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PRAGMATICS 1 2. Pragmatics: Outline: A. What is pragmatics about? B. Theories of meaning C. Speech Act Theory - John L. Austin A. WHAT IS PRAGMATICS ABOUT? I Ability to understand/use language in a wide variety of contexts 1. We have the computational capacity to assign different meanings to the same sentence in a wide range of contexts (1) Tom: Oh, it's so warm in here! (a) Open the window!" (b) "I'm pleasantly surprised!" - a module of the language faculty that helps us integrate the meaning of an utterance into a context and adjust it accordingly. 3. Pragmatics and grammar Grammar = syntax + semantics Syntax and semantics -> language structure and meaning Pragmatics -> language use. Grammar and pragmatics complement each other Levinson (1983: 32) pragmatics = meaning minus semantics, a theory of language understanding that takes context into account, in order to complement the contribution that semantics makes to meaning. 4. Pragmatic competence Chomsky 1965 - the distinction between competence and performance Habermas 1971, 1979: 'pragmatic competence' Dear Sir, Mr. Xs command of Romanian is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, Prof. Y Pragmatics: meaning effects such as the ones in (1) - (2). II Definition 1. Pragmatics: - the discipline that studies the relationship between language form and language use. - connects linguistics and other non-linguistic disciplines that study language users Focus of pragmatics - the context dependency of meaning Chomsky (1980: 224): - grammatical competence = knowledge of form and meaning - pragmatic competence = conditions and manner of appropriate use of language, in conformity with various purposes; a system of rules and principles which determines how the tool of language can be effectively put to use To be able to use a language: - linguistic competence proper: phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics - conceptual competence (related to the speaker's knowledge of the world) - communicative/pragmatic competence

2. Meaning may be derived from what is not said (2) Letter of recommendation for a prospective MA student applying for an MA in quantum physics

5. The development of pragmatics - background Charles W. Morris (1901-1979) - American philosopher (Universities of Chicago and Florida) - founder of semiotics = the theory of signs Context: - the development of the philosophy of science (the use of symbols in science had to be investigated) - American pragmatism (Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead) => the relation between concepts - goals Pragmatics - 'the study of the relationship between signs and their interpreters' (Morris 1938: 6) Wittgenstein (1953): Philosophical Investigations - many philosophical problems stem from the way in which language is used => the meaning of language should be related to its use => philosophy of language 6. Topics of pragmatics: presupposition, deixis, implicature, speech acts, conversation, politeness, relevance - 2 trends: pragmatics with a cognitive focus (e.g. relevance theory) & socio-pragmatics (language use and communities) B. THEORIES OF MEANING Language is a system of symbols which we know and use (Robert Stainton) I. L as a system of symbols - THING theories of meaning II. L as smth we know IDEA theories of meaning III. L as smth we use - USE theories of meaning I. THING THEORIES OF MEANING 1. Direct reference theories A word corresponds to an external object and nothing mediates between the word and the thing referred to.==> the meaning of a name = the object named, i.e. the thing which the expression represents or denotes

Ss denote truth values. Truth = correspondence with facts, correct descriptions of states of affairs in the world. = the object of investigation of truth-conditional semantics or logical semantics 'verificationist theory: Ss whose meaning cannot be directly/empirically verified as T or F by appeal to experience may be considered meaningless. BUT : Is The king of France is bald. T or F? 2. Mediated reference theories - the relationship between words, sense and reference Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (1848 - 1925), German logician, and philosopher (University of Jena): predicate calculus, philosophy of language, 'On Sense and Reference-1892 The sense of a term = the concept/definition a speaker grasps when understanding what the term means (e.g. the idea of cattiness for cat) The reference of a term = the object/set of objects the term names (the set of cats in the world) Senses are the various ways people can think about objects, the way in which objects are presented (the manner and context of presentation of the object) - several senses, same reference: (3) It is common knowledge that Mark Twain is the author of Tom Sawyer. ??It is common knowledge that Samuel Clemens is the author of Tom Sawyer.

- senses which do not denote/have no referent in the world: (4) unicorn, leprechaun

III. USE THEORIES The meaning of a linguistic expression is given by its use, its being used with a specific intention, under certain circumstances, pursuing a certain goal. Its meaning resides in what the expression does for a S and a H in a given context. Duranti and Goodwin (1992) : 4 parameters of context 1) the setting or the socially situated framework of the verbal encounter 2) the use of body stances and behavioural trends during the verbal encounter 3) Lg stretches used-prior to the respective interaction, which establishes the co-text for both Speaker and Hearer. 4) background knowledge of communicators, consisting of attitudes and beliefs, values and norms, which enables Lg users to derive meaning out of the verbal exchange. C. THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS L is used in a multiplicity of ways. multitude of linguistic activities or L-games (Wittgenstein) Difference bt sentence and utterance? Utterance - the production (oral or in writing) of a linguistic structure which may or may not correspond to a complete sentence (5) a. b. Tom says: 'I am terribly sorry to have kept you waiting.' John replies: 'Well, I've only just ...' (arrived myself).

II. IDEA THEORIES OF MEANING Linguistic meaning comes from pairing expressions with smth in the mind 1. The image version: David Hume: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding: Words are expressive ideas, where what is meant by an idea is like a complex of remembered sensations/perceptions (mental images) e.g. mental images associated with pork chop collectively engender the meaning of the expression pork chop There is a fixed image for every word BUT Certain associations btw words and mental images are accidental. Every mental image is specific (Cat: Do we have in mind a cat that is curled up asleep or awake licking milk from a saucer?? Imagine a cat that is not black, white, striped). Unlike a meaning, an image cannot correspond to a whole class of things (What image corresponds to the class vegetables?)

2. The sentence version: Words and sentences are meaningful bc they are paired with mental representations, which are sentence-like rather than picture-like. == human beings understand the world in terms of a language of thought (LOT) or mentalese, largely based on sentences rather than images The ability to capture words via Ss in the mind is inborn (Chomskys nativism)

Speech act theory - a research area within philosophy of language / pragmatics - there should be a distinction bt: - the meaning of an utterance & the way in which & the purpose for which the utterance is used (the force of an utterance) (6) a. I will get back! - a promise.

b.

Open the window! - an order

- utterances of every kind (including assertions) are acts - An act - something that we 'do': a piece of active behavior by an agent. I. DISTINCTION UTTERANCES BT. PERFORMATIVE & CONSTATIVE

- instate new realities by means of uttering certain propositions / create new states-of-affairs - do not describe situations in the real world => performatives are not true or false, but felicitous or infelicitous To successfully perform an act using a performative sentence the context should satisfy certain conditions - felicity (happiness) conditions 2. Felicity conditions for performatives: (i) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect. (ii) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure. Many SAs rely on social conventions to support them, sometimes they are embedded in institutional facts, i.e. procedures and ceremonies where utterances carry a special function. - certain words must be uttered - certain persons must utter these words - the words must be uttered under certain circumstances - if one of these conditions is violated, the speech act is misinvoked. e.g. conventions may change in time: e.g. the code of honour involving duelling (9) a. Tom, having been insulted, says to Charles on January 12 1568: 'My seconds will call on you.' b. Tom says to Charles on January 12 2012: 'My seconds will call on you.' (iii) The procedure must be executed correctly and completely by all participants. If this condition is violated, the act is misexecuted

1. Performatives & constatives John Langshaw Austin (1911-1960) - British philosopher (University of Oxford) - ordinary language philosopher - declarative sentences, under certain circumstances, are not reports or descriptions but performances of an act => 'performative' utterances: (7) a. I name this ship "Queen Elizabeth'. (when smashing the bottle against the stern) b. I promise that I'll come tomorrow. c. I bet you it will rain tomorrow. d. I bequeath my watch to my brother. e. I do. (take this woman to be my wife) - utterances that are only reports or descriptions of a situation - 'constative' utterances (8) a. b. Mary looks forward to the holidays. The cat was run over by a car.

Constatives - describe pre-existent states of affairs. - state propositions about the world - the description may or may not be according to reality => constatives may be evaluated as true of false. Performatives - do something (using language): promising, betting, marrying, christening

(10) (11)

Tom: Will you marry me? Mary: I will. Tom: Will you marry me? Mary: I will not. => the man's attempt is abortive (16)

c. modal verbs

Shut it, if you like.

I permit you to shut it.

You must go there at once. You may leave now.

I order you to go there now. I allow you to leave now.

(iv) The sincerity condition the persons must have the appropriate thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure. Insincere acts: (12) a. b. promise). c. I congratulate you (said when I am not pleased) I promise (said when I do not intend to do what I I bet (said when I do not intend to pay)

intonation, cadence, emphasis (17) The bull is going to charge! The bull is going to charge?

adverbs, adverbial phrases (18) I shall come without fail. Still, you should go there. = I insist that you should go there.

3. Primary/explicit performatives Some performative sentences contain 'performative' verbs that indicate what act is accomplished, i.e. the force of the utterance: (13) a. b. c. a. b. c. Go there! Did he come? I shall be there! I order you to go there. I ask you whether he came. I promise that I'll be there.

These force indicators show that the force of a performative utterance can be specified only in the context of utterance. The force of an utterance is an aspect of its meaning which is not fully determined by the sense of the sentence. 5. Explicit performatives Explicit performatives verify the schema: (19) The speaker says: "I (hereby) V" --------> The speakers Vs I (hereby) promise.... --------> The speaker promises

(14)

(13) - primary performatives; (14) - explicit performatives 4. Linguistic indicators of force moods (15) a. b. Shut it now! = I order you to shut it. Very well, then shut it. = I consent to your shutting it.

- characteristic syntactic patterns for explicit performatives: (20) a. b. c. I promise that I will be there. I order you to be there. I appoint you president. I Verb that I Verb to... I Verb

Do only explicit performatives evince these patterns? See (21)

(21)

I believe that I will be there.

(27)

On page 499, I protest against this verdict.

6. Properties of explicit performatives: - the use of the l st person, present indicative, active voice. Compare

Unambiguous markers of performativity: adverbials like hereby, here and now (formal style) (28) I hereby appoint you commander of this ship.

(22)

a. b. c. a. b. c.

I promise to help you! He promised to help her. I was promised to be helped. You are hereby requested to leave the city at once. You are fired. ??I fire you.

Performative verbs used in the 1st person of the simple present may be performative, but, when used in other persons or tenses, they are descriptive (29) He betted him $6 that John would win the race. constative /performative? 7. Paranthetical performative verbs and non-parenthetical performative verbs Paranthetical verbs allow the formation of parenthetical clauses

(23)

- Explicit performatives do not employ the present continuous which is descriptive (24) come a. I promise to come b. d. He is promising to He is shaking his

c. I refuse to go. head, he is refusing to go.

BUT some performative verbs accept the present continuous (Ginet 1979) (25) a. b. c. d. e. I'm telling you now that... I'm holding you in contempt. I'm warning you for the last time that.... *I'm congratulating you. *I'm thanking you for your help.

The simple present of these verbs is not always performative, it may be used in habituals or in a way similar to the historic present to describe the speaker's performance: (26) a. b. Every morning I bet him $10 that it will rain. I promise only when I intend to keep my word.

(30) a. I conclude he has come. He has come, I conclude. (PF, & parenthetical) b. I advise you to go. *You are to go, I advise. (PF, nonparanthetical) c. I appoint you president. *You are the president, I appoint. (PF, non-parenthetical) d. I believe he has come. He has come, I believe. (non-PF, paranthetical) e. I swear that I'm innocent. I'm innocent, I swear. f. I assure you that I will go there. I will go there, I assure you. g. I promise I will do it for you. I will do it for you, I promise. - the hereby formula cannot appear as a parenthetical. (31) I hereby state that I am innocent. *I am innocent, I hereby state.

- when a PF vb is modified by an adverb of manner, the parenthetical clause cannot be formed. (32) I insistently beg you to leave me alone. *Leave me alone, I beg you insistently.

=> There are no certain syntactic indicators of explicit performatives. 8. Criticism of the performative/constative distinction A performative utterance is not a true or false description of reality, but it creates a new reality, the reality of the act accomplished (ordering, appointing, naming, asking). A PF transforms the world, while a constative utterance attempts to correspond to the word. PF utterances are felicitous or infelicitous, constative utterances are true or false. However, the distinction is not so clear. There is evidence that constatives are primary performatives having the illocutionary force of statements. a) Constative utterances may be infelicitous as performatives are constative utterances may be insincere (33) a. 'The earth is flat.' - if uttered by sm living in the 21st c one clearly does not believe that the earth is flat, so it is a case of insincerity b. John's children are tall - if John has no children - the statement is not true or false, but void. b) a constative can be paraphrased using the schema "I state that..." (34) The earth is round. I state that the earth is round.

The speaker performs the act of stating, constituting of itself a new reality, which can then be described. Every utterance instates a new reality, all utterances are performative.

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