Faculty of Arts and Philosophy Department of Languages and Cultures of the Near East and North Africa

The Shia Crescent Theory

Sectarian Identity or Geopolitics of Religion?

By Jaafar Alloul

Promoter: Prof. Dr. J. Van Steenbergen Co-Promoter: Prof. Dr. S. Zemni

Submitted for the Award of MA 2010-2011

I. Abstract
This study seeks to accurately interpret widespread allegations that predict an all-pervasive Sunni-Shia divide and the advent of a Shia Crescent in the Middle East. This inquiry incorporates a thorough study of the regions modern history for the purpose of understanding its accurate geopolitical make-up and its actual cultural realities. A subsequent discourse analysis will furthermore inquire the nature, content and impact of current highly politicized forms of sectarian narratives in order to gain comprehensive insight into the geopolitical symbolism of such rhetoric. The key argument of this study is that reflexive sectarian Otherness has intentionally been made integral to Arab political discourse by the regions key political elites ever since the 2003 implosion of Bathi Iraq and the subsequent emergence of a delicate power vacuum in the region. Furthermore, rumours and propagations of a supposed Shiite Crescent or its so-called conceptual variants need foremost to be interpreted as top-down instigated propaganda that endeavours to generate distortive perceptions of supposedly fixed group identities and highly imaginary threat images of Shiism and Shiites; ultimately, all for the consolidation of specific political projects in the region. Moreover, these cultural portraits do not whatsoever intend to correlate with underlying, reality-bound dynamics that can be situated within the cultural sphere, in casu specific evolutions within Shia political thought (e.g. Wilayat al-Faqih) or the occurrence of socio-cultural emancipation among a variety of communities in the Middle East. Politically led campaigns of Shiite Othering clearly render highly essentialist and monolith perceptions of vastly heterogeneous Middle Eastern communities and of complex 21st century politics and geo-economics. One can in fact argue that it is impossible to merely deploy such terms as Shia or Shiism as legitimate sociological and political categories, which supposedly pretend to explain contemporary geopolitical affairs in the Middle East. This paper clearly demonstrates that the core of conflict and tension in the region does not stem from a supposed engrained cultural antagonism, that is, from alleged wide-scale and bottom-up ideological disputes between diametrically opposed Sunni and Shia groups. In that sense, regional tensions primarily result from structural geopolitical competition between differently aligned key states, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia over highly strategic regional interest-zones such as Iraqs OPEC potential which has become a crucial leverage during intra-cartel deliberations to set commodity prices- and the Levantine affairs (Palestine, Lebanon) as highly symbolical foreign policy assets (populism) and strategic locusses for possible military deterrence vis--vis Israel (e.g. 2006). The sectarian theory has, however, clearly taken a strong hold on Middle Eastern media and popular consciousness by which the very idea of a Shia Crescent or an imminent Shiite threat has quickly spread to global academia. Many observers have therefore, in one way or another, incorporated facets of the distortive sectarian prism into their analyses of regional affairs. Interestingly, this mainly stems from ideological premises and inconsistencies than from any methodological incompetence. Ultimately, the narrow notion of politicized, monolith and linear (continua) sectarian identities (reflexive) were and are mainly propagated by key Arab states such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to reaffirm their (post9/11) geopolitical alignment with the US in the post-Saddam Middle Eastern order viewed to a backdrop of a consolidating multipolar global economy (BRICS)-, to safeguard their regional interests vis--vis Irans apparent post-2003 (Iraq War) political ascendance, and to intelligently engage (perception, media) the latter regionally by propagating threat images of Shiism and Shiites. The Shia Crescent conception is an inconclusive theory that is highly phantasmagoric and distortive in nature and which should therefore be viewed upon with great scholarly skepticism, if not discarded entirely by any serious and unbiased scrutiny when assessing contemporary Middle Eastern politics.

In accordance with article 43 2 of the Education and Examination Regulations (2010-2011) of the Ghent University, which allows students to write their dissertation in other languages (i.c. English), I provide the reader with a Dutch summary (abstract) of my scrutiny. Dit onderzoek heeft tot doel om wijdverspreide stellingen betreffende alomvattende Soennitisch-Shiitische opposities en de vermeende komst van een Shiitisch Sikkel in het Midden-Oosten te contextualiseren. Dit werkstuk omvat een grondige studie van de moderne geschiedenis van de regio met als doel een grondige kennis te verwerven aangaande haar geopolitieke en culturele realiteiten. Alsook omsluit deze studie een sobere discoursanalyse die zich bevraagt over de aard, inhoud en impact van de huidige gepolitiseerde sectarische retorieken in de hoop om vervolgens inzicht te verschaffen wat betreft de geopolitieke symboliek van deze talrijke regionale narratieven. De voornaamste bevinding van dit werkstuk stelt dat het discursief en reflexief proces van Othering, volgens sectarische lijnen, integraal deel is gaan uitmaken van het politiek discours van enkele vooraanstaande politieke elites in de Arabisch wereld vanaf de implosie van Bathistisch Iraq in 2003 en de daaropvolgende verschijning van een delicaat machtsvacuum in de regio. Daarom dient men de talrijke geruchten en beweringen omtrent een Shiitische Sikkel en diens zogenaamde conceptuele varianten eerder te analyseren als regime-georchestreerde propaganda, dewelke valse ideen aangaande vaststaande groepsidentiteiten en angstbeelden van het Shiisme en de Shiitische Andere tracht te genereren; dit geschiedt voornamelijk ter consolidatie van specifieke materile machtsprojecten van de voorgenoemde politieke elites. Daarenboven, correleren deze zulke opgewerpte culturele concepties allesbehalve met enkele onderliggende dynamieken in culturele sfeer, in casu diegene betrekkend hebbend op Shiitisch politiek gedachtengoed (Wilayat al-Faqih) en andere die gerelateerd zijn aan de socio-culturele emancipatie van een grote verscheidenheid aan gemeenschappen in het Midden-Oosten. Zodoende, genereren politiek gensceneerde campagnes van Shiitisch-gerelateerde Othering sterk gessentialiseerde and monoliete percepties van zeer heterogene regionaal-maatschappelijke groepen en van complexe 21ste-eeuwse politieke en geo-economische processen. Men kan geligitimeerd stellen dat het ongegrond en enorm ontoereikend is om termen als Shiiten en Shiisme ongenuanceerd aan te wenden als veelzeggende sociologische en politieke categorien, in de waan-waardige veronderstelling daarmee hedendaagse geopolitieke relaties en problematieken te verwoorden. Deze studie toont duidelijk aan dat de kern van regionale conflicten en spanningen (bijv. Iraq) niet teruggaat op een vermeende culturele oppositie, meer bepaald op gewaande wijdspreide en bottom-up ideologisch geschillen tussen volledige gepolariseerde groepen Sunnieten en Shiiten. In dit opzicht zijn regionale spanningen eerder terug te brengen op structurele geopolitieke competitie tussen verschillend geallieerde kernstaten, namelijk Saudi Arabi en Iran. De rivaliteit tussen beiden is gerelateerd aan enkele zeer stragische belangen in de regio, bijvoorbeeld het Iraakse OPEC potentieel dat belangrijk is tijdens kartelonderhandeling i.v.m. het bepalen van de internationale olieprijzen- en de Levantijnse (Palestine, Lebanon) politieke aangelegenheden als zeer symbolische geopolitieke aanwinsten (rivaliteit), die alsook meteen strategische basissen vormen voor mogelijke militaire afschrikking campagnes (afleiding) jegens Isral (bijv. 2006). De sektarische theorie heeft echter een sterke grip weten te vatten op regionale media (medeplichtigheid) en het regionale volksgeloof, waardoor de idee van een Shiitische Sikkel of een Shiitisch gevaar zich snel heeft verspreid naar de academische wereld. Zodoende hebben vele waarnemers, op de een of andere wijze, aspecten van het vertekende sektarische raamwerk mede eigen gemaakt aan hun politieke analyses van de regio. Dit gaat opmerkelijk genoeg, eerder terug ideologische vooronderstellingen of inconsequenties dan van enige methodologische icompetenties. Het wordt tenslotte duidelijk dat de bekrompen idee van gepolitiseerde, monoliete en lineaire (continum) sektarische identiteiten (reflexief) voornamelijk gepropageerd werden en worden door prominente Arabische staten zoals Jordani, Egypte en Saudi Arabi ter herbevestiging (post-9/11) van hun geopolitieke alliantie met de V.S. in een nieuw ontluikende regionale orde in de bijkomende context van een opkomende multipolaire wereldeconomie (BRICS)-, ter veilig stelling van hun regionale belangen jegens de politieke opkomst van Iran sinds 2003 (Irak Oorlog) en om een intelligente strijd

(perceptie, media) aan te binden met de voorgenoemde antagonist via de verspreiding van angstbeelden van het Shiisme en Shiiten. De stelling van een Shiitische Sikkel is sterk fantasmagorisch in aard, waardoor deze ongestaafde theorie zeer sceptisch genterpreteerd dient te worden, zo niet volledig moet worden afgedaan bij elk wetenschappelijk onderzoek betreffende hedendaagse politieke betrekkingen in het Midden-Oosten.

II. Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank the academic mentors of our department, namely professors Van Steenbergen, Schallenbergh and Tanret for their guidance, advice and inspiration over the past few years. More particularly, I thank them for their encouragement and endorsement of my efforts to attend a period of study at Birzeit University in the Palestinian Territories during the course of my masters degree; a truly intensive and instructive experience, both from a scholarly and humanist point of view. It has effectively brought me to where I am today. Additionally, I thank professors Zemni and Parker from the Department of Third World Studies for assisting and guiding me so professionally and devoutly. Receive my gratitude for facilitating the onset of this thesis research. It was an honour and privilege to be able to work with individuals of such calibre. My sincere appreciation goes out to Dr. Khawaji, Dr. Rammal and Dr. Nimr at Birzeit University. I thank them for their dedicated contributions to my Arabic language skills and insight into Middle Eastern political affairs. Furthermore, I would like to extend my gratitude to Dra. Estanyol i Fuentes and Dra. Castells Criballes of the Barcelona University for their admirable kindness and academic instructions. I would also like to thank Ms. Arco, Mr. Verbeurgt and Ms. Abu-Taha of the international offices of both Ghent and Birzeit universities for their extensive assistance. Hereby, I would additionally like to express my gratitude to ConsulGeneral Jacobs of the Belgian Consulate-General in Morocco, Dra. Daniela Conte of the Luiss Guido Carli University in Rome and Mr. Burchard of the UNRWA representative office to the EU in Brussels for kindly endorsing and facilitating yet other instructive and international experiences that have contributed to my professional training and the development of my personality and scholarly insight. Ultimately, I would like to thank my dearest friends Drs. Valeri Natanelov and Drs. Leandros Fisher and my beloved family, most particularly my father and mother, Muhammad Alloul and Caroline Van Oost, for their unconditional affection and support; foremost, I dedicate this study to them.

III. Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION1 PART 1: GEOPOLITICS QUESTIONING THE MIDDLE EASTS SECTARIAN NATURE

1.1 Theoretical framework: the Middle East subsystem...4 1.2 Modern dynamics of hegemonic competition: Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia.............6 1.2.1 The First Gulf War and the Soviet disintegration: power distribution.6 1.2.2 The 2003 Iraq War: eradication of Bathi power and ascendance of Iran...10 1.3 Structural Interstate Conflicts: Tradition, Iraq & Palestine..13 1.3.1 Traditional threat perceptions: Iran & Saudi Arabia..13 1.3.2 Iraq as a material incentive: black gold and OPEC shares at stake.20 1.3.3 The Palestinian Question: geopolitical symbolism & military deterrence35 1.4 Shiisms heterogeneity: the Wilyat al-Faqih and the question of the Marjaiyya..44

PART 2: DISCOURSE SECTARIAN OTHERNESS AT WORK

2.1 Theoretical framework: discourse and Othering...57 2.2. Shia visibility: The case of Iraqi refugee displacement...58 2.3 Categorizations of the Shiite Other ..66 2.3.1 Political narratives and reflexive identity: Shia radicals and Sunni moderates..66 2.3.2 Clerical discourses: the revival ofShia resentment...70 2.3.3 The Arab media and the Shiite Other.74 2.3.4 Academia & the sectarian Question: methodology or ideology?...........................................................82 2.4 The Shia Crescents pretext: in legacy of Huntington, Bush Jr. and EU mythology - Islam vs. West.94

CONCLUSION102

REFERENCES..111

IV. Appendices
Appendix 1: Arabic Source Labbaad, M., The Gardens of Sorrow (Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, 2006)117 Appendix 2: English Translation124

V. Figures
Figure 1.1 Relative power cycles Middle East, 1987-19976 Figure 1.2 Relative volumes of imports of major conventional arms by the Gulf states, 19902009 and 20052009.17 Figure 1.3 Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia traditional relative power cycles, 1947-1991.19 Figure 1.4 OPEC share of world crude oil reserves 2009.21 Figure 1.5 Cycles of economic growth and oil exports income in Iran, 1980-2001 (measurement in US$, three year moving averages).23 Figure 1.6 Trends in share of manufacturing exports in Iran and Turkey, 1960-2000.23 Figure 1.7 Irans foreign direct Investment inflows as a proportion of MENAs FDI inflows, 2001.24 Figure 2.1 Iraqi displacements as of April 2008..60 Figure 2.2 Iraqi asylum applications submitted in 38 industrialized countries, 1992-2006.61 Figure 2.3 Displaced Iraqis around the world..61

VI. Tables
Table 1.1 Suppliers of major conventional weapons to the Gulf states, 20052009....14 Table 1.2 Military expenditure of the Gulf states, 20002009.17 Table 2.1 Cumulative numbers of Iraqi refugees (2008)..59 Table 2.2 Breakdown of Iraqi population by religion...62

VII. Abbreviations
ACC AKP AMAL AMU ASEAN BRICS CIA ECO EU FDI FIS GCC GDP GME IAEA IDF IDP IMF INC Arab Co-operation Organization Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, abbreviated JDP in English and AK PART or AKP in Turkish Afwj al-Muqwama al-Lubnniyya Arab Maghreb Union Association of South East Asian Nations Brasil, Russia, India, China & South Africa Central Intelligence Agency Economic Co-operation Organization (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan & former Asian Soviet Republics) European Union Foreign Direct Investment Front Islamic du Salut Gulf Cooperation Council Gross Domestic Product Greater Middle East International Atomic Energy Agency Israeli Defense Forces Internally Displaced Person International Monetary Fund Iraqi National Congress

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IOM IR IRGC LNM MDGs MENA MERCOSUR MIT NAFTA NATO NPT ODA OECD OPEC OPTs PA PFLP PLO PSP SAPs SAVAK SOFA SCO STL UAE UAR UNFCCC UNHCR UNRWA UNSC US USSR WB WMD

International Organization for Migration International Relations Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Lebanese National Movement (1970s) Millennium Development Goals Middle East and North Africa Mercado Comn del Sur Massachusetts Institute of Technology North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN terminology) Palestinian (Legislative) Authority Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestine Liberation Organization Progressive Socialist Party Structural Adjustment Programs Persian for Sazeman-e Attallaat Va Amniyat-e Keshva Status of Forces Agreement Shanghai Cooperation Organization Special Tribunal for Lebanon United Arab Emirates United Arab Republic United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United Nations Security Council United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Bank Weapons of Mass Destruction

VIII. Transliteration
With regard to names, place names and often applied Anglicized loanwords I will abide by the transliteration guidelines of the International Journal Middle East Studies (IJMES).1 However, with regard to certain names, such as those of famous Middle Eastern media concerns (e.g. Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya), I will provide the reader with the official italicized formats that are provided by media outlets themselves.

http://web.gc.cuny.edu/ijmes/pages/transliteration.html; see also IJMES Word List: http://web.gc.cuny.edu/ijmes/docs/WordList.pdf.

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INTRODUCTION
In December 2004, a year after the US-led invasion of Iraq and the implosion the Bathist state, Jordanian king Abdullah II famously coined the term Shia Crescent (al-Hilal ash-Shii) during an interview with the Washintong Post. Hereby, he predicted that an alleged Shiite expansion (al-Madd ash-Shii) would alter the traditional Sunni dominated make-up of the Middle East. He spoke of a creeping danger that might split up the Arab and Muslim World. 2 Subsequently, Husni Mubarak reportedly stated in a 2006 interview with the Al Arabiya satellite news channel that Shia in the region are mainly loyal to Iran and not to their own states.3 In that same year, a former security advisor to the Saudi King Abdullah was quoted saying that Saudi Arabia has the religious responsibility to intervene in Iraq because the country was the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community.4 Additionally, Saudi king Abdullah himself has reportedly accussed Iran for masterminding the proselytation of predominantly Sunni countries is the Middle East (e.g. Syria). In March 2009, Moroccan authorities allegedly even cut their diplomatic ties with Iran over their allegation of a Tehran-led wave of proselytism in the North African kingdom.5 Since the mid-2000s, many Arab newspapers and magazines also began publishing headlines and declarations about al-Madd ash-Shii, the Shiite expansion, which would allegedly split the Muslim world. Many more synonyms were applied in an effort to label this imminent phenomenon: a regional Shii Wave, Shii Danger, Shia Revival etc. Since the fall of Saddam in 2003 and the 2006 Lebanon war, bookstores in Cairo suddenly exhibited numerous books with titles as The Shiis, The Shiis in History, The Twelfth Shia.6 Reportedly, Arab media circulations even alarming warned for a `Shiite Full Moon -"Al-Shi'a Yahlumun bil-Badr al-Shi'i"7-next to a mere Crescent; this, as the true masterplan of the Shia: to spread Shiism from India to North Africa. Some observers have stated that The Suspicious Iranian Project also referred to as al-ikhtabut ash-Shii (Octopus methaphor)- has been pushing for a wide-scale tashayyu (doctrinal conversion) in the Middle East and thus upsetting the sectarian balance. Hereby, some even claim that the Shiazation of Palestine is a tangible reality.8 The Saudi clerical establishment has also embarked on the endorsement of this idea and has since the mid-2000s issued numerous fatwa depicting Shia as heretics and the Lebanese, Shii leader Hassan Nasrallah, for instance, as a son of Satan. A senior Saudi cleric that goes by the name of Abdullah bin Jibriin reportedly stated that moral support for Hizbullah (2006) was a sin for Sunni since Shia were in fact apostates. Additionally, extra-regional politicians, media concerns and scholars have also ventilated the idea of an allpervasive Sunni-Shia divide.9 In his Foreign Affairs article entitled When Shiites Rise (2006), Vali Nasr has argued that through the US defeat of Saddam the Bush administration has liberated and empowered Iraq's Shiite majority and has helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come.10 He famously declared that cleavages within Islam would define the regions major conflicts in the future, as such predicting more future conflicts between Sunni and Shia in the Muslim World.11 Anoushivaran Ehteshami has also analysed the Middle East from a rather cultural prism by highlighting
Brning, 2008, 61-2; Haji-Yousefi, 2009,116; Puelings, 2010, 7, 27; Jones, 2005, 24-5; Wright, R. & Baker, P., Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election From Iran, Washington Post, December 8th 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html (accessed on 09/09/2010). 3 Mubarak, H., quoted in Brning, 2008, 61. 4 Terhalle, 2007, 1, 69; Obaid, N., Stepping into Iraq, The Washington Post, November 29th 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html (accessed on 03/03/2011). 5 Jones, 2007, 30; Puelings, 2010, 36-7. 6 Rabi, 2008, 1, 4; Puelings, 2010, 27; Broning 60-1. 7 Quoted in Rabi, 2008, pag 4. 8 Shobokshi, H., The Suspicious Iranian Project, Asharq Alawsat, October 26th 2006, http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=6833 (accessed on 30/03/2011); Luomi, 2008, 5; Black, I., Fear of a Shia Full Moon, The Guardian, January 26 th 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/26/worlddispatch.ianblack (accessed on 20/02/2011); Puelings, 2010, 5. 9 Rabi, 2008, 2; Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 7; Luomi, 2008, 5; Black, I., Fear of a Shia Full Moon, The Guardian, January 26th 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/26/worlddispatch.ianblack (accessed on 20/02/2011) 10 Nasr, 2006, 1. 11 Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 6; Puelings, 2010, 7.
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Shiisms depth and vigour through reference to the popular success of the Ashura ceremonies in Iraqi cities such as Najaf and Karbala in 2003 and by claiming that the Shia awakening can shake, if allowed to grow and consolidate, the very foundations of the political orders that were resurrected atop the old Ottoman territories early last century. He furthermore claimed theat this Shia International might be on the move to challenge Sunni orthodoxy. 12 In his work entitled Shiitestan (2007) Pepe Escobar has reportedly advocated the idea of an emerging Shiitestan. Although he is said to be critical towards the idea of a Shia Crescent, he has instead argued for the emergence of a `Shia block`, which would actually be in favour of moving towards a more market-oriented economy and a progressive liberalization of morals and public opinion. 13 Numerous scholars around the globe have already debated this new phenomenon during various expert conferences, e.g. The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for US Policy in the Middle East, organized in New York in 2006 by the Foreign Policy Council or The International Conference on Sunni-Shia contemporary Relations and Fearing a `Shiite Octopus`: Sunni-Shi`a relations and the implications for Belgium and Europe, which was hosted by the Belgian Royal Egmont Institute in Brussels in 2009. The idea of an alleged `Sunni-Shia conflict or somehow politico-cultural division` has clearly thus developed into a serious issue within global academia.14 One can legitimately ask the question where all of this highly politicized sectarian rhetoric comes from. Is the Middle East truly scenery to an emerging Shia Crescent; an often debated contemporary conception, that is allegedly understood as a transnational movement of unified sectarian polities that are expansionist and proselytizing in nature and furthermore ideologically oriented (and thus politically loyal) towards the clerical Shiite establishment of Qom? Moreover, is there any ground for the numerous allegations that make claim of a common Shiite front, which is said to structurally challenge its Sunni counterpart in a bid for regional power and religious communal leadership? Can the sectarian image of Middle Eastern politics in the post-Saddam era (2003) consequently be interpreted as a natural phenomenon, that is, as a bottom-up personification of the organic emergence of an increasingly relevant, transnational sectarian group identity as a new form of nationalism overruling previously state-centric reality (behaviour, organization), which is presently demonstrating itself through the generation of a region-wide, sectarian opposition on both the societal and political level? How must one interpret these allegations; does it really concern a consolidating sectarian identity that is being expressed at all societal levels (reality) or does it rather concern an Orwellian distortion, that is, a top-down instigated propaganda campaign of identity-politics (perception)? If the latter is the case, one can additionally raise the legitimate question: Qui bono as regards the idea of a Shia Crescent? This paper commences with a geopolitical analysis, which starts from a neo-realist approach on International Relations, for the purpose of inquiring the nature of bilateral relations and tensions between the key Middle Eastern states (power cycle theory) that are usually perceived as king pins in the Sunni-Shia struggle, mainly, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As most rumours concerning the imminent Shiite block and regional sectarian antagonism seem to culminate around two major events and their aftermaths, namely the 2003 Iraq War and the 2006 Levantine war (July War), I will dedicate two separate and thorough inquiries (cf. 1.3.2 & 1.3.3) to these political geographies in order balance superficial observations and impressionistic analyses. As such, I endeavour to provide more structural insight into the importance of the local particularities of these strategic areas and their inhabitants (OPEC, military deterrence15, geopolitical symbolism etc.). Such an examination simultaneously strives to indicate more structural incentives of political and economic (material) nature as key to understanding widespread allegations of politicized
12 13 14

Ehteshami, A., quoted in Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 118. Escobar, P., quoted in Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 119. Broning, 2008, 62; Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescentsymposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized); Puelings, 2010, 1; but see also: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/NL/program_09.html, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep35.pdf; http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/adcp/documents/Final_Program_Sunni-Chia_contemporary_relations.pdf. 15 Geographical proximity to Israel.

sectarian divides and the vivid presence of sectarian and religious political rhetoric in the post-Saddam era; moreover it seeks to frame (rationalize) such culturalistic narratives in a wider context of regional geopolitical dynamics. In addition, this part concludes with an analysis of contemporary dynamics within Shiite political theory, which is crucial in mitigating certain static and monolith perceptions regarding Shiism and Shiites in general. Subsequently, the second part of this study encloses a robust discourse analysis, which strives to actively detect the societal extent as regards distortive societal categorizations of Shiites. I claim that in the post-Saddam era, one can clearly detect a new and systematic dynamic of such highly politicized categorizations, that is, a general trend of essentialized presumptions and proclamations about the supposed Shiite Other, made by a wide-range of political and societal actors (politicians, clerical class etc.). The inquiry will also include a brief scrutiny of the Arab Media to indicate how the business has been used as a political tool in the aforementioned geopolitical powerplay and additionally for the sake of delegitimizing every form of domestic political opposition in autocratic states under the pretext of a Shiite threat and foreign meddling (e.g. `Arab Spring`, 2010-2011). To further understand the idea of a `Shi`a Crescent`, I have also studied some interesting modern migration dynamics, namely those related to (post-2003) westward migration of Iraqi (Shiite) refugees in the Middle East. This second subchapter comprehensively finalizes with an important debate on whether culturalistic distortions (sectarian prism) in academic discourses relate to methodological or rather ideological inconsistencies among scholars and it will furthermore discuss how the Shia Crescent theory relates to and fits into a more global context (societal & political). This entire second section of scrutiny broadly attempts to provide a complementary empirical body of evidence (confirmation) for the structural outlay that is presented in the first part of this study. The relationship between the two sections of inquiry is essential in providing the reader with in-depth knowledge of discursive power processes and to ultinately grant comprehensive insight into the overall geopolitical significance (global context) of emerging rumours regarding a Shia Crescent. This study seeks not only to focus on structural events, but also on the (Shiite) individuals particularities (subaltern), who is also influenced by mutiple cultural dynamics in the modern era. By doing so, I ultimate hope to mitigate claims that narrowly portray a sectarian-based organization of the Middle East and furthermore endeavour to provide a balanced context (rationalization) for the comphension of why the theory of a Shiite Crescent de facto emerged in the region. Thus, by gradually discerning various amalgamized depictions of an alleged Shiite Threat and `SunniShi`a divides` in the region, this paper ultimately strives to both unveil certain accurate (underlying) cultural dynamics and similtaneously detect the structural (geopolitical) core of conflict in the Middle East`s post-Saddam order.

PART I: GEOPOLITICS QUESTIONING THE MIDDLE EASTS SECTARIAN NATURE

1.1 Theoretical Framework: the Middle East Subsystem
Todays Middle East analysts seeking to understand the contemporary politico-religious whereabouts of the alleged Sunni-Shia divide in interstate relations mostly draw one of the two dominant theoretical and philosophical approaches of International Relations, that is, constructivism or neo-realism. Although realism is the dominating paradigm in IR, it does not stand uncontended. Constructivists, for instance, interpret the principal structures of international politics as social, hence focusing on the importance of ideas in shaping the players identities. Identities and interests are perceived as endogenous to the process of interaction thus supposedly culminating a socially constructed world of international politics (incentive). This approach tends to stress the historical and transnational character of identity; such is the case for the Shiite identity, perceiving it as a supra-state identity; a cultural body that competes with state identity in the region. Moreover, this identity is said to have the ability to produce transnational movements that limit state-centric behaviour and realities thus implying a bottom-up rationale to explain social and political reality. By emphasizing the oppressive historical relationship between Sunnis and Shiites they detect conflicting social group identities as the foremost basis of sectarian opposition, which allegedly lead all the way up to the political elites. In its line of explanation, the constructivist paradigm nevertheless nuancates that this opposition is more political, social and economic in nature than it is religious (doctrinal). As such, present regional reality culminates around an allegded Revival of the Shia. Opposing experts, however, have critisized this resurgent Shia identity theory for fundamentally overlooking the (material) objectives of political actors in society and, more importantly, for the reduction of higly diverse communties to their elusive lowest common denominator. The constructivist formation of homogeneous wholes with supposed homogeneous social, economic and political agendas on a sectarian basis at either the national or regional level is contrastingly perceived as theoretically problematic by neorealist scholars, to say the least. This stems from their fundamental realization of the constructed (subjective) nature constituting notions of supposed group identity. This problematic implication that stem from the entire debate on sectarian politics needs further attention; it will be inquired in the second part of this dissertation. The realist approach discourages bottom-up analyses that principally start from such notions of identity when it comes to the comprehensive explanation of political reality and behavior on a regional level.16 Drawing keenly on historical parallels, the words of Maximillian Terhalle (and Hedley Bull) vividly demonstrate this critique: Just as there was no natural harmony between the working classes of communist China and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, it appears that the answer to the core question of whether Shiism should be a set of fixed religious values or a flexible identity shaped by the particular circumstances and environments in which Shiites live appears to lean toward the latter conclusion.17 According to the rational-behavioural philosophy of the neo-realist trend, interests are mainly viewed upon as exogenous due to the material interpretation of world politics and the characterising absence of normative guiding principles. Neo-realism, as the elaboration of realism, is characterized by a strongly systematic and structural approach; both trace their intellectual lineage back to the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Thucydides. This paradigm endeavours to scrutinize the world of international relations as a mere objective reality, hence claiming to focus on what is and not what ought to be. 18 Realists contend that the only form of order in the international system is that which emerges from competition between its principal elements, that is, rational motivated nation-states. The international sphere is seen as a self-help system of constant anarchy, a worldview of perpetual conflict though not necessarily warfare- in which crises are inevitable and always recurring. Clearly, this theoretical

16 17 18

Luomi, 2008, 15, 17, 19; Parsi, 2008, 138-9. Luomi, 2008, 20. Parsi, 2008, 138.

paradigm focuses strongly on the state and interstate realities and relations. It structurally perceives states as constantly seeking to maximize their relative power internally and externally. Based on a clearly state-centric view of International Relations, this approach perceives the Middle East and the Persian Gulf primarily as a highly strategic regions, which have recently been the scenary of redefined, post- 9/11 policies of the worlds the current geopolitical hegemon 19, the United States. Next to its neglect for identity, the aformentioned neo-realist logic is additionally criticised for its strong structuralist emphasis that is said to render exagerated perceptions of state autonomy vis--vis popular cultural dynamics (bottom-up). It is often argued that the Middle East is best analyzed by the realist or neo-realist paradigm due to the fact that its basic features are specifically apparent in the region, that is, the absence of strong institutions overruled by political impasse and elite/regime survival- and, more importantly, the lack of a clear normative framework guiding regional state-to-state interaction. Observers note that unlike the contemporary European system (economic regionalism, political intergration), the Middle East sub-system lacks a fundamental consensus on the hierarchy of states; an implicit agreement on the rules of competition and interaction. Hence neither the hierarchy for role nor that for relative power is said to have been set. Since states and statecraft in the Middle East are relatively young and due to the fact that disrupting supra-regional interventionism (e.g. 1990, 2003) has been strong in the post-colonial state-building era, a regional equilibrum has yet to be reached.20
When the ferocious men and woman who built Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy, France and Russia used advantadges over their neighbors for territorial aggrandizement and the construction of great national states, there was no external club of preexisting great powers able to penetrate their continents and enforce a paralyzing fragmented status quo on behalf of civivilized norms of interstate behavior. 21

The lack of such a consensus of hegemonic order further implies that there is no stable status quo in which all states implicitly accept a dynamic of how role should be granted to rising nation-states or withdrawn from declining or imploding states (e.g. post2003 Iraq). Furthermore, when situations of a possible increase of relative power occur, they are hence not merely generated through acceptable, that is, exclusive non-military manners. On the contrary, in an atmosphere of deliberate anti-status quo and continuing conflict it would be accurate to state that in the Middle East the gloves are always off. Moreover, observers have keenly noted that following each major conflict in the region, everything is up for grabs.22 Regional dynamics in the Middle East and more specifically its hegemonic driving forces, can furthermore be explained by making reference to Charles Dorans power-cycle theory. Essential in its comprehension is the differentiation between power and role. Doran mainly argues that states follow a cyclical path of growth, maturation and decline based upon uneven rates of internal economic growth. Although analytic in nature, physically abstract and somehow problematic in its definition (absolute) power can be maped out by the measurement of socio-economic and military variables, such as a countrys population, GDP, GDP per capita, energy consumption, military expenditure and military size (WMDs). Subsequently, the relative economic importance and the regional military impact pressure of a certain state will at least be reflected. Thereby, this absolute power can thus be put into comparision with that of other regional states that make up the regional power system, whereby a states relative power will be highlighted. Interestingly, this relative power is not only dependent and derived from its own internal growth dynamic, but is as much related to the power of the other states. This conception incorporates a structural reality of regional interdependence. As such, a state could increase in absolute power though experience a decline in its relative power, that is, if its growth is less than the systematic norm. This implies that although all relevant states could simultaneously grow in absolute power, no single state could by definition grow in relative power without a converging decrease in relative power of at least one other state. As the power cycle theory conceptualizes relative power as a fixed magnitude in a zero-sum relationship, it postulates that the principle of (strategic) competition is endemic to the regional system. Hence, the question remains to detect the competing states that have hegemonic

19 20

Such perceptions are based on a broad array of development indicators, as given by the WorldBank for instance (http://data.worldbank.org/). Parsi, 2008, 138-9; Luomi, 2008, 16, 24, 26-7. 21 Lustick, 1997, 675. 22 Parsi, 2008, 138-9.

ambitions within the partical subsystem and to comprehend the dialectics of a possible economic and political powerplay. As such, information can be framed for further analysis.23 The notion of role is defined as the currency of power, interpreted as the ability to exercise power without consuming it. 24 Contrary to power and this is of great importance- role is something, which is granted to a state by the other members of the power system. The critical appearance, preservation or collapse of a systems implicit equilibrium, even the escalation of a situation into a major conflict or war, all depend on the instrumental minimization of the discrepancy between the relative power of, and role attribution to key regional states. Apart from (capitalist) competition, positively aligned or parallel power cycles are said to indicate an evolution of potential or existing strategic alliance. It is argued that various degrees of relative economic integration or the existence of common geopolitical adversaries (common interests) are factors that determine the alignment of power cycles and will thus often reflect reality-bound geopolitical alliances or rapprochement-realities. This analytical model and its implications are quite interesting for they have the ability of rationalizing and unveiling such ubderlying geopolitical dynamics, which might not be as outspoken or detectable in the political rhetoric. Within this frqmework of overall competition, a distinction is to be made between hegemonic competition in which competing states actively seek the domination of a regions power system and the occurrence of mere strategic competition for strict relative power share. Such, hegemonic competition exclusively takes place at the top of the regional power system and its contenders actively aim to acquire the largest segment of relative power in the entire system. Moreover, this competition also primarily focuses on a simultaneous competition for role. In some cases, the quest for regional recognition (role) from behalf of regional contenders is not to be underestimated.25

1.2 Modern Dynamics of Hegemonic Competition: Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia
Two major political crises have affected Middle Eastern power balances since the 1990s, namely the First Gulf War and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union and secondly the 2003 Iraq War. Other previous key events lie beyond the scope of this study; however, they are of course of no less importance. Some are even central in understanding the fundamental make-up of the modern Middle East, e.g. British Mandate Palestine, the UN Partition plan and the 1948 establishment of the state of Israel. However, the First Gulf War (1990) and the more recent Iraq war have had a severe impact on the current political power makeup of the Middle East.

Figure 1.1 Relative power cycles Middle East, 1987-1997.26

23 24

Parsi, 2008, 139-141. Ibid.,140. 25 Ibid.,131, 140, 142. 26 Ibid., 145.

1.2.1 The First27 Gulf War and the Soviet Disintegration: Power Distribution Due to a turbulent history of warfare in the region (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1983, 1980-1988), extremely polarized interstate competion between key states and extra-regional interventionism (1990, 2003) the Middle East is one of the least regionalized subsystems of the world, that is when, analysed through economic intergration criteria, such as market integration, freedom of mobility, unhindered trade and inverstment flows, an internal market for regional members, collective measures to standarize legal and financial management regimes, a truly region-wide technical secretariat for cooperation or establishment of a convergence criteria.28
There is a regional sytem here, with strong geopolitical characteristics but what we do not have here is regionalism. Such regionalist drivers as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), or Mercado Comn del Sur (MERCOSUR) have not29 been replicated here. 30

The fact remains that economic regionalism31, as a liberal byproduct of capitalist globilization remains weakly represented in the Middle East. This contrasts the organic cultural body underlying the region. Therefore, the state remains generally the strongest unit of current political organization. State barriers are hence far from porous in both political and economic terms; the contrary may be argued. Regionalism would imply sharing economic destinies, which need a certain level of unified political representation. Today, it is extremely doubtful to see Tehran, Riyadh, Damascus and Tel Aviv feel comfortable in such a situation let alone promote it to its constituencies, without any solution of the Palestinian Question or of the persisnce aggressive (physical) extra-regional interventionism (1990, 2003). It can also be argued that the Middle East and North African (MENA) region does not constitute a subsystem without the regional non-Arab states, such as Israel, Turkey and Iran32 (GME) because these states have assumed central roles in shaping the current status quo and physical make-up of the Arab region. This of course, needs partly to be interpreted in historic perspective: the decay of the Ottoman Empire, the age of Colonialism33, the Cold War etc. Today, many contemporary problematics in the Middle Eastern subsystem are related to its geostrategic importance (e.g. Suez Canal) and its natural resources (e.g. oil, gas), which are key for the global energy market (geo-economics). However, not only the Middle Easts problematic relationship to the global system has proved to be an undermining factor in the establishment of a regional (economic and political) equilibrium, also specific intra-regional dynamics of hegemonic competition between key states (both Arab and non-Arab) have been a cause for economic and political turmoil.34
While the Arab states themselves must shoulder much of the blame for the failures of the Arab order, the role of the MENA regions nonArab states disrupting and distorting the flow of inter-Arab politics should not be overlooked. Iran, Israel, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Pakistan have directly influenced inter-Arab politics by playing a critical role in the shaping of the regions politics, its security parameters, and its alliance structures. The first three have been dominant in this role, and wether through war, revolution, or diplomacy, they have independently managed to weaken and ultimately fracture the Arab world. 35

Israels foreign policy since the late 1950s for instance, has been guided by the Peripheral Alliance Doctrine, meaning that the state of Israel has actively sought to establish close (military, political and diplomatic) ties with the regions non-Arab states (Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia) in its effort to weaken an Arab inner political circle and cosolidate its quest for regional hegemony and military supremacy. This immediately explains from a very rational and realist point of view- why Israel officially referred to Iran as a

27

Different conflicts in the Persian Gulf have been referred to as the First and Second Gulf War; I will refer to the 1980-1988 conflict as the IranIraq War, to the 1990 conflict as the First Gulf War and to the 2003 armed conflict as the Second Gulf War or the Iraq War. 28 Papp, 2005, 15-45; Ehteshami, 2007, 51. 29 The current GCC is an emerging example. A historical example was the shortly lived United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria (195861). 30 Ehteshami, 2007, 51. 31 Smaller (and often nominal) initiatives are present though, such as GCC, ACC, ECO and the Arab League of Nations, but nothing substantial that would match the regions potential (resources, underlying linguistic body). 32 And to a lesser extent Pakistan and Afghanistan, as wel as certain former (Central-Asian) Soviet republics, e.g. Kazakhstan. 33 Sykes Picot, Bagdad Pact, Nasser etc. (cf. Kramer, 1993, 174-188) 34 Ehteshami, 2007, 47-51, 57. 35 Ibid., 50.

geostrategic friend in 1987 and had supplied Tehran with military36 and logistic support throughout the 1980s, when Khomeini was still head of Iran. Some critics even state that Iran and Israel are in fact natural allies, but that their relationship -that is, an anti-Arab alliance- is merely temporarily neutralized by the fundamentalist nature of the regime in Tehran and the absence of an Arab strongman (e.g. Jamal Abd al-Nasir, Saddam). This might be a structural overstatement and somehow ethnocentric. It can, however, be argued that the state of Iranian-Israeli relations was, traditionally speaking related (dependent) on dynamics (order and strength) withing the Arab system (MENA). 37
Ironically, Irans anti-Western and anti-Israeli revolution strengthened the common Israeli-Iranian threat picture Indeed, just as Nassers death had reduced Irans38 need for Israel, Saddam Hussein and the Arab blocks attack against Iran in September 1980 did the opposite, so the reasoning went.39

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Saddam in 1991 symbolized the retreat of both Iran and Isreal their two common enemies; hence a new and more confronting bilateral relationship would emerge, in search of enlarging their respective relative power shares in the region. From this new hegemonic phase onward, Iran was suddenly (1992) labbeled by Israeli policy makers as a global threat while they had explicitly referred to Tehran as a geostrategic friend in 1987.40 Such a change in political rhetoric is thus directly related to the contempory altered geopolitical situation in the region 41 (material incentive). It is clear that from this perspective, Israel has strategically challenged any (Gulf) nation that became too powerfull and too assertive within the region.42 Together with the end of the Cold War both Israel and Iran altered their alignment policy. The Arabists among Iran policy makers, for instance, advocated that the Islamic Republic would be able to increase its regional role by pursuing friendly relations with its immediate neighbours, namely Arab and Sunni countries and populations; including Gulf states who ha previously sponsored Saddam Husein. Within the new global context, this was interpreted as a better policy than any alliance with remote states; these calculations were also made from an immediate security rationale reinforced by a traumatizing post-war legacy (1980-1988).43 After all, following the devastating Iran-Iraq War, the country realized that when invaded, it could neither rely on the Geneva Conventions nor the U.N. charter for protection.44 Arguebly, this foreign policy was also more in line with the Khomeinist ideology (pan-Islamic); but it was only after the First Gulf War that there was again space for such ideological considerations. Consequently, from the 1990s onward, the Iranians dialectically stepped up their harsh, ideological rhetoric against Israel in order to mobilize the war-thorn domestic population once again and started a campaign to alleviate Arab animosity vis--vis Iran that was undoubtedly present in the Arab street. All of this was exerted in a bid to increase their regional role and power/influence in an altered Middle Eastern order. The Israeli Labour leaders applied the exact same rationale in their public statements (1992 elections): There is the old periphery and the new periphery. The old periphery was aimed to outflank the Arab enemies of Israel. That was the case of Iran at that time. Now we should have a new periphery to outflank Iran. Whereas Moshe Dayan had made official pledges to forget the past and help Iran keep up its defences throughout the 1980s., from the 1990s onwards, Israeli rhetoric started depicting Iran as a global threat and unredeemable terrorist state.45 Interestintingly, figure 1.1 indicates the fact that the 1990 Persian Gulf War reduced Iraqs relative power from an approximately 16 per cent, a leading percentage, to a marginal 6 per cent in 1991. As global giant, the US eliminated both the physical and

The height of this relationship was marked by the Iran-Contra affair (Reagan, R.), where Israel pressured the US to improve its relationship with Iran and to sell advanced weaponry to Tehran as to avoid a victory of (initially) Soviet-backed Saddam; the most industrialized nation of the Arab world by the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. 37 Parsi, 2008, 136-7, 142-3. 38 US aligned Pahlavi regime 39 Parsi, 2008, 143. 40 Ibid., 136. 41 Syria for example lost its powerful military patron: the USSR 42 Parasiliti, 2003, 161. 43 Parsi, 2008, 144, 146, 148. 44 Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 121. 45 Parsi, 2008, 136, 142, 144, 146, 148.
36

ideological threat to both Israel and Iran emanating from an ambitious pan-Arab Iraq that had proclaimed itself as Egypts successor after the Camp David agreements and president Saddats visit to the Knesset46 (1977). As such, power was redistributed along competitive lines in 1991 and roles were redefined in a newly emerging Middle Eastern order under US hegemony (military presence). This redistribution of power created three poles: Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. All three competed for relative power share lost by Iraq. The relative power cycle scheme (fig. 1.1) indicates that all of the most powerful states that shared a leading position together with Iraq, benifited from the latters defeat. Clearly, the most benifiting state was Saudi Arabia. This is of course due to its continuing US backing and the high oil prices during the Gulf war -a commodity of which the Saudis have plenty. It should be pointed out, however, that increased US military presence in the Gulf directly reduced the volatility in relative power fluctuation, hence turning regional rivalry towards role; the currency of power. Figure 1.1 shows that from Saddams first defeat onwards, Iranian and Israeli power cycles started correlating negatively (converge & diverge), meaning that they initiated a competition over the same relative power share, whereas their cycles were depicted as either parallel or positively aligned (simultaneous increase, decrease) until the end of the Iraq war (1988); testifying their contemporary comon interests and physical cooperation efforts. The First Gulf War created a context that would increase rivalry between Iran and Israel, which subsequently necessitated both camps to establish new geopolitical alliances with Arab neighbours. From the mid-1990s onward any Israeli increase of relative power would meaningfully correlate with any such Iranian decrease, and vice versa.47 Irans regional top position, together with Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia, made the country expect an increased role gratification in the post-war era. This assumption was based on its self-perception. Thereby, one should bare in mind that Irans geographic size, demography, educational level, industrialization level, armistice impact pressure and natural resources naturally alleviate the country to a considerable regional significance. This seems to be a self-consiousness that both imperial and post-revolutionary (Islamic) Iran, irrespective of their ideology, was aware of. Moreover, its contemporary assumptions regarding role gratification were also based on the fact that the Islamic Republic had after all played an assisting role during the US-led invasion of Iraq in early 1990. For more than a decade, during its period of wartime isolation vis--vis the Arab states and the US, Tehran had accepted the vast discrepancy between its role and relative power. In the early 1990s, however, Tehran held the belief it would become a key-player in the shaping of the new Middle Eastern order, to take on, what it perceived as its rightful role in the affairs of the region. Yet, its regional role was actively set48 to remain limited with many security arrangements designed to further contain and balance the Islamic Republic.49 Contrastingly, the opposite was granted bu the US hegemon to both Israel and Saudi Arabia, countries less substantial in size, but which were viewed upon as strategic allies. The US adopted a policy of endorsing Saudi Arabia as a new Arab balancer against Iran, thus envisaging a future conform Arab block, led by Saudi to check Iranian influence in the region. As a result, Iran embarked on a more aggressive strategy 50 by actively undermining US policies in the region to eventually force the latter in recognizing its role in the region. This mainly manifestated itself through Iranian opposition of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and by reactivating51 strong financial and logistical support to militant Lebanese and Palestinian52 organizations. Irans regional weight in the Middle East make it, along state-logic, project power in its immediate regional context for in its own vital national interest; which in itself is not alien fact. The degree and manner in which Iran projects power, however, highly depends on regional interstate interactions (role attribution). In effect, Irans exclusion from

46 47

Hebrew name for the Israeli parliament. Parsi, 2008, 144-8, 152-3. 48 The weakening but keeping in place of the Iraqi Bath Regime by the US in order to check and balance Iran in the GME (Parsi, 2008, 148). 49 Parsi, 2008, 145-6. 50 One should also remark that this period coincides with the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina in 1992; these events have never been fully solved, but it is widely speculated that Iranian and Lebanese militants were behind the attacks. 51 In the late 1980s and early 1990s Iranian shortly reduced its financial support to Hizbullah (fragile momentum). 52 Strong, financial and military ties between Iran and Palestinian, Sunni groups actually only started in the mid 1990s and were previously only nominal in nature compared to contemporary relations.

the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the general Arab-Israeli rapprochement were alarmingly perceived by Tehran as a regional effort to further cement its regional isolation and power-role discrepancy.53 Over time, all efforts to reduce these central Iranian-Israeli tensions failed. Since the First Gulf War, relations between the two countries took a confronting turn. This 1991 Gulf crisis triggered the disintegration of the Arab core of the already fragile Middle Eastern order and created both a strategic rivalry for relative power share and a hegemonic competition for role between the two countries. A new major Gulf crisis (2003) would culminate a new though similar political antagonism between a new set of hegemonic contenders, backed by a new stream of phobic, alarming and confrontational political rhetoric: Bushs Axis of Evil, War on Terror (2001), Condoleeza Rices sadistic remarks of the Birth Pangs of a new Middle East (2006 July War) and Jordanian king Abdullahs sensational warning of an imminent Shia Crescent in 2004.54 1.2.2 The 2003 Iraq War: Eradication of Bathi Power and Ascendance of Iran The second major crisis that had severe implications for the Middle Easts strategic landscape was the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. In many ways this event reinforced the existing modern dynamics that had already surfaced after the 1991 Gulf War: an antagonized multipolar region (Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia) 55 and an all-time geopolitical low for Iraq. This time, however, the total eridication of the Bath regime and a subsequent total implosion of the Iraqi state (institutions, society) had a more profound impact on the regional power balance. Saudi Arabia and Iran have proven to be the two central players affected by this crucial regional event and the following regional transformation. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the new Arab contender, that is, the financial and diplomatic powerhouse, from within an Arab order in crisis in the Middle Easts post-Saddam context (1991, 2003). This is primarily due to its strong economic position in the sub-Arab Gulf region. Although Iraqs apparent and most propagated enemy (hegemony) had been Iran, Baghdads main competition for relative power share in the late 1980s and early 1990s emanated from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, due to their rapid economic growth (OPEC). The loss of Iraqs regional power coincides with its loss of oil share production vis--vis Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war. This post-war Iraqi decline is clearly visible in figure 1.1. Notwithstanding its potential in the medium or long-term, Iraq was economically exhausted by the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1988) and therefore in relative economic decline. However, the country was extremely potentin military terms56 and politically quite viable, i.e. cemented by a strong internal politico-autoritarian cohesion (absolute power). After the debacle of the failed invasion of Iran, Saddams occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 -and its subsequent propaganda campaign targeting the legitimacy of all the Gulf monarchies in the Khalij- was, definitely, a fullfledged bid for Iraqi hegemony in the Arab Gulf region. Although Kuwait did not represent a hegemonic challenge for Iraq, the latter was economically57 (relative power share) motivated to invade its southern neighbour. By doing so, Iraq could further project its power in the Gulf, immediately intimidate Saudi Arabia and safeguard its long-term regional aspirations as a substantial hegemonic contender. However, Saddam would face the legacy of his would-be precedors in the region. Whether we look at the nineteenth century Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali or the late Jamal Abd al-Nasir, all clearly demonstrated to have political aspirations (hegemony) in the Middle East and all used military force in an effort enlarge their states and respective relative power; but all, consequently collided with global, supra-regional powers, whoms political system and economic interests were

53 54

Parsi, 2008, 145-6, 149; Barzegar, 2008, 97. Parsi, 2008, 152; Kfoury, 2010; Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 124. 55 Turkey is of course a fourth major one and needs not be neglected. Nevertheless, my focus of inquiry does and cannot due to practical concerncs- expand itself to an extensive analysis of Turkish influence. However, in the course of this study certain interesting sidemarks will be made concerning the country. 56 By the end of the war, Iraq was home to one of the largest and most-experienced armies in the world; to be exact Iraq harboured a battle hardened, million man, fourth largest army in the world (cf. Parasiliti, 2003,160). 57 Even today, Iraq seems diplomatically bothered by the economic potential and expansion of Kuwait the tone is not one of economic cooperation; see, for instance: http://english.aljazeera.net/video/middleeast/2011/05/201153191038638801.html

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strongly related to the GME (interventionism). Such abrupt inversions of expectations (recurrent political vacuums) within a regional power system might explain the higher degree of recurrent conflict.58 Over the years Saudi Arabia has tried to profile itself as a new regional Arab leader aspiring a leading role in regional Arab and Gulf affairs. Since the late 1980s the kingdom has known a fairly constant relative ascent at the top of the regional system and it was the main benifitor of both Irans relative decline during the Iran-Iraq War and of Saddams decline after the 1990 Gulf War (cf. fig. 1.1).59 It was aided in this effort by its enormous financial recourses, its increasing control of pan-Arab media outlets and a strategic backing of the regions key external power -the United States. The US estimated Riyadh fit as the leader of a Gulf bloc to counter Iranian aspirations in the 1990s. Today, Riyadh enjoys considerable diplomatic capabilities. Saudi Arabia is a economically described as a rentier state; its main income is earned by oil revenues and interests that are made on the back of mostly foreign direct (sectorial-specific) investments. Since Saudi Arabia enjoys the strategic position of harbouring the world largest oil reserves it is the largest producer and exporter of petrol- it has a different position and relation to the US than other US-allied Arab states.60 To use the words of the senior lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter (U.K.), Dr. Larbi Sadiki: Saudi Arabias renting role gives it more of an equal exhange with the US: oil in return for petro-dollars and arms. Egypt and Jordan do not possess of that equal exchange: they rent their mediatory role in return for US aid and favour.61 However, these powerful Saudi attributes have seemingly not (yet) cristilized into a greater regional legitimacy for the Saudi establishment, nor has it created the USs expected Arab consensus on a Saudi leadership regarding regional affairs. Rather, the contrary might be true. Saudi Arabias interests, power and regional ambitions have often been contested; even intra-Arab competition and hegemonic rivalry still persists until this very day. This rivalry is a rather sensitive and implicit issue, for also there, one finds an organic -history, demography, economy etc.- disparity that inevitably keeps certain key countries, such as Egypt, fixed -even if merely symbolical, when there is no real economic basis upon Arab (diplomatic) leadership.62 An Egyptian official was symbolically quoted saying: Saudi activism is an annoying fact of life for Egypt, the saving grace for us is that Saudi initiatives never amount to anything.63 Clearly, the US aligned Arab bloc is thus fairly heterogeneous to a certain extent. Whereas some among Egypts ruling establishment might have felt threatened by Saudi Arabias aspiratitions, other Gulf smaller states seem to accommodate a direct fear for their souvereignty, confirming the aforementioned image of an non-fixed order in the region (hierarchical fluidity). It is exactly such persistent intra-Arab rivalry -also present in the Gulf with regard to Iraq that diludes and obstructs Saudi Arabias initiatives against Iran and which appear to overrule Riyadh hegemonic Arab aspirations.64 The US-led invasion of Iraq eradicated Tehrans main enemy in the Gulf, i.e. an Iraqi military that formerly contained Iran. Keen observers ahve argued that the 2003 Iraq War and the subsequent Iraqi instability paved the way for Iranian hegemony in the Gulf region.65 One should not forget that the US also eradicated Irans Eastern adversary, the Afghan Taliban. This regional setting has empowered Iran and although they instigated it, US policy makers seem to blame the Iranian establishment for the unfolding dynamics in the region. Interestingly, it is even argued by critics such as Afshin Molavi that the US has aided Iran in consolidating its current ambitions by fostering the myth of Iranian power and by overplaying Irans economic and military capabilities (popular perception).66 This is exactly why exquisite scholar Michael Brning, director of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)67 in Jerusalem, advocates that the thesis of an expanding Shiite Crescent throughout the Middle East could, in this

58 59

Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 1-2.; Parasiliti, 2003, 160-162; Parsi, 2008, 141, 145; Lustick, 1997, 672, 675, 677-9. Parasiliti, 2003, 161. 60 Papp, 2005, 52-3; Parasiliti, 2003, 162; ; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 1-2. 61 Larbi, S. The Arab Peace Troika, Al Jazeera (Opinion), September 14th, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2010/09/201091311433794490.html (accessed on 30/11/2010). I do not agree with the entire content. 62 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 1-4, 11-14, 87; Parasiliti, 2003, 161. 63 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 87. 64 Ibid., 5, 89. 65 Nasr, in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 40-1. 66 Luomi, 2008, 24. 67 See also: http://www.fespal.org/en/fes-staff-broening.php

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(strictly geopolitical) sense, entail the danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.68 Furthermore, it was of course no coincidence that Iran was the first of Iraqs neighbours to recognize the post-Bathi government. Additionally, Tehran strategically encouraged Iraqis to participate in the political process introduced by the United States. This dynamic rationalizes the Saudi foreign mininsters bitter complains to the US administration regarding its reckless handing over of Iraq to Iran69. In this view it is no surprise that Arab capitals are abuzz with talk of the Iranian threat.70 In the years following the 2003 invasion, Iraq was alarmingly depicted by Saudi officials as a new Shia bulwark; as the supposed locus of an apocalyptic sectarian struggle and of emerging divisison between the regions Shia and Sunni. A former Saudi security advisor literally stated in a published article that Saudi Arabia had the religious responsibility to intervene in Iraq since the Arab peninsulas kingdom was said to be the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the worlds Sunni community.71 Clearly, the very significance of this discursive shift within the dominant political rhetoric can in many ways be compared to that of the aforementioned Israeli one. An imploded and weakened Iraq has apparently become an arena for a proxy competition (relative power) between two key contenders in the Middle East: Iran and Saudi Arabia. This interstate rivalry is predicted to intensify in the case of a full US withdrawal. Both states seem to have fully realized that the unfolding dynamics in Iraq will undoubtedly alter the political and economic landscape of the Gulf region and the broader Middle East (GME). That is why these two powerhouses perceive Iraq as a zero-sum game. Since the implications could be severe, the geopolitical rivalry over Iraq is intens. However, this needs to be balanced to some extent: as strong as competition in Iraq itseld may be, it is nevertheless contained to a certain degree. After all, neither regime wishes to see a direct spillover of violence beyond their control and interests. Therefore, one could speak of a managed rivalry over Iraq, dually characterized by strong engagement and watchfull containment. The eridication of Bathist Iraq by the extra-regional hegemon in 2003, fundamentally changed the security situation in the geostrategic Persian Gulf area. The dissapearence of the Iraqi regime has had its repercussions on the entire Middle East and it has directly shattered the delicate power balance between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Many observers have, however, argued that Saudi Arabias ability to counter Iran in Iraqs current status quo is often overestimated. In this sense, its actual ability to contain Irans influence appears to be more limited than its aspirations or any US expectations. On a military level, Riyadh certainly has the financial capacity to fund Sunni insurgency and tribal Sunni networks, but its conventional military capacity is less evident and substantial as its counterpart. Iran has since long established transnational paramilitary deterrent networks during the Iran-Iraq war ISCIs headquaters were based in Tehran- that are currently further implemented in Iraq by its numerous Revolutionary Guards Corpes (IRGC) in cooperation with the Iraqi Badr Brigades. The same goes for Riyadhs supposed influence and grip on Iraqi Sunni factions.72 Meanwhile, the Maliki government in Iraq -which is known to have substantial relations with Tehran- appears to be gaining more popularity all over Iraq and while in office while it has shown the ability to reinforce its will by force, meaning that a new and more steady political dynamic is emerging in Bagdad, contrasting the previous post-invasion chaos. This steady emergence of a capable political apparatus in Iraq, which has ties with both the US and Iran, demonstrates that Iraq is still a contigious state and it further implies that a new Iraqi competitor to Saudi Arabias aspirations is again on the rise. Moreover, greater Arab recognition of Maliki and his state-building efforts also seems to be emerging gradually, leaving Saudi Arabia to be the odd man out.73 Post-war dynamics have seemingly indicated that the scale of power balance might have tipped in favour of Iran. The elimination of both the Taliban and the Bathist regime and the subsequent fragmentation of Iraqi society (along sectarian-based lines), seems to have paved the way for what is dubbed as the rise of Iran; stated to be a middle power from

68 69 70

Brning, 2008, 75. Ibid., 63. Nasr, in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 40-1. 71 Obaid, N., Stepping into Iraq, The Washington Post, November 29th 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html (accessed on 03/03/2011). 72 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 60-3, 100-2. 73 Ibid., 95-6

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US perspective. Other powerful states in the region have subsequently re-aligned74 themselves in order to deal with this perceived Iranian challenge, resulting in a revival of multilateral Arab relations (e.g. the formation of the Arab Quartet and a relaunch of the Arab League Peace initiative in early 2007 together with the Annapolis peace conference later that year).75

1.3 Structural Interstate Conflicts: Tradition, Iraq & Palestine

1.3.1 Traditional Threat Perceptions: Iran & Saudi Arabia Traditionally, bilateral tensions have long existed and surfaced between Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Iran. On a mere superficial and impressionistic level, both countries populations would seem to constitute different Islamic sects (Sunni, Shia) and different ethnic majorities (Arab, Persian). Additionally, both countries political classes have lifted aspects of Islamic ideology (and rhetoric) into politics; in fact, the clerical class forms active and integral part of the national establishment on both sides of the Persian Gulf. As such, both also appear to articulate and propagate different forms religious doctrines and subsequent dissimilar politico-religious ideologies; moreover, each pretends (rhetoric) to aspire a symbolic Islamic leadership and a converging political leadership in a contrasting view of the regional political order. Sunni and Shia symbolism is thus often seen reflected among the leadership of each country. However, it can legitimately be argued that this foremost occurs due to their need to comply with key domestic constituents who deeply focus on sectarian or religious identity. It should hereby be noted that sectarianism and their related ideologies are not whatsoever the primary determinants of the (material) foreign policy outlook of the respective countries (geopolitical motive) and should therefore not be overstated. As has been demonstrated earlier, Irans (shifting) foreign policy in the region is primarily based on rational, even pragmatic, geopolitical considerations rather being predetermined by any clear-cut ideological vocation; this is certainly the fact now that the geopolitical tide seams favourable to Tehran. The country, similar to any nation-state in the 21st centruy, bases its regional strategy on its national (state-centric) advancement, which is ultimately aimed at further integrating within the regional and global economy (harmonization of national potential).76 It is clear that within the international arena, states act on perceptions of threats and the perceptions of opportunities, both of material nature.77 This explains why 21st century Iran supports Christian Armenia against Shiite Azerbaijan, which is today supported by the US Antagonized political behaviour primarily roots in geopolitical competition (opposition) among major states in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. 78 The alleged Sunni-Shia divide and the vast presence of anti-Shiite rhetoric on the political stage, together with other politicized labels, such as those related to ethnicity, need foremost to be seen as a tool (symbolic vocabulary) that is either encouraged or downplayed in accordance with the geopolitical strategy and interest of each country. When such labels are dominant in the political rhetoric and the sphere of international affairs, they primarily serve strategic political objectives. Saudi Arabia has clearly embarked on a sectarian campaign; to put it in the words of an attentive scholar: Saudi Arabia has tried to paint Iran as a cultural and ideological abberation from the rest of the region, and the most expeditious means of doing this has been to cast the Islamic Republics Shia/Persian ambitions as a threat to Sunnis everywhere.79 The matter of Islamic leadership is actually a symbolic marker for regional hierarchy. While there is hence no substantial reason to overstate the ideological considerations within the foreign policies of both Riyadh and Tehran, there is also no need to understate their very use, that is, the very instrumentalization ideology/culture. When political and economic needs were high, both countires have demonstrated taking steps to mitigate sectarian tension, conflict and rhetoric. This was the case in the mid 1990s, when both benifited economically from the international boycott of Iraq (oil market). Subsequent to the defeat of Saddam, both countries shortly restored their diplomatic

They were already US aligned, however, in the uncertainty following the 9/11 events -either you are with us or against us-; a more publicly stance was required. It is even said that Khadaffi of Lybia was so alarmed by US rhetoric that he volunteered to dismantle his nuclear program. 75 Luomi, 2008, 7-8, 33; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 1-4, 96-98, 100-102. 76 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 11-2, 21-3, 26, 36-7, 41-43, 96-7; Luomi, 2008,16-7; Barzegar, 2008, 97. 77 Gause, 2007, 1. 78 Gause, 2004, 523; Brning, 2008, 68. 79 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, xii.
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relations, followed by a now historical visit of the Saudi Foreign Minister to Iran by the end of 1991. Such happenings of formal rapprochement even occurred while there was simultaneously open rivalry in (other geographical) areas. Consequently, one detects a direct correlation between geopolitical and economic motives and the level of aversive, sectarian or ideological (confrontational) political rhetoric. Moreover this correlation also relates to religious (i.e. political) behaviour, rather than solely to rhetoric. It was political will and material interest mutual management of the legacy (Iraq) of their former common enemy (Saddam)- on both sides of the Persian Gulf that prompted Saudi king Abdullah to officially invite Ahmadinajad the political face of the worlds Shia country- to attend the Hajj pelgrimage in 2008; the same goes for the latters compliance of going along with it.80 Rather than ideological, Riyadhs concern over post-Saddam Iraq relates more to the diplomatic openness of the new Iraqi political elite towards Iran. This, rather than the essentialist presumption regarding the Iraqi elites Shia descent, is what geopolitics is all about. Saudi and wider Arab enmity (Jordan, Egypt) towards Iran primarily stems from the fact that these nations are oppositely aligned to Iran on a geopolitical level.81 Saudi Arabias foreign policy and the political viability of its ruling house rely strongly on its strategic alliance with the United States. Both countries currently share a strategic interdependent alliance: whereas the Saudi elite counts on American military support and supply, the United States needs to uphold a military presence in the geostragic oil-rich Gulf because its domestic economy (current recovery) strongly relates to the stability of the global oil market - i.e. of the steady flow of Saudi oil production82-; this is the main reason why Saudi Arabia, despite domestic resistance which it seeks to appease with anti-American rhetoric, usually supports US policies in the region.83 Renowned journalist Robert Fisk84 alluded to and contextualized this informal political alignment of Gulf monarchies to the US quite accurately in one of his latest published news articles: Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet and the Americans don't want to be shoved out of their happy little port (albeit that they could up-sticks and move to the UAE or Qatar anytime they wish) and want to defend Bahrain from mythical Iranian aggression.85 This opposite alignment can be visualized more tangibly by symbolically inquiring the global arms supplies to Gulf countries. Hereby, one immediately extracts the fact that non-NATO countries, mainly Russia and China, supply Iran of weaponry whereas all other Gulf countries are primarily, if not exclusively supplied by key NATO member states, such as the US, the UK and France.86
Table 1.1 Suppliers of major conventional weapons to the Gulf states, 20052009.87 Supplier China France Russia UK USA Recipient Bahrain 34 55 Iran 35 65 Iraq 14 1 52 Kuwait 3 91 Oman 15 4 79 Qatar 98 Saudi Arabia 6 4 42 40 UAE 35 2 60 Gulf region 4 21 9 5 54 Figures are suppliers percentage shares of each recipients total volume of imports. Others 11 33 6 2 2 8 3 7 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

While Riyadhs foreign policy can best be understood through the lens of classic balance-of-power politics, Sunni-Shii sectarian tensions overlay that policy and, perhaps more importantly, are the lens through which much of the Saudi public sees the regional

80 81 82

Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 1- 4, 6, 12-3, 17, 26, 38-9, 40-1, 43, xi. Gause, 2007, 120-2. In fact US companies produce the oil. 83 Luomi, 2008, 34. 84 He covered almost every Middle Eastern conflict in last quarter of a century (e.g. Lebanese Civil War, Iran-Iraq War). 85 Fisk, R., Why No Outcry over these Torturing Tyrants?, The Independent, May 14th 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-no-outcry-over-these-torturing-tyrants-2283907.html (accessed on 14/05/2011); Norton, 2007, 439. 86 Solmirano & Wezeman, 2010, 3. 87 Ibid. pag 3.

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situation.88 Consequently, as the US found itself in the Sunn camp, its political interests converged with an endorsement of this distortive image of seemingly primarily sectarian-motivated politics. The United States has traditionally applied a regional strategy of geopolitically and geo-economically containing Tehran in the region by assembling all its regional enemies in a common anti-Iranian front. Washingtons traditional allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia are currently left to play a leading role in this coalition; dialectically, though informally. In return for their collaboration, military aid and political benefits, such as the mitigation of the USs former (post 9/11) call for regional democratization89 and the granting of greater Arab (i.e. Saudi) role in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating process. Since July 2007, the United States has announced and implemented a 50 billion dollar plan providing Saudi Arabia, other Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Israel with military aid and priviledged (hightech) arms deals.90 Keen Observers have, in retrospect, typed this US tactic as taking a page out of Ronald Reagans Cold War playbook by simultaneously attempting to contain Iran and force it to spend money on an arms race instead of developing 91 its moribund economy, intimidating it into bankruptcy.92 The Arab-American alignment is mutually perceived as serving national interest; it is no mere one-dimensional US enforcement. A vast majority of the Arab ruling elites in the Gulf are motivated in countering Iran for the moment due to a fear for a possible American-Iranian reconciliation in the long-term, which would result in a profound reshuffling of power relations in the region and allow for a Middle East ruled by non-Arab states (that is, the US, Israel, Iran and Turkey). 93 One should not forget that Iran, as a strategic Gulf country, had long been a key US ally; this only changed as recent as 1979. Israels regional interest converge with Amercian aligned Arab states since both obstruct a nuclear Iran; the country by which they are also engaged in the Palestinian area, namely by what are perceived as Irans geopolitical proxies (Hamas and Hizbullah). That is exactly why Isreal is a beneficial partaker in the anti-Shiite (Iranian) campaign. The current Arab-Israeli allience is of course older than the 1979. Before the Iranian Revolution Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Shahs Iran were three key US allies in the Middle East94. This former Israeli-Iranian-Saudi triangular alliance under US supervision was clearly demonstrated during the 1970s by US and Israeli arms sales (with Saudi money) to imperial Iran and during the SAVAKs95 training; the Shahs secret service96. This police force reportedly received its intelligence training from the CIA together with Israeli intelligence specialists.97 Keen observers have interestingly noted that at the Saudi elite level there is no kind of phobia regarding Israel.98 It can be argued that this alliance has an informal attitude both countries do not share any official diplomatic contacts- due to the fact that it would currently be impossible for the Saudi ellite to announce such relations because of domestic opposition. Ever since both US-allied Egypt and Jordan established an independent99 peace (1979, 1994) with Israel, Saudi Arabia has in fact been the lingering anomaly. They are today often seen charmed by Israeli officials that issue statement discursing Saudi Arabia as a moderate state.100 It is furthermore no coincidence that Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt boycotted a summit of the Arab League that was held in Damascus in March 2008, nor is it by mere chance that warning voices concerning the Shiite crescent are to be heard almost exclusively in Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, as well as in Israel. Interestingly, all these countries have traditionally received
88 89 90

Luomi, 2008, 34. The USs recent formal call for democracy is an implicit ideological threat to Gulf regimes (cf. Gause, 2007, 121-2). Luomi, 2008, 33-4; Gause, 2007, 121-2. 91 A good parallel between armistic expenditure and economic development is Japan, which was forbidden to have any military after World War II. Subsequently, Japan was in fact priviledged to invest all of its recources in its domestic industrial development; the result is Japans miracle of becoming one the worlds top economies in just a few decades. A similar dynamic applies for Germanys economic dynamic. 92 Luomi, 2008, 34. 93 Ibid., 39. 94 Turkey, as a NATO member state, was of course a fourth key ally (cf. Chomsky, Targetting, 2007, 33). 95 The SAVAK was forged from factions of the Iranian army that had earlier overthrown the civilian elected government of Mossadeq in 1953 to initiate a twenty-five year repressive rule. 96 It is also no coincidence that the early Iranian Revolutionaries were trained by PLO factions (PFLP) one of the oldest modern guerilla movements that also trained members of the IRA & ETA- in the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon. 97 Luomi, 2008, 37-8; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 86-9; Chomsky, 1987, 268-270; Chomsky, 2007, Targetting, 31-4. 98 Luomi, 2008, 38. 99 In reference to the Arab League of Nations diplomatic stance. 100 Luomi, 2008, 38, 88.

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(favourable) US brokered Official Development Assistence (ODA) deals or US military assistance. These are material exponents of a geopolitical alliance. Observers have comprehensively noted that the reference to the Shiite Crescent, in pragmatic terms, is ultimately an urgent plea for continuing US support in a post 9/11 era (dichotomy, Bush-Doctrine).101 Applying such rhetoric is thus actually a symbolical pledge, which implies a willingness to lign up with the global hegemon (post9/11 US) against its main regional enemies: former Iraq, Afghanistan andcontemporary Iran. It is consequently no coincidence that the threat perception propagated by these specific Middle Eastern states was mirrored in the U.S.A., which also also uses the nightmare vision of an ambitious Shiite crescent to sustain a regional coalition against Tehran.102 Critical observers have pointed out that by alarmingly advocating accounts of Shii proselytism and of an imminent Shiite threat led by a Shiite-Persian Iran, the US-allied Arab regimes endeavoured to alienate the regional masses from Irans recent (post-1990) populist charm offensive (anti-Israeli rhetoric). It is even more important to point out that, in light of such a creeping and allegedly existential transnational threat, close allience with the US and links to Israel might also appear less noisome to the same Arab public.103 However, this geostrategic alignment is camps is of course a rather complex and multidimensional issue in itself; there is no need for overstructural or monolith depictions of the matter, certainly since regional dynamics are still widely in flux (Iraq, Lebanon etc.) and above all because this coalition, is not a formal one.104 As such, this allience should not be comprehended as a one-way, US projection or as a watertight block that, simply for sharing the same goal, share a similar strategy. A clear example of this is the USs support of the Iraqi al-Maliki government, which Saudi Arabia publically dispises and accuses for being a direct extension of Irans interest in the country and in the region. This US foreign policy towards Iraq, interestingly, implies that US state-interest clearly lies in dealing with Shia differently according to the case-specific contexts (Iraq, Iran, Lebanon). Although the USs political rhetoric might be similarly to that of the Arab elites with regard to homogenizing sectarian groups, its actual material policy uncoveres a knowledge and recognition of confessional (political) pluralism.105 Folowing the 2003 Iraq war, Riyadh has systematically endeavoured to keep its US patron strongly involved in Iraq to balance and contain Iran regionally and to safeguard its own long-term intra-Arab ambitions (hegemony). By doing so, Saudi Arabia saw itself represented in any trilateral Iranian-US-Iraqi talks or settlements. However, alarmed by deliberations about a future US withdrawal, Riyadh106 has altered its posture on Iraq and worked out a more, independent and proactive strategy of its own, establishing direct relations with various Iraqi political actors. Riyadh seems to have set itself on steadily expanding its soft-power influence in Iraq through media (incl. anti-Shiite rhetoric), charitable organizations, patronage of tribes, etc. Yet, the somehow pragmatic elements in the Saudi attitude over Iraq might still relinquish since the US might still ultimately withdraw its troops in December 2011, as agreed by the SOFA agreement.107

101 102

Brning, 2008, 66, 74. Brning, 2008, 75. 103 Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 11. 104 Brning, 2008, 74. 105 Luomi, 2008, 34. 106 Riyadh as no other realizes Iraqs potential as a former Arab giant. 107 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 1-4, 62-3, 96-8, 100-2, xiv; Al Jazeera, Sadr supporters rally over US troops in Iraq, Al Jazeera, May 26th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/05/201152614115431859.html (accessed on 26/05/2011).

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Figure 1.2 Relative volumes of imports of major conventional arms by the Gulf states, 19902009 and 20052009.108

Apart from Saudi Arabia, the other Arab Gulf states (GCC) seem to have articulated similar hysteric threat perceptions of Irans involvement in Iraq. The general Gulf assumption is that it was broader Arab inaction on Iraq that fundamentally created the vacuum that is now misused by Iran to its own advantage. However, such logic totally overlooks the US initiave on Iraq and any awareness of national capacity and regional hierarchy. Hence, some observers, with a sense for realism, have keenly signalled that although the Gulf states may continue to lament the fact that Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq in fact, it is only natural that Iran steps up to assume a role in its Western neighbour that is at risk of falling apart to its detriment. 109 In fact, along state logic such a dynamic would indeed accord with a material state-centric calculus. Without arguing whether this is good or bad, one can clearly detect that Riyadh too, has a record of indirect, regional interference serving its national interest, as these are strategies endogeneous to any substantial nation-states foreign policy. Examples go from Saudi funding for the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan to interference in the Yemini civil war and the Omani Dhofar Rebellion of 1962-1970.110 Even more recent examples of such intervionism can be made in reference to the current popular uprising in Bahrain (March 2011), where Riyadh even physically interfered by sending its military in to assist the Bahraini royal house.111 Currently, Gulf states are among the highest (percentage of GDP) spenders on military resources in the world, subsequently rendering the impression of a regional arms race.112 The above-indicated pie charts (fig. 1.2) demonstrate the volume of imports by individual Gulf states compared to the total volume of imports to the region; the absolute numbers can additionally be found and compared in the table below.
Table 1.2 Military expenditure of the Gulf states, 20002009.113 Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 368 387 462 531 535 529 Bahrain 7409 8175 6148 7195 9109 11296 Iran .. .. .. .. .. 2845 Iraq 4023 3954 4080 4396 4732 4580 Kuwait 2621 3049 3140 3303 3713 4476 Oman .. .. 1588 1602 1476 1569 Qatar 23523 25053 21995 22157 24632 29680 SaudiArabia [10940] [10575] [9725] [10201] [11016] [10254] UAE *. . = data not available; italic = uncertain figure; [ ] = SIPRI estimate. Figures are in US$ m. at constant (2008) prices and exchange rates. Figures are for calendar years. 2006 576 12233 2383 4550 4786 1657 33809 [12098] 2007 609 10158 2097 5109 4849 2020 38946 [13052] 2008 651 9174 5324 4660 4617 .. 38223 .. 2009 [721] .. 3814 4589 4003 .. 39257 ..

Besides the known incentive of an alleged Iranian nuclear threat, this arms-purchasing dynamic is often furthermore explained

108 109

Solmirano, & Wezeman, 2010, 3. Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 61. 110 Ibid., 61-3. 111 Al Jazeera, Saudi Soldiers sent into Bahrain, Al Jazeera, March 15th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011314124928850647.html (accessed on 26/05/2011). 112 Gause, 2007, 120; Luomi, 2008, 35-6. 113 Solmirano & Wezeman, 2010, 2.

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by the fact that any substantial territorial acquisition in the oil-rich Gulf by a neighbouring counterpart would imply a direct substantial decrease of the formers national income. This is said to increase the possibility of interstate aggression, e.g. Saddams prompt invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Moreover, this is claimed to be a geographic incentive that ought to be case-specific in contrast to other regions; however, one should always be careful not to overstate such form of regional exceptionalism. It is nevertheless clear that threat perceptions and behaviour over regional armistic capacities are in this case also consistent with classic balance-of-power theories.114 Interestingly, when the Bush administration announced that it was planning to sell enormous amounts of weapons to Arab Gulf states in 2007, the US Secretary of State Rice and her under-secretary, Nicholas Burns, both reiterated that the objective of selling weapons to these countries, in particular the Persian Gulf Arab states, was to counter and balance Iran in the region.115 It is clear that the Islamic Republic has traditionally viewed Riyadh as an American proxy and a buffer for Iranian domination of the Gulf. In contrast to the Saudis, Tehran holds the view that the US military presence as an external security guarantor in the Gulf must end. Saudi Arabia, on the contrary, perceives Iran traditionally as heavyweight competition, i.e. Irans regional significance in terms of demography, geographical size, industrial capacity and military impact pressure. Riyadh, however, believes it can balance this inequality in the long run by its vast oil revenues (financial assets); certainly with the strategic asset of US backing.116 It is, however, of crucial importance to point out that this reality of bilateral tension, structurally preceeds 1979. This stems from their aforementioned natural disparity. This classical (demographic) disparity is symbolically demonstrated through Ian Lusticks reference to the possible foreign policy contemplations of the United States, upon loosing imperial Iran to the 1979 popular movement:
the United States had come to depend largely on the Pahlavi regime in Iran as an anchor for its political and military position in the Gulf. With the shahs overthrow in 1979 the United States turned to Saudi Arabia; but as vital as that countrys oil deposits were, and as helpful as the Saudi family could be in funding US military, political, and intelligence activities, Saudi Arabia was too small demographically and too weak militarily to replace Iran. 117

Although both states were traditionally aligned to the US and shared mutual security concerncs vis--vis the pan-Arab and antimonarchist project emating from Egypt and Iraq, both regimes have since long demonstrated interest for regional hegemony and OPEC leadership.118 Saudi has traditionally preferred an external security balancer vis--vis Iran, whereas Tehran has always demanded a more indigenous security system that would imply a de facto recognition of its primacy by Saudi Arabia. 119 The Shah of Iran envisioned Iran as a naval power that would dominate the Persian Gulf and further regulate (guarantee) security within the Indian Ocean. Relative power statistics indicate that both countries have been implicit competitors over the same relative power share since the 1960s (cf. figure 1.3). Since then, their relative power curves are exactly negatively aligned, which means that the loss of power to the former meant an acquisition of relative power for the latter. A structural interest-opposition thus precedes 1979, which clearly demonstrates that ideology is not the main driver for bilateral antagonism. 120

114 115 116

Gause, 2007, 120. Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 129. Parasiliti, 2003, 161; Luomi, 2008, 33-6; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 93-4. 117 Lustick, 1997, 672. 118 Chomsky, 1987, 166; Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 31-4; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 12-3. 119 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 92-3. 120 Ibid., 12-3, 92-3.

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Figure 1.3 Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia traditional relative power cycles, 1947-1991.121

In the 1960s, long before any Shia bogeyman existed, Iran was the largest and leading producer of oil in the region Saudi Arabia only the fourth in contrast to its leading position at the beginning of the current 21st century- reflecting Irans contemporary regional importance and its interrelated contemporary level of industrial development.122 Additionally, Irans 79 revolution and alledged nuclear aspirations during the recent years have only reinforced Riyadhs traditional (material) threat image of Iran. Moreover, the nuclear issue is said to be perceived by Riyadh as catastrophically upsetting the balance-of-power equation that had favoured it for more than twenty years (Iran-Iraq war, Irans1990s containment).123 According to two media outlets Saudi Arabia has even considered the possibility of military action to mitigate the Iranian threat. According to Al Jazeeras senior political analyst Dr. Marwan Bishara, the Wikileaks papers demonstrated that some among GCC members asked Washington in closed doors to attack Iran.124 Furthermore, a U.K. briefing paper for parliament in 2010 indicated that in June 2010, it was reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed to provide a corridor125 in its airspace to allow Israeli warplanes to attack Iranian nuclear facilities; this declaration was based on an article published in the Times.126 On September 9, 2010, The Economist reported that some hardliners in Bahrains ruling establishment have indeed been hoping the Americans or Israelis would attack Iran before it began loading fuel last month into its reactor at Bushehr.127 Of course, since these statements are based on media allegations, they need to be viewed upon extremely critically until further official statements (evidence) would underscores them; Dr. Larbi Sadiki comprehensively noted that in spite of media hype, the so-called Iranian threat is not imminent, moreover, the Saudis have plenty of time to weigh up all diplomatic options at their disposal. 128 Other critics have stated that Riyadh disfavours a US attack on Irans nuclear facilities because it would probably deligitimize Saudi legitimacy on the Arab stage and further generate domestic opposition. What is clear though is that the Saudis do perceive a nuclear Iran as a direct, further power challenge vis-vis their own future aspirations; Riyadh is seen to have actively propagated Iran as a nuclear danger.129 Although there are trends of pragmatic Saudi diplomacy, recent reports have also signalled increasingly sharpened political rhetoric from behalf of the Saudi establishment, e.g. There are two countries in the world that do not deserve to exist:

121 122 123

Parasiliti, 2003, 157. Papp, 2005, 51. Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 2. 124 Bishara, M. Three Questions for Marwan Bishara, Al Jazeera (In Depth), December 7th 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/2010/12/201012711143459905.html (accessed on 15/02/2011). 125 They did the same in 1981 when Israeli airplanes crossed Saudi airspace to enter Iraq and bomb Saddams nuclear facilities in Osirak. 126 Smith, B., Irans Nuclear Programme and Sanctions, International Defence Section (Library House of Commons, ref. SN/IA/5275), October 13th 2010, http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-05275.pdf (accessed on 15/03/2011), 2. 127 The Economist, Trouble in Bahrain: Shut up the Shias, The Economist, September 9 th 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16994636?story_id=16994636 (accessed on 02/02/2011). 128 Larbi, S. The Arab Peace Troika, Al Jazeera (Opinion), September 14th, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2010/09/201091311433794490.html (accessed on 30/11/2010). 129 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 2, 98.

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Iran and Israel.130 Such declarations might seem irrational at first glance, but they are in fact highly symbolical; they serve to legitimize the Saudi political establishments geopolitical stance vis--vis specific national subjects and constituencies.131 1.3.2 Iraq as a Material Incentive: Black Gold and OPEC Shares at Stake Iraq has often been depicted as the main locus of a sectarian divide and struggle. The country has mythically been portrayed as a Mespotamian scenary encroached by a regional ideological clash, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, whom are subsequently depicted as the supposed kingpings of this regional intra-Islamic (cultural) Middle Eastern conflict. However, an inquiry into more structural dynamics and key material motives shed a different light on contemporary events that are unfolding in Iraq. The Iraqi factor for mutual discontent, threat perception and subsequent hegemonic rivalry is directly economically related. Whereas Palestine is to a certain extent a symbolic and higly sensitive matter, Iraqs strategical geographic locus and the richess bulking beneath its surface are not.132 Today, oil is a vital commodity for all the economies of the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq, the U.A.E, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia etc.) since crude petrol is one of the most important energy sources in world. It should be noted that Iraq is not merely the scenary of sectarian violence, the country is also holder to one133 of largest conventional (proven) oil reserves in the world. In contrast to other places in the world (e.g. Russian Caspian Sea, Venezuelan Amazon) and similar to its larger Saudi neighbour the center of the oil universe134 and cartel leader of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) its oil reserves are relatively easy and cheap to exploit. In this respect, Iraq was not merely a former dictatorship where the tirant Saddam strangly, a former Sunni protector in the contemporary Saudi logic- was altruistically toppled by the world strongest military force to altruistically install a heaven of democracy.135 In fact, Iraq is a key holer of a global vital resource oftenly labelled as black gold136. Today, fossil fuels are central in the entire global economy. Renowned US economist Jeremy Rifkin advocates that in the early 21st century everything is based on fossil fuels: our petrochemical fertilizers and pesticides for agriculture, almost all of our farmaceutical products are fossil based, virtually all of our clothes, power, trasport, gas, light; the entire civilization was built on the carbon composits of the Jurassic age. When fossil fuel prices go up i.e. are not artificially low- the US economy and its financial markets experience direct pressure. The fundamental centrality of energy sources within todays global economy should not be underestimated.137 The removal of Saddam and the installation of a (formally) pro-US government in Iraq whether Shia or not had initially rendered the US administration which represents a domestic US market138 that accounts for one fourth of the worlds oil consumption139 while harbouring only 3 percent of the worlds reserves140- more grip on the global energy market. Through its control of Iraq, the US also gained more influence vis--vis the bargaining power of OPEC (Saudi Arabia, Iran) and it provided Washington with critical leverage over its major rivals, Europe and the Asian idustrial systems.141 It is crucial to realize that Arab OPEC countries play a significant role in the Western economy. Today, however, their own share of

Malbrunot, G., La violente charge du roi Abdallah contre lIran et Isral est dementia par Riyadh, Le Figaro, June 29th 2010, http://blog.lefigaro.fr/malbrunot/2010/06/la-violente-charge-du-roi-abda.html (accessed on 03/02/2011). Cf.: Il y a deux pays au monde qui ne mritent pas dexister : lIran et Isral. 131 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 11. 132 Ibid, 1-2, 4, 45, 60-1, 77, 93-8. 133 Estimates change, but Iraq always posits itself within the top four, together with Saudi Arabia, Venzuela and Iran. Figure 1.4, based on 2009 OPEC statistics, positions Iraq as the fourth largest crude oil unit in the world. 134 Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 70. 135 Barzegar, 2008, 89. 136 Papp, 2005, 53. 137 Rifkin, J. Niemand Ziet de Crisis die Komt, EenVandaag, December 12th 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=m9wM-p8wTq4#at=210 (accessed 03/04/2011), 03.00-03.30. 138 The US market, together with others such as the Chinese and European markets are the main benefitors of low oil prices and intra-OPEC rivalry. 139 Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 70. 140 Ibid., 70. 141 Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 55.
130

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oil production (control) has substantially grown in contrast to colonial and early post-colonial (imperialist) times (Seven Sisters)142 thus rendering them more independent political and economic power. 143

Figure 1.4 OPEC share of world crude oil reserves 2009.144

It has been suggested that the new Iraqi government -which is desperate for oil revenues might leave the OPEC cartel altogether and thus directly challenge the Saudis and the US by becoming an indepent exporter of cheap oil, cheating on official cartel quotas and subsequently generating even more financial revenues than its position within OPEC would authorize (cf. percentages fig. 1.4). This revolutionary scenary, however, has been invalidated by observers who have pointed out that Riyadh has the advantage of harbouring fareout the largest world resevers, i.e. a quarter of the globes conventional oil reserves145 whereas the regional Iraqi runner ups potential is perhaps one tenth.146 Riyadhs position is furthermore unique for its spare production capacity, which enables it to easily manage global market disruptions/deficits rendering the country enormous economic and political power. Because of these crucial assets, Saudi Arabia has the ability to engage Iraq in such a scenario through a price war (same low cost production and twice the reserves); an action they have proven to be willing to take in the past. Therefore, such a move would actually be foolish from an Iraqi point of view. Nevertheless, all extreme scenarios aside, experts do point out Iraqs strategic importance in the oil industry and its key position within OPEC: Of course, the nations shoddy petroleum infrastructure last sustantialy revamped in the 1970s- means that Iraqis could not suddenly ramp up output, but eventually Iraqi oil will put pressure on OPEC and its system of production quotas. 147 It is hereby worthy to mention that in 2008 a unity coaltion was formed in the Iraqi parliament, accros confessional lines to re-initiate the states management of its precious resourses. Thus, interestingly, when it comes to the oil-economy the Iraqi establishment was able to break through the Sunni-Shia dichotomy fairly easily.148 This is quite meaningfull. In the post-Saddam era, Iran has been supporting Iraqi Shiite parties that favour a federal, decentralized model, such as Al-Dawa, ISCI but also the Kurdish parties (in favour of the Sadrists). Hereby Iraqs OPEC potential is reduced into smaller entities; a divide-and-conquer strategy that serves Irans own strategic position within OPEC and diversifies its possibilites for coalitions during OPEC deliberations. Hereby, Iran can avoid a powerful block in the case of a Saudi-Iraqi (Arab) demarche on Iran. It is exactly this diverse political elite and its subsequent key OPEC shares that both Iran and Saudi Arabia wish to inluence. Clearly,
142

Seven multinational companies who controlled more than 90 per cent of the oil production outside the Soviet Union during the 1950s: five American, one British and one Dutch (cf. Pap, 2005, 55). 143 Papp, 2005, 55; De Ley, H., The Danish Cartoons: Contextualizing their Publication and the Muslim Response to it, Centrum voor Islam in Europa (2006), http://www.flw.ugent.be/cie/CIE2/deley36.htm#n12 (accessed on 02/03/2011). 144 OPEC, Annual Statistical bulletin 2009, OPEC, Vienna, 2010, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2009.pdf (accessed on 04/03/2011). 145 Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 70. 146 Ibid., 70. 147 Ibid., 70-1. 148 Brning, 2008, 70.

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bilateral tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran are for a substantial extent fuelled by energy politics. It is crucial to comprehend the nature of Saudi-Iranian relations with regard to the global oil business; only then, comes forth what is truly at stake in their economic rivalry over Iraq. They have been strong competitors in the oil bussines. Since both have very different domestic priorities (consumption) and external market strategies. Their disparity results from a difference in oil reserves and production capacity. Whereas Iranian reserves are estimated at 136 billion barrels, Saudi Arabia is reported to host a tantalizing 267 billion barrels in oil reserves. Moreover, the Saudi cost of extraction a barrel is estimated at $2 to $3 while Irans production costs weigh up to $15 a barrel; mainly due to sectoral inefficiency. Iran clearly takes interest in maximizing its profits in the near term since it does not believe its export reserves to last that long due to high domestic consumption rates (huge demography). This directly implies that Tehran actively lobbies for higher global market prices within OPEC and exports significantly more when oil prices are relatively high, in casu during global market disruptions. The Saudis, on the other hand, are more concerned about the longterm prospect since they have such vast amounts of oil commodities. They seek to temper the industrialized worlds push for alternative alternative energy sources and therefore tend to lower global market prices. It no coincidence that Saudi Arabia together with other Gulf states are repeatedly reported to block UNFCCC149 summits that deal with implementing global measures to reduce carbon emissions and global warming. 150 The different preference in market strategy between Riyadh and Tehran is also a direct reflection of their contrasting national make-up. High oil revenues for Iran imply high government subventions to handle the enormous post-revolutionary youth bulge; in Iran, domestic frustrations are met with cheap commodity prices (consumption). Therefore, the viability of Irans establishment is quite dependent on the countrys positioning within international oil and gas markets. Any prospect that could broker a better global position is actively pursued. Since oil is key to both countries economy, an Iraqi alliance would certainly serve to be a strategic and lucrative asset. The economic oil-factor in the regional interstate rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran should hence not be taken lightly. Saudi Arabia and Iran have not only opposing political agendas both are also ecomically opposed as far as OPEC is concerned. For Iran, a post-Saddam Iraq is, however, no de facto win-win situation; an idependent or more Saudi-oriented Iraqi stand in the oil market would directly affect Irans current OPEC runner-up position. Tehran thus has a substantial economic incentive to further influence politics in Iraq: they can either loose or win a lot of petro-dollars. Much of this will be decided in the coming years (political stabilization of Iraq). Clearly, when, it comes to Iraq, the essentialist presumption of an all-pervasive Sunni-Shia struggle is not whatsoever sufficient for thoroughly explaining intra-Iraqi developments (geopolitical patronage).151 Today, Irans economy is heavily dependent on the global oil market (commodity prices), which is clearly beyond its own control. Oil revenues are so essential to Iran because of its very undiversified economy. This sectorial depency is quite typical for contemporary Gulf nations in general, however, for a substantial country (demography) such as Iran, this is somehow remarkable and poses huge structural problems, which also have direct impact on the government budget and its spending; both domestically and foreign-politcy related. That is why oil revenues directly shape Tehrans domestic and regional profile, and, thus too its relation with the Iranian and Arab regional masses. In comparison to other oil-producing Gulf states, Iran has a more historical tradition of industrial development, which preceeds 1979. However, due to structural problems (1979, Iran-Iraq war, international embargo) there has been no major break-through with regard to diversifying the economy.152

UNFCCC conferences throughout the world (e.g. Copenhagen, Cancun); for more information, see also: UNFCCC, Johannesburg Summit 2002: Saudi Arabia Country Profile, UNFCCC, 2002, http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/wssd/saudiarabia.pdf (accessed on 02/03/2011). 150 See for example: AFP, Saudis Block Call for Global Warming Report, AFP, June 10th 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hqI3wKPaGKW8M_EyY25KvXg1yGIQ (accessed 10/03/2011). , http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8440181.stm (accessed 10/03/2011). 151 Brning, 2008, 70; Wehrey [et al.], 2009,72-3; Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 70-1; Taghavi, R., Iran vs. Iraq: Why Tehran is Nervous About Iraqi Oil, Time Magazine, April 22th 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2066791,00.html?xid=rss-fullworld-yahoo (accessed 10/05/2011). 152 Karshenas [et al.], 2008, 194-7.
149

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Figure 1.5 Cycles of economic growth and oil exports income in Iran, 1980-2001 (measurement in US$, three year moving averages). 153

Figure 1.6 Trends in share of manufacturing exports in Iran and Turkey, 1960-2000.154

Figure 1.5 clearly indicates that Irans economy is directly related to oil boom and bust periods. There has been a clear and immediate correlation between oil revenues and real GDP growth rate during such periods over the last two decades. There is a striking interrelation between the two variables; both on the up and down phases of the growth cycle. 155 Iranian economic growth activity is seen between 1982-3 right after the Iranian Revolution and the nationalization of the oil industry, between 1989-91 after the Iran-Iraq war when Iranian facilities were again operative and in 1996 during the post-Gulf War I era and the international (UN-endorsed) boycott156 of Iraq. Economic recessions correlates exactly with periods of decreased oil revenues: 1978-81 (Iranian Revolution and subsequent domestic political turmoil), 1984-6 (OPEC oil crisis), 1988 (intensified last-phase of the Iran-Iraq war), 1994 (austerity package and debt crisis) and 1997-8 (international oil price slump). Figure 1.6 indicates that Iran has not managed to systematically increase its manufactured exports since the 1960s. This strongly contrasts the steady increase of the manufacturing export share of neighbouring Turkey; a country with a similar in size and less energy-potential (resources). This clearly signals Irans ongoing problem of economic sternness. Inter-related to this weakness is Irans inability to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) over the years; this of course inasmuch due to international imposed sactions, mainly from G8 member countries. Figure 1.7 indicates that Irans total net FDI only amounted to a paltry 0.34 per cent in 2001, a negligible share in comparison with other MENA countries; certainly when one bears in mind that the region is already underrepresented in the global FDI share.157

153 154

Ibid., 198. Ibid., 196. 155 Ibid., 199. 156 UN Oil-for-food Programme; some buyers hence shifted their interest towards Iran. 157 Karshenas [et al.], 2008, 195-6, 197-9.

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Figure 1.7 Irans foreign direct investment inflows as a proportion of MENAs FDI inflows, 2001.158

One should mark how, also with regard to the context of oil economics, quite phantasmagorical (undefined) and threat-depicting amalgamations of complex (political and economic) dynamics are made by pseudo market analysts (on low quality websites) 159. Hereby, one should also take note of the applied terminology in this narrative (cf. axis, Iraqi Shiites); the use of such highly subjective speech will be further assessed in the last second of this paper (cf. Part II).
Crude oil is the key weapon in the battle between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, aligned with the United States, against the Oil Axis of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. The Persian Gulf Oil kingdoms fear the emergence of a Tehran-led axis linking Iran, Iraqi Shiites, Syria, Lebanon's Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas in Gaza, and Islamic militants linked to al Qaeda trying to topple the Saudi royal family. Earlier this month, Riyadh fired the first shot in the war against Iran, by knocking the price of crude oil to as low as $50 per barrel. The goal is to squeeze Iran's budget and wreck havoc on its economy, as much as possible, before the Ayatollahs can get their hands on the nuclear bomb. According to a Jan 24th report in the UK Telegraph, that indicated North Korea is helping Iran to prepare an underground nuclear test similar to the one Pyongyang carried out last year. 160

Hereby, another energy-related issue comes forth. Since it is clear that, the less Iran is dependent on oil for domestic consumption, the more it can export/sell (its main income), one could interpret Irans push for nuclear energy as a push towards industrial development and state-led economic diversification. Nuclear energy would directly imply diversifying the domestic energy consumption. As such, one could economically rationalize the narrow threat logic regarding the Iranian nuclear question; there is always more than mere simplism. Today, nuclear energy is a major source of energy in the world, producing about 17 per cent of the world electricity. At the beginning of the 21st century, limited forms of substantial alternative energy generation have been found or developed to replace fossil fuels. All the progressive ideas and rhetoric aside, it can arguably be stated that nuclear energy is still vital for any advanced and populous economy in todays globalized world. Nuclear energy and its technology are thus also a highly competitive issue, not only as a market force, but also as a state-owned and state-supervised commodity. Not only oil-purchasing industrialized nations want to decrease their dependency fossil fuels record nuclear energy generation and consumption was reported for the US, Germany, France, India, Brazil since the early 2000s- but also oil-producing countries such as Iran comprehend the medium-term sustainable economic rationale for doing so.161 As such, it is clear that nuclear proliferation is essentially a political problem as was the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facilities in Osirak in June, 1981; it was a political move based on geo-economic and geopolitical calculations.162 Iran, like any country in the world is increasingly worried about meeting its domestic energy demands and about the growth of its national undiversified economy (global economic integration). This is universal economic logic within an economically competitive world. People that underscore such basic structures also comprehend that without the introduction of nuclear facilities and with additional international sanctions blocking FDI flows (to increase sectorial efficiency), Iran will not keep up with its domestic energy consumption and relative economic advancement (regional competition). Any nation-state with prospects of economic growth has comprehensively calculated that the
158 159

Ibid., 198. My point here is to alert the reader of the absurdity within the general information flow regarding the topic of Shiite Expansion; I do not whatsoever consider this website or its content to be of any substantial value. 160 Dorsch, G., The USA and Saudi Arabia Combat the Axis of Oil Iran, Russia and Venezuala, The Market Oracle, February 4 th 2007, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article304.html (accessed on 11/05/2011). 161 Karshenas [et al.], 2008, 191; Askarieh, 2008, 181-3. 162 Parsi, 2008, 142-3.

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worlds energy consumption will only continue to increase in the medium term. For developing countries in particular, an increasing demand for energy and electricity will go hand in hand, since these countries will likely be the ones with the largest global economic and demographic growth shares (mutiplyer effect). This relates to a dialectic strive to raise domestic living standards and spending power. It is not a coincidence that UN reports regarding the much promoted Millenium Development Goals indicate that Eastern Asia (e.g. China) and Latin America (e.g. Brasil) have reached or nearly reached some of their most important, previously set Millenium Development Goal targets (MDGs). Due to their economic growth and industrial development, they have, by themselves (without any ODA and forced SAPs) lifted hugh amounts of people from beneath the poverty line. This is quite impressive and meaningfull with regard to the overall debate surrounding the development of the underdeveloped third world.163 Hence, the push for nuclear energy in Iran is not merely a push towards diversifying its domestic energy market and consumption; it is also a top-down effort to gain more control over its own economy destiny (i.e. stabitilty and growth) vis--vis the external oil market. If Iran succeeds in diversifying its domestic energy consumption, it will advance economically and it will still hold a strong position within the global fossil fuel market since the global market will still demand such resources in the near to longterm future. Additionally, Iran would also have more space to leave its resources underneath its surface for the time being and first develop a competitive petrochemical industry; a strategy, which Iraqi officials already envisaged in the 1970s and early 1980s. This nuclear move forms integral part of improving Irans energy effiency and developing a more dependable, sustainstable and lucrative energy future. It should of course be noted that even the Shah already planned to engage in nuclear energy, since also he comprehended and advocated the medium-term economic benefit of nuclear technology. Interestingly, this was scheduled to take place in collaboration with the US government (Kissinger) and leading US universities (MIT). This clearly contrast George W. Bush and his neo-conservatis fellows comments (political narrative) that only interpreted Iranian nuclear advancement as a warmongering step towards an irrational Iranian acquirement of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). There is of course more to the world than a simplistic and dichotomous War on Terror, i.c. economic developent and capitalist integration. Todays current narrative still seems only to narrowly culminate around statements that proclaim that Iran cant possibly need nuclear energy, since it has such vast resources of petroleum. 164 Current Israeli president Shimon Peres is a passionate supporter of such logic and uses reference to Irans future bomb systematically in his discussions regarding the Palestinian affairs.165 Such statements forget to mention that both commodities (petrol, nuclear energy) are actually strongly interrelated and conveniently silence the fact that nuclear enrichment is an a-priori legal right under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).166 Interestingly, analyses even indicate that Iran cannot afford to develop a military nuclear capability at the present moment due to several structural problems it faces (costs, international pressure, priority of investment in the civil sector, dependency on Russia) and it is furthermore argued by scholars that the current push for nuclear energy is actually mainly focused upon installing a civilian nuclear infrastructure.167 But from a realist point of view, even a military nuclear capacity would not entail a mere aggressive or irrational strategy; it would in fact symbolize a well-calculated deterrence logic consolidating Iranian souvereignty.168 Realist observers such as F. Gregory Gause III have depited the current standoff quite accurately and well balanced by stating that: It

Askarieh, 2008, 182, 192; ECOSOC, The Millenium Development Goals Report 2010, ECOSOC, June 15th 2010, http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/MDG%20Report%202010%20En%20r15%20-low%20res%2020100615%20-.pdf (accessed on 02/03/2011), 6-13, 57-8. 164 Karshenas [et al.], 2008, 194-201, 212-15; Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 71; Lustick, 1997, 671; Lotfian, 2008, 158-9, 161; Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 35-6. 165 Peres, S., Israeli president: Need for peace deal with Palestinians is 'urgent', CNN, June 19th 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/06/19/israel.mideast.peace/index.html (accessed on 19/06/2011), 02.40-03.00. The same goes for Israeli officials in the UN; see for instance, the latest statements made by the Israeli delegation in the UNSCR during their July debate regarding the PAs unilateral statehood bid: +972, Palestinian UN Envoy Breaks Down at Security Council, +972, July 28th 2011, http://972mag.com/watch-palestinian-un-envoy-breaks-down-at-security-council/ (accessed 28/07/2011), 00.50.00-00.51.30, 00.52.10-00.53.00. 166 Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 35-6. 167 Lotfian, 2008, 174-5 168 Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 35-8; Lotfian, 2008, 162-3.
163

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can be argued that the United States today poses both a military threat and a domestic-destabilization threat to Iran. In these cases, when the two types of threat are combined, it is easy to predict how the threatened state will behave. It will use all of its resources to resist that threat.169 Renowned hyper-rational critic and MIT professor Noam Chomsky further exemplified this in his writings in 2007 by looking plainly at facts without resorting to simplistic impressionism that is often applied with regard to Iran:
The invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan surrounded Iran with US forces, in the Gulf and Central Asia as well. Pakistan has nuclear weapons, but the major nuclear power in the region is Israel. It has hundreds of nuclear weapons and presumably other weapons of mass destruction. Iran is simply surrounded by hostile forces. The invasion of Iraq was a very clear signal, quite well understood everywhere, that if you want to deter a US invasion, you have to have some kind of deterrent. One deterrent is terror. Another deterrent is nuclear weapons. So the invasion of Iraq was basically a plea to Iran to develop nuclear weapons. And thats understood. One of Israels leading military historians, Martin van Creveld wrote in the International Herald Tribune that of course Israel doesnt want Iran to get nuclear weapons but if there not doing it, theyre crazy given the strategic situation and the US invasion of Iraq.170

Such rational arguments clearly counter those that narrowly make claim of Irans ideologically-driven world-view and irrational desire for war. Today, Tehrans main concern relates to further industrial development, since the country has both the demography and the economic resources for above-range economic growth rates and the potential to join the rank of highincome devolping countries.171 To do so Iran needs to invest in new equipment and dominant global technology (nuclear energy) and diversify its economy by decreasing its sectorial dependency (oil revenues) and sectorial inefficiency. These are some fundamental sidemarks that one needs to bear in mind when applying often frightening labels to Iran (e.g. expansionist, Islamist Shia-Persian). It is worthy to point out that, although agreements were made within the OPEC cartel a promising monopoly on oil and mutual sharing of all the members profits- OPEC was initially solely beneficial to four states only (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait) which held between them 75 per cent of the regional oil reserve and about 50 per cent of all the worlds oil.172 However, even within this quartet Riyadh has shown hegemonic tendencies to dominate the cartel. Riyadh occasionally alters the cartels official market strategy by unilaterally endorsing overproduction. It has done so as early as 1985. Since it has the largest OPEC share it has been able to enforce and consolidate these actions. Saudi Arabia has effectively grown out to an arbiter of the global oil market. However, not only Riyadh posseses influence on the global oil market, is clear that also other key players within OPEC have the ability to determine OPECs market strategy. Consequently, the nature of this bodys strategy has a direct impact on the economies of Gulf states (domestic revenues) and immediately determines the economic and political impact pressure of those member countries within the global economy and geopolitical sphere. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran hope that Iraq with its 115 billion barrels of oil reserves (cf. fig. 1.4)- will endorse their own strategy, since such intra-OPEC alliances are crucial in shaping and consolidation OPECs external policy. Riyadh is withfully aware of the fact that high oil prices, unstable oil markets and environmental incentives might push the global energy economy beyond fossil fuel fixation. This would be a dramatic scenario for a country of which its sole economic activity centers around its rentier make-up and which harbours the world largest fossil fuels resources. Therefore, the Saudis have become renowned for their diplomatic management of the global oil supply; by instanteneously bringing their idle capacity on stream, they have numerously filled in global disruptions (Iranian Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, 2003 Venezuelan political crisis, fractious Nigerian elections and 2003 Iraq War). Riyadh has ever since gotten better at this. In the past, oil crises did have severe impact on the global economy. The latest example of market management of the OPEC strongman was, interestingly, made just recently when Saudi officials agreed to produce more oil than their OPEC-agreed percentage securing the global supply chain during the 2010-2011 popular uprisings in the Arab world (the Arab Spring). This move immediately stabilized the oil price. By doing so, they made up for the Lybian deficit, (from their part)

169 170

Gause, 2007, 122. Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 35. 171 Jalali-Naini, 2008, 217. 172 Papp, 2005, 56.

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safeguarded US and EU economic recovery and, interestingly, moderated Iranian profits. Such management demonstrates Riyadhs very relationship with the industrialized world, i.e. its geopolitical and economic alignment.173 An article published on the website of The Economist on March 3, 2011 accurately reported this situation:
There are good reasons to worry. The Middle East and North Africa produce more than one-third of the worlds oil. Libyas turmoil shows that a revolution can quickly disrupt oil supply. Even while Muammar Qaddafi hangs on with delusional determination and Western countries debate whether to enforce a no-fly zone, Libyas oil output has halved, as foreign workers flee and the country fragments. The spread of unrest across the region threatens wider disruption. The markets reaction has been surprisingly modest. The price of Brent crude jumped 15% as Libyas violence flared up, reaching $120 a barrel on February 24th. But the promise of more production from Saudi Arabia pushed the price down again. It was $116 on March 2nd20% higher than the beginning of the year, but well below the peaks of 2008. Most economists are sanguine: global growth might slow by a few tenths of a percentage point, they reckon, but not enough to jeopardise the rich worlds recovery. 174

Other contemporary reports also show that Riyadh preferred not to announce their willfullness publicly due to the political sensitivities in the region and the internal dynamics of OPEC.175 Interestingly, it was furthermore reported on June 2011 that OPEC was unable to reach a new agreement (production quotas) on global oil supply. The Libian oil crisis seems to have hit the very core of OPECs intra-cartel oppositions. At the time being, Riyadh (backed by Kuwait and the UAE) agreed on a platform with industrialized nations in Vienna- to increase global supply (fill in deficits) while other key OPEC countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Iran and Iraq obstructed this strategy. While Riyadh wanted to set the crude oil price at $80 per barrel, the other members lobbied to keep it well above $100 a barrel. These are remarkable contemporary dynamics that highlight the very issue that is at stake regarding Iraqs future positioning within the OPEC cartel. Interestingly, it appears that Iraq is currently favouring the Iranian strategy. In this context, it is no wonder that Ali al-Naimi, the Saudi oil minister, was quoted saying that they were unable to reach an agreement, this is one of the worst meetings we have ever had. 176 It is no secret that Saudi Arabia uses its powerful influence and unique position within in the oil market to engage Iran geopolitically. Riyadh damages Irans national budget (oil revenues) as a weapon in their geopolitical and geo-economic powerplay; Nawaf Obaid, a former security advisor of the current Saudi monarch, literally stated in an article he wrote for the Washington Post in 2006:
Finally, Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding of the Iraqi and Lebanese militias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the price of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending. But it would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today's high prices. The result would be to limit Tehran's ability to continue funneling hundreds of millions each year to Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere. 177

Clearly, intra-cartel rivalry has grown out to be quite explicit, which ever more highlights the importance of Iraqs intermediary position. Of course, high oil prices are not only an Iranian dream; it is worthy to point out that all oil producing countries in the Gulf from Saudi Arabia to Dubai- benefitted economically form the US led invasion of Iraq. Although many of them opposed the invasion, it proved to render them an economic boom afterwards. This is not only due to the invasion and the global market itself, but also the non-recovery of Iraqs export capacities in the subsequent years as a result of the Iraqi insurgency. 178
Many reasons are cited for why oil prices reached a peak of nearly $80 a barrel in July 2006: strong demand in China, India and other emerging markets; low investment during the previous two decades in new oil reserves and refining capacity; supply disruptions in other oi-producing countries such as Nigeria; fear of terrorist attackson oil pipelines and other infrastructure, especially in Saudi Arabia. None is untrue, but even all these reasons together do not amount to a convincing case for why the price rose so sharply. The missing piece if the puzzle is the invasion of Iraq. Just prior to the invasion, oil cost about $30 a barrel. During the subsequent three years, the price more than doubled. Arab stock markets boomed on the back of that Government budgets, which previously were stretched or even in deficit, suddenly moved into surplus thanks to the flood of oil revenues, allowing countries such as Saudi Arabia, worried about unemployement

173 174

Papp, 2005, 51-6; Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 71. The Economist, Oil and the Economy: The 2011 Oil Shock, The Economist, March 3th 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18281774 (accessed on 11/05/2011). 175 Al Jazeera, Saudis to Offset Libya Oil Decline, Al Jazeera, February 26th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/02/2011226134942661640.html (accessed on 11/05/2011). 176 Al Jazeera, OPEC Rejects Increase in Oil Supply, Al Jazeera, June 8th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/06/201168123819705145.html (accessed on 11/05/2011). 177 Obaid, N., Stepping into Iraq, The Washington Post, November 29th 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html (accessed on 03/03/2011). 178 Emmot, in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 47-8.

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and social discontent, to increase public spending.179

At the time being, the OPEC cartel was not worried about high oil prices because too many benefitted; a typical logic of capitalism. One observer has symbolically remarked: Go to Dubai, Qatar, or any of the city-states of the Gulf and the thing that most catches the eye is the amount of construction going on: gleaming skyscrapers, holiday resorts, opulent apartment buildings, desalination plants, and more.180 As such, it becomes clear why from the 1980s Iraqs main regional (economic) competitors were key Arab Gulf states with an oil-producing capacity and not per se Iran. In effect, one could ask: what is OPEC more than an institutionalized effort to bind the economic destinies of the regional countries; to combine their economic potential and to cosolidate a common market strategy? One cannot call the organization an economic, unifying success when one bears in mind that two of its member state fought a destructive war (1981-1988), that one of its member invaded another (1990) and that one of its key member states (Iraq) was invaded twice by the global military super power (1991, 2003). In light of such economic uncertainty and regional interstate rivalry, how to explain Iraqs aggression of Kuwait in the early 1990s if not Saddams effort to increase his OPEC share, control the oil price (by pressuring Saudi Arabia) and revive his war-thorn economy (revenues) to reassure Iraqi hegemony in the Arab Gulf region? From an economic point of view (realism) one could actually interpret the very existence of tiny oil states in the Gulf as a somehow artificial anomaly; certainly when bearing in mind that they did not economically integrate (GCC) with neighbouring states such as Iraq once the most industrialized nation of the Arab world owning the forth largest army of the globe- and Iran. Clearly, the latter could be the economic engine of the entire region (like France and Germany within the EU). It is an illusion to state that a purely free market framework (global market strategy), with a high numbers of competing and fragmented oil producers would be an adavantage for any OPEC producing (and even consuming) country in the long-term. It can be argued that the existence and persistence of small oil-producing Gulf states and the absence of comprehensive economic integration in the Persian Gulf is the reflection of supra-regional power projections, that is, the geopolitical divide-and-rule strategy of the imperialist, most industrialized nations of the globe (US). It can be argued that Irans current push for economic intergration vis--vis Iraq (oil industry, petro-chemical industry a.o.) in a patronizing way, to be clear- stem from the prospect of outmaneuvering the imbalance in economic regionalism (GCC) in the medium term.181 The importance of such regional economic interdependence/capitalist integration (common market, free trade zones) is a logic that Turkey has also understood182; certainly when full EU membership seemed not to be so imminent (2000s). To use the withfull and visionary insight of Turkeys current foreign minister (and professor) Ahmet Davutolu:
Turkey is not the endpoint of East and Greece for example is not the endpoint of West; in this global world this type of terminology should be changed. It is time to end these abnormalities [terminology]. What is normality? Normality means economic interdependece. [] Why do we need to call this Arab, Turkish or Iranian [unions]; call it regionalism. [] All countries want to play an important role. Some European countries want to play a global role and nobody questions this. When Turkey says we want to contribute to global peace [economic regionalism] then there is the question: Do you want to create an Ottoman Empire? No!183

The question of Turkeys ambition to redeploy an Ottoman Empire clearly parallels the question of Irans so-called aspiration to consolidate a Shia Crescent. The terminology applied in both questions is in fact quite irrelevant regarding 21st century economic and political realities (interstate-complexes and economic regionalism) in the Middle East. Clearly, the economic ambitions of some states are discursed with distortive and amalgamazing culturalistic labels by others. It can legitimately be argued that such questions are quite absurd and signal foremost a-priori biased and even prejudiced framework of questioning. When Iran would tie its economic destiny to Iraq, it would not only generate probable economic prosperity (oil block); it would
179 180

Ibid., 47-8. Ibid., 47. 181 Parasiliti, 2003, 161; Lustick, 1997, 675; Karshenas [et al.], 2008, 208. 182 Today, Turkeys export to the Arab world are worth $32 billion a year. (Cf. Al Jazeera, The New Ottomans?, Al Jazeera (Empire), June 16th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/empire/2011/06/201161682640911172.html (accessed on 20/06/2011), 09.10-09.20). 183 Davutolu, A., The New Ottomans?, Al Jazeera (Empire), June 16th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/empire/2011/06/201161682640911172.html (accessed on 20/06/2011) , 44.45-45.45.

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mitigate the recurrence of warfare between the two key Gulf nations.184 It is, in this sense, quite remarkable how Iran has remained a rather isolated economy over the past few decades. Its trade with the region was marginal in 2006 and a great deal of its imports were delivered by non-regional countries (EU, China, Japan), with the only exception of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These considerations become even more important when we consider Tehrans exports. Observers noted that in 2007, two thirds of its entire exports185 had non-regional destinies (EU, China, Japan, South korea, South Africa), while inter-regional trade with the Arab zone stagnated along a marginal 10 per cent. Many Arab countries favour trading with OECD countries than with Iran since this uderscores their existing geopolitical security ties (arms supllies, military training etc.). In this view, it is no surprise that Iran is inversting millions of dollars to engrain its influence in its Iraqi neighbour (housing, charity, security etc.). Irans policy calculations towards Iraq are not based on brotherly Shiite support but rather on prospects of economic intergration schemes, certainly now they can enforce their dominance over an economically weak Iraq.186 It is worthy to furthermore note that future dynamics of rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran are likely to intensify since Russian oil companies -who see the benefit in the absence of Western investors blocked by their own governments sanctions, ruling out any private investments (FDI) in the Iranian oil or gas industry- might soon step in soon to reduce Irans sectoral ineffiency. A RussianIranian oil partnership would strengthen the already existing political and military187 ties between the two countries and subsequently further alarm Riyadh about Iranian power-projection capabilities in the Gulf and Middle East, most notably in oil-rich Iraq.188 Also China, widely believed to be the only credible long-term rival to the United States189-,has seemingly not felt intimidated by the US and its allies in working with Iran. Contrary to the EU, its companies invest daily in Irans energy potential; chinese investments190 have also come with subsequent military and diplomatic ties. Interestingly, this Chinese attitude has triggered US media headlines such as How Dangerous is China?. Every nation-state that might oppose US (and EU) interests in the post-Cold War era is appearently suspicious, to say the least (Iran, Turkey, China). In accordance with labels attributed to Iran (Shia Crescent) and Turkey (Ottomanism), one could arguably note an imminent tendency towards Sinic phobia (anti-China rhetoric) that primarily stems from geo-enomic motives. Let us hereby not forget the joint 2010 Turkish-Brasilian initiative to broker a deal regarding Irans nuclear programme. 191 This general tendency is understood by the fact that a diverse set of new economic power poles (BRICS) are currently on the rise; certainly now the USs economic control over Latin America192 (IMF, World Bank, CIA sponsored military coups) seems to be fading and vast (central) Asian economies are advancing. 193 The energy demands coming from Asian emerging economies, play an increasingly important role in Middle Eastern political antagonisms; especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is exemplified by recent media reports on Indias altering commercial relations194 between Middle Eastern energy-exporting countries:

184

A parallel can be made with the unifying economic cooporation scheme (EU) between key European powers (historical adversaries) such as France and Germany; the current strongmen and engine of the European economic and political project. 185 This to a certain extent logical, due to the aforementioned fact that Irans economy is rather undiversified and centered around the export of its natural resources; a commodity that also is present in most of its immediate neighbours. 186 Terhalle, 2007, 74-6. 187 Its not a surprise that Russia together with China have traditionally blocked or softened Western economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran; this reflects deeper economic and political structures. See for example: Al Jazeera, China Against another Iran Sanction, Al Jazeera, July 4th 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2007/07/2008525122313671306.html (accessed on 11/05/2011); The Economist, An Iranian Nuclear Bomb, or the Bombing of Iran?, The Economist, December 3rd 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/15016192?story_id=E1_TVDTGTJN (accessed on 02/02/2011). 188 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 72-3. 189 Tsang, S., in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 44-45. 190 Which are also present in Saudi Arabia and Iraq; Beijings FDI strategy is typed by extreme global diversification. 191 BBC News, Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal with Turkey, BBC News, May 17th 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8685846.stm (accessed 10/03/2011). 192 The best example is Brasil, which is lobbying for a permanent UNSC position and has over the years taken quite some high-profiled diplomatic actions. The most important was its agreement, reached together with Turkey and Iran over the latters nuclear programme, which was, interestingly disregarded by the US and the EU. 193 Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 38-40; see also: Solmirano & Wezeman, 2011, 3. 194 This is of course interrelated with the US (shifting) relations with India and Pakistan in the backdrop of the Chinese challenge.

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Iran's oil industry has come under increasing pressure in recent months due to international sanctions. India, one of Iran's major customers, owes Tehran billions of dollars in dues which it cannot pay due to banking sanctions; Iran has threatened to cut back its exports to India, which has started buying more Saudi oil in response.195

In light of these events, it is thus worthy to note that Iran is more eastward-oriented196 in geo-economic terms. In 2007, Iran was already an observant member of the Russia and China based Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) a regional energy and security corporation- while many central Asian countries had already joined. However, since Tehran hasnt been granted fullmembership yet, it still seems to envision an independent energy security system to ensure its profits and economic advancement. However, that aspiration could change together with the mounting international pressure (sanctions). Nevertheless, the independent strategy would seem more possible if an Iraqi political elite emerged that would envisage a similarly independent energy policy. Together, they would have the potential to work out a powerful coalition within OPEC, set up and independent body of their own or even lobby together for full membership within the increasingly important SCO.197 This Chinese and Russian-led corporative bloc (SCO) is speculated (media) to be the platform whereof both countries are said to be preparing a NATO like organization; a NATO of the East, which would further secure central Asian economic integration efforts. However, these speculations seem, for the time being, sensationalist overstatements. 198 What can be said though, is that increasing economic cooperation schemes are emerging in the region in which Iran seems to be a substantial player (potential). The country has already suggested future collaboration with Russia in creating an OPEC-like for gas exports in the near future, in a joint effort to combine their leading global positions as gas exporters. Interestingly, at the time being, Saudi officials were immediately seen to engage Qatar a major gas hub- in high-level talks to ensure its GCC alignment vis--vis such future Iranian-Russian aspirations.199 Clearly, the region as a whole and its political establishments are in fact part of a global economic system, that is, the world capitalism system. Thus, modern political dynamics in the Middle East, such as the Iranian Revolution, the Rushdie affair, the surge of Islamist inspired andti-occupation and anti-regime militancy, the authoritarian Arab regimes themselves 200, anti-Shia and anti-Western Iranian rhetoric are indeed highly interdependent and interrelated with global economic dynamics and the global politcs of state-interests. It should be argued that, today, capitilism in itself is a neutral and hegemonic (i.e. omnipresent) notion.201 This immediately implies that it isultimately capitalist-driven geopolitical (i.e. materialist) considerations that currently motivate the foreign policy of so called Shia Iran and key Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt in the Middle East, rather than any religious ideology (political Islam, Shiism), or more abstractlty culture (Islam, Sunnism, Shiism), in and by itself (cultural vocation). In the post-Cold War era this idea, however, does not stand uncontentend, e.g. the culturalistic, dichotomous and linear democratisation logic (modernization paradigm) of people such as Samuel Huntington: In the Arab WorldWestern democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces.202 In fact, such logic has only been gaining vast audiences over the past decade (post9/11, War on Terror etc.). It is hereby interesting to make a Cold War parallel. A sharp-minded Marxist critic and theorist named Tony Cliff has articulated an utterly interesting view in one of his works entitled State Capitalism in Russia. He, amongst others, has argued that is was not socialism itself that motivated and defined Soviet (domestic and foreign) policy but rather capitalist incentive. He states that the Soviet Union was -notwithstanding its formal aversion of capitalism- genrally organized along capitalist lines, that is, as a state-led

Al Jazeera, Ahmadinejad Names General to Run Oil Ministry, Al Jazeera, July 27th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/07/201172713519795674.html (accessed on 27/07/2011). 196 The same goes for another big OPEC paria that is not aligned with the US: Venezuala (Cf. Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 42). 197 Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 38-40; Tsang, S., in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 44-45; Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 70. 198 Al Jazeera, A NATO for the East?, Al Jazeera (Inside Story), June 18th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/06/201161884152617255.html (accessed on 20/06/2011), see for example: 00.40 & 02.00. 199 Wehrey [et al.], 2009,73, 74. 200 Zemni & Parker, 2002, 2. 201 Ibid., 1-2. 202 Frum, D., in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 44.
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capitalist unit on a global level. This does not imply that the Soviet state-led capitalist economy didnt have any particularities; on the contrary, its expressions within the Soviet Union -like in Iran with the case of Shia popular culture- expressed itself psychologically and physically through Communist symbolism (e.g. communes)203, which subsequently generated a particular popular culture among Soviet civilians. He argued that State capitalism and a workers state are two stages in the transition period from capitalism to socialism. State capitalism is the extreme opposite of socialism they are symmetrically opposed, and they are dialectically united with one another.204 At the time being, Moscow was propagted as the supposed core state of an alleged transnational (evil) Communist ideology yes, indeed one should remark a parallel between contemporary US propaganda and current Jordanian, Egyptian and Saudi propagations targetting Iran by discreditingShiism. This was done by its geopolotical adversaries; led by the United States. Cliffinterpretes the Soviet Union merely as a state among many (geopolitical interstate unit) that claimed to inspire itself on Marxist and socialist ideology (e.g. Communist China, North Korea, Cuba etc.), engrained within a global interstate capitalist network (i.e. accumulation of wealth, interstate economic rivalry, global trade etc.). In effect, how else can one understand perestroika and glasnost if not through the Unions global interdepence and its altering position within the global economy. 205 Some have interestingly differed by advocating the inherent inferiority of socialism itself; this argumentation is similar to adhering to Islams supposed inferiority to explain economic underdevelopment in the Middle East (e.g. Iran):
As they turn against the Iraq war, Americans seem also to have rejected the sunny assumptions about the Middle East upon which it was founded. Bush argued that terrorism was the work of a tiny handful of extremists, repudiated by the vast majority of Middle Easterners. His fellow Americans no longer believe him. More and more are coming to believe that Islam really is inherently hostile to democracy and the West. Civilizations are clashing. Paul Wolfowitz has lost. Sam Huntington has won.206

A proof for the fact that Soviet policy was foremost based on geopolitical considerations and economic incentives is found in Mikhail Gorbachevs support of the 1990 US-led coalition against Iraq, a Third World state aligned to Moscow by treaty.207 Another interesting example is todays Republic of China, which officially still adheres (political propagation) to the communist ideology this could clearly be detected during its recent celebrations of its 90th anniversary-, however, the country has entered the 21st century as a typical capitalist state, both domestically (consumerist behaviour) as internationally (capitialist trade, accumulation).208 Thus, however one tries to label Iran and its foreign policy, or Iraqi politics (Shia, Islamic Republic), indeed, pro- or anti-Shiite rhetoric is clearly related to economic dynamics. At the end of the day, the emerging Iraqi politcal establishment (Shia or not) will have to manage the Iraqi state among lines that every nation-state of todays world is inclined to do (trade, competition). Slavoj Zizek has accurately described the current omnipresence of neutral capitalist universality in one of his recent publications entitled Tolerance as an Ideological Category:
A possible argument against capitalist universality is that, within each civilizations, the same same capitalist mechanisms are symbolized, integrated into the concrete social whole, in a different way (they certainly affect a Protestant society different than a Muslim one). So while capitalism certainly is composed of a set of transcultural features, it nontheless functions within each society as a particular subsystem integrated each time into a specific, overdetermined articulation, that is, into the texture of social symbolic relations. It is like the use of the same words by different social groups; although we all talk about computers or virtual reality, the scope of meaning of these terms is not the same in a San Francisco hacker community and in a small working-class town in economic depression. Precisely for this reason, the capitalist matrix of social relations is real; it is that which in all possible symbolic universes, functions in the same transsymbolic way. Even if it doesnt mean the same thing to the individuals in different communities, even if it doesnt inscribe itself into the totality of their life-worlds in the same way, it generates the same formal set of social relations, pursuing its circular movement of selfreproduction. In the US or in China, in Peru or in Saudi Arabia, the same profit-oriented matrix is at work.209

That is why the Soviet leaders were first charmed by the idea of the Israeli Kibbutsim. Stalin thought that it signaled the beginning of socialist state (potential ally) and thus recognized Israel on May 17, 1948; he, however, failed to note Ben Gurions and Zionist Marxist movements in Mandate Palestine such as MAPAM & MAPAI- interpretation of labour: exclusively Jewish. For more information on Leftist and Marxist (pre-)Israeli socio-political movements such as MAPAI and MAPAM, (Cf. Schindler, 2008, 13, 18-21, 31-33, 36-37, 70-72). 204 Cliff, 1974, chapt. 5 State capitalism a transition to socialism, http://marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1955/statecap/ch05.htm#s2. 205 Callinicos, 2009, 53-61; Papp, 2005, 43-45; Golan, 1922, 213-18. 206 Frum, D., in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 44. 207 Golan, 1922, 213-18. 208 Al Jazeera, Chinese Communists Assert Party Supremacy, Al Jazeera, July 2nd 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/video/asiapacific/2011/07/20117202013658493.html (accessed on 10/07/2011), 0.20-0.57. 209 iek, 2008, 673.
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To speak in the name of Islam, is in many ways a political tool.210 When one inquires thoroughly enough, one is inclined to comprehend how extremely political the very actions taken in the name of Islam or tradition in fact are and how localized Islamic -and sectarian or even Leftist- narratives can be. This localilized character of the Islamist narratives and actions often accord with the particular history and circumstances in which each branch of the political Islamist movement developed. 211 It is for instance no coincidence that Turkeys leading Islamist party, the AKP, stands for The Justice and Development Partynor was its last election campaign slogan chosen by mere chance: Let stability continue, let Turkey grow. 212 Without ignoring Islamic sentiment (subaltern), academic scholars such as Bilgi University professor Soli zel, have interestingly claimed that it was foremost its economic performance e.g. an economic growth rate of 8.9 per cent in 2010- that secured the partys re-election in mid-2011: at the end of the day, like all other electorates, the Turks vote with their pocket books. 213 As Exeter professor Larbi Sadiki recently indicated in one of his media published essays, the localized character and the general zeitgeist (socialism, USS.R, Cold War) of is also reflected in Hizbullahs party rhetoric, i.c. in its political manifestos (1985, 2009): Hezbollah's 1985 first political manifesto, The Open Letter, [al-Risalah al-Maftuhah], resonates with Che-Khomeini rhetoric: the language of world imperialism mixed with meaning about the oppressed, down-trodden, justice, self-determination and liberty.214 This of course relates directly to the Lebanese context where Shiite communities and the rural areas were vastly neglected (underveloped) and politically marginalized during 20th century state-building efforts; throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Beiruts Southern suburbs were known as the Belt of Misery.215 It is clear that today, Shii populations are shaped by local social, political and economical conditions.216 In contrast to the dichotomous and culturalistic views promoted by scholars such as Samuel Huntington and others Islam as promoting violence217- and in accordance to the aformentioned material incentive of oil as a key factor for regional and global economies, it would be far more comprehensive and appropriate to advocate that political Islam is currently serving as the latest popular ideology that both Middle Eastern masses and elites apply to gain more souvereignity and indepence within the world capitalist system. In historical perspective, modern political Islam began as an elitist intellectual excercise in the nineteenth century, but only gained significance in the region from the 1980s onward, i.c. during the Iranian revolution and the definite decline of Leftist ideology (Marxism, Leninism, Nasirism, Bathism etc.). This contemporary convergence of such popular ideologies is, however, still apparent and is best symbolized by the fact that over time members of Hamas in Palestine were also simultaneously activists of Leftist fronts and vice versa. Interestingly enough, the rise of political Islam subsequently concentrated itself most, there where the political and social needs were most accute: the OPTs (Gaza), Lebanon in the 1980s (civil war), disintegrating Iraq and Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood, ISCI, al-Dawa etc.). As such, it becomes clear that this chameleon nature of political Islamic groups explains why it is so difficult to categorize clearly the nature of political Islam in the twentieth century in the Middle East. When the particular socio-political organization/context (occupation, institutionalized confesionalism, autoritarian rule etc.) in which people live fails to be beneficial for the collective, political Islam has shown to become more attractive.218 Academics have furthermore noted that Islamic political movements and personalities are in fact highly heterogeneous. One can
210 211

Papp, 2005, 279. Ibid., 279. 212 Al Jazeera, Turkey Election: Profile: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Al Jazeera, May 27th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/turkeyelection/2011/05/2011526121054590355.html (accessed on 10/07/2011). 213 zel, S., The New Ottomans?, Al Jazeera (Empire), June 16th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/empire/2011/06/201161682640911172.html (accessed on 20/06/2011), 11.00-12.00. 214 Larbi, S. Hebollah and the Arab Revolution, Al Jazeera (Opinion), June 21st 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011619134113577322.html (accessed on 22/06/2011). 215 Cobban, 1986, 141. Norton, 2007, 439. 216 Terhalle, 2007, 79. 217 Frum, D., in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 44. 218 papp 271, 280, 281

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find such movements all around the world: AKP in modern Turkey, Khomeinist movement in Iran, Wahabist groups in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Bortherhood (Hassan al-Banna) in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza the Front Islamic du Salut (FIS) in Algeria, Jamaat Islamiyyah in Pakistan etc. All these movements have tried to tailor their Islamic beliefs to specific modern political contexts and global economic dynamics. Many of these traditions (pluralism) tried to reformulate modernity219, not reject it a-priori; which is an important difference.220 It is therefore impossible to make any rigid generalizations (lowest common denominator) of the enitities that make up the wide specter of political Islam. Moreover, these movements have even appeared to change 221 over time; thus, even regarding case studies static perceptions will fail to produce accurate scholarship. The vast pluralism among political Islamic movements and the vast amount of extra-doctrinal influences -Marxisms anti-imperialist, revolutionary zeal mixed with 19th, 20th century ideas of nationalism- apparent in a variety of such organizations come to the fore when scrutinizing political Islam (Shiism) and the Iranian case study within a comparative analysis. The very political structure of the Islamic Republic is a clear example of ideological intermarriage and modern experimentalism.222 Peyman Jafari demonstrates this by quoting Irans former, wartime president Rafsanjani: Arguing against traditionalists after the revolution, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjaniat that time a close collaborator of Khomeiniasked, Where in Islamic history do you find parliament, president and cabinet ministers? In fact, 80 percent of what we now do has no precedent in Islamic history. 223 Although some observers and politicians do argue so, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its 1979 Islamic Revolution are of course no exceptions to the rule of global capitalist logic (sequence); clearly, the historical constellation rather than the message itself explains the only triumph of political Islam in the Middle East in the twentieth century if taking over a regime or country was the objective.224 To the backdrop of a post-revolutionary disintegrating nation-state there was no government, no army, no policy, no tax collection and so on - political Islam in Iran was simply successful due to its functional ability to exploit circumstances in that particulary moment of time in Iran; and not, primarely because of a supposed uniqueness of Iran, its people or of Shiism in itself.225 As such, indeed, Irans resources (oil) came into the hands of a new elite, that is, a new establishment of Iranian revolutionaries (paramilitaries, clergyman, middle-class bazari actors etc.). However these new elites, in charge of the state-led economy of Iran would, similarly to their contemporary Soviet counterparts, also have to interact further with the global capitalist system in order to consolidate their acquired (class) power. After the 1979 popular revolt had come to an end, Irans economy was transformed from a neo-colonial rentier model large-scale capital owned by a small and select elite in relation to imperialist exploitation- into a state-led capitalist economy (sectorial monopolies). From an macro economic point of view, Iranian society and economy is rather organized similarly to any society in the world, that is, along lines of class formation. The same goes for the economy; a similar trend exists in other substantial thirld world countries. Notwithstanding their grip on key Iranian sectors, it should be noted that since the revolution, the new elites226 have been pushing for Irans further integration into the global economy (e.g. free market approach under Rafsanjanis liberalization); this was symbolize by Tehrans reception of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund mission 1990. A well documented critical analysis made by Peyman Jafari in the magazine International Socialism comprehensively remarked this dynamic: [] what emerged in Iran was thus, by analogy with David Harveys conceptualisation of China, neoliberalism with Iranian characteristics or, in the words of Kaveh Ehsani, neoliberal state capitalism. However, over time, the central role of the Iranian state in the economy did not disappear; it was

219 220 221

I realize that this is in fact a controversial term in itself; this will be debated in another chapter of this study (cf. 2.3.4) Pappe, 2005, 287-8. e.g. pragmatic turns (contextual realism) of Hamas after the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections or that of the Iranian Khomeinists in power from the 1990s onward. 222 Papp, 2005, 270-1, 279-280, 286; Esposito, 1997, 1; Scham & Abu-Irshaid, 2009, 4. 223 Jafari, 2009, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=585. 224 Papp, 2005, 287. 225 Ibid., 287. 226 The dynamic of this new class formation (corruption and disillusionment, social disenfranchisement) was made into an interesting movie by Mohsen Makhmalbaf entitled The Marriage of the Blessed (1989) (Cf. Jafari, 2009, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=585).

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simply oriented away from providing protection to the poor towards promoting capital accumulation.227 This why Vali Nasr, a US academic hired by the Obama administration, has stressed that it would be a mistake to confuse containing Iran with containing Shiism. He furthermore advocated that if the US would advocate this view it would support calcified authoritarian regimes claiming to be the vanguard of containing Shiism; this is a clear reference to the self-proclaimed Sunni moderate establishments of the Arab World (Gulf, Jordan, Egypt etc.).228 When specifically assessing Irans political whereabouts, it needs to be recognized that of course theology is also there, and should not be totally excluded as a magnet and inspiration within the framework of analysis; there is no need for structural ignorance here that is not my intention- since it can legitimately be argued that ideas can also be an important motive in shaping human behaviour.229 As such, Ilan Papp for instance, keenly remarks how Lebanese Shia politcal guerilla movements demonstrated certain particularities, which at times differed from that of their Sunni and secular counterparts with regard to details such as combat tactics; Shiisms specific messianic230 componentskept alive by the yearly Ashura commemorations regarding the third Imams martrydom (traditional communalism)- probably accounts for this. However, these comments are mere suggestive and serve as case-specific details. They should not whatsoever be applied to deduct supposed monolith cultural differences of structural nature among Middle Eastern communities. 231 Many observers have indicated that political and economic dynamics in Iraq are currently favouring Iran over Saudi Arabia or their US patron in the post-Saddam era. Some even interpret Irans political-economic weight in Iraq as natural due to the sectarian background of its new elite. I do not want to go so far since Arab identity could, according to such logic, also be considered as natural; its a matter of (subjective) criteria. This issue will be further debated within the second part of my study. What is comprehendable from neorealist point of view though, is that both countries actively wish to assert economic and political influence in their imploded neighbour. Consequently, this entire realization brings forth the possibility that Saudi propagations of a Shiite Crescent (Shia expansion) are considerably based on economic incentives. 232 It should of course be pointed out that Iranian economic ties with Iraq do not limit themselves to the oil industry; after the fall of Saddam Iraq became a newly acquired market outlet for the Iranian economy generating a wide-range of economic and political ties emerged whereby Iranian influence quickly spread into southern Iraq on the back of commercial connections driven by a growing volume of trade and a massive flow of Iranian pilgrims into shrine cities cities of Iraq and burgeoning intelligence and political ties. 233 However, it is sufficient to speak of the oil factor as a comprehensive indicator for this dynamic since it is still key to the entire regions economic activity. It is worthy to point out that anti-Shiite rhetoric also serves the Saudi ruling class (a.o.) domestically with regard to oil-wealth since national discrimination of Shiite communities is directly related to the fact that oil revenues are not distributed equally among the Saudi population; moreover, a grip over the aformentioned community is vital for the small elite to secure its elitist monopoly on the immense profits of Saudi resources. As such, it becomes clear that Shia political opposition to the monarchy is not merely Shia meaning that political opposition in this part of the world is not uniquely ideological-driven or merely culturally-specific (unique character). Rather, such opposition symbolizes popular political engagement that fundamentally stems from material incentive; it is a dissident struggle for inclusion, national rights and of course for the redistribution of

227 228

Jafari, 2009, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=585. Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescent-symposiumimplications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized), 5. 5; Brning, 2008, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 71, 74-5. 229 Papp, 2005, 287. 230 The Iranian post-revolutionary establishment instrumentalized this popular sentiment in order to keep on mobilizing the Iranian population during the Iran-Iraq War; one of the longest enduring conventional armed conflicts in modern history. 231 Papp, 2005, 281, 287-8. 232 Barzegar, 2008, 97. 233 Nasr, in Nasr [et al.], 2007, 40.

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nationally accumulated wealth.234 Ilan Papp has comprehensively pointed out that oil was and is a dominant feature in the economy of the area but that it is perhaps a mixed blessing, since, similar to capitalism in general, oil has enriched the few and not the many. 235 It should be clear that Iraq is well positioned to influence or harm the Saudi dominance within OPEC. One should bear in mind that a Saudi ability for a price war does of course not imply a fortunate prospect for the kingdoms economy. Iraqs potential further implies that, from a Saudi point of view, optimal (or favourably hegemonic) political relations with (or over) Iraqs political establishmet are key to the steady maintenance of Saudi dominance within the organization. Furthermore, this also implies that a dynamic of rapprochement between the Iran a substantial competitor of Riyadh in the oil market- and the newly emerging Iraqi establishment will surely by interpreted as an alarming fact for any Saudi economic prospects. The consolidation of the geopolitical orientation of this Iraqi elite Shia or not has the potential of coming along with a subsequent powerful partnership in OPEC deliberations.236 Thus, whoever has influence on Iraqi politics and good relations with its newly emerging establishment will surely have more partners and influence within OPEC, which further implies increasing influence of that oil block within the global economy (geopolitical impact pressure). This is an assessement the US administration also incorporated whilst trying to locate their Axis of Evil during their 9/11 retaliation campaigns lets remember that most of the 9/11 killers were indeed Saudis.237 It has become conventional wisdom that whoever controls Iraq, gains direct control of the second-largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world.238 Moreover, renowned wartime journalist Robert Fisk, claimed exactly this in an interview given in November 2002; just before the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq. He predicted that a US invasion would come along with the installation of a pro-US government in Iraqi that would grant the major oil concessions to American oil companies. He states that such a strategy would enable the US to control the price of Iraqi oil, which would subsequently render it an immediate further influence on the price of Saudi oil, and ultimately, give the US a firm and privileged grip on entire market strategy of OPEC (which thus also means grip a firmer grip on the Iranian economy). However, since the formation of an Iraqi government and stabilization of Iraq did not prove to go that smooth in the post-2003 era, much is still at stake in Iraq (Iran, Saudi Arabia, China). A normalization of Iraqi affairs would of course only be the first step in fully relaunching and remodernizing (1970s) the Iraqi oil industry. Today, Tehran aspires to play a more active role with regard to Iraqs future. Iran explicitily desires to see a departure of US forces from Iraq and at least envisages a sort of cooperative power-sharing relationship over Iraq with others (Saudi Arabia, US), which would enable Tehran to influence and even coordinate Iraqi affairs in the early years of its new political life. The Lebanese example probably shapes Irans image when it comes to Iraqi dynamics. 239

1.3.3 The Palestinian Question: Geopolitical Symbolism & Military Deterrence

Not only Iraq is said to form part of the emerging Shia cultural block, also the Levantine area is mentioned as the scenary of an encroaching Shiite Cresent. Some observers have even sensationally proclaimed that the Shiazation of Palestine is a tangible reality.240 Today, Iran enjoys the effective foreign policy capibility to deligitimize Riyadh in front of the regions popular

234 235

Brning, 2008, 65. Papp, 2005, 52. 236 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 72-3; Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 70-1. 237 Fisk, R., Why No Outcry over these Torturing Tyrants?, The Independent, May 14th 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-no-outcry-over-these-torturing-tyrants-2283907.html (accessed on 14/05/2011); Targetting Iran, pag 55; De Ley, H., The Danish Cartoons: Contextualizing their Publication and the Muslim Response to it, Centrum voor Islam in Europa (2006), http://www.flw.ugent.be/cie/CIE2/deley36.htm#n12 (accessed on 02/03/2011). 238 Chomsky, 2007, Targeting, 55. 239 Vaitheeswaran, 2003, 70; Wehrey [et al.], 2009,60-63; Fisk, R., Robert Fisk on the Iran-Iraq War and Middle East Oil 2002-4, Worldnews, November 19th 2002, http://wn.com/robert_fisk_on_the_iran-iraq_war_and_middle_east_oil_2002-4?orderby=relevance&upload_time=all_time (accessed on 15/02/2011), 4.00-5.37. 240 Shobokshi, H., The Suspicious Iranian Project, Asharq Alawsat, October 26th 2006, http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=6833 (accessed on 30/03/2011).

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masses, most notably on sensitive pan-Arab issues such as the Palestinian Question241. The Saudi establishment perceives this strategy as extremely problematic; the exact same goes for their Jordanian and Egyptian counterparts in Amman and Cairo. However, among observers, the impact of this Iranian potential on the foreign policy calcus of Gulf states is often seriously underestimated. Generally observers tend to focus more on the material dimension of the interstate tension and conflict, that is, rather on the classic (armistic, political, balance-of-) power threats than the less conventional powerplay of popular perception and public provocation (geopolitical symbolism).242 What is described as the Iranian Arab Street strategy, should be understood as Tehrans effort to bypass local, Arab authorities by directly addressing the regional masses in a very provocative manner, using destabilizing Islamist243 rhetoric, which portrays Irans political adversaries often the peoples/ listernersown governments- as mere peagan lackeys of Washington. At the very same time this geopolitical tactic is meant to bolster its own image as the strongman of a self-proclaimed altruistic Islamic resistance camp -i.e. anti-Israeli opposition. This claim is held high by an openly declared and high profiled support for militant Arab guerilla groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas, rhetorical opposition to United states unilateral political schemes in the region (democracy, post-9/11) and additionally through their public defiance of US-pressure on the nuclear issue.244 Next to a bargaining need for the exchange of prisoners245, the whole 2006 Lebanon war was more a publicity campaign of Hizbullah and Iran -that is, a deligitimation campaign targeting the impasse in Arab politics- than an actual effort to defeat Israeli Army (IDF). The head on engagement with the IDF held out the possibility that in case of a swift Israeli victory- Hizbullah would be cut down to size literally and figuratively. 246 Anyone with the slightest knowledge of armistic development indicators comprehends that Iran, let alone Hizbullah, is in no real position to conventionally attack, let alone defeat, Israel. After the US-led invasions of both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) Iran has been virtually surrounded by US military forces. One should hereby not forget the additional US military bases in the Gulf the Caucasus and on top of that Israel itself is of course more or less a US military offshore base and a high-tech center, which has the strategic global advantage of harbouring an air force larger and technologically more advanced than any NATO power outside the United States. Thus, when one looks at the entire geostrategic make-up of the region, one is inclined to understand that it is really the US and Israel who have the material, armistic capability of threatening Iran they actively do so too- and Iran on the other hand uses soft military manouvering through the regional militias it supports Hizbullah, Hamas, Badr Brigades and Mahi Army247- as a relatively minor though effective military deterrent to any convential US or Israeli attack (on its nuclear facilities).248 Moreover, Palestine, in this view, is not a matter of solidarity but strategy: it is now a bulwark a frontline249- in Irans defense.250 The Palestinian Question has always been a critical and symbolic focal point in regional politics. Every political Arab strongman in the post-colonial era -whether the Egyptian president Jamal Abd al-Nasir or the late Saddam Husayn- has fed on it. One could even argue that it is an inevitable attitude/strategy/topic to incorporate/deal with when aspiring a leading regional political and diplomatic role, for it inevitably posits one in collition (bargaining position) with the other key regional power-base and aspiring hegemon, the antagonist of Arab public opinion: Israel.251 Even Turkey, which has since the 1980s built increasing economic
241 242

I use this term in reference to the unsolved Palestinian problem of absentee state-hood and refugees. Gause, 2007, 120-2. 243 I am aware of the methodological controversies regarding the application of such terminology (Islamist, Islamism), however, since this whole study culminates around the discussion such discursive labels, I take the liberty of applying them for the sake of the debate. 244 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 21-2; Ashcroft [et al.], 2007, 62-3. 245 The used this tactic of cross-borders raids successfully in 2004. 246 Valbjrn & Bank, 2007,p. 10 247 Muqtada al-Sadr is reported to have stated that if the US attacks Iran, it would assist Iran in attacking US bases in Iraq and the Gulf (Chomsky, 2007; Targeting, 40). 248 Ibid., 34-5, 37-8, 40-1 249 The exact same goes for Syria although it has its own border with Israel- it is no coincidence that Khalid Mishaal, one of the leaders of Hamas resides and operates from Damascus. See for instance: Al Jazeera, Khaled Meshaal, Al Jazeera (Talk to Jazeera), May 07th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/talktojazeera/2011/05/20115710350758529.html (accessed on 11/05/2011). 250 Chubin, 2009, 171. 251 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 77, 81-2.

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ties with all its neighbours (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran etc.), has lately been showing tendencies towards a new diplomatic involvement concerning the Palestinian affairs; certainly now entry to the EU has become less imminent. More recently, the country has embarked on a regional diplomatic mission (Ahmet Davutolu) typed by zero conflict with neighbours. However, from the 2009 Israeli aggression of Gaza onward (Cast Lead), this economic and diplomatic Turkish demarche has also (formally) altered diplomatic relations vis--vis its traditional military ally. This was symbolized by Prime Minister Erdogans walk-out during a debate with Shimon Peres at the 2009 summit of the World Economic Forum in Davos. In July 2011, Turkey also hosted a conference in support (publicity, logistics) of Mahmud Abbas`s unilateral bid for UN statehood, scheduled for a September 2011 vote in the General Assembly. In a UN special seminar on Assistance to the Palestinian People held in April 2011, Turkey had expressed the same proactive view: The representative of Turkey said that there was no need to `wait for dust to settle down` in the wake of bold changes taking place in North Africa and the Middle East; the dignity of the Palestinian people must be restored. They must attain an independent State.252 Next to mere economic development, it is such support of the Palestinian cause, whether rhetorically (diplomatically) or physically (financial aid, diplomatic or military assistance/patronage), which generates a countrys prestige (role) among other nations populations in the region (masses). Both Riyadh and Tehran have understood what is at stake in both Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. It is no coincidence that both powerhouses contributed financially to the reconstruction of Lebanon after the 2006 war; the Saudi pledge even amounted to a massive $1,5 billion of direct financial aid (banks) together with an education initiatiative paying for all Lebanese students for one year of their education.253 Moreover, a control of the Palestinian Affairs often indicates greater, underlying dynamics in the region. After the retreat of Egypt254 and Iraq from the regional stage, the Saudis had symbolically taken over the Palestinian banner. Notwithstanding its enforced containment in the mid 1990s Iran has actively and successfully managed to enter the Arab sphere of politics to compete over this Palestinian patronage. It could hence be argued that the Palestinian question is currently partly being championed by Iran respresented by a symbolic Arab imagery of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.255 It has keenly been noted that, although relatively minor in size, due to Iranian patronage, Hizbullah has become a major player in the Arab World today.256 Hereby, Irans success has not only angered the Saudis, it has also embarrassed them, for above all, the Saudi establishment endeavours to attain regional political prestige (legitimacy). Moreover, this Iranian demarche is said to have triggered a great deal of resentment in Riyadh, Cairo and Amman; three countries that actively propagate the Palestinian issue as a strictly Arab issue. In light of this Iranian capitalization on Palestine, it is no wonder that some among the Arab elites (e.g. Kuwait) have been more pro-active in resolving the Palestinian Question all together, since they argue that the resolution of this

UN Department of Public Information, With Palestinian Authoritys Plan for Statehood Nearly Complete, Secretary-General Says Time is of the Essence(GA/PAL/1197), UN Department of Public Information, New York, April 28th 2011, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gapal1197.doc.htm (accessed on 09/06/2011); See also media reports: Falk, R., Turkeys Diplomatic Rise, Al Jazeera (Opinion), May 28th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2009/02/200921614571798366.html (accessed on 23/07/2011); Al Jazeera, Abbas: Israeli Policy Forced UN Statehood Bid, Al Jazeera, July 23th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/07/201172310330622851.html (accessed on 23/07/2011); Al Jazeera, Turkey Rejects Israeli Apology, Al Jazeera, January 13th 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2010/01/2010113135644186554.html (accessed on 23/07/2011); Al Jazeera, Turkey and Syria Forge Closer Ties, Al Jazeera, October 14th 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/10/20091013947216247.html (accessed on 23/07/2011); Al Jazeera, Turkish Defence Snub Worries Israel, Al Jazeera, October 13th 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/10/2009101292429999748.html (accessed on 23/07/2011); Al Jazeera, Stormy Debate in Davos over Gaza, Al Jazeera, January 29th 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/01/20091291976879610.html (accessed on 23/07/2011); Al Jazeera, Gaza Sours Israel-Turkey Relations, Al Jazeera, February 17th 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2009/02/200921614571798366.html (accessed on 23/07/2011). 253 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 77, 81-2. 254 It is interesting to point out that immediately after the popular protest and resignation of former president Husni Mubarak, the military establishment of Egypt has announced to permanently open the Rafah crossing to Gaza; this might signal a new stance of Egypts ruling class towards the Palestinian Question, but more importantly, it should be interpreted as a highly popular move from behalf of a key Arab state. This might signal the beginning of a new Egyptian monopoly over the Palestinian affairs vis--vis Saudi Arabia and even Iran. See: Al Jazeera, Egypt to open Rafah Border Permanently, Al Jazeera, May 25th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/05/2011525174117897741.html (accessed on 25/05/2011). 255 Luomi, 2008, 7-8; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 22-4. 256 Papp, 2005, 35.
252

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central matter would immediately undercut Irans access to the Arab political sphere and its popularity among the Arab masses. Moreover, the Iranian deligitimation campaign is also directly affecting to the Kingdoms domestic legitimacy. Iranian dynamics have since 1979 alarmed the Saudis, for the formers call for regional revolution under an anti-imperial and anti-monarchical zeal was loudly advocated in the early 1980s (export of the revolution). Iranian revolutionary voices explicitly promoted the overthrowing of the Gulf monarchies. However, from a Saudi (and broader Gulf) security point of view, the Iran-Iraq war was seen as a convenient solution to contain the advance of regional Iranian influence (and its ideology) and thus explains the strong backing of the Arab Gulf monarchies for pan-Arab Iraq; their economic competitor and future political enemy (1990). As such, the house of al-Saud also perceives the Iranian deligitimation campaign as a renewed and direct assault on its national, political legitimacy. Whereas the weakening of Saddam in 1991 did not break the post-79 Iranian containment strategy, the 2003 Iraq War did. 257 As early as the 1980s Tehran pursued an Arab option, where its foreign policy assumed a populist, pro-Arab and (most importantly) pro-Palestinian orientatation. After the 2003 Iraq war, Iran has further capitalized on this long-term investment in Arab politics since it understands quite well that within the current regional status quo, many people in the Arab world and even beyond, e.g. Turkey, Pakistan- are widely agitated by anti-Israel and anti-US sentiment. It is a strategy to mobilize popular support, which could also generate direct domestic discontent and political opposition in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt.258 From a Saudi policy perspective, this threat factor of Iranian action in the Arab-Israeli sphere is thus perceived as far more harmful to their already fragile image (US alliance) in the short-term than any Iranian actions in Iraq. Hence, the Levantine arena of interstate competition thus demonstrates a more open and explicit rivalry. Ever since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who enjoyed good contacts with Saudi Arabia- and the 2006 July war, Riyadh and its regional allies have taken a more active stance (diplomacy) in confronting Iran and its allies. This has mainly focused on isolating and weakening Bathist Syrias influence (regime chance, intra-Arab isolation), which Riyadh interestingly promotes as a culturally Sunni259 country in danger of Shia proselytism (tashayyu). As such, one comprehends why Syria is supposedly one of the main actors and locusses of the supposed Shia Cresent theory that is fed by an accusing declaration of proselytism from its traditional cultural make-up (moderate, Arab Sunnism) to expanding Persian Shiism. In response, Iran has attempted to depict Saudi policy in the region as purely and solely sectarian, discrediting Riyadhs plausible position as a comprehensive Arab broker (Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain). Hence, what becomes clear is the structural and highly geopolitical nature of this pro-Palestinian rivalry. With regard to the Levant, is not a religious vocation, nor the passionate need to protect or even convert regional populations, which drives countries foreign policy but rather material state interests. As such, one also understands that Hizbullahs military engagement with Israel was perceived by Riyadh as a physical marker of its decreasing influence in the pan-Arab sphere, in favour of the Iranian regional contender; at least in terms of public opinion (and intra-Lebanese involvement).260 The small 2006 demonstrations by Saudi Shia in solidarity with Hizbullah261 in the kingdoms Eastern provinces (Qatif, Safwa)262 should foremost be interpreted as an exponent of a political, rather than sectarian sentiment. Similar to demonstrations elsewhere, such as in Cairo and Amman, they primarily articulated a political applause for Hizbullahs physical and actually symbolic challenge of the Israeli military. The 2006 war might have appeared to be a complicated amalgam to the impressionitstic obserber, i.e. of a religious war of radicals (against the Jewish state) that simultaneously generated supposed sectarian divides in the region (diplomatic rows). It would, however, be far more balanced to interpret the entire conflict of pro- or anti-Hizbullah political statements (Arab establishments and popular demonstrations) as highly politically motivated

257 258

Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 2-3, 22-4, 57. Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 10. 259 Hereby, I do not claim the contrary (popular level); my argument has a different focus. 260 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 24-25, 81, xvi; Luomi, 2008, 35; Puelings, 2010, 30-31, 36-37; Broning, 2008, 62. 261 Symbolized by people carrying pictures of Nasrallah (cf. Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 26). 262 Authority crackdowns and harrasments followed (cf.Jones, 2007, 31).

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happenings of major geopolitical signifance. At the time of the 2006 July war, a crisis occured in Saudi policy circles and among the regime-related, clerical elite, demonstrating the Kingdoms problematic paradox between its broader political, pan-Arab aspirations and its national, ideological make-up that is based on a doctrinal aversion to Shiism of its Salafi clerical establishment. The intra-Saudi debate on whether or not to support Hizbullah morally and rhetorically against Israel seemed to have touched the very core of Saudi politics. Hence, the Saudi respons during the war was diverse and hesitant, but in the end resulted in an overall negative consensus on Hizbullahs activities. Confronted with their subsequent post-war popularity, the Saudi clerical establishment was allowed to launch an anti-Shiite smear campaign; similar rhetoric from the political establishment joined this effort shortly after the specific content of such statements will be further debated in depth in subsequent chapters of this inquiry (cf. 2.2.1 & 2.2.3).263 The 2006 July War was an important regional event regarding Saudi-Iranian relations; it symbolized a turning point that subsequently triggered an intensification of the Saudi-led sectarian offensive264 in an attempt to alienate Shia Hizbullah and Iran from the wider Arab public. It is worthy to note that this intensification also correlated with US deliberations about an accelerated withdrawal from Iraq, clearly pinpointing the broader convergence between crucial political events and the use of sectarian rhetoric.265 Shia phobia, which had previously peaked in the 1980s, re-emerged in the post-Saddam context. To a backdrop of regional Shiite emancipation (political liberalization in Iraq) and Iranian political ascendance, anti-Shiite publications elaborated by the Saudi clerical establishment have thrived and easily resonated throughout the Sunni Arab region. It is exactly here, where the 2006 op-ed article of Asharq alawsat which sensationalistically alarmed readers of an alleged Shiazation of Palestine- entitled The Suspicious Iranian projects, fits in.266 However, viewed to the aformentioned backdrop of rationallymotivated geopolitics, this claim has hardly any actual grounds and foremost refers to Irans current monopoly on the Levantine affairs vis--vis traditional powerhouses such as Cairo, Amman and Riyadh. Although an actual kingdom, Saudi Arabia is not to be perceived as a monolith political entity; as indicated earlier, there is a fine, specific and at times fragile relationship present between the (US-aligned) political (monarchic) elite and the Wahhabi clerical class. It is hence important to try and calculate the Saudi regimes official relationship with anti-Shiite narrative (cf. 2.2.1, 2.2.3). Although official Saudi statements proclaim that it is Irans foreign policy and regional aspirations, not Shiism per se, that concerns them, observers have noted a strategic attitude at the political level typed as one of willfull neglect or tacit endorsement on critical geopolitical moments.267 Observers have indicated that post-war polling demonstrated an enormous increase of popular Arab support and appreciation for both Hizbullah (Nasrallah) and Iran (Ahmadinajad). Undoubtedly an indirect result of the commercialisation (liberalization) of the Arab media (regional satellite television, e.g. Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya), which extensively covered the war resulting in the iconisation of Nasrallah. This is a dynamic which government controlled newspapers and TV channels could by themselves not have allowed.268 Converging with this postwar coverage, there was reporting of a wave of conversion to Shiism. It should, however, be noted that such references to or reports of proselytism always and almost uniquely seem to relate to articles in journals that themselves merely mention the rumour of conversion.269 It is hard to locate any set of scientific literature (sources) or

263 264

Brning, 2008, 60; Jones, 2007, 30; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 24-6. In an effort to rollback Iranian influence, a post war offensive also occurred in other domains, for example by donating financial aid for the post-War reconstruction of Lebanon, which de facto far exceeded Iranian financial aid. The Kingdom also, and this might have further outcome in the future, stepped up its backing of the countrys Salafi factions in Tripoli, Sidon and the Palestinian Camps (Nahr al-Bared) (cf. Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 9, 81-3. 265 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 24-6. 266 Shobokshi, H., The Suspicious Iranian Project, Asharq Alawsat, October 26th 2006, http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=6833 (accessed on 30/03/2011). 267 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 28-9. 268 Malmvig, H., In the Midst of Change: The US and the Middle East from the War in Iraq to the War in Gaza, Royal Danish Defence College (Institute for Strategy), March 2009, http://www.forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Research%20Papers/Documents/In%20the%20Midst%20of%20Change.pdf (accessed on 30/03/2011), 21. 269 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 87.

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fieldwork statistiques, which could demonstrate objective numbers on recent Middle Eastern forms of proselytism270. Thus, if large-scale tashayyu did take place in the Middle East, this still needs to be verified and mapped out; for the time being it should still be considered a myth. Oberserves have pointed out that such perceptions (threat images) are advocated by members of the political establishment of the Middle East: Among Jordanian officials, there is also the perception that Iran is seeking to increase its influence in Jordanian society through proselytization among Sunnis, although evidence of this is anecdotal at best.271 It should be pointed out that such a depiction of conversion implicitly propagates an a-priori distortive image of Islam, meaning that there would be some sort of Sunni orthodoxy and constrastingly, a suspicious and unorthodox Shiism (challenger). The fact is that Islam is typed by its very heterodoxy (multiple doctrines, multiple schools of law, individual freedom of ecclesiastical choice). Hence, there is also no such thing as a physical rite de passage272 of conversion since one would basically remain within the wide spectre of the pluralist Islamic tradition. So, it is therefore empirically very hard to prove or make claim of such happenings. These claims are even more problematic when they are situated in a highly politicized context. One is inclined to recognize that, by merely discussing Sunni-Shia conversion, one is discussing a highly arbitrary and ungraspably matter. 273 From king Abdullah II to the Muslim Brotherhood, all have made claim that Syria would be the scenary of a wide-scale, Iranianled/enforced tashayyu. A rare study on this matter entitled The Shiitization Process in Syria 1985-2005: a Socio-Statistic Paper was published in 2006 by a France-based human rights organization named the National Council for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Syria. This paper indicated that cultural Shiite centers (Husayniyyaat) are, indeed more visible in Syria since 2000; the year of Bashar al-Asads accession to power. However, the report is said to have indicated that conversion mostly occurred within the Syrian Alawi community (85%) and that only 2% of the alleged converts were Sunnis, who, in fact, already had some associations with Shiites (family ties, inter-marriage etc.). This rapport, as one of the few available sources on this already controversial topic, thus contradicts claims of a widescale tashayyu among Sunnis in Syria.274 However, if the dynamic within the Syrian Alawi community towards Twelver Shiism is true, this would in itself be an interesting occurence, which would require further study. As such, it would be fascination to find out whether or not it applies the reformist, more politically-active, Iranian-brand of Twelver Shiism or the more traditional-conservatist, quietist one (subaltern whereabouts); the former would in the current context- seem more feasible, but this is of course mere speculation. Additionally, it would be appealing to inquire whether similar dynamics are taking place among other Middle Eastern communties related to the Shiite spectre, such as the Turkish Alawi community or the Syrian and Lebanese Ismaili and even Durzi communities. However, such questions fall outside the aformentioned hyped debates and politicized claims of tashayyu and Sunni-Shia divisions, which do not seem to have any firm basis since tabshir or proselytism only seems to be marginal at best and in such cases only affecting communties that are already endogenous to Shiisms pluralism. Clearly, there is no ground to state that Syria would harbour Twelver Shia (Shia Crescent theory), let alone those who adhere to the reformist trend and the Wilayat al-Faqih275, nor is there any firm ground to argue that Syrias Bathist Alawi establishment has abandoned its secular Bathist ideology in favour of ideological and

Shiitization Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 87. 272 The same is generally confirmed by Dra. Lechkar, I., in Bendadi, S., De Nieuwe Sjiieten van Brussel: We Leefden in een Leugen, Mondiaal Magazine, February 2009 edition,14-5. Also at http://www.mo.be/artikel/de-nieuwe-sjiieten-van-brussel. Dra. Lechkar is currently working on a PhD Research entitled Crossing Boundries: Conversion to and within Islam in Belgian and Globalizing Context, Social Science Faculty, Interculturalism, Migration and Minority Research Centre (IMMRC), Catholic University Leuven (supervisors: Prof. Dr. J. Leman, Dr. C. Stallaert, http://soc.kuleuven.be/ceso/dagvandesociologie/papers/conversion.pdf). This is a very brief impression; I do not pretend to have knowledge of the entire research program or its full (that would go beyond the possible scope of this study). 273 Puelings, 2010, 30. 274 Ibid., 30-1, 39-40. 275 See for instance also: Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescentsymposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized), 10.20-12.00 (dig.).
270 271

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cultural rapprochement with the Iranian theocracy; the bond between the two countries is primarily, if not exclusively, based upon geopolitical and geostrategical considerations (common interests, common adversaries). It has interestingly been pointed out that tabshir is quite a sensitive issue in Middle Eastern public opinion. It is therefore believed that active and wide-scale propagation of (Iranian) Shiism by Tehran towards Sunni populations would actually be counterproductive to the fromers foreign policy goals, i.e. to foremost consolidate firm military (deterrent) bases within sympathetic Arab countries and geographies. In this sense, observers have argued that Iranian Shiite organizations mainly recruit towards Shiites, even in the European diaspora.276 Thus, once again, it does not seem likely that such rumours reflect reality, nor that such a socio-cultural strategy would even form integral part of Tehrans foreign policy in the region. Observers have pointed out that the true meaning of the tashayyu feared by Sunni actors is to be seen in the light of political leanings or support: becoming pro-Iran, pro-Hizbullah and their politics and that allegations of conversion actually symbolize allegations of a change in the political allegiance. This insight implies that the whole Sunni-Shia debate and any claims or rumours made of tabshir relate more to material, contemporary politics than any culturalistic or theological issue among Middle Eastern communities. The roots of this whole discussion thus seemingly point to geopolitics, and more specifically, to Iran, as a nationstate.277 Without being immediately charmed by what is culturally fashionable (tashayyu), some observers have kept a more comphrensive scope and have thereby succeeded in detecting the very correlation between geopolitical events (2006 July War) and the occurrence of popular expression (pro-Hizbullah sympathy).278 One can legitimately argue that further elaborating on a supposed Sunni-Shia divide (clash) or a shift in popular culture (conversion) is extremely excessive, because such sensationalist elaborations would flagrantly overlook a basic historical rationale of course a minimal knowledge of modern history is required here-, meaning that the 2006 July War is not seen outside of the regional tradition of warfare with Israel. In this sense, Middle Eastern masses tend to have a more tangibly (material) sense of history: the 1948 Arab-Israeli War279, the 1967 SixDay War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1981 Israeli bombing of Iraqi nuclear facilities, the 1982 First Lebanon war & Sabra and Shatilla massacres, the Palestinian Intifadas and the Israeli withdrawal of South Lebanon in the year 2000.280 This is a more accurate historical sequence underlying the regional consiousness and the aforementioned popular Arab support (sympathy) during and subsequent to the 2006 July war. Keen observers have comprehensively and symbolically pointed out that during and after the 2006 July war Arabs could openly discuss their admiration for Hezbollahs fight against Israel, and contrast it with decades of hallow rhetoric from incumbent regimes, who either lost wars or signed peace treaties with Isreal, and who were hopelessly dependent on military and financial aid from the USA.281 Any further Sunni-Shia extensions with regard to the events (2006) can be attributed as somewhat artificial and culturalistic fabrications of uninformed observers. The obvious correlation that is manifest between the political motive and the empirical expression of sympathy primarily signals a deeper reality, that of a universality of human kind in this case foremost in the Arab region of the Middle East of course- and that of the universality of emancipatory struggle that comes along with it. Philosopher and Leftist critical theorist Slavoj Zizek formulates these notions and correlations as following:
Within every particular culture, individuals do suffer Actual universality is not the deep feeling that, above all differences, different civilizations share the same basic values; actual universality appears (actualizes itself) as the experience of negativity, of the inadequacy-toitself of a particular identity. The formula of revolutionary solidarity is not let us tolerate our differences [Sunni, Shia], it is not a pact of civilizations, but a pact of struggles that cut across civilizations, a pact between what, in each civilization, undermines its identity from within, fights against its oppressive kernel. What unites us is the same struggle. A better formula would thus be: in spite of our differences,
276 277

Puelings, 2010, 39-40. Ibid., 31. 278 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 25-6. 279 Also referred to as an-Nakba in Arab popular terms. 280 Papp, 2005, 15-36. 281 Malmvig, H., In the Midst of Change: The US and the Middle East from the War in Iraq to the War in Gaza, Royal Danish Defence College (Institute for Strategy), March 2009, http://www.forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Research%20Papers/Documents/In%20the%20Midst%20of%20Change.pdf (accessed on 30/03/2011), 20-1.

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we can identify the basic antaganism of the antagonistic struggle in which we are both caught. In other words, in the emancipatory struggle, it is not the cultures in their identity that join hands; it is the repressed, the exploited and suffering, the parts of no-part of every culture people that come together in a shared struggle. This universality is not the awareness of the universal as the neutral frame that unites us all (in spite of our differences, we are basically all human); it is the universality that becomes for-itself in the violent experience of the subject who becomes aware that he is not fully himself (he does not coincide with his particular form of existence), that he is marked by a profound split. Universality becomes for-itself in the particular element that is thwarted in its endeavor to reach identity.282

He examplifies these notions by contrasting the (equally hyped) question of Jewishness to the instant and fundamental reality of human universality:
People often addressed to Primo Levi the question, Do you consider yourself primarily a Jew or a human? Levi himself often oscillated between these two choices. The obvious solution precisely as a Jew he was human, for one is human, one participates in universal humanity, through ones very particular ethnic identification- falls flat here. The only consistent answer is not to say that Levi was a human who happened to be a Jew but that he was human (he participated for himself in the universal function of humanity) precisely and only insofar as he was unable or was uneasy at fully identifying with his Jewishness, insofar as bein a Jew was for him a problem, not a fact, not a safe haven to which he could withdraw.283

A more contemporary example for the fact that popular struggle is universal and not unique, can be found in the fact that popular demonstrations during the recent Arab Spring (2010-2011) did not only pass into regional Arab countries. Also displeased Spanish, Chinese and Central Asian people used this momentum to express their civil discontent.284 Even Israeli citizens eventually took to the street, presenting their government with similar (socio-economic) demands in mid-2011 as the Arab masses did.285 As such, one also understand why Yemeni protesters (2011) actively tried to universalize their plight by carrying slogans written by historical US dissidents, e.g. Truth is on the side of the oppressed (Malcolm X).286 Of course regional transnational sentiment (e.g. Arab, Sunni, Shia popular culture) and cultural ties exist; how else can one comprehend the fact that the popular uprising in Tunisia directly spread to regional countries. Not only do popular masses in different Arab countries share forms of political organization (repressive autocratic regimes), they also share a similar language through which (media, music) people are sensibilized (sentiment) towards happenings (expression). In the Middle Eastern region this popular politicized sentiment regarding Palestinian symbolism roots in a historical popular tradition, easily detectable in the regional musical folklore, e.g. in lyrics of one of the most popular bands in modern Morrocan history, Nass al-Ghiwan287: songs as Sabra wa Shatilla288, Intifada289 (1987) and Falastin290. Although the whole trend of Rai music was about national/localized realities, it did carry a strong social component that often focussed upon regional (transnational) events to implicitly address and ventilate domestic discontent.291 These arguments should however not perversively be used to attribute some sort of uniqueness to the region; transnational popular protests should foremost be interpreted as acts of human expression/solidarity. As such, one can generally contextualize events without incorporating an a-priori preconditioned bias that indicates dichotomous perceptions of supposedly monolith segrated group representing an allegedly engrained sectarian Middle Eastern make-up. Such a reference to general emancipatory struggles, explains why marginalized rural Lebanese Shiites if one wishes to de facto label them as suchwere often secularists in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, joining massively the ranks of the Lebanese Communist party or Kamal

282 283

Zizek, 2008, 673-4. Ibid., 674-5. 284 See, for instance: Klomegah, K.K., Arab Spring Knocks at Azerbaijans Door, Al Jazeera (Opinion), April 12th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/04/2011411112810697612.html (accessed on 12/04/2011); Tremlett, G., Morocco Protests will test Regimes Claim to Liberalism, The Guardian, February 18th 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18/morocco-demonstrationstest-regime (accessed on 12/04/2011). 285 Al Jazeera, Mass Protests in Israel over High Prices, Al Jazeera, July 30th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/07/201173020161903849.html (accessed on 30/07/2011). 286 See A Young Man Holds up a: Al Jazeera, In Pictures: Marchers Flood Sana Streets, Al Jazeera (Interactive), June 14th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/interactive/2011/06/201161423128996128.html (accessed on 14/06/2011). 287 For more info, see, for instance, part of French documentary: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDg2ZEzC2vs&playnext=1&list=PL62886399173A8F28. 288 Ibid., demo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bv1z2gWFu9k&feature=related 289 Ibid. demo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aq_tRDnI3Nk&feature=player_embedded. 290 Ibid. demo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uu-0ARbZCC8&feature=related 291 Papp, 2005, 173-4.

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Jumblatts LNM (Lebanese National Movement) and held together with Sunnis- great sympathy for secular pan-Arabists, such as Jamal abd an-Nasir. Contrastingly, today many Lebanese Shiites are appearently rallied under Hizbullahs flag, but that does not a-priori change the political motive (of striving for a steady and souvereign future). I will further elaborate on group identity, its nature and these fundamental notions of universality, shorthly after in this study (cf. 2.1). However, for the time being, we can already proceed to extract some fundamental deductions. Observing the constructivist paradigm that speaks of organic sectarian divisions (group oppositions), one is directly inclined to note that they were and in fact still are not as manifest as often proclaimed. As mentioned earlier, intersectarian sympathies did arise troughout the Arab region during the 2006 Lebanon War. Moreover, on a regional level Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah appeared as the most popular (Arab) leader according to postwar polling in Egypt (momentum). However, since there is no substantial proof for the allegiation of proselytism to Shiism, this intersectarian sympathy needs to be interpreted not as a challenge of the dominant or supposedly traditional culture endorsed by Sunni regime anger with Shia Hizbullah. On the contrary, one could rather differ to argue that these sympathies and antipathies are mere human expressions (Arab region), which primarily indicated underlying political sentiment.292 Consequenty, one understands that Hizbullahs engagement with Israel was not made by irrational cultural (Islamic) considerations of Shiites; the action stemmed from a structural geopolitical opportunity that signals a larger dynamic of interstate rivalry in the regional system, namely Irans (soft) military engagement with Israel for the purpose of demonstrating its detterent capacities in the case of any Israeli or US attack on its nuclear facilities and to simultaneously engage with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt for the sake of their political deligitimation. Hence, in contrast to comments of the 2006 July war made by scholars such as Vali Nasr the cleavages within Islam will define the regions major conflicts in the future293- one could in fact state more thoroughly that at the societal level what emerges is thus less a Sunni-Shii split than a regimes-people divide.294 The show of solidarity related more to a general humane solidarity that is, if one recognizes a basic human universalism/equality- to be compared to shows of popular compassion in the region and worldwide during the 2009 Gaza war, where Turkish, Spanish and Belgian nationals expressed their solidarity in a popular manner.295 It becomes clear that the Saudi government instrumentilizes religion and more specifically sectarian identy by using the inciting potential of its clerical (Wahhabi) establishment as a strategic poltical tool in critical geopolitical circumstances. The 2006 July War definitely qualified such an antagonizing Saudi strategy; by the end of that year the regime was not concerned for its diplomatic ties with Tehran and was facilitating the issuing of sectarian anti-Shia fatawa by prominent Salafi clerics. Subsequently, in light of Saddams execution and increasing Iranian influence in the new regional make-up, the sectarian rhetoric augmented for a second time (2006) since 2003. Also other Arab elites, namely from Jordan and Egypt systematically endorsed the Saudis in their classic strategy; during the 2009 Gaza war key Arab elites were again in need of this anti-Shiite discourse to legitmize their politcal stance towards their domestic populations. Egypt has also perceived a loss in its patronizing position vis-vis Iran with regard to the Palestinian affairs. The propagation of a supposed al-madd ash-Shii (the Shiite Expansion) in the Middle East needs to be interpreted foremost as a geopolitical Arab Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan- effort to block further Iranian influence in the Arab sphere and to safeguard their own regional interests and power consolidation.296 Attentive observers have keenly noted the top-down inflation of the sectarianization of regional politics following the 2006 Lebanon war:
The Sunni-Shii split during and after the Lebanon war bears many signs of such regime-led orchestration. Whereas sectarian tensions were low at the popular level, the three moderate Sunni Arab states engaged in a kind of Shiitization of the conflict. Since sectarian

292 293

Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 28; Cobban 1986, 141-3; Norton, 2007, 436; Zizek, 2008, 674-5. Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 6. 294 Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 7. 295 Al Jazeera, Mass Protests Held agaist Gaza War, Al Jazeera (Interactive), January 1th 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/01/2009110134856498809.html (accessed on 14/06/2011). 296 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 26-9, 39; Puelings, 2010, 27-8; RAND, 26, 27, 28, 29, 39

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disputes usually arise where Sunnis and Shia live side by side, as in Lebanon or Iraq, it is even more remarkable how the issue has been hyped in almost exclusively Sunni Jordan and Egypt.297

It is worth noting that Iran has applied a similar geopolitical strategy of religious instrumentalization, with the sole difference that it is playing the pan-islamist card, rather than a sectarian one. Tehran undermines its Arab counterparts, Israel and the US by its Arab Street strategy which culminates around the Palestinian Question and highlights the political disparity between the Arab Street and the regional Arab Monarchies298 -the political elites in the Arab world- by presenting its foreign policy as panIslamic. Obviously Tehrans strategy does not come forth spontaneously and thus acquires a level of involvement, a means of soft power leverage (Hizbuallah, Hamas) if you wish.299 One can thus legitimately argue that the 2006 July War was a geopolitical effort from the part of Hizbullah and Iran to deligitimize key states in the region. Subsequently, one could interpret the allegations of regional Shiitization/tashayyu and anti-Shia rhetoric as froming part of a geopolitical strategy of specific political elites in a dialectical response to Irans regional ascendance in the post-Saddam era and its ongoing capitalization of the Palestinian and Lebanese affairs. It is clear that regional geopolitical antagonists have clearly orchestred a powerplay of identitypolitics. The sharp-minded Ervand Abrahamian has comprehensively pointed out that the main attraction of the Hungtington paradigm is its attempt to analyse international relations without discussing actual politics especially the issue of Palestine in particular and of Arab nationalism in general; in the post-Saddam era this also started applying for the political elites narratives in the region (sectarianism).300

1.4 Shiisms Heterogeneity: The Wilayat al-Faqih and the Question of the Marjaiyya
When ideas, and not circumstances, became important again Khomeini was not the sole actor or representative of political Islam. Ilan Papp 301 When we discuss Shia political Islam, it worthy to point out that there is a great deal of pluralism and controversy within Twelver Shiite political theory. A vast majority of todays Iraqi clerical establishment renounces Khomeinis Wilayat al-Faqih/ Guardianship of the Jurisprudent theory and adhere to more traditional conceptions concerning the societal role of the clerical class, namely to the more informal paradigm of the Marjaiyya (the absolute source of emulation). This framework incorporates an implicit hierarchical power-system among clerics, which stems from Shiisms earlier convergence with state-organization and state-bureaucracy. During the establishment of the16th, 17th and 18th century Safavid Empire in the Persian region, the Shia ulama or mujtahidin302, were incorporated within in the countrys nation-building process, serving the legitimization of the political establishments rule. This process subsequently rendered the Shiite clerical class more economic and societal power and resulted in what has been dubbed as the soft and informal institutionalisation of Shiism. It is here where Shia titles such as those of Mujtahid or a Marjaiyyat at-Taqlid at-Tamm were consolidated. The concept of the Marjaiyya and the established religious classes outlived the Safavid Empire (1722) and the clerical class upheld its informal societal status and implicit right to collect religious taxes of devout Shiites. In the 1790s they reasserted their position under the Qajars who had came to power. However, notwithstanding their participation in the sphere of politics, the clergy itself did not formulate (theory) a clear political leadership role for itself during this period and instead still proceeded adhering to a quietist (political) tradition (redemption theory, awaiting the Mahdi/Hujjat-Allah/Messias). They did not proceed in formulating normative ideas that would legitimize

297 298 299

Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 11. Egypt was no formal monarchy, but its political reality came near to just that. Wehrey [et al.], 2009,7, 38- 41. 300 Abrahamian, 2003, 529. 301 Papp, 2005, 287. 302 In the context of the establishment of a (Safavid) Shiite empire, a particular group of Ulama, known as the Usulis, won the formative battle in favour of the primacy of rationalist jurisprudence in determining Twelver Shii law overruling the more literalist approach of the Akhbaris (normative period). This of course gave way to the empowerment of an emerging religious elite known as the Marjaiyya. This group of religious scholars enjoyed the right to practice ijtihad, meaning they had the authority to issue religious verdicts (fatawa) based on the rational deduction of the traditional sources of law.

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them doing so; the clerical class remained typed by a weak hierarchy and codification. Therefore the normative framework of the Marajaiyya remained a rather informal and non-institutionalized. Some scholars such as Momen Moojan have stated that there is only recognition of one ultimate and most revered Marja (Marja al-Azam) in the Shii World. However, exquisite scholars such as Linda Walbridge, state that this is a misconception that based on Iranian propaganda of their reformist trend, whom we then see reflected in academic studies. It is thus fair and moreover realistic to agree that there is a (constant) tendency towards multiple Maraji in the spectre of regional Shiite realities. The liberty within the system is marked by the fact that theoretically, one can choose to follow a Marja who is not considered to be the most learned, without any fear of rebuke or discredit from other coreligionists. This aspect of freedom and choice could be compared to the Sunni concept of choosing a school of law; this also left to each Muslim individual to decide for him or herself (heterodoxy). As is generally the case with Islam, Shiism has over time (formative periods) become typed by its very heterogeneity. The modern Khomeinst tradition represents a reformist trend, which was ultimately aimed at generating a greater institutionalisation and centralization of Shiism praxis. However, there is also an informal counter-reformist trend, which challenges the formers innovative decharche signalling a great deal of intraShiite, ecclesiastical heterogeinity. This tension between the reformist and quietist trend should, however, not be interpreted rigidly as a reform and counter-reform (Christianity) since Islam and Shiism do, de facto, not consitute rigid forms of an apriori orthodody.303 Although there is no formal procedure and no clear set of criteria (normative indicators), mentioned characteristics of a Marja are among others ilmiyya certainly with regard to entailing a great overarching knowledge of jurisprudence (fiqh and usul al-fiqh304), proven by means of of teaching and and publishing. Another marker would be salahiyya referring to an outstanding personal piety. These attributes are stated to render a Marja a spiritual object of emulation for those considering themselves Shia. It is furthermore stated that one basically grows into the positon of the most capable mujtahid over decades. Thus, within this informal structure there is said to be an informal hierarchy, which establishes itself rather implicitly on a basis of group consent. Thereafter a primus inter pares (al-Marja al-Azam) would be detectable. Today, this is argued to be the Iraqi Ayatullah Ali Sistani, since both Grand Ayatullah Fadlallah and Grand Ayatullah al-Khoi had repeatedly referred to his scholarly superiority/authority. He is the 1992 successor of the Grand Ayatullah Al-Khoi and the current head of the Iraqi Shiite seminary (Hawza) in Najaf. It is an informal matter and certainly multiple, well-established Maraji can exist next to eachother, but it is clear, however, that this the implicit hierarchy is not whatsoever pointing towards Irans Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, due to his lack of scholary credentials.305 The concept of the Marjaiyya persists informally today, in the context of modern (secular) nation-states. The contemporary importance (power) of such Grand or Ultimate (al-Azam) Maraji lies within the fact that they are in many cases still the final recipient of the religious taxes (khums/zakaat), also referred to as the sahm al Imam. Some Maraji, such as Muhammad Kazim TabatabaI Yazi (d. 1919) have event tried to postulate obedience to fatawa (religious edicts) as strict obligations. However, such views were propagated in a context in which religious law was relevant. In any case, the fact remains that they still posses a certain degree of wielding influence (social and economic) in some of todays Middle Eastern societies. Today the influential Najaf-based Khoei Foundation (charity foundation) is related to Sistani and is said to enjoy some 80 per cent of worldwide khums paid by devout Shia; the whereabouts of such informal (apolitical) cultural institutions represent the real weight of transnational Shia activity (Najaf). 306 The Iraqi Ayatullah Sistani for example, has had some influence on politics in the post-war context of Iraq; he was in casu seen to financially support communal groups or certain communal projects (e.g. rebuilding process after the Samarra mosque bombings). However, such actions do not only confine themselves to Shiite politics (sectarianism); he has for
Walbridge, L., 2001, Shiism and, 3-12; Terhalle, 2007, 76-9; Waines, 2003, 172; Walbridge, L., 2001, The Counterreformation, 244,5; Labbaad, 2006, 238-241. 304 Fiqh and usul al-fiqh: Islamic Law and the principals of its deduction, respectively. (Cf. Walbridge, L., 2001, Shiism and, 5) 305 Walbridge, L., 2001, Shiism and, 3-12; Terhalle, 2007, 76-9. 306 Tehalle 77; Linda p 4; Jabar, 2003, 17-8.
303

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instance also protested just as loudly during Israeli military operations in the (largely Sunni Muslim) West Bank. Thus, it rather concerns taking a moral ground vis--vis important political happenings in the region from behalf of an individual societal authority.307 With the emergence of nation-states and the rise of secularism308, the clerical Shia class lost much of its prestige in the Middle East, along with its funding. Khomeini belonged to a runner-up clerical segment of this class who envisioned more political role/power for the clergy within this altering regional context. He therefore elaborated the conceptions of the Marjaiyya into a more normative system with politically active formula. Hereby, he bundled both informal spiritual guidance (Marjaiyya) and ultimate political authority (by a jurisprudent) into his new theory entitiled the Wilyat al-Faqih, the rule of the Jurispredent. In this way his reform created a theoretical basis for the Marja to assume full political (worldy, material) power within society. This reform, however, was not accepted by Khomeinis clerical contemporaries who often carried more scholarly credentials than him. It has even been argued that at the height of Khomeinis prestige, most Shia followed Grand Ayatullah Abu-l-Qasim Khui in Iraq. Nevertheless, since Khomeini was able to capitalize on the Iranian Revolution, it rendered him a momemtum (resources) to consolidate his ideas within the Iranian nation-state. He and others created political structures that actively incorporated the ultimate rule of the clergy, symbolized by the position of an Iranian Supreme Leader (cleric) and institutionalized bodies such as the Guardian Council, the Expediancy Council and the Assembly of experts. Clerics like Khomeini (Musa al-Sadr, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Khamenei, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Morteza Mutahari309 etc.) were all in favour of reforming the facets of the organization of the Marjaiyya; they critized its lack of clear leadership and limited influence within society (certainly in the pretext of the nation-state). They saw big limitations in their funding as ulama (class interest), which was interpreted as merely based on the goodwill of the people. Khomeinis action can in a way be interpreted as a scholarly elaboration, a renewed and further push for power, on behalf of the religious class to consolidate more (political) power and economic strength. Khomeini is thus a major actor in a process that has deeper historical roots; he built a new paradigm of political theory and clerical power on top of an older one.310
Khomeini divided the clergy into religious specialists and political specialists, thereby acknowledging that running a state was not the same as being a religious guide. Yet the head of the state was supposed to be a cleric, so that he did not abandon the idea of a clerically run government. He did not divide the role of marja and wilyat al-faqih, rather he redifefined the type of person who should serve in this dual capacity.311

Over the years, Iranian-led efforts have been consistent in further propagating their politically active (reformist) version of Shiism. However, the informal, quietist trend is still a very prominent trend of regional (and worldwide) Shiism. Moreover, there seems to be an increasing counter-reform against the Iranian-based effort from behalf of the quietist mujtahidin. It is even argued that this quietist and apolitical trend is still the most practiced form of the doctrine and that a majority of 80 per cent of Shii believers is thought to adhere to Grand Ayatullah Sistani.312 This implies that a majority of Shia do not adhere to thoughts of politically active clergymen regarding national political organization (legitimacy), but rather prefer an informal, spiritual and cultural set of doctrinal expressions. This immediately implies that the main political framework of Shia can both theoretically and empirically be the (secular) nation-state. Only in Iran and South Lebanon (Hizbullah) has the reformist tradition somehow succeeded in gaining substantial adherents. However also in these cases controversy persist; the Lebanese AMAL for instance does not adhere to clerical rule nor to the Wilayat al-Faqih.313 Therefore, intra-Shiite clerical rivalry has attained a sort of national

307 308

Visser, 2007, 26. E.g. Mustafa Kemal. 309 One of the most important ideologues of the Islamic movement in revolutionary Iran; he was assassinated in May 1979. 310 Walbridge, L., 2001, Shiism and, 10; Walbridge, L., 2001, The Counterreformation, 234; Motahari, 2001, 162; Terhalle, 2007, 76-9; Jafari, 2009, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=585; Walbridge, J., 2001, 131-9; Mavani, 2001, 183 -203. 311 Walbridge, L., 2001, The Counterreformation, 234 312 Terhalle, 2007, 77-9. 313 This might have been different if its Iranian-born founder, Musa al-Sadr, was still alive, but even this is disputable.

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character, whereby Shia dominated countries have gradually generated different forms of nationalist Shiism today, Marjas are also affected by the power that derives from the logic of an emerging state-based nationalism. 314 The complexity that stems from the question of the Marjaiyya is best symbolized by Hizbullahs shifting ideological rhetoric. Their pragmatic stance from the late 1990s onward, does not only relate to material realpolitik (national agenda), it also reflects the partys political maturity; i.e. its realization of the strong, aforementioned intra-Shiite controversies. A well-documented article entitled Whither Hezbullah?, which was published on the website (Weakly Worker) of the UKs Communist Party depicted this dynamic quite accurately. There are two important official documents that explicitly display Hizbullahs self-definition and thus serve perfectly for analyzing their geopolitical and spiritual allegiance. These are its 1985 Open Letter and the 2009 Political Manifesto. The opening paragraph of the Open Letter immediately displays important markers: We are the sons of the Umma, The Party of God, whose vanguard God made victorious in Iran where it re-established the nucleus of the Islamic State in the World. We obey the orders of the sole, wise and just command of the faqih, which are presently embodied by the imam and guide, Ayatullah Khomeini. May his authority empower the Muslims and be the harbinger of their glorious renaissance. Very important indicators are literally here: Umma (the world-wide Muslim community), Iran, Islamic State, the faqih and Khomeini (Wilayat al-Faqih). This Lebanese movement positioned itself quite explicitly line with Khomeinis political theory.315 The manifest furthermore entails statements such as we reject both capitalism and communism and only Islamic government is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all; it could have clearly been Khomeini or Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr (reformists) themselves who wrote these statements.316 One can easily understand this position when studying the period in which the Lebanese organization came to light. After a period of underground operation, Hizbullah emerged in 1982 with logistic and military support of a contingent of Iranian Pasdaran317, Iranian revolutionary guards, based in the then Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley. The organization formed an umbrella for various Lebanese Shii Islamists who were influenced by the 1979 occurrences in Iran. Some were former member of the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi al-Dawa, other such as Husayn al-Musawi and Hasan Nasrallah were former members of the Lebanese movement AMAL. Even (the Grand Ayatullah) Muhamad Husayn Fadlallah -who formally denied any formal ties to Hizbullah - was for a short period affiliated to it by acting as its spiritual mentor, or Murshid Ruhi.318 Yet, the 2009 Political manifesto interestingly differs for the 1985 manifesto in many ways. It is three times as long and more studious (realism, maturity). Whereas the first document displays clear grievances at the hands of the Lebanese confessional system and explicit enmity versus actors such as France, Israel, the US and the Lebanese Phalangists319, the second is characterized by an additional effort to contextualize past sufferance in a socio-economic context (realism). But more importantly, it does not carry the outspoken religious terminology of the first document. Although it still refers to Islam as a main source of ideological inspiration, it does not make any explicit mention of allegiance to the rule of the Jurisprudent (Iran), the Umma, or the wish to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. On the contrary, it foremost propagates the organization as Lebanese and patriotic (al-Muqaawama al-Labnaaniyya). It is also interesting to note that there is no Arabic or English version available at any of Hizbullahs websites or mention of this document in later published works by high-ranking party members. The party also seemingly prefers to publish its electoral programs and 2009 manifesto, rather than its 1985 Open Letter; clearly signalling a party preference regarding its profile.320 Clearly, this shift comes forth from the partys opportunity to

314 315

Terhalle, 2007. 77-9. Alagha, 2006, 36-7; Kfoury, A., Whither Hezbollah?, Weakly Worker (No. 807), March 4 th 2010, http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003834) (accessed on 10/03/2011). 316 Kfoury, A., Whither Hezbollah?, Weakly Worker (No. 807), March 4th 2010, http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003834) (accessed on 10/03/2011). 317 IRGC (see, list of abbrev.) 318 Nakash, 2006, 120; Alagha, 2006, 34-6. 319 Bashir Gemayel was the leader of the Phalange, which was founded by Pierre Gemayel following his visit to Nazi Germany in 1936. The Movement was strongly influenced by European fascism and intensely opposed to Arab nationalism. 320 Kfoury, A., Whither Hezbollah?, Weakly Worker (No. 807), March 4th 2010, http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003834) (accessed on 10/03/2011).

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participate in Lebanese politics and acquire national power. The party is still an geopolitical ally of Iran -its enjoys vast amounts of Iranian funding-, however, one should also consider that its Murshid Ruhi, Fadlallah, as the only Grand ayatullah in Lebanon was opposed to Khomeinis succession by Khamenei, that is, his official promotion to scholarly rank of Grand Marja and thus simultaneously Supreme Leader of Iran. These intra-Shiite controversies (heterogeneity) probably add to the explanation of why Hizbullah has avoided to actively propagate its adherence to the Wilayat al-Faqih is why the change in Hizbullahs rhetoric also implicitly indicates the reality of Shiite pluralism (heterogeneity). 321 Khamenei is keenly aware of the fact that he lacks both the scholarly credentials and popular charisma (revolutionary zeal) of his precedor (Khomeini) and that of his intra-Shiite quietist opponents (Sistani, Fadlallah). Therefore, the reformists in Iran have claimed that in todays world, political experience would be far more important for qualifying as a Marja, hence enabling the pretention that the most qualified (political) Jurisprudent of Iran is also the highest Marja of the Shia world and therefore enjoys the legitimate right of being the Supreme Leader of Iran.
It should be cause for sober reflection that study of the written historical record and anthropological fieldwork should produce such drastically different impressions of the situation. While Qom has more students than Najaf today, it is not so clear that it is truly recognized as the centre of Shiism throughout the world.322

As such, Iranian reformists have tried to capitalize on the notion of the Marjaiyya and Shiism altogether, but not with much success, so it seems. Today, this stance poses Iran (Khamenei) many problems of legitimacy. Bolstering the prestige of a cleric with political experience and knowledge of world affairs above all else did not seem to have put aside doubts about Khamenei; it seems that this didnt manage to penetrate and alter popular perception in the Shia World.323 Hereby an essential reflection and reality was bypassed, namely, that of the participatory role of the muqallidiin (adherents). The Marjaiyya was always a kind of grassroots institution, where lay Shia themselves, foremost created the perception of power amongst the most revered. Apparently, charisma and symbolism (participation) are not too well incorporated in the operation of this reformist structure.324 Moreover, Iranian efforts are tempered by the fact that currently an over-promoted stance on this matter might backlash in the case of differing fatawa issued by higher-ranking/more prestigious Shiite mujtahidin- and subsequently even undercut Khameinis legitimacy of being Irans Supreme Leader (political power). Also within Iran itself this recent government-led conformist push wasnt free of controversy. Scholars have remarked that domestic clerical opposition is commonplace in Iran and that there are more ulama in Iranian prisons today than there were during the reign of the shah. 325 When we remark heterogeneity within Shia political theory, it is thus also worthy to note that also within the very reformist and politically active camp great pluralism persists. Following the 1979 revolution, Ali Shariati appeared together with Khomeini at centre of politics in post-revolutionary Iran. This Islamist reformist and theorist who was as much a student of Sartre, Fannon and Guevara, as he had been of Islam and Shiism326 envisioned ideas for Iran that incorporated Shiism, Marxism and patriotism into one powerful take on society. There is quite a lot more pluralism than todays often simplistically portrayed image of Shiism would predict. This relates to the fact that one only single tradition within many was ultimately consolidated with power in post-revolutionary Iran: Khomeinis more dichotomous ideology. 327 Ilan Papp demonstrates this vividly:
It was not this more hybrid ideology, but rather the more simplified and simplistic dichotomous interpretation of the role of religion in the modern era that carried the day. Ayatollah Khomeini offered a two-tier programme: the need to liberate Iran from foreign control and the wish to revive the greatness of Islam. These two messages were taped and widely distributed, paving the way for the exiled radical clergyman to be the principal spokesperson of the forthcoming revolution. He returned to receive support from the victims of the Shahs Kfoury, A., Whither Hezbollah?, Weakly Worker (No. 807), March 4th 2010, http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1003834) (accessed on 10/03/2011). , Terhalle, 2007, 78; Alagha, 2006, 36. 322 Walbridge, L., 2001, Shiism and, 11. 323 Walbridge, L., 2001, The Counterreformation, 230, 236. 324 Ibid., 244. 325 Ibid., 235. 326 Papp, 2005, 286. 327 Ibid., 286.
321

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policies in 1978.328

One can thus mark an aspiration from behalf the Iranian established to present Qom as the all-over and fixed spiritual and political center for Shiism, both domestically and regionally. Linda Walbridge argues that this politicization of religious leadership in Iran has alienated Shia both within and outside Iran and that, at present, the marja taqlid with the greatest number of muqallids is Ayatollah Ali Sistani [] a mujtahid who is both apolitical and outside the control of the Iranian government. 329 Today, Sistani prefers the persistence of an informal Marjaiyya; when it comes to politics he is keen on issuing a non-published advice (nasiha) rather than any fatawa (hukm shari), which would imply a religiously legal duty (ujub shari) of the believer.330 Additionally she brightly remarks that thus far, only highly politicized Shia have opted to follow Khamenei and they are still a minority.331 Today, it remains a question whether or not Iranian (state) resources (propaganda) will be able to outweigh the current dominant (apolitical) conceptions regarding conceptions and structures of the Marjaiyya. These arguments could be contrasted by referring to Sistanis recent (2000s) activism, however, this can in fact not be attributed to his political and societal stance, or to any supposed ideological rapprochement with Irans clerical establishment. This mainly stems from the total implosion of the Iraqi state and its inability to provide political and societal stability. It is also argued that both Saddam and the Iranian Khomeinists legacy of repression have disillusioned the Najafi quietist faction with both secularism and authoritarian theocracy. That is why Sistani is an active proponent of parliamentary (constitutional) democracy. Reportedly, he has publically stated: Even if I must be wiped out, I will not let the experience of Iran be repeated in Iraq. IntraShiite differences could not be ventilated more explicitly. Bearing in mind the fact that Sistani himself is of Iranian descent making him the first and foremost to be able to promote a transnational union- make it even more unlikely to see a future axis of cooperation being established between Qom and Najaf to integrate both countries into an ideological, federalized union.332 The elaborated study of Laurence Lour concerning transnational Shia networks in the Gulf area (vis vis Iran) pinpoints certain interesting and fundamental realities crucial to my study. Her extensive fieldwork demonstrates that such transnational networks are historically related to the aforementioned framework of the Marjaiyya, which she labels as the pre-national religious corporation. Although she indicated that these contemporary networks have organic, bottom-up characteristics (voluntary), she argues that they are primarily socio-cultural remains (religious taxes, spiritual guidance) of the regions clerical class, preceding Middle Eastern nation-state organization. They are hence not merely modern (post-1979) evolutions of transnational revolutionary Shia sympathy overruling the nation-state, but elaborations informal pre-modern structures preceding it. Their existence and persistence does not intrinsically imply a self-brewn challenge to the nation-state, but reflect historical networks that have taken an informal, secondary character in the modern context of nationhood. She confirms the fact that most of these (historical) networks are primarily cultural, informal and apolitical in nature. However, it should be noted that the clerical class (class interest) traditionally, did advocate against the foreign importation the nation-state in the region in favour of more Islamic conceptions of geographical organization. Without doubt, the Gulf region and Middle East as a whole harbour numerous such historical cultural ties (tribal, Arab, Sunni, Shia etc.), which render some degree of transnationalism, certainly in the case of tiny Gulf monarchies. Nation building processes are in retrospect quite new phenomena in the Gulf, however, the fact remains that these states are the daily reality and ultimately the main socio-political point of reference for the vast majority of todays Gulf inhabitants.333 Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the First Gulf War (1990) some interesting dynamics have taken place. From the 1990s onward, many Gulf countries started accelerating their nation-building processes and gradually demonstrated signs of opening-up

328 329

Papp, 2005, 286. Walbridge, L., 2001, Shiism and, 11. 330 Louer, 2008, 292-3. 331 Walbridge, L., 2001, The Counterreformation, 245. 332 Terhalle, 2007, 77 333 Louer, 2008, 99-103, 177-182, 291-301; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 30-1; Jones, 2007, 30.

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towards the idea of including their Shia inhabitants in these projects (e.g. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia). It is interesting to point out that the more inclusive Gulf policies have been towards this confessional inclusion (nationalism), the less outspoken sectarian issues (government repression or Shia violence/terrorism, fromal reluctance etc.) have appeared to be. From this period onward, the advocation of wataniyya or citizenship amongst regional Shia became more prominent. 334 In this sense, nationalist ideology managed to outweigh Shiism; or, in the case of Iran, Shiism was mixed with nationalism. Maximillian Terhalle formulates this dynamic quite accurately by stating that it has been the resilience of ideas of community, of collective identity and of collective interests based upon the given state structures and not an imagined transnational Shia community led by Tehran that made Riyadh the Saudi Shias point of reference. 335 Hereby, a formal domestication-process of Shia politics (opposition, demands) commenced. Today, most Gulf countries comply rather individual geopolitical units (interstate complex), which have rather successfully integrated themselves in the globalized world economic system (capitalist complex). 336 Only, in the case of interruptions of normal state-organization and continuation, say after a breakdown of the state through a civil war or invasion (Lebanon, Iraq) did nationalism (Arabism, Iraqi and Lebanese nationalism) again become porous to other forms of collective identity (Shiite, Sunni, Maronite etc.). For instance, the only reason why Hizbullah is today able to further consolidate its sectarian-based operations so extensively (housing, hospitals, militia, TV station etc.) is because of its turbulent history (institutionalized confessionalism) and subsequent Iranian funding, most probably merely present due to the very fact that South Lebanon borders Israel. 337 It should be clear that one always does politics in a bound geographical and political sphere since any genuine political enterprise [Shia activist networks] is framed by its relation to the state, whatever its agenda: destroy the state, conquer it or integrate into it. Even in a globalized and increasing cosmopolitan context (international contacts, funding), most movement always prefer to operate in the tangible national/domestic sphere; the main locus for their political aspirations. This nation-state organization and fixation is even an unavoidable logic affecting all movements, both Sunni and Shia Islamic networks. The key issue is that such Islamist organizations often do not want to abolish interstate reality, but rather integrate into the political descision making process of a specific nation-state. Hence, Al-Dawa cells in the Gulf need primarily to be interpreted as dislocated (migration) member of Iraqi Shiite socio-political groups (Saddam era), not primarily there to initiate region-wide Shiite uprisings or actively sent there (by Iran) promote their co-religionists in targeting there national establishments. One should mark the parallel with Syria and Jordan, where thousands of Iraqis have flooded the country in search of safety following post-war violence (cf. 2.2.2). Although their presence definitely attributes to visible Shia activity in Syria and Jordan at least through the scope of the ordinary citizen-, they need foremost to be interpreted as Iraqi migrants (refugees) and not as geopolitical Iranian missionaries to instigate regional intra-confessional clashes. The forms of terrorism and jihadism, which are devout in engaging themselves in what they state to be a broad civilizational fight without reference to a specific territory are in fact rather marginal, certainly when it concerns Shia radicalism. But even here, this transnational radicalism is often derived from specific nation-state (social) experiences (poverty, civil war, repression etc.) that subsequently served as an incentive for political action and the forming of ones identity. It is even argued that up until today, no Shia equivalent exists for transnational Sunni Jihadism. Hereby, the best example is Iraq, where no transnational Shia Jihad developed against the American, nor against the Sunnis, while the country has attracted thousands of Sunni Jihadists eager to fight the Americans and their putative Shia allies. This is most probably due to the inherently more politicized nature of Shia Islam and (Shia Islamist movements); in contrast to Sunni Islamic movements, the national framework of religiously-inspired political strife is an identity, which can be upheld without much societal controversy. In Sunni ideology, religious authority is diffuse, whereby the clerical establishments are faced with a bigger problem

334 335

Louer, 2008, 99-103, 177-182, 291-301 Terhalle, 2007, 71-75. 336 Louer, 2008, 99-103, 177-182, 291-301 337 Terhalle, 2007, 74-5

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in justifying their legitimacy; there is a weak doctrinal base for the pretension of clerical rule or substantial political activity. With regard to transnationalism, Shiite ideology relates either to the implementation of the Iranian nation-states material foreign policy goals (military deterrence) or to non-Iranian (Shiite) organizations that use Iranian means to achieve their political programs in their own nation-states.338
Muqtada al-Sadr does not emulate anybody outside of Iraq and in particular in the Gulf. His fight is perceived as domestic, concerning only the Iraqis. If Gulf Shias contribute financially to the restoration of Shia religious institutions in Iraq, none of them thinks of joining the ranks of Shia militias. In the matter of Shia radicalism, what we see from time to time is occasional traditional terrorist acts, sponsored by Iran as a state with specific national interest. In other words, when Iran supports terrorism, it is not with the prospect of supporting a disembodied general civilizational fight but in order to reinforce itself within the interstate system to negotiate from a power position on this or that particular issue. Hence Shia violence is never disconnected from domestic political stakes and from a concrete political project.339

Shia radicalism is often connected to the failure of domestic socio-political integration and accommodation by autocratic regimes. In this sense, Iranian patronage of regional Shia movements should not whatsoever be interpreted as signalling the excercise of transnational religious authority since the vast majority of the Gulfs Shia populations (incl. Saudi Arabia) and even Shia political movements refer to Sistani as a source of religious (spiritual) emulation. It is also interesting to point out that Bahrain harbours a Shiite tradition, which relates itself to the akhbariyya trend, the more conservative (literally) strand of Shiism, which had broken up from the usuliyya strand and moved to Bahrain in the late 18th century. So culturally, the Shiite trend in Barhrain is mutually reinforced by its political quietism (Sistanis Marjaiyya andakhabariyya tradition). However, with regard to political activism, it can be argued that the contemporary relation between Iran and Shia movements is extremely political in nature and stems from the formers need for a deterrent capacity (extra-territorial terrorism) in the case that its relations with the US and Arab regimes deteriorate and from the latter their need to be financially and logistically supported by a powerful foreign nation-state in cases of domestic isolation and socio-economic and political marginalization.340 The same goes for Iraqi Shia political parties such as ISCI, al-Dawa and the Sadrist faction. Many observers expected that in a post-Saddam era, Iraqi Shia would endeavour to implement an Iranian-like theocracy, but rather the contrary is true. Recent history shows that most Shia elements seem to embrace the organizational fundamentals of the US democratization plans (parliamentary democracy), even if they enjoy good relations with Iran. Many impressionistically inclined observers would interpret ISCI, The Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq, as a Shia faction to push for an Iraqi theocracy. It had after all been founded in Iran in 1982 by Islamist exiles opposing the Saddams regime. This faction falls formally in line with the reformist Khomeinist trend as regards political theory. However, this very party has ever since the invasion of Iraq grown out to one of the main allies of the US and they has with a great sense for realpolitik always manoeuvred within the boundaries of the American democratization schemes for the country. In that way they have, somehow similar to Hizbullah, pragmatically distanced themselves from the Iranian theocratic model. It is therefore quite interesting that this political faction has changed its name in 2007 from The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to its currently more shrouded name (ISCI). This is all the more significant, when we bear in mind that it was this partys former head, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who explicitly advocated pan-Shiite conceptions (manifesto), whilst in exile in Iran. He was one of the few ShiI intellectuals to propagate visions of a unified Shiite Empire (including Iran and Iraq) controlled by a single jurisprudent (faqih), in a federal system.341 ISCI, however, still maintain strong contacts with Iran, but it would be fair to state that they mostly collaborate with Iran by endorsing measurements that end up serving Iranian economic interests. Ever since enjoying power, they have grown out to a

338 339

Louer, 2008, 294 -301; Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 30-1; Jones, 2007, 30. Louer, 2008, 299. 340 Louer, 2008, 294-301; Terhalle, 2007, 73; Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-andpolitics/emerging-shia-crescent-symposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized), 4. 341 Visser, 2007, 27.

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nationalist Iraqi party that primarily represents the Iraqi Shiite business class (middle-class) and which maintains good contacts with Iraqs quietist and apolitical clerical elite. The fact that they had earlier called for the establishment of an independent, nineprovince Shiastan in Iraqs central and southern region should be interpreted from the point of communal economic interest the largest bulk of Iraqs oil reserves are situated in the Southern Shia inhabited areas- rather than any aspiration to establish a federal, Tehran-led theocracy. Interestingly, another Iraqi, Shiite-based party also envisaged a separate federal region (3 provinces), namely the Basra-based Fadhila party. This has nothing to do with Iran, since they publically impersonate an Arab nationalist stance; it is again directly related to Basras oil potential, right at the shore of the Gulf (export). Some of its party-members seem to envisage of a wealthy future, as a small oil-exporting state to the example of their Arab counterparts in the Persian Gulf (e.g. UAE). Fadhila claims it is motivated by this scheme due to discrimination as southerners by central Iraqi Shiite politicians (Karbala, Najaf, Baghdad), whome they perceive as a bureaucratic Shiite elite that neglects the South. In the late 2000s they have been strongly opposed in their attempts to alleviate more souvereignity to the Basra-related southern area.342 The same can briefly be said about al-Dawa figures such as the current prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, and his fellow-party predecessor such as Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Many depict them as mere servants of the Iranian theocracy, however, the party clearly frames itself within Iraqi nationalism and cooperates with the US (Iraqi National Congress/INC-initiative). Although the party is based in religion, it should not whatsoever be interpreted as adherent to the Iranian Wilayat al-Faqih; they are no ideological lackeys of Irans clerical establishment. In light of post-war Iraqi disintegration (institutions), they do however enjoy considerable geopolitical (diplomatic, economic, security) ties with the Iranian nation-state; but this needs no overstatement, however, for the newly emerging Iraqi establishment has shown to act with increasing assertiveness (national interest) vis--vis Iran.343 These forms of transnational ties are thus a highly political matter, in place due to contextual ermergency (US occupation, Iraqi disintegration), rather than it stem from any primordial loyalty. Therefore, it has been predicted that when Iraq stabilizes, Iraqis (Shia, Sunni and Kurds alike) will assert their state interest, which will take them away from Iran. 344
Iranian influence does exist in Iraq, though it is not founded on the basis of a common belief. Rather, it is the political weakness of one state that allows for interference by another state for its own self-interest, notwithstanding the fact that this is underpinned by Shiism. [] The risk Iran runs if it meddles too blatantly in Iraqis the backlash it could create with many Iraqis. While Iran and Iraq share many cultural and religious bonds, there are still significant differences. [] Iraqi as well as Iranian nationalism is framed in terms of religion; however, nationalism can serve as a means of political rejection in the case of extended intrusion notwithstanding Shiism.345

Another important Iraqi Shia figure is the young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who enjoys vast support among the immense impoverished masses of the country (street politics). Today, he heads political faction entitled The Sadrists, referring to his famous clerical family legacy (Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, Musa al-Sadr etc.). It is worthy to point out that clerical charities, such as those provided by al-Sadr, have become thee increasingly relevant to the deprived post-war masses of Iraq. Hereby, the central figures of such foundations have simulataneously grown immense societal and political popularity impact pressure (ballot box). Muqtada al-Sadr cannot be described as an ally of the other Shia factions since he actively discredits them and often politically opposes them. Although he would seem the most visible factor in superficially predicting a transnational clerical capitalization on political power he is widely discursed as an agent of Iran because segments of his Mahdi Army had been funded by Iran- his official stance has traditionally been strongly anti-Iranian and adherent to Arabism and Iraqi nationalism in particular. He even propagates differences between authentic Iraqis and alien Iraqi exiles. He also openly

342 343

Visser, 2007, 25-6, 28. Terhalle, 2007, 73, 77, 79-80; Duss & Juul, 2009, 1-19; Jabar, 2003, 12-18. 344 Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescent-symposiumimplications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized), 4. 345 Terhalle, 2007, 75.

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opposes Sistani and other influencial clerics; in brief he has antagonized many and is in fact against everybody but himself. He seems to have been challenging both Iraqs traditional and apolitical clergy as well as the legitimacy of Irans politically active clerical establishment in favour of his own views and independent position. Although his age would seemingly imply a lack of scholarly credentials to consolidate such ambitions, he has been succesfull in requiring unlimited agency authorization or ijaza from the old Ayatullah Kazim al-Hairi346 allowing him to act with clerical authority to his independent political insights/calculations. Although both Muqtada al-Sadr and al-Hairi adhere to reformist (Khomeinist) perceptions of clerical role, empirical observations have clearly demonstrated an anti-Iranian and strongly Iraqi-nationalist agenda from their behalf. Clearly, there is a lot of complexity involved in the socio-political organization of the Shiite clergy, even on a national scale. Notwithstanding his policitical activities, his relations with Iran should not be read as ideological. He has been useful to Iran as a geopolitical vehicle to pin down the US in Iraq (anti-US insurgency of his Mahdi Army) -tempering its post-9/11 ambitions to invade Iran- and to balance the power of other Shiite factions such as al-Dawa and ISCI and influence of apolitical clerics such as Sistani (divide and rule). When it comes to Iraq, however, one should in this respect not only tail of Shiite socio-cultural and political emancipation; also Kurdish347 nationals enjoy more freedom today than under Saddams previous rule, which was always suspicious about Kurdish and Shiite allegiance. Today, both Iraqi communities are widely represented in the newly formed Iraqi government, which is often depicted as solely Shia. This is why keen observers such as John Hopkins University associate Fouad Ajami have comprehensively pointed out that they [Shia] cant monopolize Iraq, and they dont. Trust me, Ive been in Iraq in six times. Ive met with everyone, up and down the line, from Ayatollah Sistani to ordinary Iraqis. This idea of this Shia monster running away with Iraq is a legend. Its a legend.348 However, according to some critics, post-war Iraqi violence symbolized an imminent, all-pervasive regional Sunni-Shia clash, which would soon, spread throughout the region. This view only became more explicit after the al-Askari Mosque bombings in 2006 and 2007.349 Today, post-war Iraq seems to be dominated by sectarianism and subsequent sectarian politics. This nature of politics in Iraq has apparently surprised some scholars; Baghdad, so it is argued, had after all been a beacon of secular pan-Arabism, seemingly gravely contrasting the current overzealous manifestation of political Islam. Some observers have consequently considered this sectarian-Islamic nature as the authentic face of Iraq. However, other critical voices have managed to explain and contextualize this phenomenon by primarily studying Iraq as a post-war society and additionally indicating structural underlying, evolutions of sectarianism in the recent history of Iraqi politics. It has been argued that the Bathi regime knew an underlying structure of tribal, mainly Sunni lines. During the 1980s and 1990s Iraqi Shia were discriminated against due to a state-instigated sentiment of suspicion and doubt regarding their loyalty (potential traitors) during and after the Iran-Iraq war and the US instigated Shiite rebellion in 1991. This is said to have consolidated a Sunni elitist monopoly on politics and key sector of the economy (banks, insurance companies, industrial firms etc.) prior to 2003. Additionally, massive oil revenues enabled the former Iraqi political elite to create a relentlessly effective repression apparatus that has violently dealt with any opposition, most specifically among Shiites and Kurds. All of these elements have undoubtedly had their effect in creating a general atmosphere of insecurity, intolerance for outsiders and in-group communalism (informal organization and solidarity). In such a sense, one can speak of a post-Saddam emancipation among
Both seem to need eachother for practical motives: al-Hairi lacks mass support whereas al-Sadr is in need of scholarly authority to balance the clerical authority of traditionalists such as Sistani. It is worthy to mention that many key figures of the Hawza of Najaf, such as Muhammad Said al-Hakim, Muhammad Ishaq Fayyad, Bashir al-Najafi, have jointly condemned Muqtada al-Sadrs aggressive decharche into the societal scene and Iraqs political life (cf. Jaber, 2003, 17). 347 The Bathi repression of Kurds culminated in the cruel chemical attacks on the Kurdish Iraqi town of Habalja during the Iran-Iraq war; see, for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvfT7zCW7ts. 348 Ajami in Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescentsymposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized),10.20-12.00. 349 Terhalle, 2007, 73, 77, 79-80; Duss & Juul, 2009, 1-19; Jabar, 2003, 12-18.
346

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different ethnic and confessional minorities (and majorities). Indeed, this does not uniquely apply to Shiites; it also applied to ethnic Kurds and Sabeans-Mandeans or religious minorities such as Christians, Yezidis etc.350 However, this underlying historical evolution of sectarianism that is to some extent detectable, should not be overstated or singled out as the sole reason for the current status quo of Iraqi political and societal affairs since it might render a picture of Iraqi exceptionalism, e.g: Instead of democracy, Americans have seen Iraqis divide into warring tribes. They have seen Sunnis rally to al Qaedas murderous gangs and Shiites rally to brutal militias. They have seen Iraqs communities wage savage war. 351 It should be clear that the current intensity of confessional manifestations (violence a.o.) is not a purely spontaneous or mere natural expression of a supposed liberated identity in the sense of a looming (e.g. just underneath the surface, traditional sectarian distrust and enmity hidden from view), cultural sentiment within Shiite character ready to finally express itself. To argue so is, in my opinion, quite a perverse argument; certainly in light of such levels of identity-inflicted violence.352 In the subsequent years to the US invasion, intra-Iraqi violence took worrisome turn. Urban districts where reportedly violently homogenized along ethnic and confessional lines.353 Viewed to a backdrop of such realities, the argument of a naturally emerging identity would, in my opinion, be the same 354 as to saying that mere tribal oppositions -and mass rape and brutal killing; yes, they come with such shrouded terminology- in todays Democratic Republic Congo is somehow natural for the given region and the locally-bound national character of its inhabitants. Clearly without any degree of state-centric organization and without the rule of lawviolence and atrocities can easily be made in a context of basic day-to-day survival. Indeed, when resources are so scarce that it is a question of one group or the other surviving, discrimination against outsiders, strong in-group solidarity and insider-favouritism become increasingly prevalent.355 The exact same parallel could of course be made to explain the ethnic violence in a disintegration Yugoslavia during the late 1980s and early-1990s356, viewed to the backdrop of a finalizing Cold War. With a great sense of history a sharp-minded (op-ed) article entitled Bosnias error of Othering (Open Democracy) made an utterly striking parallel between contemporary perceptions of political and societal evolutions in post-Yugoslavia and those regarding the modern Middle East:
Like the unhelpful binary often generated in Middle Eastern discourse between elite, artificial pan-Arabism and a somehow authentic political Islam, the fact that Titos Yugoslavia was based on a constructed and ultimately unsustainable identity doesnt prove that an ethnopolis is the natural solution, any more than pan-Arabisms artificiality proves the authentic nature of post-Khomeini political Islam in the Middle East. To argue so gets uncomfortably close to unhelpful and dangerous essentialisms; that ethnic conflict in the Balkans is somehow inevitable, that it is just what people do there.357

The main reason for the emergence of this degree of sectarianism, confessional violence, sectarian politics and in-group organization and solidarity, is still related to the invasion and occupation of US forces and the subsequent total implosion of the Iraqi state apparatus (civil & security services). How else can one explain that impoverished Iraqi families today even inhabitat cemetries, if not due to existential insecurity (poverty, violence). Cleary, it is not due to cultural affection for Shia ancestors.358 In fact, Islamic cultural heritage has only a modest impact on xenophobia when it comes to Iraq. 359 There is thus no need for Islamic, Shiite or even regional exceptionalism since it primarily concerns economic and post-war insecurity here; Iraqi people in desperate need of rebuilding a stable, secure and viable future:
Luomi, 2008, 9; Inglehart , 2006, 496; Brning, 2008, 63; UNHCR, Iraqi Situation Update, UNHCR, August 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/491956a02.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 351 Frum, D. in Nasr, 2008, 44. 352 Norton, 2007, 439. 353 Brning, 2008, 64. 354 Without reference to structural historical and socio-economic contexts: Belgian colonialism, independance, repression of Dsir Lumumba, autoritarian rule of both Mubutu Sese Seko and Kabila Sr., implosion of the state and communalism (e.g. in 1960 and 1997), post-cold ward imperialism, neoliberalism, etc. 355 Inglehart , 2006, 496. 356 Symbolized by the Srebrenica massrace in 1995. 357 McRobie, H., Bosnias error of othering, Open Democracy, January 19th 2010, http://www.opendemocracy.net/heather-mcrobie/bosniaserror-of-othering (accessed on 03/03/2011). 358 e.g. http://english.aljazeera.net/video/middleeast/2011/06/201162145014861343.html 359 Jabar, 2003, 15-6, 18; Luomi, 2008, 9-11; Inglehart , 2006, 502.
350

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Despite threats that anyone who took part in the elections would be killed, and in the face of suicide bombers attempting to infiltrate the polling places, on Election Day in January 2005, millions turned out to vote. Although 300 terrorist attacks took place that day, fully 58 percent of those eligible to vote did so a higher rate of turnout than in most US presidential elections. In our survey, 85 percent of the Iraqi public said that democracy may have problems, but its better than any other form of government. Their commitment to democracy seems genuine. They were willing to risk their lives for it.360

However, many observers trace the source of the current sectarian strife right back to the birth of Islam and to the major schism, which is a major overstatement. A typical example that is thereby often put forward as a supposed proof for the engrained religious character of Iraqi Shia is said to be the post-invasion Ashura pilgrimage to Karbala361, which attracted millions of Iraqis. Instead of interpreting the event as a celebration of the end of Saddams repression through ceremonial communal ritualism, many impressionistic inclined observers used it as a sensational argument to define the monolith nature (conservative) of Iraqi Shia. Additionally, knowing that the event was even slightly orchestred by SCIRI, immediately further tempers the supposed degree of popular spontaneity.362 Moreover, such observers make no mention whatsoever of the impact of extensive warfare on Iraqi society (1980-1988, 1990, 2003), nor of the previous ten years of heavy sanctions against the Iraqi people, ruining what was once the most [] modernized Arab state.363 Such analyses make no mention of any particularities (pluralism) when it comes to discussing the supposed subjects (e.g. secular Iraqi Shiites).364 Some keen scholars with a general insight into social pedagogics, have managed to position post-Saddam Iraqi dynamics within a finely balanced and comprehensive context:
Religion has worldy roots. It works as antidote to war and death, to crime and prostitution; it is an identity marker, a provider of charities, a source of moral support and substitute for discredited ideologies. But focus on Islam and Islamism in post-war Iraq may convey a misleading picture, and Iraq is not necessarily a land overwhelmed by tribal chiefs and turbaned clerics. These forces are prominent by default. Secular forces and rational clerics supportive of secular politics are not wanting, but they are seemingly inactive for the moment. What will remain of the religious parties street politics if government services are reintroduced to render religious charities and clerical supervision superfluous, or if, in addition, secular, civil associations are rehabilitated?365

Research has demonstrated that after the disintegration of the Iraqi state, the Iraqi public showed one of the highest levels of xenophobia and in-group solidarity in between individuals of ethnic groups such as Kurds and sectarian groups such as Sunni or Shia. Iraq appeared to have the highest level for any of the 85 societies for which data was available in 2005-2006. Multidisciplinary studies have indicated that such forms and levels of popular xenophobia towards other societal groups and in-group solidarity and communal-based organization are in fact typical for situations dubbed as those typed by existential insecurity. How severe Saddams repression might have been, it is highly unlikely that such contemporary characteristics (intensity) have been a supposed permanent cultural feature of Iraqi society. Clearly, violence, religiosity and sectarianism are not de facto features of a supposed Iraqi national character.366 It is important to recognize a trend towards sectarianism (and violence) since it renders the observers more detailed insight into a specific case study and it is additionally visible that Iraqi society organized itself along sectarian and ethnic lines after the 2003 invasion; the exact same goes for post-1975 Lebanon (civil war).367 However, it is equally important to accurately contextualize such a worrisome evolution. It is crucial to acknowledge a hierarchy within this complementary duality: sectarianism thrives when the state is unable to provide security and basic services, and the gap is then filled by sect-based organizations.368 Iraq could currently best be described as a post-war disintegrated state with extreme high levels of existential insecurity in Iraq these days life is unpredictable and dangerous369- and in which ordinary people who seek security amongst sectarian fighting have been forced to pick sides because of societal regulations of in-group
360 361

Inglehart , 2006, 503. This memorial could for the first time, once again, take place outdours. 362 Jabar, 2003, 15-6. 363 De Ley, H., The Danish Cartoons: Contextualizing their Publication and the Muslim Response to it, Centrum voor Islam in Europa (2006), http://www.flw.ugent.be/cie/CIE2/deley36.htm#n12 (accessed on 02/03/2011). 364 Brning, 2008, 69. 365 Jabar, 2003,18. 366 Inglehart , 2006, 495-6, 501-2. 367 Peteet, 2007, 3. 368 Ibid. 3-4. 369 Inglehart, 2006, 503.

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organization.370 Thus, rather than simply interpreting contemporary Iraqi politics as a result of Iranian promoted sectarianism (Shia Crescent), a wide-scale Sunni-Shia clash/divide or the emergence of a so-called historical, linear and monolith sectarian identity of Shia, a realist paradigm together with an accurate and balanced sense of history, bring forth the dynamic of structural events (1990 Gulf War and sanctions, 2003 US-led invasion, implosion of Iraq) that have undermined strong statecentric organization in specific cases (Iraqi & Lebanese Shia). Clearly, there is a great deal of intra-Shiite discontent and opposition; so much even, that it is absolutely elusive to speak of a uniform Shiite movement in Iraq, let alone in the region as a whole. Local realities and historical particularities discourage many Shia from thinking about their religious community in terms of crescents, rectangles, or indeed, any kind of cartographical projection.371 Rather than ideological belt, Iranian-Iraqi relations are quite rationally explainable from the prism of realist, material geopolitics.372 As Maxilian Terhalle states during his assessment of the term Shia Crescent and the idea of a broad Shiite revival, spreading throughout the Middle East [transnational], should be viewed with scepticism. 373 Many Shiite political parties, say for instance in Iraq, have often little in common. The premises of a supposed Shia Crescent implies the idea of a uniform regional cultural body that would furthermore embody common political belief system (Wilayat al-Faqih) ready to be exploited by one single politico-clerical establishment (Qom). This presumptions, however, does not stand upon thorough inquiry since the normative and popular conditions for such distortive perceptions are weak, to say the least. With regard to the Marjaiyya, transnational ties are quite informal and rather apolitical (inidividual spirituality) and furthermore point towards Najaf, rather than to Qom or Tehran; regarding political ties, transnational relations stay rather confined to stricts geopolitics serving material Iranian foreign policy interests as a nation-state. The de facto heterogeneous reality of Shiites and Shiite political movements in the Middle East should definitely refrain people from conveniently deploying terms such as Shia and Shiism as meaningfull sociological and political categories.374

370 371

Luomi, 2008, 10; Inglehart, 2006, 501-3. Duss & Juul, 2009, 3-4. 372 Jabar, 2003, 17-8. 373 Terhalle, 2007, 79. 374 Jabar, 2003, 13.

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PART II: DISCOURSE SECTARIAN OTHERNESS AT WORK

2.1 Theorectical Framework: Discourse and Othering
Having elaborated on the possible geopolitical and economic incentives that are behind current sectarian narratives in the political sphere of the Middle East, their very use, content and societal impact requires additional attention. Experts in the field of postcolonial studies have inquired the use of discursive mechanisms among political elites (a.o.) in both imperial and post-colonial times. Edward Said, for instance, narrated the now famous and groundbreaking counter-discourse entitled Orientalism in which he vividly demonstrated that the Orient was still widely scrutinized within a framework of the colonizer and the colonized, of the superior and inferior. He alerted scholars of the fact that many discourses with regard to the Orient primarily culminated around the active creation of inferior objects (subjects). Moreover, he indicated that these ways of knowledge production were, in many ways, tools to maintain power over the Orient. The term Othering is described by post-colonials critics375 a hierarchic discursive process in which colonial cultures advocate and consolidate their dominance over other subjugated cultures. Such processes are claimed to be immediately reflexive in nature since the creation of the Other simultaneously creates the desirable Self. This intellectual tradition has ever since been elaborated. The initial post-colonial interpretation of the process of Othering as a mere ideologic and one-way process, solely emanating from imperial societies does not longer stand uncontended. Nowadays, innovative scholarship tends to interpret this mechanism as a rather universal cognitive process that is widely applied through various communicative ways for the purpose of depicting certain people, groups or societies as fundamentally alien to that what represents the reflexive Us. Through various discursive means one can, from a distance (space, time), attribute subjective levels of Otherness to subjectively demarcated groups (conceptual entities).376
The people to be Othered are homogenized into a collective they, which is distilled even further into an iconic he (the standardized adult male specimen). This abstracted he / they is the subject of verbs in a timeless present tense, which characterizes anything he is or does not as a particular historical event but as an instance of a pregiven costum or trait. 377

Today, this discursive mechanism is vividly studied in a wide-range of disciplines and it should be noted that its body does not imply a de facto negative connotation. However, in its classic occurrence, that is, within a rather politicized sense for which it is most known- it is often observed as implicitly generating highly subjective hierarchies and distortive political images (propaganda); i.e. power discourse with a mobilizing potential.378 Good examples can today be found in the behavior of nations, which actively propagate a teleological basis (state mythology) to legitimize their relevance and safeguard their particular (geographical) organization and political viability towards their constituents/subjects. Clearly, states also define themselves in respect to eachother. Moreover, they often tend to seek for some kind of purity for the self through the demonization of the Other.379 Within this innovative and broader analytical framework, not only what is said is of importance to the observer absolute`truth` is in fact an elusive concept to any post-modern sccholar-, but also who it is that claims to advocate such truth and who it is that is mainly (hoped to be) affected by it.380
Foucaults view of the role of discourse though is even wider, and more pervasive, since he argues that discourse is the crucial feature of modernity itself. For the discourse of modernity occurs when what is said, the enunciated, becomes more important than the saying, the enunciation. In classical times, intellectual power could be maintained by rhetoric, by the persuasiveness of the speaker discoursing to a body of listeners. But gradually the will to truth came to dominate discourse and satements were required to be either true or false. When this occurred, it was no longer the act of discourse but the subject of discourse that became important.381

Supposed group identity, such as the often proclaimed transnational Shiite and Sunniones, are not a-priori homogeneous

375

E.g. Gayatri Spivak; Most famous for her work entitled Can the Subaltern Speak?, which is considered to be a landmark study in postcolonial studies. 376 Said, 2001, 63-93; Ashcroft [et al.], 2007, 62-64, 155-6; Seaton, 2009, 77-82. 377 Pratt, M.L., quoted in Ashcroft [et al.], 2007, 157. 378 Ashcroft [et al.], 2007, 154-6, 167; Chaturvedi, 2002, 1. 379 Ibid., 62-3. 380 Ibid., 62-3. 381 Ibid., 63-4.

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realities. Group associations are directly dependent on their conceptual construction and thus fundamentally related to subjective definitions of what are, however, often perceived by man as mere objective interpretations his surrounding world.382
Until future research proves otherwise, we ought to take for granted only two basic human entities: individuals and all humanity. All entities between these two, save a mother and a newborn child, are arbitrary formations created by our perception of ourselves vis--vis others. Various unifying factors, such as language, religion, and colour of skin, seem natural. I propose that none is. Language, culture, a real or assumed historical origin, and religion, form identities for an us in our minds, and only so long as they exist in our minds as unifying factors do the entities of us persist.383

The various existing forms of group identity (sectarian, ethnicity etc.) need always to be interpreted as a historical, social and cultural demarcations that are de facto deceptive in nature because they do not whatsoever carry a scientific (biological, genetic) basis. Ony, the aforementioned categories (humanity, individual) share the privilege of being natural entities that substitute welldefined homogeneities. One is consequently inclined to understand that those who hold power in society undoubtedly influence the formation of such (emerging) group associations in the human psyche. Hence, comes forth the important sociological correlation between the advocated reality of group identity (discourse) and the process of (material) power in society; this is also precisely the reason why both phenomena always need to be scrutinized as a comprehensive whole. Those who enjoy power in society often influence, if not control, what is known and how it is known. As a constructed and highly mendable conception, group identity can thus actively be used to mobilize and instigate specific groups of people, to stimulate a particular behavior among certain people or for the purpose of veiling certain (political) actions and material incentives. As such, hegemonic statecentric power discourses will often culminate around homogenizing ideas of national identity and propagations of national insecurity (threats) through a highly distortive fixations on the supposed Otherness various ethno-religious groups -also women and homosexuals- that serve as utile schapegoats in politically led and essentialist we vs. them campaigns (politicized cultural hierarchy).384

2.2. Shia Visibility: The Case of Iraqi Refugee Displacement

Although most studies relating to Middle Eastern sectarian politics, and more specifically to the Shia Crescent theory as a whole, have succeeded in pointing that widescale, Iranian-orchestred conversion to the Shiism is more of a (politically inflated) myth than a proven reality, many have seemingly failed to consider the impact of post-war385, Iraqi Shiite migration as a substantial reason, incentive or pretext for the aformentioned politically led claim and popular perception of Shia proselytism in the region. The Iraqi refugee crisis needs to be interpreted as a serious concern though; the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees alarmingly reported in 2007 that:386
An estimated 60,000 Iraqis are being forced to leave their homes every month by continuing violence. As of September 2007, there were believed to be well over 4 million displaced Iraqis around the world including some 2.2 million inside Iraq 387 and a similar number in neighbouring countries (in particular Syria and Jordan) and some 200,000 further afield. Around one million were displaced prior to 2003. UNHCRs April 2007 Conference on Iraqi displacement focused attention on the huge humanitarian crisis developing in the region.388

The US invasion and occupation of Iraq has generated one if the largest refugee problems in decades. In historical perspective, it is regionally comparable to the Palestinian refugee flows all over the Middle East (1948, 1967, 1991). Although the Iraqi refugee problem has historical precedents (Iran-Iraq war, 1990 Gulf war), the 2003 Iraq War and the subsequent insurgency have led to an unprecedented mass displacement in the Middle East. Indications giving by UNHCR testify the vast increase in refugees to their

382 383

Maly, 2001, 1.3.4. Blommaert & Verschueren, quoted in Maly, 2001, 1.3.4. 384 Ashcroft [et al.], 2007, 62-4; Chaturvedi, 2002, 1; Maly, 2001, 1.3.4 & 1.3.5. 385 Not just 2003, also during the subsequent years after the event, in light of vast intra-Iraqi violence. 386 UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 387 Comonly referred to with the abbreviation IDP; Internally Displaced Persons. 388 UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011).

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concern (registered) in the region ever since the inception of the US-led invasion.389 By 2007, about 15 percent of the Iraqi population was displaced, either internally (IDPs) or extra-territorial (refugees), mounting up to an enormous total of around four million Iraqi displaced persons on the move to due existential insecurity. An estimated two million Iraqis had either sought refuge in Jordan or in neighbouring Syria, increasing the populations of those countries by respectively 15 and 7 per cent. Notwithstanding the magnitude of this huminatarian crisis, the event has been typed by a discursive silence, i.e. it was vastly and actively ignored by the US and generally undercoverd by the media. This has consequently had the disasterous effect of only generating a minimal and actually insufficient and underfunded humanitarian assistance for these displaced Iraqis (in the region).390 A 2008 UNHCR report, indicated Jordan as the second largest host country to absord Iraqi refugees, that is, in registrated cumulative numbers.391 A 2007 report estimated the total number of Iraqi refugees in Jordan exceeding half a million, up to 750,000 while the 2008 report estimated the number just around half a million.392 Interestingly, in the immediate years after the US-led invasion of Iraq (2004-2005) Jordan was in fact the country with the highest amount of Iraqi visa applications, at least implying the physical presence of an enormous amount of Iraqi refugees (passing through the country on their way to Syria). 393 It should be noted that these enormous numbers only represent the official registrations, but undoubtedly in such a post-war chaos, it must have concerned even higher numbers (clandestine refuge).
Table 2.1 Cumulative numbers of Iraqi refugees (2008).394 Est. Iraqi Population Syria Jordan Lebanon Egypt Turkey Iran 1,0 1,5 mil 450 500 000 50 000 20 - 40 000 6 - 10 000 57000+ Total Registered 216 370 54 258 10 532 10 595 6 408 3 673 Cases 63 757 25 257 5 726 4 192 3 161 Average Case size 3,4 2,1 1,8 2,6 2

200 000 + 1 816 767 2,4 GCC* *Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE). Including approx. 50,000 in Kuwait, 100,000 in UAE, 5,000 in Saudi Arabia and 50,000 in Oman, Qatar, Bahrain (unofficial estimates)

UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 390 Peteet, 2007, 2-4. 391 UNHCR, Iraqi Situation Update, UNHCR, August 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/491956a02.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 392 UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 393 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2005, UNHCR, 2005, http://www.unhcr.org/4641be5c0.html (accessed on 02/03/2011), 371. 394 UNHCR, Iraqi Situation Update, UNHCR, August 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/491956a02.html (accessed on 02/03/2011).
389

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Figure 2.1 Iraqi Displacements as of April 2008.395

395

UNHCR, Iraqi Displacement as of April 2008, UNHCR, April 11th 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/487ef7144.html (accessed on 02/03/2011).

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Additionally, a 2007 UNHCR report indicated that the amount of submitted Iraqi asylum applications in extra-regional, industrialized countries hit a crucial low point in 2003 and the immediate subsequent years. This implies an enormous regional concentration of asylum refuge, for over a period of roughly three to four years (2003-2006).396 Hereby, one should bear in mind the year 2004 was the very timing of the Jordanian king Abdullah IIs coining of the term Shia Crescent.

50663 43187 41523 47183

52331

36481 17662 15205 12937 27139 18672 10883 25935 22200 13613

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Figure 2.2 Iraqi asylum applications submitted in 38 industrialized countries, 1992-2006.397

It should be noted that the US had admitted les than 500 Iraqi refugees for asylum between 2003 and 2007. This stands in stark contrast to Sweden, which accepted over 9,000 refugees.398 After the Vietnam War the US accepted 130,000 Vietnamese and it accepted over 80,000 Kosovars after the post-Yugoslavian crisis in the late 1990s. Only after increasing international pressure (e.g. UNHCR, IOM) did it eventually admit 7,000 Iraqi refugees to enter its borders. This humanitarian apathy is best explained by the political climate subsequent to 9/11, generally defined as the War on Terror policy that implied a direct neglect for human rights an a vaguening of the rule of law, international accountability and responsabilty. The hegemony of this dominant political discourse becomes clear when one realizes that US policy makers have not even mentioned nor paid attention to the unfolding humanitarian debacle in Iraq, which is in fact one of the least covered humanitarian crises in decades. In the Western public sphere there are almost no visual images or voices that tail of this ongoing crisis due to a political lethargy vis--vis Iraq, accompanied by an increasing absurd focus on identity (Islamic, Shia, Sunni) and xenophobia. Viewed to this background, one can fully understand the dehumanizing degree of anti-Shia or anti-Muslim discourse (societal impact). It is clear that Iraqi displaced were and are not easily recognized (or registered) as refugees and have as such been excluded from any humanitarian discourse. They are more and more being pushed into the category of the unknown set of refugees (Palestinians, Somalis, Armenians399, Afghans, Greek Cypriots) clearly contrasting other examples (Darfuri Somalis, Kosovars, etc.).
4% 9% 43% 44% 0,50%

Iraq 43% Syria & Jordan 44% Other Middle East 9% Europe 4% Rest of the World 0.50%

Figure 2.3 Displaced Iraqis around the world.400

UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 397 Ibid. 398 Ibid. 399 Armenian genocide (Cf. Peteet, 2007, 2) 400 UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011).
396

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Within the framework of 9/11 and the War on Terror the largest donor of the UN, the United States, decreased its funding whereby countries such as Jordan and Syria have received minimal logistic and financial support in handling with the Iraqi refugee debacle; so there is in fact a global picture to this dynamic. Since September 11, displaced people in the Middle East are thought of less and less in humanitarian terms (human rights, international law), but all too often in merely dehumanized security terms (suspicion). In this way, refugees are increasingly coded as potential criminals and terroritsts (character) by various political elites around the globe. Although they admitted relatively more Iraqis than the US over the years folowing to the invasion, European countries have only contributed minimally in resolving the humanitarian crisis; actually only a minor ammount of Iraqis have been accepted for asylum and aid.401 Rather than taking up any responsability for postwar societal affairs, the US administration seems keen on systematically denying the wars impact. Paul Bremer for instance, the head of the coalition prevision that ran Iraq after the invasion, fragrantly declared in front of the US congress that the country was in chaos, socially, politically and economically [post-2003]; the deep crisis has been brought about not by war, not by sanctions, but by decades of corruption and incompetence of the Saddam regime. 402 Although Saddams distructive legacy is known, it is quite interesting to see how the global power has had the monopoly on this discourse and clearly attributes all failures to the character of the political establishment predating the invasion. Countries such as Jordan and Syria, which had already experienced Iraqi refugee influxes during the 1980s (Iran-Iraq war) and 1990s (Fisrt Gulf War) were now left by themselves to deal with a new and unseen mass refugee migration.403 Moreover, a 2007 UNHCR report literally stated that the contemporary ability of neighbouring states to handle such larger numbers is close to a breaking point. In recent months visa restrictions have been considered, which, if implemented, will result in Iraqis having greater difficulty finding a safe haven. 404 These comments imply a build-up of logistic and economic pressure experienced by leading host countries such as Jordan and Syria. Additionally, an assessment of the sectarian whereabouts of the Iraqi refugees indicated that 27% of the Iraqi population seeking refuge in Jordan was Shiite.405 This is again quite significant when we recapitulate that the whole idea of a Shia Crescent actually initiated in Jordan.406
Table 2.2 Breakdown of Iraqi population by religion.407 Of the total registered Syria Jordan Lebanon Egypt Turkey Sunnis 58% 59% 20.90% n.a 22.60% Shiite 19.50% 27% 44.20% n.a 7.80% Christians 14.50% 12.50% 34.60% 2% 63.90% Islam unspecified 2.90% n.a. 0.20% 96% 3.80% Sabean Mandean 4% 0.70% n.a 0.20% Yezidis 0.70% 0.2%. n.a 1.30% Other 0.60% 0.60% 0.10% 2% 0.50%

Although figures indicate that everywhere, except for Lebanon, the majority of Iraqi refugees were Sunni, one should note that traditionally, Jordan has never harboured a substantial Shiite minority (sectarian make-up). This context probably made the country a more feasible ground for discriminatory (populist) propaganda (top-down) and dialectic xenophobia (bottomup). While recognizing the fact that Iraqi refugees of the Sunni sect almost constituted double than that of the Shiite one in Jordan, it could nevertheless be argued that, to such a Sunni scenary/backdrop, the Shiite i.e. Iraqi - influx must have had some visual effect on a societal level. Maybe, even big enough to render a utile pretext, which enabled the most visble immigrants, that is, the Shia (impoverished Southerners), to become the symbolic focal point of right-wing, governmentPeteet, 2007, 4, 7- 9; UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 402 Bremer, P., Iraq to Chase Missing Billions, Al Jazeera, June 20th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/06/201162044042488179.html (accessed on 20/06/2011), 0.50-01.40. 403 UNHCR, Statistics on Discplaced Iraqis around the World, UNHCR, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/470387fc2.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 404 Ibid. 405 UNHCR, Iraqi Situation Update, UNHCR, August 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/491956a02.html (accessed on 02/03/2011). 406 Broning, 2008, 61Jones, 2005, 24-5; Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 116; Wright, R. & Baker, P., Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election From Iran, Washington Post, December 8th 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html (accessed on 09/09/2010). 407 UNHCR, Iraqi Situation Update, UNHCR, August 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/491956a02.html (accessed on 02/03/2011).
401

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led sectarian propaganda mutually serving the political agenda of the anti-Iranian establishment in Amman and convergingly facilitating visa restriction and migration influxes in Jordan itself (costs), pushing back domestic compliance with (basic) humanitarian solidarity stipulated by international law.408 Indeed, the Jordanian policy on Iraqi refugees has been a mixture of making life manageable so as to avoid criticism, but difficult enough so that Iraqis will never feel comfortable enough to stay.409 Viewed to a backdrop of the aformentioned statisctics, it is remarkable that Bashar al-Assad hasnt spoken of a Shiite infiltration, a Shia expansion or tashayyu; such a political discourse would in fact not match with the Syrian political agenda. While reflecting on Iraqi migration in Jordan, Asher Susser has keenly pointed out a historical perspective by stating that migration (Palestinian influxes) and its subsequent societal and political implications (PLO, Black September) have always been a serious concern to the (now experienced) Jordanian political establishment. The ruling Jordanian elite shares a tensed relationship with segments of their Palestinian subjects. Notwithstandig the fact that the influx of an extremely wealthy Iraqi (Bathi) elite initially contributed to various sectors of the Jordanian economy, the continuing Iraqi refugee influx did grow out to be a serious domestic concern. At first, the Jordanian establishment interpreted the occurrence as a favourable dynamic to counter the Palestinian demography, but after the numbers kept on augmenting there was increasing worry about the kingdoms political stability and economic viability. However, it is hereby quite important to point out that one should also not overstate the impact of Iraqi refugee on the Jordanian economy since they only constituted one facet of the many that were pressuring the it.410 When you make such an overstatement there is danger of implicitly blaming the refugees themselves for the political rhetoric that targeted them without referring to other structural events such as the US-led invasion of Iraq; one needs always to uphold a comprehensive prism. Research has interestingly indicated that Jordans inflation (2000s) relates to the 2003 war, but also to structural shifts in the global movement of capital and government austerity meaures that predate the war.411 The increase in domestic food prices, for instance, related directly to Jordans increasing exports to Iraq and the subsequent increase of (foreign-produced) imported food to Jordan. The high oil prices in Jordan which have quadrupled between 2002 and 2006- relate indeed to an abolished (lucrative) contract with Saddam, but also to a gradual decrease of government subsidies on fuel as part of the governments compliance its pre-war implemented SAPs (IMF, WB). Increasing cost prices regarding land and housing purchase, particularly in Amman, also relate to events prior to the Iraqi refugee influx, namely 9/11. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, many wealthy investors from Gulf countries (e.g. Kuwaitis) became nervous about the future of their US invested capital and therefore repatriated large amounts of their foreign invested capital for investment in nearby Jordan; mainly because much of that countrys real estate company shares were strongly undervalued. On top of all that, the Jordanian establishments monetary policy has always been to pegg the dinar to the US dollar and of course the weak dollar and dramatic problems in the US economy in the early 2000s consequently put severe and increasing pressure on the Jordanian economy as well. These structural factors are, however, never incalculated by the general Jordanian public neither ever comprehensively explained by the government or the media. Many seem simply to prefer mainly, if not uniquely, to blame the Iraqi refugees (Shia) as schapegoats for the economic tumoil, while narrowly doing so rather relates to populism (simplism). Conveniently, however, their arrival coincided with increasing but quite typical 21st century economic hardship in Jordan.412 Many distortive perceptions exist in post-2003 Jordan with regard to the new invaders: 413
Ask any Jordanian in Amman about Iraqis living in their country, and they will immediately tell you that Iraqis have driven up the prices of virtually anything in the capital. Apartments cost double what they did five years ago. The prices of food and gasoline have soared. Iraqis arrive with suitcases full of cash, drive aroubd in expensive cars and make life much more difficult for Jordanians or such is the widespread belief.414

408

UNHCR, Iraqi Situation Update, UNHCR, August 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/491956a02.html (accessed on 02/03/2011); Peteet, 2007,

3.
409 410

Nanes, 2007, 24. Susser, 2008, 2-3; Peteet, 2007, 3. 411 Nanes, 2007, 22. 412 Ibid., 22-3. 413 Ibid., 24. 414 Ibid., 22.

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Moreover, when it comes to stereotyping Iraqi Shia in particular, it is even worse:

Jordanians lower their voices to tell you that the Shia are not really Muslims, that they are trying to convert the Sunnis, that they are loyal to Iran and Hizbullah and that their creed sanctions sexual practices such as as incest and group sex. References to a Shiite Crescent, a term coined by King Abdallah in late 2004, pop up spontaneously in conversations, indicating a sense that Jordan is surrounded by a hostile, alien force.415

Keen scholars have pointed out that king Abdullahs words concerning a Shia Crescent actually signal an implicit political statement towards the US and the Arab Gulf: Invest in me, and I will be the praetorian guard of the Sunni order.
416

Lebanon-specialist Augustus Richard Norton has briefly refered to the correlation between anti-Shiite discours and Iraqi migration in his article entitled The Shiite Treath Revisited, however, without further elaborating on the matter. 417 Whilst assessing Islamophobic political discourses in the context of European political integration efforts, Sami Zemni and Christopher Parker have keenly pointed out underlying correlations between visible (foreign) migration, political and economic projects and identity-fixed political discourses. They have remarked that in some cases migration allows a subjective discourse to take shape against events in the real world, creating distorted political images and popular anxieties.418 Exclusivist political discourses are in fact quite widespread phenomena and often top-down generated for the sake of specific political and economic agendas. Clearly, the very socio-economic pretext in Jordan (post-2003 refugee influx, inflation) was a perfect converging setting for the Jordanian kings December 2004 propagation of an Iranian-led Shiite Crescent.419 In this sense, it is cleary no coincidence that crucial geopolitical events (2003 war), migration flows and state-centric (right wing) discourses of identity coincide. In historical perspective the Greek-Turkish population exchange (refugee dynamic) and the Armenian genocide roughly coincided with World War I and its geopolitical aftermath and, more importantly, with the politically led consolidation of Turkish, Greek and even Armenian nationalism (reflexive xenophobia, politicized identities).420 An interesting report on Iraqi migration to Jordan indicated that the country had earlier known Iraqi refugee influxes (e.g. 1990s); of course including mainly Shiites at the time, since they had risen up against Saddam in central and south Iraq. Back then, however, their presence did not provoke the same wishper campaign of sectarian mistrust, implicitly signalling a different geopolitical zeitgeist. The appearance and form of political discourses is always dependent on the regional reality (e.g. economic boom or recession, economic migration, refugee migration) and the geopolitical setting (e.g. War on Terror, political opposition to Iran). Regretfully it is often the weak (migrated) groups within a society that become the first and foremost target of such intellectual operations, which often completely de-link the migrant from any nationality and any rational explainable socioeconomic context. The migrant Other is often used, that is, xenophically discursed, for the interest of certain other, often more powerful, groups within a same society. Today the foreigner as the 21st century migrant- is often actively linked into a vague civilizational/cultural matrix that directly problematizes him/her presence and existence. This process is often a shaped monologue where the individual the human face and actor- disappears into a homogenized problematized group; he/she is thereby totally absent for any input, for any rationalization and humanization, nor for crucially defending and/or alerting the outside world of his/her actual human needs and burdons.421
By locking the foreigner into a presumed entity of origin (whether nationality, race, religion, etc.) both the foreigner and the autochtone deny realities of interdepence that are not always so apparent on the surfuce. It assumes that state, society and the

415 416

Nanes, 2007, 24. Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescentsymposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized). 417 Norton, 2007, 434. 418 Zemni, S. & Parker, C., European Union, Islam & the Challenges of Multiculturalism: Rethinking the Problematique, in Islam in Europe: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape, ed. Hunter, S.T. (Westport/Washington: Praeger, 2002). Also at http://www.menarg.ugent.be/media/956/european-union-islam-and-the-challenges-of-multiculturalism.pdf (see this format for page reference, accessed on 30/04/2011), 2. 419 Susser2, 2008, 3. 420 Peteet, 2007, 2. 421 Zemni & Parker, 2002, 3.

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phenomenon of culture in the broadcast sense lack mechanisms that allow for communication accros stylistic and ritualistic distinctions of particular cultures.422

It has interestingly been pointed out that after anti-Shia fears and rumours kicked in, all of a suddon, Hizbullah had lost some of its popularity in the Jordanian street; it was no longer seen as the Arab vanguard. Jordanian (popular) resentment of Shia is often further legitimized by making accusatorial reference to Saddams 2006 execution, during which the Shii dominated government hanged Saddam on the Sunni (but not the Shii) Feast of Sacrifice. Today, Saddams imagery is increasingly serving as a symbolic Sunni-Arab hero in popular Jordanian consiouciousness. However, this being said, research has indicated that many of Jordans population still believe that fear of the Shia is manufactured by the government in order to counter the popularity of Hizbullah, but it is interestingly also claimed to be difficult to confirm or trace this process.423 It is clear that a dynamic of war (2003) and transnational refugee displacement, rather than any imagined Iranian-promoted conversion to Shiism was the probable pretext for a government-led process of anti-Shia propaganda and for inevitably stepping up Shia (foreign) visibility in regional public consioussness. As such, not only Irans geopolitical ascendence but also a flow of regional migration might explain a perception of a regional Shiitization. In dismissing the concept of pan-Shiism, Vali Nasr, a leading Shia expert in the US, has already noted that historical transnational migration between Iraq and Iran created numerous, layered connections between the two countries Shiite communities. 424 Hereby, he tries to explain the rise of cultural ties in rational way, but strinkingly enough, when migration is being assessed he does not whatsoever mention modern westward migration during the more recent post-Saddam era, nor does he signal the direct correlation between this dynamic and the culturalistic anti-Shiite rhetoric emating from Jordan, one of the main advocates of the Shia Crescent theory. This logic is simply overlooked by those who tend to attribute a central position to culture and not economy, migration, human rights etc.- in often sensationalist analyses. By portraying certain groups of Iraqi refugees as mere Shiites one actually dehumanizes the Iraqi refugee debacle and, more importantly, almost denies and nihilates the geopolitical nature (2003 US-led invasion) which triggered this very crisis. By culturally politicizing weaker societal groups (refugees) within regional interstate (material) conflicts with Iran, one also overlooks the seriousness of this humanitarian catastrophy and therefore one inevitably distracts the general publics attention away from more relevant/acute debates/issues that carry a more humanitarian basis (housing, jobs, mediacal or pshychological needs/aid, political accountability). Rather, it is all about culture today.425 Such implicit forms of humanitarian apathy could be associated with what keen observers have referred to as the danger of seeing the Other as completely different within his communitarian cage and thus obliterating every possible idea of universal humanity. 426 It is indeed striking how Iraqi refugee displacement is viewed upon today. The displacement due to the US invasion is depicted as a mere short-term phenomenon, while sectarian-induced violence is claimed to be the real long-term problem. Such logic directly dislocates interrelated trends and eventually even implies underlying premises of cultural exceptionalism as if the Middle East is somehow in itself and by its nature, problematic to the ideas of modern day socio-economic organization and civil coexistence in a plural social context. 427 In my opinion, this social and discursive apathy equals the ongoing dehumanization of the Gazan civilian population; by solely speaking of Hamas and of Islam during the Israeli 2009 military assault, one effectively ignores the question of accountability for (disproportionate) human suffering and, moreover, loses all touch with the reality of human universality and the ideal of basic human solidarity (human rights). Clearly, by indicating a dynamic Iraqi (Shia) refugee dynamic one comes to a more balanced and rational comprehension for the emergence of regional Shia phobia.

422 423

Zemni & Parker, 2002, 7. Nanes, 2007, 24. 424 Luomi, 2008, 17. 425 Zemni & Parker, 2002, 3; Peteet, 2007, 2-9. 426 Zemni & Parker, 2002, 7. 427 Peteet, 2007, 3- 4.

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2.3 Categorizations of the Shiite Other

2.3.1 Political Narratives and Reflexive Identity: Shia Radicals and Sunni Moderates In December 2004 the king of Jordan, Abdullah II, warned the public for an imminent Shia Crescent when he coined the trem Al-Hilal al-Shii during an interview with the Washinton Post. He depicted this emerging reality, this Shiite expansion (al-Madd ash-Shii), as a change in the tradtitional cultural make-up of the region and as a creeping danger that might split up the Arab and Muslim World.428 He was reportedly said that
if pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government, a new "crescent" of dominant Shiite movements or governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge, alter the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to US interests and allies.429

After he was accussed by regional critics for inciting sectarian tendencies, the Jordanian king was inclined to shift the emphasis of his claims to more defined statements, however, he never retracted the substance of his allegations; as such, the image was set. As soon as the theory was published it was taken over (modified, altered etc.) and started leading a life on its own in the political sphere, the media and within the regions popular consioussness.430 Furthermore, in an interview given by Husni Mubarak on the Al Arabiya satellite channel on April 8, 2006, the former Egyptian president was quoted saying that the majority of Shia in the region are mainly loyal to Iran and not to their own states. So, here we have the most powerful man of Egypt exerting a xenophobe monologue by drawing an exclusive Sunni inclusion of state-loyalty and Arab identity.431
Discourse brings about a process of categorization, ordering and normalizing, which generates knowledge about ourselves, and about the events we are living. In this, a vision of the war is created, transmitted and consolidated. The result is a we which is indefinite but which evokes a set of shared values that remain implicit.432

Interestingly, leading scholars have successfully noted that Mubaraks words actually imply that he is again (post 9/11) applying for a job from the King of Saudi Arabia [Arab diplomacy] and from Pax Americana. 433 Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabias foreign Minister, is said to have expressed similar statements throughout the recent years.434 Maximilian Terhalle tails that Nawaf Obaid, a former advisor of Saudi King Abdullah, proclaimed in an interview with the Washington Post on November, 2006 the inevitable necessity for a massive intervention to shield the kingdoms Sunni brethen against any Shia-supported expulsion should Iraq split up.435 The Saudi king himself is also not free of controversial statements; he has reportedly accused Iran of masterminding the proselytization of predominantly Sunni countries. It is doubtfull whether Saudi officials would have made such exclamations during Saddams repression of Kurds and Shiites in the early 1990s. Moreover, the Saudi establishment always seems to refer to -i.e. hide behind- its supposed religious duties when it comes to emancipatory struggles, e.g. womens rights (right to drive a car or exercise certain professions) are often repressed under the cloack of local socio-cultural (Islamic) values.436 Reports also indicate that the Yemeni government made claims of a Tehran linked global Shia during a series of popular revolts in the Saada region in 2004. It accused its nationals, that is, Zaidi Shiites of close links to Iran, thus implying

Puelings, 2010, 7; Broning, 2008; 61; Jones, 2005, 24-5; Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 116; Wright, R. & Baker, P., Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election From Iran, Washington Post, December 8th 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html (accessed on 09/09/2010). 429 Wright, R. & Baker, P., Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election From Iran, Washington Post, December 8th 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html (accessed on 09/09/2010). 430 Brning, 2008, 61. 431 Ibid. 61-2; Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 116; Barzegar, 2008, 89. 432 Rojo, M.L., quoted in Maly, 2001, 1.3.5 & 1.3.6. 433 Fouad Ajami in Fouad Ajami, Vali R. Nasr, and Richard N. Haass, The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy (panel meeting, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10866/emerging_shia_crescent_symposium.html. 434 jones, 2005, 24-5. 435 Terhalle, 2007, 1, 69. 436 Jones, 2007, 30; See also recent media reports: http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/05/26/150671.html; http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/10/140917.html?PHPSESSID=vepm09292to1c8tmco2q52ft32; http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/201161694746333674.html; http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/05/201152253018241827.html
428

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similar claims of disloyalty as those issued by former Egyptian president Mubarak.437 An article posted on the website of the Asharq alawsat media outlet an off shore pan-Arab daily, owned by the Saudi Research and Marketing Group438- alarmingly reported in 2007 that: While talk of an Iranian expansion and penetration in the Arab region (under the pretense of resistance, religion and supporting the weak) continues, the central area for these activities has come to be known as the Shia crescent, extending from Iraq to Palestine yet, there is another location that is currently witnessing detrimental activities that are strongly backed by Iranian intelligence: Yemen.439 Without questioning the fact that Iranian foreign policy is based on its material interest (foreign meddling), an iclusion of Yemen into a supposed Shia Crescent seems to be a sensational (populist) overstatement that is at odds with reality. Observers with a more balanced judgement have pointed out that the supposed Sunni-Shia divide loses credibility when one considers that President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Shiite, has run the country for more than 30 years, but that the majority Sunni population believes that this confession has never been a factor. It would surely be more comprehensive to relate the popular uprisings Zaidi440 or not- in the countrys Northern region to ongoing underdevelopment.441 The exact same can actually be said of the Bahrain, where the autocratic establishment systematically propagates claims of foreign (Iranian, Shia) meddling during popular oproar.442 Hereby, the Shia majority opposition to the monarchy seems more related to socio-economic discrimination -i.e. second-class majority oppositionthan stemming form any theological vocation or intra-Islamic, sectarian dispute. It is worthy to point out that the Bahraini regime has (reportedly) been implementing a political strategy to alter the kingdoms demography by rapidly attributing citizenship to imported security forces from Pakistan, Syria and Jordan; this looks a lot like the Israeli open-policy of birthright in its campaign to alter the demographical balance a more Jewish state- inside its controlled areas (Israel proper and the West Bank).443 Research has indicated that Shia in Khalj monarchies only strive for representative inclusion444 into formal politics and the right of religious freedom (expression). In recent years there has been an active campaign (media, study publications) to exclude Shia from the national mythology and history in various Gulf countries. 445 Sharp-minded analysts have comprehended that interventions made by these governments are not to be seen as mere fears for the Sunni identity of their country446; they should foremost be understood as an active policy calculus.447 That is why scholars have stated that Shia in the Arab world do often share something in common, namely their problem of socio-political marginality and repression by autocratic rule.448 With regard to a key regional state such as Saudi Arabia, the anti-Shia card is thus offensively and dually instrumentalized for both wider geopolitical that is the containment of Iran and domestic political reasons, namely, the autocratic repression of a substantial Saudi minority for the sake of reinforcing an autoritarian grip on power of small and exclusive some label them as Sunni, whatever that may mean in such a context monarchic political elite. As such, geopolitical Saudi-Iranian tensions and the subsequent anti-Shia Saudi discourse have implicitly though usefully that is, from the viewpoint of the Saudi political and clerical elites- worsened domestic conditions for the Saudi Shia and slowed down democratic reforms. Interestingly, the states that have brought up the wole idea of a Shia Crescent are the exact same
437 438

Brning, 2008, 65-6. Rugh, 2004, 169. 439 , Shobokshi, Asharq al-Awsat, 27/02/2007 http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=8143 440 The Zaidis, due to their long isolation from other Shiite centers, practice their own form of Shiite Islam, which is close to the Sunni Shafii school of Jurisprudence. (Cf. Broning, 2008, 71) 441 Brning, 2008, 71 442 Al Arabiya, Bahrain to sue UK newspaper, accuses legendary journalist Robert Fisk of defamation, Al Arabiya, June 16th 2011, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/16/153585.html (accessed on 20/06/2011). 443 The Economist, Trouble in Bahrain: Shut up the Shias, The Economist, September 9th 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16994636?story_id=16994636 (accessed on 02/02/2011). 444 This demand of inclusion and not fort he resignation of this ruling elite was also reported by al Jazeera; for more information see: Al Jazeera, the Listening Post, Recapping the Arab revolutions, 19.19-> 19.39. 445 Brning, 2008, 65; Norton, 2007, 436-9, Jones, 2005, 21. 446 Puelings, 2010, 27 447 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 28. 448 Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescentsymposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized).

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states that were opposed to democratic reform after 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Thefore, some believe that Arab states are more worried about democratization than they are about a Shia revival in the region. There is a clear correlation between reactionary politics and propaganda concerning Shiite Otherness/cultural threats.449 Political opposition groups in the Gulf carry the burdon of facing domestic autoritarian structures while simultaneously having to continuously de-link themselves from Iranian bogeyman for the sake of asserting their loyalty to the house of al-Saud.450 One hereby should note how the Shiite Other is supposedly predetermined (communitarian cage) in every possible context (regional, national); this is key to the entire discursive mechanism of cultural (political) exclusion and positive self-definitions:
The Other is, in the end, always seen as someone who ultimately endangers and threatens our way of life. When trying to figure out what this way of life involves or what it amounts to, nobody can give a clear answer. It is a fragmented whole of simplistic details in which the Other plays a role that does not fit the way of life. In the end, whatever the Other does, it is always turned into such a way that he is the one who threatens.451

It is not the first time that a reactionary political elite in the Arab world uses the pretext of identity when its monopoly on power is challenged. After Jordans Black September, Yaasir Arafaat and his PLO guerrilla forces (fidaiyyin) moved into South Lebanon and Beirut in the early 1970s to further engage the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).452 It is no coincidence that in the following years the infamous Lebanese civil war started (1975-88); the Christian Maronites in power started propagating their supposed extra-ordinary Fenecian decent as being exclusively different from the Palestinian Arabs that had invaded Lebanon. Subsequently, their right-wing instigation of such politicized confessional identities (physically) culminated in the notorious Saabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres, executed by the Maronite Phalangist militias after the assassination of their leader Bashir Gemayel- under the supervision of the Israeli army in 1982. The confessional structures in Lebanon which were introduced by the French colonial power after World War I- are still formally in place this very day453; thus, one can legitimately frame Hizbullahs and leaders of other confessional communites, such as Walid Jumblat, foreman of the (Druze) Progressive Socialist Party454 (PSP)- supposedly natural sectarion oppostion in a broader and more historical context, where religion and communalism were foremost instrumentilized (top-down) for (geo)political reasons. This again, is a proof of the universal cognitive use of Othering, but then in its most politically instrumentalized way. The same applies to Bahrain where a monarchic Sunni elite only in power for its cooperation in hosting the US Fifth Fleet- has a long tradition of repressing its (Shiite) population in the name of protecting the country from the external Shiite threat.455 Today, however, the Saudi and Bahraini establishments are not the only regional government to instumentalize sectarianism or religious sentiment as a pretext to assure their reactionary grip on power vis--vis the emancipation of domestic, marginalized populations. The mechanism of cultural Othering is clearly not the unique product of the Arab regimes; there is no need for exceptionalism in this review. Iran, for example, has gone to considerable trouble with somewhat unconventional means- to obtain the historical truth.456 Exquisite scholar Ervand Abrahamian has demonstrated the extensive presence of state-centric propagation in Iran vividly throughout his study entitled Khomeinism457; e.g. by demonstration the propagation of history in Ruhullahs speech:458
We owe everything to the clergy. History shows that in the past millennium it was always the clergy who led the popular and revolutionary movements. It was the clergy who always produced the first martyrs. It was the clergy who always defended the oppressed against the money worshipers. (1989)459

Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a known propagator of Islamic discourse and dichotomous thinking as part of its foreign and domestic policy. It can even be argued that the greatest project of the revolution was actually the clergy-led
449 450

Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 126-7. Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 29, Jones, 2005, 1. 451 Zemni, 2002, 13. 452 Alagha, 2006, 28, 29 453 Broning, 2008, 65. 454 The progressive Socialist Party is a formally secular and non-sectarian party, but in the Lebanese context it has demonstrated to grow out to a communal party; that of the Lebanese Druze community. 455 Norton, 2007, 439. 456 Abrahamian, 1993, 91. 457 This is an ideal work for more information on the Islamist and Khomeinist discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially in relation to the Iranian Left. 458 Abrahamian, 1993, 88 459 Ibid. 88

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Islamization of society.460 To consolidate its national mythology (Khomeinism, Wilayat al-Faqih) the Iranian establishment has systematically fed on specific vocabulary when narrating its political propagations, e.g. tuteah (plot), jasouz (spy), khianat (treason), vabasteh (dependent), khatar-e kharajeh (foreign danger), ummal-e kharejeh (foreign hands), nafouz-e biganeh (alien influence), asrar (secrets), naqsheh (designs), arosak (marionette), sotun-e panjom (fifth column), nokaran-e estemar (servants of imperialism), posht-e sahneh (behind the scene). These political polemics develop an entertaining and easily graspable dichotomous image of reality for the general public, which are seemingly made without any ambiguities or balancing sidemarks; everything is portrayed in lack-and-white terms of absolute good (linear Islamic struggle and identity) or evil.461 In order to increase its influence on a regional level, Irans establishment has always tried to overcome sectarianism by using anti-Israeli and anti-US sentiment.462 In March 2009, the Moroccan government reportedly cut its diplomatic ties with Iran after accusing the latter of supporting terrorist groups within the kingdoms borders and, more interestingly, because of alleged Iranian Shiite missionary activities in Morocco proper and among its Moroccan diaspora in Europe. It is reported that the Moroccan authorities subsequently organized a ban on Shiite literature in the kingdom463: An article in the Moroccan periodical Maroc Hebdo reportedly spoke of tens of thousans of youngsters who have converted to Shiism, mainly in the North of the county and furthermore stated that the Iranian embassy was accused of arranging the entire processus, including training in Qom.464 Of course, as has become quite usual for such allegations, more exact details or records (numbers, testimonies etc.) were absent, redering such realities and accusatory threat depictions a conveniently arbitrary exercice.465 The paper based findings of the Belgian Royal Egmont Institute for International Relations Conference on Sunni-Shia relations in 2010, comprehensively pointed out the fact that the Shiite infiltration in Morocco seems to be much more a sign of deeper lying political tension of opposition to the legitimacy of the Moroccan government, than it is a religious or doctrinal issue threatening the identity of the country or foreign meddling.466 However, some claim to differ and express other narratives; Moroccan ambassador to Belgium, Samir Addahra, for instance, was reportedly quoted saying on September 29, 2009:
We in Morocco do everything within our power to support this co-operation i.e. between Moroccan and Belgian security services. One of the means, and I want to emphasize this, is to allow, in the context of a concerted action, that Morocco guides the Moroccan community in Belgium, in conformity with its values of tolerance and openness, that are shared by both our countries, and are a trade mark of the Moroccan Islam, Sunni, of Maliki rite. This Islam has nothing to do with Shiism or Wahhabism. Morocco has indeed frozen its diplomatic relations with Iran for reasons of proselytism on the national territories, and in the Moroccan diaspora. 467

The preservation of Morrocos supposedly monocultural identity (discourse) correlates exactly with the survival of its current monarchical organization (national rule).468 The depiction of a cultural threat to Moroccos identity is a geopolitical tool to counter possible Iranian influence. The immediate link between Morrocan Shiites and Iran is, however, an overstatement, a generated homogenization, which dilludes the public of both Shiisms vast pluralism and of Morrocos current (autocratic) socio-political organization.469 In the Arab sphere, this instigated hysteria and distortive sectarian rhetoric is said to have reached an absurd level when the idea of a Shiite threat had spread to the Palestinian Territorities, where the two rival parties two main political factions are both made up by people with at least a Sunni cultural background. Hereby, Fatah activists, hostile to Hamas derided Hamas activists, by calling them Shiis.470

460 461 462

Papp, 2005, 287 Abrahamian, 1993, 111-2. Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescentsymposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized), 5. 463 Puelings, 2010, 28 464 Ibid. 28 465 Ibid. 28 466 Ibid. 37 467 Ibid. 36-7 468 Ibid. 36-7 469 Ibid. 39 470 Rabi, 2008, 5.

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In retrospect, political propaganda as means of soft power is a known tool that has manifested itself widely throughout the Modern history of the Middle East; it has often culminated around the conception of common Arab interests. Portraying political adversairies as being at odds with such interests was a popular tactic of political deligitimization during the Cold War era. A classic example can be found in former Egyptian presdident Gamal Abd an-Nassars famous speeches on the Sawt alArab radio station. After the 2003 Iraq war and the 2006 Lebanon war Shia a dangerous generalization that actually refers to Irans material foreign policy and certain Shiite political parties (Hizbullah a.o.) in the Arab sphere- were casted out of this newly constructed and reinvented conception (of a common identity and common interest) by key regional states (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco).471 It should be noted that also extra-regional actors, that is, members of the political (and intellectual) elite in the US, have advocated similar threat images regarding a Shiite Crescent in the Middle East.472 This political discourse served the agenda of US neo-conservatives in the late Bush Jr. era. They elaborated on the whole anti-Shia narrative by simplistically referring to Sunni moderates and Shiite radicals in the region. Also, Israeli policy makers, such as Labour Party foreman Ehud Barak473, have reportedly warned for what was dubbed as the Shiite banana; for which even the right-wing Israeli press initially mocked them. But, more recently the Israeli military staff apprehended the idead by stating that a Shia Crescent was one of the main driving forces of radicalism in the region portraying the idea of an all-pervasive global Shia controlled from Tehran.474 Interestingly, it was recently reported by Stratfor Global Intelligence, a geopolitical weekly, that a former head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, criticized Israeli policy makers for ignoring the 2002 Sauid peace proposal and for focusing on Iran, which he comprehensively judges to be merely a diversion from the real issue.475 The same can be said about the Arab effort to divert the publics attention. Indirectly, the Bush administrations democratization plans, created a wider urge for political reform, one that directly affected long-time rulers such as the kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the former president of Egypt. Amir Haji-Yusefi was correct to advocate that the whole idea behind the Shia crescent was to create Shiaphobia and Iranophobia in order to distract the focus from what was truly needed in the regions post-Saddam era: democratization.476 2.3.2 Clerical Discourse: The Revival ofShia Resentment Saudi Arabias Salafi477establishment has also endorsed the recent anti-Shia campaign. This dynamic peaked just after the 2006 July War in South Lebanon. Numerous fatawa were issued, which depicted the Lebanese, Shii leader Hassan Nasrallah as a son of Satan and Shia in general as heretics. A senior Salafi cleric that goes by the name of Abdullah bin Jibriin reportedly stated that moral support for Hizbullah was a sin for Sunni since he considered Shia to be apostates. Another Saudi preacher, Mamduh ibn Ali al-Harbi, is reported to have held a sermon entitled al-Ikhtabut ash-ShiI filAlam/The Shiite Octopus in the World during which he branded Shiites as unbelievers and agents of Iran with a hidden agenda to take over the Islamic World.478 This Saudi Salafi clergy, who bases its conviction foremost on the 19th century writings of Muhammad Ibn Al-Wahhab (d. 1792) and the Hanbali School of law, has a more historical tradition of Shia phobia. Thus, in retrospect this hence no extraordinary new phenomenon.479 Not only are Shiites systematically labeled as unbelievers, Saudi clerics have since the

471 472

Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 7-8 Barzegar, 2008, 88, 473 The highest decorated military in the history of Israel; politicians in Israel are often previous general of Army officials. 474 Brning, 2008, 60-3 475 Stratfor Global Intelligence, George Friedman, The Palestinian Move, rel. 07/06/2011 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110606palestinianmove?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110607&utm_content=readmore&elq=03da98daef6a4a14ba1da12e50a c0be5 (last acc 07/06/2011) 476 Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 125 477 The usage of the term Salafi or Salafiya is somewhat problematic since it is used to refer to different things; in this paper I will use the concept salafiya in reference to the Saudi Wahhabi inspired current aiming to regenerate Islam by a return to the tradition represented by the pious forefathers in litteral sense, contastring the modernist trend also referred to as a Salafi current. 478 Rabi, 2008, 2; Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 7; Jones, 2005, 21; Puelings, 2010, 5. 479 Puelings, 2010, 23-4.

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founding of Saudi Arabia in 1932 periodically called for their extermination.480 Such edicts are not issued by mere marginal elements within the clerical establishment; a key figure such as Abdallah bin Abd ar-Rahman al-Jibrin, a former member of the Saudi Higher Council of Ulama, is said to have condoned and even mandated the killing of Shiis.481 Regarding Iran, he has called for the necessity of a Sunni victory in Iraq (sectarian paradigm). Additionally, the Saudi Arabia-based charity that goes by the name of The International Islamic Relief Organization, circulated a pamphlet entitled One Hundred Questions and Answers on Charitable Work in the Eastern Province, which contained passages discursing Shiites as apostates and called for efforts to get rid of their evil. 482 Another Saudi cleric reportedly claimed that Shiites were a greater threat to Muslims than Jews.483 Such clerical voices gained great momentum after the Iranian Revolution where they were (financially) given a platform by the anxious Saudi monarchical establishment to facilitate and enlarge the societal impact of their anti-Shia tirade. At the time being, their anti-Shia literature depicted Shiism as exclusively Iranian and even more narrowly and distortedly, as Persian and Safavid, hence demonstrating their effort to cast Shiites and their supposed non-Arab roots outside of Islams alleged traditional Arabism.This campaign involved publishing Wahabi articles and study works that claimed to justify anti-Shiism both theologically and politically (e.g. Removing the Darkness and Awakening to the Danger of Shiism to Muslims and Islam by Ibrahim Sulayman al-Jabhan or The Shia and the Sunna, The Shia and the Quran, The Shia and the Prophets family by Ihsan Ilahi Zahir). Up until recent years (BBC, 2009), Saudi clerics are reportedly systematically calling Shiites rafida (i.e. they who refuse the first Righteous Caliphs) and mushrikun (polytheists) and charging them and their ulama with takfir (heresy). In 2006, a great number of Saudi clerics, joined their Iraqi counterparts (e.g. Harith al-Dhari) in a Turkey-held conference where they drafted the Istanbul Declaration484 that supported the anti-occupation anti-Shii jihad in Iraq, stopping just short of calling for regional war against Shiism and genocide against the Shia. Significantly, none of the Saudi signatories of the Istanbul declaration have been met with political or legal accountability or any other form of formal notice upon arrival in Saudi Arabia.485 The discursive process of Shiite Othering is clearly multipolar since the Saudi clergy also actively propagates anti-Shiite sentiment (one focus, multiple actors). However, this still proves a top-down dynamic since the clerical class in Saudi Arabia forms active part of the national establishment, have strong influence on the domestic political process and thus posses substantial power within the Saudi society. Their narrative is in fact highly interrelated with the discourse advocated by the Saudi political establishment; it concerns a dialectic and complementary process. This accords with the fact that the Saudi monarchical establishment needs the clerical establishment for their political legitimization.486 Keen analysts have described the Saudi regimes relationship to the anti-Shia discourse as one of willful neglect or tacit endorsement, but not necessarily explicit promotion.487 However, this being said, it needs also to be pointed out that Saudi leaders have in fact done little to temper anti-Shia rhetoric over recent years. It is clear that the multipolar relation to this anti-Shia discourse is a complex though solid and consistent one. In Saudi Arabia accommodating dynamics have occurred since the accession of Saudi King Abdallah, who was allegedly viewed as sympathetic to Shiis.488 Since 2003, he has initated the National Dialogue initiative, which promotes dialogue sessions between Saudi Sufis, Salafis, Shiites and other confessional sects. Viewed to a background of Saudi Arabias mythological rigourisity that was quite a remarkable and even progressive development. 489 Yet, this occurrence needs no overstatement since it was rather popular pressure (regional political liberalization) that pushed the Saudi ruling family to formally pledge reform. Subsequent to the fall of Saddams regime in 2003 and the renewened geopolitical context in the Middle East, this reform has rather been cosmetic in nature and was even reversed into a recrimination, that is, an anti-Shia discourse, which has, from 2005 onward, systematically been emanating from both the
480 481

Jones, 2005, 21. Ibid. 24-5. 482 Ibid. 24-5. 483 Jones, 2007, 31. 484 The Istanbul Declaration was subsequently countered by Saudi Arabias Grand Mufti, in a bid to mitigate sectarianism (in favour of the trend of National Dialogue). (Cf. Jones, 2007, 32) 485 Puelings, 2010, 23-4; Barzegar, 2008, 88-9; Jones, 2005, 23-4; Jones, 2007, 31. 486 Jones, 2005, 21, 23-4. 487 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 27. 488 Jones, 2005, 21. 489 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 27.

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clerical and political Saudi establishments. Moreover, there have been no significant official declarations that would indicate a political dissociation form behalf of the political establishment vis--vis the clergys vicious anti-Shiism. The very top-down dynamic behind these forms of rapprochement and bridging the gap with the internal other inherently demonstrates the highly mechanic not organic and orchestred nature of these supposedly fundamental confessional divisions (and reconciliations). In certain particular contexts popular ideas and imaginations, that is, constructed, exclusivist forms of group identity and consequent propagated conceptions of fear are clearly steered, meaning that they are actively further inflated or deflated by specific groups that hold power in society.490 It is interesting to see that when Saudi politicians abandon their conciliatory stance and rhetoric refering to Saudi foreign minister, Saud al-Faisals provocative comments in September 20, 2005- that prominent Saudi clerics, such as Salman al-Awda (e.g. The Tribulation of the Sunnis: Is Iraq the gateway for Iranian Shiism?), seem to follow this shifting trend simulatenously. It seems to be a mere matter of whether working with Shiis is no longer politically usefull or not.491 Moreover, other actors, situated in the more mainstream currents of Sunni Islams pluralist make-up, such as the notorious cleric Yusuf al-Qardawi (associated with the Muslim Bortherhood), have also stated to perceive a regional Shii infiltration through Iranian-led tashayyu and regional proselytism (tabshir).492 Although more critical and balanced about the idea, he reportedly said that they (Shiites, transnational cultural body) have managed to infiltrate Egypt by using Sufism493 as a bridgehead494: We do not want to be converted to Shiism, at the same degree that we do not want to convert Shiites to Sunnites. From this point of view, we reject any Shiite infiltration in the lands of Sunnism. 495
In an interview with the journal ash-Sharq al-Awsat in 2008 he complained about the rising number of Shiites in different Sunni countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and his native Egypt. He is irritated by the fact that in these countries, the Shiite voice is heard more and more and accusses Iran of conducting a policy of tabshir through the Ahl al-Bayt organization. Shayk al-Qardawi cant give exact numbers, but points out that one is not able to obtain these data due to the Shiite practice of taqiyya.496

As such, comes forth another important label that is often attributed in categorizations of the Shiite Other: taqiyya or dissimulation. (th?) Next to the attribution of the label of apostasy, Syrias Bathist establishment is, for instance, also often seen portrayed as practicing taqiyya because of its Alawi origin (character). This word, taqiyya, means fear or caution and has been used in Shii and other narratives to refer to a practive of conceilment/dissimulation of ones religion, as a safeguarding of ones doctrinal beliefs (secrets). Taqiyya constitutes a central place in Imami Shiism and there are various interpretations of this notion amongst various Shiite traditions and offsprings.497 Etan Kohlberg describes it as follows: Some scholars have explained this phenomenon by referring to the position of the Shiis as a minority within the surrounding Sunni World, while others have related it to the esoteric nature of early Imami Shiism (or Shiism in short). Looked at from the point of view of motive, there appear in fact to be two main types of taqiyya: one which is based on fear of external enemies and another which is based on the need to conceal secret doctrines from the uninitiated.498 The first type is a known practice associated with (contemporary) Twelver Imami Shiism and the second characterizes a known cult of doctrinal secrecy often demonstrated among Middle Eastern minorities of Shia offspring, such as those present among Durzi499 and Alawi communities. It is this concept to which Husni Mubarak implicitly alluded when he discursed the loyalty of Arab Shia. As mentioned earlier, the problem with claims of taqiyya in such politicized contexts (power) does not only stem from the homogenization of Arab Shia (or Shia in general); they are additionally hard to prove (without coercive measures of course), thus implying that its use by non-Shiite actors is bound to be highly subjective, to say the least.500

490 491

Jones, 2005, 23-4. Ibid., 24-5; Jones, 2007, 29, 32. 492 Rabi, 2008, 3; Puelings, 2010, 26-7. 493 Sufism shares Shiisms popular cult of shrine visits; that is exactly why it was incorporated into mainstream Sunnism. 494 Rabi, 2008, 3. 495 Qardawi, quoted in Puelings, 2010, 27. 496 Puelings, 2010, 27. 497 Waines, 2003, 196-7. 498 Kohlberg, 1995, 345. 499 It is for instance quite hard to obtain any intra-communal written documents regarding the Druze cult. 500 Kohlberg, 1995, 345-78; Kais, 1999, 6-7; Puelings, 2010, 30.

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The accusation of taqiyya in such clerical discourses is often related to the concept of the aformentioned Marjaiyya501. In Saudi Arabia for example, the Salafi clerical establishment has often advocated that Shia harbour secretive loyalties to external Maraji at-Taqlid -influencial Shii clerics residing abroad, such as Ayatullah Ali Sistani in Najaf or (the now deceased) Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in Beirut- thereby supposedly overruling state loyalty and state identity. This exposed liaison is subsequently further associated with Iran rendering the superficial, homogenized and politicized image that Saudi Shia are merely acting as a fifth column for Iran.502
Saudi Arabian Shiis are caught in a delicate balancing act, forced to constantly renew and demonstrate their loyalty to a state that has historically displayed overwhelming animus toward them, while outmaneuvering charges that they are preternaturally bonded with their co-religionists elsewhere in the region. The rise of the Shiis in Iraq, and more importantly the role that the Iraq war has played in re-politicizing sectarianism in the region more generally, has made their task considerably more difficult.503

Due to the very arbitrary nature of the tashayyu controversy, in combination with the Wahhabi inflated stereotypes of Shiites being suspicious for their batini (hidden) practices (taqiyya), Shiism has become a very utile paradigm to be instrumentilized as a geopolitical tool into a political powerplay of identity-politics that aims to acquire political influence and generate specific group sentiments among the general public vis--vis the excluded Other and more importantly towards Iran.504 It is hereby worthy to refer to Irans contempory clerical discourse detectable in its foreign policy rhetoric; there is no need for exceptionalism in this study. During the 2010-2011 popular Arab uprising, when events in Egypt were still unfolding i.e. popular opposition to the rule of long-time president Husni Mubarak- Irans supreme leader Ayatullah Khamenei reportedly stated in one of his political speeches: The awakening of the Islamic Egyptian people is an Islamic liberation movement and I, in the name of the Iranian government, salute the Egyptian people and the Tunisian people". Additionaly, he is claimed to have said that events in Tunisia and Egypt, were a sign of Islamic awareness in the region. Reports of this event furthermore indicated that Khamenei had urged Egypt's protesters to follow in the footsteps of the Iranian revolution which toppled a pro-US leader and installed an Islamic Republic, calling on Egyptians to unite around religion.505 As such, the discourse of Khamenei propagated the dichtomous idea of a linear and monolith Muslim society in the region that is currently a sick body a healthy that had been invaded by a foreign virus 506 and which is supposedly alien to the foreign (West) since it actually and inherently represents the local more traditional and more authentic (fixed) Islamic collective identity. He is also reported to have named the post-election popular uprising in Iran during the June 2009 as a mere caricature of the great movement of 1979.507 The public discourse of the Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinajad is reported to be similar (collective Muslim identity). He was quoted saying in an Al Arabiya interview:
The Muslim Ummah is a united one and there is no talk of Shia or Sunni. We have supported Sudan. Is Sudan a Shia state or a Sunni one? We have defended the rights of the Palestinian people, are they Sunni or Shia? We dont mind whether they are Shia or Sunni. We say that they are Muslims The Muslim world should know that the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic of Iran will never take any steps in creating diversity among Muslims 508

With regard to Saudi Arabia there is thus a clear historical preliminary of anti-Shiite rhetoric as part of a broad, politically led anti-Shia campgaings during specific geopolitical crises: the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war (1980s). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Saudi establishment also threw its (financial) weight behind the clerical establishments ideological efforts that excoriated the Shia as a global enemy (like the Soviets in Afghanistan).509 Even after a warming of Saudi-Iranian relations in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and the First Gulf War (1990s), this state-sponsored production of anti-Shiite material steadily continued (e.g. The Rafida in the Land of Tawhid by Nasir al-Umar). 510

cf. Part I; Shiisms heterogeneity: the wilayat al-faqih and the marjaiyya. Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 30-1; Jones, 2007, 30. 503 Jones, 2005, 25. 504 Puelings, 2010, 32. 505 Al Jazeera, Khamenei hails Islamic Uprisings, Al Jazeera, February 04th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/201124101233510493.html (accessed on 26/05/2011). 506 Papp, 2005, 271. 507 Jafari, 2009, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=585. 508 Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 122. 509 Jones, 2005, 23-4. 510 Ibid., 24-5.
501 502

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In this sense, Riyadhs anti-Shiism is a rather old discourse that saw a new life after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the subsequent emergence of a political power vacuum and the decontainment and power ascendance of Iran (cf. Part II). AntiShiism was clearly reinstrumentalized by the Saudi political establishment after the 2006 July war in South Lebanon. Hereby, Saudi Arabia was ever more an anchor for anti-Shiite propagations (rhetoric and publications). In the Middle Easts post2003 political context -Irans decontainment, Irans nuclear programme, and Ahmadinajads bold and populist rhetoric- the same arlarming proclamtions of a Shiite bogeyman returned. Consequently, the general idea behind the Shiite Crescent coined by Jordans king Abdullah in 2004- is in fact a rather old and known geopolitical distortion. Shiite Otherness has already widely been instrumentalized throughout the modern history of the Middle East. Such widely propagated exclusions and (mutual) inclusions are said to be central and (at times) indispensible byproducts of a nation-states persistent effort/enterprise for nation-building in accordance to its specific state-organization (monarchy, autocratic rule) and contemporary geopolitical context511:512 2.3.3 The Arab Media and the Shiite Other The task facing contemporary post-colonial states [] is to construct an effective unity whilst avoiding the oppression of minority groups whose practices clash with those of the dominant national mythology, whether over religion, language or cultural mores.513 Also the Arab media has demonstrated making its contributions with regard to the Shia Crescent theory. In 2006, both Arab and American press reflected rumours of widescale conversions to Shiism and the image of a regional `Sunni-Shia divide`, tipped off with allegations of an emerging transnational Crescent, hence inflating the discourse of the Jordanian King (al-Khalil al-Shii) and the former Egyptian president into a dominant and more credible narrative.514 It is remarkable how Western and Arab media outlets did not whatsoever focus upon questions of sect until after the invasion of Iraq; the same goes for US and Arab policy makers. The 2006 Lebanon war was an ultimate truning point whereupon the appearance of sectarian reporting peeked, which was often only thinly veiled beneath good/bad guy labels. 515 Clearly, not since the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq war has there been such a high-level and intens focus on sectarianism and on `Shiism` in particular. The amalgam of a Shia Crescent was depicted by the media as a transnational popular movement headed by Iran starting in the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwayt and even Saudi Arabia), through Shia-dominated Iraq and Alawi Syria right into Lebanon.516 Professor Uzi Rabi of the Tel Aviv University has pointed out that after 2006 many Arab newspapers and magazines began publishing headlines and declarations about al-Madd ash-Shii, the Shiite expansion, which would allegedly split up the Muslim world. Many more synonyms were applied in trying to label this imminent phenomenon: Shii Wave, Shii Danger, Shia Revival.517 Since the fall of Saddam and the 2006 Lebanon war, bookstores in Cairo are said to be filled with books with such titles as The Shiis, The Shiis in History, The Twelfth Shia.518 Moreover, the Egyptian daily Ruz al-Yusuf reportedly even warned for a Shii Full Moon -"Al-Shia Yahlumun bil-Badr al-Shi'i"519- next to a mere Crescent; this, as a true aspiration of the Shia.520 Furthermore, in January 2007 a Jordanian governmentaffiliated newspaper that goes by the name of al-Dustur reportedly made claim of a masterplan whose aim was to spread Shiism from India to Egypt. Hereby the Shia heretics were said to be planning the murder of central Sunni authorities.521

E.g. post-colonial state, post-partition state, neo-imperial state or even radical othering through pre-colonial terra nullius propagation, in the case of Israel for instance Israel (illan pape comment) en Colonial America. 512 Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 13; Norton, 2007, 434; Jones, 2005, 25; Jones, 2007, 32; Chaturvedi, 2002, 1; Ashcroft, 2007, 158-9, 160-75 513 Aschroft, 2002, 175. 514 Puelings, 2010, 27; Rabi, 2008, 1. 515 Luomi, 2008, 26. 516 Proctor, 2008, 1; Rabi, 2008, 2; Puelings, 2010, 7. 517 Puelings, 2010, 27, Rabi, 2008, 1. 518 Rabi., 2008, 4. 519 Luomi, 2008, 5. 520 Rabi., 2008, 3-4. 521 Ibid., 4.
511

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Such media distortions do not limit themselves to the Arab language press; equally essentialized pulp can also be found in amateur op-ed articals on psuedo news websites in the English print (cf. Sunni v Shia).522 The idea of a `Sunni-Shia divide` has indeed also appeared in Western media, e.g. Fear of a Shia Full Moon (The Guardian, 2007).523 Recent research has indicated a clear post-2003 increase of fear-mongering book and media titles such as Shia Crescent: Emergence of World War 3 (Haquani 2007), Are Shias on the brink of taking over the Middle East? (Observer 2006), Arab leaders watch in fear as Shia emancipation draws near (The Guardian, 2005).524 It is even reported that Al Jazeera posted a video of Osama bin Laden525 (dated July 2, 2006) in which he made claim of the fact that Shia were agents of imperialism and traitors that are apocalyptically planning to exterminate Sunni in Iraq.526 An article entitled Yemen and the Long Arm of the Crescent appeared in 2007 on the website of the (Saudi-owned) pan-Arab daily, Asharq alawsat. Interestingly, it made the following remarks:
Yemeni newspapers indicated the presence of Iraqi fighters among the ranks of al Houthis followers; some bodies have been discovered, in addition to the detention of other Iraqis. There are those who claim that Iranian Mullah organizations are being rebuilt in Yemen the Youthful Believers organization at the forefront of the movement. Yemen has previously witnessed blatant Shia activities that were of Persian origin, among them a number of parties and organizations that have made a strong appearance on the scene such as: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Hezbollah, the Yemeni Hizb al Haq (al Haq party), and the Ittihad Al-Qiwa Al-Sha'abiyah party (Popular Unity party) With the general preoccupation resting on the developments of the Iranian crescent and the ensuing repercussions, the situation in Yemen is developing in a dangerous manner that cannot be overlooked or ignored. People are so absorbed by what Iran is doing in the northern part of their country Iraq that they neglect the insidious creeping through their backdoor in the south which comes as a disturbing shock!527

Hereby, one should note the apllied terminology (creeping) and the appearance of ethnic Otherness, that is, the Persian Otherness (i.e. Shiisms supposed non-Arab nature). Usefully, names of political Shia parties are dropped in this narration as if it were mere logic to mention them in the first place. Subsequently, the imagery of Shia is seen casted outside of the Arab inclusion- and related to the clerical creeping danger (Octopus methaphor, al-ikhtabut ash-Shii).528 The same Saudi based columnist fabricated the aforementioned 2006 article entitled The Suspicious Iranian Project, in which he spoke of the Shia infiltration in the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, which would allegedly upset the balance in the Islamic world. Moreover, it was also he who claimed that the Shiazation of Palestine is a tangible reality. Again, Palestine is seen to be a symbolic point of political reference, whereby various (politicized) identities can be constructed (Arab, Persian, Sunni, Shia). The clear distortive level of this article comes forth when he amalgamazes that Iran is also home to a number of leading figures within the Al Qaeda organization.529 Keen observers have pointed out that, in fact, the whole conception of a Shia Crescent does not accurately nor precisely describe any political or religious alliance of states and political groups or movements and that the very idea has only gained substantial significance due to the mere fact that it has been used so frequently by political leaders and the media. 530 It is clear that Middle Eastern policy makers and publicists have striven to create imaginary geographies and phantasmagoric geopolitical conceptions by applying a strange mix of reflexive nationalism (Arab, Persian) and reflexive sectarian Otherness in their (political) narratives. Observers have broadly defined such misleading conceptions as any ideas concerning the relation between ones own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy. It is furthermore argued that (propagations of) a geopolitical vision requires at least a Them-and-Us distinctin and emotional attachment to a place Palestine and is closely related to feelings

522 523

http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2007/02/Sunni-shia-iraq-iran-arab Luomi, 2008, 5. 524 Malmvig, H., In the Midst of Change: The US and the Middle East from the War in Iraq to the War in Gaza, Royal Danish Defence College (Institute for Strategy), March 2009, (http://www.forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Research%20Papers/Documents/In%20the%20Midst%20of%20Change.pdf (accessed on 30/03/2011), 20. 525 For recent developments on this, see media reports in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden alledged death in 2011. (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2011/05/2011564225623885.html) 526 Rabi, 2008, 5. 527 Shobokshi, Asharq al-Awsat, 27/02/2007(http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=8143) 528 Puelings, 2010, 5. 529 Shobokshi, Asharq Alawsat, (http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=6833) 530 Luomi, 2008, 30-31.

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of national identity.531 The Other (Shia), who is labeled through such geopolitical imaginations, is in fact the underlying reality-bound (definable) geopolitical enemy (Iran), however, in order to swiftly mobilize people around this geopolitical project, the adversary needs to be propagated and discursed in a highly imagtive manner, whereby he, as the definable geopolitical unit becomes an all-inclusive, undefinable amalgam of sensation easily comprehended and feared of by the general public. It is important to recognize that the media is not a mere intermediary island of pure objectivity, which pasively reports events that supposedly occur in (objective) reality. On the contrary, media outlets are controlled by people, who themselves have perspectives and agendas that can further be influenced by specific socio-political environment. The media industry enjoys a position of power within every society this can either have a positive or negative effect. This business of information is constantly being influenced in its coverage by the distortive discourses (ideas) that are generated by others who hold power in society; often politicians.532
An enemy is, in some way, an opponent, but also much more. An enemy is a value-laden, emotionally charged entity, one that is the recipient of specific negative value connotations and meanings. Moreover, the images of the Other do not remain confined to a political elite, they are transmitted to the masses through education and media. It is through institutions such as the media and education that people are drawn into the political process as subjects of various political discourses. The media and education explain the linkeages between their audiences and what is being explained in order to provide a context for interpretation.533

This is exactly whycritics such as Foucault have advocated that the world is not simply there to be talked about, rather, it is through discourse itself that the world is brought into being. Thereby, `knowledge` (information) itself, is in fact, by nature, a constructed subjectivity. According to his interpretation, discourses are widely represented systems of statements, that is, areas of social knowledge as complexes of signs and practices which organises social existence and social reproduction within which the world can be known. 534 With regard to the Shia Crescent theory, there has been a strong interaction, i.e. a dialectic construction effort between Arab media outlets and the political elites in the region. Such relationships are in fact global and not uniquely regional-bound. Nevertheless, various degrees of interactions and interinfluences exist, depending on various socio-political realities on the ground (political organization, political liberty, freedom of speech, free press, press tradition). Arab media specialist William A. Rugh has studied this phenomenon with regard to the Arab region. In his typology of typical Arab press forms he argues that newspapers, radio and television respond in many ways to their environment, both in content and in functioning of institutional structure; moreover, he claims that Arab news media can only be understood in terms of the economic conditions, cultural milieu and political realities of the societies they serve.535 However, Rugh himself underscores the fact that a comprehensive qualitative survey of Arab media content, i.e. an objective content analysis of press, radio and television in all eighteen countries has not yet been done and would be an enormous undertaking. He therefore highlights the difficulty of formulating comprehensive generalized evalutions of Arab press content (and behaviour) and claims that observations about content are often made on the basis of opinions of experienced consumers of these media. Nevertheless, he does argue that Arab news media content usually carries the stamp of the originating institution in one way or another, which alert audiences can detect, because the message provides them with clues about the origins and control of the medium. So, without having to apply theory of media analysis, one can actually work via topic-related empirical inquiries to detect and extract certain underlying dynamics. Although Arab government-media relations536 are very complex -quite different for each set of countries within the Arab region and far from a homogeneous whole-, Rugh does note a top-down tendency in his inquiry. He carefully associates the Arab press with the authoritarian theory, by which the medias are controlled by the elite who believe they understand truth better than the masses do, and who assume they should use the press, radio and television to convey information and interpretation downward. 537 Hereby, he points out that Arab

531 532 533

Dijkink, quoted in Chaturvedi, 2002, 152. Chaturvedi, 2002, 152-3; Ashcroft [et al.], 2007, 62. Tidwell and Sharp quoted in, Chaturvedi, 2002, 153. 534 Ashcroft [et al.], 2007, 62. 535 Rugh, 2004, 249. 536 For recent flagrant demonstration of interaction during the turmoil of the popular protests in 2011 throughout the Arab region: (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/05/20115135621233618.html) 537 Rugh, 2004, 250-1.

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press is not a mere accidental byproduct of its political surrounding, but in effect, an object of political calculations by itself.538 He interprets Arab mass media as an important participant (actor) in the regional political process. He stresses the fact that neither the media nor its environment e.g. xenophobic societal behviour, political rhetoric and geopolitical contextcan fully be comprehended without comprehensive reference to the other.539 In retrospect, media forms have always been a corner stone in the transmittion of culture, its presevation and, for the very creation of culture/identity (bottom-up). In the twentieth century, for instance, this predominantly occurred through artistic forms such as music and poetry. Palestian poetry, for example, was a rare medium to express and consolidate Palestinian national identitiy during the harsh years of Israeli military rule (1948-66) in the Occupied Territories. Popular Rai music in twentieth century Algeria represented the outlet to implicitly express and propagate secular identity (to counter Islamism), e.g. Oh my love, to gaze upon you is a sin: its you who makes me break my fast (C. Remitti). However, notwithstanding a bottom-up possibility, the fact remains that governments (power groups) have always actively endeavoured to either use or influence these media (top-down).540 In Algeria the government tried to bann Rai from radio broadcast while the Egyptian based Sawt al-Arab radio broadcast was directly used to consolidate Arab sentiment for Jamal `Abd al-Nasirs geopolitical projects. Hereby, political discourse was mixed up was the icons of culture, e.g. Umm Kulthum 541, Farid al-Atrash.542 Friedrich Nietzsche and Arthur Schopenhauer have since long categorized music as an incredible artform, which has the ability to mobilize people as no other. At the turn of the 20th century passive media consumption started defeating poetry and classical music, whereby satellite television became the dominant medium for the expression and propagation of cultural sentiment and political ideas. It is clear that the contemporary power stake situates itself in this domain. Today, state-centric elites actively seek to influence and dominate modern media hubs to generate hegemonic discourses in accordance with specific geopolitical interests.543 Interestingly, the Saudi established was reported to tighten its media laws during the ongoing popular revolts throughout the Arab region in 2010-2011. In May, 2011, the royal house threatened to fine publications that would jeopardize the kingdom's stability; of course, in such a sense, one can legitimately question the meaning of the applied terminology, i.e. supposed stability (autocratic rule, repression etc.). 544 During the popular protests in the Arab countries throughout the end of the year 2010 and early 2011, renowned journalist Robert Fisk alluded in an article published in The Independent to a dynamic in reporting that he detected in Arab satelitte television, namely, he commented on a discursive silence that he had remarked from the part of Al Jazeera545 in the broadcasting of the human rights abuses during the Bahraini governments extensive crackdown on its people -the Shiamajority of the kingdom- vis--vis other contemporary Arab (e.g. Tunisian, Egyptian, Syrian, Yemeni etc.) events:
On this tiny island, a Sunni monarchy, the al-Khalifas, rule a majority Shia population and have responded to democratic protests with death sentences, mass arrests, the imprisonment of doctors and an invitation to Saudi forces to enter the country. That means of course also silence from al-Jazeera. I often appear on their otherwise excellent Arabic and English editions, but their failure to mention Bahrain is shameful, a dollop of shit546 in the dignity that they have brought reporting in the Middle East. The Emire of Qatar I know him and like him very much- does not need to belittle his television empire in this way. The doctors reaction was horror mixed with fear they had simply never seen such close-range gunshot wounds before. If this was happening in Damascus, homs or Hama or Allepo the voices of CamerClegg, and Obama and La Clinton would be ringing in our ears; But no. Silence.547 What is this nonsense? Well, I will tell you. It has nothing to do with the Bahrainis or the al-Khalifas. Its is all about our fear of Saudi Arabia. Which also means it is about oil. It is about a conversation I had with a Bahraini official a good and decent and honest

538 539

Ibid. 254 Ibid. 256 540 Papp, 2005, 174, 179, 180 541 It is no coincidence that she made a song for Nassers funeral, see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9VgKfbztcA&feature=related 542 Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 9. 543 Papp, 2005, 165 174, 179, 180 544 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/05/20115135621233618.html 545 It should be noted though, that Al-Jazeeras general focus lies on gaining the largest possible Arab-speaking audience due to its commercial nature 546 I excuse myself for quoting such vocabulary, however, it crucially points out a dynamic and R. Fisk is considered to be one of the most renowned Middle Eastern correspondents in the Western media. 547 It is remarkable in my view- that there are hardly any report in Western or regional media that speculate about the religious motives of the protesters in Syria or in Lybia; whereas in Egypt and Bahrain, this was often heared (Muslim Brotherhood; Shia).

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man- in which I asked him why the Bahraini prime minister could not be elected by a majority Shia population. The Saudis would never permit it548, he said.549

These comments can serve as a critical note to structural trustworthy comments such as those made by Ilan Papp, when he quotes William Rugh in his extremely comprehensive work entitled The Modern Middle East: Satellite television stations broadened the margins of freedom of expression but were still supervised closely by their owner. The one exception is alJazeera, based in Qatar. It is independent in every meaning of the word.550 Renowned theorist Michel Foucault is said to proclaimed in his History of Sexuality that: Silence itself the thing one declines to say, or is forbidden to name is less the absolute limit of discourse than an element that functions along the thing said. There is not one but many silences, and they are integral part of the strategies that underline and permeate discourses.551 Interestingly, it was recently reported that Bahrain is planning to sue the British newspaper for publishing Fisks article since they accuse the author of defamtion and a premeditated media campaign.552 In a recent documentary made by al Jazeera, the media outlet itself spoke of the accusations it had received as regards its coverage of Bahrain and it tried to balance them, but hereby, they interestingly (also) described Bahrain in sectarian terms (cultural prism) by stating that Bahrain is a tiny country; a geopolitical microcosmos of the Sunni-Shi`a divide Saudi Arabia is ruled by Sunnis and Iran is ruled by Shias.553 With regard to Middle Eastern satellite television, it is worthy to point out the Iranian-based channel Al-Alam was taken off air in November 2009 by Arab providers Arabsat and Nilesat; according to some due to the fear for influence excercised by the satellite channel.554 Such actions signal underlying, high-level interventionist measurements into media affairs and alert the attentive oberserver of regional interstate tensions not grassroots, cultural ones. Clearly, powerful groups in different states safeguard their grip on what is heared and known, implying a structural top-down influence on domestic and extranational societies. Apparantly there is more at stake than mere viewing rates. While political establishments in specific Arab countries would attribute a Shia signature to stations such as Hizbullahs Al-Manar and Irans Al Alam -which can be viewed throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world- as a marker for their alarmingly propagated Shiite Expansion/al-Madd al-Shii, it would be more accurate and appropriate to interpret them primarily as Iranian (geopolitical unit) funded media outlets engaged in a regional media war to dominate the regional masses perceptions, political orientation and socio-political behaviour.555 Consequently, when people write that it is remarkable to which extent Shiite clerics and their institutions are able to fully exploit the possibilities of the Internet, offering an entire range of Shiite literature on their website556, this implies foremost that those whome wish to propagate themselves as Shia (Iran, Hizbullah etc.) have increasingly more access to financial means to engage in regional (political) polemics. This geopolitical unit can profile itself according to it state-centric interests, i.e. generate Muslim or Shia visibility. The aformentioned media outlets (Al Alam, Al Manar) clearly tend to focus on sensitive issues in the sphere of Arab politics, such as Palestine and Iraq, to implicitly discredit specific Arab elites.557 Hizbullah, for instance, occasionally taps into a standard Arabist discourse about the Arab nation, the illegitimacy of Israeli state, solidarity with the Palestinians and the need for changes on the regional level.558 It can comprehensively be argued that Middle Eastern media outlets have increasingly grown out to be intensive platforms for the identity-politics of specific key regional states.

548

Saudi Arabia provides Bahrain with oil subsidies and research has indicated the possibility of systematic Saudi pressure on the Bahraini regime to block political reform and liberalization. (Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 54, 55). 549 Fisk, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-no-outcry-over-these-torturing-tyrants-2283907.html 550 Papp, 2005, 290. 551 Foucault, (history of sexuality) in Abraham., 2003, 529. 552 Al Arabiya, Bahrain to sue UK newspaper, accuses legendary journalist Robert Fisk of defamation, Al Arabiya, June 16 th 2011, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/16/153585.html (accessed on 20/06/2011). 553 Al Jazeera, the Listening Post, Recapping the Arab revolutions, 21.04-> 21.17. For more reports on the discursive silence regarding Bahrani coverage, see also: Al Jazeera, Inside Story: http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/05/20115128145310543.html. 554 Puelings, 2010, 29 . 555 Ibid. 29. 556 Ibid., 29 557 Jones, 2005, 21 558 Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 6

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As a means of Shiite Otherness, the anti-Shiite media card559 (potential) was recently used by Gulf governments to dismiss their populations demand for (democratic) political reform; an emancipatory (bottom-up) dynamic that de facto initiated in the Arab sphere, that is, in Tunisia and not in Tehran. These popular uprisings have seemingly to taken place without any particularly religious or sectarian tone. Robert Fisk reported on May 14, 2011 that the Bahraini monarch destroyed Shia mosques and claimed the protests were an Iranian plot and destroyed the statue of the pearl at the roundabout, thus deforming the very history of his own country560 in an effort to silence the popular revolt in his country. Other observers and scholars around the globe have confirmed these impressions (Al Jazeera, July 2011); one scholar stated that a part of the media strategy of the Bahraini government has been to portray them protesters as zealous Shi`a who are trying to take over the monarchy with support of no other than the `evil` and hated Iran while yet another stated that this discourse fits into the confortable narrative that we have grown accustomed to that there is foreign meddling; that these are not citizens asking for their inalienable rights but rather that they are acting on behalf of a larger political player. It was hereby also reported that one of the founders (Karim Faghraawi) of the only opposition newspaper in Bahrain, Al Wasat, died when he was tortured in costudy (during the protests), while the governments` version of events was essentially that the man died of a kidney failure
.561Also with regard to these Bahraini events, one can clearly detect a geopolitical powerplay between Saudi Arabia and

Iran, in terms of competing hegemonic discourses (media war), whereby enormous distortions and amalgamations are constantly being created and further consolidated within popular consciousness. A keen US-based scholar interestingly interpreted theses 2011 events as follows:
You have got the Saudi-owned al Arabiya, which from the outset had been incredibly accusatory towards the protesters that it was and outrights coup and then you have the Iranian-owned al Alam, which decided to take the side of the protesters outight and in some cases even fomented sectarianism. You are starting to see state-policy basically infiltrating broadcasting in such a way that you have a major polarization in how content is covered.562

It was furthermore reported that in March 2007, a Kuwaiti Sunni cleric named Uthman al-Khamis announced plans to launch Tibah (disclosure), a new satellite channel to warn Muslims of the Shiite threat.563 Moreover, the Al Arabiya news channel reported on April 7, 2011 that Ahmed al-Jarallah, editor-in-chief of the Kuwaiti daily newspaper al-Sayessah accused Iran Wednesday April 6, 2011 of inciting a Shiite revolution in the Gulf region. The report further mentioned that Jarrallah cited the example of Bahrain and accused Iranian agents inside the Gulf nation of organizing strikes and protests to destabilize national security and cripple the economy. The chief-editor is literally quoted saying: We saw ministers disappearing and managers of big service companies running away or joining the protests. This was Irans doing. The report by Al Arabiya goes on by mentioning that Jarallah stressed that Gulf nations are not creating an imaginary enemy and that Irans conspiracies necessitate constant caution and that Jarallah likened Hezbollah to the Barmakids, the Persian family that wielded expansive political power during the reign of Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid until they became a threat and the caliph had to get rid of them. 564 Additionally, Al Jazeera reported on April 26, 2011 during the intersification of the popular protests throughout several Arab countries- that Bahrain has ordered the expulsion of a top Iranian diplomat over his alleged links to a Kuwaiti spy ring.565 Kuwait was reported to have taken the exact same diplomatic measument over the spy cell allegation, which Iran denied.566 Bahrain is often reported to exert such allegations, but coincidently, the majority those who are (systematically) being accused of (behind the scenes), are always domestic prominent political activists and human-rights advocates (citizens).567 Interestingly, Kuwait was also reported to have simultaneously shut down its Al Jazeeras news bureau for defying ministerial warnings not to broadcast "any news about the recent events". 568

559 560

Broning, 2008, 74 http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-no-outcry-over-these-torturing-tyrants-2283907.html 561 Al Jazeera, the Listening Post, Recapping the Arab revolutions, 19.25-> 20.58 562 Al Jazeera, the Listening Post, Recapping the Arab revolutions, Adel Iskandar (Georgetown University) 21.18->21.42. 563 Norton, 2007, 439 564 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/07/144551.html 565 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011426921169779.html 566 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/201133123525225240.html 567 Economist: http://www.economist.com/node/16994636?story_id=16994636 568 http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-14/world/kuwait.al.jazeera.bureau_1_kuwait-news-agency-kuwait-city-kuwaitiauthorities?_s=PM:WORLD

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Let me be clear, the key argument here is not to pretend the impossibility of Iranian foreign meddling Iran has since long demonstrated and even openly proclaimed (export of the revolution) this capacity similar to any nation-state with a sizeble significance today. The main point here, is that it is relatively easy and actually quite typical for reactionary political elites which do not tolerate political pluralism- to make such claims of foreign even alien since it does not belong to a supposedly domestic `Arab nature- meddling during popular unrest and campaigns of political reform. It is in this sense interesting to point out that the Khomeinists, for instance, used to make the exact same claims during their consolidation and grip on power in the early 1980s, during their violent repression of the Iranian secular Left (e.g. Tudeh Party)569; their former revolutionary brothers in arms. At the time being, a diverse array of political dissidents Maoists, Mossadeqists, former Khomeinists, royalists and Mojahedin al-Khalq- was accused for spying for foreign powers (Soviet Union, US) and of plotting sinister conspiracies to harm and destroy the nation (Islamic Iran). Also here, the media was influenced and even flagrantly instrumentalized to propagate the hegemonic political discourse (Khomeinism) in order to shroud political and cultural pluralism (secularists, communists etc.).570 The key issue here is not even the occurrence of repression, it is the monopoly on the narrative; i.e. the effort by whoever enjoys power to create and consilidate history and present `reality` in the minds (perception) of the popular masses, which is the key universal mechanism:
The surprise in these 1983 forced and televised confessions, which continued intermittently for over ten months, was the prominence given histoy. History featured in the recantations made by the three most important Tudeh figures Bezahin kicked off the first show with a lesson on the Islamic clergys true understanding of the past, Marxisms misinterpretations of the course of history, and secular radicals betrayal of the people of Iran through their alien ideology. The three Tudeh leaders followed similar scripts. They began by greeting Imam Khomeini, the Great Leader of the Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic. They stressed that their brief confinement in prison had provided them with the opportunity to study the past. Kianuri concluded his second long recantation by stressing that the Left needed to examine in great detail Irans history and society. Tabari exclaimed that he had realized that his lifes work was spurious as soon as the prison authorities introduced him to Islamic authors, notably Ayatollah Motahhari. Tabari explained that his own publications were useless because they had relied on foreign sources (Europeans, Zionists, Freemasons, Soviet Marxists) and on Kasravi and Sangalaji, whose errors he recognized in prison as soon as he had read Imam Khomeinis Kashf al-Asrar. A less important Tudeh, before being executed, limited his defense to thanking his jailers for turning the prison into a university.571

Research has indicated that similar popular Bahraini unrest in the mid-1990s and in 2007 also stemmed from socio-economic discontent among the countrys marginalized `Shia` majority. Interestingly, also during these events, Saudi Arabia threatened the Bahraini monarchy to intervene militarily if if the unrest was not respressed quickly (Saudi patronage). When Riyadh intervened in Bahrain on March 2011, its officials were secular-based.
574 573 572

consistently refused to consider that the Bahraini uprising

However, the vice-president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, Nabil Rejaab, stated in an

interview (March 2011) that this is not a sectarian divide, this is what the government tries to present [] its an uprising; people want their political rigths.575 Abdullah al-Alami, a Saudi economist and writer, on the other hand claimed that as far as the troops are concerned, as you know, this is not called troops, this is not called Saudi troops, this is not called Saudi soldiers, this is called`peninsular shield`576 [] They are really deployed there as an act of solidarity, if you will (shrouded577, subjective discourse).578 According to Ray Takeyh, Gulf goverments actively use the threat image of a foreign

569 570

The Iranian Communist Party Abrah., 1993, 88-9. 571 Ibid. 89 572 Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 54, 55 573 US official simultaneously issued statements that this intervention was not an occupation. The Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani who partly funds AL jazeera through the Qatar Media Corporation- also defended tha Saudi move from a GCC point of logic. See (http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/03/2011316105616297611.html.), 9.00-> 10.00, 02.00->02.20 574 Al Jazeera, Inside Story, 07.15->07.30,(http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/03/2011316105616297611.html) 575 Najib Rejaab, Al Jazeera, Inside Story, 04.00->04.30 (http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/03/2011316105616297611.html) 576 This refers to a GCC agreement, which allows Gulf Governments to call for military aid, when there is an outside/international attack upon them; this is not really the case in Bahrain, which has called for a state of emergence and a rule of martial law in march 2011. See inside st, 10.10->10.30, 11.30->12.00 577 A discourse of double standards, which bears some similarity to US Secretary of State, Hilary Clintons comments on the Saudi ban on female driving; while stating that she supported their claim in mid-2011, she modestly added that it was actually a Saudi affairs, not really a issue for outsiders to involve with: "This is not about the United States, it is not about what any of us on the outside say" []"It is about the women themselves and their right to raise their concerns with their own government." See: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/06/201162119351841918.html. Such rhetoric clearly contrasts the hard stance on human rights that Ms. Clinton advocates vis--vis China: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2011/05/201151082419181462.htm 578 Abdullah al-Alami, Inside Story, Al j (ibid), 06.14->07.00

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`Shia danger` to stall domestic pressure for socio-political reform. In this sense, he believes that Shia communities in Gulf countries endeavour not the establishment of a Shia Crescent or even Iranian patronage, but specifically seek to renegotiate the national compact in their countries so that they can become more integrated in the political en economic life of their societies.579 These are interesting, balanced and well-defined words that have become rather scarce in the general discourse regarding Shia.580 The negative Iranian-related `Shi`a`-imagery was recently attributed to Tunisian opposition member that goes by the name of Rashid al-Gannouchi, namely by certain581 media outlets during their coverage of the Arab uprisings in early 2011. The Al Jazeera news agency interestingly reported the following fragment on January 23, 2011:
The transitional Tunisian government has also said that it would lift a ban on political groups, including the Islamist al-Nahda (Renaissance) party. The exiled leader of the formerly banned party, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, told Al Jazeera on Saturday that alNahda is democratic and should not be feared and rejected any comparison between him and Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. "We are a moderate Islamic movement, a democratic movement based on democratic ideals in ... Islamic culture. Some people pull Khomeini's robe over me, while I am no Khomeini nor a Shia," he said.582

Although his party and political ideas are based in religious ideology (reformist trend), al-Gannouchi had clearly found himself amalgamized into the Shiite and Jihadi Islamic narrative when such Shiite labels were earlier applied to his persona and movement. Other channels, such as Al Arabiyya, published the same remarks but here they were accompanied by additional information. One should keep in mind that these comments were published in January, that is, when Tunisian dynamics were still in full flux: Analysts say moderate Islamists in Tunisia may attract many followers after the overthrow of Ben Ali, while militants may be able to infiltrate from neighboring Algeria, which has long fought Islamic hardlines. 583 Hereby, one should mark key terminology in the discursive whole regarding Tunisia and al-Gannouchi: Islamists, attract, followers, infiltrate, Islamic hardliners. In fact, such reporting flagrantly draws up a highly distortive image of the Tunisian events themselves. The use of such labels, in this very context, implies not only casting away the Tunisian politician as different to the Arab sphere but it also directly relates his persona to a direct negative political connotation (Iran). A similar occurrence that was situated in the Arab Media, was recently alluded to by Walid Jumblatt recently (11/07/2011) when he commented on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 584 and the new formation of a Lebanese government headed by prime-minister Miqati supported by Hizbullah. Hereby, the Druze leader endorsed the new prime ministers pragmatic and stabilizing stance (STL indictments) and said that there was a campaign to strip Miqati of his patriotism and Sunni identity.585 It seems that the `Shia-card` is up until this very day applied as a political instrument (politicized `identity`). With regard to the Tunisian events one should remark that initially the media trend was to depicted the popular uprisings in the Arab world rather positively. After all, Arab and international news channels were, at the time being, bulking with terminology such as Jasmine Revolution586 and Arab Spring587 to refer588 to these social and political dynamics589. Later on, terminology somehow shifted towards Arab turmoil590; extra-regional amateur media headings even related this Arab turmoil a possible orgy of blootletting. Clearly, hegemonic discourse is a matter of mobilization and power, that is, the very ability of powerful societal actors (``speakers`) to produce particular speech and project it towards a numerous audience

579

PDF Versie Shia Cresc symp (http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf) 3- 4. 580 http://www.economist.com/node/16994636?story_id=16994636 581 It is hard to trace which media outlet initiated the Khomeinist (Shia) parallel that is also byond the scope of this study- however, by reusing the discursive terminology that image is de facto transferred to new audiences; references include Al Arabiyya and Aljazeera without depicting them as the intial instigator. 582 http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/01/2011122133816146515.html (last acc on) 583 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/22/134607.html (accessed on!) 584 A UN-led tribunal that investigates the murder of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik al-Hariri. 585 Naharnet, Walid Jumblatt, interview, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/10182-mp-walid-jumblat-in-an-interview-on-mtv 586 E.g. http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/01/2011121165938708665.html 587 E.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13293264 (last acc on 12/05/2011) 588 This is even the case for similar dynamics, elsewhere in the world; e.g. in China: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/23/138870.html 589 These are of course not the only ones, contrastingly, also more negative again this is my subjective estimation- connotations (cf. Arab turmoil, orgy of bloodletting) were assigned to the events by media concerns (also amateur media and bloggers): http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1360095/Middle-East-crisis-lead-orgy-bloodletting-rocketing-oil-prices.html; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2876059.stm 590 http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/worldagenda/2011/02/110216_worldagenda_tunisia_bbc_arabic.shtml; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2876059.stm

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of listeners.591 Public sentiment and perception are apparently vastly steered by the very actions and rhetoric of various political establishments. As such, comes forth the interrelated importance and impact of speech (media, clerics, politicians) and societal power. The anti-Iranian and anti-Shia propaganda fit into a more global propaganda campaign against the country, traditionally originating from the US political establishment, the 21st century strongman, over (material) geopolitical interest-oppositions. Noam Chomsky described this dynamic power interplay between politics and media quite accurately while touching upon the aforementioned nuclear question:
People still believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, even though its been officially conceded that they dont. What does that mean? it means that the government media propaganda campaign was extremely effective in instilling fear. People think theyre defending themselves. Even if its already been conceded that the threat was not there, and maybe concocted, the fear still remains. And its the same with Iran. If you read enough of those articles you cited, you will think were in mortal danger if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. What danger are we in, even if Iran does get a nuclear weapon? Theyre not going to use it except as a deterrent. If there were even an indication that they were planning to use it, the country would be vaporized. So its there for a deterrent. But people can be frightened by massive propaganda.592

Consequently, it is clear that Saudi Arabia together with other Arab establishment (Jordan and Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait etc.) propagte different forms of collective identity and geopolitical narratives in a dialectic process with the regional media for the purpose of consolidating both their (specific) foreign and domestic policies. These regimes political propagations are quite dichotomous and seem barely to relate to any societal realities on the ground. The remarks made about Gannoushis Shiiteness/Otherness make a good example of such state-led propaganda, which is subsequently negatively reflected within the Arab media. 2.3.4 Academia & the Sectarian Question: Methodology or Ideology? The people who hold the clubs typically like to forget history and say its irrelevant. But the people who are hit by the clubs tend to remember history, for good reasons, because it teaches you something. Noam Chomsky593 Observers who approach International Relations from a constructivist philosophy have often used of strongly homogenized conceptions to explain the Shia Crescent theory. This expresses itself through the (implicit) incorporation of the very sectarian (or ethnic) logic into the scholars discourse. Within academia, a new narrative has emerged, which argues that an emerging Sunni-Shia divide has become key to understanding politics in an alleged post-Arab Middle East (nature).594 It was for example Vali Nasr who famously stated that the Lebanon war in 2006 and the subsequent intra-Arab diplomatic turmoil were signs of a spillover of sectarian tensions manifest in Iraq, thus interpreting Hizbullahs engagement with Israel as the regional ascendance of the Shia in confirmation of his previous proclamation that cleavages within Islam will define the regions major conflicts in the future.595 In his article entitled When Shiites Rise he reportedly argued that by liberating and empowering Iraqs Shiite majority, the Bush administration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come. 596 As such, Vali Nasr depicted and interpreted the political reality of the Middle East primarily along sectarian lines Sunni vs. Shia in a Muslim World.597 However, this being said, it must also be noted that these predictions are often made critically, with certain important side marks and with some specific reservations: his conceptions of a transnational Shia revival in the region do seem to relate to state-realities (Irans regional power and Shia emanicipation processes in Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Pakistan).598 Vali Nasrs emphasis actually lies upon the broad dynamic of communal and cultural emacipation, i.e. upon the regional political dynamic of democratization among earlier discriminated or neglected groups within Middle Eastern societies. These are important insights and he does actually not go as far as to predict the advent of pan-Shiism. However, even when neorealist influence is appearent in his supra-national analysis (transnational) and the constructivist paradigm is subsequently seen widened in a semi-denounciation of the concept of a Shia Crescent, such analytical discourses often still
591 592 593

Ashcrof, 2007, 62. Chomsky, 2007, Targetting , 46, 47. Ibid. 31, 32 594 ref. Pan-Arab ideology, (cf. Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 6). 595 Ibid. 6. 596 Puelings, 2010, 7. 597 Ibid. 7; Nasr, 2006, 58-74. 598 Terhalle, 2007, 1; Luomi, 2008, 15-7.

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primarily attribute the contemporary dynamics in Middle Eastern politics to equally superficial, essentialized and problematic labels of group identity, therefore lacking a comprehensive basis.599 Nasr detects a broad Shia Revival that he interprets as a transnational agreed upon order of interacting polities of the same sectarian cultural, i.e. a consensus among Shia governments and movements on the point that gains made in Iraq should be protected and entrenched.600 Hereby, all Shia are thought to have a similar regional agenda they collectively experience political loss and gains on the basis of a cultural logic and a purely confessional interest- versus their alleged Sunni counterparts. Within such a culturalistic framework many analogies of terminology exist to refer to the same idea: Shia rising, the Shia revival, Shia axis, pan-Shiism, Shia international, Shia renaissance, Shia bloc, Shia empire and the Shia awakening. All of these terms have already been applied to express the central idea that culture is a crucial and even the main driver (independent actor) for all political and societal behaviour in the region, implicitly resulting in the idea of irrationally induced conflicts.601 However, other prominent scholars of the Middle East such as Gregory Gause III have countered such narrow discourses by keenly pointing out that the cultural dynamic of Shiite emancipation should be interpreted within the very framework of the Middle Eastern nation-state, Iranian foreign policy and the regions current status quo.602 Although the state is neglected it is in fact the main and primer reference of social reality and political organization, which foremost determines the reality in which Shia live.603 Other scholars, such as Bernard Lewis have interestingly claimed that identity is a permanent, historically rooted quality that lies at the heart of politics in the Middle East. Lewis describes the national chracter of Middle Eastern people in such terms that sectarianism too, is feasibly inherent to the local political culture. Hereby, there is no mention whatsoever made of material, supra-regional influence on Middle Eastern politics nor of the regions geostrategic positioning in todays global economy. It is simply a narrative that primarily, if not uniquely, focuses upon bottom-up cultural sentiments. Hereby, the Middle East is presented as something unique that stands alone and as something rather exceptional, which can be explained by its cultural tendencies; occasionally accompanied with some fashionable remarks made through the cultural baggage of the Orientalist, say for example the discovery that the word assassin actually originates from this region.604 Such scholarly discourses often consolidate the essentialist discourses of geopolitical Othering made by politicians that strife to safeguard their material interest. The stereotypying of the Middle East and its inhabitants (Muslims, Shia) by academics only dramatically increased ever since 9/11:
Academic experts in some cases only added to the publics ignorance by pandering to or promoting stereotypes. Johns Hopkins Universitys Fouad Ajami, who was then testifying before Congress on Islamic radicalism offered the now famous aphorism: The Sunnis are homicidal and the Shiites are suicidal.605

Anoushivaran Ehteshami has stated that there are deep cultural tensions between the Muslim heartland and the US a strange opposition, indeed- and argued that Islamic fundamentalism is motivated by the Muslims fear of modernization (industrialization, urbanization etc.) since, for Muslims, the accelerating globalization process implies the end of uniqueness of Islam.606 Also with regard to intra-Middle Eastern happenings, he seems keen on explaining political and societal dynamics from the culturalistic prism. He has for instance highlighted Shiisms depth and vigour in Iraq, by impressionistically referring to the popular success of the Ashura ceremonies in post-Saddam Najaf and Karbala in 2003. Subsequently, he argued that Shiites were now openly challenging their Sunni neighbours (Saudi Arabia, Jordan etc.) interpretation of Islam. While, he seemed to pinpoint certain realities, he nevertheless concluded into problematic

599 600 601

Nasr, 2008, 170-1, 179-184; Norton, 2007, 439 ; Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 117; Nasr, 2006, 1. Nasr, 2008, 179 Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 117; Zemni & Parker, 2002, 2-3. 602 Gause, 2007, 123 603 Ibid. 123; Norton, 2007, 439; Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-andpolitics/emerging-shia-crescent-symposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized). 604 Norton, 2007, 436; Abrahamian, 2003 541. 605 Norton , 2007, 437 606 Ehteshami, 2007,163-4

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phantagorasmic deductions by stating that political elites in the region were not only afraid of the Shiite demand for their national rights on a domestic scale, but he also claimed that these elites have for years feared a Shia international that would culturally challenge them.607 One should hereby remark how two different sectarian cultures are opposed in a potential conflict; how culture itself is believed to be able to generate conflict.608 In his work entitled Shiitestan (2007) Pepe Escobar reportedly advocated the idea of an emerging Shiitestan, whereby Iranian foreign policy was allegedly fixed on uniting Shiites from Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon to create a supposed common Shia front. This phatasmagoric analysis actually converges precisely with the propagations made by king Abdullah of Jordan in 2004. Although George W. Bush spoke of a crusade whilst presenting his war plans after 9/11, it is doubtful whether any serious scholarly analysis would ever state that US foreign policy was based on forming a united Christian front and that a new sensational geopolitical entity e.g. Christianistan- was imminent in the Western hemisphere.609 He reportedly argued that a Shiite Crescent was a looming Middle Eastern reality but that it had no military, expansionist logic behind it and he continued his amalgam by further stating that the united Shia front was actually in favour of moving towards a more market-oriented economy and a progressive liberalization of morals and public opinion. Escobar did balance his ideas by somehow realistically stating that, for the time being, such a united front does not yet exist because the Shiite galaxy is fractured and polymorphous and an archipelo. All methaphors aside, there are some structural thruths within this narrative (communal and individual heterogeneity, ecclesiastical pluralism), however, there is no clear mention of interstate Middle Eastern (and geo-economic) reality, nor is there great interest for any specific socio-economic contexts of different national cases and last but not least, the individual is vastly overlooked here.610 Similar arguments can be found in Yitzhak Nakashs study entitled Reaching for Power: the Shia in the Modern Arab World, in which he stated that any attempt to turn Iraq into a more permanent US protectorate, and any failure to accept the leading role that Shii and Sunni Islamists are likely to play in the new Iraq and in the larger Middle East, will spark a brand of religious nationalism with strongly anti-American overtones, badly inflame relations between Islam and the West, and seriously undermine Americas interest in the region.611 Next to some rational accuracy, one should note the nature of questionable politicized oppositions: Islam vs. West? Such approaches are often typed by a lack in focus on geoeconomics (imperialism, neoliberalism, world capitalist economic system) and by generally overlooking the fundamental correlation between events of geopolitical and geo-economic nature -such as the US-led invasion of Iraq, the 2006 July War, the first and second Gulf War or even the Iranian revolution- and the emergence of discourses culminating around religious, sectarian, ethnic and even enlightened/western identity; briefly, all forms of exclusive and politicized identities. Consequently, specific contemporary economic and military powers (industrialized G8) are labeled as the West yet another subjective amalgam, rather hard to rationally define when assessing material geopolitics- and often interpreted as the exclusive locus of political democracy and enlightened populations (citizens). Scholars such as Nakash start their narrative from the particular belief that these Western geopolitical units also carry the altruistic will to export their democracy extraterritorially:
Yet the war in Iraq has also provided America with an opportunity to establish a relationship of trust not only with the Shiis, but also with other people in the Middle East who have been craving change. Iraq has become the nexus where many critical issues are converging, most notably relations between Muslim and Western societies. Having gone to war in Iraq, and then proceeded to dismantle the Iraqi army, the United States has commited itself to remaining until Iraq can stand on its own feet. Success would mean an independent and unified Iraq with a representative government and a strong legislature. Achieving that goal will help restore Americas standing in the world and, at the end of the day, will at least enable US troops to leave Iraq with a sense of political accomplishment.612

607 608 609

Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 188 Zemni & Parker, 2002, 2-3. Bush, G.W., Today We Mourned, Tommorow We Work, The White House Archives (Press Secretary), September 16th 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html, (accessed on 06/03/2011), see for instance: "[]this crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. 610 Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 119 611 Nakash, 2008, 164 612 Ibid. 164

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Such logic of democratization can be attributed to the (America-centric) neo-conservative/neo-confrontalist school of thought, which interprets US foreign policy considerations primarily to altruistic and non-material vocations. It starts from the dichotomous idea of a culturally superior nation view to backdrop of a culturally backward world in desperate need of interventionist help to accumulate democratic political organization and such enlightened popular behaviour (US mythology). Such logic and its scholarly terminology (democracy, dismantle) tend to veile recent history by merely looking at contemporary politics and narrowly focusing on politico-cultural propagations.613 Clearly, the US could have enforced a democratic system in Iraq during the First Gulf War, when it mobilized to defend Kuwait and called for Iraqi Kurds and Shiites to revolt against Saddam. Instead of political accomplishment, US actions were then typed by a neglect for humanitarianism, to say the least:
Iraqs army unleashed a furious and pitiless response. Iraqi Shiites begged at the Kuwait border for sanctuary, where the US military stood watch. American soldiers might as well have been spectators in Romes Coloseum. The supplicants were rebuffed and turned back to their wretched fates. An estimated 100,000 Iraqis Shiites were killed. Incredibly .614

In the 1990s, as in the early 2000s, the US was directly motived by material and geostrategic interest in engaging Iraq; the goal was to secure the Gulfs particular geographical make-up of fragmented, US aligned oil-producing monarchies to eventually diversificate the oil block. Bright scholars have, indeed, detected such democratization thinking as a widespread post-Cold War phenomenon that has penetrated academia ever since. They have interpreted it as a rather dichotomous and biased starting point of analysis. The standard constructivist democratization-story in scholarship generally posits itself towards two tendencies, one is what is called Wilsonian idealism, which is based on noble intentions and the other is sober realism, which says that we have to realize the limitations of our good intentions. This scholarly discourse is generally solely narrowed to these exclusive analytic boundries; never is it even considered that the US itself has been a major perpetrator of state terror and other rogue actions, causing immense harm, always in the name of democracy, liberty and justice. Neorealist critic Trita Parsi notes the exact same application of such narrow logic in scholarly productions that assess Israeli-Iranian relations. When portraying and denouncing the current constructivist debate that often interpretes their bilateral antagonism as a mere result of an ideological threat, he keenly remarks an inherent contradiction, i.e. a subjectiveone-dimensional logic:615 While the ideological dimensions of Irans foreign policy are often accounted for in most studies, Israels Iran policy is rarely characterized as ideological. Rather, the dangers of Irans ideological orientation and expansionism are often cited as an explanation for Israeli worries, that is, Israels Iran policy is seen as rational response to Irans ideological and irrational Israel policy.616 In short, such frameworks do not even consider the role of discourse as a rhetorical tool that consolidates power.617 Observers that do see offensive geopolitical potential in current manifestations of sectarian rhetoric have alerted readers that seemingly countries are trying to create an atmosphere of Shiaphobia and Iranophobia.618 They simultaneously point out its multidimensional offensive purpose, that is, both regionally (contain Iran) and domestically (preserve autocratic rule).619 It should be clear that the central question of this study Sectarian identity or geopolitics of religion?- implies in itself, also a question of ontology and epistemology. Namely, how does one interpret claims of a Shiite Expansion, as a de facto reality or a de facto perception? Constructivist scholars often refer extensively to Iraq or Lebanon to advocate the theory that nowadays religion is overcoming ethnicity (e.g. Arabism). Undoubtedly, regime-change in Iraq has triggered a dynamic of communal emancipation (and societal violence), however, one should bear in mind that the two places in which Shia social movements have had the most political success are places where the state is weak. Hereby, the sate is not naturally weak because of the bottom-up generation of different identities; in Lebanon this is due to the fifteen year long civil war (19751990) and in Iraq because of the very fact that the US destroyed the state (2003). Thus, when one scrutinizes more thoroughly

Chomsky, 2007, Interv. 143 Norton, 2007, 437 615 Parsi, 2008, 137 616 Ibid. 137 617 Chomsky, 2007, Interv., 143 618 Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 131 619 Luomi, 2008, 26
613 614

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by studying every country within its context, the model of a Shia crescent immediately starts to break down. 620 However, some observers of the Middle East reportedly interpret post-2003 dynamics slightly different (cf. still, nevertheless, oneand-a-half millennia-old regional Sunni Arab supremacy, unfolding, remains):
there are visible signs that the one-and-a-half-millennia-old regional Sunni Arab supremacy is increasingly giving in to the interests of non-Arab powers; the United States, Israel and Iran. the intensity of the post-Saddam Shia-Sunni rift, which seems to be currently unfolding, and its significance for the Middle East state order/system remains to be seen. 621

In addition, the aformentioned US academic Ehteshami is reported to have stated that: The Shia awakening can shake, if allowed to grow, consolidate and shake the very foundations of the political orders that were resurrected atop the old Ottoman territories early last century. In the Persian Gulf, it can shake them from within, and elsewhere it can challenge Sunni orthodoxy by presenting alternative Islamic discourses on a broad range of issues. 622As such, the newly emerging threat in the form of a global Shia, controlled by Tehran623 is presented as a newly forthcoming Islamic state to achieve great power status since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.624 Hereby, the notion of culture itself, as an independent social and political actor is made the central focal point, that is, the very acting object (subject) within the analysis. Many observers seem to perceive conflicts as the inevitable outcome of a cultural logic.625 These ideas -political orders that were resurrected atop the old Ottoman territories626- mark a rigid, linear and subjective process of thought and a narrow perception of history, which are typical characteristics of the often critized dichotomous modernization framework.627 In this particular example, not even the slightest indication is given of any structural events -colonialism, secular pan-Arab ideology, secular Bathi politics, imperialist interventionism (1991 Gulf War, 2003 Iraq War)- to understand socio-cultural dynamics (Shia emancipation/popular radicalisation). According to this logic the Orient was Sunni (Ottoman) and still is the locus of Sunni power today (Saudi Arabia, Jordan etc.). Apparently, contemporary questions and debates have grown out to amalgams of civilizational clashes: supposed moderate Sunni traditionalism vs. radical Shia expansionism; enlightened, democratic West vs. violent, reactionary Islam.628 Today, studies within social sciences are bulking with accounts that attribute a central role to Islam or Shiism (culture) when discussing contemporary international relations. This, however, was not always the case; previously a strict and structural demarcation was made between the methodology and epistemology of social science and that of other disciplines, such as Orientalism: It is hard to find any study within the social sciences on the role of Islam in politics prior to the Iranian revolution as there was no place for concepts such as religion, culture, ethnicity or race in the teleological narratives of modernization theories whether in its Marxist or liberalist versions.629 This new dynamic is due to the cultural turn within the sciences, where academic paradigms incorporated all that was culturally fashionable, hence introducing the post-modern and post-structuralist era of thought. Observers have noted that this shift within the traditional paradigm coincided with the advent of Islamism on the world political scene.630
anthropologists and social historians, who had pioneered the whole field of cultural analysis pointed out that Huntington had discovered culture his latest book is entitled Cultural Matters- just when they had given it up as a key concept. These same pioneers now treat culture not as a fixed entity with a coherent central essence but rather as contested terrain constantly influenced by external forces and fought over by competing groups.631

One must of course bear in mind that many US632 departments of Area studies -African Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, East Asian Studies etc.- were partly established because of the Cold War dynamic633; signaling a geopolitical incentive for inquiry
620 621

Proctor, 2008, 2; Gause, 2007, 123 Luomi, 2008, 7, 8 622 Haji-Yousefi, 2009, 118; Terhalle, 2007, 80 623 brning, 2008, 60 624 Ibid.61 625 Sami & Parker, 2002, 2. 626 Luomi, 2008, 7, 8. 627 Papp, 2005, 2-9. 628 Zemni, 2002, 8-10. 629 Zemni, 2002, 7. 630 Ibid., 7. 631 Abrahamian , 2003, 530-1. 632 In Europe, the Orientalist departments grew out of colonial motives. 633 After the Cold War funding for area studies decreased substantially.

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that can not have been free from ideological presumptions. It is therefore understandable that some scholarly discourses still form intergral part of political narratives that endeavour to politicize and distortedly discurse the singeled-out Other. Today, cirtical observers are confronted with essentialized distortions in a wide-range of narratives, within a wide-range of disciplines; it is thus no longer unique to the classical Orientalist discourse (empirical scrutiny) to incorporate incoherent flaws and higly patronizing streams of thought with regard to the object of study. This explains why today, many academic symposia in the US -mainly by attended social and political scientists- start from a-priori cultural prisms, e.g. The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for US Policy in the Middle East.634 Today, scholars from a wide-range of disciplines are posed with enormous scholarly challenges and vast expectations from the outside world, which has appearantly gotten used to simplistic cultural amalgams in this post-modern context.635 Moreover, societal simplism today even demands this of the intteligentsia. Henk de Smaele has demonstrated this explicit need for clear-cut language -that is, for essiantilized thruth on problematic topics such as Islam- vividly by quoting Jan de Pauw in his essay entitled De Lokroep van het Essentialism (The Indolence of Essentialism).636 According to some academics there is no room for contextualities (geography, communal, individual, socio-ecnomic etc.) when cultural notions are addressed. What is often witnessed is a impressionistic, populist and often fashionable use of Muslim historiographyleading to a misplaced use of history, distorted semantics and subsequent imaginary abstractions of Islam, political reality and of certain different groups within certain societies. Such scholarly creations render the reader and listener the idea and imagery of a supposed Islamic continuum637 whereby Islam in and by itself is the supposed central agent in the history of Muslims.638 Such historical continua are used by scholars such as Bernard Lewis to distinguish the Middle East as a unique entity whith a distinghuised character that is typed by the failure to separate religion from politics, incompatibility of democracy and Islam, humiliations over military defeats, resentment over the destruction of the Caliphate, hurt pride over a lost civilisation, rejection of modernity, nostalgia for the past, obsession with the Mediaeval Crusades and fascination with terrorism. Viewed to the backdrop of this linear process, one then often argues that it is somehow natural from Middle Eastern habitants to hate us; the enlighted or moderate ones (reflexive).639 In this sense, cultural oppositions are believed to generate genuine geopolitical oppositions whereby socio-political problems are labeled as all pervasive cultural clashes, e.g. Sunni vs. Shia. Interestingly, during the appearance of pan-Arabism (Arab nationalist ideology), many such constructivist scholars used to apply similar logic in wondering why the Arabs did not succeed in regaining their world stature they once enjoyed in the eight and ninth century (Arab continuum, reflexive ethnocentric premises)640. This category error similars the contemporary amalgamized question on whether or not Muslims will once again fulfil their dreams of a Union and thus pose a threat to the West- or whether Shiites will be able to consolidate their true aspiration of a Shiite Crescent, culturally threatening the Sunni moderates (people and rulers).641 Indeed, it is exactly such logic, which is applied when one poses the question of whether or not Shia will one day transcend the current fluid boundries of the artificial postcolonial Middle East to consolidate their supposed hidden communal agendas. Viewed to this background, one can legitimately ask why the great icons of twentieth century Arab folklore (music)642 such as Um Kulthum643, Abd al-Halim,
Ajami, F., Nasr, V. & Haass, R.N., The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (Panel Meeting, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/emerging-shia-crescentsymposium-implications-us-policy-middle-east-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10866, http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/emerging_shia_cresenct_summary.pdf (Panel Summary, see this format for page reference), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4btGg9yZAE (digitalized). 635 Zemni , 2002, 8-9; Zemni & Parker, 2002, 6. 636 De Smaele, H., De Lokroep van het Essentialisme (The Indolence of Essentialism), Centrum voor Islam in Europa, 2008, http://www.flw.ugent.be/cie/CIE2/desmaele1.htm (accessed on 03/04/2011). The additional title The Indolence of Essentialism does not exist; I have taken the liberty to translate it myself, due to the absence of an English title of this essay. 637 For a good demonstration of the use of a supposed Jewish Continuum (cf. "in Judea and Samaria [the term Israeli right-wingers use for the West Bank], Israelis are not foreign occupiers")in Israeli political discourse (according to the Zionist mythology) see Benjamin Netanyahus to US Congress, May 25, 2011(http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/05/201152512623687256.html) 638 Zemni, 2002, 9. 639 Abrahamian , 2003, 541. 640 Zemni, 2002, 8-9; Hunt, 2002, 416-21. 641 Lustick, 1997, 675-7. 642 Papp, 2005, 173.
634

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Abd al Wahhab, Asmahaan or her brother and bon vivant Farid al-Atrash644, or even Fairuz645, Waida al-Safi and Julia Boutrus646 were not viewed upon and discursed in religious or confessional terms? Interestingly, when we contextualize culture in this way, at the time being, it seemingly did not really matter whether the great Al-Atrash was a Syrian, Druze, cultural Sunni or Shia; neither whether Fairuz was a Christian Maronite or Sunni Muslim.647 Apparantly, the character of the Middle Eastern inhabitant is not as fixed and linear as some scholars assume/propagte; clearly identity (cultural matters) are partly formed and fought over by the political elites and intellectual power groups in society. The apparent fact that identity is so fluxtuous should alert the unbiased observer of the reality that it merely concerns people when we tail of the Orient. Only by scrutinizing history can one understand the very conceptual particularities (propagations) of ones zeitgeist. In this way, scholars are themselves often mere products of their contemporary surroundings (hegemonic discourse). Today, this paradigm of mere impressionism has shifted from Arabs and their Unions to a general belief that Muslims, or better Shiites and Sunnites naturally crave and compete for their Unions of culture, whereby the same superficial questions (i.e. prejudices) only change in form but not in content. Such logic sensationally searches for Middle Eastern leaders who can accomplish spectacular political feats (Islamic Caliphats, Shia Crescents), ignoring the fact that such leaders never existed in Europe or the Americas and that no theory of political amalgamation exists that could justify such an expectation.648 The central element in the discursive framework of certain Islamists, global and Middle Eastern power elites, classical orientalists and constructivist social scientists alike, is their emphasis on the historical sequence of culture (and the fluidity of modern borders) for the explanation and legitimization of an absence or imminence of the reorganization of political space -enlargment of states into Unions- along lines of unifiying collective identity (ethnic, religious, sectarian).649 Such a catergory error subsequently creates a discursive flow of casual misattributions. With regard to the panArab debate these are claims that find, in the failure of efforts to move toward Arab unity, something instructive about the Arab national, the pedigree of Arab nationalism, the unnaturalness of a large Arab state, the absence of visionary leadership.650 A good example here, are (biased) scholars who also make direct comparisons between aspiring Middle Eastern political hegemons and European precedents. Hereby, however, these comparisons use Hitler and Mussolini, not Bismarck and Cavour, as referents; thus, Nasser was a thin-horn Hitler, a Mussolini by the Nile (subjective association).651 The pretention of the fluidity of borders in the Middle East, which are said to be always under pressure; in this manner such scholars ground their disregard for nation-state analyses. Hereby, culture and collective identity are said to challenge and threaten state-centric reality and intergity, as well as their political elites in a supposed dichotomous clash.652 In reality, however, Middle Eastern states are quite strongly engrained geopolitical units, which have become the main framework of reference (political and societal organization) for its inhabitants (Shia, Kurds, Maronites, Mandeans, Druze, Copts etc.) for more than half of a century at least (Mandate period onwards). It is somehow remarkable how scholars outside the Middle East overstate the colonial legacy and tend to be trapped in the notion that the Middle Eastern state is weak; its fragile; its false; it was drawn by colonialists. However, the Middle Eastern state is generally the most central political actor in regional affairs and deserves therefore a crucial focus in any analysis of Middle Eastern political affairs. 653
It took American power to break the state in Iraq. And we did; we broke it completely. We not only conquered and broke the regime, but we then broke the state by breaking up the army and turning the bureaucracy on its its head. But that took American power to do

See for example El Atlal See for example Nagm fi Hayati: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAqGbo1QXPs 645 E.g. Bahibak ya Libnan: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZSfvlzNbvA 646 E.g. Boutrus,J., wayn al malayin: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Phwg_PBAjwo 647 Papp, 2005, 165- 81 648 Lustick, 1997, 677. 649 Ibid., 677-9. 650 Ibid., 678. 651 Lustick, 1997, 676. 652 Lustick, 1997, 678. 653 Gause, 2007, 123; Gregory Gause III in Fouad Ajami, Vali R. Nasr, and Richard N. Haass, The Emerging Shia Crescent Symposium: Implications for the Middle East and US Policy (panel meeting, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 5 June 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10866/emerging_shia_crescent_symposium.html.
643 644

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it. Nowhere else had that happened. Even in the Iranian Revolution was a huge change from below, but the Iranian state preserved.654

Scholarly inadequacy that claims differently often generates self-righteouss distortions that alert the listener of (unique) cultural inadequacy, be it of Arab, Persian, Muslim or Shiite nature. Such logic consequently encompasses the implicit inability of the Other to achieve what the reflexive Us formidably accumulated by and in its own (linear, dichotomous modernization paradigm). 655 Although scholars like Bernard Lewis claim to pretend so, regional history indicates that Arabism, sectarianism or Islamism (Islamic identity) were not always engrained political or popular concerns/realities. When the early 20th century Ottoman Empire was externally and internally weakened and declining nothwithstanding its 19th century modernization reforms (Tanzimat) intiated Sultan Mahmud II- Arab nationalism was on the rise in a dialectic process with the Turkish nationalism of the Young Turks (and with Zionist ideology brought in by Jewish immigrants), thus disfavouring earlier forms of state-centric propagated forms of Ottoman and Islamic identity. This inherently meant a dynamic of taqarrub (rapprochement) between Arab Sunnis and Shiites if sectarian identity even mattered at all- in a larger effort to construct and cement an emerging Arab identity and form a possible future political unit vis--vis Ottoman efforts to re-establish political and ideological cohesion directed from the Ottoman core in Asia Minor (Istanbul). Hereby, it is of course necessary to understand the geopolitical global setting since the Ottoman state did not merely exist by itself and in itself. The contemporary ideological zeitgeist was one similar to the already existing European tradition of nationalist thought during the 19th century and 20th century -this is exactly when Theodor Herzl conceptualized and consolidated his ideas of the Jewish People and the future Jewish State (Der Judenstaat)656.657 For the Ottoman regions it was also a time of extra-regional interference defeat of the new state-builder Muhammad Ali by Brittain, France and Austria, Napoleons invasion of Egypt etc.- in the internal dynamics of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire (The Eastern Question, The Sick Man of Europe). Subsequent to the implosion of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 (World War I and the Turkish War of Independence) the Arab nationalist movement was broken by the fragmentation and a split of the remaining Ottoman Arab lands (Egypt, Sudan, Levant, Syria, Iraq, Arab peninsula), facilitated by the global postWorld War I powers such as France, Brittain and Russia658 (Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916, League of Nations madates 1920, 1922).659 This is a more accurate historical sequence and contextualization; this is why Arabs if it referes to well defined Arab nationalist groups in the late 19th and early 20th century Ottoman Empire- and their political elites (e.g. Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca) did not manage to create an Arab state 660/Union and consolidate their 20th century Arab nationalist ideology -a de facto temporary creation the minds of people. This is where structuralist and post-modern relativist criticism becomes relevant and accurate. This aditionally explains the contemporary popularity of secular pan-Arabism from Nasirist Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s and later from Saddams Baghdad after Saddat peace with Israel- in favour of pan-Islamism (which related more to former Ottomanism); it is all a matter of the coverging history of ideological creations/evolutions and geopolitical settings.661 The exact same goes for the attraction/relevance of sectarianism. As a scholar of Lebanese politics, Richard Augustus Norton pointed out that: the political salience of sectarian identity has varied dramatically over the course of history, not to mention in recent debates. For instance in Iraq and Lebanon, well into the 1960s, Shiite Muslims were quite succesfully politically mobilized by the Communist party. Arab Sunnis and Shiites alike were widely attracted by the pan-Arab ideology Jamal Abd al-Nasir in the 1950s and 1960s.662 It has also been noted that, especially in the case of travel literature and politics, discursive process can always imply an underlying subjective hierarchy indicating a belief of superiority and inferiority. Ervand Abrahamian has demonstrated the
654 655

Ibid.123; Ibid. Lustick, 1997, 675, 678-9. 656 Back then, it still wasnt decided where it would be located: Angola, Argentinas Patagonia were considered; of course British Mandate Palestine would prove to be more fit since it would consolidate the constructed Jewish Continuum. 657 Schindler, 2008, 10-37; Kramer, 1993, 174-188. 658 They declined after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917; the new revolutionary government exposed the Sykes-Picot Agreement to the public. 659 Lustick, 1997, 665. Zeine, 1981, 83-115; Kramer, 1993, 175; Papp, 2005, 10-20. 660 The Nasser-led United Arab republic (UAR) was a short-lived experiment and anomaly (1958-1961). 661 Norton, 2007, 436. 662 Ibid., 436; Kramer,1993, 174-88.

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appearance of such implict forms of superiority within historical diplomatic correspondence of European and American political envoys to Iran. One should take note of the fact that here, it is not the contemporary Shiite Other who is stigmatized when it comes to labeling Iran, but rather the Persian Other. This, once again shows how fluid these perceptions not realities- are and that it is rather about creating a negative stereotype (geopolitics) than any real estimation of culture itself:the US ambassador, showing off his classical education, warned Washington World War II: In our dealings with the Medes and Persians we must always recall that we have to do with a people for whom advantages of the day suffice.663 Such narratives display imperialist and even racist attitudes whereby the impressionistic observations of the few are without reservation generalized to the whole, often inferior or threatening, population.664 Similar to the contemporary discourses regarding the suspicious whereabouts of Shia in the Middle East, the discourse regarding the national character of Persians (race) was at the time also represented within academia and the popular belief: Lord Curzon concluded in his encyclopedic Persia and the Persian Question with the comment that the natives are a suspicious people who tend to see a cloven hoof beneath the skirt of every robe. In the 1950s Ann Lambton (Persian studies) remarked that factionalism, in one form or another, has remained a feature of Persian life down to modern times. 665 The unhistorical flaws in such academic discourses reduce contemporary complexities to the residual category of unchanging national characters (culture). It is clear that every discursive process encompasses the danger of incorporating such essentialis errors, certainly when the author is prejudiced. In fact, one understands that rascism is nothing more than the discursive deceit of actively potraying and propagating groups as fundamentally different from the Us on the basis of false criteria; it is a generated perception that leads to dangerous societal divisions.666 Many such discursed oppositions including menwomen, white-coulered, Muslim vs. heretic- and their popular residu still require extensive revision.667 One should definitely avoid wondering off in centuries, even millennia (cf. Medes) of history (sequence) and culture to explain contemporary politics. I argue that bottom-up realities concerning Shia (national) communities, such as the dynamic of political, social, economic and even cultural emancipation of these groups in certain countries (Iraq, Lebanon) by the turn of the twentieth century should not be ignored nor neglected or underestimated through structural rigorousity; however, they should also not be focused upon exclusively or impressionistically to jump to overstated culturalistic conclusions that generate hard-to-define, essentialized simplisms that pretend to explain 21 st century politics in the Middle East. In a paper entitled Are the Shia Rising?, Maximillian Terhalle comprehensively pointed out that:
Nationalism has proved capable of outweighing religion where the Shias loyalty to the state is concerned. From 1981 to 1988, Shii Iraqi soldiers fought a remorseless war against Iran. in the aftermath of the Kuwait war of 1991, Husseins rule was called into question by Shia (and Kurds alike). They rose against him and were brutally crushed, before the eyes of the United States and, more important here, of Iran. there is no doubt that the Iranian government, while applying formal diplomatic language, blamed its neighbor publicly for the ongoing massacre. The reprisal left between 30,000 and 60,000 thousand Shia dead, saw the bombing of the holy cities like Najaf and Kerbala and included humiliating the old Ayatollah al-Khoi, who was forced to speak on television next to Saddam. However, in the guise of non-interference in internal affairs, Iran did not deploy troops to save the lives of its Shia coreligionists in Iraq (even if SCIRI units moved into Iraq).668

It is thus worthy to note that in a globalized, 21 st century context, such imaginations of Arab, Islamic and Shia Unions do not a priori exist throughout history as always prominent political realities backed by underlying popular aspirations, there to revive without any precondition or a specific geopolitical (state-centric) pretext. Such ideas (ideologies) are in fact actively constructed and propagated by political, communal and clerical actors that enjoy a certain power status within a specifically bounded society at a very specific moment in time, e.g. Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Michel Aflaq, Jamal Abd alNasir, Khomeini, Abdullah II. Rather than spontaneous aspirations of the plebs, these ideas are often circular or instigated to serve the interest of very specific groups within a particular society or within a bound (defined) region/territory. However,

663 664

Khomeinism, 1993, 113. Ibid., 113. 665 Ibid., 113. 666 It should therefore be noted that, in this regard, Orientalism has its counterpart: Occidentalism. This term is used to describe Eastern indivuals (Asian, Arab etc.) who look down on the West and use self-righteous, denigrating rhetoric when tailing of the occidental Other. A now classic and extreme example would be Osama bin Ladens politicized tirade on the Westerners materialism vis--vis the glorification of his own supposedly soulfull, native culture. (cf. Lary, 2006, 9.) 667 Lary, 2006, 9. 668 Terhalle, 2007, 74.

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this does of course not imply that a particular and shared sentiment cannot genuinely be expressed at mass level; the contrary is true, since associations between individuals on the basis of language, culture, history and territory do occur. The argument, however is that these very associations are not a monolith, unified wholes that know external existence by themselves. Such existent expressions (collective identity) are a-priori heterogeneousfrom the perspective of the individual- and can be further inflated/encouraged or deflated by whomever holds power or authority within society. A dialectic relation characterizes this process, but in fact power is still central to explain the very form of the de facto constructed identity, because such power groups within society inevitably determine greatly who/what will represents the imagined reflexive entities within popular consiousness to which national identity is shaped.669 Existing levels of territorialy concentrated ethnic, religious or sectarian associations on the organic level of society are not enough to produce a corresponding state; the very action and role of state-centric power elites (regionally and extra-reagionally) is central to such a processes. In this repect, state-centric elites led by material interest- and their constituens/subjects themselves -i.e. peopleshould constitute the central agency of analysis. There is clear need for a recategorization of the object of explanation vis-vis the culturalistic paradigm.670 It should be pointed out that even certain highly qualitative realist analyses, which primarily start from a state-centric framework (interstate reality) in assessing the Shiite Crescent, ultimately conclude into equally problematic homogeneous conceptions themselves.671 For instance, while advocating the idea of a -to my opinion quite narrow- Arab Cold War, Morten Vallbjorn and Andr Bank denounce the idea of a Shia Crescent but instead argue for a transnational IslamoArabic order: Non-state actors, not upstart republics, now represent the radical challenge and these actors are Islamists. Hence the basic challenge to the present interstate order is not secular, quasi socialist pan-Arabism, but a transnational Islamo-Arabic order.672 Although both seem to recognize Iranian patronge of Hizbullah they do not acknowledge that Hizbullah does not aim to challenge the de facto interstate order/reality itself. Rather, it challenges (Israel and) specific regional states geopolitical alignment by discrediting specific Arab elites. Another scholar that goes by the name of Kayhan Barzegar states a similar idea in an otherwise balanced article, he actively denounces the idea of a threatening Shia Crescent, yet he claims that one should not dispute that there is an ongoing conflict between the Shiites and the Sunnis in the region. He elaborates his idea by stating that this confessional conflict is in fact intra-Arab rivalry. A key reason for him to dismiss a transnational ideological belt at mass level seemingly stems from his conception that Persians and Arabs are culturally different. 673 Although good scholarly insights are contributed, simultaneaously, equally problematic forms of dichotomist thinking generate similar problematic misconceptions and inconsistancies. Whether we question if it is a threat X or threat Y that is challenging state reality, democracy, or moderate Sunni rule in the Middle East, one might seemingly contradict the constructivist paradigm, but in fact, belong to the same hermeneutical field. In such a case, it concerns merely superficial oppositions, whereby both conclusions testify the same modality of thinking and quite similar premises of the debate, whereby one could in fact proof both X and its opposite not X by subjectively applying selective historical, equivalent arguments.674 Comprehensively, when you dismiss the idea of a Shia Crescent but in fact argue slightly different, though conceptually similar ideas, such as a transnational Islamo-Arabic order or an imminent Shiitestan (P. Escobar)675 or even a transnational Shia revival, all start from the same presumption, i.e. the a-priori idea of a cultural threats to the Middle Eastern nation state. In such a logic there is no eye whatsoever for the indivual nor for structural socio-economic contexts; its primarily about essentialist dichotomous oppositions that are further inflated to almost self-sustainable entities. These debates are bound to remain within a larger and similar culturalistic

669 670

Lustisck, 1993, 677-8. Ibid., 675, 679. 671 Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 10 672 Ibid., 10. 673 Barzegar, 2008, 87, 91, 97. 674 Zemni, 2002, 8. 675 Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 119.

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framework of explanation. It can legitimately be argued that it is senseless to debate details without first discussing the presupposed frame.676 Leftist critic and MIT professor Noam Chomsky has put it quite accurately in one of his latest lectures (May 11, 2011) commenting on how expansion of (political and economic) influence is generally depicted (terminology) by todays politicans, media outlets and academics and simultaneously perceived by the general public. He argues that such matters are in fact primarily a simple matter of criteria. Certain words or concepts imply different things according to the definition one attributes to these terms or depending on the context in which they are used, e.g. stability,democracy, influence, destabilizing or stabilizing. At times (pretext), their very use signals moral and philosophical orientations; how one perceives the world and how one envisages the world (ideology). This also leaves the narrative open to considerable ambiguity for the reader to fill in freely. 677 One can thus argue that the use of terminology symbolize a propagation of a possible reality and not the reality, which further implies that such terminology should in fact be applied with great care. Thus, however one wishes to label contemporary sectarian dynamic whilst discussing politics, the very use of sectarian terminology to describe Middle Eastern affairs, by itself, actually signals foremost a indidual perception (of a supposed dichotomous reality), which will generate the application of a specific set of criteria. Micheal Brning demonstrates this in a well-balanced article on the topic:
two explanatory models have recently caused a stir: the first can be summarized in the idea of a Shiite Crescent, the second in that of a Shia Rise or Shia Revival. The two formulations can barely be distinguished and refer ro the same phenomenon. Although the notion of the Shiite crescent developed in the Middle East, while the thesis of the Shia Rise was propagated mainly by US observers, they can be differentiated from one another as little as from the thesis that there is an all-pervasive Sunni-Shiite divide in the region. In sum, all the variants of this theme are based upon a conceptually vague threat analysis. 678

Due to this conceptual vagueness that Brning refers to, the whole notion of the Shia Crescent is actually utterly hard to rationally define. This is due to the the multiple meanings that are attached to the term 1) for referring to Middle Eastern states which have a demographical Shia majority or 2) as a warning to all Arabs of the Persian enemy or 3) as another collective expression for Islamofascists or for the radical Muslim states and groups hostile to US interests in the region. Even in all of these cases the conception is misleading for it actually relates to Iran, which engages key regional countries for the same political, economic and strategic interests in the Greater Middle East (GME).679 I argue that it is here in which its very discurse purpose lies: to tail of everything and in fact, nothing; to seemingly discuss politics but actually stereotype and discriminate certain (domestic) communities and simultaneously label Iran as an irrational aggressor. When this occurs many scholarly attempts represent in fact an intergral part of the consolidation and further propagation of certain conceptions and ideas about reality. 680 The very idea behind the image of a Shiite Crescent or even Shiite Banana according to Ehud Barak- is so sensationalist that some observers have even (informally) ridiculed the application of such simplism to describe contemporary geopolitical affairs and cultural dynamics: Which returns me to the Shiite banana. This opens all sorts of possibilities. Is the banana green, or is it already dangerously ripe? Could Iran turn it into the Shiite banana peel, which would be even more hazardous? And if the Shiites are bananas, what are the Sunnis? Given how varied they are, perhaps theyre a fruit platter; Al Qaeda might be nuts.681 Undefined discursive labels, such as sectarian one like the Shia Crescent should certainly be avoided discussing politics for they consolidate narratives of essentialist logic that amalgamize too many distinctive factors into culturalistic dichotomies. It should be clarified that such criticism does not whatsoever nullify the notions of identity and culture themselves, nor the latters possible value or intrisical importance; on the contrary,

676 677

Abrahamian, 2003, 31. Chomsky, N., The US and its Allies will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in the Arab World, Democracy Now, May 11th 2011, http://www.democracynow.org/2011/5/11/noam_chomsky_the_us_and_its (accessed on 15/05/2011), 55.00 & 57.00. See also: Chomsky, 1987, 256, 266, 268, 269, 271. 678 Brning, 2008, 60. 679 Luomi, 2008, 24. 680 Zemni, 2002, 8. 681 Kramer, M.; I quote him as a matter of mere witfull demonstration, I do not whatsoever associate myself with the content of the article or the political orientation of the author, nor do I interpret this source as a viable, academic one. (http://sandbox.blogcity.com/the_shiite_banana.htm) (last accessed 20/05/2011).

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I actively recognize culture since it is an inevitable and universal cognitive process of group expression 682- but not in the sense of pejorative uniqueness as a mere reactionary, dichotomous and highly politicized interpretation as if the Other can only have one single identity in opposition or considation what defines mine. Identity is in fact an ungraspable and even controversial notion; it is avolatile concept which needs to be reworked and, if not discarded, at least used in the plural and put into quotation marks. This becomes even more problematic when complex cultural features and societal phenomena e.g. the 2003 Ashura processions in Iraq- are boiled down into simple essences which are subsequently put into an artificial politico-cultural opposition and graded in superiority (democratic-autocratic, moderate-radical). In its perversive sense, culture, as a feature of civilization/modernity (subjective norms) is not whatsoever a usefull unit for the analysis of international politics.683 Clearly, the premiss of an all-pervasive politico-religious conflict or stuggle between Sunni and Shia in the Middle East is not an a-priori, neutral logic. It is rather a politically motivated way of looking at things. Such a framework contrasts ones that start from human universalism (cf. 1.3.3, 2.4).684 Slavoj Zizek puts its accurately when he points out that within politicized debates concerning us and them it is its barbarian Other that is perceived as essentialist and thereby false, like fundamentalism, which naturalizes or essentializes historically conditioned contigent traits. 685 If we choose culture as the sole or central object without attributing a key role to human agency-, ones scrutiny reflects a very specific way of thinking, which is often far fetched from actual contemporary societal and political reality. Those who pretend that structural sectarianism Sunnism vs. Shiism as some kind of backward and traditionalist struggle- is in and by itself a central incentive for conflict and tensions within the Middle East, actually demonstrate a prejudiced and even Western-centric logic that is typical for the well-known modernizational framework; We the (developed) vs. Them (underdevolopped). Ilan Papp critically illustrates that ideas of superiority and inferiority are still widely represented in the general scholarly discourse:
From within this perspective, the transition has not been completed because the area has not gone through all the modernization stages necessary for a society to become Western or modern. As it is, all Western and multinational media refere to the West as the developed world and to large parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America as the developing world, i.e., still in transition. With regard to the Middle East, this dichotomy goes along religious, sectarian, gender and geographical lines. Christians and Jews are regarded as more developed than Muslims, the town is described as more developed than the countryside, and within each category women as developing rather than developed 686

Even if one claims to methodologically adhere to this framework, modernization thought itself was more an ideology than a reality.687 It can be said that such persistent discourses are often mere neo-colonial narrations that perpetuate and thus monopolize knowledge.688 There is great need to move beyond this essentialist and culturalist tendency in order to broaden the spectre of anaylisis and move beyond disciplinary rigorousity supposed methodological monopolies are simple elusive. One cannot merely inquiry their culture (pan-Arabism, Islam, Shiism, Sunnism) on itself detached from any human agency (individual) or (social or political) context if one aspires to analyse contemporary politics. A good analytical balance comes down to a broadly informed paradigm; one should attribute people as the central agent (humanity & individual) to any cultural expression or social occurrence.689 Revisionist scholars such as Ilan Papp argue that although Middle Eastern scholars have already made substantial efforts to distance themselves form traditional modernist thinking by deconstructing previous scholarship and frameworks (methodological improvements), when it comes to a reconstructive effort, we are only at the beginning of our enterprise.690 Interestingly, Papp also claims that hereby, the main scholarly difficulty does not merely stem from methodological problems but, at the bottom, he argues it to be an ideological issue. He believes that the discussion rather stems from the question of whom we invistigate (ideology) and not on how we investigate

682 683

Seaton, 2009, 154-6 . Abrahamian, 2003, 530-1; Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 118. 684 Broning, 2008, 60. 685 Zizek, 2008, 666. 686 Papp, 2005, 4 .687 Ibid., 8. 688 Ibid. 9, 11-2. 689 Papp, 2005, 9, 11-2. 690 Ibid., 1.

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(methodology). As such, he recognizes the possibility that even the academics approach even with the appropriate methodology- might a-priori be highly subjective due to ideological setting of his societal surrounding, or simply because of his own ideological conviction.691692 This exactly why Jonathan Isacoff encourages scholars to first identify the (competing) school of thought of the authors that are used (quasi-triangulation) before looking for facts or (contested) details; indeed, some scholars are Marxists, some materialists, some constructivists, and so forth.693 Some even go further than Papp, such as Leftist critic and renowned linguist Noam Chomsky who even questions the very need for and status of IR theory/methodology itself. He argues that there is nothing in the social sciences or history that even merits the notion of theory. Therefore, politics and world affairs are claimed to be trivial and perfectly comprehendable to anyone who harbours the will to investigate (ideology).694 Although Foucaults school of criticism is different from that of Marxist theorists such as Chomsky, Said and Zizek they further debate deep moral differences (justice, struggle) without pretending an elusive scholarly neutrality/objectivity- they do all link discourse to power (human, central agency) and all fundamentally recognize that every scholar applies a certain ideological setting when scrutinizing a certain topic.695 Rather than an a priori reality (threat), the perception of sectarianism is an ideological premiss, even within academic discourses. That is why there is no need for any discipline to claim a scholarly (methodological) monopoly on the objects of Islam, the Middle East and its inhabitants; an open-minded (unbiased) and multi-disciplinary synthesis is what is needed to avoid generating scholarly discourses that end up forming integral part of the top-down instigation of the culturalistic logic (sectarianism).

2.4 The Shia Crescents Pretext: In legacy of Huntington, Bush Jr. and EU Mythology - Islam vs. West
One can legititmately inquire for a pretext for Middle Eastern leaders, clerics and media outlets to narrate in such a dichotomous and flagrantly essentialist manner. Folowing the September 11 attacks in New York (2001), the accelerating political integration efforts of the European Union and the latest global economic recessions (2000s), reflexive Othering on the basis of a supposed fixed cultural group identity has become a widely spread phenomenon in both the political discourse and the popular consciousness around the globe. This is partly due to the dichotomous propagted war on terrorism and the US policy of either you are with us or against us.696 Simultaneously, the intstitutions that today make up the European Union have been promoting a homogeneous European identity as part of the West, which is based on the democratic values of a supposedly unique and linear European history (enlighment). This European mythological project which has been championed and enlarged by numerous right-wing and populist politicians697 all over the EU- is propagtated for the sake of easing public and political anxiety regarding the pace and uncertain consequences of rapid political and economic union.698 As is the case in the US, also here, a dichotomous cultural paradigm was erected for achieving specific political and economic goals. These trends have only reinforced themselves when the global recessions kicked in the early and late 2000s. Within such dualist paradigms, organic (actors) and supposed incompatible (clashing) cultures and societes have been put in direct and inevitable opposition to eachother. It can legitimately be argued that this has partly occurred for the sake of self-idealization, that is, the creation of a supposed unique identity and an exclusive mythos to underscore the industrialized worlds material achievements. One can attribute this as a clear sociological phenomenon whereby the previous colonial states - i.e. the current imperalist nations- face the problem of the need to redifine themselves in terms of the new ethnicities created by the influx of peoples from the erstwhile colonial margins.699 With regard to the EU, the construction of exclusivist forms of European identity among the people of the Union is needed as the societal ground for
691 692

Ibid., 8, 9, 11-2. Zizek, 2008, 682. 693 Isacoff, 2005, 72-3, 83. 694 Laffey, 2003, 599, 601. 695 Said, 2001, 195-217. 696 Amir-Yusefi, 2009, 124 697 E.g. Geert Wilders. 698 Zemni & Parker, 2002, 1. 699 Ashcroft, 2007, 175.

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the liberal economic and political projects to succeed and accelerate in pace. Hereby, hegemonic discourses (European identity) have embarked on a discriminatory monologue versus a schapegoat: Islam, Muslims and generally migrant communties in several EU nation-states. Withing this dynamic such communities are implicitly and at times even explicitlyconsidered to be alien vis--vis the new politically propagated common denominator of identity (hegemonic discourse). World War II and its known atrocities might seem a historical anomaly to some of the EU evangelists, but reflection upon them has, in my opinion, become once again extremely relevant. With a keen sense of history, the sharp-minded Ervard Abrahamian has succeeded in comprehensively pointing out that:
Huntingtons underlying premises were reminiscent of 19 th century social Darwinism especially the fear for the Other, of Barbarians at the Gate, and of non-European hordes threatening the West. In his depiction of the USA as a vulnerable cleft country, Huntington inadvertently categorised Americans of African and Spanish origins as outside Western civilisation even though they may have lived in the West for over 300 years. Huntington seems to have rebottled 19 th century fears the Browns, Yellow and Black Perils- into the Islamic, Sinic, Hindu and African civilizations.700

Similar to the Middle Eastern example of Jordan (cf. Shia Visibily, 2.2), economic and political logic (interest) are nowadays only thinly veiled with similarly xenophobic rhetoric and manifestations of the discrimination of (post-)migratory communties; mostly minorities from a wide-range of countries, amalgamized into a homoginized and culturally inferior group, identified as Muslims, whom, surely and clearly, the traditional European Us is not. The tangible downside of this identity experiment for a humanist point of view, that is- is the backlash of (increasingly institutionalized) discrimination in the US and in nation-states that make up the European Union, which are all the supposed exclusive locus of this highly imagined (reflixe) purely Western and enlightened civilization.701 Such discourses, have no interest whatsoever for the indivual actor in society nor for any structural contemporary and historical socio-economic contexts (e.g. cheaply imported labour forces, economic migration, societal deprivation/marginalization). Instead an abstract notion of Islam is being bombarded as the presumed all-inclusive actor on the societal and political stage. This all-pervasive cultural system (Islam) is subsequently stated to generate a-priori undemocratie behaviour among its adherents who simply cannot integrate into the local cultural sphere due to the supposed structural weight and rigour of their backward ideology (and character), which is for instance said to clearly contrast the individualism attributed to European attitudes.702 Both in the US, Europe and the Middle has the culturalist paradigm been favoured to explain complex societal and political phenomena.703
When a Belgian man is accused of beating his spouse, he is negatively judged by society. His violence is seen as a personal flaw. People try to understand his behaviour by looking for reasons that could account for it. Maybe he was himself a beaten child, maybe the family had financial problems, etc. When a person from Muslim background is accused of the same thing, however, this contextualization disappears. The beating of a wife is explained through Islam, and reference can always be made to one or the other Koranic verse that proves the deterministic relation between religion and the specific action. The difference in approach is very important for the European self-image. 704

Such politically led societal prejudices are propagated to cover up structural problems of socio-economic nature; they are in fact typical byproducts of a modern capitalist world. Today, neoliberal political agendas ride the wave of xenophobia to press through structural asocial reforms (EU) and specific foreign policy strategies (interventionism a.o.). It is indeed quite ignorant to state that some (them, Muslims, Shiites) are entirely ruled by culture, totally determined by the lifeworld into which they were born (static), while others (e.g. enlightened Westeners, Sunni moderates) merely enjoy their culture, since only they are fully consiouss beings that act/behave rationally. Slavoj Zizek interprets such top-down simplistic and dichotomous propagations as typical byproducts of neoliberal political policy and its economic logic; it is the veil that is used to divert the populations of what actually occurs (war, economic neo-colonialism, imperialism etc.).705 Interestingly,

700 701

Abraham, 2003, 530. Zemni& Parker, 2002, 1-6, 8-9. 702 Ibid. 5 703 Ibid. 4, 5; Abrahamian, 2003, 538 704 Zemni& Parker, 2002, 5 705 Zizek, 2008, 661; Broning, 74

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during the recent Greek austerity measures and the EU and IMF bailoutplans for the country in mid 2011, new stereotypes were even created EU member state populations, namely of Greeks706 (e.g. lazy). This occurred most vocally in Holland.707 The parallels that can be found between the general Islamophobic narratives in Europe and the advocation of an imminent Shiite danger in Middle Eastern political discourse (Arab sphere) are strikingly substiantial. They both seem to fit in the same greater culturalistic framework. Although human agency is not as neglected as in the highly culturized West versus Islam debate, there is still a strong suppression of the indivual actor (pluralism) and his or her local socio-economic reality in the Middle Eastern narrative. Whereas Shiites are propagated as being unloyal to the state in the Arab world, there is often speculations about the loyalty of foreign communities in European nation-states. A supposedly uniform transnational Shiite politico-cultural system is still portrayed as the primary incentive for Shiites behaviour preferably revolutionary, politically active and Iranian oriented- throughout the various states that make up the Middle East. The post-Saddam culturalist paradigm led and instigated by a politicized depiction of the Shiite Other- generates equally problematic political and cultural images of both the Shiite doctrine and its followers as they do of Islam and Muslims in Europe. While minorities in Europe are being discriminated against be it through post-Enlightenment romanticism of the nation by local far right political parties or more implicitly by the general self-idealizing discourse culminating around the European civilization for being culturally different (Otherness) and problematic for integration708, minorities in Middle Eastern countries, such as Shiites and Ismailis in Saudi Arabia, are equally stigmatized as they are labelled as forming part of a homogeneous Shiite Other that is supposedly becoming an increasing transnational threat to authentic and traditional Sunni identity of these countries. This cultural threat and its predetermined actors are depicted as being secretely politically loyal to the Shiite core, perceived as Iran. The whole debate regarding the supposed problematic integration of the Muslim Other in European cultural is equally biased since the very premises of such questionaries are in fact highly politically constructed and politically contested.709 Peculiarly and even alarmingly, the dominant narrative in Europe actively inquires the compatibility of European Muslims (i.e. post-migratory European citizens) with democracy. Indeed, Said might have smiled wryly: We simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple, agreed-upon concepts that one either does or does not find like Easter eggs in the living room. 710 Questions of loyalty to the nation-state and its culture in both the Middle East and the Western political sphere (EU, US) can be interpreted as repressive political stagings since it is a matter of (subjective) criteria attached to them. Political elites in the Middle East have clearly embarked on equally narrow propagations of national and regional identity. When it comes to these advocates (in power), there is seemingly no space for pluralism as regards the already contested notion of identity/culture. Moreover, this very trend indicates a political project (of material interests). The creation of a new Arab identity -defined as a non-Shiite, Sunni one- serves as a subtle state-building effort and power base expansion of key Arab countries regional influence in a post-Bathi (Iraq) context. This psychological effort is needed to divert the publics attention from structural problems (e.g. rentier-state organization, post-war migration) and to alienate the regional public from Irans power ascendance and increasing regional influence (project). This discourse effectively endeavours to cast Iran out of the Arab sphere of politics as a Persian and Shia alien and expansionist aggressor. Just as the rumours of Middle Eastern Shiite proselytism and a regional Shia Crescent appeared in Arab media, higly distortive cultural narratives (Islamophobia) have numerously appeared in European media.711 Whereas the European debate of xenophobia often culminated around Turkey (as a supposed nation of culturalluy different Muslims) the Shia Crescent theory implicitly refers to Irans cultural incompatibility for economic mergence with the Middle Eastern region. Turkey is excluded both physically (politics) and mentally (e.g. op-ed articles in media outles) from

706 707

Greece is of course particularly important in EU mythology, so this makes the trend even more meaningfull. Irini Toufexes, Grieken zijn niet Lui, Radio1 (NOS), May 24th 2011, http://www.radio1.nl/contents/31037-grieken-zijn-niet-lui (accessed on 15/05/2011), 1.24. 708 Zemni & Parker, 2002, 3, 4, 6. 709 Ibid. 4, 5 710 Lary, 2006,7. 711 De Smaele, H., De Lokroep van het Essentialisme (The Indolence of Essentialism), Centrum voor Islam in Europa, 2008, http://www.flw.ugent.be/cie/CIE2/desmaele1.htm (accessed on 03/04/2011).

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the European Union and its supposed cultural sphere for allegedly being fundamentally different from European identity. 712 By advocating this culturalistic narrative, key Arab powerhouses simultaneously effort to bloc Irans political engagement (penetration) into the interstate Arab sub-region to safeguard their own hegemonic political and ecomical aspirations as leading states in the post-2003 order. Although an Arab Union (economic regionalism) does not (yet) exist; for the time being OPEC shares and partnerships can be gained. As the artificial opposition between Europe and Islam serves as a functional narrative to boost the European identity serving as a basis for accelerating European political integration efforts and liberal reform713, the anti-Shiite discourse renders the anti-Iranian states a teleological basis -i.e. under the veil of defending and upholding Arab and Sunni historical supremacy- for their domestic political legitimation -ongoing autocratic rule- and their subtle alignment to the US, Israel and certain EU memberstates. In fact, this narrative thus merely efforts to re-establish Irans pre-2003 regional containment. The entire culturalistic dynamic within both Middle Eastern and Western politics can additionally be framed within a general global tendency of post-politics (contex), whereby the top-down culturalist inflation simultaneously (and increasingly) occurs to structural (post-Cold War) backdrop of inactive citizenship and accumulating ignorance and social apathy among the general public (e.g. blind invidualistic consumerism). 714 This trend of a retreat of political and intellectual life signals an alarming dynamic whereby politics itself is no longer utilized as a societal domain for progressive change and for debating clearly defined political and societal problems. 715 The keen Slavoj Zizek contemplates:
Why are so many problems today perceived as problems of intolerance, not as problems of inequality, exploitation, injustice? Why is the proposed remedy tolerance, not emancipation, political struggle, even armed struggle? The immediate answer is the liberal multiculturalists basic ideological operation: the culturalization of politics. Political differences, differences conditioned by political inequality, economic exploitation, and so on, are naturalized and neutralized into cultural differences, different ways of life, which are something given, something that cannot be overcome, but must be merely tolerated. To this, of course, one should answer in Benjaminian terms: from culturalization of politics to politicization of culture. The cause of the culturalization is the retreat and failure of direct political solutions 716

The same simplistic public discourses that cage heterogenous Muslims into fixed communitarian categories (cages) in Europe and other parts of the industrialized world717, exist in the Middle East, where highly diverse communities are being reduced to homogeneous essentialisms (e.g. Shia) by specific state-centric elites (Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran) for the very purpose of consolidating their geopolitical interests. These discourses present the lowest common denominator of highly diverse groups as their main character. Indeed, by addressing events in the Middle East solely and narrowly through the lens of sectarianism, one ceases to speak of any defined problems that actually exist and persist in and between several Middle Eastern states: mass unemployement among the youth, massive refugees flows 718, the lack of social security systems, appropriate health care and education, the absence of progressive economic regionalism 719 to tackle undiversified static economic activity720, social problems in war-thorn countries such as Lebanon, Iraq and Iran, state repression (of political opposition), flagrant violations of human rights, the ongoing occupation and dehumanization of the Palestinians people inside Gaza, the West-Bank and Israel proper, ongoing extra-regional aggressive imperialist interventionism (1990, 2003), womens rights etc. Moreover, the use of such image forming terminology/rhetoric of transregional nature is key to comprehensive insight for it vividly demonstrates the contemporary interconnections between higly strategic regions (US-Middle East721, EU-Meditarranean)722 and geopolitical events (9/11, First Gulf War, 2003 Iraq War) and the subsequent appearance (role) of

712 713

Zemni & Parker , 2002, 2 Ibid. 1, 6 714 Zemni, 2002, 1, 2 6. 715 Zizek, 2008, 660 716 Ibid. 660 717 Sami Zemni & Parker, 7 718 Most recently after the political unrest and violence crackdowns in Syria; see: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/06/201169131651223112.html 719 It is, for instance, quite absurd that Morocco feeds solely on the EU commercial opportunities for its economic growth while still maintaining a closed-border policy with its direct Algerian neighbour. 720 Gulf rentier economies are the best example of this 721 The relationship between Hilary Clinton and the Bahraini Al-Khalifa family or other royal houses, such as those of Jordan and Saudi Arabia would serve as appropriate examples. 722 The relationship between Khaddafi and Berlusconi or Sarkozy and Ben Ali would serve as appropriate examples.

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certain political discourses of reflexive and alienating culturalistic exclusions and inclusions, e.g. Bush and Blair their War on Terror, Huntingtons Clash of Civilizations.723 As a global power, the US has a long tradition of creating sensationalist threat images of its geopolitical adversaries. During the Cold War, it was of course the alleged transnational communist threat 724, whereby a diverse set of political and societal actors around the globe -and, symbolically, also within the US itself- were homogenezid to a single Moscow-lead (core) movement threatening the US both politically and, so it was claimed, also culturally. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s there was a political urge to define Islam as an inherently anti-democratic force and as Americas new global enemy. Hereby, Islamic fundamentalism was projected as a diametrically opposed cult to a supposed JudeoChristian and secular universe725 of the West. It was argued that this threat was a de facto authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-secular cultural phenomenon, i.e. a movement inherently as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist and Nazi movements of the past. As such, the Green Peril theory slowly emerged during the 1990s and was increasingly used to explain diverse and unrelated events throughout the Middle East and the wider globe. 726 It was in this era that renowned US academic Bernard Lewis laid they very foundations for Huntingtons more recent and more famous Foreign Affairs article entitled the The Clash of Civilizations? (1993).727 It was Lewis who first (1990) spoke in an otherwise fairly informative and balanced article- of an imminent clash of civilizations between the two great traditions of Islam and JudeoChristianity. His theory was quickly picked up in US policy circles. 728 Since the events of 9/11 this impressionistic and rather simplistic narrative (Islamic terrorism, Islamo-Fascists, Axis of Evil, Global Enemy, weapons of mass destruction etc.) only gained more prominence. Neo-conservatives such as Margaret Thatcher, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney are renowned advocates of such a culturalistic discourses; a worrisome evolution because such views persistenly reflect the most powerful strand of modern conservatism in the West and are taken seriously by neo-conservatives.729 Prior to 9/11, the US administration depicted Shia Islam as dangerous and fanatic due the 1979 Iranian Revolution -without of course referring to any structural context, e.g. the Shahs brutal regime and their own involvement in facilitating this repression (SAVAK). Simultaneaously, they tolerated i.e. did not mention- militant Sunnism since they had been their allies against the Communist threat in Afghanistan (Soviet invasion). After 9/11, however, for a short while all Muslims were labelled as extremist adherent of an evil cult. When the knowledge spread that the September 11 attacks were mainly carried out by Saudi citizens the problem, so it was advocated, was Sunni extremism in Afghanistan. After the recent US invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, Iraqi Shia were initially propagated by the US as moderates, that is, as potential allies in their democratisation effort. However, when dynamics in Iraq an Afghanistan exceeded US control and Iran seemed to be benifitting from the US enforced altered geopolitical landscape, a supposed global Shia was again the problem according to US neo-conservatives (and autocratic Arab regimes). Conveniently, Irans nuclear agenda was said to be the example for the typical attributes of US political antagonists- the countrys/Shiisms irrationality and unrestrained, warmongering strife for hegemony. Subsequently, the geopolitical image of an expansionist wave, of a Shia take-over started circulating. It is thus clear that such distortive discourses are related to power processes; the Shia Crescent theory fits perfectly within the tradtion of political imageries generated by the US and its Middle Eastern allies. Keen observers have, however, rationally remarked that such perceptions say little about the situation in the region but it does say something about the interests of its advocates.730 The US tradition of using Islamic labels in discursing its geopolitical adversary has indeed quite a long tradition in retrospect. In a speech delivered on April, 1986, US president Ronald Reagan publically discursed colonel Khaddafi as a madd dogg of

De Ley, H., The Danish Cartoons: Contextualizing their Publication and the Muslim Response to it, Centrum voor Islam in Europa (2006), http://www.flw.ugent.be/cie/CIE2/deley36.htm#n12 (accessed on 02/03/2011). 724 Chomsky, 2007, Turning, 271. 725 The same arguments are heared in Europe contrasting the Muslim immigrant. 726 Ehteshami, 2007, 160-1. 727 Published in response to Francis Fukuyamas publication entitled The End of History and the Last Man (1992) 728 Ehteshami, 2007, 161 729 Ibid. 161, 162 730 Broning, 2008, 74; Jabar, 2003, 13
723

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the Middle East which has a goal of a world revolution; a Muslim fundamentalist revolution.731 Interestingly, the same mad doggs hand was kissed by Italys prime minister Silvio Berlusconi in the 2000s when bussiness ties were established between the two Mediterranean countries.732 Also french president Sarkozy was seen given this madd and irrational fundamentalis a full-honour reception at the Elyse Palace in Paris when Lybia became the EUs third largest crude oil supplier, overtaking Saudi Arabias position.733 Today, similar attributes are applied to Iran, the supposed Shia core that is allegdly planning a transnational Shiite fundamentalist revolution (and conversion-campaign) in the Middle East and whos political leaders are surely thought to be irrational and warmongering. It has been pointed out that the US media like is the case in the Middle East- has its discursive controversies. Observers have interestingly pointed out that mainstream 734 media in the US automatically, implicitly and unanimously adopted Huntingtons paradigm to explain September 11; in many ways a strongly geopolitical735 event. Through simplistic op-ed articles and headlines titles, the US media like in the Arab countries- helped to create and consolidate (a previously contested) culturalistic perception of dichotomy and imminent threat, e.g.:
Yes this is about Islam, This is a religious war, Jihad 101, The one true faith, Dictates of faith, Defusing the holy bomb, Barbarians at the gates, The force of Islam, Divine inspiration, The core of Muslim rage, Dreams of holy war, Mosque and state, Word for word: Islams argument, The deep intellectual roots of Islamic rage, The age of Muslim wars, A head-on collision of alien cultures, Feverish protests against the West, How Islam and politics mixed, Survey of the Islamic World, Faith and the secular state, A business plan for Islam Inc., Hair as a battlefield for the soul, How Islam won, and lost the lead in science, and Two views: can the Koran condone terror? 736

At the time being, some renowned scholars such as Edward said wrote that the reductive and vulgar notion of clash of civilizations had taken over thought and action.737 However, back then, such critical voices denouncing the absurd analytical paradigm were rather the exception to rule in comparison with the culturalistic pulp that was being produced at an accelerating pace. Before 9/11 there was not much credit for Huntington from the intellectual community, but after the events his book symbolically, without the questionmark- became an instant bestseller. The same goes for the Koran too. Since 9/11 there has clearly emerged a general tendency in the US media to favour a certain paradigm of analysis, which then elevates itself to some sort of common sense approach, as a supposed uncontroversial logic. Apparently, there were even some US Corporations (Netscape) who offered their clients (internet surfers) free copies of Huningtons Clash of Civilizations.738 Since the early 2000s, Saids Orientalist critique has again become utterly relevant. Today, geopolitics are veiled in cultural terms easily graspable for the general public. The surreal level of this culturalist framework that has come to dominate political and scholarly rationale is demonstrated best by the fact that it absurdly claims to instantaneously comprehend all behaviour and political actions from Morrocco to Indonesia; a geography containing 26 different states and at least 10 major national groups. A larger generalization is hard to think of. On the other hand, this framework of essentialist simplism clearly fails to explain the attitudes of Muslims in Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and, of course, Iraqi Kurdistan. Clearly, the narrow prism of religion and sectarianism (culture) does not suffice to explain why Iran favours Russia against Chechnya, Armenia against Azerbaijan, and India against Pakistan.739 740 Consequently, it becomes clear that one can detect a general tradition of a variety of simplistic culturalistic threat images within the geopolitical discourse. The Shia Crescent theory fits perfectly in this tradition of such essentialist propagation; it can thus be argued that it is the most recent (altered) product of the global dynamic. As a matter of conclusion, I would like
731

Ronald Reagen, April 9, 1986 in Empire (Marwan Bishara), Aljazeera (title Lybia?), 03.00-3.20 (http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/empire/2011/05/201151971653124693.html) 732 Ibid. 23.40->26.00 & 6.40->7.00 733 Ibid. 07.36->07.50 734 By mainstream media he means quality newspapaers and journals read by the American literari and intelligentsia, whom political scientists would describe as the attentive public. Abrahamian, 2003, 530. 735 A more accurate and recent, geoopolitical continuum was constructed by experienced oberservers: Within hours of the collapse of the Twin Towers, Robert Fisk wrote in the Independent: So it has come to this. The entire modern history of the Middle East, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Balfour declaration, Lawrence of Arabias lies, the Arab revolt, the foundation of the state of Israel, four Arab-Israeli wars and the 34 yers of Israels brutal occupation of Arab land Some of us warned of the explosions to come. But we never dreamt this nightmare. Bron: Abrahamian, 2003, 537 736 Ibid. 531 737 Said, E., quoted in Abraham., 2003, 534. 738 Abraham. 2003, 534, 529 739 Ibid. 534, 535 740 Ibid., 541

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to refer to Barack Obamas famously dilivered speech in the city of Cairo on June 2009. Hereby, the head of state efforted to alter the official culturalistic discourse earlier instigated by the Bush administration. Based on the official text released by the White House and published on the website of the NewYorkTimes741 on June 4, 2009, one can clearly detect this shift since the president literally states: America is not and never will be at war with Islam. We will, however, relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat to our security. Islam is not part of the problem in combating violent extremism.742 Further on, he implicitly acknowledges the flagrant simplicity incorporated in the former neo-conservative political rhetoric, by dismissing its discriminatory flaws and through the recognition of cultural heterogeneity and pluralism with regard to vastly discursed object/subjects, i.e. Islam and Muslims:
America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings. So long as our relationship is defined by our differences, we will empower those who sow hatred rather than peace, and who promote conflict rather than the cooperation that can help all of our people achieve justice and prosperity. This cycle of suspicion and discord must end. 743 The richness of religious diversity must be upheld whether it is for Maronites in Lebanon or the Copts in Egypt. And fault lines must be closed among Muslims as well, as the divisions between Sunni and Shia have led to tragic violence, particularly in Iraq. 744

Hereby, he even alludes to the aformentioned (cf. Zizek, 1.3.3) fundamental notion of universality; i.e. of humanitys equality. Moreover, he actively distinguishes between two conceptual realities; the individual (expression of culture) and the constructed often phantasmagoric- collective, hereby immediately signaling the danger of discriminating the individual Other and affiliated nation-bound minorities (e.g. American Muslims). Moreover, he implicitly dismisses claims of transnational loyalty e.g. those made by Egyptian presdident Mubarak- by explicitly refering to the need of legal protection (rule of law) and by emphasizing both the reality and mutual importance of the notion of citizenship:
I know, too, that Islam has always been a part of America's story. And since our founding, American Muslims have enriched the United States. They have fought in our wars, served in government, stood for civil rights, started businesses, taught at our Universities, excelled in our sports arenas, won Nobel Prizes, built our tallest building, and lit the Olympic Torch. And when the first Muslim-American was recently elected to Congress, he took the oath to defend our Constitution using the same Holy Koran that one of our Founding Fathers Thomas Jefferson kept in his personal library. I consider it part of my responsibility as President of the United States to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear. Moreover, freedom in America is indivisible from the freedom to practice one's religion. That is why there is a mosque in every state of our union, and over 1,200 mosques within our borders. That is why the US government has gone to court to protect the right of women and girls to wear the hijab, and to punish those who would deny it. So let there be no doubt: Islam is a part of America.745 it is important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practicing religion as they see fit for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear. We cannot disguise hostility towards any religion behind the pretence of liberalism.746 These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity. Of course, recognizing our common humanity is only the beginning of our task. I believe that America holds within her the truth that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all of us share common aspirations to live in peace and security; to get an education and to work with dignity; to love our families, our communities, and our God. These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity. 747

These are remarkable words and signal progressive political thinking, however, it should nevertheless be noted that also he resorts (inconsistency) into questionable culturalistic homogenizations, i.e. superficial essentialisms be it in their soft and seemingly more positive sense- since, also he, actively efforts to set a political and cultural image (subjective discourse) through his propagation of a more material (Liberal) worldview (cf. oppositions between the United States and Muslims, its what brought me here etc.):
We meet at a time of tension between the United States and Muslims around the world tension rooted in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate. The relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of co-existence and cooperation, but also conflict and religious wars. Moreover, the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalization led many Muslims to view the West as hostile to the traditions of Islam. I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world 748 America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural and historical ties749 So I have known Islam on three continents before coming to the region where it was first revealed. That experience guides my conviction that partnership between America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what

741 742

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=1 Obama, B. 3 van 8 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=3 743 Ibid., 1 van 8 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=1 744 Ibid 6 van 8 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=6 745 Ibid. 2 van 8, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=2 746 Ibid 7 van 8 747 Ibid 2 van 8, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=2 748 Ibid 1 van 8 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=1 749 Ibid 4 van 8, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=4

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it isn't.750 It's a belief that pulsed in the cradle of civilization, and that still beats in the heart of billions. It's a faith in other people, and it's what brought me here today.751

Ultimately, one could ask the same question with regard to Obamas speech in Cairo as of the discourses advocating a Middle Eastern Shiite Crescent, namely, how does one interprete an occurrence where the head of state of the most powerful country in the world (speaker) 752 addresses local, regional and global masses (listeners) 753 in a key geostrategic region of the world more precisely, the most populated city of the Arab world, just West of the Suez Canal and Israel- while litteraly initiating his very narrative on universality and equality with the words I am 754 a Christian.755 Is this a mere expression of identity or does such political rhetoric imply a policy strategy; does it concern geopolitics of religion? Well, bearing in mind that the USs actual material policy still entails occupying two countries in the GME and funding Israel to actively exert its military supremacy (and occupation) regionally, I begg to argue that the modern post-Cold War dynamic, in which political actors particularly started instrumentilizing various religious labels and identities for their consolidation of their geostrategic interests, is far from over; the discursive top-down mechanism of religious and sectarian Othering is until this very day- still vividly applied as a geopolitical toolof course, sometimes more subtle than in other occasions- serving specific material agendas, both in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.756

750 751

Ibid 2 van 8, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=2 Ibid 8 van 8, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=8 752 Ashcroft, 2007, 62 753 Ibid. 754 Then maybe it is still about race too. A recent and bizarre media report entitled Obama to discover ancestral roots in Ireland indicated that Barack Obama, the US president, has arrived in Ireland to kick off a six-day European tour, that will begin with a visit to a town home to his maternal great-great-great-grandfather. Is this a political propaganda stunt; more politics of identity? I would argue so. Bron: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/05/20115238285648868.html 755 OBAMA, 1 of 8 756 Not implying a dismissal or misestimation of Barack Obamas entire speech; I wish to make a totally distinctive point.

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CONCLUSION: Regional Interstate Competition for Hegemony & Sectarian Othering

Since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, there has clearly surfaced a geopolitical powerplay between two hegemonic state contenders in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both have striven to reshape the regional power balance in favour of their respective stragic interests after the USs annihilation of Iraqs relative power. This key event generated a regional redistribution of Baghdads relative power along highly competitive lines, due to the fact that there is no informal regional interstate equilibrium or any implicit normative framework for power redistribution/transmittion. This is quite typical for a region with such a marginal degree of economic intergration. All the major political contenders in the Middle East engage eachother in a full fledge bid for narrow hegemony. The US-led invasions of both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) and their subsequent anti-US insurgencies- have not only decontained Iran but they have also led to a decrease of the USs grip on regional affairs in favour of more independent geopolitical manouvering from behalf of both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Since each of these state actors has perceived the expansion of regional influence of the other as a direct loss of its own relative power, their geopolitical opposition has evolved to be very a direct, dialectic and consistent one over time. Rather than kingpins in a supposed full-fledged Sunni-Shia divide these two states have been competing along state-centric logic over key interest zones such as Iraq (OPEC) through manipulation of/alliance with the newly emerging political class in Badgadand Levantine (Palestinian, Lebanese) affairs, which have always been a symbolic asset for regional contenders (Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey etc.). In this view, poltical descision making, sectarian rhetoric, and intens regional antagonism can legitimately be framed (neorealism) in a context of structural geopolitical dynamics (power cycle theory) in a Post-Cold War Middle East (1990 Gulf War, 2003 Iraq War, 2006 July War etc.). Notwithstanding widespread speculations regarding a Shiite Crescent, regional sectarian divides and the fluidity of borders, the Middle East is still an interstate complex in which state-centric political elites act foremost for the sake of national interest and further integration into the global economy (global capitalist system of trade, competition etc.). Although one can definitely recognize t that some states have weak central authorities (e.g. Lebanon, Iraq) and strong sectarian-based organizations (Hizbullah, Sadrists), the recent sectarianization of Middle Eastern politics is rather a byproduct of structural geopolitics (2003, 2006) than of any widespread, spontaneous and bottom-up generated cultural dynamic. Although neither of the two is likely to confront the other on the conventional battlefield, regional tensions between the Riyadh and Tehran and their geopolitical allies (Egypt, Jordan, U.S; Syria, Hamas, Hizbullah, China)- have been confrontational in nature because of their opposed geopolitical and geo-economic alignment and interests. Moreover, they are likely to increase in the medium to long run due to the accelerating rise of the BRICS (multipolar global economy) and the increasing global demand for energy sources (fossil fuels) notwithstanding the push for alternative, renewable forms of energy (e.g. biofuels). The main arenas for this geopolitical powerplay have been Iraq and the Levant (Lebanon, Gaza, West Bank). These areas have in common that the local central authority is weak, decentralized and has known a previous collapse -1975 for Lebanon, 2003 for Iraq, 2000 for the West Bank during the First Intifada and 2007 for Hamas Gaza take-over. Due to existential insecurity within these societies (warfare, civil war, occupation, siege etc.), the populations in these areas have organized themselves along informal lines of group identity (ethnic, sectarian, tribal, urban etc.). However, these casespecific evolutions still primarily stem from structural geopolitics (material incentive) and the regions geostrategic importance in todays global economy (Suez Canal, natural resources etc.); they are no mere cultural expressions in and by themselves that signal a supposed exceptional nature of the Middle East. These settings have, however, proven to be usefull locusses for the aformentioned regional contenders to project their power regionally and consolidate their state interest, since both countries a-priori actively advocate religious symbolism whilst exerting their material foreign policy. Rather than attributing regional political antagonism between key states to an all-pervasive ideological opposition, the deterioration of bilateral relations between Riyad and Tehran should mainly be interpreted as a systematic consequence of converging crisis points that stem from hegemonic interstate competition. The 2003 crisis (Iraq War) intensified previous regional rivalries between the Middle East`s remaining potent competitors. This competitive increase was subsequently ventilated through political rhetoric, namely in the form of Shia phobic narratives from behalf of US aligned, autocratic Arab regimes (e.g. king Abdullah, 2004). Whereas regional competition had earlier only concentrated itself upon (symbolical) role (1990s), Irans

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decontainment in the early 2000s and the US grip on regional affairs from the mid-2000s onward generated a rivalry for both role and relative power share. In the post-Saddam era, Iran has clearly been pushing for a more prominent coordinating role in regional affairs (recognition); one that is more conform to its relative size (demography, military impact pressure, resources etc.). Saudi Arabia on the other hand, has ever since the early 1990s (Gulf War I) aspired and gradually assumed the position of the new Arab strongman and diplomatic (and financial) powerhouse within the Arab political sphere. It is absolutely crucial to recognize that sectarian violence` and strong in-group organization and solidarity (segregation) in Iraq (or Lebanon) are not signs of natural and wider Sunni-Shia divides. These dynamics rather signal a local contextuality of existential insecurity (humanitarian crises) that primarily emerged in the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent implosion of the countrys state structures and institutions; one should bear in mind that in historic perspective, the Iraqi population had already been severely affected by a previous decade of embargo. Consequently, also the 2006 July war in Lebanon and the subsequent regional diplomatic rows (widespread anti-Shiite rhetoric) are no signs of a transnational sectarian spill-over of Iraqi violence, as some scholars claim to pretend by culturalistically predicting that the cleavages within Islam will define the regions major conflicts in the future.757 Hizbullah and Irans 2006 initiative (July War) signalled a calculated geopolitical strategy that mainly aimed at Tehran`s further monopolization of the Palestinian Question and Arab public opinion and for the pupose of delegitimizing specific Arab political elites Irans geopolitical adversaries- over their delicate US and Israeli alignment. In 2006, Iran demonstrated its military detterent capacity vis--vis the US and Israeli administrations in the hope of countering their threats of attacking the countrys nuclear facilities. The diplomatic anti-Hizbullah, anti-Iranian and eventually anti-Shiite stance of key Arab elites which knew a previous peek during the 1980s- was not primarily motivated by a sectarian or religious-ideological vocations but rather stemmed from a perceived loss of geostrategic ground vis--vis Iran as a nation-state. The intensity of the anti-Shiite position was triggered by an alarming increase of domestic popular support (public demonstrations) for both Hizbullah and Iran in US aligned Arab states. The sectarian narrative thus stems from both domestic and foreign policy considerations. Additionally, such popular Arab support of Hizbullah (2006) should not impressionistically be interpreted as transectarian sympathy, or, even more sensationalistic, as a sign of an alleged widescale tashayyu (doctrinal conversion to Shiism), but rather as a universal expression political opposition against Israel and of humane/communal (Arab) solidarity, which needs to be compared with regional and global solidarity/protests during the Gaza war in 2009. Moreover, all of this should certainly be interpreted to a structural backdrop of modern regional history, i.e. of interstate warfare with or related to Israel (1948 Arab-Israeli war, 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War, 1982 Lebanon War, 2006 July War) in which the Palestinian Question has come to symbolize a highly sensitive geopolitcal and in the Arab and Muslim popular sphere even a religious and often mythological- marker for structural Middle Eastern problematics. There is clearly no tangible basis for claiming that Syria would harbour Twelver Shia (Shia Crescent theory), let alone those who would adhere to the reformist trend (Wilayat al-Faqih), nor is there any firm ground there are neither secondary sources nor any scientific field-work statisques available- to endorse hyped allegations of a widescale tashayyu in the Middle East. It is furthermore rather unjustified to argue that Syrias Bathist Alawi establishment has formally or implicitly abandoned its secular Bathist ideology in favour of a transnational Twelver Shiite ideological and cultural rapprochement with the Iranian theocracy; the bond between the two countries is primarily, if not exclusively, based upon geopolitical and geostrategic (material) considerations (common interests, common adversaries). However, if the dynamic of rapprochement within the Syrian Alawi community towards Twelver Shiism is true as has generally been outlined by a rare rapport on the matter-, it would in itself be an interesting fact, which would require further study. As such, it would be fascinating to find out whether or not it applies the reformist, more politically-active, Iranian-brand of Twelver Shiism or the more traditionalconservative, quietist one; the former would in the current context- seem more feasible, but this is of course mere speculation. Additionally, it would be appealing to inquire whether similar dynamics are taking place among other Middle Eastern communities that are broadly related to the Shiite spectre, such as the Turkish Allawi community (Istanbul,

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Valbjrn & Bank, 2007, 6.

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Anatolia) or the Syrian and Lebanese Ismaili and even Durzi communities. However, such questions fall outside the aformentioned hyped debates and politicized claims of tashayyu and Sunni-Shia divisions, which do not seem to carry any truth since tabshir or proselytism among Middle Eastern `Sunni` communities only seems to be marginal at best and is in other cases only affecting communties that are already endogenous to Shiisms vast pluralism. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have easily maneouvered themselves into a patronizing position of disadvantaged confessional (and ethnic) groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine; thus creating a distorive all-over image of sectarian politics throughout the Middle East. However, as the sectarian tradition in politics, in Lebanon for example, is of much structural nature and roots in French colonial times (divide-and-rule, confessional favouritism), the current status quo (institutionalized confessionalism) cannot simply and soley be attributed to modern dynamics. Nevertheless, both countries probably perceive this contemporary setting as an utterly suitable momentum giving the importance of sectarian and religious components in their own national make-up and the geopolitical gains that can be made through such sectarian patronage. It is inaccurate to think that both Saudi and Iranian leadership wishes to see an escalation of physical `sectarian violence` in Iraq that would escalate beyond their control, entailing the danger of spreading the conflict beyond the country`s borders. Whereas the Levantine arena is more a scenary of open and confrontational geopolitical rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran, It concerns rather a `managed` and often restrained rivalry in Iraq (geographical proximity). Observers have accurately described these Saudi-Iranian relations as engagement in the Gulf, containment in Iraq and rollback in the Levant. 758 Clearly, the different interest zones come along with different objectives and impacts. However, the general undertone in Saudi-Iranian bilateral relations is certainly one of constant engagement deluded with sporadic, reconciliating diplomacy, which is of mere strategic nature. This implies a reality of competition for hierarchy in a non-fixed regional order. There is extremely much at stake in Iraq for both Iran and Saudi Arabia since effective and suitable bilateral political relations with the newly emerging Iraqi elite, will certainly bring about a subsequent partnership during any OPEC deliberations as regards the cartels market strategy (commodity prices). Since oil is still key to any economy in the Gulf (rentier model), Iraqs potential has the crucial ability to impact the regions already strained relations and its positioning vis-vis the global oil market; certainly now that energy demands (fossil fuels) are vastly increasing due to the vast expansion of emerging Asian economies (China, India, `Asian Tigers` etc.). This was demonstrated just recently, during the popular uprising in the Arab world (June 2011), when the OPEC summit (Vienna) was unable to reach a new consensus on global oil supply (production quotas) and commodity prices. Interestingly, Iraq joined Iran (,Venezula and Ecuador) in their obstruction to the Saudi the current power broker of OPEC-, Kuwaiti and the Emirati (UAE) offer to industrialized nations of generously filling up Lybias supply deficit by increasing the cartels` production quotas and opening up spare capacity- and seting the price at $80 a barrel (market stabilization). In this context, it is no wonder that Ali al-Naimi, Saudi Arabias oil minister was quoted saying that it is one of the worst meetings we have ever had.759 In this sense, rumours about a `Shiite Danger`, a `Shiite block` or a `Shiite Crescent` rather relate to petro-dollars and geo-economic rivalry (new alliences) than any reality-bound, bottom-up cultural opposition. So, when we recapitulate the words of Nawaf Obaid, a former security advisor of Saudi king Abdullah, one is left with different impression (material incentive, OPEC) on why Saudi Arabia would intervene into Iraqi affairs: As the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene. 760 Middle Eastern protagonists (clerics, polticians, journalists) claiming to engage Shiism or Shia as a whole, often merely convey highly politicized messages that do not intend to relate to religion itself, but rather to geopolitics and geo-economics, i.e. the promotion of Iran`s regional containment, the decrease of the power of its Levantine allies (Hizbullah, Hamas, Syria),

758 759

Wehrey [et al.], 2009, 66-7,75-6, 94-5. Al Jazeera, OPEC Rejects Increase in Oil Supply, Al Jazeera, June 8th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/06/201168123819705145.html (accessed on 11/05/2011). 760 Obaid, N., Stepping into Iraq, The Washington Post, November 29th 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html (accessed on 03/03/2011).

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the mitigation of domestic political and popular opposition (e.g. `Arab Spring`), Iraqs strategic OPEC shares and its future economic impact on the rentier thriving Gulf area etc. It seems that Iran has been quite succesfull in consolidating its regional foreign policy goals and power ascendance in the post-Saddam aftermath. This is partly due to the USs enduring problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan (popular insurgencies). This decline of the US`s regional power and the modest though steady advance of new important power poles (Iran, Iraq) in the region has only further alarmed key US aligned Arab states in the Middle East, most notably the (former) political elites of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. The latter have subsequently embarked on a campaign to alienate the regional and domestic masses from these emerging (hegemonic) contenders and to block the regional dynamic of political change e.g. formal post-9/11 US instigated democratisation calls, popular demand for institutional reform- since they are both concerned with its consequences on a regional and domestic level. The Saudi kingdoms regional policy of leading the Iranian engagement has seemingly not yielded much fruit, neither has its traditional, rather unipolar reliance on its US patron; quite the opposite may be true. Although Saudi-Iranian competition is not uniform accross different regions and domains in the Middle East, as of late 2008, the balance seems to be favouring Irans political aspirations and geostrategic architecture; certainly with regard to Iraq and Lebanon (e.g. newly formed, pragmatic Miqati-led government). Hence, whilst assessing the Middle East`s newly emerging status quo, we are repeatedly left with a roughly asymmetric impression of both countries power projection efforts and gains, that is, when put into a direct relative competitive. Saudi Arabia benefits from using sectarian political rhetoric since its main structural competitor (OPEC) in the region has been Shia Iran. Next to being a US and Saudi ally, the former Egyptian regime (Mubarak) most probably endorsed the anti-Shiite narrative for its perceived strategic loss vis--vis Iran as regards its traditional patronizing position (Nasr, Saddat etc.) of the Palestinian affairs. Jordan on the other hand, is clearly motivated to blame Shiites for any 21st century economic hardship that country has had to endure, whether this stems from post-war migratory influxes or from structural and case-specific economic pressures (inflation, global recession, post-9/11 Khaliji FDI inflows etc.). The ongoing influxes of Iraqi refugees (humanitarian crisis), which are directly related to the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, have served the Jordanian monarchy with a suitable societal pretext (Shia visibility) for its claims of a Shia Crescent`. As such, not only Irans political ascendence but also the enormous flows of regional migration (Iraqi Shiites) said to be comparable to the Palestinian refugee debacle in sizemight explain deeper incentives, perceptions and rumours regarding regional Shiitization. The politically led anti-Shia propaganda campaign in Jordan has had a clear domestic impact: it rapidly altered Hizbullahs popularity in the Arab street and it therefore immediately defused domestic political tensions and popular opposition to the ruling establishment. Regarding this aspect, it would certainly be valuable to further scrutinize the impact of the vastly undercovered post-2003 Iraqi humanitarian crisis on the region, in terms of socio-economics (pressure) and concerning how intensively these refugee processes have inter-related with the rhetoric and (in)actions of regional political elites (e.g. politically led aversion in Jordan, silence and discursive silence in Syria). The supposed confrontational nature of both Iran and Saudi Arabias policies is often attributed to a mere ideological and sectarian opposition. This is often presumed when assessing their bilateral relations and contemporary geopolitical antagonism. This distorted premiss entails an overstated Sunni-Shia (ideological) divide which is said to generate a natural opposition between Sunni Arab (Gulf) states versus a Shia-Persian Iran; or even more simplistic, as a regional sectarian strife between mere Sunni and Shia, engaging each other as cultural blocs to get the sectarian overhand in the region. These boiled down conceptions (lowest common denominators) do not stand, mainly because bilateral tensions (OPEC) and relative power competition (negatively aligned relative power curves) between Iran and Saudi Arabia clearly preceed 1979s establishment of a Shiite theocracy in Iran; they are clearly detectable from the 1960s onward (cf. fig. 1.3). Regional as wel as Gulf relations are far more complex and multidimensional than the sectarian prims tends to highlight. While structural elements, such as the religious/sectarian foundations (organization, ideology) of each country, certainly affect the way bilateral relations are articulated -e.g. Ahmadinajads acceptance of Riyadhs invitation to Hajj-, they should not be interpreted as the main drivers for substantial mutual antagonism (geopolitical incentive). Sectarian or (Islamist) rhetoric in foreign policy of both regimes foreign policy needs to be understood as legitimizing elements towards key

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domestic religious constituents. Clearly, ideology itself should not be overstated in determining the policy calculus of Middle Eastern governments. Rather than shaping international relations in the Middle East, sectarianism functions as a calculated instrument of state policy; a utile populist tool (symbolic vocabulary), which is keenly used to highlight or emphasize differences and similarities (reflexive) and ultimately serving the broader consolidation of material geopolitical interests. Also with regard to Irans nuclear programme some balancing reservations need to be kept in mind; namely that this strategy primarily stems for a domestic rational economic calculus (energy diversification) rather than a military one. Even in the case of a military logic, the countrys nuclear push should be interpreted as a rational military deterrent rather than a `warmogering` and irrational policy by a supposed ideologically driven Islamist/Shiite Iran. The premises of a supposed Shia Crescent and its numerous conceptual `variants` for that matter, e.g. `Shi`a Wave`, `Shi`a Rise`, `Global Shi`a`, `Shi`a Octopus`, `Shiite Expansion` etc.- imply the idea of a uniform cultural body among the regions supposedly coherent Shiites, symbolizing a supposed homogenous and rather monolith common Shiite belief system (Wilayat al-Faqih) ready to be exploited by one (Tehran) single politico-clerical establishment. This belief, however, does not stand upon thorough inquiry since the normative basis (heterodoxy), the popular conditions (vast cross-over cultural pluralism), and the structural political reality (interstate complex, nation-state organization) for such assumptions are weak, to say the least. In broad terms, there is both a reformist and politically active trend (Qom) among the region Shiite clergy as well as a counter-reformist, conservative and a-political faction (Najaf). Notwithstanding the fact that Iran propagates itself as the sole and most legitimate representative of Shiite Islam, there is a lot more heterogeneity and intra-confessional oppostion than at first glance. Until this very day the question of the Marjaiyya remains quite a controversial issue in Shiite clerical rancks. When one scrutinizes more than merely Iran (Iraq, Lebanon, Khalij), one comprehends that it has remained a rather informal institution/framework of hierarchy; with all its resources Iran and its reformist clergy have not yet had an all-pervasive impact on Shiisms organzation and mainly cultural and rather a-political popular experience. Therefore, the most significant form of detectable Shiite transnationalism still relates to cultural spirituality and financial donations (khums) of devout Shiites in a great diversity of countries (e.g. India, US etc.). Hereby the Hawza of Najaf (Khoei Foundation) and Ayatullah Ali Sistani (Marja al-Azam), rather than Qom (Tehran) or Ali Khamenei, are considered to be the informal the focal points of most devout Shiites. Although there have been quite significant dynamics inside Shiite political theory over the last few decades (Khomeini, Wilayat al-Faqih etc.), one should not use these remarkable occurrences as a pretext for explaining all-over Middle Eastern political reality in sectarian terms. There is no normative uniformity among the Shiite clergy as regards the rule of the Jurisprudent, nor is there even any outspoken consensus (praxis) regarding the scholarly authority of Irans supreme leader as a de facto Marja among his equals elsewhere, let alone him being a Marja al-Azam or primus inter pares. Thus, when it comes down to debating Shia and Shiism there is clearly a great deal of intra-confessional, heterogeneous rivalry and vast ecclesiastical pluralism (heterodoxy). Interestingly, the quietist and relatively a-political, Shia clerical establishment of Iraq has reportedly called for formal sectarian and Iraqi unity for the clear self-interest related purpose of a future Iraqi state that would be more independent of Iran`s efforts for sectarian patronage, intra-sectarian division (divide-and-rule) and its instigation of `managed` Iraqi instability/chaos (to pindwon the US militarily). From the part of the Iraqi Shiite clergy, the main reference for societal and political organization in Iraq is still the Iraqi nation-state and not a cultural-ideological accession with Iran. This only confirms the state-centric political reality of the Middle East. In effect, the use of sectarian language in regional politics in the Middle East in either direction, even intra-sectarian, and with many types of connotations serves as an intelligent policy tool serving the geopolitical interest of specific elites (political, clerical, business etc.). Politically active Shiite groups relate foremost to the framework of the Middle Eastern nation-state (local political project) or Iran`s foreign policy as a geopolitical unit (deterrent capacity) than any common, transnational ideological vision orpolitical project. As such, transnational political ties stay rather confined to strictly material frameworks. Therefore, political relations among brethen Shiites in the Middle East, do not necessarily imply a consolidation of Shiite political theory (submission to Irans Jurisprudent). For instance, many political organizations who express their message and political struggle in Islamist, Shiite terms do have contacts with the Iranian nation-state (IRGC, resources etc.), but at the same time rather adhere to

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Sistani who prefers the model parliamentary democracy in society (Iraq) over a clergy-led theocracy- when it comes down to cultural matters (spiritual guidance). These attitudes are quite significant since they actually signal the fact that Shiite opposition in autocratic countries (e.g. Bahrain) actually symbolize political opposition that stems from defined, local socioeconomic problematics rather than from any doctrinal disputes. Most Shiite political movements (Iranian Khomeinists, Lebanese Hizbullah, Iraqi al-Dawa, ISCI and Sadrists etc.), just like their Sunni counterparts (Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian Hamas, Turkeys AKParty etc.) are in fact maily typed by their very localized character and particularities (socio-economics), certainly when it comes down to their actual political goals this can be derived from the applied terminology in their manifestos and from their political actions over the years. There is in fact no Shiite organizational counterpart for `Sunni` organizations such as al-Qaeda, which allegedly engage themselves in broad and rather undefined civilizational struggle; stemming from Shiism inherent more politicized ideological basis, which make the doctrine itself and the framework of the nation-state quite legitimate (authority) and confortable grounds for political struggle. NonIranian Shiite movements and clerical elements that are politically active should therefore primarily be interpreted within such a framework (interstate, nation-state, communal and class interest etc.). Their political rhetoric and actions primarily stem from socio-economic, political and historical national-bound contextualities. In this sense, the Middle East should still be interpreted as an interstate complex when it comes down to discussing regional affairs or the whereabouts of various expressions of Shiite political Islam. Moreover, due to the lack of cultural, societal and political uniformity and the fundamental reality of heterogeneity (local particularism) one should be extremely critical as regards the analytical application or discursive employement of terms such as Shia and Shiism as sociological or political categories. Since static and monolith perceptions of segregated sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) communities imbued with unity of purpose and conformed by a single political orientation or conviction do whatsoever not correspond with a pluralist Middle Eastern reality, one should certainly avoid an unbalanced deployment of such essentialized markers in highly politicized debates. Loudly advocated propagations of the culturalistic (sectarian) paradigm including those of impressionistically inclined (US) academics- often primarily serve to mobilize masses behind specific geopolitical projects and need therefore to be interpreted as distortive ideas that form integral part of various top-down divide-and-rule policies, which ensure foremost the viability of autocratic rule in the Middle Eastern region. These are often vague amalgamations that serve to contain Iran politically, economically and intellectually. Such propagations (ideas) inevitably divert the attention of domestic populations and other global observers from real structural socio-economic and political problems (youth bulk, unemployement, poverty, education, health care, democratization etc.). Within such narratives one easily detects an overemphasis on sectarian identity and cultural dynamics as regards geopolitical analyses (transnational). Rather than an a priori reality/threat, the perception of (engrained) sectarianism is an ideological premiss of the observer (regional exceptionalism). Hereby, actual human agency, as the central object in every cultural or popular dynamic, is often flagrantly overlooked Middle Easterners are indeed foremost people that are part of humanity and share similar basic needs as everywhere (basic universality and neutral scientific categorization). That is also why there is no need for any discipline to claim a scholarly and methodological monopoly on the subject of Islam, the Middle East and its inhabitants; a rational, open-minded and inter-disciplinary synthesis is what is needed to generate comprehensive insight. The question of Irans alleged aspiration to establish a Shia Crescent, in a way, resembles forthcoming rumours and sensational allegations of Turkeys ambition to redeploy an Ottoman Empire. The applied terminology in both questions is in fact quite irrelevant as regards 21st century economic and political realities in the Middle East (interstate complex, economic regionalism, global capitalist integration). Clearly, the geo-economic ambitions of some states are subjectively discursed with highly distortive culturalistic labels. It can legitimately be argued that a depiction of current Middle Eastern affairs in such absurdly glowing descriptions signal foremost a-priori biased or culturally prejudiced (inferiority) frameworks of questioning. It is clear that, within this narrative, a propagtion of the Shia, as the external them, i.e. the enemy, will immediately generate a desired and idealized reflexive selfperception, namely that of the us, the Sunnites most favourable articulated as the moderate Sunni-Arab regimes- as victims of an alleged radical Shia-Persian expansion. Subsequently, a distorted dichotomic classification of acting groups (rivaling ideological factions) is constructed as well as a culturalistic perception regarding the political, social

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and economic reality of the Middle East. Consequently, in the sense of an assessment of regional Shiite political affairs, we are clearly confronted with highly subjective categorizations vast and far-reaching generalizations of Middle Eastern Shiites political (loyalty) and cultural behaviour and nature mainly stem from ignorant or biased observations. Viewed to a backdrop of global political and academic discourses that culminate around cultural identity (War on Terror, Islamophobia, EU mythology, Clash of Civilizations, politicized Jewish, Christian and Islamic continua a.o.) replacing those regarding race or sex- this is no surprise. One can legitimately argue that the perception of an insurmountable Sunni-Shia division is a false and top down-down inflated power discourse. Linear and monolith divisions/categorizations into `Shiite` and `Sunni` do, however, not suffice to comprehend contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitical reality. For instance, the sectarian prism does not whatsoever explain why the Iranian nation-state prefers relations with Armenia to Shiite Azerbaijan and favours relations with India over Islamic Pakistan. The very process of reflexive sectarian Othering has recently demonstrated itself through anti-Shiite rhetoric emanating from, or at least actively facilitated by (culpability), several US aligned Arab establishments. They have simultaneously efforted to profile themselves as pan-Islamic, pan-Sunni and even pan-Arab as older discursive means of sectarian or ethnic propagation, division and instigation. All of this primarely served as a shrouding geopolitical effort to contain Irans regional power ascendance, in which the region`s political elites appealed to a Sunni or Arab sentiment (national mythology) in order to arouse popular support among the Arab masses for their anti-Iranian containment plans. Iran has demonstrated to implement a similar strategy by an increased post-1990s containment- integration of pan-Islamic rhetoric in its foreign policy discourse while simultaneously pledging open support to Islamist groups in the region (Hizbullah, Hamas) and by guiding its state-sponsored media concerns in their counter-discursive effort (pan-Islamist Iran) signalling a regional mediwar. It is clear that regional geopolitical antagonists have orchestred a powerplay of identity-politics. The sharp-minded Ervand Abrahamian has comprehensively pointed out that the main attraction of the Huntington paradigm is its attempt to analyse international relations without discussing actual politics; well, in the post-Saddam era this also started applying for the political elites narratives in the region (sectarianism).761 This has subsequently resulted into a distortive image of alleged sectarian politics in the region. After a thorough scrunity on the matter it becomes clear that this sectarian image of politics primarily relates to structural geopolitical events (2003 Iraq War, 2006 Lebanon War) and top-down instigations (ideas) and inflations (propaganda) and not, as some claim, to natural and merely organic phenomena of polarized cultural expressions. However, Shia phobia and sensational geopolitical amalgamations have increasingly engrained themselves in Middle Eastern popular consiousness through state-controlled and state-influenced regional media outlets that have consistently and dialectically made claims of similar anti-Shiite propagations. By making hollow allegations news worthy, numerous Arab media concerns are culpable for further reinforcing the Orwellian distortion of a Shia Crescent (phobia). Such dialectic inter-relations between the media and the political classes (power strategies) were recently demonstrated (2010-2011 Arab Spring & 2011 Lebanese government formation) when both Tunisian opposition leader al-Gannouchi and the new Lebanese prime-minister Miqati who has a same Sunni background as his rival Saad al-Hariri- were discursed as being personally affiliated with Shiism or Shia, through speculating on their national loyalty (politics) and cultural identity (possible apostates). Al-Gannouchis vivid reply indicates the vigour of such distortive campaigns: Some people pull Khomeini's robe over me, while I am no Khomeini nor a Shia."762 By intelligently applying sectarian Otherness, the Saudi, Egyptian and Jordan political rulers have (a.o.) portrayed themselves as the protectors of phantasmagoric abstractions, that is, the Arab Sunnis and their Sunni lands. Within this discursive process, the Other (Shia), who is labeled through highly politicized culturalistic labels proclamations symbolizes in fact the underlying reality-bound geopolitical enemy: Iran. However, in order to mobilize people around this geopolitical mission, the adversary needs to be propagated and discursed in a highly imagtive and deluded manner, whereby the definable geopolitical unit (Iran) is transformed into an all-inclusive he, i.e. an undefinable amalgam of sensation that can easily be
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Abrahamian, 2003, 1. Al Gannouchi, Police Join Protests in Tunesia, Al Jazeera, January 23th 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/01/2011122133816146515.html (accessed on 26/05/2011).

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comprehended and feared by the general public. A treath image of an imminent Shiite danger (Crescent) has systematically been propagated by regional and global political elites and has further been inflated by regime-affiliated (Saudi) clerics and media outlets ever since the mid-2000s. As such, distortive geopolitical images and sectarian prejudices have succesfully affected popular consioussness, after which xenophobia and rascism (sectarian discrimation) have consequently been reinforced within Middle Eastern societies and have in some cases been quasi institutionalized (political, socio-economic) by specific autocratic regional establishments (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia a.o.). The Shiite phobic narrative is thus also functional domestically; also on this level sectarian discourse is related to the quest/reassertation of autocratic power of the political elites vis--vis tightly suppressed national populations. In this respect, it is of no importance whether such nationals are Shiite or Sunni. Widely spread essentialist categorizations of the Shiite Other render the image of a supposedly homogeneous community that is alien to the historically domestic realtiy and (Sunni-Arab) nature of the Middle East and subsequently reponsable for violence and regional problems, in their most inclusive forms. For instance, with regard to Iraq, Shia are often interpreted as the henchmen of the US; after the emergence of an Iraqi government headed by a Shiite prime minister, Shiites were again (1979, 1980s) discursed as rafida and enemies of Muslims everywhere. In this sense, anti-Shia rhetoric is a rather familiar (older) geopolitical strategy; the idea of a Shiite Crescent is the re-propagated myth of the external Shiite threat (bogeyman) of the 1980s (Iranian revolution & aftermath). Rather than a widespread (popular) Sunni-Shia divide, the Middle East is scenary to a geopolitical opposition between differently aligned nation-states, i.e. a predominantly geopolitical pattern of allience between G8 member countires and key Arab states cf. military expediture and arms suppliers, table 1.1- such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan vis--vis Iran and Syria states that are economically mainly oriented to non-G8, emerging economies (e.g. BRICS). The stakes are high for both camps; it concerns Iraqs geopolitical orientation as a major regional country (demography) and energy-unit (OPEC). More comprehensively, one can point out that US aligned Arab states in the Middle East and their US patron target the nonallied US states/movements (Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas etc.) for geopolitical (classic balance of power logic) and geoecnomic reasons, namely securing the steady and cheap flow of crude oil (fossil fuels) to one of the worlds largest energyconsuming markets (US). Moreover, they have been doing so ever since 1979 by implementing physical measures economic sanctions and military funding (Iran-Iraq war)- and through psychological pressure (anti-Shia or anti-Persian discourses), which both systematically emanate from the US and its regional allies -which of course change over time (Shah, Saddam, Saddat, Jumblatt etc.). Additionally, a lot of popular opinion in the region can be won or lost wih regard to the Palestinian Question; future interstate competition in the Levantine arena will determine which countries will champion the Palestinian affairs and which regional strategy vis--vis Israel will dominate be it elusive (symbolic) armistic opposition or fruitless diplomacy. Irans military envolvement in the Levant (deterrent capacity building) will most probably continue apace as long as the aforementioned geopolitical opposition in the region endures. Notwithstanding its Islamist rhetoric and organization (theocracy), Iran is no exception to the omnipresent rule and logic of capitalism (macro-economic organization) as was the case for the communist Soviet Union or todays formally Communist China (state-led capitalism)-; every 21st century nation-states foreign policy culminates around a capitalist climax (profit, state-interest). Shiite or not, the fact is that Iran, as a regional giant, has known a regional ascendance ever since its 2003 decontainment and is now actively seeking to increase its influence and material interests in the region, most notably in Iraq (OPEC) and the Levant (military deterrence). The anti-Shiite narrative thus correlates exactly with a perceived loss of geopolitical ground in Iraq (post-2003) and the Levant (2006) from behalf of certain Arab powerhouses and consequently does not stem from sectarian motives. The purpose of this rhetoric is further explained by the fact that Irans populist discourse of resistance (Arab street strategy) and actions have generated the country considerable sympathy among the Arab public opinion, which has alarmed (domestic opposition) and directed influenced the behaviour (speech) of autocratic Arab regimes. The US and its regional allies interpret Iran foremost as a strategic and energy-rich geopolitical unit. Their policy does not only obstruct Iran to fully control and apply its own resources (sectorial inefficiency through FDI blockade), they also endeavour to contain the country regionally, for fear that Iran (and maybe its future Iraqi ally) will turn their crucial assets entirely towards the growing Asian markets with poor domestic energy resources (Shanghai Cooporation

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Organization). This would further consolidate intensive Asian industrialization efforts and most probably trigger further industrial development in Iran. With their vast resources Iran and Iraq over which the US is increasingly loosing its formerly gained strategic leverage vis--vis other global industries- enjoy a strategic geopolitical position; they now have the ability to move further away from the typical rentier state model in the Gulf and turn towards alternative (Russian and Chinese) investors (FDI) to start-up their economic diversification and industrial development. Doing so would further undermine the USs regional policy locally supervised by Israels superior military capacity-, its global superior positioning and simultaneously further generate a multipolar global economy (China, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, Turkey etc.). Iran is an international player with vast potential and it is therefore aligning itself with substantial (economic) power poles that are emerging in the post-Cold War era, in the hope of triggering its full-fledged domestic development and full intergration into the world capitalist system. Anti-Shiite rhetoric needs to be interpreted as a populist discourse from the part of the US and its regional allies to mobilize popular support to block this Iranian effort and to legitimate taking possible action against the country (nuclear facilities). Such a discursive strategy is comparable and compatible in the sense that its slightly more elaborated (regionally recycled); it also serves politics and geostrategy- to the Islamophobic discourse of the previous US administration. As is known, post-9/11 retaliation (Iraq) -under the guise of the threat of WMDs- served more as a geostrategic campaign to secure the long-term geo-economic interests of the US than it was an actual counter-attack for the inhumane and spitefull bombings in 2001; let us hereby recapitulate that most of the 9/11 killers were indeed Saudis (discursive silence). Moreover, the anti-Shiite narrative is the new verbal exponent of shrouded world capitalist rivalry and hegemony, that aims at blocking the geopolitical advance of certain nation (Iran) states and the comprehensive integration (economic regionalism) of certain global regions (Middle East). Whereas anti-Iranian propaganda in the West focusses itself mainly upon the irrational nuclear strategy of Iran together with Islams supposed inherent undemocratic nature in general (i.e. deprived of any human agency), in the Middle East this simplistic and culturalistic propaganda has taken the form of anti-Shiite rhetoric since geopolitical rivalry generally Saudi and Bahraini Shia are quite unfortunate here- coincides with the sectarian demography in the region. However, the claim that Shiites are in someway alien to the Middle Easts Arab nature is of course an inflated and elusive myth. It should be clear that current politicized forms of sectarian conflict or antagonism in the Middle East (Iraq, Levant) are not whatsoever natural evolutions, nor more authentic i.e. formerly supressed- expressions of group identity. They mainly relate to the absence of strong and inclusive national authority and state-instituions (e.g. unconditional provision of social services), structural socio-economic malaise (existential insecurity) and extra-regional interventionism sometimes more explicit (2003) than on other occasions. However, when one defines the main cause of conflict in the Middle East as cultural tensions within a regional Muslim society between Sunni and Shia populations and, even more abstractly, between Sunni and Shia governments (ideologically driven), it is relatively easy for political elites to pinpoint and identify the problematic Other to the listeners in society (audience). Hereby complex phenomena are flagrantly reduced to highly essentialized and simplistic conceptions. It should, however, be noted that there are absolutely no objective criteria attached to such politicized constructions of a supposed Shiite Other; clearly, such subjective discourse are highly dialectic in nature to material (political) power. Hence, the use of such homogenizing terminology in political and social analyses can strongly be contested .The entire trend of focusing on sectarian and also wider Islamic (backward Muslims vs. enlightened Westerners)- forms of fixed group identity (communitarian cages) in the political sphere of the Middle East is foremost the result of hegemonic and exclusivist power discourses that emanate from specific states-centric Arab political elites in the form of Shia phobic propaganda and mutual positive pan-Sunni, pan-Islamic and even pan-Arab profiling. The Shia Crescent theory is a distortive and invalid propagation that serves as an intelligent policy tool for popular mobilization and which should in fact consistently be discharged during any serious scholary attempting to analyze contempory geopolitics in the Middle East. Conscious dissociation from the idea of a Shiite threat generates less biased frameworks for observation and will most definitely render more accurate and balanced understanding of Middle Eastern affairs and its societies. Viewed to a backdrop of instagted xenophobia in key industrialized regions within the world capitalist system -USs War on Terror & EUs construction of an evangical European identity- anti-Shiite dynamics (political rhetoric and subsequent

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popular sentiment) in the post-2003 Middle Eastern sphere are of no surprise and can be interpreted as populist discourses, which emanate from specific state-centric elites. These propagations are primarily top-down instigated and they are to be situated in a general popular culture (dialectic recipients) of post-politics following the end of the Cold War, where a former structural and material debate -Marxist vs. Liberalist frameworks- has seemingly been replaced by a more simplistic framework of oppositions between clashing civilizations, cultures, religions or indeed, sects.

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The Hard Way to the Marjaiyya (232-237)

The deeds [done, according to] the fatwa of the three following Maraaji will be yielding and they will be guaranteed: Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Sayyid Ali KhameneI, Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Muhammad Faadzil Lankaraanii, Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Jawaad Tabriizii. It is allowed to follow these three Maraaji after their death. Jaamia Ruuhaaniyat, Qum. In the wake of Ayaatullah Khomeinis death, the situation concerning the Marjaiyya became very complicated. At the time being, Grand Ayaatullah Al KhuuI [for instance] had already become a Shiitte Marja even before Khomeinis death, while Ayaatullah Kulbaayakaanii was a Marja inside Iran and Ayaatullah Mutazarii was still banned [from political life] by Khomeinis verdict. The rest of the Maraaji had all passed away the title of Marja is [after all] given to religious leaders at a very old age. At that moment disputes erupted between the Maraajis supporters, the administration and the representatives of these Maraji.The conflict culminated around the assembly of the highest possible number of supporters in order to strengthen the position of their Maraaji, which would eventually resort to the strengthening of their own position. Sayyid Khamenei, who holds the political title of Ayatullah had to fight for [his place among] the Marjaiyya in the beginning of the revolution. He was elected as the [Supreme] Leader, or Leader of the revolution, which allowed him to make his first declaration. Hereby, the dispute was remarkably not against enemies, it was rather against equals of the same religion, belief and even the same sect and school of thought, that is the [Shiite] Madhad. The dispute had infiltrated the erudite Hawza of Qom in Iran and subsequently it also crossed into the noble Hawza of Najaf in Iraq. The very fact that Imam Khomeini, the charismatic leader and founding father of the Islamic Republic of Iran, wasnt the only Shiite Marja in the world only made Khameneis situation more difficult. Abu-l-Qaasim Al-Kui [for instance] resided in Najaf and he had many followers inside Iran. Imam Khomeini died before Al-KhuI, without having the chance to be the sole Shiite Marja of in the world, not even for one day, [and this] despite having fulfilled all the personal requirements, namely religious, represented in holding the title of Ayatullah, historical, by having toppled the Shah and his iron-fisted regime, and [ultimately] revolutionary and political legitimacy, witnessed by his [very] establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Critics and opponents of Khamenei and his movement claimed that his recognition as the new Marja would cause an intermingling between politics and religion, which [further] implies a politicization of this eminent rank among Shiite Muslims, that is, the Marjaiyya. But Iran- the state and the revolution does not really differentiate that substantially between religion and politics for there to be such a segregated start within a strict boundary between religion and politics; in reference to the late Mahdi Bazerkaan regarding the description of this situation. The [concept of the] Marjaiyya is one of the most important aspects in which Shiites differ from Sunnis, as Shiite scholars unanimously disagree that the Marjaeyyah would be the continuation of the Infallible reign of the Imam. For the first time in the history of Iran, politics prevailed over religion; Ayatollah Kashani, for instance, was a very distinct political figure and an ally of Mossadeq in the revolution against the Shah in the early fifties, and Ayatollah Talkani, a political heavyweight and rebel and also leader of the revolution inside Iran while Imam Khomeini was absent. However, neither of them was ever recognized as a Grand Marja for having been involved in politics, while not meeting the Marjaiyyas [formal] conditions. Khamenei, however, succeeded in becoming the Supreme Leader of the Republic and the highest State authority in Iran, while not being fully recognized as a religious Marjaiyya. This situation persisted until the mid-nineties, when he, his aides and supporters of the Ansar Khat al-Imam (Followers of the Imam) together with the state institutions, all embarked on an attempt to try and converge the Marjaiyya and Irshad ( Leadership), that is, between the political leadership of the nation and that of religious leadership of the believers. This task became relatively easier when the 3 Grand Ayatollahs, Al Khui, Marashi and Kalbaykani died.

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Nevertheless, there were still some formal and practical obstacles ahead of Khamenei . One of such formal obstacles stemed from the fact that the Marjaiyya was usually given to religious leaders that are older; moreover, Ayatollah Muntazeri, [for instance], was 71 years old in 1993. Muntazeri was criticized by the Imams opponents in the revered Hawza -for having been appointed as the Imams successor- due to the presence of older candidates. [Strikingly,] Khamenei was only 54 years in that same year. From that perspective, it is comprehendible why Grand Ayatollah Araki (107 years old) was named a Grand Marja in 1989, that is, as a compromise between the two sides: the Ansar Khat Al-Imam (Followers of the Imam) together with the Islamic revolutionaries on the one hand and the accredited (scholarly) Hawza [members] and the religious Maraji on the other. The Hawza of Qum deemed Arakis accession of the Marjaiyya as a victory -a man whose competence and qualification were indisputable- since the Islamic political movement in the Iranian state, that is, the Ansar Khat al-Imam (Followers of the Imam) and the three powerful figures in Teheran, [strongly] believed that it would only delay the decision for a short period of time, as Araki was quite aged. Pending the future decision, the Ansar Khat al-Imam (Followers of the Imam), led by Khamenei and Rafsanjani, took some quick and drastic internal measures. At the time being, Ahmed Al Khomeini seemed to be distancing himself from politics. When the 3 Grand Ayatollah, Al Khoei, Marashi and Kalbaykani died, the politically-active Islamic movement and the Ansar Khat al-Imam (Followers of the Imam) spared no effort in guaranteeing that the Marjaiyya would be given to Khameneiwho had already become the Supreme Leader-, employing all the state institutions for that purpose. The possibility that the Marjaeyya would be given to someone who wouldnt agree with the regimes ideological orientation and with the Iranian government posed a great danger for its decision makers, who were very aware of the complexity of a moving (informal) Marjaeyya in between Qom and Najaf, which would [eventually] cause the Islamic Republic of Irans ideological influence to wane the Islamic Republic among Shiites in the world. After the death of Great Ayatollah Araki in 1993, shaykh Ali Meshkini, a powerful figure of the regime and a close associate of Khamenei, sent a letter to the Foqaha of Qom, signed by a number of [other] Foqaha, which was asking for the submission to Khameneis leadership. In their response letter, the Fuqah of Qom labeled Meshkini and his fellows as Pro-regimefoqaha; Ironically, those are the exact words in which Hhomeini used to portray his opponents.The scholars of Qom asked Meshkini and his fellows: What exactly is your purpose? Is it to award Khamenei an Ijtihad degree, or Supreme Leadership, which he has taken already five years ago? Is it the Guardianship of Muslims, namely Grand Marjaiyya? And they added another question: Do you think of yourselves as superior or inferior to Khamenei? If you think youre superior, why would you choose someone of lesser knowledge? When did it ever happen in a scientific center that the lesser [qualified] is nominated by the higher [one]. Even the Scientific Hawza in Qom rejected the monopoly of the Islamic political movements on all aspects of life in Iran, which was at that time guided by Sayyid Khamenei and Shaykh Rafanjani, in the status of Marjaiyya. Despite its objection to the Supreme Leaderships further enlargement of power, the Hawza had accepted the Supreme Leadership, or the political Leadership, as an accomplished fact. The following course of events demonstrated that by then, the influence of the Hawza of Qum started diminishing dramatically and this despite the despite severe pressure and the formally toughening words. Moreover the actual and direct influence of Qom Hawza was hence geographically restricted. The rank of the Mudarrisin, affiliated to the regime by the end of 1994, embarked upon the task. They issued a list of 7 Maraaji out of which the believers could choose their Marja. These Mudarrisun Of the revered Hawza In Qom, who represent the second in hierarchy after the Maraji in the Hawzas [line] authority, undertook the task of nominating new Maraaji after the death of a former Marja. Said Ali Khamenei was [of course] included among these 7, however, because of his age and scholarly credentials (knowledge), it was not possible to [bluntly] nominate Khamenei solely. The fact that Khamenei had not even published a scientific communiqu -something which is famous among believers and a prerequisite to the title of Ayatollah according to 1994 Hawza traditions, before he is to be recognized as one of the Grand Maraaji of the Twelver Shiites- made the situation even more vexing.

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The Seven Scholars List represented a formal solution to the crisis of Irans ruling political class; it would effectively allow Khameneii to combine both the rank of Supreme Leadership and that of the Marjaiyya and it would furthermore restrict the [margin of the] Marjaiyya to Iranian scholars of Qum, in their opposition to the Arab scholars from Najaf. Arab scholars of Najaf and elsewhere, could not be appointed and have thus been excluded from the List of Seven Scholars. Moreover, this even applied to those who had followers in Qum, such as as-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah of Lebanon and as-Sayyid Muhammad Saiid Tabatabai al-Hakim of Najaf The names of the seven scholars on the list, issued by the regime- affiliated (conservative wing) Jamiat Mudarisin, were all preceded by the title of Grand Ayatullah: 1) Muhammad Faazil Lankaraanii? Who in addition to having the revolutionary legitimacy, has been a close associate of Khomeini. 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) Mohammad Taaqi Bahjat, the Suufii and Irfan scholar. Sayyid Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Wahid Khurasaanii, a student of Khuii, whos relatively independent from the Iranian regime. Jawad Tabrizi, known for his his clear nationalist view. Sayyid Musa Zengani, known for not seeking the Marjaiyya and political interference. Naasir Makrem Shirazi, a popular figure among the youth.

In that same week, Jameehe Rrohaniyate, the conservative organization headed by the regime-friendly politician Mahdavi Kani in Qum, declared that it was productive and acceptable(for the conscience) to emulate the fataawa following three Maraaji: 1) 2) 3) Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Sayyid Ali Khamenei Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Muhammad Faadzil Lankaraanii Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Jawaad Tabriizii

The statement concluded with a note regarding the fact that those three Maraaji allowed Shiites to follow dead Maraaji, unlike the great majority of Hawza Fuqaha, who rather adhere to the idea of only emulating living Maraji, since it would imply leaving some space for dead Maraaji, which might subsequently obstruct the way for other living Maraaji.

Sayyid Ali Khamenei: Between Irshaad and the Marjaiyya (238-241)

Dont complain of your grieves to the enemies for they will say there is no strength, in which they will find happiness. In Kalstan, Saadi. It was by all means a tough decision for the Assembly of Experts to elect Sayyid Ali Khamenei as the Supreme Leader after Khomeinis death. Hereby, it was revolutionary legitimacy that [mainly]affirmed his leadership; [a criterion] which was only introduced ten years ago, after the success of the revolution. This [criterion] is, however, of very little or no importance whatsoever as regards the position of the Marjaiyya, which has been regulated by principles that date back hundreds of years. Opponents claim that that the fifty existing Ayatullah, which were older [than him], overlooked the [inner] question of leadership due to his role in the revolution, his close relation with the late Imam and his status as president between 1983 and 1989. Yet Imam Khomeini did [in fact] not explicitly recommend Ali KhameneI for leadership instead of Muntazari. This was [mainly] due to his illness on the one hand and the short time in between Muntazaris dismissal and Khomeins death on the other. All of this was realized, however, [the fact remains that] the status of theMarjaiyya is not something that is easily disregarded. Specialists are divide into the [category of] Faqiih or Marja, by which a Faqih is defined as someone who has proper knowledge of the traditions and the ahaadiith and who has the ability to distinguish between the authentic and weaker ones; [as someone] who can understand their meaning and their objectives in a good way and who is [furthermore] able to derive

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Islamic law from them. As concerns the Mujtahid, he is defined as someone who is qualified to deduct Islamic rulings from the four sources of Islamic Law and he is regarded as an Absolute Mujtahid if he is either [able to work] well in branches of Fiqh or specialized in a few of them. Each Absolute Mujtahid [subsequently] shares of the Marjaiyyas authority. As regards a Marja, he is a Mujtahid (jurist) with great knowledge of both ijtihd and fiqh and it is he who can be consulted by the lay people with regard to religious and worldly affairs. The lay are those adults who did not attain a degree of ijtihd or self-education. Therefore, every Marja is necessarily a Mujtahid, but not the other way around. If we reflect on the meanings and the significances of the two positions, the Murshid and the Marja, it becomes clear that, although it seems to be religious, Supreme Leadership is in fact a political authority. The Marjaiyya, on the other hand, is a religious authority with political dimensions. It is no secret to the observer and the investigator that the separation between the positions of Irshad and Marja was rather favourable to Sayyid Ali Khamenei. Although Imam Khomeini fairly combined the two positions, the [very] separation between the two offices was [quite] necessary for Ali Khamenei in order to [be able] to occupy the position of Irshad, that is, political leadership. His attempts to combine the Irshaad and Marjaiyya, [that is,] between political and spiritual leadership was an enormous task due to the [very existence of] rivalry from behalf of Maraaji who were older than him, who were more experienced in in Shia fiqh and who held a higher scholarly degree in the Hawza. This explains why Ali Khamenei did, up until now, not whatsoever succeed in this endeavor; despite the full support of the Iranian nation-state and its agencies that were faithful to him. None of the Grand Maraaji at-Taqliid have recognized the ijtihd [, i.e. religious authority] of Sayyid Ali Khamenei. They limited themselves to endorsing the authorization of the Mujtahidiin [or the men of faith] who came second in the Hawza hierarchy, such as Ali Mashkiinii, Yuusuf Saanaii, Ahmad Jannatii and Misbaah Yazdii. Although the Grand Maraaji only endorsed Khamenei as a political leader, this was nevertheless interpreted by Ali Khameneis supporters as a confirmation for their (the Ummas) pledge of allegiance and thus for the justness of the [previous] election. However, a content analysis of the scripts of these letters has clarified that it [only] concerned a ratification of [his] leadership (status) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran and not an endorsement of the rank of Marjaiyya. The proof of this can be found in the fact that there was only one [single] Marja who supported Sayyid Ali Khamenei in his actions, namely, Ayaatullah Aamilii, while (at the time) the majority of the Grand Ayatullahs [rather] opted for the entitlement of Hujjatu-l-Islaam wa-l-Muslimiin (rank) for the leader of the republic in the congratulatory letter. Without [any] ambiguity, this confirms their refusal for the inauguration of the rank of Marjaiyya, which is would [of course] be a condition for the acquirement of the title of Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa; the proof this is [hence] the letter of Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Mohammad Ali Iraaqi, Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Muhammad Ridaa Kulbaayakaanii and Ayaatullah al-Udzmaa Marashi Najafii. All of Irans governmental agencies, as well as the people of the of the organizational establishment of the Hawza of Qum, participated in the struggle for the inclusion of [both] Khameneis political leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran and his religious (spiritual) leadership of all the Shia in the world. The issuing of the List of Seven Maraaji and the List of Three Maraaji which both contain the name of Sayyid Ali Khamenei as a religious Marja amongst the other Maraaji- has generated a theoretically feasible context for Sayyid Ali Khamenei to combine both the positions of Irshaad and Marjaiyya. This convergence (of authority) was, however, the result of quite a complicated process, in which politics was blended with religion and religion [in turn] with nationalism. Hereby, the ideological (reformist) movement thus volunteered in serving politics and the ruling classes in Iran. Through this reform multiple Maraaji from honorable Najaf and Lebanon were replaced by non-Arabs for the first time in the history of Shiite Muslims, while for ages, both Arabs and Iranians used to emulate all Shiite Maraaji, setting a wonderful example of Arab-Persian brotherhood. The convergence of the Marjaiyya and the Supreme Leadership were unwelcome outside Iran, but [interestingly] also within the Hawza of Qum, because it would imply the government agencies inciting them to oppose other Maraaji at-Taqliid. Near the end of 1994, 150 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran (Irans parliament) consented in declaring Kameneii a new Marja, which [ultimately] indicates the link between Khameneiis endeavors and the Iranian regime.

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In many ways, this relates to both Iran and dynamics outside the country. It would seem as if the disagreement regarding the status of Leadership and the fierce rivalry concerning the status of the Marjaiyya was only affecting Iran, that is, within Islamic country itself. This is, however, an imprecise and generalized observation. Moreover, this has led to a supposed neutral stance from behalf of individuals and movements from outside the country. This crucial and significant rivalry has had profound implications on the entire Iranian system and it has generated a breakdown within the Hawza in Qum and ultimately within the Shiite Marjayya; this [disintegration] also concerns bilateral relations between the large Hawazatayn, Najaf and Qum, and the bonding relations between the Shiites within and outside Iran. Same plate, same soup goes the Iranian saying that aptly describes sentiment about the two rivaling factions. The conflict regarding the status of the Marjaiyya had multiple appearances; it was not a mere rivalry between Islamic factions within Iran, it rather concerned a [wider] power struggle over the religious and spiritual authority of Shiite Muslims. It also concerned a finalizing conflict regarding the ruling factions concrete political power, in terms of the various pillars of power and the [armed] forces. This was ultimately settled in favor of the movement Katt al-Imam, represented by Khamenei and Rafsanjani.

Internal Political Dynamics (313--315)

Despite the religious and sectarian nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its foundation on the basis of the Wilayat alFaqih and the granting of the authority of the infallible Imams to the Leader of the Republic, a fair analysis cannot ignore certain facts that carry important implications. Since its creation, the Islamic Republic has witnessed nine presidential elections and nine parliamentary elections. This indicates the popular character [itself], even if relatively imperfect, still constitutes a primary aspect of the legal elements of Irans political system, based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. In addition to the quantity of elections, we cannot help but notice the importance of the quality of the Iranian election, which have been relatively impartial and which have [therefore] proven to be superior in comparison to elections elsewhere in the region. The presence of this impartiality refutes the accusations of prevailing dictatorship in the [presumed] lack of popular participation within the Iranian community. The political dynamics that have dominated Iran continuously for the last eight years, ever since the second half of the nineties until the end of the term of previous president Muhammad Khatami, clearly testify the proactivity of the Iranian community. It is true that the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded on religious bases, but it is also true that it is based on [a process of] popular participation, even if we disagree upon the size (matter) of impact that these elections might generate. In spite of the prevention of certain candidates from running for elections and the exclusion of opposition groups that disagree with the Wilyat al-Faqih, the democratic process in Iran does carry a great deal of credibility. The former president Although former president Mohammad Khatami, belonged to the highest Iranian establishment, he did, however, persist in supporting debate and democratic movements. The Iranian people were initially [rather] attached to the former president and his project, this was, however, followed [by disillusionment and] and their disinterest in him, mainly for his inability to [deliver] work, as well as the exclusion of the reformist movement from all governmental institutions? One might conclude that Khatamis reformist experiment came at a time of complex internal and external conditions and at a specific historical period of the regime, in a manner that inclines us that the [future] difficulty of repeating such an experiment in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The political icons that have occupied governmental positions after Khatami, represents the conservative and radical faction, which describes itself as fundamentalists. They represent certain political, economic, social and socio-economic interests and they are backed through an alliance with members of the military, guards, volunteers and a large number of religious figures. It is [therefore] hard to image the advent of a new political process within Iranian society under the control of this political movement, that is, from the perspective of their slogans and their intertwinement of political and sectarian morals. That is why it is rather unlikely to expect this movement to hand over some of the powers of the Wali al-Faqih to the president. Doing so, would, however, have created a kind of balance between the institutions that are elected by the people

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and those who have been chosen by God. The increase of presidential power is considered to be one of the key conditions for stabilizing the Iranian regime and for it to gain wide public support. One can briefly conclude to be aware of the importance of upcoming challenges with regard to the [countrys] internal dynamics.

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