2 2006

Romanian Military Thinking
Military Theory and Science Journal Edited by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff
2006
April June
Founded in 1864 under the name Military Romania ~ English edition, 2 nd year ~

EDITOR
ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663 THROUGH WHICH MILITARY ROMANIA BECOMES THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL STAFF
THE EDITORIAL BOARD

CHAIRMAN Maj Gen Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD MEMBERS Academician Dan BERINDEI HSH Radu, Prince of HOHENZOLLERN-VERINGEN Lt Gen Sorin IOAN, PhD Lt Gen Gheorghe CATRINA RAdm Gheorghe MARIN, PhD Maj Gen Cristea DUMITRU, PhD Maj Gen Mircea SAVU Col Costinel PETRACHE, PhD
Art. I. - The official journal named Military Romania is founded at the General stStaff, starting with January the 1 , 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training. Throught the agency of this journal all officers, of all kinds of arms, which are in service activity, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces.
Carol - King of Romania Issued in Bucharest on December 8, 1897
Romanian Military Thinking Journals

National Awards
EDITORIAL STAFF
Editor-in-Chief Col Costinel PETRACHE, PhD e-mail cpetrache@mapn.ro Assistant Editor Alina UNGHEANU e-mail alinagmr@yahoo.com Editors Diana Cristiana LUPU Iulia N~STASIE
Layout Editor
Marshal Major General Brigadier {tefan F`lcoianu Constantin H\rjeu Alexandru Averescu
General Ioan Sichitiu
Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu
Adelaida-Mihaela DANDE{
EDITORIAL STAFF ADDRESS
Bucharest, Izvor Street, No. 13-15, Sector 5 Telephone: 0722/229400; 0722/380091; 410.40.40/1001731, 1001732 Tel./fax: (4021) 319.56.63 http:/ /gmr.mapn.ro
These awards are yearly bestowed on the most valuable contributions to the enriching of the national military sciences theoretical heritage
Subscriptions can be made through post-offices, postal factors and Rodipet SA branches and the Journal is placed at the 5127 position (Chapter XXI) from the Publications Catalogue. Our readers from abroad could use SC RODIPET SA P.O.BOX 33-57, fax 0040-21-222.64.07 or 222.64.39, st Pia]a Presei Libere, no. 1, 1 Sector, Bucharest, Romania for subscriptions. For the readers within the Ministry of National Defence, the subscriptions 2 can be made at Armed Forces Technical-Editorial Center st (M.U. 02560), bd. Ion Mihalache, no. 124-126, 1 Sector, Bucharest, telephone 224.26.34, tel./fax 224.04.05, in bank account st RO 34 TREZ 7015 032x xx00 0371, States Treasury, 1 Sector, Bucharest. For further informations please address to the editorial staff.
Military Theory and Science Magazine Edited by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff
Romanian Military Thinking Journal is issued in March, June, September, December. ISSN 1841-4451
COPYRIGHT: articles may be reproduced free of any charge, on condition that appropriate credit is given by making mention of the number and date issue of the journal
2006
April June
Founded in 1864 under the name Military Romania

~
English edition, 2 nd year

Military Theory and Science Journal Edited by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff
2006
April June
Founded in 1864 under the name Military Romania nd ~ English edition, 2 year ~
The entire responsibility for the intellectual assuming of articles sent to the editorial staff belongs to the authors
Romanian Military Thinking Journal is recognised by the National University Research Council
Contents
Editorial
The Leader Col Costinel PETRACHE, PhD
RMT
Dialogues
13
Interview with General Eugen B~D~LAN, PhD, Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff
Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

The Use of Military Power After the Cold War Maj Gen Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD Command and Control System Within Close Air Support Missions AF Gen Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU, PhD Asymmetry in Warfare Col Mircea MNDRESCU Human Resources Management in Globalisation Era Col Tache JURUBESCU Effects-Based Operations. A New Approach to Armed Conflict Lt Col Ion VLAD Maj Iulian BERDIL~
26 34 42 48 57
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NATO
Reality
65 71 80
A New NATO Strategic Concept. Pros and Cons Brig Iordache OLARU NATO Resources Management Col Cristian DORCA Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations Brig Valeriu NICU}
Opinions Arguments Certitudes Perspectives

A Strategy of Performance Suitability Capt Ion DUMITRA{CU The National Integrated Crisis Management System. Structure and Conceptual Milestones Col Marian BUCIUMAN, PhD Lt Col Viorel RO{ CIMIC ~ Civil-Military Relations at Operational Level Col Florentin UDREA Communication in Managing Conflicts Sorin Cristian BANU Towards a Paradigmatic Approach to Security in International Relations 2nd Lt Adi MUSTA}~ Remodelling Organisational Culture Lumini]a POPESCU, PhD
88 92
101 108 114 120
Geopolitics Geostrategy International Security

Strategic Reflections: Military Science and its Strategic Impact Brig (r) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD 4
125
Contents
Security Dilemmas or What Does the Future Hold for Arms Control ? AF Gen Victor STRMBEANU Active Challenges of Globalisation Maj Doctor Drago[ POPESCU
139 154
RMT
Debates
159
The Military and Society. The Armed Forces and Society. Guests: Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU, Chief of the Sociological Investigation Section from the General Staff, Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer, The National Defence University Carol I and Radu POPA, Chief of Department, Romanian Commodities Exchange
National Foundations
The Romanian Army Campaign Plan in 1916. The Z Hypothesis Brig (r.) Nicolae CIOBANU, PhD
179 185 188 190 195
Military Publications Universe Thinking Differently ... Editorial Events Abstracts
Contenu
Editorial
Le leader Colonel dr. Costinel PETRACHE
Inhalt
Editorial
9
Der Leader Oberst dr. Costinel PETRACHE
Dialogues RMT
Interview avec le gnral dr. Eugen B~D~LAN, chef de lEtat-major gnral de lArme Roumaine
RMT
Dialoge
13 Befragung mit der Fhrer
des Generalstaabs der rumnischen Armee, gen. dr. Eugen B~D~LAN
Projections conceptuelles Developpements theoriques

Lemploi de la pouvoir militaire aprs la Guerre froide Gnral-major dr. Teodor FRUNZETI Le systme de commandement et de contrle dans les missions dappui arien rapproch Gnral de flottille arienne dr. Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU Lasymtrie dans la guerre Colonel Mircea MNDRESCU Le management des ressources humaines dans lre de la mondialisation Colonel Tache JURUBESCU 6
Begriffliche P rojekti onen Projekti rojektio Theoretische Entwicklungen

26 34
Benutzung der Militrmacht nach dem kalten Krieg Gen. dr. Teodor FRUNZETI Das Fhrung und Kontrollesystem im Nahluftuntersttzungaufgaben Luftflottegen. dr. Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU
42 48
Asymmetrie im Krieg Oberst Mircea MNDRESCU Verwaltung von Humanressourcen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung Komandeur Tache JURUBESCU
Contents
Operations bases sur les effets. Une nouvelle approche du conflict arm Lieutenant-colonel Ion VLAD Commandant Iulian BERDIL~
57
Auf Wirkungen basierten Operationen. Eine neue Anschneidung bewaffneter Konflikt Oberstlt. Ion VLAD Major Iulian BERDIL~
Mise jour de l OTAN

Un nouveau concept stratgique de lOTAN. Le pro et le contre Gnral de brigade Iordache OLARU Le management des ressources de lOTAN Colonel Cristian DORCA Les concepts pour les futures oprations interarmes de lOTAN Gnral de brigade Valeriu NICU}
NATO
Wirklichkeit
65 Ein neues strategisches Konzept 71 80
der NATO. Argumente pro und gegen Bgd. Gen. Iordache OLARU Die Ressoucenverwaltung der NATO Oberst Cristian DORCA Konzepte fr die knftigen versammelten Operationen der NATO Bgd. Gen. Valeriu NICU}

Lopportunit dune stratgie des performances Capitaine de vaisseau Ion DUMITRA{CU Le systme national de management intgr des crises. Structure et repres conceptuels Colonel dr. Marian BUCIUMAN Lieutenant-colonel Viorel RO{ CIMIC ~ les relations civilo-militaires au niveau oprationnel Colonel Florentin UDREA La communication dans le management des tats conflictuels Sorin Cristian BANU Dune approche paradigmatique de la scurit dans les relations internationales Sous-lieutenant Adi MUSTA}~ De nouvelles dimensions de la culture organisationnelle Charg de cours dr. Lumini]a POPESCU
Meinungen Argumente Gewissen Perspektiven

88 92
Erwgungen betreffs eine Leistungenstrategie Komandeur Ion DUMITRA{CU Das nationale System integrierten Krisenmanagements. Begriffliche Konstruktion und Bezugspunkte Oberst dr. Marian BUCIUMAN Ob. Lt. Viorel RO{ auf dem operationellen Ebene Oberst Florentin UDREA der Konfliktstnde Sorin Cristian BANU
101 CIMIC ~ Ausdruck der Zivilmilitrbeziehungen 108 Die Mitteilung in der Verwaltung 114 Zu eine pragmatischen Analyse der
Sicherheit in den internationalen Beziehungen Unterleutenent Adi MUSTA}~ Kultur Lektor dr. Lumini]a POPESCU
120 Umgestaltung der organisatorischen

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Geopolitique Geostrategie Securite internationale

Rflexions stratgiques: La science militaire et son impacte stratgique Gnral de brigade (en rserve) dr. Gheorghe V~DUVA Les paradigmes de scurit ou quest-ce quon attend du futur du contrle darmement ? Gnral de flottille arienne Victor STRMBEANU Les dfis actifs de la mondialisation Commandant mdecin Drago[ POPESCU
125 Strategische
Geopoliti k Geostrategie Geopolitik Internationale Sicherheit
139 Die Paradigmen der Sicherheit oder der

Zukunft der Rstungskontrolle ? Luftflottegen Victor STRMBEANU
berlegungen : Die Militrwissenschaft und ihre strategische Auswirkung Bgd. Gen. (r) dr. Gheorghe V~DUVA
154 Die aktiven Herausforderungen

der Globalisierung Maj. Arzt Drago[ POPESCU
Debats RMT
Arme et socit. Larme et la socit. Invits: le lieutenant-colonel George SPIRIDONESCU, le chef de la Section Investigations sociologiques de lEtat-major gnral, le commandant charg de cours Mihail ANTON, lUniversit Nationale de Dfense, et Radu POPA, chef de dpartement, Bourse du Commerce Roumaine
RMT
Debatten
159 Armee und Geselschaft.
Die Armee und der Geselschaft Gste: Kpt. Kdr. George SPIRIDONESCU, Leiter der soziologischen Investigationen Abteilung der Generalstaabs, Maj. Lektor Mihail ANTON Nationale Vertidigunsuniversitt Carol I, und Radu POPA Leiter de Abteilung der rumnische Warenbrse
Foundements nationaux
Le plan de campagne de lArme Roumaine ~ 1916. Lhypothse Z Gnral de brigade (en rserve) dr. Nicolae CIOBANU
179 Der Feldzugsplan der rumnischen

Armee ~ 1916. Die Hypothese Z Bgd. Gen. (r) dr. Nicolae CIOBANU
Nationalen Grundlagen
185 Universum Univers militaire des publications der Militrveroffentlichungen

Penser differemment ... Evenements editoriaux Resumes
8
188 Anders denken ... 190 Leitartiklerereignisse 195 Zusammengefa t
The Leader
While always existing in the social formulae that presuppose the mutual understanding of at least two individuals, the concept and condition of being a leader have been essentially proved incompatible with the assertion and cultural organisation of a totalitarian society. Exactly as religion did, at a particular moment i n i t s ex is t enc e, c om m u n i s m , a lymphatic system, played upon the exclusivity of the eternal validity of dogma, managing to dully and amorphously survive, by crowning the gregarious instinct of mob discipline and the pernicious exultation of mass reflexes to absolutes in themselves. Against its own nature and being itself caught in the web of the inflexible archetypes of social annihilation, the quality of a leader was suppressed from the area of human practice and action. The political sacredness of work, the outranking of the gregarious instincts of mass thinking and the one-person-inspired culture, alongside with the conversion of the loyalty to the party and of social ideals into supreme values, all excluded the very idea of leadership as dangerous and destructive, whilst imposing the one-and-the-only supreme leader that could not be confuted, value which was to become part of an undeniable reality. Yet, throughout
Le leader
Ce sont le concept et la condition du leader qui, bien quelles existent toujours en formules sociales qui supposent le fait commun au moins par deux individus, savrent incompatibles, au fond, avec laffirmation et la culture de la construction totalitaire de la socit. Le communisme ce systme lymphatique qui a jou, comme la religion, lexclusivit de lternel de la dogme, a institu, aplati et amorphe, son survie sur ltablissement de la discipline grgaire et sur lexaltation maladive de rflexes de la collectivit. Contre sa propre nature, la condition de leader, elle-mme attrape dans les modles rigides de lannulation sociale, a t supprime du domaine de la pratique et de laction humaines. La sacralisation politique du travail, la massification de la pense et de la culture dunique inspiration, la fidlit pour le parti et les idaux sociales, toutes exclurent, comme un pril, laffirmation de la condition de leader, moins laquelle qui venait dune ralit inexpugnable du commandant en chef. Mais, au bout dun certain temps historique, nous avons ramen le leader dans la comprhension dgage de lorganisation sociale. Pas du tout comme une expression des conjonctures, mme comme
9

the course of an unfinished history, we have eventually managed to bring to life the free comprehension of the concept of leadership, as part of the organisation of society. Not as an expression of conjunctures but as a matter of the necessity of continuity, it is so because, obviously, conjunctures are due to assert, while continuity only is due to confirm. The leader proof of power and of the decisive influence of the personality involved in the process of leadership; active provider of trust, inspiration and potentiality; centre of the global comprehension of the stage in the development of an organisation at a particular moment in time and of the imminent challenges its projects and destiny are related to is the rhythmical measure of the aspirations that nourish the vectorial certainties of the future. Therefore, the condition of being a leader can be outlined, beyond qualities, responsibilities and experience, exactly as it can be perceived within the locus between the mature and obsolete disappointments of dogma and the conspiring innocence of audacity. Open-minded pathfinder of hypothetical courage, of the critical spirit and experimental attitude, the leader, simultaneously detached of form but totally fulfilled through the content, assumes responsibilities that, essentially, reside in the following: the ceaseless improvement of the functional relationships between human beings and their aspirations converted to objectives; the discovery of hidden and yet unexploited resources that will eventually
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une ncessit de la continuit, peut tre pour le fait vident que les conjonctures affirment, mais les continuits confirment. Le leader cest la preuve de la puissance et de linfluence dcisive de la personnalit implique dans lacte de conduire; un fournisseur actif de confiance, inspiration et du possible; le centre de la comprhension de ltat organisationnelle un moment particulier et des dfis imminents auxquels elles rapportent ses projets et son destin , cest la mesure rythmique des aspirations qui nourrissent les certitudes vectorielles du futur. Au-del des qualits, responsabilits et lexprience, on peut justement rsumer la condition capitale du leader, ainsi comme elle peut tre percevue entre les dsorientations matures, puises de la dogme et linnocence conspirative de la tmrit. Un caractre intelligent, qui ouvre lui-mme galement la porte dun courage hypothtique, de lesprit critique et de lattitude exprimentale, cest le leader qui applique, dtach de forme, mais accompli par essence, ses responsabilits qui, essentiellement, peuvent viser: lamlioration continue de la relation fonctionnelle des gens et leurs aspirations converties en objectives; la dcouverte et le maximum de ressources annules; un mode dviter la transformation des moyens en buts; la concentration simultanment de la commande vers des charges et des gens; le transfre opportun de la productivit et de lefficience organisationnelle
Editorial
be turned to most effective ones; the attempt to avoid the transformation of means into aims; the simultaneous concentration of leadership on tasks and people; the appropriate transmutation of productivity and organisational efficiency from state indicators to process ones; the leader inspires the organisation with an encouraging potential for positive adaptability, constructive flexibility, ethical and functional immunity and, last but not least, he constantly optimises the interactions within the trinom: the state of the organisation, its condition as a process and the performance of the organisation as it is the leaders task to focus not only on obtaining performance as such, but especially to develop the capacity of attaining performance, to increase the possibilities to perform. As far as the leaders traits of personality are concerned, they are both easy and difficult to cram in didactic paradigms. Anyway, presupposition allows for attributing some qualities to leaders, as follows: responsibility, materialised in the leader capacity to assume capital responsibilities and to blow away the inhibitions caused by regimentation; unquestionable ethics; contagious energy; proactive flexibility; self-confidence, tailored to follow the pattern of invulnerability; unelaborated sociability; detached wisdom; indubitable morality; operational freedom; decisive initiative; transforming professionalism. Transforming indeed, as the leader, geometrical spirit of a continuously changing des indicateurs dtat vers ceux de processus; il offre lorganisation un potentiel stimulant pour une adaptabilit positive, pour une flexibilit constructive et limmunit thique et fonctionnelle et, videmment, au dernier, mais pas mineur, il optimise constamment les interactions du trinme: ltat de lorganisation, sa condition processuelle et la performance de lorganisation, sens pour lequel le leader ne veut pas seulement obtenir ainsi la victoire, mais le dveloppement de son capacit dobtenir la performance, de la possibilit dtre performant. Relatif aux qualits de la personnalit du leader, il est facile et difficile en mme temps den relever au fond des paradigmes didactiques. Toutefois, la prsupposition nous permet de lui attribuer quelques qualits: la responsabilit, matrialise par la capacit dassumer des objectives majeures et denvoler les inhibitions dune certaine affiliation; une thique indiscutable; une nergie contagieuse; une flexibilit proactive; la confiance en soi, coupe sur le modle de linvulnrabilit; une sociabilit visible; une sagesse dtache; une moralit indiscutable; une libert oprationnelle; une initiative dcisive et un professionnalisme transformateur. Transformateur bien sr, parce que le leader, cet esprit gomtrique dun monde toujours vivant, il est, il doit tre en premier lieu un homme de la transformation, un leader pour la transformation. Cest cette qualit par laquelle il peut comprendre
11

world, is, has to be, first and foremost, a man of transformation, a leader of transformation. It is this quality that enables the leader to understand the cause, depth, sense and the gradual finality of transformation; to discern what the most important activity regarding the particularities of each sector of a systemic engagement is and to bestow philosophical tonus and conceptual rigour on the strategy for change; to lead transformation prescribing and managing the therapy for the divergences and conflicts generated by the inevitable resistance to change. Moreover, the leader believes in the existence of chance, he does not expect it to come but challenges it; he does not discourage the right to and the exercise in opinion, but he puts it to work for the benefit of the organisation; he denies himself so that the ontological power of the organisation could be consolidated; he proves to have the mentality of a winner, rejecting failure as fatality; he disseminates the certitude of victory even though the viruses of desperation sow the possibility of defeat; he is really aware of the fact that crisis situations do not form leaders, they only set them to play a certain role. To conclude, the leader is a true measure of his force and qualities especially when he is in the position of leading some other leaders.
~ 2/2006
la cause, lessence, le sens et le rsultat stagiaire de la transformation; il distingue entre ses actions particulires de lengagement systmique et imprime une tonalit philosophique et une exactitude conceptuelle la stratgie pour le changement; il mne le processus de transformation par un prescription et un management de la thrapie des divergences et des conflits qui sont gnrs par linvitable rsistance de changement. Dailleurs, le leader croit en existence de la chance, mais il ne lattend pas, au contraire, il la provoque; il ne dcourage pas le droit et lexercice dopinion, au contraire, il les met constructivement au service de lorganisation; il renonce lui-mme pour consolider la force ontologique de lorganisation; il offre sans cesse une transparence son mentalit dtre gagnant, en refusant linsuccs comme fatalit; il offre la certitude de la victoire, quoique les virus de dsespoir provoquent la probabilit dune dfaite; il sest rend vraiment compte du fait que cest ne pas la crise qui produise des chefs. Celle-ci seulement les offre un certain rle. Et, pour obtenir un sens, le leader rvle effectivement la mesure de sa force surtout alors quand il se trouve dans la situation de mener autres chefs.
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD
Version franaise par Alina UNGHEANU
12
We are certain that, by the end of the period for which we assume the condition of transformation, the Romanian Armed Forces will have been perfectly aware of the Past that deserves cherishing, will have honoured the Present with decency and will have been able to look into the Future without fear
Interview with General Eugen B~D~LAN, PhD ~ Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff ~
General, the Romanian Armed Forces have experienced, more and more elaborately, the applied condition of transformation and I think I am not wrong stating it, considering the clear perspective of desirable prediction. Transformation or reform, a continuous one ? Transformation ! Unfortunately, the concept of transformation is still mistaken for that of reform, although they are completely different. It is true that the philosophical perspective on concepts denotes their applied synonymy, as the references they point to are common processual and operational elements. As far as we are concerned, under the pressure of both its essential determinations and its continuous causality, we pragmatically, organically and functionally assume the condition of transformation. Why not that of reform ? It is simply because reform as such, when applied to a specific domain of the social system, projects its objectives partially, in a limited way, or structurally and its historic characteristics denote, unequivocally, its horizons and exhaustion. On the other hand, considering the concept of transformation, when applied to the national military body, from the institutional point of view of global comprehension and communication and also from that of the doctrinaire development, it does not represent an offence addressed to the term reform; on the contrary it is an act of thorough acknowledgement of a radical process of continuous and on the fly reconstruction of one of the fundamental State institutions. 13
~ 2/2006
Therefore we have chosen transformation as, in the productive semantics of the process, the structural and super-structural valences of the concept are not only more profound but also, inevitably, more complex. Last but not least, we have made our choice of the term transformation, because the process itself, as far as its components and objectives are concerned, is not only a sequence of forms that differ in point of their quality, but forms that become manifest within the context they denote, and also the expression of the development of the system itself, in the diachronic objective perspective of the processes that govern it. General, from the perspective that we have already taken into consideration, I suggest that we should talk, at the level of details that play a configurative part, about the strategic concepts related to the Romanian Armed Forces transformation, as it has been designed, elaborated and comprehensively assumed by the General Staff. To begin with, what are, in your opinion, the reasons for the necessity of elaborating and operationally engaging a document such as Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy ? The fact that ensuring Romanias defence in the Allied context is a continuous and complex process, unconditionally extended over a large spectrum of domains, relations and interdependencies and meant to promote the society and the citizen interests and security objectives is already acknowledged and understood, thus the philosophy of national defence is projected and promoted in an indissoluble correlation with NATO and EU specific policies. Therefore, what does the term inter-conditioning refer to ? It refers to the fact that the nature of nationally constitutional responsibilities, as well as the Alliance exigencies related to coping with any type of threats urge the Romanian Armed Forces to project and develop those capabilities that allow for conducting operations, within the area of NATO responsibilities, in not only the national territory but also in an extended strategic environment, permanently influenced by factors that require change, in fact changes, which are, many times, unpredictable. Well, in this context, the process of transforming the Romanian Armed Forces is a natural requirement, a requirement determined by both the inner nature of patriotic feelings and the new Alliance strategic and transformational orientation that allow for broadening the range of objectives and processes that include forces structuring and training to participate in collective defence and enhancing the necessary capabilities for crises management and combating terrorism multinational operations. What does the above brief insight into the issue point to ? It points to the fact that Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy will be the foundation on which all the other strategies, concepts, doctrines and action plans will be built, as well as the basis for their implementation in the specific domains of affirmation and operational concentration. Trying to answer your question briefly, I can say that the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy has been imposed by the need to articulate the national military state and capacity of comprehension with the predictable future in a credible way; the necessity of establishing a state of trust 14
RMT Dialogues
and positive continuity in developing the Romanian military body; the need for having applied knowledge of own capabilities correlated with the evolution of the military phenomenon. You have already outlined the teleological and philosophical comunion between the process of transformation, initiated by NATO and the one designed and engaged by the General Staff as far as the Romanian Armed Forces are concerned. I would like you, General, to pinpoint, through an explanatory parallel, the prefigured aims and goals, as well as their content, in a brief manner. Mention should be made that, in NATO view and, implicitly and independently, in our own view, military transformation represents a continuous process of development and integration of new concepts, strategies, doctrines and capabilities, aiming at enhancing efficiency and forces interoperability and positively and proactively adapting to the new security context, which itself undergoes continuous change, this attitude rendering evident the necessity for re-evaluating, re-considering the military factor as the main source of credibility. Well, essentially, the process of transformation presupposes changes at the level of doctrines, forces and capabilities organisation and structure, intelligence, training, education and acquisitions, personnel management and budget planning, all these representing, in fact, the main domains in which transformation should operate. Based on these conceptual premises, the fundamental goal of the Alliance transformation defines and consists in creating military capabilities that enable the Allied Forces to conduct operations not only in the area of responsibility but also outside it, to accomplish the full range of missions and to maintain the decisional consensus within the context of enlargement, as well as establishing a new type of relations with the European Union, Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia or within the Mediterranean Dialogue. In short, NATO military transformation focuses on both conceptual and capabilities domains, aiming at achieving three major objectives: sustainment and decision superiority, coherent effects and joint deployment and sustainment, as well as meeting the requirements imposed by network centric warfare and effects-based operations. In connection with it, I hasten to add that the Alliance will adapt its current concepts and capabilities concomitantly with enhancing and making military forces planning, generating, deployment, use and sustainment more effective. At national level, the major goal of Romanian Armed Forces transformation is developing new capabilities that enable Romania to credibly meet the current and future challenges, generated by the security environment. These are conceived so that they could be in accordance with the provisions of Constitution related to the issue, Romania commitments to NATO and EU, as well as to regional initiatives and, when it is required, to coalitions. The general objective resides in establishing a modern structure, completely professionalised, more mobile, efficient, flexible, deployable, sustainable, and able to conduct joint operations and to be engaged in a larger spectrum of missions. The general objective materialised content, as it is defined above, is sustained by projects that, as far as concrete actions are concerned, aim at: assuming 15
~ 2/2006
and discharge obligations towards NATO; preparing and participating in EU missions; reshaping command and control and logistic structures; C4I2SR network systems implementation and enhancing electronic warfare capabilities; modernising human resources management; improving personnel life quality; reshaping military educational system; optimising planning, budgeting and evaluating system; reshaping the intelligence system; coordinated military equipments modernisation and, last but not least, reshaping the Armed Forces health care system. General, would you like to define the stages that configure transformation time horizons and, as far as possible, to pinpoint their content ? We have designed and projected transformation until the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, the year 2025, in other words, until the time horizon when the youngest generation that is now preparing to have a military career will be able to manage the national destiny of the military institution. We have divided this period into three sectors or stages. We are now in the middle of the first one, 2005-2007, that is the stage of finishing basic re-structuring, when we intend to achieve the short-term goals of the Armed Forces transformation process. Essentially these are the following: restructuring and reorganising leadership system at strategic and operative level; finishing, in broad lines, the process of transforming, reorganising, re-subordination and units dissolving, in accordance with the annual plans approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence; continuing the operationalisation of the units planned for NATO and UE, attaining a level consistent with the provisions of NATO Essential Operational Capabilities 100% with equipment and fighting technique and 90% with personnel for highly operational units, respectively 70% for low operational ones; reorganising the joint logistic system and the military health care system, as well as implementing voluntary military service. The second stage, between 2008 and 2015, defines and aims at fully operational NATO and EU integration and the fundamental transformation process medium-term objectives that have to be fulfilled are the following: operationalisation of developing units for NATO and UE; continuing the implementation of Task Force Goals; finishing the logistic system restructuring at strategic and operative level; continuing new equipment acquisition and the major procurement programmes according to the doctrinal exigencies; reorganising the military educational system according to concepts for reform of the military educational system; expanding the implementation of the Task Force Goals requirements at the level of non-deployable units to generate the necessary reserve for deployable units; enhancing the value of forces that take part in the NATO Response Force and the contribution with forces and capabilities to the European Union. As far as the last stage of the Armed Forces transformation process is concerned, 2016-2025, it is the stage in which we intend to achieve the complete NATO and UE technical integration, the long-term transformation objectives aiming at: focusing efforts and human and financial resources on achieving all technical capabilities established by the Force Goals and fulfilling the responsibilities within NATO and UE; continuing to modernise procurement and achieve full compatibility of forces with NATO and EU 16
RMT Dialogues
armed forces; creating the conditions for big units and units to be disposed in military bases with complete facilities for social assistance, accommodation, sheltering military equipment and training. Without necessarily concluding, we have to emphasise the characteristics of the manifest intrinsic transformation process: operational continuity and conceptual coherence; national interests clearly determinant character; flexibility as far as the promoted doctrinal thinking is concerned; complete correlation with the transformation process undergone by the Alliance; strategic predictability; it contains the premises that can convincingly be the ground for the strategic continuation of the transformation process in the second quarter of the 21st century and, last but not least, without exaggerating, it can be considered the anti-dogmatic foundation for the National Armed Forces enduring development throughout the 21st century. General, would you be so kind to give details regarding the main domains of transformation process. I would suggest this type of editorial conduct, as they are the very centres of gravity of the process itself. Therefore, what are the important changes in the delicate and liable to stir problems domain of human resources ? Liable to stir problems, indeed! That is why our attention and preoccupation are, in turn, sensitised at maximum when, in a way or another, we get involved in the extremely complex problems related to human resources. With regard to this issue, there are two fundamental aspects we focus on: designing and implementing an efficient military career management at the level of and following the structure of all categories of personnel and establishing a connexion between the militaries education and training system and the exigencies of the national educational system, in accordance with the specific evolutions of NATO and EU Member States armed forces. In this domain, transformation is focused on accomplishing some goals. Among them we can mention: implementing the criteria established by the Bologna Convention in the human resources education and training system; implementing a new system for promoting the military career, as a result of reconsidering military personnel recruitment and selection methodological procedures, based on the principle of executive policies separation; developing the system of military personnel professional motivation, with this end in view, focussing on rise in the wage rate, life quality improvement, setting up a social protection system similar to those in NATO Member States armed forces, ensuring health care and work capacity recovery conditions for all the personnel in the Armed Forces. As for the technical framework of human resources management system, we focus on reasonable decentralisation of individual career management, combined with unitarily applying the policies that are specific to the domain. I am not going to exhaust our strategically programmed intentions related to this chapter, but I would like to mention the completion of the Armed Forces personnel information management system; operationalisation of minimum standards for foreign languages learning, especially for English, devised on different levels, functions and units, as well as implementation, in accordance with the practices within the Alliance, of policies regarding the reserve forces, those that are to retreat and the veterans. 17
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General, what are the applicable perspectives for the Romanian Armed Forces to be engaged in operations, within the period that is strategically subject to transformation ? Current evolutions within the geopolitical and geostrategic spectrum, manifest tendencies in the too fast process of globalisation, as well as the general evolution of the contemporary phenomenon, especially in the last two decades, but also in relation with the next decades, all lead to the conclusion that future operations will be multidimensional, mainly dynamic, characterised by a higher level of complexity. Well, it is these dimensions and characteristics military operations should be based on in their opportune and efficient response to the threats and challenges that may affect security. Therefore, from the perspective of these considerations, the Romanian Armed Forces must be capable and it will surely be ! of participating in operations that ensure Romania security in peacetime, its defence, in the collective engagement of the country and its allies, promoting regional and global stability, playing its trump cards and making use of the prerogatives of defence diplomacy, as well as of the support of State institutions and local authorities in case of civil emergency. As far as the operations the Romanian Armed Forces might be engaged in are concerned, they may be high-intensity operations within a war or an armed conflict, or low-intensity ones within stability military actions. Thus it is obvious the manner we will take actions in both cases: in case of a war/high-intensity armed conflict, we will conduct military actions either on the national territory or beyond the territorial confines, based on the principle of collective defence indivisibility; with regard to stability military actions, actions that can be conducted by NATO, EU, OSCE or UN, we consider that may include both combat and non-combat actions. As for the spectrum of operations Romania may conduct or participate in we could mention stability military actions, which are, to some extent, acknowledged and other possibly emergent forms of manifestation, specific to the political military phenomenon , such as: peace-imposing, combating terrorism, non-combats evacuation, demonstrations of power, organised crime networks annihilation; peace-supporting, humanitarian aid or actions in support to civil authorities in case of emergency. From the presentation of the pack of missions our Armed Forces might be engaged in, we can draw the conclusion that the forces that will take part in the military operations characteristic to future wars must be capable of conducting the full range of military actions, from humanitarian support missions to high-intensity combat operations, even if they could be simultaneous and within the same area of operations It is the first time a document in this case, the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy , has brought major important clarifications concerning the act of leading armed forces, to be more precise, the Romanian military power, at all its levels of exercise. General, I would like you to outline the architecture and the functional aspects with regard to the process of leading armed forces. Indeed, the present Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy not only clarifies, for the first time, for all levels of exercise, the responsibility for leading the Armed Forces of the country, but also excludes any ambiguities related to its specific 18
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application in the different contexts I am going to refer to in what follows. With reference to political leadership in the national security domain, it will be provided by the National Command Authority represented by the Parliament, the President of Romania, the Supreme Council of National Defence and the Government of Romania, the Ministry of National Defence is subordinated to, as the unique body specialised in leading activities in the national defence domain. An important part of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy conceptual unity focuses, and it could not be otherwise, on the problems concerning Romanian Armed Forces leadership transformation, sense in which a short-term plan comprises a balanced reduction of central structures, parallelisms elimination, a clear-cut delimitation of competencies and responsibilities and a significant reduction of the time allotted to decisional cycle for the time dedicated to execution to be more. The already initiated transformational process aims at reshaping operational and administrative leadership structures at strategic, operative and tactical level, unequivocally establishing their responsibilities and competencies, as well as the relations between them, with a view to making the process of armed forces leadership in peacetime, crisis situations and wartime more efficient, as well as to optimising relationships with NATO and EU similar leadership structures. This process of leadership transformation in which an essential role will be played by setting up and implementing a new set of standard procedures, similar to those in the Alliance and using computer networks in the informing and decision-making process at all levels , is not an institutional entity separately being acted upon, without considering the entire process, but it will be simultaneously conducted in conceptual and operational concordance with the process of forces structure transformation and it will be subject to useful reconsiderations. What is important, among others, in this transforming engagement, focused on the major problem of leadership ? It is the fact that the prefigured leadership system will be adapted to the specific security environment, in accordance with the provisions of the Romanian Security Strategy and the Alliance Command and Control System transformation process itself. Transformation Strategy brings conceptual and functional clarifications with regard to exercising leadership at strategic level, as well as in the operational and administrative domain. Thus, Romanian Armed Forces structures military leadership will operate at the strategic, operative and tactical level not only in the operational but also in the administrative domain. As for the architecture of the functional responsibilities in leadership domain, the Ministry of Defence Central Structures subordinate directorates, offices, services, sections, agencies, specialised institutions and formations, the General Staff subordinating the Staffs of the Armed Forces categories of forces and a series of headquarters comprising all combat structures, supporting structures, logistic structures, medical structures, training ones, as well as those intended to special operations, military education institutions and other structures. Military command at the strategic level, in peacetime and during crises situations, will be fulfilled by the General Staff, both in the operational and administrative field. Operational command, in peacetime and crises situations, will be exercised by the Chief of the General Staff, through the Strategic Planning and Command Centre the specialised structure of the General Staff which provides the military actions planning and command. At the level of Strategic Planning and Command Centre, the National Military Command Centre 19
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permanently operates, both in peacetime and crises situations, as a structure resulted from the reorganisation of the current COCMIL ~ Military Command Operational Centre, which essentially has the role of permanently monitoring the actions of the Romanian Armed Forces and of providing the timely report to decision-making factors. There is only one situation left, one context to specify: How do we proceed to set up the state of siege and at war ?. Well, in this situation, the General Staff will make sure the National Military Command Centre is established and becomes functional, this being the structure that will draft the Strategic Guideline, on the grounds of which, according to the competencies and responsibilities it is empowered with, it will fulfil the command of military actions at strategic level and will leave the responsibility of operative art and tactics to the Joint Operational Headquarters and Division, Brigade and Battalion Headquarters. Hence, by eliminating any kind of explanatory details, this is the comprehensive, systemic architecture of what command means within the process entailed by the desideratum of transformation. General, what does transformation mean within the domains of scientific research and procurement ? It means much, very much ! These are, in fact, the domains that are most exposed to the unprecedented technological development specific to the current century, a development to which, let us be honest !, we cannot catch but a glimpse of its immediately following steps, at the most, and, by no means, strategic horizons to be reached in the next 30, 40 or 50 years or more. That is why I reckon that, for the moment, it is important for us to develop flexible and convincing strategies so that scientific research could continually integrate the transformations that govern society at global level in the military domain. That is why we intend to maintain one of the fundamental scientific research components, having a strong applicative extension meant to the military technology, in the subordination of the Minister of National Defence, the most important source of the Armed Forces scientific consultancy. We intend to focus our attention on fundamental scientific research being accomplished by specialised military institutions and/or, when needed, by those of the civil society and on it being mainly oriented towards the operational level, as well as the technical one, being, at the same time, capable to provide expertise as far as the following are concerned: the nature of the future military conflicts and the physiognomy of the fighting actions that will develop within them; the lessons learnt and the conclusions drawn from the development of current military conflicts; the manifestation of war and armed fight laws and principles; the implementation of the outcomes of the revolution in military affairs in projecting and establishing the military capabilities; the identification of the full range of missions that are possible to take place in the national defence, the collective defence provided by NATO, as well as within coalitions and partnerships; the future systems of armament and categories of technique that will be part of the Armed Forces procurement. On the background of these programmatic matters, identifying and analysing the main phenomena that manifest in the technological evolution of military equipment, potential risks and threats, for whose management military instruments will be employed, represent the fundamental 20
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functional premises for conceiving the Armed Forces procurement programmes. I have created, in my turn, the premise for responding to the second part of your question transformation in the field of the Armed Forces procurement. The main objective, a programmatic one, in the field of the Armed Forces transformation and procurement is represented by the purchase, in sensible agreement with the available resources, of the systems of armament that comprise adequate modern technologies, with the purpose of fulfilling the operational requirements of the military forces branches and providing interoperability with allies forces. Carrying out the main intended and, consequently, assumed objective will be accomplished successively, and the major share of acquisitions and procurement of new equipment will be obtained during the Stage of the full technical integration in NATO and EU. From the above-mentioned perspective, the process of the Romanian Armed Forces modernisation and procurement takes its strength from the assertion of the following principles: providing the Armed Forces with new effective and intelligent systems of armaments, capable to meet the requirements regarding precision, mobility, flexibility and interoperability; modernising the available fighting technique, the one which is still morally operational, with the purpose of extending the life duration of the systems of armament and increasing their performance; establishing the short and medium term priorities in the field of the procurement of major systems from the intern and foreign providers; co-ordinately updating the procurement programs on medium and long term through adopting a flexible way of funding; stimulating the capabilities of the national industry with this profile provided that they are adapted to the long term new necessities and requirements of the Armed Forces; cooperating with other countries for producing systems of armament. Concluding the exposition of this response in a direct reaction to your question, I might add that, within the domains of scientific research and procurement, transformation represents the affirmation of our capacity to permanently optimise the relation between possibilities, desiderata and necessities, just like it might mean, and it really does, step by step, the extent to which we understand the essence of the future, the times undergoing a continuous, complex and significant change. Which are, General, the precepts that govern transformation in the military doctrinaire area and the one of forces training ? Within the doctrines field we aim at establishing a general efficient and flexible framework, free from immutable things, be they situational, able to provide the circumstances which are necessary for the assertion of the unitary, but creative thinking in its plenitude, and a way of action integrated in the fields with a variable geometry, let us say it plainly of the military concepts, the operational language, and the procedures for planning and development specific to military operations planning and carrying out. Within the forces training field, the centre of gravity of our attention and concerns is focused on adapting the entire training process to the one used within the other armed forces of the Alliance, this nevertheless meaning that adaptation as such will be a mechanic one, lacking horizon or personality; on fulfilling the operational capability of forces in accordance with the available resources and the already achieved of training level 21
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and, last but not least, on the predictive development of the fighting qualities specific to the complex forms of development of the war of the future. The exigencies formulated as such cause the entire architecture of forces training to be shaped on a ground unitarily offered by education, training and exercises. I will not go into further details but I only wish to point out that military education will practically follow the transforming conceptual and actional conduct covered by the national education system during the process of joining NATO and the European Union. During the stages that we will cover, we will identify, on personnel categories, the real training needs of the human resource, according to the national policy but also to the one promoted at the Alliances level, and according to the intrinsic complexity of military actions as well. By the assumed educational objectives, the systems organisation and the structures of the military education curricula, we wish to provide the personnel with the possibility of developing their competencies and capabilities, both those necessary for fulfilling the military profession and those directly useful for easily integrating in civil life. From the perspective of the same coordinates, we will seek to form and develop the individuals and military structures capacity for action through training, a context in which making use of the systems of modelling-stimulating will probably become the most efficient training method. It is precisely for this reason that the development of these systems will represent a priority. As far as the third element that grounds this architecture, exercises, is concerned, we will seek to develop, through them, the collective skills of the command structures and the ones with a prevailing actional role, to initiate the evaluation of their operational capability and to support certain rehearsals before the forces are introduced in the theatre of operations. General, what are the expectations of ... the year 2025 with regard to the logistic state and condition of the Romanian Armed Forces ? The fundamental requirement of the transformation in this field consists in creating an integrated logistic system, with great mobility, which should allow the fighting units and the one meant to combat support to be fully relieved of any administrative tasks, a system which should be capable to provide logistic support wherever necessary, in the required amount and timely. In this respect, while highlighting that the logistic system consists of the production and expenditure logistics, the logistic structures will be tailored to meet the requirements of the theatre of operations and the assigned fighting mission and will have an increased degree of flexibility, adaptability and mobility, so that they could timely modify the organisation and functionality profile, in accordance with the logistics support requirements of the forces they attend. The logistic structures will adapt the way of fulfilling the fighting forces logistic support to the requirements and the pace entailed by the decisions connected to the military actions, by laying a preponderant stress on predicting the requested support. As far as the national contingents logistics, for contingents that take part in missions abroad is concerned, this will be provided by the Joint Logistics Command. In addition, one may mention the concern regarding the reconsiderations which the military assistance will be subjected to, which will be mainly improved through reshaping the military health care system, within the new structural configuration, so that the medical support 22
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for the forces deployed in the theatre of operations could be provided through operational medicine. What will technically happen in this field will only be an issue for the concern of specialists in the field, yet, I would like us to keep in mind that the main objectives of transformation within the medical assistance field consist in: establishing the military medical services in the forces logistics system; fulfilling and applying the medical services on three components primary medical assistance, specialised ambulatory assistance and hospital medical assistance; integrating the medical-military personnel training system in the general outlook of the military education and training modernisation; accrediting the military hospitals by the National Commission for Hospital Accreditation. Once more, and not as a conclusion, one can easily notice that the objectives and responsibilities deriving from all above have an important ... specific share in the important equation of the national military establishment transformation. Which is, General, the level of ambition that motivates at present the speech and the strategic action of the General Staff and what will the architecture of the structure of forces look like in determining The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy ? Our level of ambition outlines the Romanian Armed Forces capability to simultaneously provide: the national land defence, through the capability to militarily respond to an armed aggression and to support the civil authorities in case of emergencies, natural disasters, NBC events etc. and the fulfilment of the engagements assumed towards NATO, EU, different regional organisations and coalitions, through complying with the principle of complementarity and implementing the unique Package of Capabilities, according to the Commitments assumed at Prague (taking part in NATO Response Force), taking part in EU Battlegroups, multinational operations. On the background of this perspective, the Romanian Armed Forces will have a unique package of forces at their disposal, acquired through the transformation of force, a process that will aim at: organising, thus ensuring: the fulfilment of an optimal relation between the fighting units, the support and logistic support ones; the outline of a modular, lethal, interchangeable, compatible, deployable force; the basis for force rotation; the establishment of adequate forces for special missions; the fulfilment of adequate capabilities for forces extension and regeneration; equipment and procurement; training; sustainment of the force. With regard to the second component of the question, we must underline that the main product of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation will be represented by the structure of forces, consisting of: the forces planned for the national and common defence, this meaning the deployable forces, listed at NATO through the Defence Planning Questionnaire and at the EU, through which they cover the operational-making process with the purpose of fulfilling the requirements established through the Task Force Goals applicable at the level of the respective structure; forces for generating and regenerating, which represent non-deployable forces, with a low framing level, which improve and increase the ones of the first category. From and in this perspective, Force Structure 2015 will fulfil the required balance between operational 23
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forces and the structures for generating and regenerating the force and will provide the national defence within the common defence and the Alliances intervention in situations of civil emergency and the complete coverage of the commitments to NATO and EU. The qualities that they must acquire are specific to the structure of forces resulted from the transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces, as the forces that will be engaged in the future military conflicts must respond to the following requirements with organisational nature: joint and modular structure, permanent information support; joint logistics support; integrating the elements for battle preparation; including the specialised battle elements; the existence of own or especially organised positioning, training, embarking/disembarking bases; the procurement of transport and supply means at long distance, with a specific purpose; the establishment of an active reserve of forces and a functional nature: command elements with increased power; information directly received from the participating nations; direct relations between the task forces disposition elements; fluidity of the communication between the own command points and the central command point, as well as with the local elements with which they cooperate; providing an increased striking/action potential. As far as their dimensions, depending on the allocated resources, are concerned, in 2015, the Romanian Armed Forces will have 80 000 soldiers at their disposal, their distribution seeking to achieve the establishment of a balance between the commanding structures and forces, so that the missions could be fulfilled in the best circumstances. In percents, the commanding structures will represent up to 4.5% of the entire military personnel, and the forces 95.5%. What will the Romanian Armed Forces look like at the end of the first quarter of the 21st century ? The technical and conceptual framework that the questions asked have forced me to laboriously describe allows me to state that the development of the transformation process will result in the establishment of military capabilities characterised by flexibility, an increased speed of action and interoperability, which will provide the military-political decision makers with increased chances for fulfilling the goals sought, obviously, in complete consensus with the substance of the national interest. We must understand that the Armed Forces transformation by no means represents a purpose in itself, but the adequate, we believe, answer to the general and complex evolution of the security environment, a response assigned, at the same time, to the exigencies of the North-Atlantic Alliances transformation and to the nature of the commitments Romania has taken upon her at international level. Still, even if the question does not entail this, I wish to highlight that the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process is not by far an easy one, a path that can be covered anyhow and in any circumstances. For instance, the fulfilment of the objectives of the Armed Forces Transformation Strategy is expected to be influenced by a host of challenges and factors having a more or less counterproductive role, starting, if you wish, from the necessity for changing the mentality of the decision-making and execution factors towards the way of approaching 24
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this process up to providing the financial, human and material resources necessary for supporting it. On the other hand, the success of this unprecedented in the Romanian military construction Strategy is decisively dependent on the way in which we fulfil the integration in a unitary system of the objectives representing a priority on short, medium and long term, at the level of all the components of the Armed Forces. At the same time, timely identifying and making the decisions necessary to lessen the negative effect of the constraints, limitations and restrictions of any kind, which might stop up the accomplishment of the pre-established objectives is of utmost importance. In addition, even if one foresees that the period 2008-2015 is expected to be characterised by reduced financial pressures, as a result of discharging personnel, certain infrastructure elements and equipment, suppressions, reorganisations and re-subordination of some units and structures, the level of necessary resources will further be at high level. Moreover, the requirements of the multinational headquarters in which we are part in the field of contributing with personnel, the raised costs for sustaining the troops in the theatres of operations, the significant differences between the technological level of Alliances developed states military equipment and our Armed Forces equipment, to which the material constraints and the ones in the field of preparation, training and education add, are all guidelines with major importance that we should consider when establishing the priorities of each stage on the route of the transformation process. It is perhaps for this reason that the careful management of the transformation process must facilitate the timely establishment of new objectives and courses of action, encourage the conceptual answers asked for by the challenges of the security environment undergoing a continuous and unpredictable change and allow for making the working tools used for fulfilling transformation more flexible. The stipulation of these possible realities does not confer a pessimistic note to our state of mind, but, quite to the contrary, a realistic one. However, to highlight the major points, in accordance with our state of mind, we are certain that, by the end of the period for which we assume the condition of transformation, the Romanian Armed Forces will have been perfectly aware of the Past that deserves cherishing, will have honoured the Present with decency and will have been able to look into the Future without fear.
Written down by Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD 5 June 2006
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THE USE OF MILIT AR Y POWER MILITAR ARY AFTER THE COLD W WAR AR
Major General Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD ~ Deputy Director of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff ~
The Cold War was a complex and contradictory phenomenon that kept the world in the status quo that was the result of the Second World War. It marked the configuration of the international scene as far as the following three aspects are concerned. Firstly, it shadowed or completely eliminated the conflicts and political rivalries that shaped the international politics even before the Second World War. Some of them disappeared from the international scene, as the colonial empires themselves had disappeared and, along with them, the rivalries between Great Powers on the ground of the territories they dominated. France and the Federal Republic of Germany were both members of the group led by the USA and, subsequently, the old historic divergences were left aside after 1947, not for another reason but the one that the USA hegemony on Western Europe was undeniable, which did not allow Germany to have any freedom of action. Surprisingly enough, differently from what had happened in other epochs and wars, the winning powers in the Second World War did not regard the recovery of the new defeated, Germany and Japan, with suspicion and fear. The explanation for this attitude resides in the USA military capacity to totally control all the defeated states for a long period of time after the end of the war. If, after the First World War, the winners feared that the defeated could recover their strength, while the defeated were planning to change the established status quo, after the Second World War, only few Western people were really worried about the fact that Western Germany and Japan spectacularly and in force regained the status of Great Powers, both being seriously armed, in spite of not having nuclear weapons. Even the USSR and its allies within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, although denouncing the threat represented by Germany, with whom they had a recent negative experience, did it, especially with propagandistic purposes, although they really feared it. Moscow did not fear the German armed forces, but NATO forces deployed in Germany. Allied Forces stationed in this country by virtue of the occupation regime and, despite it, the USSR created the Warsaw Treaty Organisation only after Germany became a NATO member, for fear it should disturb the balance of forces. 26

Secondly, the Cold War froze the international situation, stabilising what, in essence, was designed to be a temporary situation. This way, alliances lasted even after the war period, peace being thus militarised, as it had never been before. Germany is the most eloquent example: for forty-six years it remained divided into three sectors: the Western Sector, that became, in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Middle Sector, that became, in 1954, the German Democratic Republic and the Eastern Sector, to the east of the Oder-Neisse line, which the majority of Germans were either forced to flee or expelled from and which became a component part of Poland and the USSR. The end of the Cold War reunited the Western and the Middle Sectors, leaving aside the Eastern Sector, the one detached and isolated from the rest of the Russian Federation, because of the existence of Lithuania as an independent state and not as a part of the USSR, as it used to be between 1940 and 1991. Poland accepted the promises of the reunited Germany to agree with the borders established in 1945 and then confirmed by the Paris Peace Treaty in 19471. Stabilisation did not mean peace. It was only in Europe that, the Cold War was a period in which the armed conflicts ceased. However, the disagreements between the Great Powers were kept under control, for fear they should have been the cause of a war, especially a nuclear one, between the countries that had such arsenals. Moreover, the combination between using the military power, the political influence, the system of financial subsidies and the internal logic of bipolarity and anti-imperialism itself maintained the division of the World into antagonist blocks relatively stable. The threat of a nuclear conflagration guaranteed not only the survival of the liberal democracies and the Communist states in Europe, but also that of different regions such as the absolute monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In general, big or small states were supported to survive so that the international status quo could not be modified, which was a situation of balance between the two superpowers and their political and military alliances in competition. Thirdly, the Cold War lay at the basis of proliferation of important quantities and types of armament from the Great Powers to those on the outskirts of the international system. For more than four decades, the Great Powers were engaged in a ceaseless armament race, with a view to participating in a war that could burst any moment. During that time, the two superpowers were in competition with each other for the enlargement of their areas of influence, by making new friends, delivering financial aids, as well as economic ones and diversified armament. Especially because they could not directly fight each other, the superpowers encouraged this type of conflicts in order to create a safety valve for the tensions in the system to be allowed to escape. This way the peripheral wars, stimulated from the outside, perpetuated. Low intensity wars, in which the clients of a superpower were engaged against the ones of the other, continued, nourished both on the local basis and on their own account, opposing even those that had stimulated them and then wanted to put an end to them. For example,
1
Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Secolul extremelor, Bucure[ti, 1999, p. 297.
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UNITA rebels in Angola continued to fight against the government of socialist orientation, although both the Cuban and South-African militaries withdrew from the country and although both the UN and the USA recognised the legitimacy of the legally constituted government. In Afghanistan, the USA financially and materially supported the anticommunist and anti-Soviet tribal guerrillas. When the Soviets withdrew, the civil war continued as if nothing had happened. The Mujahideens, benefiting from a serious and diversified arsenal of portable armament, started selling it on the international black market, rejecting the USA offer to buy back the weapons that they themselves had provided the Mujahideens with, for free2. The end of the Cold War proved to be not only the end of an international competition but also the end of an epoch in which there were not significant changes in the international system, although the world economy underwent major changes, evolving from the industrial to the informational age and from the national economic systems to global ones. It was thus necessary for the international system, on the whole, to be reconfigured and adapted to this trend. The period after the Cold War was characterised as showing unprecedented dynamics of the events and incidents related to the international crises, materialised, at times, in armed conflicts. Using the military instrument of power was more specific and diverse, starting from threat and reaching the climax with effectively using it in high intensity fight operations. Although there were not open conflicts between Great Powers, as they maintained the tendency to solve the litigious matters between them by means of negotiations and political solutions, another tendency continued to be manifest, respectively that of resorting to means of coercion, military ones, with a view to promoting the Great Powers interests as far as their relationships with other actors, be they niche or secondary powers, were concerned. The international security and stability evolution used to be and still is a non-linear one, as the unexpected factor has been playing a significant part. However, we consider the events on September 11th, 2001 represented a fault line, which divided this era in two distinct periods: the first one before the terrorist attacks, when the predominant feeling was that of hoping to peacefully solve the disagreements and conflicts and the second one after September 11th, 2001, characterised by incertitude and pessimism at the global level. During the first period, the political factors in the decision-making process, as well as the political and military analysts hoped that the use of non-military instruments in managing and solving conflicts could become prevalent, while, during the second period, the use of military instruments has been given much more attention, without leaving aside the selective use of non-military instruments, which, together with the military ones, can cause enough pressure on the actors involved state and non-state, thus persuading them to observe the norms and principles of International Law and fundamental Human Rights.
2
Cf. International Herald Tribune, 07.05.1993, p. 24.
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After the Cold War, neither the USA nor the USSR were tempted to compete when intervening in peripheral wars. The USA formed coalitions whenever they took action, not only in the wars against Iraq, in 1991 and 2003 but also in the one against Afghanistan. Russia, on the other hand, sent military forces in the wars and interventions in Caucasus and Central Asia. Neither took action so that it could obstruct or provoke the other or encourage an armed intervention against the other. Lacking the constraints imposed by the existent relationships between the two superpowers during the Cold War period and by the reciprocal care not to exacerbate a political and ideological conflict to the limit of transforming it into a military one, the Great Powers of our present world have been less reserved in using military power according to their own interests and objectives, but not against equivalent powers. The only pre-existent military alliance that has adapted itself to the new strategic conditions is NATO, which has extended not only the range of missions that now includes, for example, crises management missions but also the area of responsibility. In parallel with these changes, a diversification regarding the forms and procedures of strategic action used by belligerents occur, procedures of asymmetrical military engagement being thus more and more resorted to, which differ from the others in terms of objectives, the types of military and semi-military structures engaged, the temporal and spatial horizon, the types of technologies used and the command and control. These differences, expressed in all the domains mentioned above, are the ones that create the asymmetry that is particularly specific to the phenomenon generically called the global war on terrorism. The military interventions that take place nowadays, more and more follow two completely different directions: the first direction has in view the coercive military interventions, through which, in general, states aim at imposing their interests and strategic objectives by means of war actions; the second direction aims at crises management and humanitarian interventions, having a reverted objective, that of preserving or inducing peace by engaging a third party, most often than not under the mandate or with the direct participation of international organisations that have vocation for security. Conflicts management and prevention are influenced by certain phenomena that currently occur in the world nowadays, which exacerbate latent or open conflicts, such as armament proliferation, especially that of mass destruction weapons and international terrorism associated with organised crime. A characteristic of the current security environment is that, once with the disappearance of the ideological, political and military competition that was specific to the Cold War period, the incidence of central crises has reduced drastically, tending to zero, because, among the current powers, apart from minor frictions that are inherent to the process of cooperation within the international system, there are no major reasons for conflicts. Currently, there are not only peripheral crises between secondary powers but also crises in which regional or global powers and actors of second importance, state and non-state, are engaged. The military means they can make use of have significantly diversified 29
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as the military instrument of power has changed from an instrument exclusively intended for carrying and possibly winning a war to an instrument meant to be used for international crises prevention and management as well as for carrying humanitarian actions. The states response to the challenges, risks, threats and dangers proper to the third millennium materialises in a process of adapting and reconfiguring their military forces, so that they could be more flexible, agile, endowed with a more rapid capacity of response and manoeuvrability, able to adapt to a more diversified range of fight actions, others than war itself included. These actions will be intended not only against enemies of the same kind (states) but also against non-state actors who frequently make use of unconventional and asymmetric procedures, be they of military or terrorist type. This process of adaptation and transformation goes hand in hand with that of strengthening the civil control over the armed forces, proper to democratic regimes, process that has been implemented in more and more states, as the democratic regimes have replaced the authoritarian ones, irrespective of their ideological orientation. At the operational level, taking advantage of information technology, command and control has become more and more decentralised, decisional prerogatives being thus closer to the tactical levels of execution. It allows for taking decisions in a real time, due to the possibility for the decision making process to be assisted by up to date information systems, which enable a direct relation between the sensor and the striking means in real time, too. The omnipresent phenomenon of globalisation more and more obviously intensifies the use of the military instrument of power both by states and non-state actors, each of them having nowadays access to many dual technologies. Thus the informational revolution is a basic component of the operations carried by not only the armed forces of the economically developed states but also by a great part of the non-state actors, such as the terrorist organisations or the cross-border organised crime networks. Globalisation has an important effect on the way forces are now projected in different areas of action and conflict, which are, many times, situated at thousands of kilometres from their permanent dislocation bases in peacetime. As for the logistics involved, there are important quantities of materials and equipment of all types that are carried, in the majority of the cases, at intercontinental distances. As far as effective military leadership is concerned, it can be achieved with the help of satellite systems that allow the leader to know, in real time, what the situation of forces (own and enemy ones) is, to select targets and appropriate striking means, being thus highly effective in neutralising or destroying the established objectives and reducing collateral losses at minimum. All these elements have become a permanency within military interventions, taking into consideration the fact that, more and more often, they are not dictated by national interests but by interests of humanitarian nature, such as those with regard to putting an end to human rights violation, resolving major humanitarian crises caused by endemic conflicts or those in which the norms of international law and especially those of international humanitarian law are infringed. Coercive interventions have therefore been less numerous after the end of the Cold War than humanitarian ones. The latter are usually conducted under the UN or OSCE patronage, sometimes with the effective participation of a regional security organisation 30

such as NATO, or applying the principle of leading nation. This way the intervention is much more effective, as the financial, material and human resources are used with a view to maximising the results in terrain. Non-military solutions for crises management have been more and more extensively used, the system of international organisations with vocation for security covering, in practice, all the domains that are inherent in finding viable solutions, negotiated and accepted by all the parts involved. Different instruments, such as International Law, armament control, democratisation and integration have been used with positive results, superior to those obtained during the Cold War period, when the main instrument used was the balance of power, creation of alliances and, subsidiarily, armament control. One of the advantages of using non-military means in providing solutions for conflicts is considered to be the capacity to plan and find the necessary resources so that they could be in agreement with the possibilities of those in charge with providing them, having in view the fact that resources allocation takes into account society general needs and is an adequate prioritisation, when, in case of conflicts, resources allocation can never be in accordance with the initial plan, as military actions gradually extend and last longer than they are initially expected to. That is why, even though the financial resources involved in resolving conflicts using non-military methods may sometimes be very important, they will represent only a small part of the resources wasted in case of escalation of conflicts up to the level of an armed conflict. Mention should be made that most of the resources used for the national reconstruction materialise in palpable, concrete effects (infrastructure reconstruction, modernisation of the education system and communications, development of measures for good governing), from which the citizens of the respective state benefit, while the resources used in armed conflicts can neither regenerate nor entail an increase in the citizens general welfare. One of the characteristics of interventions nowadays is that their major objective is to help creating states with democratic mechanisms and institutions, besides infrastructure projects. States continue to play an important part in administrating non-military instruments and methods used to resolve conflicts, as they have not only the necessary human, technological, material and financial resources but also the necessary expertise and capabilities for the institutional and public mobilisation to assume and discharge such duties. In parallel, an ascending tendency is that of the more and more active involvement of non-state actors such as international organisations, multinational corporations, mass-media, humanitarian organisations or private persons that all can cover the domains states pay less attention to, although there are critical moments, in international crises, when they represent necessities to be provided solutions for. These organisations can adjust to such situations more rapidly than state institutions, which are characterised by powerful bureaucratic systems. The present scientific approach focuses more on the institutions and instruments states and international community can make use of to resolve conflicts by military means and less on the processes generated by these instruments and on the ones 31
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that are specific to political evolution nowadays. There is no doubt that democratisation and the principles of the rule of law implementation are, themselves, means meant to ensure the internal stability of different states where they are manifest, as well as to develop stability and security at the sub-regional, regional and global level. All these processes have also objective characteristics, which can be expressed at the level of society, involving thus more other aspects, apart from providing solutions for different crises and conflicts. There is something else that should be mentioned with regard to religion which, besides the negative part some fundamentalist streams may play in heating different latent conflicts and violence escalation, can also play a positive part by implementing a new set of norms and values meant to condemn violence and to evince the fundamental human values. Ecumenical tendencies have a positive role to this effect, as different churches and confessions are in search for solutions to harmonise people all over the world spiritual needs with traditions and with the necessity to ensure stability and order at the national and global level. The civil society (that plays an important role in post-industrial societies and in consolidated democracies, being in a self-defining and affirmation process in societies in transition and in developing countries) by taking social responsibilities, in the security domain included, and complementary actions, in their relationship with states institutions, can play a fundamental positive role with regard to observing human rights and the principles that lie at the basis of resolving disagreements peacefully. Negotiations and international mediation, humanitarian interventions, diplomacy and international organisations are all relevant and effective instruments used by both states, as main actors and subjects of International Law, and, sometimes, by non-state actors to intervene harmlessly and to provide solutions, based especially on compromise, to resolve disagreements and conflicts of different nature, before they escalate to the intensity of armed conflicts. These are considered to be the most relevant, efficient and effective instruments, prior to any other possible approaches. Military and non-military complementarity in providing solutions for conflicts is a constant of processes and institutions that are specific to collective security nowadays, not only at the global but also at the regional level. The way in which, according to each particular situation, these instruments are made operational is a matter of choice and effectively managing the situation by each of the actors involved. Convergent or divergent interests of the actors involved, be they states or non-state entities, influence the interventions in terms of their effectiveness, their accomplishment in due time, their positive effects on national reconciliation, national reconstruction or the dissolution of different forms of state organisation that correspond to an obsolete international order. International order and stability is in a state of relatively precarious equilibrium nowadays and to redefine and consolidate it, certain responsibility for the fate of present and future generations is necessary when taking action. Romania has constantly acted as a factor for the consolidation of regional, sub-regional and global stability and security. Our country acts not only in the conceptual plane, initiating or contributing to different pragmatic solutions, but also in the practical 32

applicable one, contributing with forces to the peacekeeping operations or to the operations meant to impose peace, initiated by UN Security Council decisions, in conformity with the provisions of chapters 6, 7, respectively 8 of the UN Charter. As an ally and reliable partner, our country has proved credibility and transparency as far as its foreign and military policy is concerned and predictability regarding its actions at the international level. Romanias actions and position are concordant with its status of a medium country, which has, inevitably, a limited capacity to fulfil its objectives by using the military instrument. This is the main reason for the desire of the country to contribute to the stability and security of the region in which it is situated, respectively in the Balkans and the Black Sea region. The regional initiatives that Romania has contributed to prove its permanent preoccupation with the South-East of Europe and the Black Sea region becoming poles of stability in the European security framework, an important role being thus played by the directions of collaboration and cooperation that are generated by these initiatives, as they enhance trust and security and maintain the conflicts at the outskirts of the region in a state of frozen conflicts. The concordance between the objectives of different actors involved, Romania included and the directions they follow in taking political and military action at the national and international level also contribute to the international implementation of certain democratic relationships, based on common values and the observance of international law norms and principles, as they are reflected in the contents of the UN Charter.
33
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM WITHIN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS

Air Flotilla General Lauren]iu SIMIONESCU, PhD ~ Commander 90th Airlift Base ~
oint operations, according to their definition, reunite structures belonging to the various task forces that act together, in the same departments, or, sometimes, in neighbouring areas. The close cooperation and synchronisation between the actions of the forces taking part in combat are essential elements for achieving the objectives of operations, avoiding fratricide, ensuring the connection between armament and targets, as well as for reducing the losses in their own forces. A structure of command and control capable meet these requirements represents a necessary element for a successful outcome of joint operations. At operative level, the joint action taking place in land, air and maritime environment must be designed, planned, led and sustained as entity. The commander of the operative echelon must lead and/or control the land, air and maritime forces and, therefore, he must be capable of manoeuvring the resources in order to acquire their concentration in the point of main effort. The headquarters of this echelon cannot be but joint ones, capable of integrating the land, air and maritime effort in order to fulfil the operational objective established by the Strategic Military Command. From this perspective, the coordination of air operation with land and maritime ones becomes a prerequisite for successful joint operations, and this cannot be achieved unless some liaison teams are established among joint task forces. The air task force commander will provide the other components with air operation coordination centres, liaison officers, groups of tactical air control and forward air controllers. The tasks of these structures are to provide: assistance regarding the use of air forces and expertise of the armament systems used; preparation of air support requests and air interdiction, and, in some cases, missions assignment for the units established by the air component commander; monitoring the air situation and the due assistance; the interface necessary for the usual information transfer.
Command and control

Command means the authority a commander legally exercises over its subordinates during military service, in accordance with his job or prerogatives. Command includes authority and the responsibility for efficiently using the available resources and for planning 34

the use of military forces with the purpose of fulfilling the assigned missions. In addition, it also consists of the responsibility for the subordinated personnel health, living conditions, morale and discipline. As a rule, command consists of activities especially related to identifying the tasks that must be fulfilled, achieving motivation, allocating means and other resources necessary for achieving the objectives, assigning missions to subordinates. The purpose of command is enforcing the decisions made, as this is the authority assigned to a commander in order to guide, coordinate and control military forces. In a broader sense, we can define command as being a prerogative of commanders and the art of: conceiving the operations; visualising situations; assessing risks and establishing priorities; setting missions; making decisions; seeing, listening and understanding; anticipating changes; leading, guiding and motivating organisations. Control represents the authority that may be exercised the commander over a segment of activities of his subordinates or other structures temporarily subordinated to him, and aims at verifying the way the provisions of the action plan are put into practice by subordinated echelons. The main purpose of control is to verify the steps taken for successfully fulfilling the assigned missions and to assist commanders in preparing the actions and permanently keeping a high state of training for subordinated units. Synthesising, control consists in the capacity to: process data; describe situations; identify variables; set and provide the means necessary for achieving the objectives; draw up specific instructions for general directions; correct misbehaviour; count and evaluate achievements and failures; envisage the necessary corrective. Control is fulfilled by: analysing the reports sent on the existing lines of communication; studying the document of combat; directly observing the activities; air photographing: using radio-electronic means. Command and control represent the authority and monitoring exerted by an appointed commander over the organic and/or temporarily subordinated forces in order to fulfil the mission. Command and control are parts of an essential cyclic process by means of which the actions of the military forces are planned, led, coordinated and controlled (corrected) in order to fulfil a mission. This process begins with storing information on the evaluated and analysed situation and the alternative courses of action for changing the situation to the commanders advantage, which are consequently proposed and elaborated as plans. Since the development of actions continuously Simplified model of the command and control process modifies the initial situations, the process Order restarts. Making decisions and applying Order them in time, both represent the essence of battle Action planning of battle Request of the process. Maximum responsibility belongs to the commander, as he asks for the Action organising support of the staff regarding: obtaining Control Action coordination and securing information, analysing and anticipating the situation, recommending Action command the most appropriate courses of fighting 35
~ 2/2006
actions, preparing the plans, orders and provisions the commander consequently approves and decides the dissemination of decisions, supervises and monitors the way of fulfilling them. Command and control system, also called C2, mainly consists of the human structures and the technical means specialised in exerting command and control (the staff of a particular structure), which provide the exercise of command and control based on the assigned missions, data and information at disposal (directly obtained or from the connected data bases). The communication system consists of technical equipment, methods, procedures and specialised personnel, meant to provide the technical-functional interconnection between the C4I system components (command, control, communication, computer and information) and the transfer of information between and within the command and control structures, as well as between the elements of the operative disposition. Besides the command points of big units and the units of other joint task forces, the structures set up by different echelons of the Air Forces with a view to ensuring the operative and tactical control in the case of air support missions are: Air Operations Co-ordination Centre ~ AOCC is the command-control structure of the Air Forces, operationally subordinated to the Air Operations Centre ~ AOC and administratively subordinated to the headquarters it is part of. This will represent the air component commander within the staff of the land component/army corps. Its area of responsibility will be identical with the one of the land component. AOCC has the role of counselling the commanders of land and naval component regarding the way of using the aviation resource, the structures and means of air defence, of assisting them in the air missions coordination with their schemes of forces and means manoeuvre1. Air Liaison Officer ~ ALO is an officer from the Air Forces attach at the big tactical units of the supported land component and subordinated to AOCC. ALO responsibilities especially regard: counselling the commander of the big land unit on all aspects regarding organising the air forces, methods and means of action, equipment and ways of action; advising on air targets that might be most effectively fought against by the air means; monitoring the activity of the subordinated tactical air control groups of the forward air controllers when directly subordinated; coordinating the close air support missions and controlling them in the absence of the forward air controller (if he is qualified); reporting the results of the missions to the commander of the big land units and AOCC. Tactical Air Control ~ TACP is a command-control structure which can be found at any echelon, between battalion and corps. TACP consists of an ALO and/or a forward air controller, as well as the personnel and means of communication and information technology necessary for the control of close air support missions2. The responsibilities of TACP personnel are: supporting the land unit commander in integrating the actions of air means with fire and supported forces manoeuvre; coordinating the flight of the support
1 F.A. 1, Doctrina pentru Opera]ii a For]elor Aeriene, Statul Major al For]elor Aeriene, Bucure[ti, 2005, p. 40. 2 Air Power Handbook, 1995, p. II-11.
36

air means in accordance with the order of air space control; controlling these means in the points established by ATO/ATM (for instance, initial point, contact points); providing data regarding the meteorological situation in the area of the targets to be struck. Forward Air Controller ~ FAC represents an extension of TACP 3. The forward air controller is the specialist who guides the aircrafts planned to fulfil the forward close air support of the land forces. FAC can act from a land or air platform (means). FACs responsibilities are: counselling the commander of the supported unit regarding the attack aircrafts/helicopters means of action; coordinating the attack of air attack means with the manoeuvre of the supported unit; supporting the identification, by the crews of air attack means, of the position of their own forces subunits; guiding the attack aircrafts/ helicopters against the assigned land targets; reporting the results of the attack; providing the crews with data regarding the meteorological situation in the area of the target. At the same time, Structures of command-control set up by the air forces with a view to acquiring operative and tactical control within air support missions the other components (variant) of the joint forces RLFH* RAFH** RNFH*** provide the air Joint Task Force Air Land Naval Headquarters c o m p o n e n t Component Component Component (Joint Operational headquarters with Headquarters) liaison teams (liaison Army corps officers), which: Course Air Operation of Action/COA monitor the situation Coordination of the represented Centres component and AOCC Air base i n f o r m s t h e Brigade commander of the TACP/ALO air component on its Battalion intentions; coordinates Squadron TACP/ALO/FAC and submits the air It can provide/contribute with personnel Operational control support requests and Delegation of operational/tactical control Orders the necessities for air * Romanian Land Forces Headquarters ** Romanian Air Forces Headquarters *** Romanian Naval Forces Headquarters control; provides the necessary interface for the transfer of information and the expertise regarding the systems of armament used by them.
Close air support

Within joint operations, the term support signifies the action developed by one or more components for the benefit of another component, all of them belonging to the same joint force. Thus, for each operation, the commander of the joint force sets down, through the operations order, the status of both the supported commander and the supporting one.
F.A. 1, Doctrina pentru Opera]ii a For]elor Aeriene, Ibid.
37
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Close air support ~ CAS, from the perspective of the Air Forces Operations Doctrine, comprises all the air hits carried out by the multi-role combat aircrafts and the attack helicopters on the targets placed in the proximity of own forces. In a different way, we may say that close air support represents the air action aimed at the targets placed in the proximity of own forces, therefore the detailed coordination of each air missions with the fire and the manoeuvre of supported forces is necessary4. In order to avoid the losses on their side, owed to the effect of the aviation ammunitions, and to increase the close air support effectiveness, air strikes must be integrated with the fire and the manoeuvre of land forces, and this necessitates the detailed coordination of the operations fulfilled by the big unit, the units and subunits of different arms. Close air support is an action led at tactical level, which might create and exploit operational opportunities. This must be planned in order to prepare the circumstances or to amplify the success of land forces and, implicitly, of joint forces. Close air support can temporarily stop the enemy attacks/advance, help with engendering a gap in his disposition, cover withdrawals and protect the exposed wings of own forces. In order to be efficient, close air support must focus on obtaining a maximum effect on the target. The intrinsic features of aircrafts, speed, manoeuvrability, armament variety included, together with the fact that they act in the third dimension, allow them to attack the targets that other support weapons are not capable to effectively engage. At the same time, the improvement of tactics, techniques, procedures, own defence equipment, armaments has increased the ability of aircrafts to provide close air support, both at day and night time, in the most various meteorological conditions, as well as the capacity to react and change the objectives, depending on the effort and needs of the course of land actions. The commander of the joint force sets out, depending on the objectives and the stage in the development of the joint operation, which part of the air effort should provide the close air support objectives fulfilment, and the commander of the air component reports to the land component commander, through the Air Tasking Order ~ ATO or Air Task Messages ~ ATM, on the number of raids/aircraft which may be provided for the fulfilment of the requested close air support missions, during each planning cycle5. The commander of the land component sets out the targets that must be struck within the close air support according to a list of identified, examined targets, which are prioritised depending on various criteria. Close air support missions are requested through the liaison officers and the air operations coordination centre and are fulfilled through the planned actions method or upon request actions method. The communication systems of the two components must provide the rapid delivery of Air Request Messages ~ ARM and process them, and confirm the air support through ATO or ATM as well. The targets identified in time are demanded as planned air support requests. The immediate requests occur during the operation and cannot be identified beforehand, so as to allow for the detailed coordination and planning. Meeting these immediate
4 5
ATP 27 (C), Air Interdiction and Close Air Support, June 1999, p. 2-1. F.A. 1, Doctrina pentru Opera]ii a For]elor Aeriene, Ibid, p. 85.
38

Close air support planning process requests, Joint Operational a b o v e t h e Air support report, Approved resources Target list Headquarters i n i t i a l l y recommendations Resources/target distributed/ allocating allocated air recommendations resource for Air support Land Air demands the close air component component support, might Prioritised influence the target list CAS Demand Coordination COA availability of Corps/AOCC Liaison the air means Officer/Corps ATO/ATM f o r o t h e r CAS Request Brigade planned air ATO ALO/TACP 6 (ATM) operations . Coordination ATO/ATM CAS Request The time ALO/TACP Air Base available for Guidance Battalion the air subunits FAC Squadrons to respond to Aircrafts/Helicopters Objective the call must formation ensure the missions preparation by crews, aircrafts configuration and the establishment of the details of execution and cooperation with the other elements of own disposition. The request for air support, no matter it is planned or immediate, will be hierarchically submitted by any of the echelons of the supported component structure, through the command-control structures represented by the air forces at the respective echelons. These structures authorize the requests of the subordinated echelons, concentrate, prioritise and present them at COA through AOCC. The aircrafts or helicopters subunits assigned to carry out close air support missions will be placed under COAs operational control and will fulfil the missions according to the ATO/ATM drawn up by it. The commander of the joint force can decide, for an established period, that AOCC should be assigned the operational/tactical control on a/some aircraft or attack helicopters subunit. In these circumstances, the requests for planned air support will be included in the ATO drawn up by AOC, since AOC is the only structure qualified to draw up ATO, and ATO includes, during its valability period, all the aircrafts planned to fulfil combat missions. For the immediate requests, AOCC will draw up the ATM and send it directly to the subunits placed under operational/tactical control.
The request-response flow in the planned and upon request air support missions
Close air support missions can be fulfilled under the direct or indirect control of FAC or without its involvement. When combat aircrafts that carry out close air support are guided by FAC , it is necessary to know and apply certain common procedures
6
Ibid.
39
~ 2/2006
in order to coordinate the fire and the manoeuvres of the air forces with the Air Support Planning ones of the land forces. ALO/TACP ALO/TACP AOCC COA When CAS is carried Liaison Officer/ Battalion Brigade Corps Corps out under FAC s direct ATO control, this comes in direct CAS - ARM Request connection with the aircrafts ATO (ATM) Confirmation meant to support, information Air Base Execution order - ATO (ATM) exchange being made after the reciprocal identification. Squadrons As a consequence of the When aircraft and attack helicopters subunits are information exchange, when under AOCC operational/tactical control: the objective is in FACs line Air Support Planning of sight, it can ascertain and ALO/TACP ALO/TACP AOCC COA indicate the armament type, Liaison Officer/ Battalion Brigade Corps ammunition categories Corps CAS and quantities that may be ATO Planning CAS - ARM Request used in order to fulfil the ATO Confirmation missions objective. The Air Base direct control is compulsory Execution order - ATO in the areas wherein own Squadrons ATO Inclussion/confirmation troops are in direct contact with enemy forces. This Air Support on Demand means that FAC must know AOCC ALO/TACP ALO/TACP COA and even be familiar with Corps Liaison Officer/ Battalion Brigade Corps ATM the action procedure adopted CAS - ARM Request in fight, the characteristics Air Base ATM Report of the ammunition and the Execution Order - ATM capabilities of the aircrafts Squadrons assigned with CAS missions, Coordination they must have two secure ways of communication and keep them functioning throughout the mission and communicate the result of the attack. The indirect control of CAS by FAC is necessary when the objective is out of FACs line of sight, but one has enough detailed information on this that allows for the aircrafts crew to engage the target, precisely and rapidly identify it and efficiently attack it. In this case, FAC notifies the pilots of the aircrafts on the general situation and the one in the neighbouring area of the objective, while giving coordination instructions regarding the fighting disposition, the fire and the manoeuvres made by own forces. CAS actions that do not involve FAC will be detailed in ATM, and the liaison officers and Air Operations Coordination Centre will bring those up to date. These missions are fulfilled at the commander of the formation order, do not necessitate radio air-land connection and involve assuming responsibility by the commander of the supported unit for the security of the subordinated forces7. When aircraft and helicopters subunits are under AOC operational/tactical control:
7
Air Power Handbook, op. cit., p. V-2.
40

With a view to achieving the coordination of the flight on trajectory, the contact point (CP), initial point (IP), indicators and frequencies of all the command-control structures involved in the missions fulfilment will be notified. Throughout the entire trajectory of the fight, the reciprocal identification will be made, and the radio connection will be permanently kept so that the ultimate details could be received, in case the plan changes and the missions are cancelled. FAC will maintain the connection with the land forces elements engaged in the fight with the enemy, too, in order to inform them about the air actions that are about to take place, so that the losses among own forces could be eliminated or diminished. In order to fulfil CAS , the land-air communications are of great importance, as means by which the following will be provided: the local air traffic control, leading the air actions for supporting the land forces, receiving reports from the flying aircrafts, specifying the landing areas, parachuting zones, gathering sectors and the contact alignment etc. In this respect, FAC will be equipped with radio stations with 225-400 MHz range, with antennas of 1,6 m, which will provide the connection at distances of 15-160 km, depending on the aircrafts flight altitude (30-6 000 m). In addition, it will have VHF radio stations at its disposal and HF ones, too, when possible, in order to ensure the communications within the structure from the disposition wherein it is engaged usually within the battalions combat disposition, near the contact line. The radio stations on land will be interoperable with the UHF stations on the aircrafts, be they secret or not, with or without frequency hopping, with the possibility of automatically changing the frequency in case of jamming, resistant to random perturbations. The provided working ways are: voice, locating tone in case of damage, 16 kbps speed data. Amplitude modulation with two adjacent sidebands will be employed in order to send secret data and voice. CAS missions represent a convincing example of joint action, with major effects on the development of fight, but which might prove its effectiveness only following a successful planning and synchronisation. The complexity of CAS missions represents a process that involves cooperation between numerous structures, being dependent on a multitude of aspects related to both planning and execution.
41
ASYMMETRY IN WARFARE
Colonel Mircea M|NDRESCU ~ Advisor, the Defence Section, Romanias Permanent Delegation to NATO ~
he first explicit mention of asymmetry appeared in US in 1995, in the Joint Doctrine. At that time, the concept, which was focused on defining asymmetric engagements as those between dissimilar forces, specifically air versus land, air versus sea, and so forth, was assessed as having limited utility and consequently other attempts followed. In 1995, in US, the National Military Strategy enlarged the concept and listed terrorism, the use of weapon of mass destruction and information warfare among asymmetric challenges. In 1997, the Report of Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) re-examined the concept and stated: US dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to useasymmetric means to attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home. The doors of debate being open, many attempts have been made in order to accommodate the concept in defining the challenges of the modern world. A potential asymmetric challenger has been labelled as being one who would not fight fair or who would use surprise or who would attack ones weaknesses. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that asymmetry is nothing new in the history of warfare. It will be demonstrated that the achievement of positive asymmetry is the reason for ones victory. If asymmetry means the lack of equality or equivalence between the parts, then asymmetry has been present in the whole history of warfare. Its forms have had many names: types and number of weapons, number of soldiers and the level of training, strategic culture, military doctrine, morale etc. Never in history have two opponents been equal in military strengths and capabilities, and this difference is proposed to be called standing asymmetry. The acting asymmetry, the other embodiment of the term, is a result of many factors that are playing their role into a conflict and, finally, it is the explanation of victory. This is the main relevance of asymmetry in warfare. Asymmetry has not only been present all the time but also it has been highly desirable. As it will be demonstrated, positive standing asymmetry does not necessary mean positive acting asymmetry. In defining asymmetry in the realm of warfare, the first point to be stressed is that asymmetry is not a fashion that appeared in the 1990s. The roots of asymmetric approaches are in the existence of asymmetric possibilities. If war, as Clausewitz put it, is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will, then, nevertheless, the weaker has had to find ways to achieve his goals in spite of his inferiority, and to act as the enemy expects is probably the best way to failure. 42

On the other hand, the asymmetric approach does not belong only to the weak party. The stronger has discovered, in his turn, that acting originally, doing what his enemy expects less would make his victory less costly and more complete. In this way, to achieve the necessary degree of superiority, that is to say positive asymmetry, has been the aim toward which both parties have constantly been acting. The race for better arms, for better doctrine, for better organisational system, for better training etc., is the explanation for the desire to achieve superior asymmetry in order to have success. For a better understanding of asymmetry in warfare probably it is worth analysing what could be assessed as being symmetric or asymmetric in the realm of warfare and what places these two forms have inside the phenomenon war. In accordance with the English Dictionary, symmetry is the quality of being made up of exactly similar parts facing each other or around an axis; similarity or exact correspondence. Simply speaking, symmetry means similarity. In the realm of warfare, symmetry is more present in the philosophical aspects of war. Taking into account the final scope of a war, so to say, the imposition of ones will upon the adversary, there has always been symmetry, although antagonistic, between the competitors, each at their turn trying to concentrate their action toward achieving their aims. Another symmetrical feature would be that no military conflict has been won without respecting the principles of war. When speaking about the Clausewitzian enduring characteristics of war, namely the presence of friction, fog of war, uncertainty and fear, it is clear that both competitors have symmetrically been subject to the influences of these factors. It would be interesting to address the degree of symmetry in the so-called symmetric wars. Probably, those who are advocating the existence of a purely symmetric type of warfare would say that an army versus army style of waging war, fought only with conventional weapons, is a true example of this sort of conflict. Germanys campaign against Poland in 1939 would probably be an example, which would satisfy the supporters of this idea. Provided that there had been no differences between the opposing parts during that campaign, that both competitors had been symmetrical in capabilities and had been using a symmetric type of warfare, it would have been difficult to explain why Germany won and Poland lost so quickly. Going to analyse the true reason for which Germany was given victory, it will be discovered that Germany won because it enjoyed an overall positive asymmetry upon its adversary. So, Germany won not because it was the same as Poland but because it was different in a positive way, it had positive asymmetry compared with its adversary. In turn, Poland was different to Germany but in a negative way. Taking another example, the 1991 Gulf War was fought in an army versus army style and only with conventional weapons, but was that war symmetric ? Did the opponents have the same capabilities ? Definitely not ! The Iraqi forces were outmatched in every aspect and these huge differences were the explanation of the complete success of the Coalitions forces. From these examples, it is clear that symmetry has not been the reason for the fact that one wins and the other loses, it is compulsory to achieve a overall positive asymmetry in order to succeed. 43
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The explanation given by the English Dictionary to the term asymmetry is that it means the lack of equality or equivalence between parts or aspects of something; lack of symmetry. Simply put, asymmetry means difference. In the realm of warfare, asymmetry has to be seen as a presence beyond any discussions (two opponents have never been exactly the same) and, through its aspect of positive asymmetry, as being the core explanation of victory. All the time the balance of success has been inclined to the part that puts something in addition on its plate in comparison with its adversary. It is to be underlined that, from a dynamic point of view, the asymmetry in warfare has two aspects. The first one is that asymmetry has a standing aspect, which is sequential and static. The second one is that asymmetry has an acting aspect, which is overarching, changing, and it is this aspect that decides who will win a war or a battle. The relation between the two aspects is probably better described using an example. The fact that a state has a superior number of tanks in his army is a positive standing asymmetry for it and a negative standing asymmetry for its enemy. The existence of a standing positive asymmetry does not automatically mean that the respective state will have a positive acting asymmetry and will win. As it was the case in 1940, between the Allies and Germany on the Western Front or in 1941, between Germany and the Soviet Union, the superior number of Allied or Soviet tanks, so to say the existence of a positive standing asymmetry in the most important weapon of the Land Warfare, was not enough for the Allies or the Russians to succeed. As it can be seen from the 1940 and 1941 examples, a positive standing asymmetry, although desirable, is not sufficient for achieving success; what is important is to have a positive acting asymmetry. Did the fact the Germans were inferior in tanks mean that they were the weaker party ? If the answer were yes then the fact that the Germans were successful would not explain their victory, for a weak has never won. Therefore, logically, the answer has to be the Germans were, somehow, the stronger party overall and that only the number, or even the quality of equipment, does not always equal positive acting asymmetry. The necessary conclusion from this short demonstration is that for assessing which party enjoys positive asymmetry and which party enjoys a negative one, a constellation of factors has to be taken into account, not only with regard to their separate play, but most important, their inter-relations have to be analysed, the ways in which they influence each other positively or negatively have to be taken into account, because what is important is the overall final result. These results pertaining to both opponents spell the overall final balance between the competitors. If accepting the explanation provided above, then it becomes unclear why eventually Germany lost and the Soviet Union won. There are two main explanations. The first one is related to the Metzs classification of asymmetry in long termed and short termed ones. The operational positive asymmetry, which was imposed by Germany in the form of Blitzkrieg, is generally a short termed form, due, mainly, to the fact that sooner or latter the enemy learns. On the other hand, the strategic asymmetry (especially in terms of resources), in which the Soviet Union was superior, is a long termed one. Being inferior strategically, the single solution Germany had had, would have been a quick decision. It was not like that, because its positive operational acting asymmetry was not enough. The second explanation regarding the outcome of the struggle between Germany 44

and the Soviet Union, in close relation with the previous one, is related to the balance between standing and acting asymmetry. Making an analogy, the standing asymmetry (troops, weapons etc), which is in close relation with the strategic possibilities, could be compared with the raw material. On the other hand, activities regarding war (for example the application of military doctrine) belonging to an opponent could be compared with the technological process that enables the raw material to be transformed in the final product. The better the quality of the raw material one will send to the technological process, the better the result one will obtain. This result is called acting asymmetry. When the quantity or quality of the raw material begins to fall, then the quality of the final product will fall, as well. In a way, it could be said the standing asymmetry is feeding the acting asymmetry. By this process, acting asymmetry influences standing asymmetry by increasing or decreasing it. That was Germanys case when it fought against Russia. After a while, Germany could not provide what it used to, and the quality of results fell accordingly. So, its superior acting asymmetry declined over time to the point of having a negative value eventually. This is not the general rule though. As Paul explains, in some particular conditions (external diplomatic support, limited objectives etc) operational superior acting asymmetry could be enough (in a case of quick victory) for success in spite of strategic negative standing asymmetry, as the case of Japans victory over Russia in 1905 demonstrated. Metz and Johnson recognise that at least six forms of asymmetry are relevant in the realm of national security and warfare. These are: asymmetry of methods, which entails using different operational concepts or tactical doctrines than the enemy; asymmetries of technologies; asymmetries of will, with its derivate of asymmetry of morale at the operational and tactical level; asymmetry of organisation; and asymmetry of patience which is conceptually linked to an asymmetry of will, but operates mainly in cross-cultural conflicts. In their description, Metz and Johnson underline many facets of asymmetry but they do not organise them in more elaborated forms and do not touch the aspect of how they influence each other and how they, together, influence the war as a whole. Arguably, a more elaborate form of organising the various aspects of asymmetry would be possible if the concept of Fighting Power were taken into account. It could be seen that Metz and Johnsons forms of asymmetry are included. Basically, the Fighting Power (in other words, the ability to fight) has three components: the Physical Component or Combat Power (the means to fight) that includes manpower, logistics, equipment, training and readiness; the Conceptual Component (the thought process) that pertains to principles of war, military doctrine and development; the Moral Component (the ability to get people to fight) that refers to motivation, leadership and management. What is important to be underlined, is that the Fighting Power is the result of the interactions of all components. There is a necessity that all of them are mutually supportive. Taking a tank as an example, its physical existence means almost nothing. Its effectiveness depends on: its technical characteristics, the value of its crew in terms of skill and morale, and the way in which it is employed on the battlefield. A state could enjoy various degrees of positive and negative standing asymmetries in relation with another state regarding all the components of fighting power. The possession 45
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of an overall superior fighting power is the aim of each competitor case of a conflict. If one competitor perceives itself as being inferior, so to say has a standing negative asymmetry in relation with its enemy in one or more of the components of fighting power, it will try to surpass its challenger in the other/others in such a manner so as to achieve a superior acting asymmetry overall, a globally superior fighting power. The more a competitor perceives itself as being inferior in some components or subcomponents of fighting power, the more it will try to outweigh its enemy in the remaining components or subcomponents, so that the overall balance of fighting power is favourable to it. Therefore, it is possible to say that the primary root of asymmetry is asymmetry itself. There is a continuous cycle, in which the level of asymmetry rises and decreases accordingly to relations between the opponents. This could lead to various degrees of asymmetry that could end up with the adoption of a totally asymmetric warfare. The existence of positive asymmetry is the explanation of the success but it is extremely difficult to assess precisely what importance a particular superior aspect would have in the overall picture of achieving superior asymmetry. During the Matabele war, fought by the British 1893-1894, 5 000 Matabele warriors were defeated by 50 British soldiers that were armed with four Maxim guns. In fact, it is said, in respect with the Maxim machineguns, that they conquered empires. US Col Boyd provides an astonishing example of disproportionate influence some aspects may have. During the Korean War, the American pilots achieved an extremely superior rate of killing during air fights with respect to the communist pilots, in spite of some inferior technical performances of their Fs compared with the Migs. Boyd discovered that was the case because the American pilots were able to complete OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action) cycles before their adversaries. Further on, Boyd reached the conclusion that the American pilots were able to be faster than their opponents in completing the OODA cycles because the design of the cockpit of their airplane enabled them to have a better visibility during the fight therefore concluding the Observation phase more rapidly. Another important and challenging aspect of asymmetry is underlined by Metz when he stresses that asymmetry could come up deliberately or by default. In addition to Metz observation, probably another type could be added, namely asymmetry by chance. The deliberate asymmetry is planned and is the result of human thought. Metzs second type is when an opponent recourses to a specific action because that is the only way he could act (due to various reasons), and not because he chooses so consciously. The third one, proposed here, is strongly related to chance and accidental happenings. As Clausewitz put it, No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound by chance. And through the element of chance, guess-work and luck come to play a great part in war. An accidental occurrence could boost the existence of either positive or negative asymmetry between the opponents. The capturing, by chance, of an enemy operational plan could be an example of the sort. Although the concept of asymmetric warfare has been perennial throughout history, the particular forms of it have not. As Clausewitz states in On War, Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. As it was the case with gunpowder, the airplane, the corps organisational system etc, what today seems to be asymmetric, tomorrow could be very common. Therefore, to define what forms asymmetry could take and what place it could have in the future are subjective and time 46

dependent attempts and, therefore, the results could lose their everlasting values. To prevent this, one should concentrate on the core of the concept. Is the presence of asymmetry a desirable thing ? History has shown that when contending parties were too similar, as it was the case in WWI, or the 100-year War, the periods of fighting are prolonged and inconclusive. Therefore, the more the asymmetry is present, the shorter a conflict would be. In conclusion, to draw a firm line between symmetry and asymmetry in warfare is almost impossible. In reality there are not asymmetric or symmetric conflicts, in reality there are only conflicts in which the opponents are more or less different, doing some things almost in the same way, and others things in very different ways. To pick up one particular feature of a conflict, either one that stresses the symmetry or one that stresses the asymmetry, and to say that particular feature is the most relevant one is a process doomed to lack objectivity. Instead, what is to be picked from the history is that the side with the overall positive asymmetry has always won and in achieving this positive asymmetry often originality, the avoidance of the strong points of an adversary and the playing of ones own strong features, have proved themselves as being the best solutions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Everymans Library, 1993. Gerard Chaliand, The Art of War in World History, University of California Press, 1994. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War, Frank Cass, 2000. Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, Frank Cass, 1986. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Shambhala, 1988. Col Franklin D. Margiotta, Brasserys Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography, Brasseys, 1994. A. Cordesman, Lessons of Modern War, London, 1989. N. J. Newman, Asymmetric Threats to British Military Intervention Operation, London, RUSI, 2000. Lloyd J. Matthews, Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated ?, US Army College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare, http://www.cdi.org. US Congressman Ike Skelton, Americas Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts , http://www-cgsc.army.mil. Timothy L. Thomas, Asymmetric Warfare, Military Review, Jul/Aug2001, http://ehostvgw18.epnet.com. Jonathan Tucker, Asymmetric Warfare: An Emerging Threat to US Security, http://www.comw.org. Robert Worley, Asymmetry and Adaptive Command, http://www.cgsc.army.mil. Sharon Hobson, The Asymmetric Future, http://intranet/janes. Timothy L. Thomas, Deciphering Asymmetrys Word Game, http://www.infowar.com. Jonathan B. Tucker, Asymmetric Warfare, http://forum.ra.utk.edu. David L. Grange, Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern, http://nationalstrategy.com. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts. James J. Schneider, A New Form of Warfare, http://www-cgsc.army.mil. Clark L. Staten, Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming Challenge For Emergency and National Security Forces, http://www.emergency.com/asymetrc.htm. Clark L. Staten, Asymmetric Warfare, and Other Attacks; Future National Security Implications http://www.emergency.com. Robert H. Allen, Asymmetric Warfare: Is the Army Ready ?, http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil. Richard Norton-Taylor, Asymmetric Warfare, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
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HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN GLOBALISATION ERA

Colonel Tache JURUBESCU ~ Chief Deputy of the Organisation, Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate from the General Staff ~
One fifth of the European Union (EU) population live with about 60% of the national median incomes, the threshold to identify relative poverty in the EU. Poverty rates vary between 11% and 14% and they have not significantly changed during the last period. Some other 20 to 40% of the population live just above the poverty limit1. Their incomes do not provide a decent living and they can easily become unemployed. Unemployment and especially long-term unemployment is considered a decisive factor leading to the so-called social exclusion. From the social exclusion point of view, the elements defining work quality, such as duration, stability, and income, are very important. The way in which governments react to the problems generated by social exclusion represents an essential aspect of each and every countrys policy in the first years of the new century. The Article 128.2 of the EU Treaty provides the basis for the adoption of the guidelines for the employment policies for the Member States, at the Commission proposal. Following a five-year experience in implementing the Strategy, the Commission together with the Member States performed a thorough analysis and proposed a complex review of the main guidelines regarding the employment policy2. Therefore, on January 14, 2003, an official statement was issued expressing the Commissions point of view on future European Strategy in the field of human resources, as well as the priorities for establishing the new directions. In order to accomplish the three objectives established in Lisbon3, the Member States should consider a number of ten priorities. The tenth is related to supporting occupational and geographical mobility and improving employees training level to meet the job requirements job matching. For that reason, the Member States should put into practice
Is globalisation acceptable ?
Paul Brenton, Globalisation and Social Exclusion in the EU: Policy Implications. Proposal for a Council Decision on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States, Brussels, 08. 04. 2003 COM (2003) 176 final 2003/0068 (CNS). 3 The European Council, Lisbon, 23 and 24 March 2000.
1 2
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an Action Plan for mobility and professional abilities, which may lead to the reduction, even elimination of the problems concerning the employment issues at regional level and large variations of the unemployment tempo by removing the obstacles related to geographical mobility, promoting occupational mobility, improving the system of professional skills acknowledgment, providing the possibility to transfer the social insurance (welfare) and pension rights, introducing a new tax and benefit system to stimulate the potential immigration. Transparent training and employment opportunities will be made available at European level to achieve a better relationship between job requirements and employee capabilities. Member States, through specialised services, will provide a list with all available positions for those who are interested in finding a job. In his paper issued in November 2000, as part of a project on Globalisation and Social Exclusion4 developed within a EU economic-social research programme, Paul Brenton, as chief researcher at CEPS (the Centre for European Policy Studies) thoroughly analysed the effects of globalisation over the economic and social policies. The author brings arguments in favour of commercial restrictions as a reaction to the effects of globalisation. Even though globalisation is a major factor to determine the social exclusion phenomenon, economic analyses have shown, no doubt about it, that commercial and capital restrictions are not an answer for Europe. In order to ensure redistribution, a better policy should be applied to prevent the loss of the advantages from the commercial and capital exchange. In Europe, people that work in other places benefit from a special social security system. Therefore, the fear that globalisation might undermine the government ability to collect taxes and increase the income, this way compromising the European population welfare, has no support. Recent research on the impact of globalisation on labour market in Europe shows that there is a pretty high degree of uncertainty with respect to the impact commercial and capital flows might have. Some studies suggest an important role of commerce in influencing social inequalities, while others see this role as being irrelevant when compared to the impact generated by technological changes. Nevertheless, even though globalisation may be considered the main factor in generating such inequalities, commercial barriers and long-term restrictions on capital flows are inappropriate answers to the inequality and social exclusion issues. For the last two centuries, for most of the European countries social expenditures have increased significantly in line with the continuous augmentation of the tax weight in the GDP value. In most of the European countries, authorities take action to overcome the problems generated by a series of distressing factors to gain and maintain welfare. One of these factors, even though with a minor influence, could be globalisation. The issue related to the pressure upon social security systems, if the global integration continues, stays open. There is no total answer to the question up to which level the globalisation is acceptable, but we might
Paul Brenton, op.cit.
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believe that there will never be a full and perfect integration of the world assets and capital markets and an important number of constraints will limit globalisation widespread. Often discussed is the fact that commercial exchanges with lots of the developing countries are unfair due to the fact that these countries do not respect the work standards as in the EU countries. As a result, the costs are lower than if the fundamental rights of the employees are respected. If the inequalities in the EU were increasing because of the unfair commerce, then an appropriate answer would be to reduce commerce. The researchers though have not established exactly how much these commercial flows are affected by the lack of basic labour rights. National policy regarding taxes and transfers, including unemployment support, plays an important part in improving the quality of life for the European countries. Statistics show that in the mid-90s the poverty transfer rate5 for the population able to work was 23% in Belgium, 25% in France, 14% in Germany, 23% in Sweden and 24% in Great Britain. The effectiveness of the tax and transfer systems in the EU countries enhanced during the globalisation period and the effect of the redistribution through the tax transfer system amplified in the last two decades of the past century. As a conclusion, Paul Brenton appreciates that if it is impossible to reject the assertion according to which globalisation has had a major impact upon the wages and the inequalities among employees in Europe and, consequently, upon social exclusion, then it is possible that the commercial security measures and long-term control over the capital flows may be seen as an inappropriate answer. This does not mean that governments will not be involved in sustaining the interests of the employees with a low level of training; on the contrary, a more and more efficient policy on redistribution will be implemented. Presently, social security systems in the EU aim at supporting jobless population, disregarding the cause: either globalisation or technological modernisation. At the same time, we can state that the size of commercial impact depending on technological modernisation is not relevant comparing to the response policies, if we consider that commerce, as well as technology, brings benefits to an economy whose redistribution policies aim to consolidate it. As for commercial sanctions, they are thought inappropriate because developing countries will never respect them. This does not mean that the measures for eradication of children exploitation, discrimination related to work, freedom of association and collective negotiations will not be continued. Imposing commercial sanctions as a reaction to the lack of measures for the implementation of basic labour rights in different countries will not improve the situation. On the contrary, the quality of life of the poor citizens in poor countries will worsen. Industrialised countries should give up these measures. A positive approach will be to stimulate those countries, which try to apply fundamental rights of the employees, but have technical difficulties
5
Proportion of persons in households with less than 50% of median disposable income.
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in implementing them. From another angle, a lot more effective will be to develop a policy to improve the educational system in developing countries, including the financial support of childrens education in order to eliminate their exploitation. Starting with the need to create more and better jobs for the EU citizens, in March 2004, the European Council pointed out the emergency character of taking action in this respect. The three major objectives established in 2003 by the Employment Guidelines continue the European Strategy line in the field of human resources (EES European Employment Strategy) in Lisbon. Reforms made by the EU Member States have shown their validity in improving the performance of the labour market confirmed by raising employment in the first years and their relative stability in the recent economic decline. Yet, the progress of Lisbon objective6 to achieve a 70% level of employment by 2010, set at just 64.3%, represents a compromise. Not having strong support actions, the objective will not be accomplished. Productivity has stagnated; the quality of work and the respective labour markets remain important challenges for many EU Member States. For Europe to reach the objectives of 2010 and improve competitivity and economic growth7 there is a need to accelerate the level of filling the jobs and increase work productivity. To ensure the trust and stability of the jobs there should be an appropriate macro-economic policy. Creating jobs and competitivity on the labour market should be accomplished together with the structural reforms in services, and capital market. Progress in all domains established in Lisbon, completed by the environmental dimension in Gteborg in the field of research and development8 (R&D), education and training, the development of potential to employ environmental policy, especially in the environmental goods and services sectors, as well as the reform of the social security systems including pensions must go together. Policies in these domains lead to more investment in business both for human and material capital, which will create conditions for new jobs and increase productivity by strengthening the European capability to perform the management of change. The four action areas of the European Council in 2004 are: increase adaptability of employees and factories; attract population towards the labour market and change the job into a real option for everyone; effective investment in human capital; ensure a real implementation of reforms through a better governance. These four areas, which have become more important after the block accession of the ten new members, represent the European Council recommendations with regard to human resources to be considered by all members. Since they were introduced
Human resources policies within EU
6 The Future of the European Employment Strategy (EES), A Strategy for Employment and Better Jobs for All, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 14. 01. 2003 COM (2003) 6 final. 7 More than 20 million new jobs to be created. 8 In March 2002 Barcelona European Council set the objective of increasing the investment for R&D at 3 % of GDP, from which 2/3 to be supported by the private sector.
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for the first time in 2000, the recommendations permitted the partition of different directives between Member States according to their concrete situation and progress in implementing them. EU will make available considerable financial resources to promote development and reforms or structural adjustments for the Member States or the regions remaining behind. Active actions regarding labour market and public and private investments in human capital will be taken in order to correlate some failure on the labour market and to support the implementation of the employment strategy. Together with the recommendations for each country, the four common recommendations make a strong set. Member Countries will focus actions to eliminate main obstacles and the government programmes will be more and more harmonised with the European Strategy in the field of human resources. EU recommendations can give a new dynamic to the strategy through a better correlation of the EU financial resources, based on the experience of the Member States. The strategy entails the implication of national governments, social partners and other participants and will be a major component of the Partnership for Change introduced by the European Social Partners. All the aspects of the directive should be taken into account by the human resources policy of the Member Nations in an integrated and comprehensive manner, then included in the National Action Plans every year on the 1st of October. Plans are analysed and the results are introduced into the Common Report of the European Council and Commission of European Communities. At the European Council in Brussels, March 2005, the human resources issue, the integration and social development aspects for the EU were taken into consideration in the Lisbon Strategy implementation context. The Council appealed to the Member States so that, in line with their responsibility and according to the European Strategy on the topic of human resources and social inclusion, the following actions have to be taken regarding young people: monitor supporting policy for the integration of young people on the labour market; improve the situation of the most vulnerable, especially the poor ones with a focus on strengthening the level of graduation of educational programmes; increase social responsibility of the employees for vocational integration of the young; encourage young people to begin own business. The Council made recommendations regarding the educational and training systems and the mobility within EU, as well as the reconciliation between work and personal life. In human resources management (HRM) activities, the economic context plays a very important role with direct influence on work conditions. European economic development has shown a progress starting with 1997, after the stagnation at the beginning of the last decade. Economic sectors with rapid progress are the ones in the field of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, genetics, energy, microelectronics etc. In these sectors productivity has reached maximum levels that automatically led to maximising the use of human resources. Labour market liberalisation in Europe, together with the EU expansion, has determined
European human resources management models
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an increasing competition and also the hunting for skilled human resources, not only locally or regionally, but more and more at the European level. Due to the revolutionary, reformatory events European countries dealt with in the 90s, Western countries had to react in order to adapt to the new situation. Developed countries like France and Germany made great efforts to reduce the salary costs level, counter the reduced working time and also the creation of a new model for the human resources management. German HRM model is based on professionalism and competency, which supports professional training, promotion and loyalty towards the employer. If, at the beginning of the 90s, the favourable circumstances of the labour market were determined by the budgetary and economic policy, which stimulates the development, the flow of foreign investment, encouraging salary policy for increased productivity, presently, the competitivity on the European market can essentially change the freedom of action of the German HRM. West European Union countries have noticed that the human resources function encompasses all the professional relations established within an organisation. That is why, specialists should fully understand and use the legislative set in the field. Human resources function had a limited role in the past in the decision-making process related to personnel. Nowadays, this function with strategic, control, and evaluation values plays a fundamental role in the decision-making process. The objectives of the function revealed after an analysis made in about 600 organisations in EU countries and Romania, with a different weight from country to country, are: create and develop human resources (32% in Germany, 23% in France and Great Britain), recruit and retain the human resources (16% in Germany and Great Britain, 5% in France), social relations (12%), effectiveness, productivity and flexibility of the human resources (7%). In respect of the human resources managers origin, these are not exclusively lawyers like they use to be two decades ago, but lawyers (25%) and also psychologists, sociologists, engineers etc. Human resources management means implementing employment policy (recruitment, selection, individual career management), salary (individualised salary, flexible anticipation of human resources), training (personal plans), planning the working hours, communication. Policies determine certain practice such as: evaluation systems of the personnel potential and performance, professional surveys and career plans, introducing automated data processing (ADP) systems for keeping human resources records. Human resources function is adaptable and flexible to cope with the competitive environment within EU. For instance, limited contracts are used again and also partial unemployment is accepted as a damper on labour market. Even though EU recommendations to the Member States sustain permanent contracts as general type of contract, currently, the macroeconomic circumstances show the effectiveness of this practice. Functional flexibility that has developed more and more as a result of the efforts to provide organisations with the necessary human resources is also a characteristic of our times. Within organisations we must consider all employees to participate in specific activities; rapid adaptation to the external environment with which the organisation interacts; this is a major concern for organisations disregarding the size and activity and involves 53
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intelligence, initiative, interpersonal and global communication skills, innovation and creativity to counter the rigid environment. The success of an organisation through performance is the result of better use of available resources and especially human resources. This means not only the quantitative and physical aspect, but also the qualitative one: the intelligence and creativity of the individuals that constitute the human resource. Human resources managers have the responsibility to elaborate and set a new division of work, tasks, responsibilities and objectives for human resources to reach success regarding mobilisation, adaptability and personalised HRM. This provides information and means necessary to the activity, trains managers, controls social management, and also develops the human resources social audit. Of course, in the new European competitive context these cannot be accomplished without automated data processing of human resources. Human resources manager has a complete set of programmes and computerised applications designed to help him/her to deal with the information available effectively, improve the carrying out of duties and lead to increasing productivity. Besides the calculation of salary, ADP programmes can solve all the administrative issues of human resources management. These programmes allow for the analysis of human resources condition, provide a better understanding of the previous situation, as well as of future risks and also help in foreseeing posting management and necessary human resources. The other European countries develop HRM models not very different from those of the western countries. Great Britain9, for example, has a special position: here the common law system shows a cultural difference compared to the legislative systems in other European countries. Human resources function has changed dramatically in the past years and has integrated a strategic vision. Due to the fact that big organisations managers retired during the last decade of the last century, the number of people (the so-called hunting heads) designated to find appropriate replacements has increased. Therefore, the profile of the function changes accordingly; presently, specialists capable of getting involved in setting strategic visions are needed to define the organisational structure, to motivate human resources and to maximise productivity. After a period in which human resources role was not considered very important in Great Britain, now the human resource has got the role of first strategic resource and most of human resources managers are involved in defining the organisation general policy. British organisations have projects in human resources area and human resources policy, detailed action plans, in well-defined term (38% of the organisations less than a year, 32% one to two years, 28% two to five years). Academically, managerial thinking in general and especially human resources thinking is highly developed in Great Britain. In smaller countries like Denmark, Ireland, Belgium and Holland, the models of neighbouring countries influence practice in the field of human resources. In Denmark, human resources department participate very little in the strategic process, almost
9
Iulia Chivu, Dimensiunea european` a managementului resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, 2003.
54

as little as in Italy. The degree of participation of human resources managers in steering committees is merely 53%, under the European average level. The weight of the organisations that have a strategy in the field of human resources management is 61%. If we consider automated data conversion of the strategies in the field of human resources management, Scandinavian countries have a lot better situation than countries with tradition in the field (68% in Sweden and 74% in Norway compared to only 20% in Germany, 29% in France, 33% in Italy and 45% in Great Britain). The Netherlands is a moderate case, where, even though 54% of the human resources managers participate in the strategic decision-making process, only 44% are part of the committees and administration. More than a half of the organisations have a strategy in the field of human resources. In this country, the human resources function has evolved after 2000, since they transformed the employee interest-based approach and human character-based approach into the managerial efficient-based approach. In Southern EU countries the evolution of the human resources function was determined by the favourable economic circumstances characterised by the rapid development of labour market. Spain and Portugal, two representatives of a strong economic development in the past years, have developed the human resources function as well that have passed from an administrative-based approach to a modern concept adapted to the economic context. Evaluation manner of the human resources management in Spain is representative for tailoring the human resources function: evaluation is based on two fundamental criteria such as cost control (like Sweden and France) and management of the personnel recruited by the organisation, specific to Spain that has the majority of the population employed in factories and small to middle organisations. Italy is a special case, full of contrasts. Even though it has a remarkable dynamism, Italy confronts with a series of structural difficulties, which negatively influence performance. The strengths are the investments that led to re-technologising factories, monetary stabilisation, and economic aggression over the East European market, a special quality of human resources management, which pays more attention to people. The weaknesses are the big budgetary shortage (11% of the GDP), unemployment and inflation rate, a poor quality of public services, underground economy (25% of the GDP compared to only 12% in France), demographic falling (annual birth rate of 0.03% the lowest in Europe). * Human resources management systems have evolved a lot, human resources function receiving and consolidating its role of active participant in the strategic decisionmaking process. Even though human resources management has a limited role in small and middle organisations, human resources are more and more important and present in the organisational strategies. Human resources function has a new role and has radically renewed. Despite the difficulties faced when developing the human resources function, especially related to the size of organisations, the rigidity of legislative systems and the externalisation of human resources, these are currently in the centre of the organisational strategy attention. 55
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Human resources management has contributed to the strategic changes in the European organisations, both at instrumental level, as an exchange means (recruitment and career management plans and procedures, training or payment plans), and at integrated level, as a component of the strategic approach to; recruitment, selection, training decisions being closely connected to one another and simultaneously with those related to production and even to organisation augmentation, diversification and specialisation. Integrated approach mostly explains the success of the strategies adopted at the European organisations level. This generated, though, a series of changes in the content of human resources management. Enhancing the area of activity of human resources, separating the labour market and individualising human resources, changing recruitment, employment and individual career management policy by creating an European labour market, as well as decentralising the human resources function, are elements encompassed in human resources management that have undergone changes generated by the need to adapt to the new and diverse socio-economic context of Europe of the 25. Human resources management is sensitive to the labour market inputs, to maintain characteristics specific to strategic management and proceed to increase organisation productivity. Human resources management renewal is accomplished through lots of actions such as: acquiring competency through the externalisation activities, coordinating small organisations and developing contractual relations; moving from a uniform human resources management to a divided and individualised one; a new type of management of the employees and responsibilities in order to change the organisation; decentralising strategic decisions regarding human resources management.
56
EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS
A NEW APPROACH TO ARMED CONFLICT
Lieutenant Colonel Ion VLAD
~ Student, Faculty of Command and Staff, the National Defence University Carol I ~
Major Iulian BERDIL~ ~ Personal Assistant to the Romanian CHOD ~

It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemys forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, paralyse it that gains us new allies, favourably affect the political scene etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies. Carl von Clausewitz
In the period following the Cold War, many military systems have analysed and planned the implementation of certain doctrinaire or technological changes, as well as changes regarding the approach to military affairs. The USA focuses on the implementation of an emergent concept achieving military effects, and not only, on different levels of the war: strategic, operative and tactical. This concept aims at approaching national objectives and effects achievement, the effects that lead to the respective objectives achievement, in a holistic manner. In essence, Effects-Based Operations ~ EBO represent the adaptive application of the instruments of national power capacities to achieve certain results in peace and conflict time, at strategic, operative or tactical level. In other words, EBO seeks to defeat the enemys will and strategy rather than to achieve its kinetic destruction. EBO concept is at the stage of an embryo, given the fact that research concepts and emergency always stir up debates and cause challenges, due to the already existent perceptions and stereotypes. There are yet sources for the research and development of EBO concept that succeed in presenting and analysing the concept in detail. Thus, Williamson Murray develops a comparative analysis on three distinct campaigns with a view to providing a historical basis for the study of EBO concept. In his work, A Historical Perspective on Effects-Based Operations, Murray analyses General Ulysses S. Grant campaign in Vicksburg, during the American Civil War, the German forces in 1940 forcing the River Meuse and the offensive of the strategic 57
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allied bombardment in the Second World War. Murray defines EBO as a concept with a mental state-focused approach. He identifies EBO as being operations of assessment and adaptation to respond to the real conditions before these conditions dramatically change. Paul K. Davis, in his work, Effects-Based Operations. A Grand Challenge to Analytical Community, defines EBO as those operations conceived and planned within a systemic framework that considers the full spectrum of direct, indirect and waterfall effects. He highlights that the current operational methods for analysis and modelling are inadequate for EBO representation. Davis suggests approaching new culture, new theories and methods if we intend to thoroughly understand EBO concept. Gary H. Cheek approaches EBO from the terrestrial manoeuvre perspective in his work Effects-Based Operations. The End of Dominant Maneuver. He states that real EBO engagement can be found at the level of superior echelons. Cheek concludes that the analytical nature of effects-based thinking is more appropriate to the strategic decisional process and less to the tactical levels, where the standard operating rules and training are real determiners of success. From the historical point of view, the syntagm effects-based operations originates in the time of the air campaign at the beginning of the Desert Storm Operation. Major General David Deptula argued, during the operation, that the technological progress attained in the field of air power led to EBO concept approach and design. Thus, stealth aircrafts capabilities and the precision guided ammunition allowed for this concept to be applied for the first time. Deptula suggested changing the paradigm regarding determining and establishing objectives towards focusing on the desired effects instead of a destructive approach that implies striking objectives. Experts in strategy consider the attacks on September 11, 2001 as the moment that causes EBO concept development to accelerate. These attacks marked a change in the perception of global security and acted as a catalyst for EBO concept. This change evinces the need for new approaches with regard to protecting national interests, especially those in the national security domain.
EBO concept has stirred many debates within the American military system and is currently approached at NATO level, too, as it has been promoted by Allied Command Transformation as a key element for the Alliance transformation. There is also a debate regarding the concept within the Romanian military system, aiming at the implementation of EBO conceptual understanding and at the avoidance of reciting some principles. That is why we consider presenting some EBO definitions as useful with a view to developing the relevant language that is necessary for launching the debates related to EBO within the Romanian military system as well. This way, the negative effects related to misunderstanding new concepts and to their raw copying are avoided, at the same time, allowing for building the fundament for previous assessment and analysis. Moreover, such an approach, as far as the Romanian military system is concerned, claims for a change in the collective mental state and, thus, a change in the military culture with regard to the decision-maker and military organisation mental model. The change in military culture is a vast and complex paradigm, tightly connected to approaching new concepts such as EBO. 58
Defining EBO

EBO institutionalisation will not take place without a change in the military culture. If EBO concept effectiveness is aimed at, it will be developed as a joint and interorganisational one, without focusing on each category of forces or agency ambitions and premises. The only environment for EBO to become a successful concept is the joint and interorganisational one. In order to achieve this objective a new and appropriate military culture definition and implementation is necessary. An important part of this new military culture must be the acceptance of the fact that effects, both lethal and non-lethal, may be utilised to accomplish the national desideratum. The military system, when designated to lead to resolving a problem, must accept the support of the other national instruments of power. Moreover, the change in the military culture towards a holistic approach, based on EBO concept, will allow for the development of an operational ADN, in which not only the genes of the other instruments of national power but also those of other relevant non-military organisations and agencies will be present. Each definition emphasises one or more aspects of this concept, although none of them seems to include all the others, having in view the fact that the debate on EBO concept is in progress. Some definitions concentrate on the strategic and operative levels, generating the premise that EBO is inexistent at tactical level. Others refer to aspects related to EBO mental state, but they do not address EBO elements of integration. Anyway, we do not intend to present a new definition as a revelation.
A set of actions that are planned, executed and assessed from a systemic perspective, which creates the necessary effects for the political objectives achievement by the integrated application of different instruments of national power. (William T. McDaniel) A process for obtaining the desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the cumulative, synergetic and multiplicative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at strategic, operative and tactical level. An effect represents the physical, psychological or functional result, event or consequence as they resulted from the military or non-military actions. (US Joint Forces Command) An instrument meant to support the attack on critical objectives to paralyse the enemys system of systems. The desired effect is to control the enemy through eliminating his capacity to engage forces. (Major General (r.) David Deptula) A method meant to determine the correct application and integration of national power to achieve certain effects and outcomes, within the acceptable risk ranges. The effects may affect the enemy physically, functionally or psychologically, forcing it to change behaviour and eventually achieving desired results. (Brett T. Williams) Operations conceived and planned within a systemic framework that consider the full range of direct, indirect and waterfall effects that may be within different degrees of probability achieved through the application of military, diplomatic, psychological and economic instruments. (Paul K. Davis) EBO seeks to alter the enemy actions through affecting its capabilities and decisional process, at the same time avoiding the undesired effects and addressing and exploiting the unexpected effects. (Gary H. Cheek) EBO represents the identification and engagement of the enemy strong points and vulnerabilities in a unified and focussed manner and the use of all available means to produce specific effects consistent with the commanders intention. (Allen W. Batschelet) EBO represents an approach a way of thinking regarding the military operations planning, executing and assessment that focuses more on the military operations outcomes and on explaining the way those results were achieved and less on the executed firing missions, on the quantities of ammunition used or on the deployed material resources EBO final goal is following and understanding the way the respective actions influence the attackers or the enemy behaviour. (Marris B. McCrabb)
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Without pretending to exhaust the subject, we consider that EBO essentially consists in defeating the enemys will, which is, in fact, the final goal of any other type of operation, making use of the full range of known methods and especially focussing on the integrated and balanced application of all instruments of power, military and non-military, the permanent actional initiative obtaining and maintaining and, to a lesser extent, on the enemy physical destruction.
One of the vital aspects related to EBO is represented by the way of thinking. Williamson Murray states that EBO must be based on an appropriate way of thinking. In other words, it must focus on assessing and, eventually, adapting the operations to correlate the real conditions and circumstances before they change. EBO should be seen as a solution to link the final goals achievement and the appropriate means. EBO should not be conceptually perceived as one of the standard cognitive stereotypes as, this way, the ability to elaborate creative and detailed solutions would be restricted. The decision-makers and the Staff personnel acquisition of cognitive attitude in understanding the gap between final goals and means and in articulating these gaps in each level of action represents one of the key principles of EBO. The main obstacle the military system must overcome in the process of adopting and implementing the thought related to EBO is the military culture. The military too often base on the kinetic and lethal effects because of their experience, education, levels of comfort and conditioned approach manifest in the process of resolving a military matter. William T. McDaniel supports the development of the military system ability to think in broader terms, as a factor that can raise the action level of success. What are the main points of the argument that is significant for the potential of EBO concept ? EBO is based on three arguments: It highlights the enemy comprehensive understanding as a complex and adaptive system of systems against which EBO remains essential for final goals achievement. Not only this understanding but also the informational domain focus on the determinist process directed towards identifying events and actions intentions, motivations and causes are intensified by a more efficient reconnaissance, surveillance and information system. This predictive analysis is made in a collective that collaborates, improves interaction and breaks the stereotypically dogmatic ways, enhances parallel planning, eases the efforts of the decision-makers and of those who plan the access to information, as well as the access to centres of expertise in real time. This ability to identify the enemy critical vulnerabilities and to anticipate its reactions allows for identifying a larger and more efficient range of options to change the enemy behaviour. EBO is also founded on understanding the enemy through a comprehensive analysis, supported and developed by teams of experts on a systemic range of domains (cultural, behavioural, technical, economic and military) that allows for an interrelational assessment of the enemy. This complex approach does not pretend to eliminate the incertitude, chaos and frictions proper to war, but to enable the decision-makers and commanders to accept them and to learn to successfully overcome them. 60
Introduction in EBO Thinking

Essentially, EBO presents a new progressive framework for four important domains: thinking, relationship, integration and adaptation, to produce national solutions that are superior and cost-effective. Consequently, the US Joint Forces Command identifies some of EBOs benefits: the process of strategy translating into missions and tasks is improved through a much better understanding of the enemy; more and much better argued options are presented; the possible results, be they premeditated or not, are analysed; the success of the actions at tactical level is measured in comparison with the contribution they bring to the strategic and operative objectives; the ability to rapidly adapt is improved during the situations undergoing an explosive development. As far as the mental state and the effects-based thinking are concerned, Brett T. Williams states that it is necessary to reduce susceptibility in the complexity of warfare. Commanders improving their knowledge of EBO will allow for a certain methodology to be used in order to face the non-linear nature of modern warfare. At the same time, approaching a new holistic political-military outlook is necessary. Helmut Sonnenfeldt states that the military system way of thinking is based on military campaigns and plans, while political decision-makers one is based on options. In order to exploit EBO potential, the development of a collaborative process meant to unify the two domains in the decision-making process is necessary. In consequence, the lexicon must be more than a military one. As to relationship, EBO entails a certain discipline for the commanders from the strategic and operative levels, asking them to focus on relating the effects from one level in order to attain the objectives at the superior level and denying their tendency to limit at the level of tactical actions. Commanders vision will have to develop in order to provide a holistic approach, larger than simply destroying the enemy objectives. The EBO approach must begin with clearly enumerating and understanding the desirable national and strategic effects. Conceiving and planning an EBO-based campaign must begin with drafting a set of strategic final goals, able to lead to a comprehensive political outcome. On the other hand, the political system must develop in a coherent vision regarding the strategic outcome towards which the engagement of military forces inclines. US Joint Forces Command believes that the ability to correlate effects will call for a dedicated effort. The explicit analysis and correlation between the strategic objectives and the desired outcomes, on the one hand, and the possible tactical actions, on the other hand, are very important for drafting the courses of action and fulfilling the objectives. The relationship must also approach the correlation of the instruments of national power actions, in order to influence the key points and the connexions between the networks and the political, military, economic, social, of infrastructure and information systems. Integration means the progressive step taken from the traditional approach towards the holistic one. The main element is represented by the frame concept EBO provides and which supports the holistic integration of the instruments of national power. The Institute of Defense Analyses from the United States synthesised the arguments that come to support the integrating potential the EBO concept represents: the correlation between the host of actions (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) and the outcomes at strategic and operative levels; 61
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the planning, analysis and assessment of the actions and operations implications, depending on the effects they had over the enemy; the analysis of both the desired and undesired effects; the understanding of the implications and consequences effects have in time; the continuous adaptation of plans and actions to the reality of the crisis or conflict. The fourth main domain of the EBO concept is adaptation. It belongs to the essence of EBO assessing and adapting the operations in order to cope with the circumstances, before they change dramatically. Otherwise stated, EBO suggests a fundamentally transformed approach from the operations based on clear rules or hoping for a successful outcome, typical to the traditional manner. EBO is characterised by the beforehand awareness of situation combined with the agility to adapt to unanticipated events and the ability to reduce the effects of the mistakes and surprise of big proportions. All things considered, the ability in adapting to the mentality appropriate to the real conditions and circumstances, differing from the suppositions and rules from the time of planning the campaign, in order to generate the adequate changes in plans and actions remains of maximum importance for EBO. Williamson Murray analysed the tendency commanders and military organisations have towards persisting in grounding the operations on suppositions, premises and pre-conflict doctrinaire rules, in spite of the realities that develop in the operational space and with which they confront. As consequence, the approaches based on premises and rules often led to operations based on believing in the successful outcome, with important costs for the contact forces. Gary H. Cheek emphasised though the fact that there were cases when successful commanders made use of a process of the military forces analysis, assessment and adaptation and, taking into account the reality and the pursued effects, fulfilled the operations without letting themselves carried away by the illusion of hope and the belief in pre-conflict plans.
Understanding the EBO cycle depends on an important factor: the place effects hold within the objective-based traditional approach. Objectives-based approach relates the objectives clearly defined by the planned actions and then reviews the relationship in the operational plans, through a process of translating from strategy to missions and tasks. The United States Air Force Research Laboratory defines the objectives-based approach as being one that makes the commander focus on the intended results and consequences of the actions and in agreement with his intention. EBO develops the objective-based approach, allowing for the examination of the causal links and the effects through which the actions lead to the objective achievement. US Air Forces Operational Command states that EBOs revolutionary step is represented by acknowledging the fact that one action can produce more effects (results, events or consequences). In order to compare the two approaches from the qualitative point of view, the objectives-based one and the effects-based one, it is necessary to apply certain assessment criteria. Using them may generate conclusions which confirm or infirm the utility of the approaches for each criterion. The criteria proposed are: the clear visualisation How well does the process facilitate the ability to notice, orientate, decide and action within the commanders intention ?; 62
Objectives versus Effects

the efficient use of resources Does the process concentrate the resources on the minimum number of missions/tasks required by the successful outcome ?; the effective use of resources Does the process of using the resources concentrate on the fulfilment of desired results and minimise the counterproductive efforts ?; synchronisation Which is the process that sequentially arranges the mission and actions in time, space and purpose, in order to obtain the desired outcome ?; the flexible and adaptive execution Does the process encourage the initiative, allowing the subordinates to adapt and modify the execution based on the real, continually changing situation ?; the entire range of the conflict Can the process be applied within the entire range of the conflict, the pre-conflict period, the conflict per se and the post-conflict period ?. John T. Harris synthesised the results of the comparative analysis of the two approaches based on the mentioned criteria as follows:
Criterion Clear Visualisation Objectives-Based Operations Exaggeratedly focused on tasks, they provide a precarious guidance when the respective task is not relevant anymore. The unity of the effort is provided by the synchronisation between task and purpose, but undeclared tasks remain and, omitted, they limit the process in achieving the desired effects. The process is mostly linear and sequential, oriented towards indirect attacks and towards influencing the decisive points rather than directly attacking the centre of gravity. They group resources in order to fulfil the tasks, but do not contribute to generating the required conditions, circumstances and effects. Synchronise the tasks in time, space and purpose, but not the effects. Being assigned the task and the purpose, subordinates have flexibility only in choosing the execution method. They have minimum possibilities to modify the task, in case it is not relevant anymore. A preponderantly reactive process, which takes into consideration a unique connection from the enemys action to its reaction, followed by the counteraction of its own troops, but without taking into consideration the impact upon the other elements of the operational space. Effects-Based Operations They provide a better visualisation and guidance, while the process of the subordinates is guided by effects, conditions or results above all and less by tasks. The process minimises the counterproductive tasks and actions by focusing on effects and selecting only those tasks that have causal connections with the desired effects. An effective use of resources by clearly identifying the actions that have a higher degree of probability in the evolution of the conflict situation towards the final desideratum of the campaign. The process facilitates a better synchronisation by taking into account the localisation, timeliness and duration of the effects and not the tasks. Much more flexibility and adaptability, by the fact that they allow subordinates to modify the task, purpose and execution method as long as they achieve the required effects. A proactive process, which takes into account only the tasks and actions that are able to generate the desired effects. It focuses on the operational space moment, location and type of effect for which the task is fulfilled.
Efficient use of resources
Effective use of resources
Synchronisation
Flexible and adaptive execution
Employment in conflicts entire range
Considering the criteria proposed for comparison, one can easily notice the advantages of EBO as compared to the objectives-based operations ~ OBO. As any new approach, this one can be amended too, especially, we believe, as far as the level of knowledge necessary to the human factor involved in this kind of operations is concerned. Yet, the reality of contemporary conflicts more and more strikingly proves that focusing on breaking the enemys will to resist final and major goal of any operation, more and more moves from the classical methods, preponderantly kinetic towards a different kind of approaches. EBO is significant from this point of view. We also believe that this vision on operations represents a new challenge for the military experts at all levels. 63
EBO will have to become an imperative for the transformation of the Romanian military system, since Romania is a NATO member with rights and responsibilities. The Alliance started this process ever since 2005, through the Transformation Strategy drafted by the Allied Command Transformation from Norfolk, USA. EBOs institutionalising within the Romanian military system must be an integrant part in changing the military culture. The difficulty of the process will consist in providing the successful triple leap of the Romanian system: from being part of the Warsaw Pact to the post-Cold War period, then to achieving the quality of a NATO Member State and towards NATOs Long-Term Vision and, implicitly, the EBO concept. Institutionalisation will have to comprise the doctrinaire adaptation to the EBO concept, seeking answers to questions such as: Where and how will EBO manifest in the Romanian military/non-military structure ? Which structures will be responsible for EBOs planning, execution and assessment and at what levels ? All in all, we believe that conceiving a new structure of forces based on modularity is opportune and necessary in order to allow for modelling the capabilities depending on the development of the real conditions and circumstances from the time of the crisis/conflict situation.
Romanian Military Thinking ~ 2/2006 EBOs (Possible) Implications for the Romanian Military System
Selective Bibliography
Batschelet, Allen W. LTC, 2002, Effects Based Operations: A New Operational Model, Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Clausewitz, Carl von, 1993, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cheek, Gary H., 2002, Effects Based Operations, the End of Dominant Maneuver, Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Davis, Paul K., 2001, Effects Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Deptula, David A., Effects-Based Operations: Changes in the Nature of War, available at http:// www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf, accessed at 10th of March 2006. Harris, John T., 2004, Effects Based Operations: Tactical Utility, Thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Linde Gwen, Denis J. Gleeson, Kathleen McGrath, Adrienne J. Murphy, Williamson Murray, Tom OLeary, and Joel B. Resnick, 2001, New Perspectives on Effects Based Operations, Institute for Defence Analysis. McCrabb, Marris, Buster, Dr., 2002, Explaining Effects, US JFCOM. McDaniel, William T., 2002, Effects Based Operations, US JFCOM. Murray Williamson, 2001, IDA Paper P-3606, An Historical Perspective on Effects Based Operations, IDA Joint Warfighting Program, Alexandria, Virginia. US Air Combat Command, 2002, Effects Based Operations, White Paper, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. US Joint Force Command (JFCOM), 2001, Concept Framework for Effects Based Operations, Draft White Paper. Williams Brett T., 2002, Effects-Based Operations: Theory, Applications and the Role of Air Power, Strategic Studies Institute, US War College, Carlisle Barracks PA. Wainwright, David, 2003, Should the Australian Army adopt effects based operations ?, Thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
64
A NEW NA TO NATO STRA TEGIC CONCEPT STRATEGIC

~ PROS AND CONS ~
Brigadier Iordache OLARU ~ Deputy Military Representative of Romania to NATO ~
NATOs strategic concept is believed to be the second in the hierarchy of Alliances political documents after the North-Atlantic Treaty. The 1999 NATOs strategic concept was complemented by two other relevant documents, the Prague and Istanbul Summits Declarations, as well as the communiqus issued after ministerial meetings. Analysts in the field estimate that the present strategic concept is outdated, considering the fact that it was drafted before the September 11, 2001 catastrophe, before NATOs engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq and previous to the latest seven countries, Romania included, admission to NATO. Mention should be made that the allies have not drawn up strategic concepts too frequently, and when they did it, they took into account the fact that this step, generated by practical and political necessities, was sensible, complex and difficult. The 1991strategic concept was set up immediately after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The allies had not set up a strategic concept since 1967, when they approved the MC14/3 document, known as the military strategy of flexible response. At the same time, the allies adopted the Harmel Report, named after the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, who established NATOs strategic policy regarding its relation with the USSR and the allies of the Warsaw Pact, covering almost the same aspects of the political and military strategy that were subsequently included in the 1991 Strategic Concept. Nonetheless, prior to this year the Alliances strategic concepts were secret and tackled the military strategy of deterrence and defence, the force requirements included. The 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts had the same fundamental features, but the purpose was broader, namely to inform the population from the allied countries, as well as the unallied governments regarding the Alliances political strategy. Since 1991, NATOs strategic concepts have been declassified, having objectives such as offering a coherent framework for the Alliances activities, providing guidelines for military policy, operations and generating the force, promoting the Alliances policies to the public and communicating NATOs intentions to potential enemies, as well as informing 65
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the partners as far as the current and future connections and opportunities are concerned. From this perspective, to be useful for the allied governments responsible for implementing the agreed upon policies, the strategic concepts must open new horizons with regard to the development of events, with adequate prediction and precision. As far as the present is concerned, one may state that no strategic concept can provide the final solution for the Alliances purposes and plans, especially because it is an evolving composite, which becomes more actualised with every communiqu or other documents approved by the North-Atlantic Treaty Council. Any approach with a view to explaining the origins and principles of the 1999 NATOs Strategic Concept must take into account the substantial changes occurred as far as the security environment and the activities carried out by the Alliance are concerned, starting with 1991. In addition, during the mentioned timeframe, NATO undertook major operations, other than those stipulated by Article 5, and intensified its cooperation with its former enemies or with other countries from the Euro-Atlantic region. The 1991 Strategic Concept included ideas regarding the ethnical risks and territorial conflicts from Central and Eastern Europe, but did not stipulate much on the proportions and expectations concerning the fulfilment of non-Article 5 missions, such as the peacekeeping and crises management ones. In fact, the authors of the 1991 Concept did not anticipate the major operations carried out by NATO in the 90s (the deliberate air strikes from August-September 1995, the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia, the KFOR missions, the air campaign from March-June 1999 in Serbia) and focused on the missions stipulated by Article 5: common defence against the aggressions that affect the Alliance, non-intervention outside NATOs area of responsibility. The way the 1991 Strategic Concept was conceived suggested that NATO did not stipulate the participation in any crises and that the military forces would ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Member States, thus ensuring peace and stability in Europe. The missions in which the Alliance participated in the 90s, the establishment of the North Atlantic Coordination Council ~ NACC, the initiation of the Partnership for Peace Programme and the Mediterranean Dialogue, the setting up of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which replaced NACC, the initiation of the first contacts with Russia and Ukraine, all these proved that the events transcended the provisions of the 1991 Strategic Concept, but, at the same time, foreshadowed the lines and hastened the moment of making the decision to draw up the 1999 Strategic concept. One of the main features of the 1999 Strategic Concept is represented by the redefinition of the Alliances fundamental security missions. The allies removed from the former concept the phrase the strategic balance within Europe, which Moscow Considered to be a pre-offensive and a reminiscence of the Cold War. In fact, three missions remained unchanged in the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts, namely: NATO operates as a forum of consultations, provides the collective defence and initiation of the main elements for a stable security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on the development and consolidation of democratic institutions and the commitment for peaceful settlement of disputes, that is to say no country should intimidate or impose its will by threat or force. With a view to reflecting the Alliances activities following 1990, the 1999 Strategic Concept 66
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incorporates two fundamental security missions: one is connected to crises management, conflict prevention and crises response operations and partnership, and the other to strengthening the dialogue and cooperation with other nations in the Euro-Atlantic area. The allies finalised the concept without settling the most controversial issue: the legitimacy of using force in non-Article 5 operations in the absence of an explicit mandate coming from the UN Security Council. The Alliance reiterates its offer made in Brussels, in 1994, for supporting, from case to case and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping operations, other than the ones carried out under the authority of UN Security Council or the responsibility of OSCE, placing the resources and expertise of the Alliance at ones disposal included. Given this context, the Alliance restates the ulterior decisions regarding the crises response operations in the Balkans. In addition, mention is made that the allies used force in Kosovo without receiving an explicit authorisation from the Security Council. In brief, part of the allies justified the military operation through the humanitarian necessities, while the other part interpreted the resolution of the Security Council, although none of them explicitly stipulated the Alliances authorisation for using force in Kosovo. Basically, the allies agreed they had a legally adequate and sufficient support in the international laws for using force, but they did not consent on the way of bringing them into operation. Consequently, the allies were not capable of making a common statement on the official legal bases regarding the use of force. Each ally was responsible for drawing up its own national reason, and some of the NATO Member States chose to invoke humanitarian necessities and the Security Council resolutions. Some of the allies stated that NATO having used force in the conflict in Kosovo represented an exceptional case, which should not be seen as a precedent, but such a declaration was not included in the 1999 Strategic Concept. As far as the efforts made regarding non-proliferation and the discouragement of weapons of mass destruction proliferation are concerned, the 1999 Strategic Concept paid much more attention to these issues than to the previous one, by defining the characteristics of the allied conventional forces as being flexible, mobile, deployable and sustainable. The aspects regarding nuclear forces are approached in both concepts in the same manner, the only difference being that in the 1999 Concept mention is made that NATOs nuclear forces do not aim at a specific country. According to the provisions of the 1999 Strategic Concept, The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring. Given the provisions of the 1999 Strategic concept and taking into account the international circumstances, one question should be raised whether these two aspects are enough to justify a new strategic concept. It would seem untimely and unnecessary, at least for the moment. We believe these affirmations deserve a much-detailed analysis. As a result, if the allies prove to be skeptical about beginning to draw up a new strategic concept, that happens because anything one might undertake in an acceptable horizon of time can be achieved under the flexible auspices of the present one. The terrorist 67
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attacks against USA in September 2001 led to the invocation of Article 5 of the Treaty for the first time in the Alliances history. Some of the measures taken then still exist today, such as the Active Endeavour Operation from the Mediterranean Sea. Obviously, if one were to redraft the 1999 Strategic Concept, then one would pay more attention to terrorist threats than before. Nevertheless, the 1991 Strategic Concept specified that the Alliances forces and infrastructure must be protected from terrorist attacks, thus ensuring the starting points for Alliances actions in case of terrorist threat. As a proof, the allies have drafted the concept regarding the defence against terrorism. In other words, in spite of a schematic phrase in the strategic concept, one could notice the developments occurred at different levels in the campaign against terrorism. Moreover, regarding proliferation, in November 2002, in Prague, the allies examined and created options for the protection of the Alliances territory, forces and populated centres against missile threat. The 1999 Strategic Concept tells less of the possible activities beyond the Euro-Atlantic area than it could be said in the new concept, nevertheless, it is unambiguous as far as possible options are concerned. In this context, it is emphasised that an enduring peace in Europe might be influenced by crises that could occur in the Euro-Atlantic area and, as a consequence, by the determination to achieve a security environment able to enhance peace and stability. Accordingly, the security of the Alliance must take into account the global context, as the allies security interests might be affected by risks of even bigger proportions, terrorist acts, sabotage, organised crime and malfunctions in supplying with vital row materials. These principles have provided the Alliance with the necessary basis for the support and command of ISAF in Kabul and the missions in Afghanistan, as well as other missions, such as training the Iraqi forces. Generally, the principles are sufficient for other activities beyond the Euro-Atlantic space. One could mention the humanitarian aid missions from Darfur and Pakistan. On the other hand, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative might pave the way for redrafting certain parts of the 1999 Strategic Concept. Carrying on the Alliances enlargement process does not offer grounds for reviewing the 1999 Strategic Concept. This process will further be regulated by the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. Just as adopting, after the Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan ~ MAP, as systematic means of providing the adhering candidates with practical support and assistance leaves no room for a new approach in the new strategic concept, considering that the existing document is further relevant for the states wishing to join NATO. When the Strategic Concept was adopted, in 1999, the European Union had not yet defined the draft for the European Security and Defence Policy ~ ESDP. For this reason, the phrase from 1999 Strategic Concept refers to the European Security and Defence Identity. Nevertheless, the Washington Summit Communiqu states that the allies approved the key elements for the development of an effective cooperation between NATO and EU. These key elements provide EU with the possibility to have access to NATOs capabilities, their planning and using within EU-led operations. All these aspects 68
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are part of the Berlin plus NATO-EU arrangements. The support provided by NATO to EU-led peacekeeping operations to continue the SFOR mission, starting with December 2004, stands proof for the fact that these arrangements were useful. In May 2002, NATO and the Russian Federation agreed on the replacement of the Permanent Joint Council with the NATO-Russia Council, which is based on new decision-making principles, a new quality of the relations and the identification of some new domains of mutual interest, given the circumstances in which the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act remained valid. The only field added was search and rescue at sea. In consequence, a new strategic concept would not add more elements not even in this domain, except when the NATO-Russia relations would go worse. Even in this situation, within the 1999 Strategic Concept is mentioned that the existence of some powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance represents a significant factor that the Alliance should take into account in order to ensure security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. If the facts mentioned above lead us to believe that a new strategic concept is not necessary, we will also examine the possibility of considering it inopportune. At present, the allied governments in general look at the preparation for a new version of the Strategic Concept as being inopportune and counterproductive, mostly because some of the issues, given the post-Iraq conflict, are difficult to handle. Wounds and controversies dating back to 2002 and 2003 might reopen, and that would be against the reconciliation of the transatlantic relations that all the allied governments want to carry on. The issues separating the allies are connected to the ways of managing risks and threats, those related to terrorism and proliferation of mass-destruction weapons included, and, finally, if and to what extent the governments of the NATO Member Countries should intervene in order to change governments and promote democracy. These issues are delicate, given the fact that they can re-ignite the disputes that preceded the war in Iraq. In fact, some of the governments show a slight interest in reanalysing the debates before the war and, consequently, do not wish to get more involved in transatlantic reconciliation. The issue that might be raised continues to be relevant and concerns the legitimacy and carefulness of the strategies regarding war prevention and the identification of the most efficient means for discouraging the countries that seek to possess weapons of mass destruction. Anyway, justifying and legitimating threat or use of force are inherently much more controversial than common defence, because none of the allies has been directly attacked. Accordingly, the allies must decide if certain situations really represent threats to their values and interests, thus justifying the risks and responsibility of an intervention and if a certain terrorist threat, with weapons of mass destruction included, might call for intervention or action prevention with priority. In this respect, the last threats are obviously to be found closer to the provisions of Article 5, but politically speaking it is much harder for democratic countries to initiate military actions than to respond to attacks. In addition, it is difficult to resume the discussion on fundamental principles and there is serious doubt that acquiring much more precision in the provisions of the Strategic Concept would be constructive, as far as the legitimacy of resorting to force is concerned, than what it stipulates at present. 69
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Given the continuous commitment of the USA to the principles expressed by the 2002 National Security Strategy, some of the allies are preoccupied with the fact that initiating a new strategic concept might provide the USA with the opportunity for outlining and leading NATOs policy on paths that they do no agree with. In fact, a new strategic concept might force them to choose between actively resisting to USAs policy regarding the strategy of the operations carried far from Europe and the political order in Middle East or to accept the abstract principles that they see as potentially dangerous for the future dissensions on how a certain situation should be settled. From this perspective, the allies would rather postpone the preparation for a new strategic concept, even if the pressure generated by this review were imminent. It results from the above that reviewing the Strategic Concept is not necessary. The argument of the political inopportunity may always be invoked, since the discord connected to this topic has always been present. If one were to wait for a moment of harmony, propitious to change, this might never occur. A powerful argument as far as inopportunity is concerned is the overloaded agenda of the Alliance. If this 1999 strategic concept is adequate for all predictable purposes, initiating its review will divert the Alliances interest and preoccupations connected to the improvement of using forces, interoperability, deploying and sustaining allied forces, leading the operations from Afghanistan, Balkans and Iraq and furthering the dialogue with Russia and Ukraine, the countries within the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative. That is why focusing on the mentioned topics is of utmost importance, because the necessity of preparing a new strategic concept, capable to provide a multiannual political framework, must be proved.
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Colonel Cristian DORCA ~ Advisor, the Defence Section, Romanias Permanent Delegation to NATO ~
hile seeking to respond to the current and future challenges and threats to its own security and to the Euro-Atlantic stability, nevertheless without modifying its capacity of fulfilling the goals and disturbing the development of the means for exerting the new functions, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation had to manage its own process of modernisation. For NATO, the challenge was not the attempt to create its own role, but to make sure that its functions, which have already been defined, are not compromised by too many demands over its resources. The decisions of the Alliance, as they resulted from the reunions at high level that have marked its evolution, laid the foundations for enlarging the dialogue and cooperation in security issues established by the Member States throughout the years. NATO is a political-military organisation, responsible for defending the population and the infrastructure of the allied sovereign nations. Within the organisation, the nations allot the necessary resources (personnel, money and means) in order to ensure the daily functioning of the Alliance, and also with a view to engendering the conditions necessary to the consultation, adoption of decisions and implementation of political strategy. The financial resources of the Alliance are used for: administratively and financially supporting the civil and military command structures; financing its own activities, programmes regarding science, Partnership for Peace, research and development, preparation and training fields included; developing the response to crises operations and providing the necessary capabilities in order to fulfil the political-military objectives according to the priorities ascertained and unanimously sanctioned by the allied states. At national level, in the allied states, the planning of strategic activities and defence resources is implicitly influenced by the Alliances policy and strategic objectives, depending on the level of ambition, the missions the forces must fulfil and, last but not least, on the priorities establishment. At military level, most of the military forces and resources belonging to the NATO Member States are placed under national command and control, until the moment, some of them, or even all of them, depending on the country possessing them, can be allocated to the Alliance in order to fulfil the specific military missions. These forces are 71
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APOD ~ Airport of Disembarkation AWACS ~ Airborne Warning and Control System BICES ~ Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System CAX ~ Computer-Assisted Exercise CEPMA ~ Central Europe Pipeline Management Agency KAIA ~ Kabul International Airport MD ~ Missile Defence NACMA ~ NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency NAEW&CC ~ NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Capability NAHEMA ~ NATO Helicopter D&D Production and Logistics Management Organisation NAMEADSMA ~ NATO Medium Extended Air Defence System Design and Development, Production and Logistics Management Agency) NAMSA ~ NATO Maintenance & Supply Agency NAPMA ~ NATO AEW&C Programme Management Agency NC3A ~ NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency NCSA ~ NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency NDC ~ NATO Defence College NETMA ~ NATO EF 2000 and Tornado Development, Production & Logistics Management Agency NHMO ~ NATO Hawk Management Office O&M ~ Operation & Maintenance O&SB ~ Operation & Support Budget RPOD ~ Railport of Disembarkation RTA ~ Research and Technology Agency
transferred under NATO authority for a determined period, being trained, equipped, maintained in operative state and financed by the nations from their own defence budgets. In order to facilitate the consultative process and the one of jointly adopting the decisions within the Alliance, each country is represented at political and military level within the strategic headquarters and NATO General Headquarters, as well as in the staffs of different NATO agencies and headquarters. The costs for maintaining and supporting the personnel within the permanent delegations and the military missions also represent a national responsibility, being financed in keeping with the accountancy principles and practices of each country. NATO financial funds are mainly meant to those expenses that correspond to the interests of all member countries. The common-funded structure is diversified and decentralised. Thus, certain multinational joint activities in the research-development, defence production and logistic field do not involve all the allied states, only a few of them being included in some of the cases. Generally, NATO funding does not cover the expenses regarding the military forces or the military technique acquisitions, such as vessels, submarines, aircrafts, tanks, artillery or armament systems. The allied states are the ones asked to provide the military forces and means for the Alliance, being at the same time responsible for their financial sustainment. Therefore, NATO mainly finances the investments meant to the common requirements, such as anti-aircraft defence, command and control structures or the communication systems within the Alliance, which cannot be seen as being the responsibility of one country. The equipment which was procured in this way must be maintained, repaired and, eventually, replaced, depending on the new operational requirements and the technological evolutions, the expenses due to this process representing a significant percentage in NATO funds. The resources of the Alliance consist of the national contributions allocated by the Member States. At the same time, more then 95% of NATO Member Nations 72
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defence budgets exclusively remain under national SPOD ~ Seaport of Disembarkation control. The forms of multinational cooperation TBMD ~ Theatre Ballistic Missile wherein defence resources are allocated represent Defence the exception to the rule. The multinational cooperation Flexibility (the forces capability outside the official framework of NATO has various of being flexible) is an essential forms, from students exchange within military academies, characteristic of NATO forces that arrangements for providing logistic support, procurement is connected to the arrangements regarding the military capabilities the equipment in common to considering the evolutions and their judicious, timely and regarding the complex systems of armament. optimum employment. Flexibility The financial procedures regard the exchange represents a prerequisite within of products (barter arrangements), the sales the structure of forces and the command and control (C2) of military equipment, making payments for services arrangements of NATO, so that, supply, procurements with multinational participation, by using only one structure, the as well as development programmes regarding the costs Alliance to be able to have the distribution. There are no precise estimations of the capacity to lead the entire range of missions at its disposal. sums spent for this purpose, but one may consider that a percent of approximately 5 to 10% of the total Deployment (forces deployment capability) means the NATO of the allied states national defence budgets is used capability of concentrating the for multinational cooperation outside NATO. forces and engaging the capabilities Multinational cooperation within the Alliance at the specified place and time. takes into account two very well established Thus, by taking into account the possible threats to Alliances components: joint/multinational funding and commonsecurity, NATO will have to be funded resources. Besides the ones already mentioned, able to estimate its own risks and the Member Nations also cooperate through a more deploy its forces and capabilities restrictive form, through ad hoc funding arrangements in time, outside its own territory. respectively. The arrangements regarding the joint-type funding are structured forms of funding from national resources, given the circumstances of certain procedural terms agreed at NATO level. The participant countries are responsible for identifying the funding requirements, priorities and procedures, while NATO, that is the beneficiary in terms of visibility, gives the political and financial endorsement. The joint-type funding procedures necessitate, in principle, the creation of a managerial organisation and an agency for implementation. NATO agencies have an important role in promoting interoperability and in supporting the fulfilment of Alliances objective in different fields, such as the production and maintenance of defence equipment or providing logistic support for NATOs missions/operations. The following agencies are subjected to the principle of integrated funding: for the domain of aircrafts and helicopters production NAHEMA (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal) and NETMA (Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom); for the anti-aircraft defence domain BICES (all the allied states, except Island and Luxemburg), NAMEADSMA (Germany, Italy, United States) and NAPMA (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United States); for the logistic domain CEPMA (Belgium, Canada, Germany, 73
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France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United States), NAMSA (all the allied states) and NHMO (France, Italy). In addition, the following agencies are mainly financed from NATOs common resources: NACMA, NC3A, NCSA, NSA, RTA and NDC. The arrangements of common-funded resources include NATOs military and civil budget and NATO Security Investment Programme ~ NSIP. Based on these funds, NATO authorities identify the requirements and establish the Alliance objectives and priorities. At the level of common-funded resources (the military budget and NSIP), the leading principle of eligibility is in accordance with the Over&Above rule: the common-funded resources will be focused on meeting the requirements which are in the interest of the Alliance and cannot be provided from national resources. The activities eligible for the common-funded resources of the Alliance are analysed in NATO committees (Civil Budget Committee, Military Budget Committee and Infrastructure Committee), the general problems regarding the resources policy being managed by the Senior Resource Board, which annually elaborates the Medium Term Resource Plan, thus covering all the requirements regarding military common-funded resources for the next five years. The ad hoc funding procedures are adopted within the framework of the cooperation between the NATO nations in the activities that do not meet the criteria of eligibility as established for common-funded resources for operational, political, programming or organisational reasons. In these cases, the funding arrangements may have various forms: trust fund, contribution in kind, ad hoc cost sharing arrangements, donations etc. In this respect, some recent examples are convincing, for instance NATO institutions granting assistance for the training of Iraqi security forces ~ ISF; transporting the military equipment donated to Iraq; transporting the products and food, as well as the funding for reconstruction projects, as in the case of the earthquake response operation in Pakistan; the cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council (for instance, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative) or the assessment of the possible expenses concerning integrated/commonfunded funding activities (for instance, the AGS programme management office Alliance Ground Surveillance System). Contribution in kind means the form of participating in actions or programmes in a different way than the financial one, as follows: by providing its own national facilities or capabilities and by contributing to them with personnel and national expertise. Normally, by adopting these forms of contribution within NATO, the value of the national participation is quantified in financial terms. The contribution of the United Kingdom and France by providing the fleet made up by the NATO AWACS with their own radar capabilities is a significant example. Trust funds presuppose volunteer financial contributions for a well-established purpose. These funds are allocated for the benefit of an entity in order to satisfy the requirements, others than those covered by the budget meant for that entity with this purpose. This method opens the path towards contributions from the part of NATO Member Nations. An important example in this context is represented by the volunteer assistance for transport and subsistence fund, established within the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). 74
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The Alliance uses a variety of mechanisms and arrangements in order to finance its own activities. The key to success consists in the establishment of the principle that will allow for the identification of the best way of funding. NATO civil budget mainly consists of the funds provided by the ministries of foreign affairs. It is established under the guidance of the Civil Budget Committee, and the fulfilment belongs to the NATO International Secretariat ~ IS. The civil budget of the Alliance covers the working expenses of IS, the amounts needed to fulfil the civil programmes and activities approved and to build, exploit and maintain facilities, including the personnel expenses required to carry on conferences, reunions of the committees and subordinated NATO groups, security services etc. NATO military budget is made up mainly of the funds provided by the ministries of defence. It is established and used under the guidance of the Military Budget Committee (there are over 50 separated military budgets). The military budget of the Alliance covers operating and maintenance costs, as well as the expenses made for equipment, connected to NATO Command Structure ~ NCS, except the major investments of construction and system, which are financed by the NATO Security Investment Programme. In all situations, the funding of the military personnel represents a national responsibility. The NATO Security Investment Programme consists of the funds provided by the ministries of defence. It is established under the guidance of the Infrastructure Committee and exerted through the individual actions of host-nations, as well as by NATO agencies. The programme is meant to the funding of the installation and facilities necessary to support the roles of NATO strategic command. The investments cover installations and activities such as: communication and information systems, radars, military headquarters, airdromes, pipelines and fuels storehouses, harbours and navigation instruments. Just as in the case of the military budget, NSIP also covers the eligible requests for Peace Support Operations ~ PSO, including communication and information systems, facilities for local headquarters, energetic systems and airdromes, railroads and highways repairs. The O&M expenses regarding these activities are a national responsibility. The setting up of the Partnership for Peace in 1994 added a new cooperation dimension to the programme. In order to obtain common funding for a certain project, the first step is identifying and acknowledging the necessary expenses and establishing most assuredly the fact that the responsibility of these expenses cannot reasonably be attributed to only one country, since it serves the interests of all the contributing countries. The request must be justly generated, declared and certified, and that presupposes a complex interaction of the national and international administrative processes. From the moment of its drawing up, the request for expenses must be considered eligible to be funded from common resources by all the Member States, on a well-established scale of values. Establishing eligibility is made through the consensus of the Member States that will have to sustain these costs. 75
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As a rule, all the Member Countries participate in the expenses accepted for the common-funded resources. Thus, all the Member Countries pay their contribution to funding the International Secretariat, the International Military Staff, the agencies of the Military Committee, as well as the elements of the funding from common resources of peace support operations and activities of the Partnership for Peace. Nevertheless, the expenses for the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force ~ NAEW&C Force are divided only between the 14 participant countries. The expenses made with other elements or entities from NATO Command Structure are divided depending on the nature of each countrys participation in the new structure of integrated command of the Alliance. Conventionally, the solutions for the distribution of the established costs, which specify the contributions of each Member Country, must correspond to their payment capacity. Nevertheless, the basis of this applied rule is both political and economic. The capabilities of the Alliance represent a part of the integrated system of defence planning. The responsibilities regarding identifying the requests, priorities and establishing the management of integrated resources are centralised at the level of the strategic headquarters and included in the process of implementing the capabilities initiatives, the Medium Term Resource Plan and NATO audit. The responsibilities regarding budgetary execution, developing and implementing projects are decentralised at the level of the credit accountant, the host nation and the agencies. Regarding the funding of NATO operations/missions (KFOR/ISAF/NTM-I) and the crisis response operations, they are accomplished according to the principle Costs lie where they fall: the nations involved cover their own participation expenses (and establish the source of the national funding). The financial expenses of the numerous bilateral-multilateral support arrangements (logistic support, transport, medical support) will be reimbursed or not. Until now, the funding from common resources covers only the costs that are not specifically ascribed to a single nation, such as: the expenses for investments and O&M meant to the command elements in the theatre; the costs of covering the deficit regarding the strategic communication equipment; providing a minimum of requirements necessary for the strategic infrastructure elements in the theatre. For the activities regarding missions preparation, nations have chosen to cooperate through different forms, such as: multinational organisation of the transport; jointly providing the logistic support; resorting to arrangements regarding providing certain capabilities through externalisation. The development of this kind of missions represents a bilateral arrangement of cooperation between nations. Until now, the establishment of multinational forces, such as NATO Response Force ~ NRF, does not theoretically change this approach. NRF is financed by multinational resources through using the special arrangements agreed at the level of the nations that participate with forces. In this context, we estimate that the following aspects represent a challenge for the Alliance: difficulties in providing the necessary capabilities for the multinational operational force ~ CJSOR; 76
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resorting to the method of externalisation in providing certain capabilities; providing the financial support regarding the integration of support activities: fuel, medical services, airport facilities (KAIA, for instance), transport; implementation of the future operations and missions; NRF deployment. NATOs experience regarding the operations carried out, as well as those taking place now highlights the fact that the special arrangements have been necessary in order to allow the nations to allocate a sum of operative capabilities at theatre level and to place them under the operational control of the commander from the theatre of military operations. Therefore, at present, in accordance with adopting the principle Over&Above, the common-funded resources of NATO are placed at ones disposal not only for the support of the headquarters elements in the theatre in leading NATO operations but also in order to provide the minimum requirements of the operative capabilities at theatre level, such as: airports (APOD), seaports (SPOD) and railport stations (RPOD); medical facilities Role 2 and 3; intelligence, research and surveillance and air-land surveillance; engineering support; fuel supply and stock. At the Alliance level, the problems regarding the possibility the expenses for the strategic transport of the capabilities with a short deployment term to be supported from the common-funded resources are still at issue. The new arrangements made for the command structure have determined the reorientation of the Alliances forces. NATO military forces must be flexible and deployable. The integrated structure is eligible to be funded from common resources (but not for its military effectives). Given the background of these realities, the elements of the NATO Response Force and the centres of excellence are not in the responsibility of national or multinational funding. Among the financial difficulties the Alliance confronts with lay the implications having a budgetary nature and the identification of the personnel demand and the fact the latter are not covered. In order to do so, NATO authorities have to resort to a solution of compromise regarding covering operational demans by the method of externalisation. For NATOs special partnerships, as well as for PfP, the funding from common resources for the military forces was strict. The following elements are specific to these fields: most of PfPs activities are financed from national resources; providing the basic requirements for C3, the CJFT concept and the capabilities for CAX are mainly included in the range of the Alliance requirements; applying the standard principles for Alliances military requirements. In order to substantiate these partnerships, NATO considers it necessary that a reassessment of the aspects regarding the participation of nations in CROs, joint exercises and the air space control should be made. For the new initiatives regarding defence capabilities, the nations have become aware of the necessity for jointly settling the common requirements. Thus, one must take into consideration the following elements: analysing the right balance between the national, multinational, joint funding and the common one; some capabilities 77
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surpass the means most of the nations have at their disposal; harmonisation within the Alliance by distributing the roles, risks and responsibilities; providing the strategic command with central capabilities. In this context, from the point of view of providing the financial resources, the allied systems have in mind the following fields of interest: The allied system of terrestrial surveillance (ASG: central strategic capability possessed and controlled by NATO, supplemented with interoperable national capabilities as part of a system of systems): national funding for the national capabilities; joint funding for the NATO system; common funding regarding the O&M expenses; common funding adapted for the NATO Air Command and Control System (NATO Air C2) and NATO Air C3; antimissile territory, population and forces defence (MD) and theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD): feasibility studies financed out of common resources; adjustments regarding the funding from common resources at the level of the NATO Air Command and Control System (NATO Air C2) and NATO Air C3; interception systems financed at national level; strategic system and refuelling during flight: joint funding; searching for a resource of alternative funding. As far as the applicability of NATO financial resources is concerned, AEW&CC represents a model of combining the funding resources. The procurement of AWACS aircrafts by NATO was possible due to a form of multinational funding, to which 13 nations contributed. France and United Kingdom are engaged in this programme by placing their own AWACS capabilities at the Alliances disposal (contributions in kind). Paying the wages for the operative military effective of the fleet is a national responsibility, and the payments are made by the countries that provide the personnel resource. The Operation & Support Budget (O&SB) is ensured through common funding budget split among 14 (with Hungarys participation, from 2006). The airborne force command (which includes the command, the E-3A and E-3D components) derives advantage from the common-funded resources budget split among 15 (with the United Kingdoms participation). Specific investments are allocated to the national airdromes as far as NAEW is concerned, by applying the NSIP programme for facilitating the funding out of common resources by the multinational contribution of 25 countries. The common financial resources of NATO are a way of complementarity of the national activities and have the role of strengthening the Alliances cohesion. In addition, they are used in providing the Alliance with essential capabilities. Providing capabilities depends on the fulfilment of certain requirements, such as: to correspond to the eligibility criteria; to be the object of the arrangements regarding the apportionment of costs and to respond to the funding and acquisition mechanisms. 78
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Multinational cooperation is developing. The advantage of such cooperation gives the possibility of complementarily providing the necessary capabilities. Thus, each nation will be able to participate with the most appropriate structures of forces that it has at its disposal, without being necessary for only one of them to cover all the niches of the operations/mission, as this will be fulfilled through collective efforts. The network based capabilities, the interoperability and the forces deployment capability, the multinational forces, as well as the integrated logistic support are good examples in this instance. Although a great part of the cooperation will continue at multinational level with NATO, providing most of the planning infrastructure , the principles and the funding ways from NATO common resources will nevertheless have to be developed. The deployable C3 system (command, control, communication) and the recently agreed financial arrangements for crisis response operations are two examples in this respect. Through the agency of the Allied Command Transformation ~ ACT, NATO coordinates and harmonises the otherwise challenging actions of the military transformation between the Alliance and the Member Nations. The efforts made during the military transformation process represent significant guaranties of the Alliance both at present and in the future. They aim at increasing interoperability (placed at the basis of the joint allied actions), network facilities, distribution of forces, rapid capacity of making decisions, as well as the domination of the battlespace.
Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and International Staff, Ottawa, September 19th, 1951. Status of Missions and Representatives of Third States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels, September 14th, 1994. NATO Handbook. NATO website www.nato.int Partnership for Peace www.nato.int/pfp.pfp.htm NAMSA www.namsa.nato.int Trust Fund website www.nato.int/pfp/trust-fund.htm www.nato.int/education/docs www.nato.int/multi www.e3a.nato.int www.napma.nato.int www.act.nato.int/organization/hqsact/transsupport.htm http://home.tiscali.be/jansens.andre/NATOBugetSistem111103.ppt www.valcartier.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/rtgonifd/background/tor.html
79
CONCEPTS FOR ALLIED FUTURE JOINT OPERATIONS

Brigadier Valeriu NICU} ~ Advisor to the Chief of the General Staff ~
The post Cold War operational experience, in Kosovo and Afghanistan, evinced the necessity for the Alliance forces to undergo transformation, so that they could acquire operational coherence, they could become integrated and relevant as far as the new security environment is concerned. The need for transformation was agreed upon in Prague, reaffirmed in Istanbul and has become the leitmotiv of all NATOs General Secretary speeches and messages. Required by the current strategic environment we are part of and take action in, transformation is neither a slogan nor an option. Strategic commanders decisive work on transformation was reflected in the Strategic Vision and subsequently materialised, in May 2005, in Military Committee Memorandum for Commanding Officers Regarding Transformation MCM 0054. Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations CAFJO, a legitimate outcome of the above mentioned Memorandum, on which I will focus in this attempt, represents a bridge between the ample character of Comprehensive Political Guidance, which is still being worked on, and the concrete, specific character of the concepts. These new concepts will lead to the development of a correct set of capabilities the Alliance needs to effectively fulfil future missions. During the development of this document, which has real chances to be adopted this year, the invention (finding) of a single, all-inclusive concept, regarding the way the Allied Forces can operate in the future, proves to be neither possible nor useful for the activity of transformation. It is the logical follow-up of the fact that the new strategic environment is characterised by complexity and multidimensionality. Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations find their legitimacy in the present context of the political-military both the finished and the unfinished ones that, in fact, constitute the basis for the development of the Alliance forces and capabilities (figure 1). In other words, the main function of the Political-Military Guidance is represented by the significant influence it may have on the ways NATO generates integrated and coherent forces and capabilities, following the transformational concepts. 80
NATO Reality
Context Aim
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Extant Authority Guidance
+ NEW & EMERGING NEEDS

Means Concepts Ends Capabilities Capable Forces
Political
NATO Strategic Concept 1999 Praga & Istanbul Declarations
Broad Approach to Security
Effects-based Collaborative Agile Network-enabled Multilateral
Products
Political Guidance
EBAO
Expeditionary + Relevant Capabilities

Doctrine Organisation Training Materiel Leadership
Military
MC 324/1 Command Structure MC 400/2 MC Guidance to SCs on Transformation MCM 0054 Scope
CAFJO
+ Transforming Enablers
Transformational and Operational Concept Policy Strategy Concepts Doctrines
Established
Evolving
Figure 1: CAFJO Place and Role
Future
Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations translates the strategic guidance into concepts and, wherever it is possible, into capabilities the forces of the Alliance will need to conduct operations over the next 15 years (figure 2). CAFJO paves the way for the introduction of an effect-based approach to operations Conceptual Framework for Effects-based Approach to Operations ~ EBAO allowing thus for the possibility to have intimate knowledge of the concepts to capabilities process. CAFJO also guides the future activities within the process of the Alliance transformation and facilitates the involvement of organisations outside NATO but cooperating with it in this process. By translating the guidance into concepts and capabilities, CAFJO will act like a compass for the process of transformation, allowing for an overall approach to it, practically describing the concepts to capabilities process, which is necessary for it to be successful. The present strategic environment is dominated by two important traits complexity and multidimensionality, presented in the second chapter of the document. There are some important conclusions that rise from the description of the strategic environment, which I consider relevant: The operational responses to events will include non-military effects and entities. 81

Extant Authoritative Guidance
Current Forces and Capabilities
~ 2/2006
Year 15 +
Future Forces and Capabilities
Hierarchy of Conceptual Thought

Emerging Forces and Capabilities
NATO Strategic Concept
Political Guidance Capabilities on Transformation MC Guidance to SCs on Transformation Bi-SC Strategic Vision
MC 400/2
Defence Planning + MC + SCs
CAFJO Forces & Capabilities Doctrine Organisation Training Material Leadership Personnel Facilities Interoperability
Identification of long-term requirements through research and technology
Transformational Concepts
New Operational Concepts for:
Transformed Forces & Capabilities
MC 400/2 = CM Guidance on Implementing the Alliance Military Strategy
Figure 2: CAFJO Essential links
The Alliance will need capabilities meant to ensure stability, to dilute adversities, to discourage aggression and, if necessary, to defeat the enemy across the full spectrum of the conflict. The Alliance forces must derive advantage of the use of new technologies, they must be agile, interchangeably and expeditionary. The third chapter refers to EBAO conceptual framework, highlighting the essential elements of transformation. It is known that, there are very few cases when military actions themselves can solve the complex problems specific to a complex and multidimensional security environment. Solving these problems requires the integration of all the Alliance and Member States available instruments of power. This is the fundamental principle that lies at the basis of effects-based approach to operations, which can be defined as the integrated and comprehensive application of the Alliance instruments of power, military and non-military, to generate effects that lead to the Alliance final goal achievement. The name of this concept stresses the importance of identifying the causal relations between action and effect (figure 3). To make the actions that are to be conducted easily to understand from their conceptual point of view, the document introduces both the term Engagement Space, which refers to the part of the strategic environment the Alliance wants to engage and that of Military Mission Domain, which explains that particular part in the engagement 82
NATO Reality
space where military actions are END STATE E carried out. P X POLITICAL ECONOMIC MILITARY CIVIL As a consequence of the L E OBJIECTIVES Strategic Vision , Chapter Four A C U thoroughly presents the developing N T concepts , as well as the future N I I EFFECTS associated capabilities, that will lead N O to the actual transformation G N of forces. Taking into account ACTIONS the operational capabilities that Figure 3: Effects-Based Approach to Operations are essential for the Alliance to fulfil its military missions, their development must focus on an effect-based military approach and highlight the domains in which concepts have to be developed and capabilities implemented. Within the current security environment, there are three Transformation Goals of the Alliance, which are critical in order to have coherent, integrated and relevant forces, respectively achieving: Coherent Effects , Joint Deployment & Sustainment and Decision Superiority. Coherent Effects is a state in which Allied military forces are able to integrate capabilities to produce and disseminate information, generate effects, assess results and re-engage with decisive speed. Joint Deployment & Sustainment allows the Alliance to quickly deploy task-tailored forces wherever needed and conduct sustained, continuous operations until successful conclusion of the campaign. Decision Superiority is a state in which the Allied Commander not only possesses information superior to that of the adversary and is able to make more effective decisions, but is also able to make and execute such decisions in a timeframe too rapid to allow a considered reaction by the adversary1. To achieve these three transformation goals and to ensure appropriate capabilities development, seven focus areas were developed, called Transformation Objective Areas ~ TOAs, respectively Information Superiority ~ IS; NATO Network-Enabled Capability ~ NNEC; Effective Engagement ~ EE; Joint Manoeuvre ~ JM; Enhanced CIMIC ~ EC; Expeditionary Operations ~ EO; Integrated Logistics ~ IL. The Chapter describes the transformation goals, their domains, the relationship of TOAs to the goals, all necessary for the development of NATO capable forces, through a NATO Defence Capability Management System, within EBAO context (figure 4). While other transformation goals support physical actions in conducting an operation, coherent effects represent the main force in the application of the elements meant to resolve a crisis. In other words, coherent effects are the state in which the Alliance
1 In Gndirea Militar` Romneasc` Journal, no. 2/2006, document n]elegerea transform`rii militare a NATO, punctul 14, pag. 35, translation and expertise Brigadier Valeriu Nicu].
83

Capable Future NATO Forces
~ 2/2006
forces have the possibility to integrate their NATO Defence Planning capabilities with those NATO Defence Capability Management System of other instruments of power. To attain this Achieving Achieving Achieving state, the concepts and Joint Decision Coherent Deployment Superiority Effects capabilities comprised TG TG TG in effective engagement, Effective Engagement Expeditionary Information joint manoeuvre and and Joint Manoeuvre Operations Superiority and NATO enhanced CIMIC are Integrated Network Enhanced CIMIC indispensable. Logistics Enabled Capability Effective Engagement Transformation Objective Areas is, in short, effect-based TG = Transformational Goal approach to operations. EBOA Joint Manoeuvre Figure 4: NATO Capabilities Management System presupposes the Alliance conducting rapid, precise and continuous military and non-military actions. These general concepts are supported by specialised ones such as: joint surveillance and reconnaissance, rapid deployment, joint aerospace defence, operations in urban areas, protection of forces against asymmetric threats, CBRN events management etc. Therefore, differently sized expeditionary forces rapid deployment and logistic support, to have advantages as far as the distribution in terrain and the timeframe are concerned, are key factors for current and future operations. Enhanced CIMIC refers to civil-military relationships, others than the ones we are already accustomed to. Future CIMIC will be characterised by permanent official relations with civil actors, a detailed understanding of the civil environment and a greater ability to operate together with civil entities. Enhanced CIMIC advantages will not be restricted to the tactical level. Expeditionary Operations means continuously deploying forces, wherever necessary, task-tailored, as number and structure, capable to conduct the entire spectrum of the Alliance missions. These forces will be supported by an integrated, multinational logistic system, more efficient than it used to be in the past. As a consequence of the new strategic environment, presented in Chapter Two, the Alliance has to adapt its military posture so that it could provide a rapid, precise and flexible response to the new threats, derive maximum benefit from the new technologies and preserve the technical and operational advantage. It presupposes the ability to make decisions rapidly, at all command levels (politic, strategic, operational and tactical), using integrated systems, which provide the decision makers with early alarm systems and allow for planning and conducting operations with reduced risks and collateral damages. Information Superiority refers to the ability of collecting, using and disseminating information whenever and wherever needed. NATO Network Enabled Capability NNEC helps the Alliance to provide, access and properly disseminate information, according to the situation. 84
NATO Reality
To be able to develop capable transformed forces, necessary for future operations, intellectual work is needed, work that sometimes transcends the framework of concepts especially designed to achieve transformation goals. These additional concepts describe the way the Alliance will conduct operations such as stabilisation or/and reconstruction, security assistance to individual NATO states, or as high intensity combat operations. CAFJO promotes adaptive command and control structures, flexible Headquarters structures, means of changing mentalities and strategic deterrence. NATO has to evolve and this is the way for its forces to transform. Each Member State perception and determination is, of course, different. However, in the future, all members have to come to the same denominator. It is only then we can talk about deconflicting all categories of forces land, air, maritime and special, about their coordination and the associated concepts, as well as about putting their specificities together, about the integration of the components of categories of forces and the specific elements in the culture of each Member Nation see NATO Response Force and the necessary, sometimes ad hoc, interaction with non-military entities and about the coherence of a force based on effects, collaborative, network-enabled and interdependent with institutionalised relations, with non-military entities with a view to creating a common effort area (figure 5). It is important to notice the place of non-military entities outside
Deconflict the Categories of Forces
Land Forces Special Forces Air Forces Maritime Forces
Coordinate Capabilities
Integrate Capabilities
Effects-Based, Collaborative, Agile, Network-enabled, Multilateral, Interdependent NATO Joint Forces
Unity of Effort
Transition period IOs GOs NGOs Past Current
GOs NGOs Coherence Future
IOs
Figure 5: Deconflicting, Coordination, Integration, Coherence
NATO Joint Force, as it is shown in the figure. As a small part of the Alliance Joint Forces, NATO Response Force is the transformation avant-garde, as it facilitates an ample transformation of the Allied Military Forces and, subsequently, the transformation of each Member State. Chapter Five describes the concepts to capabilities process. Effects-based operations require a consolidated, integrated and coherent capabilities-based approach to the Alliance 85
~ 2/2006
Defence Planning. Moreover, CAFJO must provide the basis for the Alliance Capabilities Management System, as it results from the effects-based approach to operations, so that the Alliance future forces could have the required capabilities. Capabilities-based planning changes the centre of gravity from a fixed, stable posture and from threat-based planning to one more flexible and reactive. This new approach recognises the fact that the Alliance cannot exactly know which nation, combination of nations or non-state actors will threaten its vital interests in the future. Capabilities-based planning is thus incertitude planning (figure 6). It does not mean
Concepts Political and Political Military Guidance Inputs from extant system (Long Term Capability Requirements, Defence Requirements Review, leasons learned etc.) Development Strategic Vision of Capabilities CAFJO CD&E R&T Follow on Concepts (a framework) Validation Capabilities
Doctrine Organisation Training Material Leadership&Education Personnel Facilities Interoperability
Endo
rsem
ent
Follow on Concepts (A Hierarchy)
Transformational Concepts Dream
Applied Concepts Reality
Degree of abstraction and forward look Capability Development Process
Need
Process CD&E
Proposed Solutions
Approval
Implementation
Capabilities
ACT-led
NATO Community
Figure 6: Concepts to Capabilities Process
that capabilities-based planning ignores threats. To create a more flexible and adaptive planning process it is necessary that the presupposition of well-known enemies, as well as the associated concepts should be eliminated. The activity of transforming concepts is led, mainly, by the Allied Command Transformation ACT , through lessons learnt, academic and technologic impact, as well as through the advantages offered by experimentation. Once a possible solution to an operational requirement is formulated, associated capabilities development occurs within the enlarged NATO community, after it is approved by Member Nations. NATO Joint Force must be an effective combination between recently developed essential capabilities and the previous ones, which prove to be still viable. The essential element, common for all the Alliance capabilities, will be their contribution to the forces transformation so that they could successfully conduct future operations. In figure 7 it is shown the way the specific activity of transformation will be introduced in the strategic guidance and the existent associated processes. 86
NATO Reality
Extant Authoritative Guidance
Current Forces and Capability
Hierarchy of Conceptual Thought

Emerging Forces and Capability
NATO Strategic Concept
NAC & NATO

ACT-LEAD
Political Guidance on Transformation MC Guidance to SCs on Transformation Strategic Vision
MC 400/2
Defence Planning + MC + SCs
Forces and Capabilities Doctrine Organisation Training Material Leadership -Development Personnel Facilities Interoperability
I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
D E C I S I O N
N E W R E Q U I R E M E N T
CAFJO
Transformational Concepts
EBAO IS NNEC EC EE EO JM IL
CD&E
New Operational Concepts
Transformated Forces & Capabilities

Figure 7: Military Transformation Process
Transformational concepts are hierarchised so that they could nourish new ideas and requirements regarding the existent forces development processes. Although expressed in a concise manner, my opinion is that the above mentioned things will contribute, to some extent, to a better understanding with regard to Concepts for Allied Future Joint Operations, which are still debated within the North Atlantic Alliance.
87
A STRATEGY OF PERFORMANCE SUITABILITY

Captain Ion DUMITRA{CU ~ EU Military Deputy Representative ~
As complex forms of socialisation, organisations have a tendency to associate higher and higher performance criteria in order to gain the best possible place in the competition requested by the market economy. The military organisations, even though non-profit, are predestined, due to the specific responsibilities extracted from their very existence, to follow the same path. The first duty of the military leader, and maybe his most complex mission, is to lead the organisation towards success. Success in combat cannot be compared with the great accomplishment of a civilian business, mainly because of the different nature and effects generated by their actions. It can be reached by the integrated application of a set of theoretical acquisitions (principles, knowledge, habits, experience) on the multiplying frame of the top technological achievements, added to human intelligence and ingenuity, embodied by leaders charisma. Success in combat is, in fact, the final element from a series of preparing actions, the goal and the target, the reason to be of the military organisation. This cannot be anticipated though, if the organisation does not have the necessary potential to achieve it.
Performance as a need
We build military structures according to the missions we have to fulfil, to the available support, the objectives we wish to reach, and last but not least, to our skill and ability to foresee the future. Once these structures defined, we establish the required measures for these to function, i.e. we define rules, we create training and procurement programs, we imagine sophisticated battle scenarios with possible enemies, thus obtaining, at the end of the cycle, the desired results. Can anyone guarantee that this whole edifice, built on the known rules, is the best or with the highest chances to succeed ? Is this system, made of institutions, people and relations, built to be competitive, and if so, which are the judging criteria and the ways to establish and evaluate the actual performance ? Unlike civilian business structures, military institutions are not compelled by the market to sell their products, to fight for survival and eventually, to be at all times under the growing pressure of demand and offer. This does not automatically place 88

them in a comfortable spot, in which, except for the wars and some small conflicts, nothing happens. The growing requirements, associated with the budget cuts, force the military organisations to rethink the rules they should obey, adjusting their way more and more towards efficiency and performance. The contemporary military leaders, as co-responsible for providing national security, are confronted with a double problem, issued, on the one hand, from the higher complexity of the assigned mission, on the other hand, from the rather low adaptation ability of the systems they lead. In fact, it is all about the constant need for change, expressed as an external requirement of the system and its internal inertia, promoted by the human element. Has the military leader enough motivation, strength and determination to push the system forward, knowing very well that one of its characteristics is stability, hence preserving the existent relations and status ? What are the weapons at hand for him to prevail against inertia, conservationism, bureaucracy, sometimes self-sufficiency or even incompetence, elements for which status quo is the very reason to be ? Do his power instruments have to limit themselves to his natural or educated qualities and abilities or do they need anything else to add ? Those who believe in the leaders exclusive ability to boost and channel his energy and resources in the right direction have enough elements to prove it. The opponents of the absolute role of the leader are also right when they state the fact that the very system, through its own mechanisms, has to support at all times the leader in his decisions. We stand here in an equation in which the two elements leader and system boost each other, in the way that one improves the system, and the other helps him rule. To what extent and how can the military leader adapt or transform the system so that this can respond to the social need for which it was created and not to his own ambition ? Do the necessary correction levers exist, in order to, on the one hand, offer enough freedom of action and, on the other hand, keep the system within the boundaries established by the political decision, and therefore, by the national interest ? And finally, the question to be put regards the correct set of a leading strategy in which resources, goals and ways to accomplish the former two have to be in a synergic relationship.
About a possible definition of command strategy

The term strategy used in the past, mainly in the military language, has lately migrated towards the civilian fields, being more associated today with politics and economy rather than with the military field. Nowadays we talk about political strategies for governing, integration in different structures, or about firms strategies to promote their products or to take over a market. In a broad sense, the strategy defines a set of measures and actions integrated in a single conception, which need to be taken in order to reach the desired goal. In the military we talk about traditional military strategies, and, following the civilian pattern, about transforming, forces operationalising, modernising strategies etc. Command strategies are less visible and known as they are, even though in a form or another they manifest themselves after the new leader assumes command. 89
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The existence of a command strategy becomes more and more an essential condition to put this in practice; without it, the organisation takes a risk to go on a winding path, never being able to really find the vocation for which it was conceived. Formulating the command strategy stands only for the first step in a complex process whose final goal is to implement that strategy. The ability to implement a strategy is more important than its actual elaboration admitted Norton and Kaplan, two famous business scientists, in a study dedicated to economic organisations strategies 1. In the same study are mentioned the results of a survey, according to which 90% of the built strategies fail in their implementation. This percentage draws, in fact, attention to the difficulties faced by a theoretical construction (the strategy) in the process of its integration in the organisation. The identification of the elements which facilitate the transfer of the elements established by the strategy into action, measurable and oriented towards reaching the final goals, remains a matter that depends on the culture of every organisation and on its ability to respond to these requirements. The command strategy, materialised in implementation plans, has to be simply formulated, at the level of common grasping meaning, because it addresses to the organisation in its entirety. Therefore, its message must not be limited to the level of the main associates, but has to be forwarded to all levels, wherever an act of command is being done (a team, a platoon, an office or a service). The contents of command strategy has to express the ways in which the commanding officer intends to achieve the established goals, respectively his approach on the way in which the organisation has to function in order to be a successful one, using his professional abilities and the organisation resources. In this category, an almost unlimited resource for the system is the human one. Defining the performances is strictly attached to the way in which the human resource is made aware of, mobilised, available and oriented to a particular target. A system performance is, above all, a matter of culture.
Towards a culture of performance

Command strategy is, without doubt, an action of the commanding officer supported by the organisation, to the extent to which it manages to combine the general interests of the institution with the personal expectations of its members. Consequently, command strategy does not have to be conceived, nor perceived as a simple action plan, but rather as a dynamic process that allows one to look in the future, usually on a medium term (2 to 4 years). Within this process one should have in view the purpose of the organisation (the mission), the requirements, the way it should look like to be able to fulfil the mission (the vision), and the actual steps to be made in order to reach the desired results (the goals). In this triad mission, vision, goals performance represents the mechanism by which the energies and creative potential of the organisation is triggered and made valuable through human action.
1
Robert S. Kaplan, David P. Norton, The Balanced Score Card: Translating Strategy into Action.
90

Evaluation (measurement) of performances is possible with the help of performance indicators. These are quantity and quality expressions of the results in a process that engulfs the entry elements, the internal mechanisms and the final products. Establishing the performance indicators is a part of the organisational management and stands base for any efficient measurement system. The performance indicators have to be quantifiable and measurable, relevant for the field they refer to, easy to understand, substantial from the point of view of the value they express, measurable in time, comparable and trustworthy. The measurement of performance helps us to transfer the organisations mission, its vision and strategy into tangible goals. The levers by which the commanding officer pursues the implementation of his command strategy, respectively the fulfilment of the goals of his strategic plan, are closely related to the evaluation and measurement of the performances of the systems he leads. The relationship between the two elements, i.e. between the establishment of a strategic command plan and a performance measurement system is the key to the efficient functioning of the whole edifice. The existence of a performance measurement system, without a strategic planning in the above defined sense, will provide information about how fast we are going, but not about the fact that we are going in the right direction or not, as well as a good planning without a performance measurement system will help us to go in the right direction, without knowing when we will reach our goals. Talking about the need of a performance culture in the military field means reconsidering competition, the honest spirit of competition, as well as building the team to represent and to be represented by. The performance culture can be a part of the transformation process. If we accept that this process has to start with ourselves, we have to start from the beginning, that is with reconsidering the values we subscribe to and of the landmarks which guide our steps in the military. Within this type of philosophy, the approach of performances as part of daily military actions command strategy can only put next to each other the institution we serve and the dynamic and successful elements of society, connecting it, through the present day, to the challenges of the future.
91
~ Structure and Conceptual Milestones ~

Colonel Marian BUCIUMAN, PhD ~ Chief of the Operational Centre for Military Command ~ Lieutenant Colonel Viorel RO{ ~ Staff Officer, the Operational Centre for Military Command ~
eyond being the century of the most powerful empires of the world and their sudden extinction, the century of the only two World Wars humankind has been confronted with so far and the most extraordinary discoveries, the 20th century is the one when the crisis phenomenon was conceptualised due to the huge number of such kind of events and their global effects. Now, the crisis, as well as the war, has become a universal notion, as a consequence of the large spectrum of hazards and threats within the international security environment, which could generate a variety of subsequent crises.
THE NATIONAL INTEGRATED CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Crisis and crisis management concept within the contemporary security strategies
Although the crisis phenomenon is present in all international organisations (UN, NATO, EU or OSCE) security strategies, a consensus regarding the definition of the term has not been reached yet, as it is a very complex phenomenon with a very large spectrum of manifestation. We appreciate that crisis may be defined as a special and abnormal situation, at national or international level, which represents a threat to the fundamental values, the political, economical and social balance and stability of the country, the fundamental rights and freedom of the citizens, the material and spiritual values, the environment, the interests and the objectives of Romania as state, as well as the accomplishment of the international obligations of the country, for which the adoption of special measures is necessary, through unitary action of the appropriate national systems. Each crisis is unique and it is necessary to solve it in a specific way, according to its particularities, and the crisis management represents the planned activities ensemble to solve critical events/situations, to come back to normal status. At first sight, crisis management is, by definition, a reactive concept, meant to eliminate or diminish the effects of a critical situation. But, the main challenge of crisis management 92

is to anticipate those critical situations that can become crises and to take gradual preventive measures to stop this evolution, which gives this process a preventive character. For this reason, crisis management should not be seen as a process that starts with a crisis, it is a permanent process, even when the situation is a normal one, as it has components regarding security environment monitoring, identification of the signs that foreshadow a crisis, warning of the response system and use of preventive measures. The significant increase of asymmetric threats in the international security environment has caused crisis management to become an essential component of international organisations security strategies UN, NATO, EU, OSCE etc. Particularly, both NATO and EU identify this field as fundamental mission which influences the entire transformation process at NATO level, and to realise to EU, the command and forces structure, as well as draft agreements to increase these organisations capability to face the new asymmetric threats. In this context, NATO Crisis Response System ~ NCRS which entered into force in September 2005, was conceived so that it could ensure training, operationality and functionality at optimal level for all NATO command and execution structures, and, at the same time, provide a set of options and measures to ensure a unitary and rapid reaction, under a strict political control, to respond in short time to the all crisis situations spectrum, including those that are subsequent to Article 5 of Washington Treaty. The main experimental projects, developed now in NATO, are to optimise the informational-decisional process, to enhance the Alliance reaction, to face every crisis which can affect the organisation security. Crisis Management Fusion Centre and NATO Common Strategic Picture are two examples in this field. NATO Crisis Management Fusion Centre ~ CMFC is a tool to decision support at high strategic level NATO General Headquarters, having as goal the development of better training and better reactions in crisis situations. The Centre will represent a systemic capability, personnel, structures, methods and infrastructures ensemble necessary to obtain and disseminate information and other knowledge necessary to develop the crisis management process and to allow the political military decisionmaking factors at Alliance strategic level to take better and faster decisions than a potential enemy. This centre will have the role to centralise all information related to international security environment, which can be involved in crisis evolution, to integrate this information in a comprehensible unitary set of knowledge specific to the dynamic of each crisis. NATO Common Strategic Picture will represent the data and information from security environment ensemble that represents the basis for the achievement and, subsequently, maintaining at strategic allied level, the permanent situational awareness of the possible break out of crisis in NATO area of interest or the development of some present crisis. The picture will include information on the most important events, forces status, warning and status indicators, immediate decision elements, geo-spatial information, graphic analyses on the relevant fields regarding crisis development political, military, economic, civil, infrastructure etc., all integrated and shown in real time, in a clear, recognised and relevant format for all users, but, at same time, flexible and adaptable to the established requirements of decision-makers. 93
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Both programs were already experimented during the last NATO crisis management exercise, CMX 06, between 1-7. 03. 2006, proving its utility and we consider that it will be implemented in the strategic decisional structure at allied level in a relatively short time.
Crisis management at national level

According to foreign policy objectives and engagements assumed under treaties and agreements, as well as to promote Romanias position as promoter of international security and stability, our country has to be ready to prepare, develop and sustain the participation of some military and civilian forces and means at a large spectrum of multinational operations, to solve some crisis situations which can affect national or international interests. The main types of threats, which are at the basis of the new Romanian Security Strategy, as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, totalitarian regimes which support terrorism, the crisis situations in the proximity of the country draw the developing directions of national defence and security capabilities. Now, at national level, solving crisis is based on stipulation of actual laws, which establish the measures taken on national territory in special situations when severe threats to national defence or security, to constitutional democracy occur, to prevent or limit disasters or for disaster relief. These measures are, primarily, non-military ones, which include political, diplomatic, legal, economic, informative-educative and moral-ideological measures and last, the military measures, applied separately or combined, to prevent and solve crisis when they occur, respectively to stop their re-apparition and recrudescence. Despite it, there is not a unique national system for crisis management in Romania. Present laws are insufficient and do not cover all spectrum of crises and, at national level, there is not a unitary action strategy against the entire crises spectrum. From a structural and legal point of view only the aspects concerning emergency situations or preventing and fighting terrorism are regulated. In the emergency field, seen as a form of crisis, the National System for the Management of Emergency Situations has been already established and designed to work under the coordination of the Ministry of Administration and Interior, mainly consisting of emergency situations committees and operative/operational centres, set up at national level, as well as at the level of ministries and other central public institutions or those from Bucharest, other counties and cities. The Ministry of National Defence, together with all the other components of the National System for the Management of Emergency Situations, takes part in the actions for limiting and removing the consequences of emergency situations, ensuring the accomplishment of 12 support functions assigned to it. Within this framework, at the level of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministerial Committee for Emergency Situations was created, as deliberative structure, for the management support, meant to assist the decision-making process of the Minister of National Defence, as well as to endorse, plan, guide and control the military forces and means taking part in preventing and managing certain emergency situations. 94

During the participation in missions of intervening in emergency or civil protection situations, the operational command of forces and means belonging to the Ministry of National Defence is fulfilled by the General Staff, through the agency of the Military Command Operative Centre, namely its Operative Centre for Emergency Situations. In the field of countering terrorism, the Terrorism Preventing and Fighting National System was created, under the coordination of the Romanian Intelligence Service, which is responsible for intervening with forces and means in order to neutralise the terrorist actions on the national territory, through the Terrorist Actions Coordination Operational Centre. The Ministry of National Defence has the obligation to cooperate with the Romanian Intelligence Service and the other public institutions with prerogatives in the field of the national security for preventing and fighting terrorist actions, the latter having direct responsibility for managing the crisis situations generated by the actions of the terrorist groups upon military objectives. In this respect, the Antiterrorist Actions and Special Operations Service functions at the General Staff. As far as engaging in the settlement of certain international crises that affect the national interests and those of the international community is concerned, one may notice that the Romanian Armed Forces must be capable to make ready, deploy and sustain military contingents, having different sizes and structures, in different theatres of operations in the structures of the international forces taking part in peace support multinational joint operations, within NATO or other coalitions of states. The modified text of the Constitution of Romania stipulates (Article 118) the dimensions in which national defence and security must be approached. The Supreme Council of National Defence acquires enlarged prerogatives for unitarily organising and coordinating the activities regarding national defence and security and those concerning taking part in maintaining international security and common defence in the military alliance systems, as well as in actions for peacekeeping or peace re-enforcement. Romanias engagements, as NATO state and future EU Member State, as well as the necessity to adapt the national security strategy to the new types of confrontations have represented important elements for analysing the legal frame and the existing capabilities at national level, thus resulting the necessity for redesigning and harmonising the domestic laws and tools for implementing political and political-military decisions at national level, through which crisis response measures to be adapted and become compatible with both international organisations requirements, procedures and structures. At the same time, taking into account that, according to our opinion, the multinational operations will be the main ways for intervening in future conflicts, we believe that Romanias taking part in these operations should be seen as a problem concerning the promotion of national interests, considering that one cannot seek to obtain security guaranties in the future security architecture without actively taking part in its creation.
National Integrated Crisis Management System

The inherent complexity of crisis situations in the last years, be they internal or international, as well as the participation in CMX-type NATO crisis response exercises have reconfirmed the necessity for the existence of a host of specialised actions, which should be based on a unique conception in the field of planning and organising, 95
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as well as the necessary procedures and measures that must be put into effect at political, diplomatic, economic, military, social, religious, ecologic etc. level in order to eliminate the effects of crisis situations and come back to normal. In this context, it is necessary for domestic laws to be complemented and a unitary legal and for institutional frame to be established, capable to integrate in a unique system, at national level, the structures with responsibilities in the crisis management field and to coherently and flexibly provide the management of the entire range of crisis situations from civil emergency situations to crises having a military nature. Basically, the National Integrated Crisis Management System ~ NICMS, which was proposed through the draft of the law with the same name, has to be developed so that, through operationalisation, it could ensure compatibility with NATO principles and existing procedures and interoperability with Alliance similar specific structures and, at the same time, it could have the necessary flexibility to consequently adapt to EU crisis management mechanisms. In addition, it must be capable to respond to a large range of crisis situations, at national level, and to provide circumstances for actively taking part in international crisis management, since Romania is member of international organisations and in accordance with the agreements it is part of. NICMS must provide: civil emergencies management, riot control, terrorist crisis management, weapons of mass destruction proliferation crisis management, participation in crisis response operations, other than common defence: peace support, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, maritime sanctions and embargo, participation in self defence and common defence. In order to efficiently respond to the challenges of the security environment, we reckon that NICMS has to accomplish the following requirements: to be established and work as an integrated crisis management system, capable to respond to the entire spectrum of crises at national or Alliance level; to provide the necessary political control, both at national and Alliance level for applying crisis response measures; to increase the interaction between civil and military structures with responsibilities in the field; to be capable to efficiently respond to warnings sent by the Intelligence and Warning National System or by the warning systems that are specific to the international organisations inter-connected with NICMS (i.e. NATO Intelligence and Warning System ~ NIWS); to ensure the celerity of the decision-making process and shorten the time for response; to provide the autonomy, complementarily and interoperability of the system components. The NICMS represents an integrated and flexible ensemble of civil and military crisis management structures, mechanisms and procedures. The systems with responsibilities in managing the various domains of manifestation of the already existing crises emergencies, fighting terrorism will be functionally integrated in NICMS, as its components, but with autonomy, so that they could become operational and react according to the nature, intensity and dimension of the crisis. At the same time, the possibility for NGOs and other juridical personnel to be able to cooperate with NICMS in the actions meant to eliminate the effects of crises must be provided, on condition they comply with the provisions of the national management plans for these situations. 96

The NICMS organising framework proposed by the draft law is based on the conception according to which crisis management is an integrant part of the national security field and is gradually achieved according to the crisis nature, dimension, complexity and intensity, the integrated coordination of the measures for preventing, eliminating or limiting being exercised, according to the law, by the Parliament, the President of Romania, the Supreme Council of National Defence or the Government. These authorities establish the structure directly responsible for the operational command of the crisis management process, according to the crisis nature, dimension, complexity and intensity. In this respect, the NICMS is organised according to the system of systems concept, having three major functional components command, execution and support. The architecture of the systems command structures is configured on three levels of competences, as follows: integrated political coordination, meaning exerting the political will and control over national reaction fulfilled by the national authorities, according to the constitutional provisions of the law in force; operational command at national level, which expresses the integrality of the command and coordination measures adopted by the political factor through operative and operational centres, as well as other structures existing at the level of the public institutions appointed by law (the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Ministry of National Defence, the Romanian Intelligence Service), as permanent technical bodies for supporting the political-military decision at strategic level; sectorial operational command, at the level of the other central or local structures level with crisis management responsibilities, the operative and operational centres, as technical specialised structures level, which will become operational, according to the crisis type. Basically, the coordination of crisis management such as civil emergencies and public order control, at national level, is fulfilled by the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the security crisis in the defence field being under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defence and those in the antiterrorist field, of the Romanian Intelligence Service. In complex crisis situations, which cover at least two of the domains presented above, that being, in fact, the characteristic of most of the security crises, the authorities of the state will decide which organisation will take charge of the responsibility for the integrated management of the respective crisis. The NICMSs execution component consists of the range of structures, human resources and specialised means available for the public organisations and authorities with responsibilities in crisis management and other structures or emergency professional or voluntary constructions, stipulated by law. The support component consists of: The Intelligence and Warning System, comprising a host of structures, procedures and equipment necessary for discovering and monitoring the signs of an internal or international potential crisis emerging and its evolution; The Communication and Informatics System, which encompasses the communication and IT resources and services provided by central and local public 97
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authorities, as well as by public operators and authorised contractors for resources and communication services and IT; The Public Communication System, which includes the specialised structures, resources and means available for the authorities and public institutions with responsibilities in crisis management. NICMS must provide the timely and coherent development of crisis management process, which, basically, is structured and organised on five distinct phases, drafted for crisis of utmost complexity, according to the principle which states that, if this desideratum is to be fulfilled, the system will be able to settle a low intensity crisis as well:
Phase 1 Identifying and warning on a potential or current crisis is the phase of transition from normality to the crisis status, in which the Intelligence and Warning System is the main element, able to provide the signs for the emergence of a crisis which can affect national security. Phase 2 The situation assessment, during which the crisis effects assessment process starts in the political, military, civil emergency etc. fields, is meant to provide the state authorities with a comprehensive technical picture on the crisis characteristics and the existing or potential implications, based on which the decision on a course of action for settling the crisis is taken. In contrast with the previous phases, which are descriptive in their essence, Phase 3 The development of response options, seeks to develop the crisis response strategy. The final goal of this phase is to draft the Initiating Directive of Integrated Response and to start, if necessary, the operational planning and/or activating the civil emergencies planning arrangements, if the crisis was not settled during this phase. The Initiating Directive must set the strategic objectives, the status of the desired outcome, the response options, the missions, as well as the existing premises and limitations. Phase 4 The integrated crisis response planning and development is the most important phase of the entire crisis management process. The Initiating Directive will be effected through the concept for operation (CONOPS), followed by the operation plan (OPLAN), during the security crisis occurred in the defence field or the one of fighting terrorist acts. For non-military operations, other specific steps will be executed as well, such as putting into effect the agreements in the domain of civil emergency, public order control etc. Phase 5 Come back to stability represents the phase of reassessing the situation and, depending on its evolution and goals achievement, ends with the redeployment of forces and means that took part in the crisis settlement.
One should notice that passing through the 2 to 4 phases is not mandatory. Depending on the efficiency of employing preventive options and certain response measures during the first stages of a crisis, it is possible for it not to degenerate and for the return to stability to be made without the phases 3 and 4. Nevertheless, the entire process must be seen as a cyclic development, so that, depending on the development of new course of action, the process could be restarted in order to develop a new course of action, no matter it means an escalation or a de-escalation of the crisis. Moreover, crisis management must be seen in close connection with the operational planning process, both being complementary as far as applying the crisis response measures and elaborating/implementing the operation plans are concerned. Another important aspect is represented by the fact that, for these crises response measures to be functional, it is necessary that a structure of forces ready to intervene to permanently exist, in the domains crises manifest, such as civil protection forces, gendarmes, operationalised military units etc. 98

Although, in the predictable future, no major danger of a classic military type can be foreseen in the geopolitical and geostrategic area of Romania, nevertheless, we reckon that the increasing classic risks and threats, among which we can mention terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, can generate different system crisis, especially in the security field. Mention should be made, in this respect, that the thorough changes caused by passing from the common defence philosophy to the common security one must bring improvements not only from the conceptual point of view but also from the structural one that of forces construction, namely the response strategies, whose putting into practice more and more strikingly prefigure the need for using specialised military forces in the crises management process. The establishment of National Integrated Crisis Management System seeks to fulfil the basic requirements of the informational-decisional process at strategic level, so that Romania could adequately respond to the new typology of asymmetric risks and threats both on national territory and during crisis response operations everywhere in the world through: informational superiority, decisional supremacy, decisional act celerity, shorter time to react. The presented quartet processualy manifests, each of its element inter-conditioning, the celerity of the decisional act and decisional supremacy being based on acquiring informational superiority. Finally, these first three objectives of the strategic command contribute to reducing the reaction times of the entire response system, this representing the main characteristic of a rapid, efficient and coordinated response in crises situations. We consider that providing the functionality of NICMS during a crisis will be conditioned by the existence, even in peace time, of certain operative response structures, with specific functions and framing the selected personnel on positions and providing its stability. The necessity for training at peacetime is called for as well, through different forms of instruction, both of the system in its whole and its components specialised in the management of different types of crises. In order to provide an increased viability and efficiency to the National Integrated Crisis Management System and a rapid and efficient reaction, one is required to draft and adopt a series of Stand by normative acts, able to cover the entire spectrum of crises, such as contracts for renting and providing services etc., which must be activated depending on the type of the crisis. Considering that an important factor of the efficiency of the crisis management process is given by the quality of the information flow from the civil and military structures, with major implications on a timely response reaction, it is necessary to integrate all these institutions in an adequate analytic assessment system and to complete a communication matrix at institutional-governmental level, in accordance with NATOs security requirements. The capabilities meant to settling a crisis situation must be grounded on the existing resources and the laws elaborated in advance. One must take into account the necessity of correlating the deployment of human, material and financial resources in the theatres of operation, at the Alliances request, with the possibility of concomitantly providing the necessary capabilities to manage a new crisis situation. 99
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In conclusion, we reckon that Romania must redesign and adapt the informationaldecisional structure, the force and means structure, as well as the host of training strategies of the two already mentioned components, so that it could efficiently and timely respond to the entire spectrum of crises on national territory and actively take part in the entire range of missions specific to the crisis response operations at international level, in keeping with the agreements it has been part of.
Selective bibliography
*** Constitu]ia Romniei, Bucure[ti, 2003. *** Strategia de securitate na]ional` a Romniei. Garantarea democra]iei [i a libert`]ilor fundamentale, dezvoltare economic` [i social` sus]inut` [i durabil`, aderarea la NATO [i integrarea n Uniunea European`, Bucure[ti, 2001. *** Strategia militar` a Romniei, proiect, Bucure[ti, 2004. *** Ordonan]a de urgen]` nr. 21/2004 din 15/04/2004, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 361 din 26/04/2004 privind Sistemul Na]ional de Management al Situa]iilor de Urgen]`. Locotenent-comandor ing. Gelu Alexandrescu, c`pitan-comandor Gabriel-Florin Moisescu, Aspecte privind gestionarea crizelor, Buletinul Universit`]ii Na]ionale de Ap`rare, nr. 1/2004. Maior Ioan-Constantin Stan, Situa]iile de criz` [i gestionarea acestora, Buletinul Universit`]ii Na]ionale de Ap`rare, nr. 2/2004. *** NATO Crisis Response System Manual.
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~ Civil-Military Relations at Operational Level ~

Colonel Florentin UDREA ~ Chief of the Civil-Military Cooperation Office ~
In the early 1990s both civilians and the military realised what they had to do, but few knew how to do it. In a relatively short term, the basic constitutional procedures and the primary institutional capacities were established for the development of democratic civil-military relations1. Civil-military relations generally refer to the interactions between armed forces as institutions and the sections of the society they belong to. In terms of a general definition, the democratic civil-military relations stand for the efficient management of security, based on the principles of democracy, as well as of the governmental agencies associated with the above-mentioned field. Generally, civil-military relations focus on the relative distribution of power between the government and the military forces of a country. They imply a process in which civil control is measured and assessed weighing the militarys and the civil officials influence on making state decisions on war, domestic security, defence and military policy (that is, the way, dimension and operating procedures of the armed forces). As far as we are concerned it is considered that Romania has been a model of civilmilitary relations since the very Middle Ages. Since a 10,000 people armed forces would defeat a 500,000 soldiers, belonging to the Ottoman Empire, it becomes obvious that we would have been rapidly destroyed unless civilians had cooperated with the military2. Taking another example from the recent history of our country, one can assert the fact that, undoubtedly, the relations between civilians and the military during the Revolution of December 1989, in addition to being an actual need, worked really efficiently, it is true, on an informal background. Lately, following conflicts, beginning with Somalia and ending with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the urging problems have occurred since the armed forces retreat or the beginning of their retreat, while the reconstruction and the management
1 Ionel Nicu Sava, Civil-Military Relations, Western Assistance & Democracy in South Eastern Europe, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2003, p. 3. 2 HSH Prince Radu of Hohenzollern-Veringen, Impactul rela]iilor civil-militare asupra securit`]ii, Adev`rul, nr. 4831, 18 January 2006.
CIMIC
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of the given areas were requiring a co-operation framework among all the actors in the area: central (local) public administration authorities, military forces, IOs and NGOs, civil populace etc. For this purpose the establishment and operationalisation of an adequate capability, represented by the civil-military cooperation ~ CIMIC, was necessary in order to establish relations between the above-mentioned actors. In this kind of situations, CIMIC, as a means of putting into practice civil-military relations, does not do anything but reproduce with high fidelity, at operational and tactical levels, what civil-military relations define at strategic level. CIMIC has actual influence at strategic level, and it contains elements of military strategy, but its actions are confined merely to the above-mentioned levels. The relativity and circumspection with which civil-military cooperation, as a distinct activity, is derived not from the lack of definitions but from the lack of strategies that harmonise all non-military phenomena contributing to the military success. Paradoxically, if we tried a purely random enumeration we would see that the non-military elements that contribute to the military success overwhelmingly outnumber those within the force3. The difference of values between armed forces and society, determined by the very cultural difference between these two systems is a well-known fact. In this case, the role of civil-military relations and implicitly that of civil-military cooperation is to fill this gap. CIMIC comes not only to fill a gap but also to essentialise those military-civil concerns which should harmonise interests as well as means, methods and mainly the resources necessary to achieve the final objective: the successful completion of the mission. For instance there are serious disputes regarding the negative influence of PSO type operations Peace Support Operations/CIMIC on the strictly military skills of the armed forces. In other words, these kinds of missions would alter to a certain extent their warlike spirit and their combat readiness in a conventional warfare. This reminds us of the use of tanks or submarines operating in World War I. It was then that the decisionmakers complained again about the shifting of the war from its knightly aspect to the technical one. At present, the same decision-maker factors (not necessarily military) complain about the shifting of war from its technical aspect to the asymmetrical one4. This very cooperation between civilians and the military, at both tactical and operational levels but mainly at the strategic level of the defence policy, is the key element of success, be it the assurance of national security or the successful completion of the military operation. Actually, the civil-military relations can be a valuable indicator. At strategic level, they indicate, among others, the level of democracy in the given country, while at operational level they indicate the efficiency of the military operation. In 1989 the American William S. Lind Gary Hart senators adviser at that time together with four active duty and reserve officers, was outlining the picture of imminent
3 HSH Prince Radu of Hohenzollern-Veringen, Impactul rela]iilor civil-militare asupra securit`]ii, Opening lecture of NATO Operational CIMIC course, 15 November 2005, National Defence University Carol I, Bucharest. 4 Conference Transforming Post-Communist Militaries JSCSC 26-29, April 2001.
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fundamental changes in the art of warfare. Their study was aiming at bringing the concept of the fourth generation warfare into attention and actually into the military culture. The new conflicts had to be defined by a few basic ideas as follows: the fourth generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemys society; decreasing dependence on centralised logistics; a high degree of ability to live off the land and the enemy; small, highly manoeuvrable, agile forces will tend to dominate; the goal will be to collapse the enemy internally rather than physically destroy him; targets will include such things as the populations support for the war and the enemys culture; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts; the distinction between civilian and military may disappear5.
Civil-military cooperation is the expression of civil-military relations at operational level. While civil-military relations are established at strategic level and, as we have already seen, they represent a political-military concept, the civil-military cooperation is a military concept that puts into practice a sector of the civil-military relations, namely that of the collaboration and cooperation of the military with public administration authorities, civil organisations and civil populace in order to achieve common goals. CIMIC is a NATO concept that was used initially and as a rule, during Peace Support Operations and which has gained popularity in the last few years. Governments, non-governmental organisations, international organisations and Armed Forces cooperate during operations in order to build new and stable societies or to provide assistance during crisis (civil emergency) situations. It would not be right to consider CIMIC just a contemporary form of military activity. The idea of cooperation between military and civil authorities in this kind of operations is not a new one. It should be mentioned that the term used initially was that of Civil Affairs and it has been used since World War II, when American troops were present in almost all theatres of operations, dealing with various problems generated by the interference with the local civil populace and the multitude of cultures representing them. Immediately after the end of the world war the concept was revised and improved, while the first large scale Civil Affairs project was Marshall Plan, whose remarkable results are felt even nowadays. The term Civil Affairs is used by the US Armed Forces but the forces that perform Civil Affairs activities belong to those, which conduct Special Operations. One must distinguish between the NATO CIMIC concept and the American Civil Affairs concept. While CIMIC refers especially to the cooperation between NATO commanders on one hand and the civil institutions on the other hand, Civil Affairs imply a larger scale of activities of which the civil-military cooperation is only a part.
5 William S. Lind, Col Keith Nightengale, Capt John F. Schmitt, Col Joseph W. Sutton, Lt Col (r) Gary I. Wilson, The changing face of war: into the fourth generation, Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.
CIMIC and Civil Affairs ~ conceptual delimitation
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The idea of civil-military cooperation can be also found in concepts like Nation Building and Hearts and Minds. They imply the prevalence of military forces in a peace enforcement operation, which can imply the change of the political structure of the occupied nation6. The Hearts and Minds campaigns are initiated in order to gain the support of the local populace to a military operation and finally to the government that initiated the campaign. Civil Affairs activities enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present, and involve the application of Civil Affairs functional specialty skills, in areas which are normally the responsibility of the civil government, to enhance the conduct of CMO. Civil-military operations (CMO), in turn, are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organisations and authorities, and the civilian populace, in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area7. One of the features of the Civil Affairs is the profound regional orientation in setting missions, which implies more than maintaining a linguistic expertise, up to the efficiency of communication, having deep knowledge of culture and customs as well as of the non-verbal communication subtleties, which sometimes go unnoticed at first sight. This aspect resulted in establishing units and subunits specialised for different areas of the world. According to some authors8, the distinction between the two concepts is more than semantic, even if the two American concepts of Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations (CMO) include tasks common with those performed by CIMIC and the US accepts NATOs CIMIC doctrine. This approach creates problems for the US military in a humanitarian intervention, beyond those faced by other NATO nations9. However, between CIMIC and Civil Affairs there are actually no big differences, while they have the same purpose. Lately there has been a special concern for moving away the Civil Affairs and PSYOPS structures from the Special Operations Command ~ SOCOM. The majority of US Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) forces are to be shifted from US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to the conventional US Army senior military officials have said. The move was ordered by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld10. The CIMIC concept was brought together during the Cold War and it began to take shape only after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the involvement of massive multinational forces in the theatres of operations, mainly after the lessons learned from the Gulf in the early 90s.
6 R. Janssens, G. Teitler, CIMIC since 1945. Historical, Political and Operational Contexts in Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2002, p. 6. 7 Joint Publication 3-57.1: Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, Washington, Department of Defense, 2003. 8 Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo, 2004, Strategic Studies Institute, USA. Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis is Professor of History at DePaul University US and was member of to the experts team of Civil-Military Relations Centre beside the Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, that participated in 2002, in the elaboration of Romanian Armed Forces CIMIC Manual. 9 Ibid. 10 Joshua Kucera JDW Staff Reporter, Washington, DC, Civil affairs, psyops shift away from SOCOM, in Janes Defence, volume 43, issue 12, 22 March 2006.
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During the Cold War, CIMIC used to acquire different meanings, closer to the idea of Host Nation Support. During the Cold War, CIMIC within NATO was directed to huge conflicts in Europe likely to happen between East and West. Under these circumstances the civil authorities were to support the military mission. The CIMIC key factor during the Cold War was the support provided by civil authorities to military commanders. Harbour facilities, railways and roads were used by militaries, enabling the transfer of military equipment to areas of operation. The CIMIC concept had a meaning almost opposite to the present one. Now CIMIC represents a military activity that is part of an operation and that provides support to the central (local) public administration authorities. Changing this way the meaning of CIMIC into its opposite, that is from civil support to a military operation into the military operation which aims at supporting civilians is a natural result of the new type of military operations carried on immediately after the end of the Cold War. Deployed in Crisis Response Operations, NATO has taken over both humanitarian and reconstruction activities, either to prevent unacceptable human suffering or as a consequence of the fact that empowered civil organisations and authorities, IOs, NGOs or local authorities were not ready to deal with the requirements, or simply for both reasons. Facing a series of highly complex humanitarian emergencies in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the Alliance felt the need to develop clear procedures, capable to facilitate the cooperation between own military structures and the humanitarian organisations, which were providing support. In this respect, NATO defines CIMIC as the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies11. The dual aspect of CIMIC activity the support provided to the civil environment and concomitantly to the force and the operation carried on by it may surprise or confuse; however the relation is as clear as possible and simple enough. While the support of the force is the central objective, the support given to the civil community is the means by which CIMIC accomplishes this objective. It is clear that the objective of being an active and efficient interface between the two systems, can be achieved by a constant contact with the local populace in the theatre of operations, with its representatives, be they local, central, transition authorities or ad interim ones. The essence of this relationship derives from the constant need to have information exchange. In order that the military body can participate along with other active actors present in the area in aid actions, which are so useful for a populace undergoing crisis situations, it has to get in touch with all these people, to gather the necessary information on society, on the way it functions and to learn how to better know each other in order to cooperate. Though CIMIC followed the pattern of Civil Affairs, it has developed as a less preventive and less proactive one in terms of methods, not so exclusive, as it supports the operations of the coalition forces as a whole and therefore it does not work on the principle of Civil
11
NATO CIMIC Doctrine, AJP-9, 2003.
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Affairs, which supports the success of the operations carried out by the American forces in the first place. This is why we can say that CIMIC, though theoretically owes a common NATO doctrine (AJP-9), it is applied in different manners by different countries, which approach it according to different schools and patterns. One of the features of CIMIC is the lack of political involvement. The military personnel are used to help restore economy or institutions like hospitals or schools. Changing the local political structure or the balance of forces in the area of operations is not part of CIMIC projects. Though it has never been officially asserted, it seems that NATOs requirement to have European CIMIC forces is an American initiative. When the United States Government decided to diminish its contribution to SFOR, European NATO partners were also asked to participate in CIMIC activities. Around this time NATO requested three European nations, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands to establish their own CIMIC capacity12. At the end of the last century approaches of CIMIC activities outside NATO were developed as for instance the EU CIMIC Doctrine. The CIMIC project is defined by EU as follows: Specific tasks or activities developed by EU Forces, isolated or within a partnership with one or more civil bodies, always in support of the commander. In its turn UN suggests the following definition, in which CIMIC represents mutual support relations, joint planning and a constant information exchange at all levels, between military structures and humanitarian organisations/agencies, which take action in order to fulfil common objectives, as a reaction to humanitarian emergency situations UK MOD civil-military cooperation philosophy. The American Armed Forces Manual FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, as of February 14, 2000, gives the following definition: CIMIC includes all activities and measures taken by UN, NATO, and national commands or headquarters and HN civil authorities during peace, crisis, or conflict. It also includes the relationship between allied forces and the government authorities of the respective nations on whose territory armed forces are stationed and will be employed. CIMIC stems from the need to uphold and respect the sovereignty of the NATO nations and from constraints in the forward basing of units from the United States and other countries. CIMIC missions vary according to the location of forces. In NATO, logistics remain a national responsibility. During war, the acquisition of HNS under CIMIC consists of two types of support-preplanned and ad hoc. Preplanned HNS is negotiated during peace and culminates in a formal, signed document. We adopted the CIMIC definition in accordance with the provisions of the NATO CIMIC Doctrine (AJP-9) which we have already introduced in the CIMIC Doctrine and in the national CIMIC Manual. Therefore the two concepts CIMIC, respectively Civil Affairs refer to the same field of activity but from a conceptual perspective they slightly differ. CIMIC forces support missions carried on in any theatre, in peace and in wartime, throughout the whole spectrum of military operations. These forces multiply the combat force of any commander in all spheres of conflict.
12
R. Janssens, G. Teitler, op. cit., p. 13
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As one can notice, in any military operation CIMIC forces are used as well; lately we have witnessed the enhancement of CIMIC activity. As a matter of fact Enhanced Civil-Military Cooperation is one of the seven objectives of transformation in the view of NATO-ACT (Allied Command Transformation).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Doctrina pentru cooperarea civili-militari, SMG/PF-5.2. NATO CIMIC Doctrine, AJP-9, 2003. Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2002, Civil-Military Cooperation, A Marriage of Reason. HSH Prince Radu of Hohenzollern-Veringen, Impactul rela]iilor civil-militare asupra securit`]ii, Adev`rul, nr. 4831, 18 January 2006. Prof. univ. dr. Alexandru Babo[, Florentin Udrea, Curs rela]ii civil-militare, Universitatea Lucian Blaga, Sibiu, 2006. Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo, 2004, Strategic Studies Institute, USA. XXX, Globalisation of civil-military relations: democratisation, reform and security, Enciclopedica Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002.
@ Translated by Aura TUJON
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COMMUNICATION IN MANAGING CONFLICTS

Sorin Cristian BANU ~ Director, Regional Customs Directorate, Bucharest ~
he concept of conflict refers not only to the conflicts that have negative effects (unproductive ones) but also to the positive ones (productive), which have positive effects on the individual, group or organisation. Positive conflicts can test different ideas, stimulate the generation of alternative concerning decisions, prevent the decision-making process from being too fast, raise the level of understanding problems, increase group members involvement, stimulate interest and interactions, creative thinking and, therefore, the quality of decisions and adherence to their implementation. Conflicts are inevitable in the life of an organisation or group and in any professional activity. On the one hand, they may result in prejudicing productivity and, on the other hand, they may be synonymous with dynamism and progress. As it is almost impossible to eliminate the sources of conflict within an organisation, it is the manager who has to be capable to identify these sources, to understand their nature and then, considering both the organisation and the individual goals, to take action so that the negative effects could be reduced, while taking advantage of the positive ones. Negotiation is thus the specific form of communication when aiming at conciliating opposed points of view. There are intrapersonal, interpersonal, inter-group, intra-organisation or environmental conflicts. They may occur among individuals/groups that are connected in a way, but either have mutually inconsistent aims, values, interests, or have consistent goals but different or competing manners to reach them. The inter-correlation conflict-communication is determined by the fact that the process of communication itself can generate conflicts, may be a symptom of conflicts or lead to conflict resolution. Any type of communication behaviour is, in fact, a way of externalisation and any communication affects behaviour. As communication is interaction, it is, therefore, an instrument of interinfluence. Referring to the characteristics of interpersonal conflicts, Watkins states two axioms, as follows: 1. Conflict can be solved or generated only by means of communication process (using verbal and nonverbal communication), as people can interact and exchange messages only by communicating. 2. Conflict is generated by the fact that the two parties involved in conflict have mutually inconsistent goals. These goals are due to either concrete facts or different systems of values. 108

We can mention the following conclusions: It is only communication that helps parties in conflict to find a solution that is mutually acceptable, in accordance with both parties objectives; it is possible for incertitude and ambiguous information, generated by defective communication, to lead to perceiving goals as mutually inconsistent; as different value systems induce different perceptions, they may be considered a source of conflict; appealing to positive communication, emphatic listening, self-exposition can lead to finding a common basis for discussions, common interests, sharing common values; precise communication reduces differences in perceptions and thus the possibility for a conflict to occur decreases. Intrapersonal conflict occurs when the correlated cognitive elements are incompatible or inconsistent, resulting in the individual affected capacity of foreseeing and self-controlling. Inconsistency, perceived as threatening the validity of the individual referential framework, results in incertitude. Once inconsistency is perceived, intracommunication is used to reduce incertitude but not necessarily inconsistency. Individuals can maintain inconsistency, while trying to reduce the associated tensions. The most effective method to reduce incertitude is self-explaining (by intrapersonal communication) inconsistency: we bring ourselves plausible arguments to understand the discrepancy; we try to understand the less clear aspects; we ask ourselves questions and try to answer them. Interpersonal conflict, at group, organisation, or environmental level, can have many sources, such as: the functional structure, the division in subunits and the way activities are grouped; the process of assessing performance; competition for limited resources; competition for power and influence; inconsistency between individual perceptions regarding the role each worker has at the working place, different personalities, needs and expectations; desire to be psychically and physically autonomous; personal problems originate from outside the organisation.
In general, there are five interrelated steps in the evolution of conflict: occurrence of the conflict generating the source and the shape of latent conflict; perceiving the conflict, on different channels and in different ways (the perceived conflict stage there is something wrong); clear externalisation of signs characteristic to conflictual situations (conflict comes to be felt the boss did not tell me I had to attend the meeting); open actions meant to resolve the conflict become manifest( the manifest conflict stage many times, the boss has not told me that I have to attend the meeting); conflict and taken actions consequences appear (the boss does not want me to participate in the decision making process, therefore I will sabotage their implementation). Latent conflict is the first step in a conflict, characterised by the fact that, under the influence of the source of conflict, a specific set of attitudes and sentiments is generated. It can either remain in this stage or degenerate into a irremediably critical situation. Perceived conflicts may take many forms: latent conflict, yet unperceived; existent latent conflict, yet unperceived; inexistent latent conflict, yet perceived as existent. The situation can take the form of a perceived conflict, although there has not been any latent conflict. 109
Conflictual Process Dynamics
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The perceived conflict stage is characterised by the occurrence of an emotional component, thus those involved can feel hostile, tense, anxious or, on the contrary, when the conflict is a positive one, enthusiastic, more ambitious, ready to take action. Felt conflict is a personalised conflict, having characteristics that are typical of the individual and, many times, among its manifestations, we can mention defensive or aggressive communication. There is gossip and news spread around the subject and information tends to be distorted. Spirits are low and much time is wasted in unproductive actions. Group discussions, interpersonal ones and meetings can be, at this stage, a safety valve. Manifest conflict is the observable behaviour, nourished by latent perceptions and feelings and it can follow either the path of open fight, which will generate a winner and a looser, or that of trying to establish common goals. There are three important forms of intervention in situations of manifest conflicts: negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Negotiation is the process of communication that aims at reaching agreement. The two parties involved work together in an attempt to craft outcomes that serve their mutual interests. If it is not possible, mediation is resorted to. Mediation is the form of intervention that promotes reconciliation or explanation, interpretation of standpoints so that they could be clearly understood by the two parties. It is, in fact, bargaining for a compromise between standpoints, needs and hostile or incompatible attitudes. Mediation generally presupposes the assistance of a third neutral party in finding resolution to the problems. This person attempts to help the two parties in conflict to reach a mutual satisfactory decision. In case mediation does not prove helpful, arbitration is resorted to. Arbitration consists in hearing and defining the conflictual problem by a person who is skilled or authorised in doing it. The arbitrator acts like a judge and has decisional power.
The specialised literature on the issue suggests the fact that, according to the extent the manager tends to be preoccupied with the success of the organisation or the relationships with subordinates, five types of approaches are outlined. Therefore, in case of withdrawal from conflict, the manager sees the conflict as having no chance of resolution, tries to avoid the frustration and stress that inevitably accompany the conflict, withdrawing or pretending the conflict is inexistent. There are different ways of withdrawing from conflict, such as: changing the topic, ignoring some statements, pushing responsibilities towards another area, delaying decision, in hope that the conflictual situation will disappear without intervention. It is characteristic to managers who are not self-confident and do not want to be in the position of facing a manifest conflict, many times because conflict resolution implies communicative skills the respective manager does not have. The disadvantage of this approach resides in the fact that it ignores the very conditions that have generated the conflict and this does not simply disappear but turns into a latent conflict. One of the consequences of ignoring the conflict is the communication 110
Conflict Management Approach

blockage at all levels, which worsens things. This type of approach is advantageous only if the conflict does not have any importance. Accommodation is characterised by the managers attempt to approach the conflict so that everyone could be satisfied. He overevaluates the importance of maintaining a good relationship with the subordinates while underevaluating the importance of reaching the goal. As the manager wants to be approved and accepted by those around him, he will perceive any confrontation as destructive and he will give up when his interests are in conflict with those of the others around. Accommodation is achieved, for instance, by resorting to humour or by changing the topic when the situation becomes too tensional. The manager tries to provide explanations and to make the others understand. This type of approach can reduce the felt conflict and can be sometimes effective, on short term. However, the fact that the negative effects of the conflict are not felt at that moment does not mean that the sources of conflict have been eliminated. Accommodation generates a camouflage that can any time disappear; it can also generate barriers to progress. It is preferred especially in case of low-performance organisations and it can result in lack of open communication from the top to the bottom and, in the subordinates lack of involvement and refusal to assume responsibilities, which are very serious problems. Conflict Accommodation may be useful when the problem is not important at all, or when it is impossible for the parties involved to reach an agreement. Power-based approach to conflict is resorted to when the manager attempts at achieving the goals related to productivity at any cost, without considering the others opinions, needs, feelings or agreement. He will appeal to imposing constraint, using different financial, intellectual or ethical means at hand due to the power and authority guaranteed by his position. The manager is not able to resort to appropriate communication resources to resolve the conflict and, instead, makes use of the power conferred by position: the language used is typical, abounding in words like opposition, fight, conquest, force, constraint, destruction etc. This kind of language generates, through the associated emotional implications, negative feelings, frustrations and humiliations. Resorting to force can solve the dispute for the moment, but, on long term, graver conflicts may occur. Applied within the context of a climate of cooperation, only occasionally, when the time is limited or the situation is on the point of becoming critical, this type of approach may be appropriate. However, if repeated without justification, it triggers about the already mentioned negative effects. Compromise is situated between the power-based approach and accommodation and consists in resolving conflictual situations by reciprocal concessions, resulting in mutual partly satisfaction. It is often used in case of negotiations. Confrontation is a constructive type of approach to conflicts, as, considering the need for both productivity and cooperation, it is the only one capable of leading to definitely resolving the conflict. Research shows that the most efficient managers approach the conflict in different styles following the order below: they start with confrontation, continue with accommodation, 111
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compromise, power-based approach and, in the worst of cases, withdrawal from conflict. The less competent managers avoid confrontation, as they prefer the power-based approach, although they immediately resort to withdrawal, accomodation and compromise.
Studying the problems of groups in conflict, A.C. Filley describes three types of outcomes to conflict: win-lose; lose-lose and win-win. The first two strategies are, mainly, directed towards achieving results, neglecting long or short time relationships. The general atmosphere is unproductive, each of the parties focusing on own interests, points of view or problems. The parties have own opinions regarding conflict resolution and there is no interest in identifying common interests, shared values or goals, interests that are behind the positions adopted. The conflict is thus extensively personalised. The win-lose strategy is typical of the following situations: when the boss syndrome is present (it is the position for imposing a solution); when the vote is resorted to and the majority decides; when ideas that contradict the own ones are not supported any more or are even sabotaged. The winwin strategy is the optimal form of conflict resolution. It can be applied if we are not under the time pressure. The parties involved focus their energy on defeating the problem, not the people. Both parties agree upon a solution that mutually serves their interests. The key of implementing such a strategy is the managers attitude, his competency in communication and the existence of a climate of cooperation. In this context, the conflict is accepted by the parties as something normal and useful in solving the problems optimally and not as a source of stress. This strategy can be successful on condition the group manager ensures minimal conditions such as: eliminate the feeling of time pressure; the possibility for direct, open interactions between parties; sharing information; agreeing upon the equal validity and importance of both parties goals; reciprocal trust; all group members are aware of the fact that their opinions and work are important for the group; the long term costs of different solutions are understood by everyone; group members are used to giving descriptive and specific feedback; the focus is on common aims and goals, on exhaustively trying to provide alternative solutions to different problems, on quality and involvement; different standpoints are tolerated; questions are accepted and asked; leadership is flexible. Any conflict must have an optimal and mutually accepted resolution. It does not mean that both parties will gain the same thing, but that different goals can be achieved in manners that are acceptable for both parties. Different points of view can and must exist, as they lead to new points of view that can stimulate creativity. We have to sincerely accept the others opinions. In this context, it is important that we should minimise hierarchical differences interfering, as they automatically place us in the opposing team, inhibiting the optimal conflict resolution. We have to trust our partner of conflict, not to distort, willingly or not, the process of communication by hiding information, filtering information due to perceptions, fearing to uncover ourselves, which can lead to vulnerability. 112
Conflict Management Strategies

The attitude of trust triggers about confidence, while that of mistrust in one partys actions promotes a similar attitude in the other. Let us start with trusting until it proves false and not vice versa. Cooperation is preferable to competition, and different opinions play an important part in cooperation. Only an incompetent manager, who lacks self-confidence, feels as if in continuous competition. Conflict resolution is made possible only by an appropriate communication in both senses. To be able to implement a win win-type strategy, it is recommended that the following rules should be observed: using neutral, not emotional language; avoiding absolute statements, which do not leave room for reconsidering some aspects or changing the point of view; existence of open questions, especially when there are hierarchical differences, to encourage the interlocutor to express his point of view; avoiding guiding questions, meant to determine the interlocutor to verbally agree with what we state; applying this rule is more important especially when we are hierarchically superior to our interlocutor; paraphrasing important ideas to be sure we talk about the same issues; distortions of perceptual nature will be thus reduced; making use of appropriate communication style and language (terms known by the interlocutor) to deliver clear messages; this way, a conflict generated by semantic or emotional distortions is avoided; not interrupting the speaking person who has the floor, which would nourish the conflict; that person should be let talk as, this way, communication is not importantly distorted; it is many times useful to ask questions, to understand what the source of conflict is; using interactive listening method to be sure that we understand the interlocutors feelings and perceptions correctly; appropriate use of nonverbal language; a certain facial expression or position of the body that suggests challenge may increase the perceived conflict; paralanguage, especially voice, is extremely important in a conflictual discussion, especially when the emotional state begins to occur; in case of delicate situations it is advisable that we should use face-to-face communication, not telephone or writing, so that we could appeal to nonverbal language; the physical and psychological context of communication must be considered; agreeing with some of the interlocutors points of view may substantially reduce conflict intensity. Total denial will lead the interlocutor to look for new arguments, to try to impose if not by means of consistent arguments, at least through the intensity of his voice.
General de divizie (r.) dr. Gheorghe Ar`d`voaice, Managementul organiza]iei [i ac]iunii militare, Editura Sylvi, 1998. Robert French, Russ Vince, Rela]ii de grup, management [i organizare, Chi[in`u, Editura Tehnico-Info, 2004. Ovidiu Nicolescu, Sisteme, metode [i tehnici manageriale ale organiza]iei, Editura Economic`, 2000. xxx Colectiv, Managementul schimb`rii organiza]ionale, Editura Economic`, 2000.
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TOW ARDS A PARADIGMA TIC TOWARDS PARADIGMATIC APPROACH TO SECURITY IN INTERNA TIONAL RELA TIONS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
2nd Lieutenant Adi MUSTA}~ ~ Logistics Planning Officer, 811th Battalion Dej ~
he process of questioning peoples social existence has fascinated and intrigued even the ones with the highest degree of expertise in the field. Besides the beauty of the show offered by some of the subtlest minds trying to provide for and against arguments, it still remains the image of the inability to come to the same denominator when cooperation should be a guideline. States policies with regard to security are based, in most of the cases, on concepts that outline their creators different positions, which are contrary or even contradictory. In his article entitled The Contested Concept of Security1, Steve Smith argues that the concept of security itself is not only difficult to explain but also complex enough to allow for outlining a neuter, generally viable significance. The above-mentioned author borrows W. B. Gallies interpretations regarding some concepts proper to social sciences that cannot be but contested (essentially contested concepts). Among them we could mention arts, democracy, religion and social justice. The latter states a series of criteria2 that can be used to identify such concepts: they are liable to be used while formulating good-evil-type appreciations; they denote complex activities; they can be described in different ways and it is likely that their users should give different importance to the component parts of the respective activities; their significance changes in time and these changes are difficult to predict; each party to a dispute recognises that the own interpretation is contested by the other parties. Using such a concept means using it against the other parties; such concepts derive from others whose authority is recognised by all parties; using such concepts requires the possibility or the plausibility for root concepts to be improved, as a result of competition. Following Gallies direction, we verify, in our turn, the plausibility of labelling the concept of security as contestable: it is a good thing for us to enjoy security; ensuring state security is a very complex activity; a brief insight into the main trends in thought
1 2
www.ntu.edu www.bmjjournals.com
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related to the respective concept allows for better noticing the diversity of approaches, the concepts alterability, the confrontations, the root concept and its improvements. Therefore: The Copenhagen School: its main representatives are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. In essence, this school of thought pleads for broadening the spectrum of preoccupation in the security domain beyond its military sector, so that five new sectors should be included: the political, economic, social and environmental ones. For Buzan the main beneficiary of security is the individual, but the object of analysis for a specialist in international relations must be the state as main actor at the sub-state, state or international level. At the beginning of the 90s, Buzan introduces the concept of social securitisation in the interpretation of security equation, through which, beyond state sovereignty, preservation of certain national identity is sought. In their most recent work, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Buzan and Waever abandon state-centrism and focus on developing a regional approach to global security. This attitude is justified by the authors through the Great Powers declining tendency to intervene in regions in the world, others than those in their proximity, regions being thus more autonomous and, implicitly, more important. The Neo-Realist Perspective is state-centric and global. The distribution of material power in the world is the one that dictates the international security system configuration. Since there is no bipolarity any more, there will be unipolarity or multipolarity, if not a hybrid of the two. The supporters of this movement main preoccupation is to identify those processes that cause the change of power poles in the world. The Globalisation Perspective is especially outlined in the works dedicated to enhancing cultural and economic interdependencies at global level. Global politics deterritorialisation is the most prominent theme in the security domain, tendency which, in more radical approaches, turns state into a powerless actor, as far as international relations are concerned and, in the moderate variant, confers it power that is diminished by non-state trans-national actors intervention. State is often considered a player in the emergent network of interdependencies, but not necessarily a dominant actor. From a liberal perspective the binomial developed countries-developing countries is favourable to both parties, so globalisation cannot be a source of insecurity. There are also more pessimistic opinions that draw attention to the danger represented by the expansion of the gap between rich and poor, to the contradiction between the liberal ideals of growth and the finite character of the planet resources, to the danger represented by the Western culture aggressiveness towards other cultures. The Constructivist Perspective interprets security as a state that can be attained through communion rather than through power. Security can thus be constructed while insecurity is not a per se attribute of international relations (Security is what states make of it.). Knowledge is, in this context, the main resource when trying to peacefully shape international relations. The Critical Security Perspective emerges as a reaction to the classical security studies impossibility to treat subjects that are really relevant for the security domain in the post Cold War period. In principle, it militates for defocusing from the military aspect and taking into account aspects such as the security of the individual, community 115
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or his identity. A second critical thinking trend focuses on human emancipation (not in the sense of behaving like being Western) as the sole viable project for humankind security. Human emancipation would mean, according to this interpretation, people being freed from all humane or material constraints that could prevent them from acting in conformity with what they have chosen to do. The Feminist Perspective on security draws attention upon women being ignored although, in reality, they are deeply involved in international relations (80-90% victims of wars are civilians and the majority is represented by women, more than 80% from the refugees at global level are women and children, domestic violence is higher in militarised societies). Broadening the spectrum of preoccupation in the security domain towards the economic or ecological aspects of social life emphasises the necessity that women should be considered active factors both in society and in international relations. The way state is conceived today, does not guarantee every citizens security. The Post-structuralist Perspective interprets the language used in international relations (threats, dangers, fears) as a tool, which, in fact, by identifying, producing and reproducing threats, justifies state existence. Without external threats, the legitimacy of state existence as a security guarantor, as it is today, would be seriously doubted. On the whole, the Post-structuralist contribution to questioning international relations resides in interpreting political contradictions not as obstacles but as inherent stages of the process of providing solutions, which prove to be always perfectible. The brief characterisation of some of the schools of thought related to the issue of security allows us to notice the diversity of standpoints (we have mentioned at least seven), their confrontation (some movements are shaped as reaction to others) and transformations (the approach to security from the state level to the global one, then laying emphasis on the regional or the individual level) undergone by the concepts related to the ways people can create that particular situation which gives the feeling of safety (the root concept). As a follow-up to the interrogative attempts mentioned, attention is drawn to the importance of considering the soft aspects of security, the language used by analysts included. Following verificationist logic we come to the conclusion that S. Smiths interpretation is correct. However, the different concepts mentioned do not cumulatively lie on the foundation represented by the root concept. On the contrary, they remain separate, or even in relations of contrariety or contradiction. The inevitable consequence on the international relations practice is the lack of a denominator and, implicitly, difficulties as far as establishing a really constructive dialogue between the actors involved is concerned. Abandoning the hypothesis of the cumulative character of knowledge can open another cone of possibilities to humankind, a more promising one, as it is shown by the current stage of investigations. Th. Kuhn is the first researcher who, after studying the symbolic transformations within communities of researchers, formulates the hypothesis of the discontinuous character of the interpretations people make. Knowledge cannot advance gradually, cumulating new and old knowledge, but by revolutionary leaps that deny previous acquisition. Paradigm shifts, in Kuhns terms, refer to replacing old ontological models 116

and the corresponding ways of investigating them with new ones, which are more effective. The paradigmatic stage is one denoting the maturity of a subject and, as far as we are concerned, the study of the security concept seems to rather be described as follows: An important stage in the evolution of a subject is, according to Kuhn, the pre-paradigmatic one, previous to the subject being really mature. This stage is characterised, in the absence of a standard set of methods, a dominant and unifying paradigm, by: complementarity of approaches, which, in turn, have absolute metaphysical justifications; permanent reconsidering fundamental issues; doubling the dialogue with nature by a dialogue with the members of others schools or orientations; the existence of serious controversies on methods, problems and criteria, which, most of the time, do not end with an agreement but with a more exact delimitation of different positions; the non-systemic, chaotic character of empirical research3. Therefore, as long as the interpretations on security refer to disparate aspects, we can state that they are in the pre-paradigmatic stage. It is thus necessary that research should be placed in a global, coherent and unifying theoretical framework that allows for naturally considering not only the different aspects mentioned above but also others, which have not been identified so far. As follows, we will analyse the interpretative possibles as they emerge from adopting the framework interpretation of the processual-organic theory in questioning security issues in international relations. Here are the fundamental premises of the processual paradigm, which the author considers sufficient for outlining a paradigmatic approach on security: P1. A priori accepting the info energetic character of existence, in the processual-organic paradigm, people are interpreted as resultants and expressions of possible connections between bio processors and their interpreters4. P2. By bio processors, we understand those processors of information, which are specific to human beings, integrating them in the mega-biotic organisation. Bio processors are complexities, structures, which, by their specific nature, tend to equilibrium. P3. As a result of the superior capacities to store, connect and deliver information, which are specific to neocortex, interpreters are considered to be bio processors extensions. To encode and process the information provided by bio processors, signs, rules according to which signs are processed and associated memories are used by this new capacity. Interpreters are processualities, structures, which, due to their characteristics, tend to change their rules of functioning, re-producing themselves. P4. Human interactions, after being interpreted and processed, result in establishing and accepting rules that make the common objectives and actions coherent, social organisations being thus established. These social organisations may be private or public, depending on the types of necessities they have to face and the emergent interactions.
3 Cited from L. Culda, Dimensiunea epistemologic` a interog`rii existen]ei sociale a oamenilor, Editura Licorna, Bucure[ti, 2000, p.50. 4 L. Culda, Poten]ele fiin]ei umane, Bucure[ti, Editura Licorna, 2003, p. 22.
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P5. Organisations are those specific social structures that have built up the capacity to coordinate part of the processes that are conditions for their performances and functioning. The more numerous organisations are, the more complicated the networks of the relations between them are, which result in the necessity for new organisations to appear, to regulate these relations. Nowadays, for instance, we can talk about companies that must obey the rules imposed by markets, trade unions or employers confederations and even different thought that include many schools of thought (systemic ways of thinking, for instance). The social organisations established this way become specialised and thus, in time, useful. To regulate the relations between the latter ones, organisations that have managerial aims are established, meant to generate both social norms and public administrations. At the same time, through the networks of connections established between derived social organisations, the conditions for establishing social organisations with integrating aims, such as nations, are created. P6. The evolutions in international relations nowadays support the hypothesis according to which the integration process at regional, or even at continental level should continue. Interpreting the existents as info-energetic organisations helps us to overcome the false dichotomy between the materialist approaches and those based on processing information. To be sheltered from dangers, human beings and social structures need not only energy but also favourable information. The distinction between complexities and processualities urges us to be more precise: the security of a complexity refers to preserving its functionality, while, in case of a processuality, its functioning must be analysed in connection with the process of evolution of the respective organisation. In case of social structures (those supported by social interpreters), insecurity would refer to unfavourable evolution or to lack of evolution. The latter aspect becomes evident once we take into account examples of organisations that cannot keep the pace. Enduring development is a concept that naturally finds its place in the framework of processual interpretation and, moreover, expands its significance by considering the necessity of information resources management. The soft resources should not be used at random or so that they could serve only to narrow circles of interests. Instead, those modalities, which ensure a secure evolution for the entire mankind, as its soft potential is not undermined, should be found. Making the connections established in the social, both horizontally and vertically, from the top to the bottom and vice versa, more explicit determines us to consider security, irrespective of the level it is analysed at, as part of a whole. Man and the social structures he generates become thus parts of the equation. All the levels, be they national, regional or global become levels of interest. The brief ontology above draws attention towards the connexions between different aspects of peoples social life (economic, cultural, confessional etc.). National identity can be an issue of interest when questioning security, but, in the processual variant, it is correct that we should talk about identity in evolution and about the awareness of this identity as a coagulant factor of different social structures. 118

Information processing is, in my opinion, the corner stone of establishing security on the entire planet. To this purpose, organising and disorganising processes, functional and dysfunctional ones, should be carefully moulded. Knowledge evolution and, implicitly, that of social structures is not cumulative, but marked by discontinuities, by revolutions. Different cultural spaces are at different levels of evolution, as far as their capacities to interpret things are concerned (mythical, mystical, empiric, philosophical, scientific-causal, interactionist or systemic). Belonging to a level or another, as far as the capacity of processing is concerned, implies making use of specific interpretations that have non-equivalent consequences. To enjoy living in a better world, in which people are sheltered from the dangers represented by other people aggressions, we need to make our information processors compatible and to direct them towards solving problems by cooperating and not confronting. Cooperation, however, needs to be supported by highly effective interpretations, so paradigms prove to be the most viable options in this case. As long as we take action in ideological horizons, it is evident that opinions are heterogeneous and divergent. Not even the scientific approaches, which are in the pre-paradigmatic stage, can provide viable solutions, able to ensure security. Normal research, subsequent to the paradigm consolidation, requires the cooperation of experts in different domains, time and consistency in pursuing the ideal of a better world.
L. Culda, Organiza]iile, Bucure[ti, Editura Licorna, 2002. Th. Kuhn, Structura revolu]iilor [tiin]ifice, Bucure[ti, Editura {tiin]ific` [i Enciclopedic`, 1976.
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REMODELLING ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Lumini]a Popescu, PhD ~ Lecturer, University of Craiova ~
rganisational culture is specific to each organisation in part, springs from its history and experience and determines the way the associations members react when they are confronted with certain situations. It also leads the fashion of the individuals actions, behaviours and perceptions. The way managers do their jobs results in a certain type of organisational culture, and, in turn, the organisational culture generates a certain type of management and action. Organisational culture building is a process which ORGANISATIONAL requires time and intense efforts of accumulation CULTURE and learning. Once installed, the organisational culture Taboos, beliefs and values is rather a combination of processing elements, than a structure in the classic sense of the concept (figure 1). Anecdotes, myths and symbols The essence of the organisational culture consists Statutes, parts of what is shared by the groups of people who form and behaviour norms in organisation, the way in which they understand and interpret the world. So, we can state that it is Traditions, rituals and ceremonies a combination of conscious and unconscious human beings, Employees perceptions rational and irrational, of group and individual, among and representations which there are interdependences and has a major influence over the organisation functionality and performances. Typical products: clothes, There may be more cultures (subcultures) in an buildings, offices etc. organisation, owing to the real differences between Figure 1: Organisational Culture Components departments or professional and training differences. In other words, typical forms of manifestation of organisation culture may appear, not only at the level of the organisation organisational subdivisions but also at the one of different professional groups existing within it. Irrespective of the particular form of manifestation of the organisational culture (at the level of organisational subdivisions or at the level of the groups having the same profession) there are common items that give unity to the organisation as a whole. If conflicts due to the organisational culture forms of manifestation occur, the management must achieve convergence between them and must try to develop an organisational culture as homogenous as possible at the level of the whole organisation. 120

The main role in forming and shaping organisational culture is played by the superior management that can be achieved through: promoting certain values within the organisation, establishing the main directions regarding the approach to the current processes within the organisation and establishing models of behaviour for the employees in different situations generated inside or outside the organisation. Currently, the main purpose of organisations is to have a strong organisational culture, quality-oriented, that supposes the existence of certain values, beliefs, perceptions and representations based on quality, as follows: the necessity for the whole personnel to be aware of what quality means; the consistent application of the quality management principles, within the whole organisation, irrespective of the hierarchic level; the promotion of those values and behavioural norms that support the idea of quality, respectively the idea that no matter what the purpose of the organisation might be, it can be attained only by a constant preoccupation with satisfying the persons who are interested in the organisation achievements. In order for the attempt to remodel organisational culture to be a success, it is necessary for human resources specialists to start by investigating the current content of it. Research in the field has emphasised three essential aspects that must be analysed: organisational culture as norms, beliefs, values; organisational culture as myths, stories, manifestation of language; organisational culture as ceremonial and ritual manifestation forms. The analysis of the organisational culture regarding the norms, values, beliefs that exist within an organisation and of the way in which they directly influence the success of the organisation is one of the most important matters for analysis. In addition, this is the field that can be assimilated by employees both by means of some formal strategies and by means of different informational materials within the organisation. Most of the successful organisations have a rich tradition of values, beliefs and norms that come from experience, from testing what might be useful or not in the existent environment. On the other hand, the standards and beliefs within the organisation are decisively influenced by the persons having well-shaped individuality. These values must be made known and emphasised in as many situations as possible and the negative behaviour deviations must be punished in order to avoid further similar situations. Moreover, mention should be made that even if the values and beliefs are known and shared by the employees this does not necessarily mean that they have reached an agreement unanimously accepted with regard to all issues but only the fact that they have a minimum of accepted common understanding. It might be possible for the employees to agree upon following the beliefs and values of the organisation they are part of only to keep their position within it. The second important matter for analysis of the organisational culture is represented by stories, myths, and the organisation specific language that represents items assimilated in a longer period of time that are not part of a formal program. Most of the times, they reflect tensions, conflicts and aspects related to the workplace security or insecurity, or the desire to control events. Research needs to be made within the organisation so that the management could be aware of the way employees perceive these issues, 121
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otherwise they can result in a degradation of both the climate and the organisational behaviour as well as in diminished performances. This has to be made in due time to allow for adopting the necessary corrective steps which should minimise or eliminate the possible negative effects. The third field of analysis is represented by organisational culture seen as ceremonial and ritual forms of manifestation. These have the purpose to mix the different cultural forms brought by each individual inside the organisation, to unify performances and to orient some events within the organisation towards a certain aim. The consequences ceremonials and rituals may have upon the organisation are the following: they show how certain things are made within organisation; they help with establishing the organisational identity; they facilitate the peoples work by establishing certain action rules. The typology of rituals within organisations according to Trice and Beyer is the following: the passing rituals which show the alteration of a status once the person is accepted within an organisation and its replacement with a new one; the degradation rituals are included in the socialisation process of a person who is new within an organisation, especially if that person has previously had a higher status than the positions he or she is going to hold; the rituals of professional promotion are those that emphasise the new status and the newly obtained identity by a member of the organisation; the rituals of change have the role of emphasising the existence of an organised structure and they improve its functioning; the rituals of diminution of conflicts are developed as a consequence of the necessity to solve the conflicts that occur inevitably between people or groups; the rituals of integration are those extending the degree of interaction between the divergent groups within the organisation development, after performing varied actions, the feeling of union and of commitment towards the company. The employee can become aware of these rituals either by certain socialisation programs or by direct contact to the work place. Moreover, the knowledge of the organisational culture, at general level, can be achieved by two ways: at formal level (when the employee reads official documents for instance the Internal Regulations) and at informal level (by knowing the organisation myths, stories, ceremonials and rituals). After analysing the organisational culture with the purpose to reshape it in order to obtain quality, the following stages need to be followed: the higher management must establish the general directions to be followed through the culture reshaping (for instance to be more client-oriented, to develop the team spirit, to approach the activities more pragmatically, to focus on improving quality by preventive steps); to establish exactly what the specific objectives to be attained are in the process of remodelling the organisational culture and to establish the organisational structure 122

that shall take part directly in the project, the methods of communication between different groups and the methods of reporting the obtained results; to establish the main stages of the organisational culture remodelling: creating the general framework for the analysis of the organisational culture by which the members of the team that shall become the main pawns of the cultural change are established, team members instructing and training, identifying the necessary data for the culture audit and for the methods of gathering and processing the mentioned data; the culture audit and formulating the first recommendations by which the data are gathered (with the help of interviews, questionnaires and direct observations), the data are analysed and preliminary conclusions are formulated and also, the first recommendations are formulated; implementing the actions meant to change the organisational culture which supposes: establishing the reshaping program of the organizational culture, instructing and training the personnel involved, putting into practice and monitoring the planned actions; evaluating the cultural changes, which suppose establishing the organisational culture components, components that shall be evaluated, gathering and processing the data, identifying the organisational culture reinforcement items and establishing the corrective steps that are required if, comparing to the initial objectives, differences occur. Considering the fact that within an organisation the organisational culture is the one that influences all the other components as well as the organisation seen as a whole, it is necessary to pay special attention to its reshaping with a view to obtaining a better quality. The military organisation, as part of society, is submitted, in broad lines, to the same values and norms. The organisation specific functions, the fact that it is an organisation with a strong hierarchy, the members commitment to their roles as protectors and defenders of civilians and of the rule of law, all cause this organisation to have some particularities regarding the norms and values, myths and beliefs, the system of metaphors, the symbols, ceremonials and rituals as follows: the predominant values are patriotism, responsibility, courage, lucidity in action, desire to achieve the ordered, self-imposed assumed and internalised tasks, spirit of combat, sense of sacrifice, solidarity, cooperation, military discipline; norms that are clearly expressed and a little bit stricter than in case of other organisations; myths and beliefs that are consistent with the organisation long history and prestige; system of metaphors well-established within the framework of the highly specialised language and the acronyms used; symbols, ceremonials and rituals better represented than in case of other organisations, due to, again, the history of this organisation, the large number of members and the importance the organisation attaches to them. It is natural for the organisational culture to change in time, to meet the challenges and requirements generated by exogenous factors, so that the organisation could have 123
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a highly qualitative level, capable of ensuring its adaptability and efficiency, in one word, its evolution. The military organisation is, in turn, subjected to this natural evolution. As far as the Romanian military organisation, which finds its expression in the Romanian Armed Forces is concerned, being confronted with the challenges generated by the rapid changes in the social, geopolitical and geostrategic environment, especially after 1989, it undergoes itself a process of transformation, meant to enhance its adaptability, quality and efficiency. Even more important is the fact that the process is managed by the General Staff, which has conceived and devised the Romanian Armed Forces transformation as a process that is to subsume all the strategies, doctrines, action plans and their implementation until 2025. The guiding document in this sense, unprecedented in the history of Romania, is named the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy and is conceived in accordance with the Constitution and Romanias commitments to NATO and UE, as well as with the regional initiatives. An important part of this strategy aims at components that are related to organisational culture and refers, mainly, to effective leadership, professionalisation, and human resources management, all meant to remodel the organisational culture towards quality, adaptability and efficiency.
REFERENCES
P. Burloiu, Managementul resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, Editura Lumina Lex, 1997. A. Manolescu, Managementul resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, Editura RAI, 1998. R. L. Mathis, P. C. Nica, C. Rusu, Managementul resurselor umane, Bucure[ti, Editura Economic`, 1997. G. Pni[oar`, I. Pni[oar`, Managementul resurselor umane, Ia[i, Editura Polirom, 2004. www.clubafaceri.ro/info_article/article/1236/ www.ele.ro/articol_1174_p2.html.
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cience is involved in everything. There is not a single enduring thing, created by individuals, on this planet that is not grounded on scientific knowledge, on science. Science is, therefore, argument and fundament, connexion and the resistance structure of each system and process fostered out of knowledge. Nothing is possible, nothing can be enduring without science. Not even military science. So much the more military strategy, which cumulates in its domain the theory, practice and strategic art related to the war phenomenon.
Science is storing knowledge, system of values, network of pieces of information, logic and method in the human action alike. Human being is more and more a homo scientificus. The society of the future will be more than an information society, it will be a knowledge society, more precisely a scientific knowledge society, an epistemological society. The science of human thinking is logics. The science of the human soul is psychology. The science of life is biology. The sciences of existence and human being are, at the same time, the knowledge sciences mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, history, politology, psychology etc. and the nature knowledge sciences geography, geomorphology, meteorology, cosmology, astronomy etc. , but all these have relevance only in the process of knowledge and human action. Moreover, human action requires at least four components, which influence each other through a network philosophy and physiognomy: conception, planning, organising, development. These four elements derive advantage from the network effect, and not only from the feedback. The network effect defines and maintains the procedures of the systems, its life and its dynamics. All sciences find themselves, one way or the other, in the military science, too, which loses its quality of being a particular science, an individual one and becomes a synthesis, an integrating one and, at the same time, a utilising science , a science of action, which massively uses the other sciences. The society of the future will be a society one hundred percent dependent upon science, a scientific society. 125
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All that belongs to this space of knowledge and of the one of action has science, knowledge as ground as well as structure of resistance. The term science is a generalising, a generic one. Science is eminently an outcome of knowledge and a stimulus of knowledge. Human society is based on science, it is dependent on science. Human being cannot live outside science. Everything he does from construction to destruction, from collaboration to confrontation and war is based on science. Each activity has its science, namely its principles, rules, concepts and methodology and, at the same time, uses the integrating effect of the other sciences. Each strategy Brig (r.) Gheorghe V~DUVA, PhD has and must have a scientific support, a scientific source, which provides it with consistency and stability. Strategy without science is improvisation and adventure. Or not even this much. Because, frankly speaking, there can be no strategy without science. There are numerous sciences of peace, but also numerous sciences of war. War, no matter how irrational it may be as far as the numerous destructive results and implications hard to control and manage are concerned , cannot be placed outside science. Quite on the contrary, it is the war itself that stimulated scientific research, science throughout years. It has always been like this and, unfortunately, it seems to it will be the same in the future, even if, in the new Age that we have agreed to name the Network Centric Warfare Age , it seems that war, as it becomes more and more a business, acquires new connotations and determinations, especially economic rather than traditional ones. It takes its means from not only the military science and technology but also from those which are not directly military, but which massively influence the military field and even tend to replace what we call military science. It is only an appearance, which is sometimes excessively promoted, especially in order to move the war phenomenon away from a certain science of war, a certain strategy of war (since it turns into business) and to get it close to the non-bellicose, non-military sciences. In fact, war keeps its science almost untouched, but we must make mention that this kind of science does not resort to the direct principles of the immediate training of military forces, means and actions and their development anymore, but appeals to everything that exists today on the planet and can be used at war. This matter is accomplished through policies and strategies to the same extent. Actually, war has extended its range of coverage outside the military confrontation, campaigns and battles. Not even this ascertained fact is very new. More than two millenniums and a half ago, the Indian Kautilya, in the 15 books of Arthashastra 1, out of which 10 are meant
Kautilya (313-289) was contemporary to Alexander the Great. The 15 books of the monumental work Arthashastra [translated as Handbook of Profit or The Science of Wealth and Welfare] are: I. Concerning Discipline, II. The Duties of Government Superintendents, III. Concerning Law, IV. The Removal of Thorns, V. The Conduct of Courtiers, VI. The Source of Sovereign States, VII. The End of the Six-Fold Policy, VIII. Concerning Vices and Calamities, IX. The Work of an Invader, X. Relating to War, XI. The Conduct of Corporations, XII. Concerning a Powerful Enemy, XIII. Strategic Means to Capture a Fortress, XIV. Secret Means, XV. The Plan of a Treatise.
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to diplomacy, economy and war, evinced the true purposes and dimensions of warfare. He wrote: That keeping the agreement of peace, I can undertake productive works of considerable importance and destroy at the same time those of my enemy; or apart from enjoying the results of my own works, I shall also enjoy those of my enemy in virtue of the agreement of peace; or I can destroy the works of my enemy by employing spies and other secret means; or by holding out such inducements as a happy dwelling, rewards, remission of taxes, little work and large profits and wages, I can empty my enemys country of its population, with which he has been able to carry his own works2. Also, Sun Tzu wrote in his famous work The Art of War: Generally in warfare, keeping a nation intact is best, destroying a nation second best; secure the peacefulness of your nations cities; the rule is not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided; your first duty is to protect the allied states against any kind of insult; laying siege to a city is only done when other options are not available; the houses and villages of your peasants must not be exposed to any danger; bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy3. War has always resorted to everything that was the most developed on the planet in order to use it in the military confrontation, but this everything belonged almost entirely to it. Today, this everything namely everything that means science, technology, nanotechnology etc., scientific research in the respective fields included is disseminated in the entire society and on the entire planet. Therefore, military science can no longer remain very pure, but becomes more and more an integrating science, which monopolises and organises in a system, attracts and captures, stimulates and uses. This matter may probably be one of the reasons for which, at the level of the alliances and coalitions, the stress is not so much laid on the rather isolated, privileged study of the military science or sciences, but one resorts to integrating, operational methods, in which it is aimed not so much at the causal links, but at the development of the effects. Therefore, the effect goes to the forefront. After all, the very effect matters. Therefore, the military science becomes more and more a sort of a black box, since it is not it that matters, it is not it that goes to the foreground, but the very effects attained. Not even this statement is brand new. The war has always been based on effects. The effect has been put in front of campaigns and battles. The predictable effect. The expected effect. The desired effect. But the effect used to have a limited character during the earlier ages. Today, it tends to become unlimited and even to get out of control. That is why nowadays, more than in the previous ages, it is the very effect that must be placed under control. Military science, even if it is only a black box (meaning not everybody may gain access to its concepts and means, but only the specialists), must find an answer to the sharp questions that are asked regarding the management of the effect.
General dr. Mihail Popescu, general-locotenent dr. (r.) Valentin Arsenie, general de brigad` dr. (r.) Gheorghe V`duva, Arta militar` de-a lungul mileniilor, vol. I, Bucure[ti, Editura CEPTA, 2004, p. 23. 3 Ibid., p. 273.
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This assertion may come down to a very Compared analysis Emergence of the need (Objective and subjective determinations) of determination simple scheme: What ? When ? With Establishing Establishing Establishing the quantum Costs what ? With what costs ? (With what the objective of forces and means the time costs ?) With what effects ? (What ?) (With what ?) (When ?) There is one EFFECTS question missing from (With what effects ?) t h i s equation: How ? To this question responds, to a great extent, the military science. It provides a flexible system of laws, principles, norms and regulations, theories and values that lie at the basis of an effective actional architecture on which the necessary strategies of passing from decision to effect are built. Military science does not remain in its ivory tower (it has never had something like that), but remains directly connected with action, with life. We might say that it is an operational science, which generates actional concepts. The fundamental characteristics of the current military science and, so much the more, in the future refer to: escaping from strict categories; wholeness; interdisciplinarity; digitising; the shift towards technology; an increasing operational dimension; effectiveness.
Military science had and still has its own object of study: the military component of human action and, mainly, war, not only war in itself, in its dimension of armed conflict, but also the strategy of generating the forces, means and actions required by preparing and leading the war, by clearing its consequences and getting ready for the one to come. Nevertheless, studying the war as a complex social system polemology remains one of the most important components of the military science. Yet, one must take into account the new architecture of war, conditioned by: the complex determinations of the age we are in; the restrictions and limits that direct this complex social phenomenon on coordinates unknown so far, such as the information, the cosmic ones, those of the wave field, the mediatic, geophysical and terrorist ones; the new discoveries made regarding the development, in time and space, of social and military processes; the dynamics of hypotheses, experiences and lessons learnt etc. It is for that reason that military science cannot be replaced, but only supplemented, that is to say taken out of a certain isolation, a relative isolation integrated in the system of general scientific knowledge, in an epistemology of the action. In fact, we are dealing with a new stage in the military art, which complexly revolutionises the military domain, the so-called revolution in military affairs ~ RMA. Military science was and still is understood, in general, as being a cluster of knowledge regarding the warfare (armed conflict) field, mostly the armed fight prepared and led within it4.
Colonel dr. Constantin Oni[or, Teoria strategiei militare, Bucure[ti, Editura Academiei de nalte Studii Militare, 1999, p. 25.
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Still, warfare becomes an increasingly complex notion. It cannot be reduced to the violent dimension of the confrontation, to the armed conflict. War has always been a political solution or option, in other words a means of politics, namely its means of force, its violent one. When all the other means (dialogue, diplomacy, pressure, discouragement, warning, threat etc.) exhausted, one resorted to the last and more risky of the solutions: war. Nevertheless, although it is seen as a means or as an instrument of politics, and namely of the policy of force, war is much more than this kind of policy. War cannot be reduced to a maximum of politics, nor to an in extremis policy or a political extremism, since this phenomenon has many determinations, some of them placed at intervals in time, other defined on the characteristics of the human being, community and human activity, on the relationships between humans and human entities. Thus, warfare is a very complex phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to a battle, to one or many campaigns and not even to a closed interval, defined on a host of violent confrontations. Warfare is part of the life of human beings and human communities and, even if it should not be taken as a fatality, it has a lot of objective determinations, some of them placed in well-individualised systems, others in chaotic processes, in which the rule or the law of the variation of initial conditions plays an essential part5. The relationships established between individuals and especially between human entities that, in their essence, are political (meaning they are related to an ensemble of interests), are experiencing a permanent setting up, they are dynamic and complex. Their range of coverage is broad and mostly fluid. There are relations of collaboration, partnership, alliance, coalition but also relations of competition, confrontation, some of them with solutions in the political, economic, financial etc. dialogue, others characterised by conflict from one end to the other. These relations are not immutable, they are not final. Neither the partnerships, nor the collaborations are forever. Neither confrontations are permanent. It is possible for the intentions of competition or confrontation to be hidden within each partnership and relation of collaboration. In addition, it is very likely that, in certain circumstances, confrontation and conflict would have the collaboration or partnership as solution of temporary or long duration way out. Depending on many factors, the relations of partnership, collaboration or confrontation between human beings and human entities transform one into another. These realities, as well as certain statistics regarding the ratio between the times of peace and the times of confrontation and war have made certain people state that war is permanent, with tempestuous transitions from phases of expectation (quiet, active or alarming) towards a tense attitude and, in the last phase, towards a violent confrontation, and peace is relative, being defined on the interval of expectation or the one preceding the expectation. Alongside the tensed attitude, the state of peace becomes doubtful, the differences are increasingly stressed, they become oppositions, and opposition turns into conflict. Starting from this point, it would mean that the purpose of peace would be
5 General dr. Mircea Mure[an, general de brigad` dr. (r.) Gheorghe V`duva, R`zboiul viitorului, viitorul r`zboiului, Bucure[ti, Editura Universit`]ii Na]ionale de Ap`rare, 2004, pp. 21-70.
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the recovery following a violent confrontation and the preparation for the next one. This statement is not a simple metaphor, but a reality confirmed by the entire history of humankind, wherein the periods of peace alternate with those of violent armed confrontation, confrontation being identified with what we call war. In fact, the violent armed confrontation, always ended with human losses and damages, represents nothing but the very maximum of war, the peak of trajectory, a seism, a discharge of the energies gathered in time. Yet, war must not be reduced to this peak of trajectory, because it would mean that it would lack its support (the peak is a stage or a point during an evolution), namely what generates and maintains it. War must be analysed and understood in all its complexity, as a sequence of dynamic states, of transitions more or less sudden from one state to another, so it is not linear and predictable, but non-linear and very hard to anticipate. All we know about war is that it exists, that it is part of humans life. Regarding the causes that generate it, the configuration, philosophy and physiognomy, the probability for war to break out, the trajectory it will have, one cannot know many things for sure. What we know refers especially to past wars. The analysis of war is usually made afterwards. The purpose of any analysis is, at first, providing the emergence of certain premises for understanding and preparing the future war, namely the part which is the most dynamic and dramatic in the confrontation, the peak of trajectory (the armed confrontation) of the war. Military science is nothing else but that branch of science which deals with identifying, locating, defining and knowing this trajectory, namely the causes and laws of the war phenomenon, the military action in general, the circumstances which favour it, determine or impose the military action, the conditions that generate it, the moments that make it break out and in which it breaks out, more precisely, which determine the stage or the stages of violent armed confrontation, the effects and implications. Theory has no practical finality: it does not supply recipes, it is compulsorily mediatised through doctrine 6. But military science is placed, as support, in all the components of the military art: history of military art; military geography; geostrategy; military medicine; military logistics; military technology; strategy; operative domain; tactics; military action; civil-military action. In other words, military science is not only military theory, but becomes more and more a system of systems, namely a meta-system that integrates within the same space the three great components of the military dynamic systems: military theory; military practice; art of warfare and armed fight. In addition, military science is present at all the levels of military art: strategic; operative; tactical. Military science, not only on its whole, but also as far as its components are concerned, is interdisciplinary. We find in it, at the same time, the traditional sciences mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, biophysics etc. , as well as the new sciences of micro-systems, macro-systems and processes.
6
www.stratisc.org, Herv Coutau Bgarie, Brviaire stratgique, prg. 64.
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Science is no longer a simple instrument. It becomes a factotum, being omnipresent and omnipotent. It is asked to solve millions of problems from the area of military prevention, discouragement and confrontation, not only military, and this is not at everybodys hand anymore. All militaries (obviously, the ones trained as such) can operate in a network centric warfare, but few of them understand the extremely complex and complicated architecture of the structures and infrastructures of this kind warfare. In this case, militaries the ones that effectively operate and not only, since the war and the action in the confrontation area have already extended to the civil-military concept, know and are able to know everything that they are interested in for fulfilling the missions, namely they have access to all the data bases needed for that certain action. However, they will never be able to know everything about this complicated architecture of network centric warfare. With a view to preparing or preventing the war, all nations adopt the measures they believe to be necessary and adequate. One of them refers to establishing international organisations, structures and alliances. International organisations and structures are restrictive, alliances are active, preventive and dissuasive. Their functioning principles have a political essence, but the structuring, organisation, definition of competencies, complex actional systems presuppose a remarkable scientific dimension and generative strategies to the same extent. The science of alliances and coalitions establishment, consolidation and functioning is, undoubtedly, one of synthesis, with significant references to politology, sociology, economy, finance, management, exact sciences, technology, nanotechnology, polemology and military art, especially in the dimension of the lessons learnt. An alliance is much more than an enlarged partnership, it is an entity, a construction with a complicated architecture and a variable geometry but which does not leave its initially agreed parameters. In order to be enduring and effective, an alliance needs a very solid structure of resistance, and this structure political, in its essence, meaning based on interests absolutely needs an integrating political concept, as well as a scientific dimension of system and method (of strategy) in order to effectively achieve the respective architecture. It is the very case of the North-Atlantic Alliance.
Military science can no longer be reduced to the fields or the components of military art. Without excluding this traditional classification, we must turn to the object of military science studying the laws and principles of warfare, of military action in general and insert them in the domain of this definition. Military science prolongs more and more in the military action, it passes, as Frenchmen say, from savoir (knowing) to savoir-faire (to have the ability to make) and from savoir-faire to savoir comment le faire (to know how to do it). All the NATO member countries, as well as those that are not part of the Alliance, study the history of military art, military geography, geostrategy, strategy, operative art, tactics, logistics, military management etc. Some of them have specific connotations, are closely linked to a patrimony, to a certain experience, to certain systems of values 131
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of great importance at national level. They confer identity and force and cannot miss from one nations system of training for difficult situations, limit situations, war included. In the United States of America, for instance, military history is studied, the battles from the American territory are reproduced at 1/1 scale etc. It is also here where the most developed scientific research in the field of strategy, operative art and tactics, of armaments and systems of lethal, non-lethal and unconventional weapons, management of crises and armed conflicts etc. exist. In all European countries, in Russia, China, India, a great deal of attention is paid to the study of the history of military art, as well as to the very modern sciences, with applications in the military field. As far as the influence of technology upon military art is concerned, we believe a distinction between the change (revolutionising) of principles and the fast adaptation of structures (strategy of forces and strategy of means) and actions (operational strategy) to the new possibilities should be made. For instance, during the Second World War, Germany relied on a strategy of fast reactions, based especially on a very well prepared system of communications and a strategic concept to the same extent (blitzkrieg). In this way, she managed to impose in front of the French armed forces, which were hanging on to the philosophy of positional warfare, thus neglecting the role of movement, namely the armoured vehicles and aircraft, even if they had enough of this kind of vehicles to counteract the action of Nazi forces. The delay in the technologic impact over the French military art, especially in the field of the strategy of forces and the one of operational strategy, meant defeat and humiliation for the glorious armed forces of this country, at the beginning of the Second World War. When referring to this painful episode, the Frenchmen trenchantly state that the biggest inferiority of the French armed forces lies in the brains of their generals. The Headquarters breviary, the Instruction regarding the tactical use of big units designedly stipulate that the war of the future will represent the continuation of the precedent war7. Thus, it is not so much for the German technological superiority to have caused the defeat of the French armed forces, as for the strategic inflexibility of the latter, for the fact that it did not adapt the concepts to the technological requirements, to the evolution of military science. The Americans are among the first that have rapidly learned from the experience of the military confrontations, especially following the war in Vietnam. They have perfectly understood that the new technologies create the possibility of striking at long distance, and that has led to the configuration of a few new ways of engaging the forces and, correspondingly, to some types of wars in which it is believed that they might be involved: the low intensity war, the medium intensity war, the high intensity war and, for the last years, the war on terrorism. After the dramatic experience in Vietnam, the American armed forces, as well as the economy and infrastructure, have shifted towards applying a new concept of training the forces. According to the strategic vision of the 80s, the Americans had to be prepared to wage a war and a half, even two wars,
7
La seconde guerre mondial, vol. 1, Larousse, Paris-Match, p. 47.
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in different regions of the world, wherever their interests would have called for that. As far as the East-West confrontation is concerned, the Americans created, at that time, a rigorous system of action and reaction, based on a concept that has evolved from the doctrine of massive response to the Airland Battle 2000, all of them being subjected to a policy of damming up the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, this concept has somehow remained without subject. Yet, technology has further developed, both in the field of creating some effective systems of research intelligence, information, surveillance, and strike and in the field of conceiving and fulfilling some systems of systems. Nevertheless, the concept immediately found a new object, a new space of application. Operation Desert Storm, for instance, was led not in accordance with a strategy, but in keeping with the strategic concept regarding the airland battle. The complex social processes crises and wars included are analysed by frequently resorting to chaos theory. More precisely, the non-linear equations. By introducing different values in non-linear equations Gleick wrote the scientists who study the theory of systems have managed to represent the effects that different policies and strategies might have on the evolution of cities, development of a society or the functioning of an economy. With the help of non-linear patterns, it is possible that in this kind of systems critical points to be localised and the slightest change at their level might have a disproportionate impact8 . This disproportionate effect represents, in fact, the essence of chaos theory. Scientists have needed a long time in order to reach to a series of equations very complicated, in fact through which this disproportionate effect is evaluated. Still, equations do not completely solve the problem, they only explain it or, at least, they try to define its parameters and discuss the possible solutions. If chaos theory which is only at the beginning were to offer solutions to complex situations, which are subjected to the conditioned probabilities, events such as those from December 1989, from Bucharest, and the ones from September 11, 2001, from the United States of America, would be at least predictable. For the time being, this is impossible. This first conclusion regarding the stochastic character of social processes, namely the role of detail, of little facts, in the ulterior evolution, generally not wholly controllable, of economic, social, political, information, military etc. processes, is extremely important in the theory of crisis, war and armed conflict. It results that the transition from normality towards abnormality, from abnormality towards crisis and from crisis towards war or armed conflict is very hard to notice and identify. That is why the thorough analysis of the state indicators might offer an area in which the sensible points, which generate perturbations and malfunctioning, can be noticed and consequently supervised. In order to understand that, one resorted to a mathematical construction in an abstract, multidimensional area, which was named the area of phases. The curve resulted says Gleick pointed to a disorder of the pure state (no point or group of points appeared twice) and an unexpected order (the curve described a sort of spiral in two dimensions, resembling to the wings of a butterfly) at the same time. This double spiral has become widely known under the name of Lorenz attractor.
8
Gleick, La Thorie du chaos, Glossaire.htm.
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In the theory of crisis, armed conflict and war, the area of phases is extremely important, since it modulates the universe of possibilities, causes and effects alike. And even if this kind of pattern does not always offer an optimistic perspective, since chaos theory proves it precisely (that there are no connected causes or the connection of the causes has different dimensions from those with which we have been accustomed to due to the mechanistic determinism), it is important as it draws attention towards a very hard to understand and manage reality.
Strategy is, in its essence, a way scientific (theoretical), practical (operational) and even artistic (creative, intuitive, ingenious), at the same time of putting into practice a political decision. From here results especially the actional, operational character of the strategy. It is the very reason for which the strategic concept of the Alliance, adopted at the Rome Summit in 1991 and improved at the Washington Summit in 1999, the Prague one, in 2002, and the Istanbul one, in 2004, is an operational concept, with particular reference to the new competences and the new range of action of the Alliance and not necessarily to their scientific support. At the 1991 Rome Summit, NATO drafted and adopted a new strategic concept for that period, which aimed, among others, to the reconfiguration of the Alliance philosophy, so that NATO should be able to deal with the new challenges concerning crises management, humanitarian assistance, ensuring and keeping peace etc. The transition from a philosophy of nuclear or classic massive, tempestuous, gradual, flexible etc. ripostes to a philosophy of crises management, the challenges and threats of the cyber-information environment included, of peace maintaining, ensuring and even imposing, of humanitarian aid and of support towards the new European democracies has gradually occured. Within this entire very complex process, in which all the components of political art, military science and, obviously, military art are involved, neither the contradictions, pessimistic visions nor the feeling of uselessness of the Alliance or the one of fear for the proliferation of a new type of escalation missed. Many people spoke of the uselessness or desuetude of the Alliance, especially for the European area, where it seemed that no threat would occur, and which radically changed following the Cold War, of the necessity of establishing certain new structures for consolidating the already existing political and security structures and of the renunciation of the ones of force. In a way, even the anti-globalisation demonstrations were against a new NATO. Lord Robertson explained, in detail, in an article published in NATO Review, the new philosophy of the Alliance, its new path. NATO not only resisted to these pressures but also transformed and keeps transforming. This transformation has not ended yet and will not end soon. Because NATO has become a much more dynamic Alliance, being more and more put in the service of certain very actual common Euro-Atlantic values and interests. This process is possible, this logic is possible, since, as we all know, NATO was established on a system of values. 134
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NATOs strategic concept is guiding and generating-centred at the same time. It comes out of a political consensus and responds to an environment whose hostility is fluid and asymmetric. Given these circumstances, NATO philosophy does not simply move from old to new rigours, or from one type of ontology to another the ontology of NATO remains the same , but from a functionality of political and military response (massive, gradual, flexible, nuclear, classical, informational etc.) to one of the security strategic environment management, of the area of conflict prevention and control, of discouragement of any type of conflict, of the consolidation of democracy and optimisation of the relations between the great entities of the world. Hence, the evolution of a broad concept, of strategic partnerships, in all the fields, the one regarding the control of resources and the big routes towards them. This entire metamorphosis, even if it especially aims at the operationality and making operational, is based on a very large scientific expertise, on a thorough analysis of the determinations and, undoubtedly, on the reappraisal of the process and the variation rules of the initial conditions. The NATO strategic concept is the expression of this new philosophy of the Alliance. It deserves a complex and enlarged analysis, since it is the most conclusive result and the most direct form of what NATO is and what it will be for the Euro-Atlantic area and the entire world. From it, all the other concepts derive, the ones with strategic value included, among which the most important is the one referring to the structure of forces. As we all know, this kind of structure is about to be fulfilled and consists in providing certain components of fast response and headquarters to the same extent. These headquarters will cover all the levels of NATO headquarters structure, the general headquarters of the Joint Multinational Groups of Forces included. At Prague it was stipulated a firm calendar regarding their achievement. The re-examination of the structure of forces was determined by the new challenges. It belongs to both NATOs general policy and the strategy of forces and involves at least three essential dimensions, some of them already fulfilled, others able to be fulfilled: The enlargement of the area of the Alliance through the full integration of the new members, namely the seven countries accepted at the last enlargement. The improvement of a structure of forces, especially a NRF of 21 000 soldiers, so that it could be capable to respond to the new challenges and even to prevent and discourage the proliferation of certain threats and tensions. The modernisation of support capabilities. Through enlarging and leaving the doors open, NATO becomes something different of what it used to be. At first, it becomes a Euro-Atlantic organisation, and not just a North-Atlantic one. However, the most interesting evolution in the area of concepts and their implications seems to be the one referring to NATOs Defence Capabilities Initiative. As we all know, this concept was launched in April 1999, at the Summit in Washington, and was long discussed in the European environment. It presupposes that the Alliance should identify the new security challenges of the 21st century, configure the board of the new threats and be able to efficiently react to crises such as the one 135
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in Kosovo, while keeping its capacity of assuming its fundamental responsibilities for the collective defence of its members. The concept that we have in view was re-approached in Prague, under the form of a new Capabilities Initiative. This new initiative must focus on a smaller number of capabilities essential for the full range of missions of the Alliance, especially on those regarding NATOs ability to defend against terrorism, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks, while guaranteeing the superiority of the protected systems of headquarters, communications and information, the interoperability of the deployed forces and the important aspects regarding the effectiveness during combat, as well as providing the rapid deployment and maintaining the power of the combat forces. This concept involves many actions, re-dimensioning and re-orientating the budgets included, so that, for instance, if necessary, the level of forces would be reduced and the resources would be oriented towards modernising the material. Unlike the old measures, a new concept is now introduced, referring to the common military capabilities, an appropriate specialisation of the roles, the acquisition of different materials through cooperation (of course, systems of arms) and even common and multinational financing. It is a new concept, a very important one, since it puts into practice a different philosophy regarding the new structure of forces common forces , with an increased degree of interoperability, of roles specialisation and even of integration, especially as far as the NBC defence, the fast action and the fast response and the integrated systems of command and control are concerned. In addition, the new defence capabilities initiative aims at fulfilling and putting into practice an anti-missile defence system in the theatre, which derives from the finalisation of a study of feasibility of the Alliance regarding the defence against ballistic missiles in the theatre. The initiative consists of almost all the aspects concerning the concepts with regard to the strategy of forces, means and especially the operational strategy: mobility; logistic support; survival (the capacity of self-protection); the capacity of surprising the enemy and striking him on sides; the command, control and information systems; the fast and effective deployment in order to manage a crisis on long term. In Europe (the Euro-Atlantic area, in fact), the security environment has become much more dynamic than during the Cold War. The more plausible threats to security come from the conflicts on the outskirts of Europe, such as the one from the former Yugoslavia or from the proliferation of the weapons of mass-destruction. Therefore, NATO must be capable to deploy forces outside the borders of its territory in order to respond to crises, while being ready to defend itself against a deliberate aggression. This represents, in fact, the essence of the new NATO strategic concept. In addition, the new Defence Capabilities Initiative, as it was formulated in Prague, aims at consolidating the Alliances capability in five fields: mobility and deployment capability; sustainment capability; the effectiveness of striking the enemy on sides; the survival (self-protection) capability; interoperability in communications. As well, as far as the strategy of means is concerned, the new initiative regarding NATO defence has stressed the need for a further modernisation of armament, according to certain relatively familiar horizons which depend on increasing the precision of striking 136

and reducing the collateral losses, especially through developing the day/night systems of arms and the ammunitions with precision guiding, through improving the systems of reconnaissance and surveillance, the air defence systems and the systems for neutralising the weapons of mass-destruction. In reference to what is called narrowing the gaps between the United States and Europe regarding the systems of arms, information technology and the capability of force protection, James Appathurai, in an article named Closing the Capabilities Gap, tackles the risks of a separation, because the ally across the ocean provides all the sophisticated technology, logistics, air and maritime transport, information and air power, while the others will be more and more confronted with the situation of offering only manpower, namely with fulfilling peacekeeping tasks on long term. The new initiative comes to solve this kind of issue, too, and to reduce this gap between the USA and Europe. If is known that the Europeans already have been working on the A 400 M strategic military transport aircraft, the Eurofighter multi-role aircraft, the Tiger helicopter, the modern communications systems, these programmes being able to pay their contribution to increasing the European rapid response capability by setting up a Rapid Reaction Force ~ RRF of EU and equipping it with effective means. The European RRF is complementary to NRF. We could say that it will materialise, in a certain way, the concept of European Security and Defence Identity ~ ESDI, launched and supported by the USA. Edgar Buckley, while referring to the realism of the European objective, shows that the new initiative regarding defence capabilities, launched by NATO at Prague, differs from the previous one in three respects: it re-established the national engagement more rigorously, it emphasised the stress that should be laid on multinational cooperation that would materialise in the mutual consolidation of the development efforts of EUs military capabilities. In this respect, there are four main centres of interests of the new initiative regarding the defence capabilities: defending against the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks; providing superiority at the level of headquarters and information; improving the interoperability of the deployed forces and the essential elements regarding fighting effectiveness; providing rapid deployment and sustainment of forces. These are only a few of the aspects marking out the evolution of the post-Prague strategic concepts. This kind of tendency will be manifest in each of the Member States, in the new states invited, as well. The Romanian Armed Forces, General Staff has already drawn up, as drafts, a series of documents, doctrines and manuals Joint Operations Doctrine, Special Forces Doctrine, Strategic Military Headquarters Handbook etc., which add to the old ones, the doctrines of the armed forces category of forces by means of which the evolution of strategic concepts is materialised. This process will go on and increase in the following period, because, without any doubt, we are experiencing one of the crucial moments of the reconstruction of the world, Euro-Atlantic, European and national security environment. 137
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Thus, military science, far from being only a scholastic projection and an analytical justification of certain concepts and theories, becomes more and more a sort of black box, namely an extremely sophisticated operational support for the effective military action. Its first effect is a strategic impact of great force, which consists of the proliferation, harmonisation and optimisation of the crises and conflicts management strategies. Nevertheless, military science is no longer at everybodys hand, but, since it resorts to theories of complex dynamic systems and processes, chaos theory and nano and super-technologies, it becomes, through its sphere and content, interdisciplinary, integrating and predictive, a field of certain experts of high value, indispensable in the military action, of the same kind with the type of experts and wise men used in Antiquity by the Chinese headquarters for preparing and waging wars.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carl von Clausewitz, Despre r`zboi, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, 1982. General Valentin Arsenie, Actualitatea strategiei, Bucure[ti, Editura ASM. Statul Major General al Armatei Romniei, Academia Oamenilor de [tiin]`, Sec]ia de {tiin]` Militar`, Tratat de [tiin]` militar`, volumele I, II [i III, Bucure[ti, Editura Universit`]ii Na]ionale de Ap`rare, 2004. Bruno Colson, La culture stratgique amricaine, FEDN, Economica, 1993. http://www.stratisc.org/traite_tdm.htm. http://www.cdsar.af.mil/battle.bftoc.html, The Battlefield of the Future 21st Century Warfare Issues, Air University. Commission des sciences et des technologies, La Revolution dans les affaires militaires, Rapport Special, M. Lothar Ibrgger (Allemagne). Gordon R. Sullivan, James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st Century, Strategic Studies Institute.
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What Does the Future Hold for Arms Control ?
Air Flotilla General Victor STRMBEANU ~ Commander 86th Airlift Base ~
or
Arms control has a very long evolution alongside mankind history, accompanying in a more or less salient form the armed conflict since the very beginning. According to Thucydides for instance in The Peloponnesian War1, some 2500 years ago, the Spartans proposed that not only should Athens refrain from building her own fortifications, but that she should join them in pulling down all the fortifications which still existed. But almost at the same time with this first attempt to have a kind of control over arms, including disarmament, subsequent tendencies to cheat appeared, hence the necessity for verification, because, according to the same source, for instance, simultaneously to negotiations the Spartans built their fortifications high enough to be able to defend2. However, despite this early start and its long tradition, the real arms control has not come into force until much more recently, during the last century to be more exact, after the immense destructive potential accumulated, due on one hand to scientific and technological progress and on the other hand to ideological competition, reached a global dimension threatening not only the existence of peoples but even the life per se on this planet. Even the most, recognised, aggressive political regime (the communist one) became aware of the global danger and commenced to worry about the possibility of self mutual destruction. Andrei Kozirev, one of the ministers of foreign affairs of the former Soviet Union, in his report to the Symposium held on October, 21 23, 1987, at Mc Gill University3, pointed out that the Earth is a unique space ship in the Universe, too fragile for nuclear wars, indeed for any war or arms race.
1 Cited by Lt Col Walter K. Schweiser, SO1 OPS MO4, The Role of Arms Control, Arrangements for National and International Security, on 16 January 2001, RMCS/Cranfield University, Global Security MSc. 2 Idem. 3 Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification: Options, Montreal, 1987, edited by Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, after the Symposium held on October 21-23, 1987 at McGill University, p. 93.
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So far, we already introduced three new concepts: arms control, disarmament and verification. Since from now on they will be often used, a clarification of their meaning is required: Arms control represents in Joseph S. Myes4 view the efforts to limit the numbers, types or disposition of weapons. Others tried to further develop this definition; for instance, Hedley Bull5 saw arms control as those acts of military policy in which antagonistic states co-operate in the pursuit of common interests, even while they are struggling in the pursuit of conflict ones. Disarmament is a concept representing the actual process of reduction, conversion, destruction etc., and by comparison with the above-defined concept, disarmament has a slightly narrower meaning, actually being encompassed in the overall arms control; Verification is generally accepted as the process of verifying procedures laid down in weapons agreements6 and I would classify it as a feedback method of deterring the violations by making the costs and risks of evasion unacceptably high as compared to the conceivable gain7. Having defined the necessary tools to operate with, a brief retrospective and analytic look is recommended for a better understanding of the most contentious issues generated by the accumulation of weapons and by its implicit control upon which those interested in studying international conflicts are endlessly arguing and debating. In Frederic Pearsons view8 these contentious issues around arms control, took the form of an entire series of dilemmas. First of them, termed as security dilemma, starts from the assertion that arms races and the consequent accumulation of weapons were generated by the need of security but, paradoxically ended up in a more insecure global environment. As a personal view over this dilemma, I agree that militarisation of a nation might be accepted as a factor increasing the security of that particular nation, but at a certain moment in the development of this process, the balance is disrupted and the global insecurity becomes predominant. The second dilemma in Pearsons view, the so-called dilemma of causation, is highly advocated by the opponents of arms control, especially in the United States, asserting that guns dont kill people; people kill people9 and if fire arms would be eliminated, humans, in whose nature violence is intrinsic and constant, will find other ways to kill each other. One counter argument in my view is that this way could be indeed the case but only for small arms and only at individual level. Another counter argument is provided by the statistics according to which casualties rates are higher in American cities where guns are available to public access than in the Canadian cities for instance where they are prohibited.
Cited by Lt Col Walter K. Schweiser, SO1 OPS MO4, op. cit. Idem. 6 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Oxford, 1990, p.1557. 7 F. Calogero, M.L. Goldberg, S.P. Kapita, Verification Monitoring Disarmament, San Francisco, 1990, p. 2. 8 Frederic S. Pearson The Global Spread of Arms, San Francisco, 1994, p. 5. 9 Idem, p. 2.
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The third issue approached by the author in the referenced work is the dilemma of access consisting in the possibility for those more violent and more interested in banned items to find illicit ways to procure them and consequently if guns are outlawed, only the outlaws will have guns10, leading to an uncomfortable situation where a small minority threatens the security of the majority. In support of the fourth dilemma, that of alternatives, is brought under discussion the example of humanistic Czech president Vclav Havel who promised to eliminate the arms sales but faced with the risk of economic ruin11 and national disintegration, decided to continue selling guns and tanks to foreign markets (even so he failed to prevent the split of former Czechoslovakia into two different states). Czechoslovakia was not the only state for which the arms trade represented a vital income, and the opponents of arms control have here a strong argument. Deriving from the security dilemma earlier mentioned, on the general debate is brought the adequacy dilemma comprising the question: How much armament is enough for a nation to feel secure ? This particular question proved to be a major impediment in the development of arms control and disarming process. It still generates endless debates, but it does not match the purpose of this essay to detail it deeper. Neither does it the equity dilemma, deriving from the access one. I only want to mention the political dilemma12 which in my view is eventually outranked by the economic factor (see dilemma of access). This particular dilemma is based on the fact that the armament in international relations is not related only to security or economy but to politics as well, because the latter is part of the debate since arms represent an important means to political power13. Important and unexpected progress in arms control and disarmament has been made but as shown in the brief retrospective of the main contentious aspects, the disarmament process bears a high complexity and plenty of controversial facets which are expected to impede and delay the future of arms control.
Relatively soon after the first atomic bombardment on Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) marking the conclusion of Second World War and the beginning of a new, atomic, era, four more states achieved nuclear capability but the main competition was held between the two exponents, (United States and Soviet Union), of the politically and ideologically opposed regimes. In a certain extent some of their adjacent satellites, encompassed within two opposed military blocks (NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation), have been involved. With the images of the horrifying effects of the atomic bombing over Japan still fresh in their memory, the world leaders understood from the very beginning the exponentially increased danger for the entire world, posed by the achievement
Ibid. According to World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, issued by US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Czech Republic ranked the 8th in arms exports (after USA, UK, Russia, China, France, Germany, Israel) with an income of 300 000 000 $. 12 Frederic S. Pearson, op. cit., p. 4. 13 Carl von Clausewitz, Despre r`zboi, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, 1982, pp. 59-60.
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of the new capability. The only reasons for further competitive development of nuclear race resided in fear and mutual distrust14 they had with respect to each other. Consequently, in parallel with arms race, attempts to alleviate it have been made not later than fifteen years after the beginning of the nuclear age. These eventually led to the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty ~ PTB in 1963, according to which parties to the treaty agreed to conduct nuclear weapons tests, or any other nuclear explosion, only underground15. Since in the meantime mankind entered the space era, a new specific treaty, The Outer Space Treaty16 entered into force in 1967 to expand the provisions of PTB over outer space by prohibiting placement on orbit around Earth, installing on the Moon or on any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing in outer space, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The danger now moved into the area of proliferation and large spread of nuclear weapons as more nations could afford technologically to develop nuclear capability under the cover of peaceful use of it. Next step indeed important was the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty ~ NPT opened for signature in 1968 and entering into force in 1970. The treaty represents a landmark international key one designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology while promoting nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy17. The progress resides in the entanglement of nuclear disarmament, which was supposed not only to stop further development of nuclear weapons but also to enforce measures to decrease the already existing nuclear arsenal. At the same time, NPT allows the peaceful use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all states parties. To prevent the eventual shift from peaceful purposes to aggressive ones, the treaty establishes a safeguard system under the responsibility of International Atomic Energy Agency ~ IAIA designed as an instrument to verify compliance with the treaty through inspections conducted by it. Another positive aspect of the treaty is given by its provisions, particularly in Article VIII, paragraph 3, envisaging revisions at every five years18. As a result, following the revision on May 1995, the treaty was extended unconditionally from an initial duration of 25 years to indefinitely. By January 2000, a total of 187 states ratified the treaty, this making it the largest adhered arms linked and disarmament agreement. Resuming the chronological development of arms control, in 1971 The Seabed Treaty prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed of the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. In 1972 entered into force SALT I Interim Agreement between USA and USSR on certain measures with respect to the limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which froze the existing aggregate levels of American and Soviet strategic nuclear missile launchers and submarines
Frederic S. Pearson, op. cit., p. 4. Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements (1963-2000), NATO compilation presented by Lt Col Walter K. Schweiser, SO1 Ops MO4. 16 Idem. 17 http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/index.html, p. 1. 18 Idem, pp. 4-5 and H. Muller and R. Kokovski, The Non-Proliferation Treaty Political and Technological Prospects and Dangers in 1990, a SIPRI Research Report , Stockholm, 1990, pp. 46-47.
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until a future agreement on more comprehensive measures could be reached. Unfortunately the future agreement concretised in the provisions of SALT II concluded in 1979, never entered into force and was eventually superseded by START I in 1991 after the radical change in Soviet politics, promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev. The ABM Treaty ~ Anti-Ballistic Missile entered into force in 1972 and limited the deployment of USA and Soviet ABM systems. Its additional Protocol on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, four years later (1976), further limited each party to a single ABM system deployment area. Eleven years after PTB (banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere and under water) came out the Threshold Test Ban Treaty ~ TTBT to prohibit underground nuclear weapons tests of more than 150 kilotons. Similar somehow to SALT II Treaty, and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (signed in 1976 and entered into force in 1990), TTBT entered into force 14 years later, in 1990. This latent, non-productive period coincides by and large with the protracted mandate of Leonid Brejnev and the series of old Soviet leaders succeeding after him, before Gorbachev, on the one side, and with Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan on the other side. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ~ INF, signed in 1987 and fully implemented in 1991, marking the new stage in Soviet politics and in international relations as well, is focused mainly on the vectors of nuclear warheads, and banned all US and Soviet ground launched short and medium range missiles (between 500 km and 5 000 km); although the main players were the Americans and the Russians, this treaty is particularly important for Europeans because, given the range of the vectors eliminated in pursuit of it, they were most likely to be used in European Theatre of Operations. In support of this assertion I would bring Reagans doctrine of limited nuclear war in Europe19, this being a very serious, in my opinion, warning for Europeans with respect to American politics towards Europe and to the easiness to sacrifice it for their own interests. The series of STARTs (first in 1991, applied in 1994, and the second signed in 1993, ratified in 1996) marked an important step in the development of nuclear arms control through significantly reducing the ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles, launchers and warheads, heavy bombers and their armaments including long-range nuclear air launched cruise missiles. Part of overall arms control development, although not very relevant for global security, the 1994 Trilateral Nuclear Agreement between USA, Russia and Ukraine details the procedures to transfer Ukrainian nuclear warheads (inherited after dissolution of Soviet Union) to Russia and establishes associated compensation and security assurance for Ukraine. But the most important of all, an excellent example to be followed in pursuit of disarmament for other categories of weapons, is the so-called Option Zero, concretised in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ~ CTBT from September 1996. The United Nations General Assembly adopted it with an overwhelming majority, 147 states have already signed it (nuclear power states among them). The treaty prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion irrespective the yield size. Unfortunately CTBT, more than ten years after its adoption, has not really entered into force, since major players considered they have not finished their nuclear tests programme.
19
Frederic S. Pearson, op. cit., p. 4.
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Future Developments recorded in the development of nuclear arms control
Undoubtedly an important progress has been
process. The legal basis, first stage in my view, has been settled. The second stage, the implementation, is in the same extent difficult to achieve if not even more. Both stages should be based on mutual confidence and trust since there is no international force to apply the legal provisions. As previously shown, the excellent Option Zero is blocked for already ten years because key states are reticent in ratifying the CTBT, which would eventually oblige them to stop their nuclear programmes. Furthermore, certain states seem not likely to renounce to the significant economic output resulting from export of nuclear technology and even weapons. In the SIPRI Report20 from April 1990 USA is mentioned as subsidising Israel with three billions dollars in fiscal year 1990 for foreign military sales without which, according to the cited source, Israel would be bankrupt. Similarly, USA supported Pakistan militarily, including 60 F-16 fighter-bombers capable of delivering nuclear bombs after refit. Also, the breach of president Zias commitment not to enrich uranium above 5% was not considered by American side as a sufficient reason to cancel military aid and would not play a role in the further US Pakistani relationship21 . Europe with some exceptions, which will be further examined, proved to be committed to a higher extent to the assumed legal obligations and, in 1986 for instance, The European Council resolved not to enter any new nuclear supply contracts with South Africa. But again, on the other side of the Atlantic it has been discovered that USA Department of Energy had, through lax security standards, given information on detonators, explosives and firing sites with possible nuclear applications to Argentina, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan. On the other hand, the dissolution of Soviet Union opened large possibilities for access to nuclear technology, including experts, and it is hard to believe that faced with economic ruin and territorial split, the remnant entities of the former Soviet Union will commit themselves to the obligations assumed by another political structure and they will not take advantage of their nuclear inheritance. To conclude this chapter, the nuclear arms control should hold for following directions: enhance confidence-building measures as a mandatory basis for next steps to be taken; enforcement of the treaties, agreements and other legal bindings, already ratified; urgentation of ratification of CTBT by the key states still reticent; prevention of spread of nuclear technology, especially from former Soviet Union, and again especially towards states likely to use it as terrorist means; enhance verification efficiency, to provide compliance with legal obligation; on site inspection proved to be one of the most efficient tool of arms control;
H. Muller and R. Kokoski, op. cit., p. 12. Idem.
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Biological weapons ~ BW are living, self-replicating micro-organisms which are intended to be intentionally spread in aerosols, food or water to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants; in the same category are included some of the toxins and non-living poisons deriving from biological sources, which have incapacitating or lethal effects22. Infectious diseases were used deliberately as weapons well before they were known to be caused by microbes, or being recognised as weapons per se. The potential of different diseases, as possible weapons, may have been discovered accidentally as a result of naturally contracted ones during war when elementary rules of basic hygiene could not be respected. Caribbean and South African wars are good examples in this sense23. Infected corpses were catapulted into besieged fortresses, wells were poisoned with putrefying bodies, blankets from smallpox patients were intentionally distributed among American Indians etc., but the real possibility to develop biological weapons did not come out until Koch discovered in 1876 some pathogenic bacteria (attaching his name to them thereafter) and replicated them artificially. During First World War, the Germans used anthrax-contaminated food to kill enemy horses; in 1930, the Japanese may have been used biological weapons during their war with China. Anthrax bacilli, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, botulinum toxins and staphylococcus enterotoxins B, were stockpiled for use as BW during Second World War and its aftermath24. According to American sources25, ten nations are engaged in development of BW programmes. These nations are reticent in recognising such facts. Russia, for instance, did not admit officially the development of BW until the so-called Sverdlovsk incident26. United Nations inspections have identified evidences that Iraq was operating BW programme, at least at research level. Until after WW II, four main agents were used as BW. Two of them, anthrax and Venezuelan enquine encephalitis, from living, self-replicating class (usually bacteria and viruses) and the other two, botulinum toxin and staphylococcus enterotoxins B, from non-living poison of biological origin class. Today more than twenty agents27 are under consideration, some of them genetically manipulated, which make them even more efficient and dangerous.
22 Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons, Report of a Royal Society Study Group, London, 1994, p. VII. 23 Malik I., Biological Weapon, London, 1968, pp. 48-61, cited in Report of Royal Society Study Group, London, 1994, p. 5. 24 Idem. p. 22. 25 S.J. Lundin, Chemical and Biological Warfare and Arms Control Development in 1991, The SIPRI Yearbook 1992. World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 147-182, cited in Report of Royal Society Study Group, London, 1994, p. VII. 26 In Sverdlovsk, near a Soviet biological facility, a large outbreak of anthrax erupted. 27 For a comprehensive list, on classes, see op. cit. at pt. 22, pp. 16-17.
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The military do not agree, by and large, the use of BW, from certain well-argumented reasons, such as: delayed effects, non-selectivity, dependence on environmental conditions, risk of self contamination or fear of retaliation from the opposite side with a similar weapon. Given their largely devastating and perfidious effects, BW have been under the consideration of Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 which prohibited inter alia the use of poison and pathogenic agents; the Geneva Protocol of 1925, on a Polish proposal, included bacteriological methods of warfare28. The Protocol has been signed by 115 parties but some of them retained the right to use BW in retaliation for first use by others. There was another initiative in 1968 to discuss the prohibition of both chemical weapons (CW) and BW but a generally accepted agreement could not be reached as to address both categories of weapons all together. Following an USA initiative, the United Nations General Assembly agreed to consider a BW treaty and in 1972 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction29 (further BWC) was opened for signature, eventually entering into force in 1975. The Convention prohibits, through its provisions of Article I, the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, for other than peaceful purposes as well as the weapons or other means of delivering such agents. Article II, goes even further, obliging the states parties to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes all subsequent agents, toxins or delivering weapons and equipment, no later than nine months after entering into force. And this happened, as mentioned above in 1975; it has been revised in 1980, 1986 and 1991. If the provisions of BWC would have been fully applied, the world would be totally safe from BW threat and this chapter of the essay would turn futile, but I have serious doubts that this is indeed the case. There are reasons to believe that states parties to BWC failed to comply with the obligations assumed. While very exact and comprehensive enough with respect to specific matters, BWC failed to implement an effective means of control and verification. Even after successive revisions, the set of confidence building measures (totally seven)30, are supposed to be voluntarily undertaken by parties. Since the response to the seven CBMs, formulated after 1980 and 1986 revisions, remain poor, the 1991 review established the set up of a Verification Group of Governmental Experts ~ VEREX to perform off site and on-site inspections on the suspected objectives. But the shortcoming of non-compulsory
Future Concerns For BW Control
28 G.B. Carter, The Microbiological Research Establishment and its Precursor at Porton Down; 19401979, pp. 1, 8-10, cited in Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons, Report of a Royal Society Study Group, London, 1994, p. VII. 29 For the background of BWC see http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/page6.html and for full text of BWC see http://domino.un.org/Treaty/FFA7842E7FD1D0078525688F0070B82D?Open document. 30 For details on CBMs related to BWC, see Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons, Report of a Royal Society Study Group, London, 1994, p. 19.
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CBMs remained. Even under these circumstances, to improve the BW control, experts (from VEREX) considered that BWC can be operational and made some recommendations31 in this direction, to be applied as soon as possible, such as: establishment of an administrative office to send out and chase in the reply forms and to analyse them for verification purposes; the reply forms should be made more simply so they are more easily completed by developing countries; methods of detection of BW facilities, from short and long distance (air, space), should be applied; But they conclude their recommendations for future improvement of BW control with the most relevant (in my opinion) one: if these improvements in the voluntary system do not succeed, the replies should be made mandatory32. Before conclusion of this chapter, a particular aspect of BW must be mentioned: that of the threat of use of BW by the terrorist groups due to the considerable advantage of easiness to transport them in small quantities and eventually undetected, and especially due to the delayed effects which allow the aggressor to get safely out of the target area. This is in my opinion, one of the key points with respect to BW, where experts should concentrate their efforts, beside enhancement of enforcement procedure which remain, somehow similarly to nuclear weapons case, the weakest side of BW control.
Chemical weapons ~ CW represent any chemical toxins and their precursors which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals, as well as any munitions, devices and equipment used for delivery of active agents (toxins)33 . This definition was intentionally broadened to include the means of obtaining the active agents, for the purpose of Chemical Weapons Convention ~ CWC. The precursors for instance, may not produce per se any harm on human or animals, but they are essential for getting the final product. They are defined as chemical reactants that take part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical34, and they are particularly important for the purpose of verification of CW. CW have a longer history than biological weapons for instance, and at least double than nuclear ones. They have been acquired and stockpiled by several countries and have been intermittently used in war during last century, despite international efforts to outlaw their use. They were used not only during the two worldwide conflagrations, but in their aftermath as well. Egypt for instance made use of them in the civil war in Yemen in the early 60s. Soviet occupation forces used CW against insurgents
Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons cited report, pp. 19-40. Idem, p. VIII. 33 The complete official name of Oslo Final Document is: Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe. 34 Idem, p. 3.
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and civilians in Afghanistan. Vietnamese forces used toxins in the course of their invasion of Kampuchea35. During Gulf War chemical threat hovered over allied troops and it seems than only the fear for nuclear retaliation prevented Saddam Hussein to make use of them. CW effects on living beings are horrible and chemical way to wage a war is one of the most terrible. Mustard gas victims die slowly due to asphyxiation as their lungs are destroyed, after suffering extreme painful burns on their skin. Phosgene victims also die slowly as their lungs fill with fluid causing further the asphyxiation. Victims of nerve gas poisoning may die quickly in case of inhaling a large dose or may hover between life and death after a small dose36. From strictly military perspective, CW, in a certain extent similar to BW, are non-selective, impersonal, remote, dependent on ambient conditions and somehow cowardly. These are the main reasons leading to, more than one century long international efforts to prevent production, stockpiling and especially their use in battle. Some of these efforts resulted in international agreements, conventions, such as, 1899 Hague Declaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases (and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)37 etc. First efforts aimed to make war more human, trying to limit or prohibit the use of CW in wartime and only recently, in 1992, after a decade of long and painstaking negotiations, an almost comprehensive convention has been agreed, prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons but establishing also the destruction of the existing ones and the implicit verification procedures*. The CWC was signed by 130 states since 1993 and entered into force in April 1997. Through its Article III, CWC obliges states parties, inter alia, to declare whether they own or possess any chemical weapons, specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory, provide a plan for destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities they own, or possess, and specify actions to be taken for closure or temporary conversion of any CW production facilities. The verification process is established through an especially dedicated annex (Verification Annex). The implementation of CWC and CW Control, by and large, is the responsibility of Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ~ OPCW. The legal basis is settled and the inherent responsibilities
Future Concerns assigned. By difference with BW case, for CW a verification
system (procedures and agency OPCW) is established. It remains still a lot of difficulties with respect to detection of eventually hidden or disguised CW facilities, technical details for on-site or off-site inspections, and not in the last extent with respect to access into suspected states and suspected areas.
R.W. Jones and S.A. Hildreth, op. cit. p. 72. H. D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons The Scientific Background, Cambridge, 1992, p. 89. 37 A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford, 2000, p. 59 and 155. * The complete official name is: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, further CWC.
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In my view, for the future CW Control should be concentrated not on the chemical weapons per se, but on the production facilities and on the access to eventually remaining sources of the active agents. As in the case of BW, there is a growing tendency for CW to be used by terrorist groups. Until the implementation of CWC, there was a threat to security from the Third World countries, but I do not think that the concept of poor people bomb has serious potential as a threat to security. However the possibility to be used by terrorists still remains due to the obvious advantages CW have with respect to the way terrorists act pursuing their goals (easy to produce, transport, remote, delayed effects offering the vital time for the launcher to put a safe distance between target and him). Unfortunately, due to their discretion, CW proved attractive not only for terrorists but for, let say legal secret agents, as well *38 . But there are serious doubts that this particular breach of CWC, besides many other national and international laws, can be ever controlled.
With no claim of formulating an academic definition, I would include into the Conventional Arms concept, what would remain from arms concept, by and large, after extracting nuclear, biological and chemical ones, although it is arguable indeed whether some of the newest warfare achievements (such as information warfare, military satellites, space combat assets, robotics, and not very far in the future genetic human mutants designed for combat only) can possibly be included under conventional meaning. But for the purpose of this essay, conventional arms encompasses, let say, classical means of warfare (aircraft, ships, artillery pieces, small arms, etc.). Furthermore, conventional arms control includes also (by difference with nuclear, biological and chemical arms control) the forces, meaning the human combatants, designed to handle the conventional arms. While most concerns were related to the most deadly weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological), the conventional ones have been somehow neglected although they gradually transformed Europe into the heaviest armed continent of the world and one of the most dangerous places to live in. That is why efforts to approach conventional arms control started relatively late, at the beginning of 70s, (actually in 1973) with the proposals for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions ~ MBFR, which successfully failed because none of the sides involved (East and West) aimed neither mutual, nor balanced reductions. Warsaw Pact aimed to maintain the territorial status quo in Europe, with existing forces providing them the superiority (at least quantitative) on the European Theatre of Operations. NATO, on the other hand, sought an asymmetric reduction in force levels to eliminate Warsaw Pacts numerical superiority39. It was not until December 1988,
See Umbrella Case -- when a Bulgarian migr, Georgi Markov, was killed by a Bulgarian agent using a mini bullet (1.53 in diameter) containing 0.5 mg of ricin, sent into the body of the victim very discretely, with a modified umbrella, hence the name of the case. 38 H.D. Crone op. cit., p. 41. 39 S. Croft, The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty The Cold War Endgame, Dartmouth Pbl. Co. Ltd. 1994, pp 42-43.
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when Mikhail Gorbachev engaged Soviet Union in unilateral drastic reductions of its forces (500 000 men, 10 000 tanks, 8 500 artillery systems and 800 aircraft within 24 months40), that the conventional arms control had real chances to start and develop. That announcement, in front of United Nation General Assembly, marked actually the end of Cold War and the commencement of a new international era. Unfortunately, Washington responded more than three years later and not in the same radical extent (withdrawal of land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, halt day-to-day alert status of strategic bombers (of whose eventual activation is a matter of hours !) stand down all ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START (pending on START it is no more unilateral initiative), cancel new production of ICBM and short range attack cruise missiles (they should have been already cancelled under the provisions of 1987 INF Treaty, entered into force in 1988 ?!) and limit the production of B-2 bomber41. Moscow responded at its turn declaring nuclear test moratorium and reducing strategic nuclear warheads below the limitations imposed under START I. It is highly arguable that Russians became suddenly peace lovers; sooner, Gorbachev understood that Soviet Union can no longer support such a high level of military expenditures and they needed those resources to rebuild their economy. Officially he explained these cuts in terms of reasonable sufficiency thus introducing a new doctrinal concept bearing an important role in increasing security: we shall maintain our countrys defence capability at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency so that no one might be tempted to encroach on the security of the USSR and our allies42. No matter which was the motivation, these were decisive steps for arms control and disarmament and I would not have this particular fragment of East-West dialog highlighted, unless I would be convinced that the main impediment in the pursuit of arms control still remains the lack of mutual trust and confidence, hence the need for confidence building measures, and the non-negotiated arms reduction is an excellent example of CBMs. These procedures led to the foundation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe ~ CFET setting limits from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks and large scale offensive operations. It was signed by a total of 22 states parties both from NATO and Warsaw Pact in 1990 and entered into force in 1992. The reduction period lasted until 1995, when a verification was scheduled for the elimination of 50 000 pieces of equipment. The treaty was criticised for both underestimating the scale of disarmament that would take place in Europe and for overestimating the ability of some states to apply the disarmament measures at the speed required by the Treaty43. The eventual outdateness of CFET due to high pace of disarmament and changes in Europe have been avoided through some updated additional documents, such as Oslo Final Document44, enabling the implementation
B. Ramberg, Arms Control Without Negotiation: from the Cold War to the New World Order, London, 1993, p. 1. 41 Ibid. 42 Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 December 1988, cited in S. Croft, op. cit., p. 47. 43 S. Croft, op. cit., p. 1. 44 The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe Final Act, Oslo.
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of CFET in the new international situation following dissolution of Warsaw Treaty and of Soviet Union, and the Istanbul Agreement45, 1999, that replaced the block to block structure of the initial treaty, with a system of national and territorial ceilings. Istanbul Agreement also added an inspection regime for temporary deployments and possible accession to CFET of other states. Without entering into details of the treaty and despite mentioned criticism, CFET will remain one of the most remarkable in the history. It allows great intrusion into national sovereignty of the states parties, but it seems that this is the only (or at least the most efficient) way to build confidence and if national sovereignty has to suffer for security, so be it; after all, security should be the ultimate goal of all nations. However, CFET has a major missing element: naval forces. Despite Easterners (mainly Russians) insistence, the Westerners (mainly Americans) refused to include aircraft carriers, surface ships, and submarines, on the plight of the treaty. This missing link laid the premises for maintaining, or even developing, a world superpower: United States of America, which surrounded by oceans, obviously need naval forces to project its power in the areas of its own interest. So far, a bipolar balance, albeit very risking and oscillating, managed to maintain an acceptable level of security for more than half of a century. But what does it mean for global security a world dominated by a single super power, we do not know.
The Particular Case in the same time. They can be nuclear, chemical, biological Of Aircraft as well as conventional vectors. They had and still have
an essential role in data collection, more or less authorised (as history proved), air reconnaissance, before, during and after the actual combat operation etc. The importance of aircraft is proved (if it was still needed) by the fact that aircrafts issue has blocked CFET negotiations because West side refused until May 1989 to include them into negotiated list (similar to naval forces). It was only after 30 May 1989, when NATO heads of government announced a dramatic change of policy46, that negotiations went further and included these air assets of particular importance for global security into the process of arms control. It still remains the contentious issue of aircraft from aircraft carriers. To keep them out of the provisions of CFET, they have been considered as belonging to the naval forces, but they can leave carriers any time and enforce the regular Air Force as an organic part. It is true also that aircraft which can operate from carriers are per se tactical or operational, (at their maximum range capabilities) but the carrier can project them in any part of the world, so they cover in fact all levels, including strategic one. And again due to their high level of versatility, they can turn into nuclear, chemical, biological (besides conventional) vectors and change mission character very fast.
Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, 19 Nov. 1999. Declaration of Heads of State and Governments after the North Atlantic Council Meeting, NATO Press Service Communiqu M.I. (89) 20, Brussels, 30 May 1989, para 17, cited in S. Croft, op. cit. p .136.
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Accordingly, the aircraft carriers should be also considered one of the key points for future development of conventional (and not only conventional) arms control.
Open Skies The idea dates back to 1955 when president Eisenhower made Example a proposal envisaging a regime of unarmed observation flights
over territories of state parties to promote confidence, predictability and stability47. Despite the declared intentions, both sides saw the OS initiative as a military intelligence measure of the highest importance, especially beneficent for US which at that time experienced a weakness in this direction. Accordingly, for Soviet Union it was unacceptable, for this reason48. The chronic mutual distrust made impossible such a daring endeavour until 1990, when following a Canadian-Hungarian initiative a dedicated meeting was held in February 1990, and two years later (1992) the OST was signed. The status of mutual confidence is very clearly demonstrated by the fact that after eight years from signature, it did not entered into force because key states (Belarus, Russia Federation and Ukraine) have not ratified the treaty. However the states that ratified it, so far, already started the programme of reciprocal flights and its main result is not the collection of data on different area of interests, but a salient increase of mutual trust and confidence. Mixed aircrew, from armies which until recently were on the edge of possible conflict, sharing ideas, impressions, have really broken the ice of miss trust, while the effects on intelligence plan are of little relevance (if they are at all) due to the imposed conditions (selection of area, routes, inspection of aircraft scheduled to execute the flight etc.). So, the main outcome of an initially designed as a data collection plan is the enhancement of mutual trust and build of confidence and this is the reason I wanted to bring this issue under attention. To conclude this particular subchapter, in order to increase the efficiency of the arms control, by and large, for the future, based on the confidence and mutual trust the entrance into force of OST should be considered a key direction. Sooner or later the countries still to ratify it will do so, even if for this some diplomatic efforts are required; and it will have chances to be successful. If the future will confirm my supposition, then the next step could be Open Seas (something similar to OST, with mixed crews visiting naval bases and performing missions in common); and then why not Open Space ?! * At lower levels and on a case by case analyse, the conclusions have been drawn in detail at the end of each chapter. What do they have in common (besides the vital need for confidence and mutual trust of whose lack leads to the failure of ratification or enforcement) is the increasing threat of access to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons by terrorist organisations; with respect to conventional forces, the next step to be taken is the inclusion of naval forces including aircraft carriers through the extension of the actual agreements, or through the creation of a new one.
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The Open Skies Treaty ~ OST has quite a long history.
http://sun00781.dn.net/nuke/control/os/ S. Koulik and R. Kokovski, op. cit., p. 158.
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At a higher level it is clear that an unprecedented progress has been recorded in arms control and disarmament. The legal basis has been settled and a continuous process of revisions and optimisation is ongoing on all four main categories of weapons and forces (except for the naval forces under the conventional arms category). The main top treaties and conventions (1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1972 Biological Weapon Convention, 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as well as other additional, parallel or secondary documents49) are not ideal but they offer the premises for a good start towards final goal, a safer world with no threat to security, which is still very far in the future. But all these achievements vitally depend on one basic condition: confidence and mutual trust. The lack of confidence is the main reason for not ratifying for years, different documents, or for not complying with the assumed responsibilities. The best treaty worth nothing and can be ruined by failure of trust and confidence; a good example in support of this idea is the sinuous evolution of American Russian relations: at a certain moment Russia has stopped its plans of military cuts and reduction of military forces in response to the Bush administrations decision to press ahead with the son of star wars, (National Defence System)50. Consequently, building confidence and mutual trust is the key point for the future in arms control and the only chance in the same time for implementation and enforcement of excellent legal basis, which has already been settled.
49 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1986 Stockholm Document, series of Vienna Documents of 1990, 1992, 1994, 1999; Budapest Document 1994; United Nation Register of Conventional Arms Transfer ; 1997 Anti personnel Landmines Treaty etc. 50 Russia halts military cuts as hawks take over in US, in Defence News from 18 January 2001, copied from The Guardian.
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ACTIVE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALISA TION GLOBALISATION

Major Drago[ POPESCU ~ Doctor, The National Institute of Aerospace Medicine, Bucharest ~
ery briefly defined, globalisation is a phenomenon characterised by the interdependence of economies, the interrelation between the production systems being illustrated by an increased competition on markets and a bigger international mobility of the production factors (capital and work). As a paradigm of the socio-spatial development, globalisation is usually placed in opposition with individualisation. It is a phenomenon that has drawn more and more attention during the latest years. One has become aware of its existence especially in the last decade, as, after the end of the Cold War, globalisation has replaced it as a defining trait of the international framework. According to Friedmans opinion, the present era of globalisation is an international system, just as the bipolarity of the Cold War was, with its own attributes, which nevertheless are in obvious contrast with the ones of the previous system. The occurrence of globalisation is generally believed to be a phenomenon that became obvious at the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, caused by (or simultaneous with) three major changes in the contemporary world, changes occurred in the way we communicate, invest and see the world. The first type of changes, named by Friedman the democratisation of technology, is the result of a series of innovations concentrated in the 80s, which included computerisation, telecommunications, data miniaturising and digitalisation. For instance, the progress made in microchips technology has led, during the past 30 years, to an average doubling the calculation capability every 18 months, while the progress made in the data compression technology evinces that the volume of data that can be stored on a square centimetre on the surface of the disk has been of an average of 60% annually, starting with 1991. The democratisation of technology also means that the potential of richness engendering is much more spread, geographically speaking, by offering the chance of having access to knowledge to many categories of people, which lack the possibility of being connected. 154

The democratisation of technology has definitely contributed to the stimulation of the second major change that impels globalisation, namely the change occurred in the investment conduct. Friedman named it the democratisation of finance. The democratisation of finance started at the end of the 60s, with the development of the commercial paper market. These were bonds that corporations issued directly on the market in order to raise their capital. Engendering these markets led to certain pluralism in the world of finance and eliminated banks monopoly. This was followed, in the 70s, by the securitisation of home mortgages companies, when the entire portfolio of mortgages was bought and it was divided into small value bonds that could be bought by everyone. The third change that has made globalisation possible is the change occurred in the way we see the world, named by Th. Friedman the democratisation of information: Thanks to satellite dishes, the Internet and television, we can now see through, hear through and look through almost every conceivable wall. This breakthrough started with the globalisation of television. Throughout almost the entire Cold War era, television and radio broadcasts were present in a small proportion, since the spectrum of technologies for transmission were limited. Governments either directly led most of the television broadcasts or strictly regulated their activity. All this ended first in the USA, when the cable television, which was able to broadcast much more channels than the traditional network appeared. If television and satellite dishes were important for the democratisation of information, the spread of the Internet has already overtaken them. The Internet is the peak of the democratisation of information. The globalisation system is a very complex one. In order to be understood and explained, the world today must be looked at from a multidimensional perspective: namely the six dimensions that the same author evinces. Today, more than ever, the traditional borders between politics, culture, technology, economy and finance, national security and ecology disappear. Together, these six dimensions offer us a picture of the world, which might never be obtained if the things were looked at from only one perspective. In a world wherein everything interconnects, the capacity of tracing links and connect various points is the only one that can provide the contemporary individual with a global vision over the world he lives in. The first two dimensions are somehow obvious. Politics and culture have always defined themselves in interconnection. Huntington brought almost to the extreme the idea that states politics is determined by the civilisation and the culture the respective state belongs to The Clash of Civilisations. National security, the balance of forces, is an essential dimension of globalisation. Here is comprised the entire connection of themes that gravitate around armament control, competition of superpowers, alliances politics and geopolitics of powers. Financial markets represent the fourth dimension, by means of which we can identify the causal connections that would not be noticed otherwise. Financial markets represent real invisible hands, able to handle leaders and nations. 155
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In addition, what really determines the development and force of markets, what gives a new shape to the way nations and individuals interact, in other words, what really represents the core of globalisation is the recent progress made in technology, starting from the Internet to satellite communications. Finally, the sixth dimension of the globalisation process is the ecologic one. The globalisation system in action has unleashed devastating forces from the ecologic point of view. As a consequence, the perspective on the surrounding environment is one of the major forces that can limit development, by developing a strong resistance to globalisation. In conclusion, this new globalisation system in which the walls between countries, markets and social domains are more and more cleared out represents a new fundamental stage of the problems. The defining trait of the present international relations is represented by the unprecedented increase of the interdependencies between actions, on the one hand, and the actions and their actors, on the other hand. This globalisation phenomenon involves new challenges, too. They are mainly connected to a few great fields: economic security, a field correlated with the one of the socio-political stability; military security; ecology and culture. The globalisation process means more than working together, than the integration of the economies of many countries. The qualitative characteristics of these economies change, transforming from closed systems into elements of a new world system. The notion of national economy itself changes. The cross-border corporation becomes the basic economic institution, places its factories and sells its products wherever convenient, without taking into account the existence of borders. This is why the process of international division of labour deepens, and the double economy, blooming enclaves, donor regions versus credited regions occur within a state, be it a developed one. Entire regions turn into raw material providers and commodity markets for the cross-border corporations, without developing their own production. The deepening process of the division of labour engenders serious social-political issues. During the discussions on globalisation the notion of the vanquished appears more and more: they are certain social strata or even whole nations that have found themselves outside the economic development, without any chance of coming out of this extremely difficult situation by themselves. Unfortunately, it is a real fact that the gap between the rich and the poor countries is continuously deepending. The increasing interdependence in the international relations, generated by globalisation, brings about new aspects of the notion of national and international security. Even the number of the extern factors that influence the steady functioning of the society increases. Therefore, maintaining stability at global level, providing assistance in the creation of those kind of international mechanisms that could ensure the enduring and balanced development will become a priority and one of the main problems for the regional communities. The ecologic catastrophes are, in their turn, among the dangers having a regional or even planetary character that the globalisation phenomenon involves. There are entire areas threatened by degradation, and the way in which ecosystems are influenced by globalisation has repercussions over the globalisation process. 156

Last, but not least, mention should be made that the globalisation phenomenon has been accused of the uncontrolled spread of certain cultural models of a doubtful quality, to the detriment of the national and cultural traditions of the nations, threatening their originality. The only institution having a global competency that is qualified at present to respond to these new challenges seems to be the United Nations. Established on the 26th of June 1945 and mirroring the equation of power that was created at the end of the Second World War, the UN subsequently fitted in an international situation that ended once with the Cold War. More precisely, the groups of winners, and of the losers respectively, at the end of the Second World War, are not the same today, and the UN functioning has become more difficult because the current international situation differs from the one which existed at the end of the war. For instance, Germany and Japan, countries defeated in 1945, are today among the most strongly industrialised countries in the world, while Russia, the successor of USSR, has drifted in the opposite direction: from a country having the status of superpower, it has the tendency of withdrawing in the shadow of the USA, this situation being concretely exemplified by her rather isolated position in the G 7+1 group, which meanwhile became G8. The question raised is what the UN can offer during the crisis situations occurred as a consequence of the specified challenges. If we were to analyse the challenges on every domain, we would notice that the role of the UN is most of the time outrun by the new developments in the events. The main UN bodies are indicated within the Article 7 of the Charter: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat. Within the economic security field, the Economic and Social Council, according to the duties settled by the Charter of the UN, may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialised agencies concerned (Article 62, the Charter of the UN). One should notice that the resolutions of the General Assembly have a recommendatory nature. It is very easy to notice that the key factor for regulating the economic phenomena of the contemporary world, which is in UNs hands, is as if it did not exist, as it was limited to recommendations lacking a concrete actional content. All the other international organisations significant for the economic-social field United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ~ UNHCR; United Nations Childrens Fund ~ UNICEF; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ~ IBRD; Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations ~ FAO; International Monetary Fund ~ IMF; World Trade Organisation ~ WTO (the former GATT) are not capable to manage global issues or, even worse, some of them make nothing else but complicate them, just as in the case of the IMF. 157
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In the field of military security, the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken [] to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 39, the Charter of the United Nations). Even if the duties of the Security Council are more concrete and have a bigger applicability, the procedure consented at the middle of the 20th century is much too difficult, now, at the dawn of the third millennium, when it is obvious in what way the UN recommendations can be avoided or ignored. On the one hand, the way the Security Council is structured proves, the clearest possible, the anachronism of this body. The simplest argument is that countries such as Germany, Japan, India, Mexico, Brazil are not among the permanent members of this council. On the other hand, the emergence of super-state actors such as NATO and the European Defence Initiative is obvious, and they will probably claim access to the global decision-making mechanisms. In the cultural and especially the economic domain, the UNs duties are almost null. This type of issues has a much too recent origin, and only the nongovernmental organisations fight, for instance, against the ecologic catastrophes of any type. We may conclude that there is an obvious asymmetry between challenges and institutions and, from this perspective, the United Nations, the sole organisation having a global competency, must be reformed. A question is raised though: who should reform it and according to what criteria ? This issue must be approached as soon as possible, in my opinion, since modernisation is, at present, a process that is not held under control (not in the meaning of giving it a direction which is not possible , but in the idea of managing crises) an objective that should represent a priority on the agenda of the present powers political elite. A possible way of settlement could be G8, a body that, paradoxically, gathers the winners and the losers of not only the Second World War, but also of the Cold War, USA, Russia, Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Japan and Canada. In addition, the first non-state actor occurs The European Union, represented by the president of the European Commission and the president of the country that has the presidency of the European Council. It is also true that the other great Asian actors China, India or the Latin Americans Brazil, Mexico do not find themselves in this structure.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Simion Boncu, Securitatea european` n schimbare. Provoc`ri [i solu]ii, Bucure[ti, Editura Amco Press, 1995. Teodor Frunzeti, Organiza]iile interna]ionale n era globaliz`rii, Sibiu, Editura ASM, 2000. S. Huntington, Ciocnirea civiliza]iilor [i refacerea ordinii mondiale, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1998. Alvin Toffler, Powershift. Puterea n mi[care, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1995.
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T es M t R ba e D THE
THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
Guests: Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU, Chief of the Sociological Investigation Section from the General Staff, Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer, The National Defence University Carol I, and Radu POPA, Chief of Department, Romanian Commodities Exchange
Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: The military and society. To begin with, I would like to outline, from the perspective of causal interdependencies, resorting, if possible, to the principle of gradually defining the conceptual nature of the military, as it is exactly prefigured, beginning with modern affirmation certitude and, from the same historical perspective, the evolution of the social command of society, related to its military force, to the armed forces, eventually. Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Speaking about the military supposes a two-level reflection. Firstly, it is about the military institutional organisation at national level, which is the active principle, the determining and unifying force, the synthesising force of state security. Secondly, the military has its own history, which we resort to whenever we evoke events and the soldier virtues, heroism, as well as his availability when it comes to the supreme sacrifice. We have thus the military perceived as being the nation itself , idea that is present, in the period around 1848, in Nicolae B`lcescus works on history and is given an expression once the colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza is elected the ruler of the country. Another concept representing the perception of the military is that of peoples armed hand or steel fist, as Nicolae Iorga used to like calling it. Moreover, there is the concept of all the people armed force, which used to be, until 1989, a very useful institution, although it had a too general function. Nowadays, the basic concept is that of completely professionalisation of the armed forces. 159
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Therefore, in time, the military is differently perceived, at different conceptual levels, according to the historical events and the political formulae specific to different periods. When understanding the military as the nation itself, the national awareness is emphasised, right in the middle of the century of nationalities, the second concept symbolically synthesises peoples force, while the third abolishes the idea of the military itself. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: I would like to specify, from the very beginning, that all the ideas expressed in my discourse within the debate are personal and they do not necessarily express the official position of the educational institution I am a member of. In other words, I feel bound to tell you that, if you are interested in the official point of view, it is the institution of the speaker of the university (rector) that is in charge of expressing the university official position. I am sure that, in case of addressing this institution, you could receive more elaborate answers, although you risk, this way, being the receptor of a biased and ideological message, compulsorily expressed so that it could promote the institution interests. You should not draw the conclusion that I am not preoccupied with the institution interests but we should distinguish the discourse specific to PR (Public Relation) from the sociological approach. In my opinion, the military and the society are recurrent themes, as far as military sociology is concerned. Many times, this theme can be found in western literature under the name civil-military relations. Thus, this issue comes into the military researchers area of interest, whenever some changes at the level of organisations result in perturbing this relationship. An example for the Romanian case is represented by the new situation created by the military service abolishment. An objective analysis of the situation may emphasise both the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary service. Considering only the advantages derived from this change means narrowing down to what is known as the theory of rationalising our existence, in the sense of identifying only the arguments in favour to justify or make a conjuncture positive. Let us remember that, neither at the moment this decision was made, nor at present, the public opinion is favourable, in its majority, to this change. It is true that the ideological discourse voluntary military service = military forces professionalisation may cause, or has already caused, in time, a change in attitude, in the sense of accepting the virtues of voluntarism to the detriment of the relationship we analyse. The issue may also raise interest at a larger scale, when the relation is questioned at the level of society, when the military becomes the main actor of certain social events. The fact that an issue like the Romanian Armed Forces involvement in the Revolution in 1989 has been a recurrent theme of debate in Romanian society may be an example in this sense. The subject involves prosecutors, historians, politologists, journalists etc. The fierce debates with regard to this issue are no longer fuelled today. However, the problem of its legality has not been solved yet. At world level, an event that caused disturbances in the populace sense of security has led to reconsidering the role of the army in a society that is psychically traumatised by Islamic terrorism. 160
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The prototype of the military-society relations, as a subject for study, is ensured by the case of the USA. In this framework, the relation is analysed as far as the following three aspects are concerned: convergent/divergent civil and military cultures and experiences, military personnel neutrality vs. political activism and the quality of civil democratic control on the military. The first wave of the American studies in the field began soon after the Second World War and lasted until the compulsory military service was abolished (1973), being represented by the classical polemics between Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz. In his work published in 1957, The Soldier and the State, Huntington tried to reconcile the American society hostility towards an army that demanded more and more money, within the context of the Cold War. Huntington identifies the existence of a problematic relationship between the military and society, based on an ideological difference between officer corps, who is conservative, as a rule, and civil society liberal and individualistic. A solution to the problem would be for civil society to become more tolerant, if not to internalise the conservative values proper to the military culture. Other partisans of this solution support the idea according to which officers should be educated to integrate political preoccupations in their strategic training and, reciprocally, civil leaders should be better informed on the problems related to military culture so that they could make appropriate political decisions. Morris Janowitz, although does not agree upon the military and civil culture gap, considers that, in order to bridge this gap and to be effective, the armed forces should conform to the civil leaders needs and decisions. In case the gap cannot be bridged, the military would be less tolerant with regard to civil control and civilians could thus give up ensuring the support necessary for the military to be effective. The Vietnam War traumas (second wave) reborn the public interest in this study domain and the animosities between the civil and military elites amplified. At the same time, abolishing compulsory military service resulted in demographical changes within the military: it became an auto selective organisation, which allowed for deepening the divergences towards society; the military profession came to have similarities with civilian jobs; the vocational character of the military profession attenuated. The end of the Cold War and the derived changes in the field of the USA foreign and security policy represents the third important moment in the evolution of this study domain. The classical debate between the two great orientations, Huntington Janowitz, comes to be of great interest again. The partisans of Janowitzs theory consider the armed forces exclusively consisting of volunteers has isolated itself from society, fact that poses problems as far as the civil control exercised on the military is concerned. Their main assertions are the following: the military has ideologically evolved outside society, while, within it predominant options for the right wing and associations with the Republican Party policy become manifest; the military is confronted with a process of alienation from society and even becomes hostile to it; the armed forces are resistant to social changes; particularly, it is about women and homosexuals integration in the armed forces and the prevalence of missions, others than war; the civil control and the armed forces efficiency will be affected if the military, trying to expand its autonomy over society and to avoid civil expertise in the military domain, loses the respective society respect and support. 161
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On the contrary, the partisans of Huntingtons ideas state that civil society has gone so far from traditional values that it would affect military effectiveness if tried to change the military that is seen as an exemplary representative of an American decadent society moral health. They also suspect the social and political elites of being ignorant regarding military affairs or even hostile towards the military; civil leaders are critical of the warlike culture and conduct promoted by the military and, at the same time, despise the aspects related to civil control, as they consider the military has the principle of submission so deep-inculcated that military commanders excessively respect government control. Having in view the public opinion high level of trust in the armed forces and considering both institutional trust and the military profession social prestige, the issue of the gap between civil and military values is inconsistent. In other words, the partisans of Huntingtons theory distinguish between the nature of the military and social elites differences, on the one hand, and the nature of the military and the large public differences, on the other hand. Radu POPA: Within the framework of conceptual complementarities and, moreover, of the pre-conceptual ones, I would like the previous speakers to accept some thematic adds-on to the already mentioned problems. Therefore, it is a truism to state that the military organisation is a particular reflection of war technology, fact that has caused the history of military-type organisation and profession to be, in general, the expression of the changes armament systems have undergone. From this perspective, the extremely fast social and political changes that occurred after the Second World War seem to outline two theoretical premises of the way a war can be carried out, which have had major consequences on the evolution of the military organisation, the armed forces themselves, as a national institution. Firstly, I have in view the fact that the impact of technology and of the new mass-destruction weapons has significantly changed the pattern of international relations and have outlined the threat of a war with general character. Against the background of this reality, while promoting a policy of reciprocal discouragement, the main nuclear powers had to face the severe limitation mass destruction instruments exercised over traditional management of diplomacy and international relations. As far as specialised education is concerned, the military profession, as it developed during the 19th century, started from the fundamental premise that the outbreak of a total war was inevitable, inevitability that was considered, by the theorists of the time, to have its origin in human nature itself, in the specifics of international relations evolution, as well as in the logical consequences of the armament race. Secondly, the limited war was not appreciated as purely traditional anymore, becoming less a dispute between the legitimate governments of two countries and more a violent contestation within a nation, on the part of groups that contested the existent regime. At the same time, an idea laboriously developed by Amos Perlmutter, one of the main important characteristics of the contemporary national state is that all its citizens form a unique political community, governed by a unique regime, which controls 162
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a clearly defined territory and whose administration is exercised by a centralised administration and political order. Well, it is known that this type of public authority organisation has made possible for the military establishment to elude this authority and act by isolating from the political system, attitude possible for the military in the epoch of modern development of society, as well as within the historical context of political imperial, patrimonial or feudal systems. However, entering the organic consistency of the relations between the military and society evolution, I reiterate the thesis according to which there is a profound and complex correlation between the type of national state and the type of military organisation. Why do we consider the national state as a reference point ? Because the historical sense of the question aims at the military institution conceptual development starting with this period and because the national state is, let us say, the most successful political form. As an organisation that dates back centuries, the state has a rational, legal-type administration system at its disposal, variables that denote the modern national state effectiveness in using rational administrative procedures with a view to having legitimate authority, one of its instruments of power being the armed forces. Therefore, implicitly, political regimes are rationally oriented and embodied by the national state, all the relations outside the national state territorial frontiers involving authority and the regime legitimacy. From the perspective of this preliminary digression, examples cannot be but relevant. For instance, the Prussian model in the 19th century, with its characteristic bureaucracy, militarism and autocracy, denotes, in fact, the consistent and stable relationship between the modern national state, the political regime and the way administration is exercised. In line with it, the 19th century France illustrates a similar set of autocratic monarchical relations. At the same time, the modern national state is under the authority of a political regime, considering thus, deductively, that, through the regime agency, the rational and legitimate use of force is permitted to maintain the control over population and to exclusively exercise jurisdiction over a certain territory, prerogatives exercised, principally, through assuming and applying military power. As a conclusion of my first intervention, I consider we may appreciate that the evolution of the military conceptual nature goes hand in hand with the evolution of society, the military body development projects pointing out, in turn, the evolution of a society social command related to its military force, to the military power as a state instrument. Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: In line with the same problems: How have the relationships between the military and society, between society and the military evolved ? Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: I do not know where to start. If we were to go back in times we did not live in, but we found out about reading textbooks on history of civilisation, we should refer to the old tribal communities in which the incipient forms of social organisation overlapped the army itself. Historical evolution led, in time, to the division of social responsibilities and violence specialisation. Talking today about certain relationships between the military and society means forcing the debate over the relationship between a social ensemble and one of its component elements. It is as if you asked me what the relationship between the handle and the door is. You could 163
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retort though: What if a sloping house, would I need a handle ? The door would stay close without it. ... Modern models are sliding ones that open at a simple (self) command, using infrared . It is true we have become familiar with some syntagms, as we do not need elucidating their content. To contradict myself, I feel bound to tell you that I have myself analysed the relationships between the military and society, the cultural differences between them, to be more precise. In this case, to speak about an evolution regarding the relationships, we should be in possession of a set of data, older, as well as more recent ones, to identify certain tendencies. So, as you already know, sociological research is now conducted in the absence of a medium or long-term strategy, meeting thus only momentary, situational needs. A funny thing related to this aspect has happened recently, when someone scolded me for my insistence to revise an opinion questionnaire for sociological research: What are you doing, Sir ? Are you coming again with the same issue ? You came with it last year, or two years ago, didnt you ? Take the last year data and analyse them !. I spent some energy to persuade the respective person that, in fact, it was a process that underwent analysis, thus it could not be emphasised other ways but by identifying the tendencies in its evolution. I am not sure he is convinced. But this is another problem To come back to our theme, let us conclude that we have identified the cultural differences between the military and society as normal. Making some institutions still founded on traditional cultural values compatible with the present society represents a characteristic of the above-analysed relationships. In fact, the Romanian society does not have a pronounced tendency to modernisation, so different traditional values specific to the military establishment do not cause perturbations as far as the relationships between the military and society are concerned. Not to be accused of subjectivity, I recommend that those interested in the subject should read the work of a renowned sociologist, Ronald Inglehart, as well as the analysis of data available on the Internet with regard to the world system of values1 or the European system of values2. There are two main paradigms in the literature in the field. One of them states there is a necessary cultural difference between civilians and the military and this particular difference is not a negative one. The other as well agrees upon the idea that the armed forces have a culture that is different from that of the civil society, but the traditional military culture serves less essential purposes nowadays; the armed forces do not have a functional imperative to maintain a culture that opposes the dominant civil values. Without embracing one or another of the above-mentioned paradigms, I consider important to discover the real functional equivalences to control certain distortions caused by the inevitable contextual differences. The armed forces functional imperative must be submitted to the society social imperative.
1 2
www.wvs.com www.evs.com
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Consequently, social research in the military domain has a double mission; on the one hand, it has to analyse the general problems regarding military structures adaptation to the existent social environment, especially when rapid social changes occur, which result in rapid changes as far as military organisations values are concerned; on the other hand, it analyses the way that makes it possible to maintain traditional values (loyalty, discipline, sense of sacrifice etc.) within military organisations, values considered and proved to be functional, without the risk of impairing the social military-society relations. In other words, appealing to one of the classical outlook (Janowitz), the armed forces should be a faithful reflection of civil society, as protecting society from external threats is important, but not important enough to justify the sacrifice of the values society is based on. Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: The two syntagms, the military and society, on the one hand, and the armed forces and society, on the other hand, may be identical at first sight. In fact, they are rather distinct, as they refer to different levels of generalisation. The first syntagm is more general than the second one. It is also necessary to refer to the domination-subordination relationships at the level of each syntagm. We will emphasise only one relationship of this type, respectively that existing between subsystem and system or, in other words, part-whole relationship. It is obvious the military is a subsystem of the global social system, of society respectively. Hence the military is not face-to-face with society but within society. We can thus speak about a binomial the military-society, about functionalities we could identify within civil-military relationships. This aspect is though different. The military is an establishment that performs a social function, the military one. As any function, it makes possible for the categories of relationship, rule, law etc. to be universally applied. It is true these categories vary from a public domain to another but it does not mean they are applied differently. Our tendency to see the military related to society or vice versa is generated by the confusion between essence and existence. However, the fact of being and obeying the rules of society means the same thing, no matter of location. Only the dictatorial political rules could change this type of semantic, with a view to warning civil society. Radu POPA: The question is inciting as well as extremely complex. Complex, as the evolution of the direct relationships between the military and society cannot be approached, in a debate, other way but referring to the backbone of its architecture and not to the details that coagulate the concept or concepts as such. That is why I will refer, obviously at the level of enunciation, to some facts whose evolution was and still is strongly determined by the relationships between the military and society evolution. Here, I have in view issues related to military professionalisation and the probability of war assessment (Bengt Abrahamson), the condition of professionalism within the military organisation from the perspective of corporatist pressures (Amos Perlmutter), the vocational, professional and occupational dimensions 165
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in contemporary military construction (Charles C. Moskos jr.) and the military profession (Samuel P. Huntington). Therefore, referring to the aspects concerning professional military socialisation, Huntington promotes the opinion according to which military professionalisation develops a pessimistic point of view on state security or, in other words, a manifest incapacity not to consider the possible positive consequences of the evolutions towards peace and tensions reduction in international life on national defence programmes. To the extent professional socialisation of the military presupposes the assimilation of values that have an absolutist character, it implicitly means that the pessimism regarding the evolution of international situation has to be adequately reflected within the military hierarchy. However, if it is true or not that absolutist indoctrination really occurs within the military establishment, it is a problem that requires special attention when analysed. Without doubt, the analysts of the issue, Huntington for instance, argue that the process of professionalisation leads to certain prejudices towards the military profession, as well as a strong sense of duty, which urges the military to emphasise the threats to national security, which, in turn, may result in the military seeing threats to national security even though they did not exist. Therefore, such attitude seems to point out the fact that the process of professionalisation has a strong impact upon the military general attitudes and beliefs. On the ground and from the perspective of the relationships between the military and society evolution, we have to approach the process of values building within the military profession as well as the mechanisms that lie at the basis of the values social homogenisation within the military profession, the military profession within the spectrum of socialisation, the manifest judgements with regard to the possibility for a war to be avoided or not, the military capacity to adapt to this profession exigencies, estimates regarding the probability for a war to occur and so on. As for the state and condition of professionalism within the military organisation, in the more than evident context of the tendencies towards a corporatist-type organisation and functionality within the armed forces system, we have to take into account the following: the military is an organisation that serves the public, in general, except those that constitute the direct object of the organisation itself; the military profession is one on a voluntary basis, on the one hand, as those who are attracted to it are free to choose a job within its limits and a coercive one, on the other hand, as its members cannot form an association on a voluntary basis, being forced to conform to a hierarchical-bureaucratic situation, specific to the military; control, qualification and skills are qualitative variables, essential to the condition of military professionalism; as bureaucrats, professional militaries are strongly attached to the modern national state, whose technological capabilities are revolutionary, as far as management, strategy and informational power are concerned; the professional military tendency to get involved in politics and in policies elaboration is related to the corporatist and bureaucratic roles and orientations; the effort to maximise autonomy causes, among others, influences on politics, not only through organisational counter pressures but also through political institutions and regimes; within a military establishment, professional and bureaucratic responsibilities are convergent; corporatist professionalism represents the fusion between professional and bureaucrat, in fact, the fusion between group exclusivity and managerial responsibility; modern industrial states authority systems inspire the military organisation, which is focused on professionals and professionalism 166
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with a sense of belonging and so on. With regard to the social evolution of the military profession, even if things used to be blurred for a long time, nowadays the concept I share has coagulated, the concept according to which, as far as the profession of arms is concerned, it is considered to be a genuine and unforced profession and not at all a vocationally-guided job or activity. Anyway, no matter what perspective we analyse the above-mentioned issue from, it is one thing that is clear: the relationships between the military and society have evolved in tight interdependency, a reciprocal transfer of values and mentalities having thus been realised, transfer that has evident symbiotic consequences. Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: What is the significance of the military, the military establishment and the military body today ? What can you say about the society, which, in fact, projects its military needs ? Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: The military establishment used to be seen as one in charge with defence, as well as one that had to carry out general missions, such as working in agriculture or participating in cultural life. Today, the armed forces are the expression of defence, from the perspective of the process of exploring and adapting the new capabilities to successfully meet the challenges of a security environment that undergoes almost continuous changes. On the other hand, the society has an ontologically integrating direction as it unifies the individuals, without preventing them from being individualised but compelling them to obey certain norms and values. In none of the cases society is perceived as being an object or corps. As for the relationship between the military and society, the latter is reduced, through the agency of the military, to the military life and to its need for being defended. Why do we have to see society, on the one hand, and the military, on the other hand ? We are used to attach, from the conceptual point of view, an independent meaning to the national institutions, to interpret them in relation to what they represent, in order to be easy for us to adapt to a way of thinking or, perhaps, to a certain mentality lacking in qualitative aspects. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: To describe the two elements of the relationship, I will again mention the fact that the analysis aims at a part-whole relation. The armed forces are what society projects. If it were otherwise, we should take into account the legitimacy of the military establishment in a democratic society. However, as far as we know, no problem like this has resulted from the available data. It is true, and we should not have to stand aside stating it, there are opinions according to which the fact that Romania has assumed missions considered having no direct relation with the national interest. Such opinions prove, if you want, the ignorance of those who express them, 167
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the lack of information or the hypocritical inconsistence with what it has been many times expressed, regarding the European and Euro Atlantic integration. In other words, we want to be NATO/UE members but we are interested only in the advantages or benefits deriving from it. The natural contribution to security enhancement or economic welfare may be delayed, according to this opinion. Obviously, this type of conduct cannot be considered as a correct one in a relationship. We all have emotions but our faculty of reasoning should determine us, once we make a choice, to go one near the other, even when the circumstances are not always happy. That is why we should be aware of the necessity for promoting and developing a culture of security among civilians. There are attempts of this kind but there is not a combined effort at the level of certain elements in the National Defence System, the Romanian Information Service, for instance. Radu POPA: I have to confess that the mission to point out the two concepts, through defining, is a very difficult one, especially because I do not belong to the military or, better to say I am not a professional, although I fulfilled my military service timely and in real conditions. I am trying to, though I have to mention my opinion has a pronounced sentimental note. The military is, in my opinion, an institution with a national vocation meant to be an instrument of state power, the main one in the equation of national security safeguarding. It is one of the products of society, as I have mentioned before, of its evolution and, I state in all sincerity, I cannot see the society future evolution without the military power component, irrespective of the way the military establishment will be organised or it will function in the future, be it near or far. As far as society is concerned, it will maintain the acknowledged characteristics, those of being a unitary ensemble, dynamic complex, organically integrated, of relationships between people, as a historically determined product, with common existentially general objectives, more and more subjected to the postmodern effects of development. Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: We are witnessing, without doubt, a process of redefining the military organisation, implicitly the military as a state institution, specialised in violence management. The concept that helps managing the process is philosophically subordinated to transformation. What are the challenges that have imminently determined the transformation of the armed forces, of the military establishment and what have the national states answers to these challenges been ? Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: These transformations do not cause a change regarding the content of the military reason for being. If we analyse the transformations within a certain organisation, for instance, without detecting a change in the nature of the organisation itself, we intuit that the organisation is outside 168
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its members. Therefore, it is not only about redefining the military organisation but also about redefining some principles that lie at the basis of current military strategy. As far as the challenges are concerned, the anxiety with regard to frozen conflict in certain geographical areas represents the main challenge. Technological progress has also resulted in transformations at the military level. The most important impact on the military environment is attributed to the development of information technology. Many national states have responded to these challenges through their armed forces integrally professionalisation. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: For Romania, the Armed Forces Transformation Strategy is, without doubt, a document that emphasises an unprecedented effort to conceptualise the change of an institution after 1989. Within the framework of the process of transformation undergone by the military organisation, beginning with 1990, many stages have occurred, according to the Chief of the General Staff3, all of them having some essential characteristics, as follows. The period 1990-1993 is characterised by both the lack of clear projects regarding the future of the military establishment and the lack of experience regarding the domain of institutional change. The period 1994-1996 is characterised by devising wide-spread projects, on the background of a balanced optimism, but without having certain perspectives; it is the period in which the necessary proceedings to realise structural and actional interoperability with the armed forces of NATO Member States were initiated. The period 1997-1999 is that of the widely spread restructuring, of the significant reduction of effectives and of the determined sustainment of the option to adhere to the North Atlantic Alliance. The period 2000-2004 is characterised by the essentialisation of the process of restructuring and modernising the armed forces, of the operationalisation of the military capabilities meant to collective defence, as well as that of the continuation of the specific integration process. The year 2005 marked the beginning of the period of the Romanian Armed Forces enduring development, characterised by the enhancement of qualitative transformation and completely professionalisation of the armed forces. At the level of attitudes, during these periods of transformation, the sociological polls have shown the following defining notes with regard to the personnel opinion towards the military institution transformation: the reform in the military is accepted and considered a necessary process; a certain resistance to change is although manifest, especially because the internal communication is ineffective, the social protection measures unsatisfactory, the financial-budgetary support minimum; the efforts made for Romanias NATO integration are supported by a large part of the military personnel; the expectations regarding Euro-Atlantic integration aims at major benefits: the enhancement of the sense of security, the improvement of the level of professionalisation; the technological modernisation; the rise in the living standard; the conception of human resources management develops professional competencies in a transparent competitional environment; the participation in external missions is an efficient way to professional development and social prestige attainment.
3 Eugen B`d`lan, Sensul transform`rii, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, Colec]ia Gndirea Militar` Romneasc`, 2005.
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The transformation of the military profession, as its coordinates of evolution become more evident, because of the elimination of the situations of incertitude, will result in positive changes in the personnel mood. As far as the way other national states have reacted to the challenges or necessities regarding their own armed forces transformation process I cannot give generalities. Each case in turn has its particularities when analysed. What I would like to emphasise is that, compared with the states we want to relate to, the Romanian Armed Forces have been confronted with a totally unfavourable to change conjuncture. Thus, no one can foresee with certainty all the directions regarding the armed forces transformation, given the fact that everything around is in a continuous change. The Romanian society is undergoing a profound process of transformation. Some name it transition NATO transforms. The World, within the framework of globalisation processes, transforms, too. The economical dimension, which is the financial support for transformation, represents the least happy conjuncture we have to face. Given the changing conditions, to have pretence of certitude or happiness seems to denote a little bit exaggerated attitude. The armed forces, as the coordinates of the evolution of process become more evident, as the economy becomes really supportive for change, as the situations of incertitude are eliminated, will certainly occur and it will be accompanied by an evident the personnel mood enhancement. Radu POPA: In fact, if we pay attention while analysing the evolution of the military establishment, of the military body, some aspects have already been mentioned even in our debate, we notice that, historically, we witness a continuous redefinition of the military establishment, of the armed forces, transformation being a process with a continuous character, as the society transformation is continuous, too. The armed forces transformation has a continuous character but we have to take into account the fact that the process of redefining, of transformation is crucially sustained by the genuine shoves of change that constitute, historically, the backbone, I cannot help repeating, of the transformation process. It is, in fact, the situation proper to the Romanian Armed Forces after December 89, but especially now, when the Romanian military body transformation is suprastructurally managed by the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy, a document inspired, conceived and devised by the General Staff. I am not, for sure, the right person to judge this document, but, as far as I know, it is for the first time in the Armed Forces modern history when the vision of the transformation process has extended over a period of a quarter of a century, which considerably enhances its value and provides trust in the enduring continuity of transformation. What about the challenges that lie at the basis of the armed forces, not of our armed forces but the armed forces in general ? Agreeing with what has been mentioned before, I would add the following: the consequences of the society global postmodern developments that are unpredictable on long and even medium term; the asymmetric development of the global village, with direct consequences 170
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in asymmetric-type reactions, some of them being liable to degenerate into armed conflicts; the proliferation of lack of control on the mass destruction weapons, as well as the components that are vital for producing nuclear weapons; terrorism, in the already known forms but also in forms that have not been put in role yet; the tendencies to administrate and readministrate the primary sources of energy and raw materials; the differences of global status, applied to the World states and, of course, other challenges that may be generated by the lack of control on the World enduring and balanced development. Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Does society need the military ? Radu POPA: This is a difficult question, not because of the answer it might entail, whatever this might be, but because of the intrinsic complexity of the answer as such. Can we say no ? We can say anything, you might say, but can we argue the answer ? The military is a product of society, it has developed together with society, it used to maintain societys vital purposes and still does it, and, (negatively) further applying this logic, it will cease to exist at the same time with society. Therefore, society needs the military. It is true that the issues connected to its future organisation, the missions it might be assigned, the social distribution of the military responsibilities, the philosophy of the military establishment as such are all debatable, but the military is and will further be indispensable to national societies. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: Does society need the military ? I believe it is a false issue. The topic may be rephrased, in turn, from the perspective of an anachronistic establishment regarding a society that has followed a more rapid course of evolution on the civilisation ladder. From this perspective, acknowledging the experience of military conservatism, we might take into account certain risks that derive from the lack of an opportune reaction that aims at adapting to the changes occurred in society. That is why there is so much concern for institutional transformation At the same time, we cannot claim that the military should represent a prototype of social organisation or cause the society to adapt to the military model. However, if we were to accept the challenge represented by this question, the answer would be entirely positive. As long as humankind exists, the military will last, too. If there is no army, there is nothing Or at least we cannot imagine otherwise. Another argument is symbolised by the fact that the military means, for any state, the same as the flag, national anthem and other symbols without which ones feeling of belonging to a nation would be totally destroyed, and would lead to the lack of national identity and, consequently, of the concept of nation. Or, up to now, one has not been aware of other alternative forms of social organisation in the evolution from the modern society to the postmodern one. Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Societys ontological construction involves the need for armed forces as well. An officer lives through his soldiers, just as society exists through its institutions. 171
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Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: The military in the 21st century is a very wide project, which has clustered some of the most assiduous national concerns. In what perspective do these concerns meet, and I am thinking of the sociological perspective, in the social forms specific to the 21st century, the military condition ? I have in view the vocational, occupational and professional patterns. Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Owing to its structure, society is a functional reality, namely a reality that does not exist in itself. Society is a reality of the total, and wholeness does not exist but through its parts it would be absurd to speak of an army without soldiers, for instance. It is only through this, the parts represent the relational reality they do not exist as such outside the whole, either. In other words, the military condition is a social condition offered by society. The vocational, occupational and professional patterns are firstly social, and secondly military. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: The vocational, occupational or institutional patterns regarding the military profession represent a permanently current theme for the military sociology. Samuel Huntington, one of the most quoted researchers of the military profession, identifies three main elements for any profession: expertise, responsibility and esprit de corps. For the military profession, expertise is given by the specific of the knowledge the military have in the violence management field, while responsibility consists in the military security of society. Esprit de corps is explained through the felling of belonging to a social group having a unique responsibility. Huntington does not consider all the military men to be professionals, but only those who are involved in the violence management. Charles Moskos, from the perspective of two models for analysing the profession (the institutional model and the occupational one), identifies the occupational influences over the military profession, through which the members of the profession are not interested in the calling anymore, but rather in obtaining certain material advantages (extrinsic motivation). Framing the analysis of the military profession in the context of the presented conceptual framework involves the military sociology finding answers to a series of questions. To what extent can we look at the military as being a profession or just some occupation on the labour market ? In what version is the concept of professionalism preponderantly used within the public debate regarding the armed forces, as system of professional norms and values or as occupational ideology, being aware of the fact that both forms of professionalism, the normative and the ideological one, facilitate the organisational change ? Do the internal forces preponderantly intervene in initiating the new organisational changes, in modifying the content of the military profession or do the external ones ? In other words, does the modification of the organisational field occur by the agency 172
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of institutional forces, professional elite, within a self-adjusting system or is the military profession dominated by external forces ? In the absence of a military conduct code, may we speak of military profession ? Some recent English-American research on professions have reinterpreted the concept of professionalism as being a system of values involved in the socialisation of the new members of a professional group, in preserving and predicting social order. This current interpretation has materialised in a more equilibrated and careful evaluation and has led to acknowledging the power and self interests of certain professional groups in order to preserve and promote professionalism as a normative system. Professions are thoroughly involved in reproducing legitimate power, expert authority. Accepting the authority of professional experts goes hand in hand with consolidating the authority of states. Accepting the authority of governments and professionals have been interconnected and have been part of the process of normalising the state-citizen relationship. The principles of organising professions can be interpreted as being the ones modelling the normalising process: professionals training involves the development of a balance between ones own interest and the one of the community, which is sustained by the interaction with the occupational community. This kind of model can explain the interest towards professionalism. The ideology of professionalism, so attractive to occupational groups and their practitioners, includes aspects such as exclusive property over an expertise field and authority to define the nature of the problems in that particular field, as well as control of the access to potential solutions, autonomy in decision-making and freedom of action in practicing the job. The series of questions may be expanded. Nevertheless, in the absence of some systematised answers, one cannot ignore the fact that the military profession is changing. The military profession transformation, which takes place under the spectrum of professionalism, brings multiple benefits for both the armed forces and society. Radu POPA: The evolution of the military profession, extremely alert during the last years, represents a total concern for the political decision maker who has guaranteed the intensification, on these issues, of the research in the military sociological field. Calling, occupation, profession ? Once, these used to be alternative conceptions of the military social organisation, the centre of gravity being consequently established on the social and institutional timely format belonging to a certain period. Underlining that the three terms are frequently used in an imprecise way during common discussions in current speech, let me remind them briefly. Therefore, the calling is legitimised in terms of institutional values: it is a purpose that transcends the individual interest in favour of a higher accomplishment, a value which can be associated, according to society, with the value of self-sacrifice and full commitment to a certain activity. Occupation is legitimised in the endogenous terms of market economy, in other words in the terms of the prevailing financial acknowledgement for equivalent 173
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services; profession is legitimised under the form of a specialised expertise, otherwise stated, of a formal qualification level attributed after a long term, intensive and superior training. In my opinion, in the 21st century, a century that has already astonished us with an almost incredible revolutionary evolution of technology, especially information technology, the job of arms cannot be practiced but by highly trained men, operationally capable of high professionalism. Why do I have this belief ? It may be a truism to restate that the rule of permanently including the most advanced discoveries of science and technology in the military logistics and systems of armaments remains more than valid; it can never be lapsed. Or, only absolute professionals can efficiently put highly technical armament in motion. Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: The perspective of this binomial, military-society, has caused, especially lately, the civil-military relations to have a certain typology. Would you be so kind to evince their evolution, content, the societys management/control means and, if possible, the latter ones evolution ? Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: Society is, by definition, existentially-functional, existentially-military consequently. This idea can also be explained through the reason of a democratic principle, the control of the civil society over the military. The relations between civilians and the military are expressed through this principle, and, in order to describe the typology of the civil-military-type relations, one must identify the relation between the civil institutions and the military ones in a political regime/system type. Radu POPA: Civil-military relations have the history and the evolution of the relations between the military and society, the forms and procedures of manifestation being determined by the socio-historic characteristics of the period they operated in, as well as by the changes they provoked. Thus, as far as evolution is concerned, the facts are obvious: the civil-military relations have evolved in close connection with the evolution of society and military institution, by borrowing their features up to assuming them. A comparative typology of the civil-military relations is difficult to undertake during this discussion, especially because we witness the uncontrolled proliferation of ad hoc general conclusions on this theme. I believe it is more important for us to see which the relational factors that influence the civil-military relations are, sense in which, in my opinion, we should take into account the development of professionalism in the military, since the professionalisation phenomenon determines the ineffectiveness of the political factor influence over the military environment. In this respect, one should also bear in mind the political modernisation and the development of an active public opinion not only towards the military establishment, but also towards its essential issues; societys general attitude towards the military, on the one hand and that of the political class towards the military content of national security, on the other hand, the traditional military conflicts metamorphose into armed conflict forms, in connection with which one declares from the beginning that the final purpose must be zero civil losses; the level of power and maturity of not only the civil institutions, but also of the armed forces; 174
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the nature of coercive, political, legislative-normative and organisational resources placed at civil societys disposal in order to manage the relations with the military establishment, the nature of the direct relations between the military establishment and the social-political environment, as well as of the frontiers established between them. Last but not least, we should mention the interaction between the military power and the civil one, the military roles in politics etc. Besides the mentioned factors, I believe the typology of civil-military relations is decisively determined by the nature of the control the society exerts over the military through politics. The means as such are essentially configured by the state, maturity and condition of the democratic regime, the missions constitutionally assigned to the armed forces, as well as the cultural level of the two entities, the military and society. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: I have already addressed the civil-military relations in my first answer. I would not like to repeat myself. Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: How is the military seen in the postmodern society ? Radu POPA: Such a delicate issue ! I would rather say how the warfare is seen in postmodern society and, from here, it is relatively easy for us to imagine the institution capable to wage it, capable to manage armed violence. Thus, in my opinion, this is the warfare in postmodernity: hyper-technologisation of instruments, be they lethal or not, so that they could materially sustain the armed fight; extension of the possibilities of armed engagement at the level of all the physical possibilities accessible to the land condition; complementary spread of confrontation in the economic, mediatic, information, scientific, political, cultural, social and other environments; excessive professionalisation determined by the vertical shifts occurred not only in the structure, the content and the importance of military branches, but also in the operational priority of the categories of armed forces; laborious, spatial and mobile improvement in the training didactics of combatants; the marginalisation of the tactic and operational exigencies under the pressure of the constantly increasing influence of strategic thinking and action; considerable decrease of the area in which conflicts take place and in the number of directly engaged forces, balanced by the complexity of the procedures of surgically intervening on strategic dimensions; communication and information become both causes and support for the operational concentration focused on the desired project zero dead; live and unhindered transmission of armed confrontations and the deepening of the military establishment socialisation process towards acquiring and asserting an ineluctable legitimacy. In other words, a different war and different armed forces, accordingly. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: The military must be analysed, in postmodern society, through the angle of the relation between postmodernism and nation/nationalism, which is one difficult to grasp. The national feelings will not be missing in a postmodern society. Following a previously expressed reasoning, the military will develop forms of manifestation in accordance with the new society. Otherwise, the issue of the military institution being anachronistic will be once more raised. The solution is for it to permanently adapt to the society it is part of and to redesign its functional imperative. 175
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The alternative theoretical perspectives regarding the forms of social organisation do not contradict as far as the future of the nation, and, consequently, that of the military is concerned. The perspectives on the nation and nationalism according to which nations are conceived as primordial and natural divisions of humanity and nationalism is omnipresent and universal are placed under the label of primacy. What we understand now by primordialism derives from these assertions. Primordialism can be identified under three forms. The first one is represented by the organic (popular or nationalist) primordialism, according to which nations exist in their natural state, they are the consequence and effect of a divine plan, not only of historic evolutions. The nations are conceived in an organicist manner, namely they are subjected to the laws of nature, with a perpetual existence. The second form derives from socio-biology, which argues that nations or ethnic communities are expressions of kindred and represent genetic extensions of smaller units, such as families or clans. There is, as the followers of this perspective argue, a logical coherence and a truth between the myth of common origin and the biological reality. The third type is that of the cultural primordialism, which leaves the biologic aspect aside, but further mentions the major power the so-called primordial links might have, which are seen as major starting points for of human experience. These are the blood, language, customs, religion, territory etc. connections, crucial connections that tend to dissolve or lead to crisis, at one point, at least, the civil connections already established in modern states. What should be mentioned is that, within this approach, the matter of the human being assigning these ineffable powers is addressed, namely about the members of the community conferring some fundamental valences to the community. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the centrality of symbolism in constituting the nation and ethnicity. As I stated before, I consider the military to be a necessary symbol in the existence of every nation. Perennialism focuses its speech on the crucial importance of the nation in the history of humanity. Therefore, the nations have existed ever since the beginning of history, although they are not necessarily parts of the natural order. The representatives of this movement identify nations wherever in history, from the ancient Egyptians to Babylonians to Frenchmen or Englishmen and explain history in terms such as: conflicts, alliances or other different types of relations. Ethno-symbolism is an approach that aims to go beyond failures, without nevertheless falling into the simplifications of a vulgar primordialism. It is an approach that attempts at deconstructing the two myths: the one of the perennial nation and the one of the modern nation. Just as its name shows, the movement stresses the subjective elements in the persistence of ethnic communities and their connection to the future nations. This connection is not direct or causal, but incidental. In other words, not any ethnic community generates a nation, but, in order that a nation can be established and resist, it must be based on an ethnical nucleus, even if rather symbolically perceived (founding 176
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myths, specific identity symbols etc. are included here). In this perspective, the nation is a modern creation, but its roots are premodern and it will last in the postmodern society, too, next to its armed forces. Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: I will respond as briefly as possible: strongly computerised. In fact, the concept of informational society is gaining ground as we speak in the detriment of the one of postmodern society. Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: We are at the end of this century, the 21st. Would you please define the military, in an exercise of adaptation which transcends time. Lieutenant Colonel George SPIRIDONESCU: It is difficult to make such an imaginary projection. This would mean to reduce much of the reality and omit many details. Yet, we are convinced of one thing, that the military will define itself through the type of society it will be part of. In this case, we have not different, but identical forms of ontology. We will probably have a postinformational society, therefore postinformatised armed forces, and the weapons of the soldiers will be information and computers. Probabilistically speaking, it is wiser for us to make sure that the things will be somehow similar, by virtue of another universal dialectic law: inertia. Major Mihail ANTON, Lecturer: The level of incertitude and non-determination in social sciences remains high, but one does not sufficiently considers the fact that, in natural sciences, so-called exact, the modern scientific revolution shows that there is no advance towards a definitive truth, but only towards a better one. Military sociology is trying nowadays to find solutions for the issues occurred in the international security environment without nevertheless pretending to have the optimal answer to them. Peoples need for certitude, for minimum certainty or guarantee for the future stimulates them to search around existential guidelines for orientation, generically named values. It is unanimously accepted the fact that we are all obliged to certain cultural concepts which regulate our perceptions and govern our expectations. Yet, in the current transitory societal ensemble, the value guidelines are not fixed and, immutable anymore. Everything is subjected to change, to transformation. Given these circumstances, to predict today the evolution of certain social phenomena or processes definitely represents a hazard. Therefore, I will not set myself up for being a futurologist or a prophet. Radu POPA: It is the institution without which going towards the 22nd century would not be possible ! Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD: Society a unique complex of creating values, organically integrated, which goes throughout history by applying the principle of the systemic self-management of relations between individuals; a qualitatively distinct unity of individuals, conditioned by the revolving rigours of history 177
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and objectively determined by the meditative laws of becoming; the most ample and heterogeneous instance which, tacitly or assumingly inspired, may determine one path of history or another, having the conviction that was the right path; a superior form for organising the general-human relations, in which the party distribution and assuming political and ideological options and beliefs determine the public format of the action for obtaining and maintaining the power; a formal construction of the bureaucratic state, bureaucratic itself through its functions, organisation and purposes, in which the proximal political type and the nature of the specific differences, as well as the validation by contrast, all develop asymmetries able to generate abrupt social cleavages or even fratricide confrontations. The military a fundamental creation of society, indispensable to its evolution, mostly contradictory and lacking in horizon, its instrument in proving its power, credibility, aspirations and grandeur; sometimes decisively ignored up to the limit of the institutional disregard and the identitary marginalisation, is heroically treated when, at the constrained limit of hope, is socially asked to safeguard the aspirations and the present of one nation; an instrument of the Power and not an instrument for power, it is often superior, by means of understanding, responsibility and altruism, to the general social context to which it belongs and to which it unconditionally serves. The military and society Which is genetically the first ? As an institution specialised in the armed violence management, it is definitely the product of society, although the violent conflicts between individuals precede their unitary organisation, socially integrated. Far from historys tempting simple facts, the military undergoes very modestly the winners social glory, while solitarily and quietly accepting the unconditioned sacrifice. A glory he forgets when returning from the training field.
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THE ROMANIAN ARMY CAMPAIGN PLAN IN 1916

~ THE Z HYPOTHESIS ~
Brigadier (r.) Nicolae CIOBANU, PhD ~ Member of the Academy of Scientists in Romania ~
he outbreak of the First World War, in the summer of 1914, caused the political-military decision-makers to face problems regarding the strategy and the political orientation that were of capital importance for the future and the fate of Romania. The fact that two belligerent groups were constituted the Central Powers and the Entente came to make the political debates in Romania, over the decision the Romanian Government should have taken regarding the attitude towards the First World War, even more complicated. A first decision, considered to be in complete accordance with the interests of the Romanian state was that regarding the adoption of a neutral position on the war that was shaking Europe. Romania was in an ambiguous situation: on the one hand, it signed the RomanianAustro-Hungarian Treaty of Alliance in October 18/30, 1883, in Vienna1, treaty that was kept secret and should have been renewed every 3 years if no party denounced it and, on the other hand, it had to take into account the quasiunanimous opinion of the Romanian populace who were hostile towards the Austro-Hungarian Empire, considered to be oppressive, as the Romanians who lived in Transylvania did not have political and national rights and were subjected to national prosecutions, especially after the Austro-Hungarian dualism was set up2. Given the complex situation, the military factors were imposed, by the political factor, to have military objectives that sometimes opposed each other. Thus, with regard to a campaign plan that should have been drawn up to guide the army in case of war, there were many variants proposed, in time. During the period that followed the signing of the Treaty with Austria-Hungary, to which Germany adhered, too, the Campaign Plan C Hypothesis was drawn up, establishing the way Romania should have taken
Istoria Romniei n date, Bucure[ti, Editura Enciclopedic`, 2003, p. 255. On 5/17th of February 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Pact was sealed, regarding the establishment of the dualist state Austro-Hungary (Emperor Franz Joseph I was crowned on 27 May/8 June 1867, as King of Hungary), of which Transylvania was part of, Hungarys autonomy being at the same time cancelled. Proclaiming of the Austro-Hungarian dualism resulted in negative effects on the Romanians in Transylvania, because of the policy of discrimination and desnationalisation promoted by the Hungarian authorities, under the slogan: There is only one nation in Hungary the Hungarian one.
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action in case Russia, allied with Bulgaria, had endangered Romania that was allied with the Central Powers3. The second variant of the Plan was drawn up having in view that Bulgaria, more and more closed to the Central Powers, signed, on September 6, 1915, a secret treaty with the Central Powers and Turkey, engaging itself in the war within 35 days4. The B Hypothesis Plan was thus drawn up, stipulating the use of the majority of forces for the offensive against Austria-Hungary and for the defence of the frontier with Bulgaria. B1 Hypothesis Plan was also drawn up, plan that would have been put into practice if Bulgaria had declared neuter. In this case, the main forces, the entire military effort was to be directed towards a single front, the one in the Northwest, to free Transylvania and Bucovina from the foreign occupation5. Finally, based on both the Treaty signed with the Entente on August 4/17, 1916 and on the Military Convention, the engagement of all the forces in a military action against Bulgaria was adopted, with the considerable insistence of not only General M.V. Alexeev (Chief of Stavk, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) but also that of General Joseph Joffre. The Romanian Supreme Headquarter stood firm on its position regarding the concentration of main forces on the front against Austria-Hungary. Eventually the Romanian Campaign Plan from 1916 was adopted, with the entire title the Project on Operation Regarding a War against the Central Powers and Bulgaria. Romania Allied with the Quadruple Entente, also known as the Z Hypothesis6. The first chapter of the Campaign Plan specified that the main desideratum of Romanias engagement in the vortex of the First World War was the accomplishment of our national ideal, respectively reuniting the nation and the liberation of the territories inhabited by Romanians that are, today, part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy7. The strategic aims of taking armed action were the annihilation of the enemy forces in Transylvania, the debouche in the Hungarian Plain and the exit in the Tisza and the Danube Valleys to take control over the Austro-Hungarian armed forces procurement8. Analysing the enemy capabilities and groupings of forces, the authors of the Campaign Plan justly concluded the disposition, the force and the intentions of the Central Powers forces in Transylvania, Banat and the Northern part of Bulgaria. Thus, it was appreciated that the about 70 000 soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Army in Transylvania were capable of carrying out defensive fights on successive lines, from the line of the frontier between Romania and Austria-Hungary, a greater resistance being expected in the Southern and Eastern Carpathians passage. Concomitantly, the enemy Headquarter could concentrate in the area Cluj Dej Bistri]a forces summing up about 100 000 soldiers, appreciated to be capable of defending the front and hindering the Romanian invasion on the middle course of the Mure[.
Apud Romnia n anii Primului R`zboi Mondial, vol. 1, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, p. 212. Istoria lumii n date, Bucure[ti, Editura Enciclopedic` Romn`, 1969, p. 341. 5 Romnia n R`zboiul Mondial, vol. 1, Documents Annexes (further on the source will be cited under RRM), Bucure[ti, 1934, pp. 110-111. 6 Ibid., p. 111 and passim. 7 Apud Romnia n anii Primului R`zboi Mondial, op. cit., p. 216. 8 Curs de Istoria artei militare, vol. II, Arta militar` na]ional` [i universal` n epoca modern`, Bucure[ti, 1990, p. 236.
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In Banat, the enemy was considered to dispose of about 20 000 people in the area Caransebe[ Deva Lugoj and of about 10 000 soldiers on the Cerna Valley. At the Southern frontier, in the North of Bulgaria, the Romanian General Staff appreciated that the enemy had a series of groups, consisting of Bulgarian troops, disposed as follows: between the Timoc and the junction of the Olt and the Danube, approximately 10 000-15 000 militaries, in Rusciuc area and the outskirts about 25 000-30 000 militaries were disposed, and in Rusciuc Razgard {umla Varna area, about 70 000-75 000 people. All in all, at the Southern frontier, the enemy had about 105 000-120 000 militaries9. The mission of the Bulgarian forces disposed near or even on the frontier with Romania was, probably, to concentrate the forces of the Romanian Army, through demonstrative actions meant to force a crossing over the Danube, especially in Giurgiu and Olteni]a sectors10 and to take offensive in the South of Dobruja, all with the clear end of attracting more forces of the Romanian Army from the front in Transylvania. The General Staff did not have enough available data regarding the enemy strategic supplies and did not consider the possibility to bring forces from other fronts in order to launch counteroffensive in Transylvania. In accordance with the established strategic purpose and with the enemy possibilities and the probable character of actions, the Romanian Headquarters plan comprised provisions regarding the strategic disposition, the armies mission and the stages in the development of the operation. Thus, the majority of the forces (the North Army, the Second Army and the First Army, reinforced, then, with general reserve), approximately 75% from the total of forces, were to launch offensive in Transylvania, Banat and Hungary, attacking Budapest11 on the general direction, while the Third Army (25% from the mobilised effectives) was to launch defence on the Northern bank of the Danube and in Dobruja. The 5th Armed Corps was in the reserve of the General Staff. With a view to launching offensive, the Armies were assigned the following missions: The Northern Army12 (commander General Constantin Prezan), concentrated on Romania Western frontier with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, between Cmpulung Moldovenesc and the Oituz Valley, had the mission to break through the enemy defence lines between Dorna and Oituz, to get out through the Some[ Gate and to debouch with the main forces in Turda Plain. The Second Army (commander General Alexandru Averescu), disposed between the Oituz Valley and the superior course of the Arge[, behind the RomanianAustro-Hungarian frontier, with the mission to launch offensive, initially coming out to the Mure[ course, between Trgu Mure[ and Alba Iulia. Subsequently, it had to develop offensive in cooperation with the North Army through the Some[ Gate. The First Army (commander General Mihail Asian) was assigned the mission of defending the Southern border, behind the Danube, at Or[ova, then, in the South of Dobruja, up to the Black Sea Coast, at Ekime. It had the mission to reject all the attempts
RRM, op. cit., p. 113. Istoria militar` a poporului romn, vol. V, Bucure[ti, Editura Militar`, 1988, p. 387. 11 RRM, op. cit., p. 97. 12 The Northern Army is also called the Fourth Army in some documents regarding carrying out strategic offensive operation.
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the enemy made in order to force a crossing over the Danube and ensure the concentration of the 47th Russian Army Corps13 (the 61st Infantry Division and the 3rd Cavalry one, both Russians, and the Serbian Division)14. Subsequently, the army had to be capable of taking the offensive in order to conquer the line Rusciuk {umla Varna, eliminating the risk of an enemy action in force. The Campaign Plan established the stages of the fighting actions carried with a view to fulfil the strategic objective. Therefore, during the first phase, the three Armies (the Northern, the Second and the Third ones), by initially using covering detachments, had to reject the enemy from the positions organised in the 18 gorges15. Then they were to carry on the offensive in Transylvania, the major goal being a break through, after about 25 days since mobilisation, on the middle course of the Mure[, where it was estimated that the decisive battle for Transylvania would be fought. At this stage, the forces of the Third Army, positioned on the Southern border (The Western Group) the 20th Infantry Division, located in Oltenia; The Central Group consisting of the 16th, 18th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Division, between the spring of the River Olt and the confluence of the River Arge[ and the Danube; The Eastern Group, consisting of the 9th, 17th and 19th Infantry Divisions, positioned in Southern Dobruja), had to stay in defence and secure the disembarkation and concentration of the 47th Russian Army Corps southwards the line Cernavod`-Constan]a. During the second stage, of approximately 4-5 days, the Northern Army and the Second one were to continue the offensive and, by rejecting the enemy, to reach the line Dej-Cluj, penetrate through the Some[ Gate and the Apuseni Mountains. Simultaneously, the First Army had to use its main forces along the Mure[ Valley, protruding in the Caransebe[-Dobra area and, concomitantly with a detachment, take possession over the Abrud area, in order to intercept the communication lines leading to the Rivers Cri[ul Alb and Cri[ul Negru. During this stage, the Third Army, after the concentration of Russian forces in Dobruja (approximately in the 10th day since launching the mobilisation), was to take the offensive with the Romanian and Russian forces from Dobrogea in order to take possession over the line Rusciuc {umla Varna. In addition, it was to attack and annihilate the enemy forces from Northern and Eastern Bulgaria. The offensive operations carried in Southern Dobruja were to take place in cooperation with the Romanian Danube Fleet and the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. During the third stage, estimated to last for 8-9 days, the Northern and Second Armies were to reposition most of their forces in the Tizsa Plain, the Debrecen-Oradea area, while the Fifth Army Corps (the strategic reserve of the Romanian General Headquarters) was to enter the battle with the mission to penetrate, through the valleys of the Rivers Cri[ul Negru and Cri[ul Repede, in the Oradea-Bkscsaba area. There, they were to be able to attack, in flank and from behind, the enemy forces that might have resisted
Apud Istoria militar` a poporului romn, op. cit., p. 381. The Serbian Division consisted of both Serbians who did not manage to evacuate themselves from the Austrian-Hungarian armies and prisoners captured by the Russian army among the Serbian solders enrolled in the Austrian-Hungarian army. 15 Istoria romnilor, vol. VII, De la Independen]` la Marea Unire, Bucure[ti, Editura Enciclopedic`, 2003, p. 423.
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in the Debrecen-Oradea area. In this stage, the First Army was to take action in Banat against the enemy groups in the area and establish connections for cooperation with the French-British-Serbian army which was to move forward from the Thessaloniki area, through Serbia, towards the Middle Danube. At the same time, a detachment belonging to the First Army, which had the strength of a division, was to go forward on the lower course of the River Mure[ in order to ensure the junction with the Romanian troops from the Oradea district16. Analysing the Campaign Plan the Z Hypothesis now, after almost nine decades since it was drafted, we think that this was not the best plan to choose, which should have taken into account the geopolitical circumstances and the strategic situation on different European battlefronts at the time Romania entered the war, in August 1916. It is a positive and unquestionable fact that the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff had a scientifically grounded campaign plan, taking into account the requirements of certain laws and principles of the armed fight, such as: the law of the agreement between purpose, forces and means, the law of the ratio of forces but also the observance of certain principles, such as the one of focusing the effort on the decisive directions, freedom of action, surprising and avoiding surprise or manoeuvre. The plan corresponded to the political-strategic purposes sought by the politicalmilitary decision-making factors and, in the main, it was in keeping with the situation that Romania confronted with at that particular moment, and the provisions of the Alliance Treaty and the Military Convention between Romania and the Triple Entente, signed in August 4/17, 1916. The terms necessary to fulfil the missions and the duration of the stages were properly calculated, especially for the first phase of the strategic offensive from Transylvania. Establishing the fact that the decisive battle for Transylvania would be carried out on the middle course of the River Mure[ was realistic, because on that line the frontal display of the offensive strip of the three armies would have been diminished with almost two thirds, from 900 to 300 km. The final objective of the offensive operation led in Transylvania was established too far from the Romanian forces possibilities, with a strategic reserve with the value of an army corps. The main drawback of the Campaign Plan consisted in the stipulation of the offensive taking place, some day, in the tenth day since mobilisation, on two diametrically opposed fronts at the same time, which, as they became more and more remote from each other, required special lengths for communication lines, impressive quantities of forces and means for supplying the effort on the two strategic directions, for which Romania was not ready at all. The human and material potential of the country did not lead towards adopting this kind of strategic conception. The drawback was noticed by the authors of the Plan, and, for that fact, the offensive in Southern Dobruja was set a limited objective: reaching the line Rusciuk {umla Varna17. At the risk of stirring discussions, I however state that the Campaign Plan the Z Hypothesis was drafted more with the heart and less with the mind ! In establishing the political-military strategic objective, one took into consideration especially the national
16 17
Istoria artei militare, op. cit., p. 238. RRM, op. cit., p. 121.
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feelings that animated population, such as freeing the brothers from the Austrian-Hungarian terror, especially the Hungarian one, while the military necessities, the material conditions were taken to the secondary plan. The political decision-making factors, especially Prime Minister I.C. Br`tianu, drastically negotiated Romanias entering the war, thus obtaining what they wanted: commitments and promises coming from the allies, who, practically, as it was proved afterwards, did not even think of keeping them. From the beginning, the stand taken by the chief of Stavka, General M.V. Alekseev, was open and firm towards an offensive with Romanias main forces against Bulgaria18, a stand that had been upheld by the Russians ever since January 1916. The supreme commander of the French armed forces, Marshal Joseph Joffre, embraced the same attitude between 1914-1916, sustaining, during the negotiations with the Romanian party, from June 1916, an action with most of the Romanian troops in Bulgaria19. I reckon that applying the B Plan would have been more efficient, but focused the main effort in the South. This would have allowed for the efforts of the Alliance and Romania to sum up, meaning the offensive from Thessaloniki of General Maurice Saraill would have been favoured (he had been prevented from moving towards the Balkans, and even rejected, on some directions, by the Bulgarian forces). Thus, the back of the Bulgarian army would have been attacked through Romanian offensive, and, consequently, they would have been forced to fight on two fronts or with the front reversed. At the same time, sending Russian forces on the Romanian front would have had a different qualitative and quantitative value, as they would have represented the second strategic echelon of the offensive between the Danube and the Balkans. Thus, in this respect, one can raise the issue of some Romanian troops resisting at the border with Austria-Hungary. Experience showed that, in order to open the gorges, the Central Powers, with the two armies the Ninth German and the First Austrian-Hungarian ones , fought from the second half of September to the first week of November, and meanwhile, of course, expecting the situation on the Southern Front to have been resolved. Caught between two fronts, the Bulgarian army would have been defeated. The Campaign Plan adopted in 1916 offensive in Transylvania and defence on the Danube and in Dobruja , according to, among others, the historian Florin Constantiniu, took into account the state of mind of the population rather than the military necessities. It was implemented in order to satisfy the publics feeling, obsessed with setting Transylvania free, which determined the strategic option of the offensive over the Carpathians, rather than for fear that the enemy would separate Moldova from Muntenia by breaking through the Romanian lines from the Carpathians curve. This mountain mass, easy to defend with reduced effective, would have represented a safe shield for an offensive in South, which would have taken Bulgaria out of the war, interrupted the connection between the Central Powers and Turkey and ensured the security of the Romanian Southern flank, in order to allow for the operations in Transylvania to take place20.
Apud Romnia n anii Primului R`zboi Mondial, op. cit., p. 214. Colonel Atanasiu Victor, Unele considera]ii asupra angaj`rii Romniei n Primul R`zboi Mondial. Ipoteza Z, in revista Studii, nr. 6/1971, p. 213. 20 Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincer` a poporului romn, Bucure[ti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1997, p. 277.
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Armada International, Switzerland, vol. 30, no. 2, April-May 2006 Ship-Based Helicopters Pocket Artillery Less is More in the World of DAS Dubai Air Show The New Breed of Light Workhorse J-Ucav Cave In Shine On, Deadly Light The Law Gets Tougher Sagems Spare Wares Yvory Coast: Licorne Exercise to Support UN Forces Medical Emergency for Republican Guard Military Chaplain Isabelle Maurel Nuclear Dissuasion Revisited An Army for Democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo French Defense Ministry Engaged to Combat Bird Influenza Monaco Principalitys Carabiniers Joint Defense College ALFOST Ocean Strategic Forces Command Iraq, After Three Years (File) Hidden Weapons of Multipurpose American Aircraft F35 Must We Still Send Permanent Journalists to Iraq ? Bulletin europen, Italy, no. 671, April 2006 Why does Moscow Hold G8 Chairmanship ? Do not Ask Too Many Questions About Russia Breaking Silence About Tchetchnya France Aspires to Have a Major Role in Europe in the Frame of the Global Europen Security and Defense Environment UNESCO International Book and Copyright Day Dfense nationale et scurit collective, France, no. 8-9, January 2006 Major Strategic Stakes in Asia The Great Project of South Korea India a Major International Actor Challenges and Strategic Stakes for Japan Japanese Project to Review the Constitution Strategic Challenges for China China Views Between Partnership and Restriction: Washingtons China Policy Chinese Strategies in Latin America China and Navy Status Navies of Asian Countries Scorpene on the International Submarine Market After Three Years, What About the American Preemptive War in Iraq ? A New Proximal Economy as a Response to the Globalisation Impact French Defense Ministry Sets up the General Management for Intellegence and Communications Systems Dfense nationale et scurit collective, France, no. 2, February 2006 Austrias Expectations Concerning European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) WEU and ESDP Policy Impact on French-German Military Cooperation Political Dimension of ESDP: the First Half 2005 European Security Strategy: Surveying an Integration Project European Military Space Activities Intelligence and ESDP Map Examination of European Defense Strategy New Models for Military Cooperation in Mediterranean The Future of Turkey Consensus Regarding Defense, Between Totem and Taboo Institutional
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Research, Translation and Selection Ioana MANAFU, Delia PETRACHE, Mihai POPESCU National Military Library
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Thinking Differently ...
When it comes to the contemporary military matters, we can think ... differently. Our colleague, Cristi VECERDEA CRIV who, being very keen on the world that can be taken seriously even in ... a different way, proves it, exercising essential implied meanings. CRIVs artistic personality, affirmed with modesty, although overwhelming through its substance, comprehension, use and finality, does not need flattering speeches. His work, and it is indeed the authentic work of genius, recommends him with incontestable certainty.
Plane
Shipwreck
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We are not going to mention the number of times he has exhibited in the galleries in the country as, for about a quarter of a century, he has participated in all the representative manifestations in the field. Abroad, CRIV has left the mark of his brilliant talent on the spirit in countries like Japan, Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, Iran, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the USA, Canada, Brasil, Tunis, Poland, Ukraine, Former Yugoslavia, England, Egypt, Italy, France, Korea, Hong-Kong, Portugal. Sign of his artistic value globalisation, his caricatures can be found in private collections all over the world. We do not mention the states as such, as it would be easier to identify those CRIV has not got to yet. As for the prizes he has been awarded ? A lot ! There is not room enough here to mere enumerate them. Anyway, the Chief of the Military Circle in Lugoj is the artist who, with regard to everything we know under the name of geopolitics, geostrategy, globalisation, terrorism, antiterrorism, counterterrorism etc., brings us closer to a meaning. GMR
Chance
Dreaming in a Barrack ~ like Manner
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&
EDITORIAL EVENTS
The Cold War was not an event planned or anticipated by the main actors who participated in it, nevertheless, the political, ideological and military confrontation lasted more that any of the warm wars that took place in the world during the last half of millennium. Even if it is already a page of history, the Cold War has consequences that have influenced the events that followed. That is why it represents a phenomenon that must be further studied, the lessons learnt resulted being important for the development of the events we are undergoing at present and will confront with in the future. Solu]ionarea crizelor interna]ionale (The Settlement of International Crises) comes as a possible response to the host of questions regarding the evolution of the international system for the last 15 years. Being structured on three chapters, the book of Major General Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD, published by the Institutul European, in the Seria Studii strategice [i de securitate, whose coordinator he is, succinctly evinces the role of military power in conflict prevention, crises management and settlement during the Cold War, the importance of the military instrument in transforming the international security environment, while mentioning the new type of conflict the fourth generation warfare, whose main purpose is changing the system of thought of the enemys political leadership, the North Atlantic Alliances vision regarding crises management, conflict and pre-emptive actions prevention, ways for the pacifical settlement of international disputes, the Charter of the United Nations representing, in this respect, the document that stipulates them, in the most explicit and comprehensive way possible. Thus, together with the means stipulated by Article 33 of the UN Charter, the author presents other types of solutions for settling, through non-military means, international conflicts and crises, which are now put in practice, such as: negotiations, which are centred on settling a conflict before it reaches its violent phase; the enquiry, developed under different names observation, investigation, establishing the facts, control, monitoring, surveillance, prevention and early warning (the Hague Conventions, in 1899, 1907 respectively, played an important part for the fact that the former introduced the inquiry among the pacific ways for settling a conflict, its content being detailed subsequently); the good offices, laying the stress on establishing a contact having an exploratory and informative role; 190
Editorial Events
reconciliation; arbitration; legal course, the International Court of Justice in the Hague being the representative of the international jurisdiction functioning in case of litigations between states; international mediation, which aims at leading the conflict towards an acceptable solution for the belligerent parts, in accordance with the interests of the mediator. The book announces a discussion, according to the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mihai R`zvan Ungureanu, with respect to the recent international events and changes occurred in the military area of interest. It is an inciting book, which provides answers but also poses questions that we must consider, in our position of readers and Romanian citizens. I have entitled my book Persona since my relation with the fictional characters and the public ones is an unusual one: during the years when I practiced my profession as an actor, art seemed so real, that I was forgetting to live my own reality. When I became a public figure, real life became more surprising and original than fiction. Between the stony effigy of the public life and the incomplete and vulnerable creature there has always circulated an image having a very hard to outline essence, which might be called persona, namely the face that connects our dreams and the daily moments. The words are not enough, it seems that thoughts fly much too fast, especially when we want to stop them. Moment, wait ! Your are so beautiful ! it is all I can say after reading this marvel expressed in Persona ! It seems like words do not help me anymore, I feel they are helpless and emptied by any kind of significance. Prince Radu of HOHENZOLLERN-VERINGEN delights us with this journal-confession, not leaving room for applause. As you read, you see yourself projected in His world, a world of the Stage at first, a world wherein the Mask is discovered, and the Soul does not find itself. It was probably for its best, since the mask can also be educated, by denying certain feelings to the soul in order to protect it from excesses or ridicule. Then, a world of the genuineness, served as a stage: the 7th of June 1996 was my first birthday spent at Versoix, among those who were going to become my family and in whose family I was going to enter, a few weeks later I was a Romanian actor at the Court of the exiled king, who performed acts of heroism on August 23rd, 1944. It is a book that lasts through its spiritual force (Michel Camus, the one who signs the foreword of the book). A book written for us, from which we ought to learn or, perhaps, only to remember that the history of Romania consists of its intellectuality, too, and the glory of those who defended its territory and life, and of what Brncu[i and Carol I left us with, but also from the nobleness of its peasants, and from her poverty, belief and uplifting dreams. 191
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The book was published by Editura Nemira , in an exceptional edition, with the assistance of Halewood Romania&Cramele Halewood, by the kindness of J.E. Halewood. Last but not least, the book is dedicated to Her Royal Highness Princess Margarita of Romania: In a certain way, this book, as well as my identity and my whole life belong to her. On national security, seen as the ultimate value of one nation. On the ratios established between the power structure of the state, the Parliament as legislative power and the public administrative authorities specialised in national security. Parlamentul [i securitatea na]ional` (The Parliament and the National Security), published by R.A. Monitorul Oficial, having an interdisciplinary approach, submits to the readers attention the idea that national security can and must be analysed from the angle of the historic and geopolitical realities, by obviously taking into account the identification of some possible operational solutions and the exigencies of the international context. In this respect, both the Parliament and the national security institutions make every effort in order to materialise the collaboration and cooperation as far as the legislative harmonisation in the national security domain, the parliamentary control and the response to it, as well as the diplomatic activities are concerned. By sharply and objectively analysing the state of the fulfilment at legislative and institutional level, Constantin MONAC presents the complex inter-relational mechanisms between the Parliament and the administrative authorities having vocation for national security, by highlighting their role in promoting and protecting the national interests and values. It is an analysis of the national security, having as ground a range of disciplines and theories, such as constitutional law and political institutions, administrative law and the science of administration. Finally, yet important, although it is at the end of the paper, the author suggests certain punctual and of a national interest possible solutions, which aim at improving the relations between the Parliament and the executive authorities from the national security field, on different lines of action, as follows: defining the national security objectives, in its complexity, as society needs a cult of national security, but also a security culture, designing, conceptualising and guiding the National Security Strategy, wholly anchored in the realities of the internal, European and international security environment, improving the relations between the Parliament and the national security authorities from the viewpoint of their elements subject (parts), object, content, the author suggesting, for instance, the transition from electing the list to electing the person as far as senators and deputies are concerned. 192
Editorial Events
The paper is dedicated to those who believe in the solidity of the fundamental establishments of the rule of law and the fundamental values of the nations, such as sovereignty, security, citizens rights and liberties, as well as to those who are more sceptical as far as the above are concerned, and he also thanks to all his readers, as I feel you are all very close to my soul now !. Military Theory and Establishment, Operational Command, Geopolitical Meanings. These are the key points and, at the same time, the pillars of the problems approached by Brigadier Visarion NEAGOE, PhD in Elemente de teorie [i teorie [i construc]ie militar`, a bilingual edition Elements of Military Theory and Establishment published by Editura Militar`, in the Gndirea Militar` Romneasc` Collection. The work gathers the main articles published in specialised journals, between 1997 and 2005, their topics having found their assertion and relevance in studies such as: Military strategies from theory to practice, The correlation strategy-technology a Romanian version, Operational requirements regarding the structure of the Romanian Armed Forces for counteracting asymmetric risks and threats, Forms and proceedings of terrorist activity in crisis situations and conflict areas, The permanent Romanian territory peacetime anti-aircraft defence battle service between necessity and possibilities, Air forces and anti-aircraft defence manoeuvre during the first defence operation, Perspective and possibilities of taking part in multinational operations command, Armed forces categories coordination, CJTF concept and the military operations of the future, The Romanian national state historical process, Romanians in Modern Europe synchronisation, isolation, integration, From bipolarity towards multi-polarity directions of evolution. And, just as general Eugen B`d`lan, PhD, the one who signed the Foreword, assesses, beyond or even above all these, the operational qualities of the author are to be found a theorist always dissatisfied with himself, a scrupulous and persevering practitioner, a professor with an authentic didactic calling. A convincing paper, wherein the penmanship of the word is a constant ! And, from the combination of the military theory and establishment elements, I would like to believe that this will be one of the books that will be present on your writing table ! Interested in Romania, the author of many studies, analyses, articles and books about our country, major Christophe MIDAN French officer specialised in international relations, graduate of the 15th series of the National Defence College of the National Defence University Carol I proposes us in the book Roumanie. 1944-1974. De larme royale larme du peuple tout entier (Romania. 1944-1974. 193
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From the royal armed forces to the armed forces of the entire people), published in the Collection Aujourd-hui lEurope of LHarmattan Publishing House, Paris, a synthesis of the activity of the Romanian Armed Forces at that time. The idea is a consequence of the undertaken studies and started especially from the need to establish the truth on the situation of the Romanian Armed Forces and the sound transformations occurred in that period as objectively as possible, in a chronological and thematic presentation of the facts that have put a print on the great phases of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation between 1944-1975. The paper, prefaced by one of the most known specialists in the history of Romania from France Catherine Durandin, is structured on three chapters, which successively dwell upon the systematic destruction of the royal armed forces (1944-1947/1948), the setting up of the armed forces of the people (1947/1948-1955) and the part played by Romania in founding the Warsaw Pact (1955-1975), by laying the stress on the acceptance of the new Soviet strategy. By searching the archives of the Historical Service of the Army (France), various documents, articles, laws, regulations, specialised studies generally written in Romanian, but without consulting the Romanian military archives, the author surprises us with the accuracy of details and the elaborated report of the facts, obviously leaving room to possible modifications. By illustrating, in the creation of a new military elite, the author describes the process of the Romanian soldiers transformation in political soldiers, connected through an ideological comradeship, their objective being the triumph of socialism. The priority was not the regeneration of effectively operational armed forces, but of a political structure loyal to the communists, an instrument devoted to the power. A reorganisation of the armed forces based on a Soviet model, which eliminated all the Romanian traditions. A mixture of nationalism and communism, the armed forces of the people developed between 1963 and 1975, Nicolae Ceau[escu coming into power being responsible for amplifying the role of this movement, over which he exerted a merciless control. On the other hand, the opening towards West was a frail one, with modest repercussions on the armed forces. A delicate topic, aspects that have never been analysed before, all from the angle of the ability of an officer of the French Armed Forces, who has devoted time and soul in researching the history of the armed forces of a country with which he is connected through friendship, admiration and, last but not least, human affection.
Editorial Selection and Arguments @ Alina UNGHEANU
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Rsums
Le leader
Lditorial met en vidence lune de principales caractristiques dun chef la pouvoir et linfluence dcisive de son personnalit, qui incombe inclusivement ses responsabilits fondamentales. Ainsi, il poursuit doptimiser le rapport entre ce quattendent les subordonns et ce quils pourraient offre, il transmet lorganisation un rythme positif daccommodation, tout pour obtenir la performance. Au plus, cest le leader qui, croyant effectivement en chance, la provoque, en stimulant ses subordonns par lexemple personnel, vers la russite. prsente les caractristiques des aronefs et les principales objectives et tapes de droulement des oprations interarmes.
Lasymtrie dans la guerre

Larticle dcrit lasymtrie du point de vue de son origine, son lieu et son rle dans le combat arm. Lun des aspects met en vidence linexorabilit de lasymtrie, comme une diffrence entre deux quelque chose ou quelquun. Lasymtrie est vue comme une prsence constante dans lintrieur du phnomne de guerre. On peut remarquer une possible conclusion: lexistence de lasymtrie positive, cest- -dire la supriorit en relation avec ladversaire est llment dcisif pour obtenir le succs.
Larticle prsente trois aspects importants du monde post-la Guerre froide, insistant sur lemploi de la pouvoir militaire. En premier lieu, on vise llimination des conflits et des rivalits qui existent dans la politique internationale avant la Deuxime Guerre Mondiale, ensuite, une certaine stabilit des dsaccordes entre les grandes puissances, de la division du monde en groupements adverses. A troisi me lieu, il faut empcher la prolifration dimmenses quantits et types darmement de grandes puissances vers la priphrie du systme international.
Lemploi de la pouvoir militaire aprs la Guerre froide
Le management des ressources humaines dans lre de la mondialisation

Larticle rel ve les principales tendances de ladoptabilit des politiques de ressources humaines dans les pays membres de lUnion europenne. Celui se rapporte au quatre domaines fondamentaux, confirms par le Conseil de lEurope en 2004: ladaptabilit des employs et des firmes, la stimulation de la population vers le march du travail, linvestissement effectif au capital humain et limplmentation relle de toutes les reformes. Lauteur prsente aussi certaines mesures pour renouveler le management des ressources humaines.
Larticle rel ve la signification du syst me de commandement et de contrle dans les oprations interarmes, avant tout dans les missions dappui arien rapproch. Au-del des dfinitions classiques des termes de commande et de contrle, lauteur insiste sur la dfinition dappui arien rapproch de la perspective de Doctrine pour les Oprations des Forces Ariennes. Il nous
Le systme de commandement et de contrle dans les missions dappui arien rapproch
Oprations bases sur les effets. Une nouvelle approche du conflit arm
Les auteurs mettent au centre des changements dans le systme militaire la ralisation des effets militaires, concept qui concerne lutilisation des instruments du pouvoir nationale pour obtenir
195

des rsultats dsires et viables, en temps de paix autant quen situation de conflit. Le concept a t promu par le Commandement Alli pour la Transformation, en tant qulment essentiel de la transformation de lAlliance, surtout aprs les attaques terroristes de 11 septembre 2001.
~ 2/2006 Lopportunit dune stratgie des performances

A lopinion de lauteur, une stratgie de la performance et de lefficience dune organisation militaire compte sur laccomplissement par le leader de lorganisation de la mission reue, mais aussi sur la capacit dadaptation, qui est relatif rduite, des entits dont il les conduisent. Il exprime un point de vue sur la ncessit dune culture de la performance dans le domaine militaire, qui inclue la comptition correcte et lesprit de la camaraderie.
Un nouveau concept stratgique de lOTAN. Le pro et le contre

Lauteur nous offre quelques possibles rponses sur la ncessit et lopportunit pour revoir le prsent concept stratgique. Les unes des analystes de ce domaine consid rent prim ce concept et lauteur recourt aux similitudes et distinctions entre les concepts stratgiques de lanne 1991, respectivement 1999. Sil nest pas ncessaire un nouveau concept stratgique, tant il est inopportune. Cest lopinion dautre part des analystes, laquelle lauteur insiste encore.
Le systme national de management intgr des crises. Structure et repres conceptuels

Les auteurs mettent en vidence le rle du systme de gestion intgr national de crise, qui doit assurer le mcanisme ncessaire, des procdures et, aussi, un statut appropri de la promptitude de possibilits oprationnelles civiles et militaires. Et cela, pour permettre une rponse nationale opportune et intgre au spectre entier de la crise qui pourrait apparatre sur le territoire national ou dans lenvironnement international.
Le management des ressources de lOTAN

Cest un expos de lissue et le rle du mcanisme de financer de lOTAN. Lauteur prsente quelques exemples daccorder lappui dAlliance en diverses actions, comme: la formation des forces de scurit iraquienne, le transport dquipement militaire donn au Iraq, le transport des alimentes et matriels, le financement des projets pour la reconstruction le case de Pakistan, la coopration dans le Conseil OTAN Russie ou ltablissement des ventuelles frais pour les activits de financement intgr.
CIMIC les relations civilo-militaires au niveau oprationnel

Lauteur dcrit la coopration civilo-militaire de la perspective dappliquer ce concept militaire dans la collaboration et dappui des forces armes et les autorits de ladministration publique, les organisations civiles et la population civile pour accomplisser un but commun. Lauteur recourt une distinction entre CIMIC et les affaires civiles. Celles-ci visent une srie dactivits qui mettent en vidence les cooprations civiles et militaires.
Les concepts pour les futures oprations interarmes de lOTAN

Lauteur fait une prsentation des Concepts pour les futures oprations interarmes de lOTAN, cest le rsultat de La Directive du Comit Militaire vers les commandants stratgiques relatif la transformation. Ce document a t finalis dans le mois mas, lanne dernire. Lobjective cest que ces concepts doivent faciliter, dans le nouveau contexte stratgique, leur transformation dans des capacits des directives politico-militaires de lAlliance, qui reprsentent le fondement pour ses forces et ses capacits.
La communication dans le management des tats conflictuels

Lauteur prsente les possibles sources de conflits de lorganisation. Bien quelles ne puissent pas tre vites ou limines en totalit, le manager doit les identifier et les comprendre, en visant les objectives de lorganisation, aussi les buts de lindividu. Tant plus, il doit actionner pour
196
Abstracts
rduire les effets ngatifs de ces conflits. Par exemple, en cas de la rconciliation de certains points de vue divers, cest la ngociation qui reprsente la forme spcifique de communication.
savoir comment le faire. Larticle dfini aussi

lvolution des concepts stratgiques post-Prague, au sujet des mesures prises par lEtat-major gnral de lArme Roumaine.
Dune approche paradigmatique de la scurit dans les relations internationales

Lauteur nous propose, en comparant diverses courantes de pense qui ont traits la problmatique de la scurit, de lEcole de Copenhague jusquau poststructuralisme, lapproche de ce sujet de la perspective des relations internationales. Les caractristiques prsentes mettent en vidence des points de vue diffrents, aussi de nombreuses confrontations et transformations qui se produisent, au premi rement, sur les relations interhumaines.
Les paradigmes de scurit ou quest-ce quon attend du futur du contrle darmement ?

Larticle prsente, chronologique et dtaill, le concept de contrle de larmement. Ainsi, lauteur souligne le dploiement des mesures pour la consolidation de la confiance rciproque, le maintien des dmarches pour adopter les traits, les accords et dautres obligations lgales, la prvention de la dissmination de la technologie nuclaire, en particulier de lUnion Sovitique, et assurer lapplication des prvisions des obligeants lgales, par laccent sur linspection sur la vie. Celui est un instrument efficient dans la situation du contrle des armements.
De nouvelles dimensions de la culture organisationnelle

Larticle souligne la spcificit de la culture organisationnelle de la perspective de ses lments: convictions et valeurs, des tabous et des mythes, des symboles, des statuts, des rles et des normes comportementales, traditions, rites et crmonies. La culture organisationnelle est un phnom ne complexe, influenc par une multitude des facteurs qui, successivement, influencent dautres facteurs. Cest la raison pour laquelle les organisations aspirent une culture organisationnelle efficiente, axe sur la qualit et les valeurs.
Les dfis actifs de la mondialisation

Cet article prsente une modalit de rponse du monde aux dfis gnrs par la globalisation, combien de capacit doit-il en disposer. Lauteur souligne certains aspects relatif ce qui nous apporte la mondialisation positivement et ngativement, interne et externe, quels sont les probl mes provoqus par ce phnomne et en quelle mesure il y a un rponse de la communaut internationale, qui se confronte avec de nouveaux dfis.
Le plan de campagne de lArme Roumaine ~ 1916. Lhypothse Z

Larticle reprsente une page de lhistoire tumulteuse de la Roumanie pendant la premire guerre mondiale, quand plusieurs solutions de rechange pour le plan de campagne ont t proposs et sur la base duquel les forces armes roumaines aurait du agir. Aprs les discussions, lhypothse Z a t adopte, qui tait un projet des oprations visant une guerre contre la Bulgarie et les Puissances Centrales. C tait un plan rdig plus avec lme quavec lesprit, conclut lauteur, qui pourrait provoquer de possible interpretations !
La science militaire et son impacte stratgique

Larticle dfini la science militaire de la perspective de son objet dtude laspect militaire de laction humaine et, au principal, la guerre, aussi comme les stratgies pour gnrer des forces, des moyens et des actions reues par la formation et le dploiement dun conflit. La science militaire se prolonge dans laction militaire, en passant, successivement, de savoir savoir faire et, par l,
Version franaise par @ Alina UNGHEANU

197
Zusammenfassungen
Der Leader
Das Editorial eine der Haupteigenschaften eines Leaders hervorhebt die Macht und der einscheidende Einflu seiner Persnlichkeit, wovon auch ihren Verantwortlichkeiten ergeben. So, er die Optimierung des Verhltnisses zwischen die Untergebenenerwartungen und-angebot verfolgt, der Organisation ein positiver Anpassungstakt ausprgt dessen Endpunkt ist die Leistung zu erzielen. Insbesondere, der Leader, eigentilich in die Chance glaubend, herausfordert sie und durch eigenem Beispiel ihren Untergebenen zum Sieg anregt.
Asymmetrie im Krieg
Der Artikel die Symmetrie unter dem Gesichtspunkt seines Ursprungs, seines Ortes und seiner Rolle beim bewaffneten Kampf beschreibt. Einer Aspekt bezieht sich auf die Unerbittlichkeit der Asymmetrie als Unterschied zwischen zwei etwas oder jemandes. Sie wird als eine konstante, legitime Anwesenheit im Kriegsphnomen gesehen. Man kann eine mgliche Schlufolgerung ziehen: die Existenz der positive Asymmetrie, mit anderen Worten die berlegenheit in Bezug auf den gegner ist es das entscheidende Element, um den Erfolg zu erhalten.
Benutzung der Militrmacht nach dem kalten Krieg
Der Artikel stellt drei wichtige Aspekte der Welt nach dem kalten Krieg vor, mit strker Betonung der Benutzung der Militrmacht. Erstens die Entfernung der Konflikte und der gegenwrtigen Rivalitten in der internationalen Politik von vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg, und dann eine solche Stabilisierung der Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den groen Mchte, der Welteinteilung in antagonistischen Blcken und drittens die Verbreitung von unermelichen Quantitten und Typen von Rstung der groen Mchte zur Peripherie internationaler System.
Verwaltung von Humanressourcen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung

Der Artikel stellt die Haupttendenzen der Annahme der Politiken der Humanressourcen in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europischen Union in vier wichtigen Bereichen vor, die durch den Europarat im Jahre 2004 besttigt wurde: die Anwendbarkeit der Freiwilligen und der Unternehmen, die Anziehung der Bevlkerung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, die wirksame Investition ein Humankapital und die wirkliche Implementierung aller Reformen. Der Autor legt uns einige Manahmen zur Erneuerung der Verwaltung der Humanressourcen vor.
Das Fhrung und Kontrollesystem im Nahluftuntersttzungaufgaben
Der Artikel beschreibt die Bedeutung des Fhrung und Kontrollsystems im Falle der versammelten Operationen, besonders im Nahluftuntersttzungaufgaben. Neben den klassische Definitionen der Fhrung und der Kontrollekonzepte besteht der Autor darauf, die an der Perspektive der Doktrin fr die Operationen der Luftstreitkrfte der Luftuntersttzung zu definieren, und uns sowohl die Eigenschaften der Luftschiffe als auch die Hauptzielsetzungen und Etappen der Entwicklung einer versammelten Operation vorstellt.
Auf Wirkungen basierten Operationen. Eine neue Anschneidung bewaffneter Konflikt
Die Autoren stellen am ersten Plan der nderungen des Militrs die Verwirklichung der Militrwirkungen, Konzept was die Anwendung der Kapazitten der Instrumente nationaler Macht betrifft, um das gewnschten und lebensfhigen Ergebnisse sowohl in Friedenszeit, als auch bei Konflikt wiederzufinden. Das Konzept ist durch den Aliierterkommando fr die Umwandlung als wichtiges Element der Umwandlung der Allianz, besonders nach den Angriffen vom 11 September 2001, benutzt worden.
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Abstracts
Ein neues strategisches Konzept der NATO. Argumente pro und gegen
Der Autor bietet uns einige mgliche Antworten ber die Notwendigkeit und die Gelegenheit der Revision des aktuellen strategischen Konzeptes an. Es gibt auf dem bei Analytiker, die dieses Konzept als berschritten betrachten, der Autor der hnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen den strategischen Konzepten des Jahres 1991 beziehungsweise 1999 in Anspruch nimmt. Wenn ein neues strategischen Konzept nicht notwendig ist, um so ist es unangebracht. Es ist die Meinung anderer Analytiker, auf der der Autor besteht auch. Aufgabe als auch auf der Kapazitt ziemlich begrenzt des Gebildes das diese fhrt begrndet. Der Autor drckt einen Gesichtspunkt auf der Notwendigkeit einer Kultur der Leistung im Militrbereich aus, der den ehrlichen Wettbewerb und den Freundschaftsgeist umfat.
Das nationale System integrierten Krisenmanagements. Begriffliche Konstruktion und Bezugspunkte
Die Ressoucenverwaltung der NATO
Ab dem Ursprung und der Rolle des Finanzierungsmechanismus der NATO stellt der Autor uns einige Beispiele des Abkommens der Untersttzung der Allianz in verschiedenen Aktionen vor wie beispielsweise: die Ausbildung der irakischen Sicherheitsstreitkrften, der Transport der Militrausstattung, die dem Irak gegeben wurde, der Transport von Nahrungsmitteln und von Materialien, die Finanzierung der Projekte fr den Wiederaufbau der Fall Pakistans, die Zusammenarbeit im NATO Ruland-Rat oder die Schaffung der mglichen Ausgaben fr Aktivitten integrierter Finanzierung.
Die Autoren heben die Rolle des Systems integrierten Krisenmanagements hervor, die den notwendigen Mechanismus und die Verfahrensweisen versichern mu, aber auch ein eigenes Statut der Schnelligkeit der zivilen und militrischen operationellen Mglichkeiten. All das, um eine nationale opportune ins ganze Spektrum einer mglichen Krise integriert Antwort zu erlauben, die auf dem Staatsgebiet oder in der internationalen Mitte erschienen ist.
CIMIC ~ Ausdruck der Zivilmilitrbeziehungen auf dem operationellen Ebene
Konzepte fr die knftigen versammelten Operationen der NATO
Der Autor macht eine Vorstellung der Konzepte fr die knftigen versammelten Operationen der NATO, Produkt der Richtlinie des Militrausschusses an den strategischen Kommandanten bezglich der Umwandlung, Dokument der im Monat Mai des vergangenen Jahres abgeschlossen wurde. Die Zielsetzung besteht darin, durch ihre Konzepte im neuen strategischen Zusammenhang die Umsetzung in Kapazitten der politico-militrischen Richtlinien der Allianz, Entwicklunggrundlage ihrer Krften und ihrer Kapazitten zu vereinfachen.
Der Autor die Zivilmilitrzusammenarbeit behandelt unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Anwendung dieses Militrkonzeptes auf die Zusammenarbeit und auf die Untersttzung zwischen der Streitkrfte und den Behrden der ffentlichen Verwaltung, den Zivilorganisationen und der Zivilbevlkerung, um ein gemeinsames Ziel auszufhren. Der Autor auch eine Unterscheidung zwischen CIMIC und den Zivilangelegenheiten macht, diesen Letzten, die eine Reihe von Aktivitten umfassen, die Zivilmilitrzusammenarbeit, nur eine Komponente ist.
Die Mitteilung in der Verwaltung der Konfliktstnde
Erwgungen betreffs eine Leistungenstrategie
Eine Leistungstrategie und eine Leistungsfhigkeit der Militrorganisation ist, nach der Meinung des Autors, sowohl auf der Erfllung durch den Fhrer einer Organisation des eingegangenen
Der Autor stellt die mglichen Konfliktquellen in einer Organisation vor, Quellen die, auch wenn man nicht gnzlich vermeiden oder eliminieren kann, der Manager identifizieren und begreifen mu, sowohl aus Zielsetzungensicht der Organisation, als auch jener des Individuums. Um so mehr mu er wirken, um die negativen Wirkungen dieser Konflikte zu reduzieren. Zum Beispiel, im Falle der Vermittlung bestimmten Gegengesichtspunkten wird die in der Organisation zu benutzende spezifische Kommunikationskraft die Verhandlung sein.
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Zu eine pragmatischen Analyse der Sicherheit in den internationalen Beziehungen
~ 2/2006 Die Paradigmen der Sicherheit oder der Zukunft der Rstungskontrolle ?
Der Artikel chronologisch und detailliert das Rstungskontrollenkonzept behandelt. So unterstreicht er die Entwicklung der Manahmen zur Konsolidierung des gegenseitigen Glaubens, der Wartung des Vorgehens fr das Inkrafttreten der Vertrge, der Abkommen und anderer legaler Verpflichtungen, die Vorbeugung der Verbreitung der nuklearen Technologie, besonders von der ehemaligen Sowjetunion und die Versicherung der Anwendung der Prognosen der legalen Verpflichtungen an Akzent ber die Inspektion am Ort, wirksames Instrument im Falle der Rstungskontrolle.
Der Autor vergleicht verschiedene Gedankenstrme die sich ber das Problem der Sicherheit, von der Kopenhagenschule bis zum Poststrukturalismus, beunruhigt haben und schlgt uns dieses Konzept unter dem Gesichtspunkt der internationales Beziehungen zu analysieren. Es ergibt, da zu diesem Thema verchiedenene Gesichtspunkte, zahlreichen Gegenberstellungen und Vernderungen gibt es, die erstens auf ihren zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen eintreten.
Umgestaltung der organisatorischen Kultur
Der Artikel unterstreicht das Spezifische der organisatorischen Kultur unter dem Gesichtspunkt seiner Komponente: Glauben und Werte, Tabus, Mythen und Symbole, Statuten, Rolle und Verhaltennormen, Tradition, Riten und Zeremonien. Die organisatorische Kultur ist ein komplexes Phnomen, durch eine groe Anzahl von Faktoren beeinflut, die ihrerseits andere Faktoren beeinflussen. Deshalb manifestieren die Organisationen die Tendenz, eine starke organisatorische Kultur auf Qualitt und Werte ausgerichtete, zu haben.
Die aktiven Herausforderungen der Globalisierung

Dieses Vorgehen beabsichtigt zu verfolgen, wie die zeitgenssische Welt fhig auf die Herausforderung durch das Phnomen der Globalisierung erzeugende zu antworten ist. Der Autor deutet einige Aspekte an, betrifft, was die Globalisierung uns von positivem und von negativem innerlich und uerlich mitnimmt, welches die durch dieses Phnomen erzeugten Probleme sind, und inwieweit es eine Antwort der internationalen Gemeinschaft gibt, die mit diesen neuen Herausforderungen konfrontiert wurde.
Der Artikel definiert die Militrwissenschaft aus Gesichtspunkt ihres Studiengegenstands die Militrkomponente der menschlichen Aktion und hauptschlich der Krieg, und auch die Strategie der Krften , der Mitteln und der durch die Vorbereitung und die Entwicklung eines Konfliktes zu verlangenden Aktionenerzeugung. Die Militrwissenschaft, zeigt den Autor, immer mehr in der Militraktion verlngert wird, indem man nach und nach von savoir savoir faire est dici savoir comment le faire bergeht. Der Artikel hebt auch die Entwicklung der strategischen Konzepte post-Prag hervor, an Hinweis auf die Schritte, die durch den Generalstab General der rumnischen Armee unternommen wurden.
Die Militrwissenschaft und ihre strategische Auswirkung
Der Feldzugsplan der rumnischen Armee ~ 1916. Die Hypothese Z
Der Artikel stellt eine Seite der lrmenden Geschichte von Rumnien im ersten Weltkrieg da r , w e n n m a n m e h r e r e V a r i a n t e n v o n Feldzugsplnen vorgeschlagen hat, von dem die rumnische Armee handeln mute. Zum Schlu der Diskussionen die Planvariante Hypothese Z, ein Operationsprojekt fr ein Krieg gegen die zentralen Krfte und Bulgarien angenommen wurde. Ein eher mit der Seele als mit dem Geist ausgearbeiteter Plan schliet den Autor ab, der mgliche Kommentare verursacht !
bersetzung @ Delia PETRACHE Militrische Nationale Bibliothek

200
Romanian Military Thinking Journals design is produced by Col Costinel PETRACHE, PhD
The Armed Forces General Staff (1902)
Source: The National Military Museum, by the kindess of Mrs. Valeria B~LESCU
T M
http://gmr.mapn.ro

2 2006

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Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Romanian Military Thinking Journals

General Ioan Sichitiu

Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu

Founded in 1864 under the name Military Romania

English edition, 2 nd year

Romanian Military Thinking

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

Romanian Military Thinking

Opinions Arguments Certitudes Perspectives

101 108 114 120

Geopolitics Geostrategy International Security

179 185 188 190 195

Military Publications Universe Thinking Differently ... Editorial Events Abstracts

13 Befragung mit der Fhrer

des Generalstaabs der rumnischen Armee, gen. dr. Eugen B~D~LAN

Projections conceptuelles Developpements theoriques

Begriffliche P rojekti onen Projekti rojektio Theoretische Entwicklungen

Mise jour de l OTAN

65 Ein neues strategisches Konzept 71 80

Opinions Arguments Certitudes Perspectives

Meinungen Argumente Gewissen Perspektiven

120 Umgestaltung der organisatorischen

Romanian Military Thinking

Geopolitique Geostrategie Securite internationale

Geopoliti k Geostrategie Geopolitik Internationale Sicherheit

139 Die Paradigmen der Sicherheit oder der

154 Die aktiven Herausforderungen

159 Armee und Geselschaft.

179 Der Feldzugsplan der rumnischen

185 Universum Univers militaire des publications der Militrveroffentlichungen

188 Anders denken ... 190 Leitartiklerereignisse 195 Zusammengefa t

Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

Written down by Colonel Costinel PETRACHE, PhD 5 June 2006

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Secolul extremelor, Bucure[ti, 1999, p. 297.

Romanian Military Thinking

Cf. International Herald Tribune, 07.05.1993, p. 24.

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

Romanian Military Thinking

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

Romanian Military Thinking

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM WITHIN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS

Command and control

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

Romanian Military Thinking

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

Close air support

F.A. 1, Doctrina pentru Opera]ii a For]elor Aeriene, Ibid.

Romanian Military Thinking

Conceptual Projections Theoretical Developments

Romanian Military Thinking

Air Power Handbook, op. cit., p. V-2.