocles,
of

is angry

with

mother and

is

therefore acting, or

in danger

acting,

improperly
agery
that!"

towards her. In order to

asks

put

his

wife's

harshness in

some perspec sav

tive, Socrates
of a

Lamprocles, "Which do
do
you

you think

is harder to bear, the

at or

beast
she

mother?"

or of a ever yet

"A mother's, I think,

least if

she

is like

"Did
as

harms

which one wouldn't more

many have suffered for all one's life

you

any harm from

want

biting

you

kicking
she

you, such
things

beasts?"

"But, by Zeus,
to."

says

to listen

"Do

you

think it is to

difficult for

to listen to what she says than for actors when

things?"

they say

each other

in the tragedies the

most extreme
words

Lamprocles

responded

that the actors easily bear the harsh

they have

to listen to since

they

know they
else, well

are spoken with no

ill-will. "And you,

knowing

full

well

that your

mother speaks not

only

without

knowing
Socrates'

this you

ill-will but wishing you, as The conversation get

angry?"

she wishes

nobody

of which these ex of an at

changes are a part

is the only
part
Socrates'

example given

by

Xenophon (or Plato)

tempt on
chapters

to educate

his

own

children.

containing

conversations about comments and

In presenting the two relatives, Xenophon abstains

Socrates'

from any
generally The

introductory
as seven

thus avoids speaking of

deeds

distinguished from his

chapters

speech.

next

concern

friendship.

According

to

Xenophon,

the

Socratic
gard to

conversations or speeches reported

in this

section were useful with re

self-examination

the

acquisition

and

use of one's

the
of of

amount of one's worth

to

friends, friends,

encouraged and gave

as

to

instruction
to

as to what sort
relief to

friends

are worth acquiring. who were

Socrates

also attempted
or other.

bring

those
was

his friends

in

some

difficulty

Where the

difficulty

it using his judgment; when it was by caused by want, by teaching his friends to assist one another. To give one of the examples Xenophon furnishes of these efforts, a friend of Socrates was be
caused

ignorance, he

attempted to cure

ing

eaten

out

of

house

and

which

number of

had severely curtailed female relatives to

home because the wars, both foreign and civil, his income, had also added to his burdens a large
Socrates'

support.

advice was simple:

sold?

why don't
to get

you put

them to work making something that can be

But in

order

that advice accepted, tion that

he had to

relieve

his friend

of

the

foolish

scruple or no

free

women

(society ladies,

one can say) ought not to engage succeeded

in

com

mercial activity.

Once Socrates had

he later

was accepted and acted upon with great

in enlightening him, the advice success. The ensuing harmony in the

friend's home was,

as

reported to

Socrates, disturbed only by

the la-

Xenophon
dies'

and

his Socrates

303

that now the man was the only idle member of the household. Socrates was able to be of help: Here, too, "Why don't you tell them, then, the the dog? For they say that when the animals could speak, the sheep story of
complaint

said

to the master: it

is

an

nish you with wool and

amazing thing that you do in giving to us. who fur lambs and cheese, nothing but what we can take from

the ground, while to the

give a

dog,

who

furnishes

you with

share of your own

food. When the

dog
from

nothing of the sort, you heard this, he said, Yes, by

stolen

Zeus! For I
carried off

am the one who preserves you

being

away

by
be

men or

by

wolves; if 1
of

weren't

guarding you,

you wouldn't even

able to

graze,

from fear
in the

perishing."

quiesced

more

Thus, according to Socrates, even the sheep ac honorable treatment for the dog. As this chapter reminds
Socrates
"friend"

us, Xenophon and his

were

willing to
number of

use

the term

rather

loosely. It
whom

could

thus be applied to a

different

sorts of people with

Socrates had

relationships of various section on

kinds. This fact,

to the question

together with the

attention given are worth

in the

friendship

what sort of

friends

acquiring, makes us wonder what sort of

friends Socrates himself

thought most worth acquiring. An answer

rates'

has already been indicated in Soc

Xenophon
explains what

remarks ment comes

to the sophist Antiphon and elsewhere. A more explicit state

on

later

in the Memorabilia
as

when

Soc

rates meant when

he said,

he

often

did,

that he was

in love

with someone:

manifestly, he
whose

was not

longing

for those

whose

bodies

were

in bloom but those

who were

souls

were

naturally fit for acquiring virtue, that is, those

whatever

quick at

learning

they

turned their minds to and remembered what

they learned and desired all the sorts of learning relevant to the noble manage ment of household and city and, in general, the good use of human beings and
human
affairs. emphasis

The
tions

in the

friendship

section as a whole on utilitarian considera

makes us
other

wonder, in turn,

about the possible elements of

Socratic friend
remarks

ship
swer

than utility, even utility of the sort pointed to

answer one:

in the

to An

tiphon. Now the

to this
what

question of

is

not without

its

relevance

to the an
acquir
what

to the other

sort

friends Socrates thought

after with

worth

ing. In this connection,

we might note that

explaining

as

he does

Socrates

meant when

he

said

he

was

in love
much

someone, Xenophon seems

with

to go out of his way to show how

time Socrates spent

a certain one of

brainless beauty. (We

the

can also recall

here his

liking

for Critoboulos.) In

friendship
Later
on

chapters, Socrates distinguishes between friendships

"love-charms"

acquired

through the
efits.

use of

and

those acquired through conferring ben

admits

in the Memorabilia, he
as

to

being
they
whole

a master are

in the

use of

such charms.

Or,

he

says

in the

chapter

in

which

first mentioned, he
to be loved

is

erotic and therefore strives mightily, with

his

being,

by

those he

loves, longed for

with gives

by

those

he longs for,
in the

and

to have those he desires to

be with, desire to be Xenophon

him.
Socrates'

four

examples

friendship

section

of

at-

304

Interpretation
relieve

tempts to

the difficulties of his friends. There are

indications,

as

we

have

to some extent already seen, that some or all of these efforts took place

against the

background
Socrates'

of

the awful suffering brought to

Athens,

to the vast

majority
war and

of

fellow citizens, Xenophon

by

the latter

part of

the Peloponnesian
attempt to re

its

aftermath. of

gives us no report of a

Socratic

lieve the distress in the in these leaders

his city, he
in

unless one or more of

the conversations reported

seven chapters

places next constitute such an attempt.

Socrates

speaks

conversations to actual or potential or of

aspiring military

and political

the city

one case

giving

advice with regard to the current

dis

tress, in

another

public role.

urging In his general

a capable man not to shrink

from playing a (greater) introduction to the conversations in question, how

for them than that they benefited the individu he characterizes as "those longing for the no

ever, Xenophon
als addressed

claims no more

individuals

whom

ble

things,"

i.e., for

public

honors

the effort appropriate to such

making them take the care or make longing. These conversations explore, in an ex

by

tremely fore, in
Socrates in

thorough way, what political or military

leadership
in

calls

for

and

there

particular,
seems to

whether what

it

calls

for is

of

benefit to the leader himself.

order on that

indicate that

some

doubts

are

score; surely,

he himself
place

never sought political

leadership. Yet in

a conversation that took

an earlier

section, he had

chastised a companion of

his

who wished

to

live land

an

entirely

unpolitical

life

the

life

of one who

is

foreigner in every
political responsi

so as to avoid companion

the burdens

which come with

sharing
a path

bility. The
ness

believed that he

was

following

that led to happi

on

precisely because it avoided both mling on the one hand and slavery the other. Socrates said on that occasion, "if the path avoids human beings
well, just as it avoids both ruling and slavery, you
pointed out might

as

have

point,"

and

he

the dangers to which the weak in general and

foreigners in
mled or

particu

mling being voluntarily serving the mlers. Or, as Socrates put it when asked on another occasion why he had married the most difficult of all women past, present and future, "I have
are exposed.
real choices are

lar

The only

or

acquired

her because I
well

want

to

make use of and associate with

human beings,
hu

knowing
man

that if I

can endure

her, I

will

keep

company

with all other

beings

ease."

with

The

seven chapters which

follow the

section on politics

do

not seem

to be

long

to a single group. The most significant of them are

probably the first two,

the scepter
gotten

where we are told what

Socrates

said about a number of characteristic themes. and rulers not or

For example, Socrates

or

called

kings

those

who possess who

those chosen

where

they

are

by any by force or

chance

group by fraud but those who know how

the lot or those

have

to rule. This remark

admits of a number of
rates would enlarge on

different interpretations. Left to his own devices, Soc it in the most innocent way. But if someone objected

that it is possible for a tyrant not to obey the rectly, Socrates said, "How
would

knowers,

those who speak cor

when a

it be

possible not to

obey

penalty is

Xenophon
laid down if
matter one

and

his Socrates

305

someone doesn't obey the one who speaks well; for in whatever doesn't obey the one who speaks well, he will err and, erring, be If someone persisted in the objection, saying that it is possible for

the tyrant to kill the one who thinks well, Socrates said, "Do you think the

killer

of

the best of his allies

would go without

penalty

or meet

merely

with

some chance penalty?

Do

you think

the one who did this would be preserved or

rather,
us

in this way,

perish?"

most

speedily
"If

And, in

general, as Xenophon tells

later on, Socrates treated those

who

who objected

to what he said

differently

from

those
...

listened in

silence.

someone contradicted
. .

him
.

on some subject

he led the

whole argument

back to its hypothesis But

Thus the tmth be

went

came manifest

to the objectors themselves.

whenever

he

through an

argument on some subject

by

himself, he kept to the

path of

the opinions most to be the safe

generally Seven

agreed

upon, considering that

manner of argument

one."

of the

last

eight chapters of

the Memorabilia are devoted to Socratic

attracted

education.

They

show

first how Socrates

the attention of certain types

of potential students and then successive stages of

how he led

one student

in

particular through of

the

Socratic instmction. While the demonstration

an

Socratic

instmction undoubtedly tells us much about Socrates as about his views on various matters, in reading it, one
the fact that the individual chosen

educator,

as well as

must

take into account

by

Xenophon to be the

model student

in this

demonstration is Euthydemus, the brainless beauty referred to earlier. Xeno phon begins his treatment of Socratic education by telling us that Socrates did
not approach

everyone,

i.e., every

type of person, in the same types. At the

way.

And he
natures, those

distinguishes for

us a certain number of

top

are the good

whose characteristics we
of some natural gifts cation and

have already it.

mentioned.

In the

next place come

who, on account of
on

look down

Skipping

to

these, think they have no last place, we find those

need of edu
who

believe

they have already received the best education and pride themselves on their wisdom. Euthydemus belongs to this class. To use the distinction mentioned
that
earlier

but introduced in the text in the

Euthydemus is the

context of the

demonstration
In

of

Socratic

instmction,

nonobjector par excellence.

Socrates'

one of

the

chap

ters of this section, he is

replaced as

interlocutor
when

by

the world-famous
was

sophist, Hippias. Hippias had

out to some people
of

come upon

Socrates

the

latter

pointing
teachers

how difficult it is to find

or

a teacher of

justice,
so

while

shoemaking, carpentry, smithing

conversation

horsemanship

are

ready to hand. saying the

Their
same

began in this

way.

Hippias said, "You

are still

And Socrates replied, things, Socrates, that I heard you saying long "What is more terrible than this, Hippias, not only do I always say the same things, but I say them about the same subjects. You, perhaps, on account of
your great

ago."

subjec

learning,

never

say the

same things about the same

new."

"Of

course, I try always to say something example, if someone asks you how to

"Even

about what you

know? For
and

spell

Socrates

how many letters

306

Interpretation
to say different things at different times? Or with num you give the same answer now to those asking whether twice five is

which ones

do

you

try

bers, don't

ten that you gave

formerly?"

As Xenophon

shows

in this way, the

change of

interlocutors did
The last demnation

not affect

significantly the quality of discussion.

Socrates'

chapter of and

the Memorabilia returns to the theme of

Socrates'

con

death
was

and reports some of

attached

reflections as

those events

clearly especially his age, he seemed to feel that it was not time for him to die. We might be disturbed by the manner of his death

approached.

He

to

life,

which

he felt he had lived to the

a

fullest; but,
injustice,
of

given

bad

by its
es

which

it

was after all part of

the intention of the

Memorabilia to

tablish. In his

Apology

of Socrates,

where

he takes up
a somewhat
would

again some of

the parts view,

the last chapter of the Memorabilia

shows what

from

different

point of

Xenophon
tion.

he

and

his Socrates

have thought
whom

of such a reac char

Among

those present at the trial was

ardent

Apollodoros,
to

Xenophon
fellow."

acterizes as
Socrates'

"an

lover

of

Socrates

and otherwise a naive

After

condemnation, Apollodorus
see you

said

hardest thing to bear is that I

lodorus'

unjustly."

dying

him, "But for me, Socrates, the Socrates, stroking Apol

have
preferred to see me

head,

said, "Dearest

Apollodorus,
more

would you

dying
where

justly?"

And, for only

caused us

the second time in Xenophon's than a few

Socratic writings,

he has

to laugh

times, Socrates laughed.

XB. Metzler
BciirkSMclcr

Heinrich Meier Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss und Der Begriff des Politischen
Zu einem Dialog unter Abwesenden Strauss' Mit Leo Aufsatz fiber den Begriff des Politischen und drei unveroffentlichten Briefen an Carl Schmitt aus den Jahren 1932/33
1988. 143 Seiten, kart, DM ISBN 3476-006344
24,-

Carl Sdnitt, let Hraiss

and

DcrBeiriffiies
lZlClBCB

Mitoi utcr Mwcseita.

m l$trH'4ilMU ttcrfci c*rIt
fciNfflUclaBrtfttlMrtflaiiytWffl ftlda a Carl ktrtH ms IciJaftRi

M32/33

J. B. Heftier

Carl Schmitt ist durch den Begriff des Politischen beriihmter und beriichtigter geworden als durch sein ganzes iibriges Werk. Indem Meier den Dialog zwischen Schmitt und Strauss neu in Gang setzt, bringt er den unaufhebbaren Gegensatz zur Sprache, der zwischen Politischer Theologie und Politischer Philoso phie besteht. Der Autor legt mit dieser Analyse eine grundsatzliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Denken des umstrittenen politischen Theoretikers vor, der am 11. Juli 1988 einhundert Jahre alt geworden
ware.

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Kemerstraffe 43
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Philosophy
Agnes Heller

& Social Criticism

13 No. 4

Volume
|
can

everyday life be endangered?

Jeffner Allen
women who

beget women must thwart major sophisms

Ronald KMcKhney

sartre and the politics of

deconstruction

Llewelyn Negrin I two critiques of the autonomy of the aesthetic consciousness: a comparison of benjamin and gadamer

JamesJ-Valone

women and culture: a reconsideration of simmers appraisals

Stephen K. White between modernity

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SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 14, 1988

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I.insky

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Introduction

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or

Last Infirmity? Altruism?

What is

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Galen Explains Networks Is the Conceptual Natural Selection

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Levy Alexander Rosenberg

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and

and

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Supervenience
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Macbeth: Shakespeare

Mystery Play

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Leslie G. Rubin Love
and

Politics in Xenophon's Cvropaedia

of

Timothy

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Bacon's Myth

Orpheus: Power

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Science in Sanford Kessler

Of

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Sexual

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Gree Russell

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A Meditation

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