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Gordon Lederman
From: Kevin Scheid [kscheid@9-11commission.gov]
Sent: Monday, November 10, 2003 5:25 PM
TO! 9/11 Closed by Statute
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^j
Cc: glederman@9-1lcommission.gov; dmarcus@9-11commission.gov
Subject: Lines of Inquiry for Ms. Dempsey

9/11 Closed by Statute

Per your request, we will be asking Ms. Dempsey questions related to the following issues:

• Overall success of the reforms to Intelligence Community Management established by the 1997
Intelligence Authorization Act, which established the DDCI/CM, ADCI/A, ADCI/C, and ADCI/A&P
•'-State of the Intelligence Community's budget during the 1990s, the pressures created by rising personnel
^ costs and the decline of operational and investment funding
•/State of the Intelligence Community's personnel system during the 1990s, its flexibility and the agility it
afforded the DCI in reallocating resources to higher priorities
• Steps taken by Ms. Dempsey to reform the budget and personnel systems, steps to reallocate resources to
higher priorities like counterterrorism
•/-The "hard targets" reviews performed by the Community, led by the CMS and its impact, if any, on
^ counterterrorism
• The relationship between the DDCI/CM and the CIA - does the DDCI/CM have actual authority over the
CIA to make internal reallocations of resources to high priorities like counterterrorism
• Efforts Ms. Dempsey took in her position as DDCI/CM to improve "warning" provided to policymakers by
the Community
Is. Dempsey's involvement in NSC Principal Committee meetings and Deputy Community meetings on
counterterrorism
The role of the DDCI/CM in establishing and monitoring the IC's requirements system

11/10/2003
 Interview Questions for Joan Dempsey

Position: Former DDCI/CM; currently ExDir of the PFIAB

Purpose: The purpose of this interview is to explore her experience as DDCI/CM in

managing the 1C, including (1) major IC-wide initiatives during her tenure, (2) whether
she received sufficient DCI support, and (3) whether components of the 1C resisted her
authority and initiative. At the end of the interview, we will ask her to discuss the PFIAB
in a very general fashion.

Key Questions

Background:
1) Please provide for us a brief overview of your positions at CIA and elsewhere.
Management:
responsibilities and jurisdiction - brief from Tenet - division with program
managers, have to operate by consensus? DCI have to make every big decision?
s • '
2) Does the DDCI/CM have actual authority over the CIA or any other 1C
component to make internal reallocations of resources to high priorities like CT?
3) 1C components 'go over your head' to the DCI?
^4) What was the state of the 1C when you began as DDCI/CM? Please describe how
I/ the percentage of costs for 1C personnel increased in the 1990s to 55%, what was
your proposed solution, and what was the result?
5) CMS=detailees or acadre of non-detailees? What was done to ensure that
detailees did not represent the interests of their parent agencies?
6) What was your relationship to the ADCIs? What did you expect from them, how
did you monitor them, and how did they perform?
7) What is the process pursuant to NSAct 104d by which CMS ascertains that the
department from which money would be transferred does not object? How long
does it take?
8) Much has been made of the DCI's lack of execution authority - did you ever
detect any differences between the DCI's budget guidance and NSA, NRO, and
NIMA's actual execution of the budget?
9) xWe have been told that there was a DCI offsite of 1998 where program managers
Y were concerned that the DCI lacked a strategy for managing the community, and
V that the DCI drafted his Strategic Intent as a result. Please give us your
perspective on this offsite and any other circumstances that resulted in the
strategic intent. How was the SI implemented, and who was responsible for
implementing it? What was the Strategic Intent's relationship to CT?
10) What did you do to develop a common IT and security infrastructure for the 1C?
11) What was the DDCI/CM's role in establishing requirements processes and
making decisions on allocating scarce resources?
 12) The Strategic Intent states that customers try to circumvent the requirements
process - does that still take place?
13) The DCI's Strategic Intent called for establishing "practical methods for
corporately managing the Community," developing a "cadre of officers that move
across agencies," developing A&P and collection strategies, "fundamental shifts
in traditional security practices" regarding need-to-know, creating an "integrated
requirements framework" and a "joint strategic planning process," revising the
"Community program and budget formulation process to improve cross program
decisions, relate intelligence performance to national security missions, and
establish an acquisition oversight process that challenges, assumptions, planning,
and cost estimates," and reallocating "resources from infrastructure and some
current operations to future investments in R&D and new sources and methods."
What was done to implement the Strategic Intent?
Counterterrorism
1) It is our understanding that the DCI's decwar of 1998 was addressed to you.
What did you do with it, whom, did you task, and what resulted from it?
2) We have identified 8 ways to move funds: budget, reprogram, CIA RfC, transfer
from DoD, transfer from other NFIP agencies by 104d, Economy Act, cut lower
priority programs, or obtain supplementals. We only see evidence that
supplemental were used, but supplementals have inherent disadvantages. Why
weren't the other seven used more extensively?
3) We have no evidence that there were collection/A&P strategies against al Qa'ida.
Why didn't you task it, and whose responsibility was it otherwise?
4J Please describe the hard target review process. Why was it started? Who did the
V reviews? Why was CTC given the CT hard target review? What did CTC do?
5) What was the state of the 1C personnel system in the 1990s, including whether it
was flexible enough to afford the DCI options for reallocating personnel across
the 1C and whether the DCI exercise those options?
6) What are the Principals and Deputies Committees in the 1C that you spoke of in
your testimony? Were decisions made in these fora, and did actions result -
particularly concerning CT? Did the Committees ever review the IC's CT
strategy and performance?
7) What did you do to resolve barriers to information-sharing in the 1C?
8) Did the DCI fully exercise the statutory authority he has? Does the DCI have
sufficient statutory authority to fulfill his responsibilities?
Other
1) Has Congressional oversight improved the performance of the 1C?
2) NPSD-5 assigned responsibility to the DCI to conduct a comprehensive review of
intelligence and make recommendations regarding future threats, intelligence
capabilities, and organization of the 1C. How was this executed, what was your
role, and what happened to the recommendations? Did it address CT?
3) What steps were taken at the Community level after 9/11 ? What was your
involvement in the DCFs post911 memo? What was done to follow-up and
implement the memo? Was everything in the hands of CTC at that point?
4) Did you attend any NSC Principals or Deputies Committees?
5) Please describe the role of the PFIAB in conducting oversight of the 1C, including
what "oversight" means and the mechanisms that the PFIAB uses to conduct
oversight.
 WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00003 Folder: 0009 Document: 9
Series: Team 2 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 41

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: [Joan] Dempsey

Document Date: 11-12-2003
Document Type: Handwritten Notes
Special Media:
From:
To:

Subject: notes and summary of interview with Joan Dempsey

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 361
Withdrawn: 11-05-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 361 00003 0009 9

System DocID: 5519