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Superior Court of California In and For the County of El Dorado Small Claims FEDERAL HOMELOANMORTGAGE Plaintiff, Vs.

LAURIE FLOOD Defendant.

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UNLAWFUL DETAINERRULING PCU20100359

JUDGMENT FINDINGS OF FACT This matter came on for an unlawful detainertrial before Andrew D. Woll, Judge Pro-Tem,after having been duly appointedto serveas such by the Superior Court of El Dorado County. Trial was completedand the casewas argued I I -16-2A10. The Court, after consideringonly admissibleevidence,makesthe following factual findings: The caseis one where the FederalHome Loan Mortgage Corporation(hereafter referredto as FHLMC), is suing Laurie Ann Flood, for a writ of possession an in unlawful detainerproceeding. Such proceedings expeditedproceedingswhich are significantly cut down time for discovery and pleading,as well as limit defenses available to the defendant: During trial plaintiff FHLMC, throughcounsel,submittedinto evidenceas Exhibit l, a TRUSTEE'S DEED UPON SALE. Plaintiffalso requested courr take the judicial notice of the complaint and defendants answerthereto. The Court admitted Exhibit I and ruled it would takejudicial notice as requested. Defendantrepresented herselfin pro-per and submittedvarious exhibits which will be referredto in the discussionherein. From the various exhibits we learn: The propefiy at issueis commonly referredto as 4957 Fin Court, Pollock Pines, CA95726. It is residentialpropertyat which defendant residesand which is or was, owned by the defendant. Presumably,the property was purchased the use of cashand by a promissorynote securedby a trust deedthat containeda non judicial sale provision. The note was in favor of Wells Fargo Bank (plaintiff s predecessor interest). The note in and trust deedwere not offered into evidenceby either party, but both partiesagreedthat therewas no issuethat defendantwas the owner of the property before foreclosure

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proceedings took place. It is uncontested that FHLMC was the buyer at the foreclosure sale. It was undisputedthat defendantfailed to make a certain number of payments betweenAugust and December,20A9.Each paymentwas approximately$908.00. The exact amountsvaried somewhatdependingupon sumsneededto keep escrow money in balance. After defendantfailed to make her payments,Wells Fargo and plaintiff worked togetherto put togethera refinancing plan called the "HOME AFFORDABLE MORTGAGE PROGRAM". Under this program defendantwas to make trial payments of approximately$637.00per month, and if the paymentswere made without a default then her loan would be refinancedin such a way that paymentswould be due on a monthly basisand would remain at the $637.00level. Defendantmade her paymentsas required. Shemissedno payments. When defendanttenderedher July 20lA payment it was refused. Wells Fargo correspondence claims a number of reasonsthe program was terminated. None of the reasonsstated completely with Wells Fargo. No appears legitimate. Plaintiff testified shecooperated evidenceto the contrary was presentedby the plaintiff. Following Wells'refusal to acceptthe July 2010 payment,the propertywas foreclosedon and this unlawful detaineraction has now been filed by the purchaserat the sale. LEGAL ISSUES: There are no legal issuesto be decided. On the record, in open court, plaintiff statedno monetary damagesare sought. The only relief sought is a writ of possession plaintiff s counselagreedthis type of relief is equitablein nature. It is. and EQUITABLE ISSUES: The only equitableissueis whetheror not plaintiff is entitledto a writ of possession. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES: Sincethe times of Courtsof Equity'in early'England,real property has beenheld to be unique (See 3387 below) and in England,mattersrelatedto foreclosurewere long within the province of the Courts of Chancety,also referredto as Courts of Equity. The principles theseCourts createdhave beenhandeddown through the centurysand still guide the Courts in today's moderntimes. There are no longer the separate Courts of Law and Equity because two are mergedin America, but many (if not all) of the principles of equity have beenincorporatedinto California Codes. See,for instance:(All referencesare to the Civil Code) 22.2. The common law of England,so far as it is not repugnantto or inconsistent orthe Constitutionor laws of this State,is with the Con stitution of the United States, the rule of decisionin all the courtsof this State.

t327q.As a generalrule, compensation the relief or remedyprovided is by the law of this Statefor the violation of private rights, and the meansof securingtheir observance; and specific and preventiverelief may be given in no other casesthan thosespecifiedin this Part of the CIVIL CODE. 3275. Whenever,by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reasonof his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom,upon making full compensation the to other party, except in caseof a grosslynegligent,willful, or fraudulentbreachof duty. 3366. Specificorpreventive relief may be given as providedby the laws of this state. 3367. Specificrelief is given: I . By takingpossession a thing,and deliveringit of to a claimant;2. By compelling a party himself to do that which ought to be done; or,3. By declaring and determiningthe rights of parties,otherwisethan by an award of damages. 3368. Preventiverelief is given by prohibitinga party from doing that which ought not to be done. 3369.Neither specific nor preventiverelief can be grantedto enforcea penalty or forfeiture in any case,nor to enforcea penal law, except in a caseof nuisanceor as otherwiseprovided by law. 3375 . A personentitled to specific real property, by reasoneither of a perfected title, or of a claim to title which ought to be perfected,may recoverthe samein the mannerprescribedby the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, either by a judgment for its possession, be executedby the Sheriff, or by ajudgment to requiring the other party to perfect the title, and to deliver possession the of property.

erle.j r-ri ' All of detbndansevidenceu'as objectedto b plaintitTardall >aidobjectionse .'rr -is..:'.;iii as set forth herein:

Exh A - Obj. hearsay and relevance. BloombergNews Articles - obj. sustained.Exh. B No obj. lodged.Exh. C - Obj. hearsay, relevance and foundation.Ltrby FreddieMac. Obj. sustained. Exh. D - Wells Fargo servicing.Obj ovemled. The exhibit corraborates testimonywhich is admissibleunderPG&E -v- ThomasDrayage.Exh. E - No obj. by plaintiff. Exh. F - Obj. relevance,Deposition of Kennerty.Obj. ovemrled. (Kennerty signedpapersin presentcase. Issuesin depoare identical. This opinion, however,does not rely on anythingfrom this depo.).Exh. G - Obj. relevance and hearsay. Obj. ovemled.Docs relateto Home Affordable Plan. Exh. H - Obj. relevance and hearsay. Obj.ovemrled.(phonelog and summaryof voluminous evidence). Exh. I - No Obj.Exh. J. Obj. Relevance.Docs are operativefacts,or res gestae.Also admissibleunderPG&E -v- Thomas Drayage for corraboration. Exh. K - Obj. hearsayand relevance.Obj overruled.Operative facts, res gestae, and summaryof cumulative evidence. The exhibit corraborates testimonywhich is admissible underPG&E -v- ThomasDrayage.

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that the breachof an agreement transferreal property to 3387. [t is to be presumed In relievedby pecuniarycompensation. the caseof a singlecannotbe adequately performance intendsto occupy,this family dwelling which the party seeking presumption conclusive.In all othercases, is this presumptionis a presumption affectingthe burdenof proof. cannotbe enforcedagainsta party to a contractin any 3391. Specificperformance consideration the for of the following cases:I . If he hasnot receivedan adequate was obtained 3. contract;2.\f it is not, as to him, just and reasonable; If his assent circumvention,or unfair practicesof any concealment, by the misrepresentation, party to whom performancewould becomedue under the contract,or by any promiseof suchparty which hasnot beensubstantially fulfilled; or;4.If his or assentwas given under the influence of mistake,misapprehension, surprise, in exceptthat where the contractprovides for compensation caseof mistake,a for, and the mistake within the scopeof such provision may be compensated if contractspecifically enforcedin other respects, proper to be so enforced. 3392. Specific performancecannotbe enforcedin favor of a party who has not on fully and fairly performed all the conditionsprecedent his part to the obligation of the other party, exceptwhere his failure to perform is only partial, and either in entirely immaterial,or capableof being fully compensated, which casespecif-rc being made for the performancemay be compelled,upon full compensation default. for 3394.An agreement the saleof propertycannotbe specificallyenforcedin doubt. favor of a seller who cannotgive to the buyer a title free from reasonable so of 3510.When the reason a rule ceases, shouldthe rule itself. 3512.One must not changehis purposeto the injury'of another. to 3515.He who consents an act is not wrongedby it. in 35 16.Acquiescence error takesaway the right of objectingto it. of 3517.No one can take advantage his own wrong. 3523.For every wrong thereis a remedy.

3529.That which ought to havebeendoneis to be regarded done,in f'avorof as him to whom, and againsthim from whom, performanceis due. ANALYSIS r'[An unlawful detainer action is a summaryproceeding,the primary purposeof which is to obtain the possession real propertyin the cases of specifiedby statute. (Fontana Industries Western v. Grain Co., 167 Cal.App.2d408,411,334P.2d 611; Markhamv. Fralick,2 Cal.zd 221,227,39 P.2d 804; Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146,146p.423; seeCodeCiv. Proc.s 1161.) Accordingly, a general rule hasemerged that, sincethe sole issuebeforethe court is the right to possession, neithera counterclaim nor a cross-complaint,nor affirmative defenses, admissiblein an action in unlaw.ful ffie detainer,even though the alleged causecontainedtherein grows out of the subjectmatter involvedin the originalsuit. (Smith v. Whyers,64Cal.App.193, 194,221P. 387; Arnold v. Krigbaum,supra,169 Cal. at p. 145, 146P. 423;LakesidePark Assn. of Kelseyvillev. Keithly,43 Cal.App.zd418,422, 110P.2d 1055;Knowlesv. Robinson, Cal.2d620, 60 625,36Cal.Rptr. 387P.2d833;Cheney Trauzettel, Cal.2d158,159,69P.2d v. 33, 9 832).The purposeof this rule is to preventtenantswho have violated the covenantsof their leasesfrom frustrating the ordinary and summaryremedy provided by statutefor the (AbstractInvestment restitutionof the premises. Co.v. Hutchinson,204 Cal.App.2d 242,248,22 Cal.Rptr.309; LakesidePark Assn.v. Keithly, supra;Knowles v. Robinson, supra.)As observedin LakesidePark, supra,and reiteratedin Knowles, supra, "The reasonfor this rule is that the injecting of other issuesextrinsic to the right of possession (43 Cal.App.2dp.422,110P.2d may defeatthe very purpose the statute." of at p. I 058.) Accordingly, under this generalrule a tenantis not permitted to interposea defenseusual or permissiblein ordinary actions at law. (Arnold v. Krigbaum, supra, 169 Cal. App. 146, t46 P. 423.) The generalrule, hou'el'er, has t\yo recognizedexceptions.The first exceptionis possession where the tenant has voluntarily surrendered before the issuesof fact are P finally joined. (Servaisv. Klein , ll2 Cal.App. 26,36,296 . 123 Hellerv. Melliday, 60 Cal.App.2d 689,697,l4l P.2d 447.) The basisfor this exceptionis that sincethe right to possession no longer in issue,the rationaleunderlying the generalrule evaporates and is the action thus becomesan ordinary one for damages. The secondexception is that which permits the court to inquire into equitable v. considerations an unlawful detainersuit. (SeeSchubert Lowe. 193 Cal291 295in v. Manninav. Franklin.8l Cal. 296.223 550: Johnson Chelv.43 CaL.299.305: P. 205.207-20822P. 550: Pico v. Cuyas.48CaL 639.642: Gray v. Maier &Zobelein Brewery.2Cal. App. 653.658. P.280:Knightv. Black.19 Cal.App.5l8. 525-527 84 555:Stromv. IJnion 126P.512:Rishwain Smith.77Cal.App .2d524.531.175P.2d v. Investment v. Hutchinson. Co. Oil Co.. 88 Cal. App.2d78. 83. 198P.2d347:Abstract

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supra204 Cal.App.2d242.247-248.22 Cal. Rptr. 309.)In AbstractInvestment. supra.It was observed that 'An equitabledefense (a) defense an action on groundswhich. is to Prior to the passingof the Common Law Procedure Act (J7 and l8 Vict. c. 125)would havebeencognizableonly in a court of equity.'(Citation.)'and that 'lt hasalso been construed meana defense to which a court of equity would recognizeor one founded jurisdiction. (Citation.)'(P. 248.22Cal. Rptr. at upon somedistinct groundof equitable 313.) In Schubert, supra,the Supreme Court cited, with approval,language Gray, in supra,that in an unlawful detaineraction the equitablepowers of the court may not be extended "into a firll examinationof all the equitiesinvolved, to the end that exactjustice be done."(193 Cal. at p.295,223 P. at p. 552.) In Schubert, supra, defendant the was permittedto raise the equitabledefensethat the tenancywas not a month-to-month tenancyas allegedby the plaintiff, but that his occupation was under an oral agreement to lease. pleadedand proved that as a part of Similarly, in Rishwain,supra,the defendants the considerationfor the purchase the plaintiffs' mercantilebusiness plaintiffs of the was located.In Johnson,supra,the agreedto leasethe building in which the business tenantwas perrnittedto show that, being alreadyin possession, was inducedto enter he into the leaseupon which the landlord was relying through deceptionand imposition practicedupon the tenant by the landlord. The equitabledefenseurged in Manning, supra, was that the relationshipwas not that of landlord and tenant,but a sale of an interestin (Seealso Henderson Allen, propertyand, similarly, in Pico, that it was a partnership. v. (1970)4 CaLApp.3d 716,72 l-723.) 23 Cal.5I9,52l.)" (Union Oil Co. v. Chandler and the entire line of cases thesedecisions "The basicteachingof Knowles,Lakeside, normally permittedbecause it'arises out of reflect, [Footnoteomitted.] is thata defense the subjectmatter' of the original suit is generallyexcludedin an unlawful detaineraction which the unlawful detainer if suchdefenseis extrinsic to the narrow issueof possession, procedure seeksspeedilyto resolve.[Footnoteomitted.] Neither Knowles. Lakesidenor any other Californiadecision,however,prohibits a tenantfrom interposinga defensewhich doesdirectly relate to the issueof possession retentionof the premises.The would resultin the tenant's and which, if established, is thrustof the Knowles' line of cases basicallyto preventtenantsfrom fiustratingthe of matter: decisions the introduction extraneous through summan'statutor)'remedv directll' accomplish this objectiveby confining the unlawful detaineraction to issues (Greenv. SuperiorCourt (1974) l0 questionof possession." relevantto the ultimate Cal.3d616,632-634.)

evidencethat her paymentswere made In the presentcase,defendantFlood haspresented by with a refinancingplan proposed plaintiff and plaintiff s predecessor in accordance evidenceshe was not in default and that payments Wells Fargo. Plaintiff has presented missedbefore the work out plan was proposedwere to be addedto the balancedue on her no note when the note was rewritten.Plaintiff presented evidenceto the contrary. Under defeats the it is clearthat to awardplaintiff a writ of possession suchcircumstances, abovebecause will clearly work a forfeitureand it equitableprinciplesthat are discussed the it is axiomaticthat "the law abhorsa forfeiture". (See3275 above).Because payment

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of sumsdue goesdirectly to the right of possession suchevidencein the presentcaseis fully admissible and bearsdirectly on the equitableconsiderations the Court must that makein order to make its decisionon whetheror not to grant equitablerelief. DISCUSSIONRE BONAFIDE PURCHASERFOR VALUE Section2924 of the Civil Code creates conclusivepresumptionin favor of a a bonafide purchaserat a trustee'ssalethat if the trustee'sdeed recitesthat all requirements of law havebeencompliedwith regardingthe mailing posting,publication,or personal deliveryof the notice of defaultand the notice of sale,the recital is conclusive. other In words,failure to comply with the notice requirements a groundto cancelthe saleonly is as against party who is not a bona fide purchaser. saleto a bona fide purchaser not a A is (|,lapue Gor-MeyWest.Inc. (1985)175 Cal.App.3d "The voidable." v. 608, 620-621.) elements bona fide purchaseare paymentof value, in good faith. and without acfualor of constructive notice of another's rights. (Emphasis Added) (SeeTrusts;77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendorand Purchaser 633 et seq.)"4 Witkin, Summaryof California Law (9th ed. $ 1987) RealProperty, 206,page411.) $ In Little v. CFS Service 188Cal.App.3d Coip.,supra, atpages1358-1359,233 Cal.Rptr.923,the court reviewedthe California cases which considered whetherdefects in noticewhich madea foreclosure salevoid or voidable.The court found: "Although the extentof the defect is not determinative,what seemsto be determinativeis the existence and effect of a conclusivepresumption regularityof the sale.A deedof trust, which of binds the trustor, may direct the trusteeto include in the deedto the property recitalsthat notice was given as required under the deedof trust and statethat such recitals shall be proof of the truthfulness conclusive and regularitythereof."(Id. atp. 1359,233 Cal. Rptr. 923.) Where no such recitals as to the regularity of a sale appearin a deedand there was a defectin the notice to the trustor, the deedhas been found void. (Ibid.) Where such recitalsappearon the face of a deedbut the deedalso setsforth facts which are inconsistent with the recital of regularity, the deedhas been found void on the basisthat the deedshowedthat the recitalswere not valid. (lbid., citing Holland v. Pendleton Mtge. Co. (1943)61 Cal.App.2d 570,576-577, 143P.2d 493.) Only where recitals of regularity appearin the deedand no contrar)-recitals are madehave notice defectsbeenfound to make a deedvoidable, rather than void. (Little v. at CFS Service Coip., supra,188Cal.App.3d p. 1359,233 Cal.Rptr.923.)In such instances trustor then bearsthe burdenof showing that there are groundsfor equitable a relief from the deed such as fraud or that the buyer was not a bona fide purchaserfor value,and that therewere also defectsin notice,(Ibid.)" (Dimocky. EmeraldProperties Added). LLC (2001)8 CalAnp.4th 868. 877.) (Emphasis I In the instant case,plaintiff was fully awareof the agreementupon which defendant relied to cure her default.Defendantso testifiedand plaintiff presented no evidence the contrary.Plaintiff had actualnotice of defendant's rights underthe to "Affordable Home Loan Plan" agreement redeemand cure the default; and to retain to title and possession said property. Furthermore, during the trial no evidenceat all was of

presented demonstrate to that plaintiff paid anythingof value for the propertyor the note. It appears the Court that defendanthas met the burdenof showing that plaintiff was not to a bona fide purchaserfor value.

DISCUSSION RE THE TENDER REQUIREMENT points and authoritiesthat in essence make the argumentthat Plaintiff presented defendantcannotproduce any evidenceunlessshe hastenderedfull paymentof all moniesin arrears. This argumentonly has merit if thereare, in fact, any missed payments;and, even then, there are exceptionsto the rule. As the Court has noted above, any missedpaymentswere waived when plaintiff and Wells Fargoinvited plaintiff to participate their refi plan and then actedin bad faith in contravention the very plan of in they proposed. As defendanttestified, the paymentsmissedat that time were to be added to the principal sum owned and not paid in one large sum. Defendantwas not in default of the proposedplan until plaintiff or Wells Fargo refusedto acceptdefendant'stendered payment. It follows that full tenderwas made and the argumentof plaintiff, to the effect it was not, fails. Defendanthas not moved to cancelthe sale. In fact, in an unlawful detaineraction, defendantcould not make such a demand. However, in generalin equity owing is essentialto an action " [a] valid and viable tender of paymentof the indebtedness v. to cancela voidablesaleundera deedof trust. (Shimpones Stickney,2l9 Cal. Bankv.McClevetry,161 Cal. 285,290,119P. HumboldtSavings 637,649,28P.2d673; P. Bank, 133 CaL 659,666,66 7,204;Crummerv. Whitehead, 82; Copseyv. Sacramento .2d 264,268,40 Cal.Rptr.826;Mack v. Golino,65 Cal.App 731,735, 230 Cal.App.2d v. 576,581--582, P.2d393; 161 Carpenter 70 213P.2d760;Py v. Pleitner, Cal.App.2d .2d 149, 151,138 P.2d355; Touli v. SantaCruz CountyTitle Co., Hamilton,59 Cal.App 20 Cal.App.zd495, 499,67 P.2d 404.)"(Karlsenv. AmericanSay.& Loan Assn.(1971) 15 Cal.App.3d ll2, l17.) The proper forum for this type of issueis a quiet title suit in the jurisdiction of a Court of GeneralJurisdiction. In such a Court all issuescan be joined including potential cancellationof the foreclosuresale. In an unlawful detainer action, such relief cannot be granted. :, havepo\\er to vacate i-rec-:=*:: "It rule thatcourts Furthermore. is the general rvherethere has been tiaud in the procurementof the tbreclosure decreeor rvherethe sale salehasbeen improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted,or is tainted by fraud, or wherethere has been such a mistake that to allow it to standwould be inequitableto purchaser parties.'(Bankof America etc. Assn. v. Reidy, supra,15 Cal.2dat p. 248, and 101 P.2d 77.) A debtormay apply to a court of equity to set asidea trust deedforeclosure on allegationsof unfairnessor irregularity that, coupledwith the inadequacyof price obtainedat the sale,mean that it is appropriateto invalidatethe sale.(Sierra-BayFed. Cal.Rptr.753; 318,3371',277 Court(1991)227Cal.App.3d v. Land BankAssn. Superior 3 Witkin, Sumrnaryof Cal. Law (9th ed. I 987) SecurityTransactionsin Real Property,$ The court supraat 149.)"(J v.Jensen(2001)88 Cal.App.4th1093,1097-1098.) appellate judgment settingasidea trustee's sale,even pages1097-1099, affirmed the trial court's though the plaintiff debtor did not tenderpaymentof the arrearsprior to initiating the action.The appellatecourt found that thejudgment itself satisfiedthe tenderrequirement

in that as a condition of settingasidethe trustee'ssaleand trustee's deedthe debtorwas requiredto tenderthe amountin arrears.Here,the Court is not being askedto setaside the trustee's saledue to plaintiffs fraud. Rather,the Court hastaken undersubmission the evidenceand argumentsoffered at trial and has considered relevant law, and, under the foregoingfacts and authorities, Court will denyjudgment in favor of plaintiff on the the unlawful detaineraction and orderjudgmentfor defendant who is entitledto possession of the premises.As indicated,plaintiff is not without a remedysincethis judgment is without prejudiceto the continuationof relevantlitigation in the proper forum. (See3523 above). This judgment is madewithout prejudiceto eitherparty filing suit in a casewithin the GeneralUnlimited Jurisdictionof the El DoradoCounty SuperiorCourt. Sucha suit can,and should,resolveall issueswhich can be broughtto the Court by eitherparty u'hile providing appropriate involved, someof which were discoverytime limits for the issues party, as Wells Fargo,as an interested raisedin the presenttrial. It canjoin, for instance, which can resolvethe concerns all of well asprovide relief, both legal and equitable, parties. It allows for a crosscomplaint,as well as a complaint. The presentCourt is not oblivious to the fact that defendantis not entitled to continuepossession the propertywithout doing equity. Equity in this case,as to the of defendant, will consistof placingthe sum of $637.00per month into a bank account monthly payments to whosepurposeshall be solely to collect fundsneeded accumulate that should have beenpaid on the revised note had Wells Fargo not improperly refused tender of payment.Defendantis to establishthis accountand maintain it in defendants upon funher litigation, her name. The distributionof this accountshall depend betweenthe partiesreducedto writing and signedby the parties,or a further agreement order of the Court. Defendantis to make eachsuch paymentso that a review of the accountpaperwork on the 3rd of eachmonth shall show the paymentrequiredhas been made. Defendantshall not withdraw any funds from this accountfor any purpose without court approval or a stipulation signedby both parties. Defendantshall keepthe PITI, with escrows represent taxeson the propertypaid and current.Sincethe deposits included,the Court expectsthe partiesto agreethat taxesdue may be withdrawn and proofof deposit eachpe\ne:: for paid. Defendant shallprovideto plaintiff s counsel as and the court apprised to the identi$' of their made. Plaintiff shall keepdefendant counselor agent at all times, and shall do so by certified letter to defendantand a pleading filed with the Court. Defendantshall not be requiredto place into the account, by the any sumsrepresenting paymentsmissedbeforethe refinancingplan was proposed Fargo. Thosemissedpaymentsmay be addedto the balancein her refinancing Wells to if arrangement plaintiff decides finalizethe refi plan. This accountis to be established within 30 daysof the date this judgment is served. The initial depositshall be $637.00 which shall apply to the first monthsmoneydue following the datethis judgment is served. The Court shall retainjurisdiction over the partiesfor the purposeof enforcingor modifying this judgment, but saidretentionis madewithout prejudiceto the filing of

furtherlitigationasdescribed funherlitigationbe commenced, Court above. Should this will welcome motionto consolidate a bothactions a Courtof unlimitediurisdiction. in

Respectfully submitted by:

Dat edi:l - f f i - ] D

_rgdftr^J h"lol]__ ANDREwwoLL D.


JUDGE rEM PRo

O.1lf.b*rq

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