Fascist Propaganda and the Italian Community in Peru during the Benavides Regime, 1933-39 Author(s): Orazio A.

Ciccarelli Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Nov., 1988), pp. 361-388 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156719 . Accessed: 24/03/2011 10:55
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Latin American Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 20,

361-388

Printed in Great Britain

36i

Fascist Propaganda and the Italian Community in Peru during the Benavides Regime, 1933-39
by ORAZIO A. CICCARELLI

In the second half of the 1930s, confidential information from and concerning Latin America reaching Washington promoted the suspicion, and ultimately the conviction, that the security of much of Latin America, and by extension that of the United States, was imperiled by the Axis powers. Officials in Washington were convinced that the Axis menace to the Western Hemisphere was not in the form of a direct military threat, but rather through the use of propaganda and subversion. Such concern - based in part on fascism's appeal to Latin America's elites - was aroused particularly by the efforts of the Axis powers to organise their own national communities in Latin America into instruments of their foreign policy and by the simultaneous mounting of a propaganda campaign intended to win over public opinion in the Americas and to weaken the support for democracy.1 Germany mounted the earliest and best organised propaganda campaign aimed at Latin America. As early as 1933 the Hitler government had outlined a strategy of propaganda and subversion guided from Berlin and carried out by Nazi organisations in the Americas. Italy initiated its propaganda assault in I935 and the United States, in reply, in I936. England and France also contributed to the war of words which engulfed Latin America in the late 193os although their organisations were considerably less effective than those of Germany, Italy and the United States.2 The propaganda war between totalitarian and democratic forces
David G. Haglund, Latin America and the Transformationof U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-i940 (Albuquerque, 1984), p. i6. Haglund argues that it was such security concerns in Latin America that eventually led the United States to abandon neutrality and enter the Second World War.

362

Ora.io A. Ciccarelli

was clearly won by the latter, judging from Latin America's role in the Second World War. Nonetheless, until 1939 the outcome of that conflict was in doubt with both sides convinced that the other was turning public opinion in Latin America against it and gaining influence over a growing number of Latin American governments. To the democratic forces it was obvious that Germany posed the greatest military threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere. However, many believed that Italy was more effectively advancing the Axis cause by utilising its cultural, religious, and ethnic affinities with Latin America. Its propaganda themes of religion, family, and order were believed to have found particular favour among the Latin American elites and middle sectors. Moreover, the millions of Italian nationals residing in Latin America were receptive to Italian ideological blandishments. And through its nationals many of whom were believed to be fascist - Italy was thought to have gained influence over a number of agents South American governments.3 Peru was one of the countries where Italy seemed to be reaping great benefits. To the casual observer it might indeed appear that Italian fascism had firmly rooted itself in the repressive political and social institutions of Peru thanks largely to a well orchestrated propaganda campaign financed mostly by the rich Italian community and condoned by the pro-fascist regime of Oscar Benavides (1933-9). The avalanche of pro-Italian news reports and feature stories published by Peru's leading newspapers in 1936 and 1937 as well as the dramatic increase in the playing of Italian-produced films, newsreels, and radio programmes created the perception of a successful fascist advance in Peru. The expansion and/or creation of fascist organisations among members of the community beginning in 1936, and the intensified efforts to indoctrinate young Italians to fascism through the establishment of youth organisations and the political manipulation of school curricula, appeared to give substance to the
2 For a comparative look at the question of propaganda see Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda(London 1964), pp. 54-75, 104-17. By 1939 German radio broadcasts to Latin America amounted to twelve hours daily, higher than to any other region of the world. Harold L. Childs and John B. Whitton (eds.), Propaganda By Short Wave including Charles A. Rigby's The W[aron the Short Waves (Princeton, 1942). It contains essays on short-wave propaganda by Germany, Britain, Italy, France, and the United States. Alton Frye, Nazi Germanyand the American Hemisphere, 933--I94I (New Haven, I967), pp. 3 i, passim; Philip M. Taylor, The Projectionof Britain. British OverseasPublicity and Propaganda(London, I98I), pp. 8 I-259; Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, War Propagandaand the United States (New York, 1972). 3 Carlton Beals, The Coming Struggle for Latin America (New York, 1938), p. 92; 'Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities up to March I938', U.S. National Archives (USNA), US State Department (USSD), file no. 3850.

Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39

363

impression of Italian success. The simultaneous growth of closer military and political ties between Italy and President Benavides in 1936 and 1937, in the form of increased arms sales to Peru, the contracting of Italian air force and police missions, and the establishment of a Caproni aircraft manufacturing and repair plant in Lima, seemed to confirm the success of Italian propaganda and community efforts in favour of fascism and to intensify fears that Peru was being drawn inexorably into the Axis orbit.4 The reality both of Italy's propaganda operations in Peru and of the Italian community's fondness for fascism was quite different. Italian diplomatic documents reveal that such activities - virtually non-existent
until
I 9 35

and most intense in 19 36 - grew in response to the international

condemnation of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, and to League of Nations' sanctions rather than as part of a plot to dominate Peru. The successful conclusion of the African crisis in July 1936 brought a rapid dismantling of key components of the propaganda apparatus that had gained great support for Italy's cause. By 1937 Italian propaganda activities were being curtailed dramatically, the result of the Italian community's unwillingness to subsidise them and of the Italian government's reluctance to maintain them. By I939 Italian operations were reduced to a defence of national interests against German and Japanese advances and to the mounting of a cultural propaganda campaign aimed mainly at the indoctrination of young Italians. Even these modest goals met with only marginal success, victims of a structurally flawed and grossly underfunded propaganda operation. That Italy - though not fascism - continued to enjoy great favour in Peru after 1936 was attributable less to propaganda efforts than to the immense goodwill built over the decades by the Italian community there. During the first decade of fascism, Italy abided by Benito Mussolini's pronouncement that fascism was not an article for export by rejecting
In 1937 United States Ambassador Fred Dearing had reported that Benavides was proving to be a 'poorer and poorer neighbor every day'. In the next i8 months Washington believed that matters had deteriorated as Benavides strengthened economic and political ties with Italy and Germany. See Haglund, Latin America, pp. 103-4; Laurence A. Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 9 Oct. 1937, (USSD) file no. 723.65/7; R. M. Lambert to Secretary of State, Lima, 12 June 1937, (USSD) file no. 723.65/7; Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 5 Nov. 1937, (USSD) file no. 7I0, Italy-Peru, no. 98; Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 8 Nov. 1937, (USSD) file no. 800 B; 'Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities'. This conclusion is based on a reading of Italian Foreign Ministry documents between 1922 and 1935. See also 'Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities', p. 9; Haglund Latin America, p. 55.

364

Ora-io A. Ciccarelli

international fascism and curbing the activities of the Fasci all'Estero.

Originally created in
1920-z2

for the purpose of using Italians abroad to

spread fascist ideology, the organisation's activities were curtailed first in I925 when it was placed under the direction of the Foreign Ministry, and then again in 1928 when the Fasci were placed under the control of local diplomatic representatives and were ordered to refrain from all political activities in the host country.6 The sincerity of Italy's intentions regarding international fascism was confirmed by the government's failure throughout the 1920z to develop a credible propaganda apparatus. Indeed, responsibilities for propaganda were so widely diffused and activities among the Ministries were so poorly coordinated as to have rendered Italian propaganda virtually non-existent. Events of the early 1930s finally gave impetus to the concept of Universal Fascism. The economic crisis in the liberal-democratic countries increased the respectability of the corporate state and presented Italy with major propaganda opportunities. More importantly, the rise of Nazism in Germany and the subsequent creation of an elaborate international propaganda apparatus challenging Italy's hitherto exclusive claim to fascist orthodoxy, mobilised Italian energies into a more visible international role including the consolidation of disparate propaganda services under an Undersecretary of State for Press and Propaganda, under the immediate direction of the head of State. It was the Ethiopian crisis in 1935, however, which gave the greatest impetus to both Universal Fascism and to the drive to refine the propaganda structure.7 On 24 June 1935, Press and Propaganda was raised to ministerial rank and by I936 it had been given control over all aspects of cultural and propaganda activities formerly conducted by a variety of ministries and quasi-public corporations.8 While Italian troops carried on the war in the battle-fields of Ethiopia, it was left to the newly created Ministry for Press and Propaganda to conduct the war of words against international condemnation and the League of Nations' economic sanctions which threatened Italy's successful conclusion of the war. Late in 1935 the Ministry for Press and Propaganda launched a systematic propaganda campaign to enlist world opinion in
Enzo Santarelli, 'I fasci italiani all'estero', Ricerchesulfascissmo (Urbino, 1971), p. 124; Guiseppe Bastiniani, Gli italiani all'estero (Milan, I939), pp. 46-53. 7 Philip V. Cannistraro, Lafabbrica del consento:fascismo e mass media (Rome-Bari, 1975), pp. 102-4, Io6-7, izo20-; Michael A. Ledeen, UniversalFascism. The Theoryand Practice of the Fascist International, 1928-1936 (New York, I972), pp. 62-3. 8 Taylor Cole, 'The Italian Ministry of Popular Culture', Public OpinionQuarterly, vol. 2 (July 1938), p. 426.
6

Italian Fascists in Peru, z933-39

365

support of Italy's policies and to minimise the impact of the sanctions. Although Italy's propaganda efforts failed to alter the generally antiItalian course of the European news media, it paid high dividends in Latin America where most nations refused to enforce the League's economic sanctions against Italy, and a few openly embraced Italy's cause.9 In Peru Italy gained perhaps its greatest propaganda victory. El Comercio,La Prensa,La Cronica,and El Universal,Lima's major newspapers representing the views of the dominant coastal elite, endorsed the Italian position so enthusiastically that in no other country outside of Italy were the news media as universally favourable to Italy as the Peruvian press.10 El Comercio,Peru's oldest and most influential newspaper, came to reflect the openly pro-fascist philosophy of its publisher, Carlos Mir6 Quesada, whose books and newspaper columns, written under the pseudonym Garrotin, consistently extolled Italy, Benito Mussolini, and fascist policies. The newspaper's 'Notas al Cable', an elegantly written and reasoned column on international events, repeatedly supported Italy's international position, particularly during the period of the Ethiopian crisis. La Prensa, the voice of Peru's agrarian interests, covered the Ethiopian crisis less extensively than the other major newspapers. Nevertheless, the newspaper supported the Italian position throughout the conflict and reprinted numerous articles from foreign newspapers which defended the Italian cause. The other two leading Lima newspapers, La Cronicaand El Universal,journalistically less discreet than the first two, served openly as unabashed outlets for Italian propaganda. La Crdnica offered its readers two columns in support of the Italian cause. One by 'Index', a pseudonym for an unknown author, supplied a review of the world press consisting exclusively of excerpts critical of the League of Nations. The second column, 'Mosaicos', was written by Roberto McLean Estenos, an editorial writer for the newspaper who used the pseudonym Viracocha. The principal intent of this column was to build public opinion in favour of a restructuring of the League. El Universal carried bulletins of the Stefani agency, Italy's distributor of all official news releases, and published daily the column 'Guerra al Dia' containing favourable military and diplomatic news on the conflict. After the
9 Peru 1935-6, Direzione Generale Affari Politici (DGAP). Ministero degli Affari Esteri (MAE). This document reviews the attitudes of Latin American nations towards the League of Nations stand against Italy and their position regarding recognition of the Italian empire. '0 'Peru, situazione politica nel I935', pp. 7-9; Quaderno no. 5I (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Guiseppe Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8.

366

Orario A. Ciccarelli

annexation of Ethiopia on 9 May 1936, the column was renamed 'Europa al Dia' and its principal objective at first became that of convincing readers of the 'fallacy' and 'illegality' of the League's sanctionist policies. Subsequently the column became an apologist for Italy's involvement in the Spanish civil war.1l Throughout the Ethiopian crisis the four newspapers accepted without reservations Italy's theses on the conflict and on the dispute with the league. They all presented the military struggle as a symbolic confrontation between civilisation and barbarism, with Italy carrying the banner of civilisation to a population subjugated and enslaved by a cruel elite and denied even the most rudimentary benefits of education, health care, and material comforts. From their endorsement of Italy's 'noble crusade' in Ethiopia, it followed logically that the newspapers would criticise the League's condemnation of Italy and the imposition of sanctions on Mussolini's government. Eventually the newspapers came to portray the League as a paper tiger, subject to the manipulation of certain major powers - principally England - and no longer capable of fulfilling the functions for which it had been founded. Consequently, the newspapers suggested either that the League be abolished or that it be restructured into regional organisations. Italy's military advances in Ethiopia, culminating with the occupation of Addis Ababa on 5 May 1936, and the subsequent annexation of Ethiopia, were the cause of exuberantly favourable editorials, with Viracocha paying Mussolini perhaps the highest compliment when he claimed that the Duce's achievement had surpassed those of Camillo Cavour and Giuseppe
Garibaldi.12

In addition to support for Italy in Africa, the Lima newspapers also created a very favourable image of Italian fascism through the publication of a plethora of stories on Italy and Mussolini in which they compared favourably the achievements of fascism with the 'tragic' shortcomings of liberal-democratic ideals. These stories and hundreds of others published on the Ethiopian issue, represented the height of Italian propaganda influence in Peru. They reflected, however, neither a commitment to fascism by the Peruvian news media nor the start of an Italian offensive to
1 See El Comercio,La Prensa, La Cronica, and El Universalparticularly for the months of March through July 1936. For an analysis of the treatment of the Spanish Civil War in the Peruvian press see Willy F. Pinto Gamboa, Sobrefascismoy literatura. La guerra civil espanolaen La Prensa, El Comercio,La Cronica (I936-1939) (Lima, I983). 12 La Cronica, 7 May 1936.

Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39

367

infiltrate fascism into Peru. They were the result of a successful propaganda campaign mounted by members of the Italian community to assist the mother country during one of its darkest hours. The intense propaganda campaign in Peru was organised in August 1935 at the instigation of the Italian minister Vittorio Bianchi and with the financial support of leading members of the Italian community. The Nucleo di Propagandawas created for the purpose of shaping Peruvian public opinion in favour of the Italian cause in Africa and to combat according to its leader Gino Bianchini - the anti-Italian and pro-Ethiopian and pro-League propaganda coming to Peru through the 'Anglo-Saxon and Jewish' news organisations in New York - meaning the Associated Press and United Press International.l3 By the beginning of 1936 the Nucleo had successfully turned the Peruvian press into an advocate of Italy's cause in Africa and into a seemingly fascist mouthpiece. Bianchini, the manager of the Empresas Electricas Asociadas, the company with a monopoly over Lima's electricity and its trolley system, could boast that the Nucleo had changed Peruvian public opinion on the Ethiopian crisis from one of opposition and/or apathy to one 'completely favourable to our cause and points of view'.14 This achievement resulted mainly from both the personal influence of leading members of the Italian community and from the monthly financial subsidies paid to the newspapers to guide them along the desired ideological path. Financial and ideological backers of the Nucleo included some of the most influential individual and institutions of the Italian community in Peru. The BancoItaliano, Peru's largest, was the major contributor to the Nucleo's funds with a minimum monthly sum of S/.i,ooo, and members of its board of directors, such as Gino Salocchi and Ernesto Magnani, added personal contributions of about S/.5o per month. The Empresas Electricas Asociadas made the second largest contribution to the Nucleo with S/.I00 to S/.i5o per month, while the chairman of its board, Pietro Vaccari, and its manager, Gino Bianchini, added a personal monthly contribution of S/.5o.'5 As the head of the Nucleo, Bianchini also underwrote major expenditures meant to influence leading Peruvian opinion makers. For example, in 1936 he paid Lit. io,ooo.oo for the translation and publication in Italy of Mir6 Quesada's In tornoagli scritti e discorsidi Mussolini, ten thousand free copies of which were distributed
Gino Bianchinito Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. Vittorio Bianchinito MAE, Lima, 13 June 1936 (DGAP), Peru 1936, busta 3. 15 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 8.
13 14

368 OrazioA. Ciccarelli in Europe and Latin America.16 Other contributors to the Nucleo's propaganda fund included the textile manufacturing company El Pacifico, leading businessmen like Luigi Nicolini, owner of the Nicolini Brothers flour mill and pasta factory, and Giovanni Batta Isola, proprietor of the San Jacinto textile and manufacturing firm. Their monthly contributions averaged S/.5o. In all the Nucleo received over S/.2,0oo per month or about four times the S/.5 5o per month budgeted for propaganda in Peru by the Ministry for Press and Propaganda in Rome.l7 The funds controlled by the Nucleo were strategically distributed among Lima's leading newspapers and their editors. The Nucleo paid the largest subsidy to El Universal, which received S/.75o a month for the publication of bulletins from Radio Roma as well as other articles of a general political and cultural interest. An additional S/.Ioo per month were paid by a Mr. Zozly, the newspaper's foreign news editor. La Cronica was paid S/.33o, with S/.8o going to the newspaper itself and the remainder to two editors, Roberto McLean Estenos (Viracocha), who received S/.i o, and Rauil de Megaburu, who was paid S/.ioo. A monthly sum of S/.330 was also paid to El Comercio,with the majority of it going to its editors, Clodoaldo Lopez Merino (S/.zoo) and Lamberto Cobos (S/.ioo), who doubled as one of La Prensa's own editors. Although the Nucleo's budget did not earmark a specific sum for La Prensa, Cobos ensured that the newspaper published articles selected for it by the Nucleo. 8 These and other expenditures assured the publication of hundreds of articles on the Ethiopian conflict favourable to Italy, and as many essays, columns, and editorials touting the progress made by Italy under Mussolini and offering the promise of even greater future achievements. It was this kind of unabashed reporting which helped form the impression that Peru was falling under Italian tutelage. In fact the newspapers' commitment to Italy and fascism appeared to depend on the Nucleo's ability to subsidise the Italian propaganda effort, on the community's commitment to it, and on Italy's continued interest in pressing the propaganda advantages already gained. None of these survived the end of the Ethiopian conflict.
16

Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 6. Bianchini also paid for the translation and publication of one of Jose de la Riva Aguero's books. Riva Aguero was one of the most vocal and articulate defenders of Italian fascism. 17 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 8. 18 For a complete listing of recipients of the Nucleo's funds see Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8. In I936 one dollar equalled S/.4.3 and Lit. 12.5 respectively. In 1937 the value of the sol had risen to 3.7 to the dollar while that of the lira had fallen to I9. to the dollar.

Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39

369

The successful conclusion of the Ethiopian crisis and the lifting of the League's sanctions against Italy in July 1936 marked the beginning of the decline of the Nucleo's intense propaganda activities in Peru. Members of the Italian community, arguing that official propaganda should again become the sole responsibility of the government and claiming that other community projects required their support, terminated their monthly contributions to the Nucleo.l9 This by no means meant that community members would stop defending Italy's good name. Indeed members of the community continued to use their personal influence with editors and publishers to obtain favourable treatment for Italy in the Peruvian press. Nonetheless, the end of the monthly contributions, and the consequent eventual demise of the Nucleo early in 1937, led to the severe curtailment of propaganda activities and to the loss of the immense influence Italians had enjoyed over the press throughout 1936. Although irritated by the community's decision to suspend contributions, and aware that the Nucleo's demise would quickly follow as a result, the Italian minister Talamo was forced to accept the contributors' decision. He did not wish to risk antagonising individuals who were continuing to support other activities and who could be counted on again for help in case of other extraordinary needs.20 The Italian community, the largest European colony in Peru since the i86os, represented one of the most successful Italian settlements in the Americas in spite of its relatively small size. (It had reached a peak of 13,000 in 1906 but had shrunk to 5,ooo by the 1940S.)21The per capita income of its members was probably higher than that of any other Italian settlement in the Western Hemisphere and its integration into Peruvian
Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Ministero per la Stampa e Propaganda (MSP), Lima, 3I March I937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6; Talamo to Emanuele Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru i937 busta 5. 20 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 8; Talamo to MSP, Lima, i8 and 31 March i937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. 21 The literature on the Italian community in Peru - particularly for the period before
1914 19

La vita italiana nella repubblicadel Peru; statistica, biografie(Lima, i9I ); Janet Worral, 'Italian immigration to Peru: I860-I914' (Ph.D Diss., Indiana University, 1972); Antonio Franceschini, italiana nell'America Sud(Rome, 1908); Gabriella del L'emigrazione historiadores latinoamericanistas europeos(Stockholm,2 5-26 May 198 ), pp. 551-99.

is growing. moresignificant The worksareEmilioSequi Enrico and Calcagnoli,

italianos procesode industrializacidn el Peruentre en Chiaramonti, 'Empresarios y finalesdel siglo XIX y la primera de guerramundial',in Actasde la sextareunion

370

Ora<io A. Ciccarelli

society one of the most complete. This impressive success was due to several factors. Italians in Peru, unlike the millions of others who had settled on the Atlantic coast of the Americas, had emigrated spontaneously and on an individual basis rather than as a result of governmental initiatives. Most of them had come from the Ligurian region of north west Italy and, unlike their counterparts in most of the Americas - ignorant and illiterate peasants escaping the exploitation of their landlords - the Italians in Peru were reasonably well-educated products of the Ligurian commercial and maritime bourgeoisie possessing entrepreneurial skills and often enjoying excellent contacts in Peru.22 Taking advantage of the country's booming guano and nitrate-based economy before the War of the Pacific (i 879-83) the Italians had become, after the English and the French, the richest foreign community in Peru. The Italians again enjoyed the benefits of Peru's economic expansion
between
1890 and I930

when they helped develop,

and came to control

substantial interests in, Peru's oil, sugar, textile, banking, insurance and manufacturing industries. By the 1930S the Italians had lost their preeminent position in the oil and sugar industries to the Americans and Germans respectively. Nevertheless they controlled over 50 percent of Peruvian banking activities, were a major force in the insurance industry, and owned over one hundred manufacturing plants. By 1936 the Italian mission in Lima estimated that 30 % of Peru's economic activity was in the hands of Italian nationals.23 The uniqueness of the Italian community in Peru was that, unlike the English, German, and American, its economic interests, geared mostly to the internal market, were affected more directly by internal than external political factors and economic strategies. Moreover, unlike the Japanese, the Italian community was dominated by businessmen and entrepreneurs born in or long time residents of Peru who had strong family and other emotional ties to their host country. Indeed, according to a 1938 Fortune magazine report, they represented 'the outstanding example of social incorporation of aliens to be found in all South America, and a striking departure from the Italian norm existing in Argentina and Brazil', where they kept themselves apart.24
22 Chiaramonte, 'La
13 (Lima,

migraci6nitalianaen AmericaLatina.El caso peruano', Apuntes,no.

23 Talamo to MAE, Lima, i6 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6. In 1936 the Italian

I983), p. 23.

minister in Lima conducted an extensive survey of Italianeconomic holdings in Peru and its findings were reviewed in this despatch. See also Chiaramonti,'Empresarios but they show the progress of the community over a seventy year period. The I876
(Jan.
1938),

24

italianos', pp. 552-77. 'Peru', Fortune, vol. I7:

p. 128. Statistics on Italians in Peru are imprecise

Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-39

371

The community's integration into Peruvian society and economy had made its members less than eager to embrace any cause that might endanger their peaceful and prosperous existence in Peru. Moreover, physical distance from the mother country and a paucity of new immigrants to reinvigorate the ageing community, had contributed to a deterioration of its cultural and linguistic integrity notwithstanding the schools and the numerous social and fraternal associations maintained by the community. This gradual deterioration struck Italian visitors and preoccupied diplomatic officials in Lima who tried unsuccessfully to arrest its progress. Integration into Peruvian life and declining cultural ties help explain the community's attitude towards fascist propaganda. Members of the community had overwhelmingly and enthusiastically gone to Italy's assistance during the Ethiopian crisis when they believed that their mother country was being unjustly treated. However, when the crisis had been successfully resolved, they saw no reason to continue supporting a propaganda campaign whose purpose had seemingly become the spread of fascism and whose impact on community interests might be negative.26 This was precisely the interpretation given by the Italian minister Talamo to the community's suspension of contributions to the Nucleo. In a 1937 despatch Talamo remarked bitterly that some of the leading members of
Peruvian census put the size of the Italian colony at 6,990; by I891 the population had declined to 4,5 I I as a result of the War of the Pacific and of the economic and political crises that followed it; by 1906 the community reached its peak with I3,000; by 1927 Italians in Peru numbered about 8,000 and by I940 only about 5,ooo according to Italian estimates and 3,774 according to the Peruvian official census. All these numbers, with the exception of the first and the last, come from Italian sources. They may not reflect accurately the real size of the community because they tend to include Peruvianborn children of Italian residents who were legally Peruvian. Peruvian statistics between 1876 and 1940 are even less reliable as no formal census was taken between those years. The decline in the number of Italian residents occurred mostly outside of Lima. In the Peruvian capital the size of the community declined less dramatically, from a high of 3,283 in I876 to a low of 2,491 in 1940. The size of the Italian community in Peru was miniscule compared to Argentina in 1924) and Brazil (285,oo000 in 1940), but its national importance was (1,00,000o not. 25 Talamo to MAE, Lima, i6 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. I938 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9; Ugo Faralli, Italiani al Peru (Rome, I941), pp. 42-43. According to Talamo the community's weakened ties to Italy were explained in part by the very little effort and money spent by Italian governments on efforts to maintain the cultural integrity of resident Italians. 26 By the end of 1937 the Lima Fascio, reorganised and revitalised by Talamo, numbered only 403 card-carrying members many of whom, according to Talamo, seemed not to demonstrate the proper enthusiasm for fascism. See Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.

372

Orazio A . Ciccarelli

the community 'seem to live in the continuous fear of any kind of Italian or fascist affirmation',27 and in another he accused them of being uncooperative, indifferent, and passive towards the mother country.28 In his final despatch the exasperated Talamo told his government that the greatest obstacles he had faced in carrying out the legation's activities had been presented by the Italian community itself rather than by foreign competitors.29 Talamo's successor, Ugo Faralli, similarly charged that Italy benefited little from the success enjoyed by the Italian community in Peru and argued that Italy should concentrate on the education and training of the children of resident Italians if it wished to have in the future a more cooperative and loyal following.30 The community's caution also led it to criticise Rome's courting of President Benavides as potentially damaging to Italian interests in Peru.31 As successful practitioners of the art of survival in the unpredictable world of Peruvian politics, Italians had traditionally sought to eschew any course of action that might arouse antagonism by avoiding intimate association with any political faction. They believed that Rome was undermining the community's future security by its pursuit of the Peruvian president who ruled only through control of the military establishment. Indeed, Benavides did not have a popular base. He was
vehemently opposed by the leftist Alian.a Popular Revolucionaria Americana

(APRA), Peru's largest party, and by the rightist Union Revolucionaria (UR), the party which had received the second largest number of votes in the 1936 presidential election after the APRA-supported candidate.32 Benavides had also failed to gain the loyalty of the elite some of whose members considered the President ill-equipped to occupy the office, while others viewed him as too weak to deal with the gravest threat to Peru's
28

27 Talamo to MAE, Lima, io July 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5. Ibid.; Talamo to MAE, Lima, I6 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. 29 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. 30 Faralli, Italiani nei Peru, pp. 42-3. 31 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 10 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5. On a number of occasions community leaders had warned Talamo that too close an identification by

32

Italy with the Benavides regime might bring about anti-Italian measures by the government that would succeed it. For interestinginsights into Peruvianpolitics during the Benavidesregime see Thomas del M. Davies and Victor Villanueva(eds.), 3oo documentos la historia APRA (Lima, para del electorales APRA: 1978); Thomas M. Davies and Victor Villanueva(eds.), Secretos de y documentos 1939 (Lima, I982). The 1936 presidentialelection was correspondencia nullified by Benavidesand rescheduledfor 1939.

Italian Fascists in Peru, I9j33-3

373

stability, the APRA party. Because of Benavides' lack of support outside of the military, the Italian community believed that Rome should distance itself from the regime or risk future retributions from an oligarchic government which, in all likelihood, would succeed it. The community's warning was not heeded. Rome, believing that Benavides was potentially its most important ally,33 continued assiduously to court the Peruvian President causing, in the process, further community alienation from their country's policies. The demise of the Nucleo di Propagandapresented Talamo with the challenge of continuing to maintain the high level of propaganda activities reached in 1936. Although disappointed by the community's suspension of contributions, he had philosophically agreed with its members that propaganda activities should have been an official function of the Italian government. Talamo argued in despatches to Rome that to make propaganda activities dependent on private contributions resulting from official 'mendicancy' cast a shadow on Italy's dignity and placed an official function such as propaganda on an 'unstable and artificial' foundation. The only proper course of action, he insisted, would be for the Ministry for Press and Propaganda to increase its subsidies to the ministry in Lima for propaganda activities.34 However, not only was the Ministry reluctant to pay in order to maintain the same level of propaganda activities, it was also unwilling to increase the subsidy in order to pay off the S/.8, 88.45 debt accumulated by the Nucleo in 1936 and financed personally by
Bianchini.35

The reluctance of the Ministry for Press and Propaganda to increase contributions for propaganda activities clearly reflected the Italian government's growing financial crisis as a result of the massive
33 The Italian government made no serious attempt to establish close ties with important rightist political groups opposed to Benavides. Italy believed that the Peruvian president afforded the best opportunity for Italy to enhance its interests there. 34 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MSP, Lima, 3I March I937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5. 35 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8. The Nucleo's debt had more than doubled by July I937. Bianchini had continued to finance the debt personally although he had resigned himself to the probability of never being repaid. See Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. The only solution offered by Rome was to use part of the meagre S/.55o per month appropriated to pay off the debt to Bianchini. See Guido Rocco to Talamo, Rome, 4 Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

13

LAS 20

374

Ora.io A. Ciccarelli

incurred both in Ethiopia and Spain.36 It may also expenditures demonstrate Italy's continued relegation of Latin American affairs to a minor position in its geo-political considerations in spite of Galeazzo Ciano's inculcation of fascism into the Foreign Ministry after 1936 and the fascist rhetoric generated by Italian officials for Latin American consumption.37 Diplomatic correspondence between Lima and Rome in 1937 clearly underscores the Italian government's lack of interest in taking advantage of the propaganda gains made in 1936. Despatches from Talamo show him continuously pleading with the Ministry for Press and Propaganda for more funds or appealing to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to intercede in support of his request. He repeatedly assured Rome that Peru was 'worth the effort', because public opinion there could be won 'with a relatively minor effort', and that from a base in Peru, Italy could exert influence in neighbouring countries.38 He also reminded Rome of the superb calibre of the Italian colony in Peru, of its solid economic position and prestige, of the favourable attitude of the Benavides government toward Italy, and of the potential expansion of armaments sales to the Peruvian armed forces.39 All these advantages, he warned, would be lost very quickly if propaganda activities were discontinued because 'normally, only currents generally unfavourable to us penetrate [Peru]'.40 He predicted serious damage to Italy's prestige and to the unity of the Italian community which saw the curtailing of
Macgregor Knox. Mussolini Unleashed,1936-194I. Politics andStrategyin Fascist Italy's Last War (London, i982), pp. 30-3. In 1938 the reserves of the Bank of Italy had shrunk from over 20,000 million lire in 1927 to under 3,000 million in 1939. The Ethiopian war and the subsequent pacification campaign, plus intervention in Spain, had drained the treasury. From 1934-5 to 1939-40 over 5 % of Italy's state expenditures of 249,000 million lire went to Ethiopia, Spain, Albania and other colonies, and to the military. In I940 Foreign Minister Ciano warned that Italy was broke, that its reserves were down to ' ,400 miserable millions' and that when they were spent 'we will have nothing left but our eyes to cry with'. and 1936 the Italian Foreign Ministry had remained relatively untouched 37 Between I922 by the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy. In 1936 the appointment of Count Galeazzo Ciano signified the beginning of the Ministry's shift towards fascism with personnel and policy changes reflecting more faithfully its goals and ideology. See H. Stuart Hughes, 'The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism', and Felix Gilbert, 'Ciano and His Ambassadors', in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton, I953). 38 Talamo to MSP, Lima, 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. 39 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 8; Talamo to MSP, Lima, i8 and 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. 40 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.
36

Italian Fascists in Peru,

933-39

37 5

propaganda activities as a return to the days of'liberal insensitivity' and the severing of spiritual ties with the mother country.41 The choice left to Italy, Talamo wrote, was not whether to reduce already insufficient funds but whether or not 'to liquidate the entire structure of our press and propaganda work here'.42 All the pleas, warnings, and impassioned arguments failed to loosen the purse strings of the Ministry for Press and Propaganda.43 Even when late in 1936 Galeazzo Ciano himself had urged that propaganda activities in Peru be intensified 'so as to produce favourable repercussions on other South American States',44 this appeal was rejected as were those made by Talamo. Guido Rocco, General Director for Foreign Press Services, wrote to Emanuele Grazzi, General Director for Transoceanic Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who had forwarded Talamo's many requests for more funds, that the subsidy given to the legation in Lima was relatively higher than those 'assigned to diplomatic posts having more important tasks in the area of press and propaganda'.45 If anything, Rocco continued, the Ministry would be more inclined to reduce rather than increase the subsidy.46 In relaying Rocco's response to Talamo, Grazzi in effect told the minister in Lima to stop requesting more funds since they would not be forthcoming.47 Talamo, of course, did not follow his friend's advice and continued to bombard the Ministry with pleas for more funds until his diplomatic tour in Peru ended in December 1937. In the end the only major victory won by Talamo on the propaganda issue was its continued funding at the same rate of Lit. 28,ooo per year, which in reality constituted a 40 % reduction because of the recent devaluation of the lira.48 This decrease in purchasing power meant that most of the pro-Italian articles printed in the Peruvian press in the second half of 1937 appeared largely as a result of Bianchini's persuasive powers.
41

Bianchini to Talamo, Lima,

30

42 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 3 April 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6. 43 Talamo enlisted the able and patriotic Bianchinito scale down the Nucleo'sbudget in

June 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6.

a order to make it more palatableto Rome. Bianchiniproposed to El Universal budget calling for drasticreductions,eliminatingsubsidies to certaineditors and government officials, and transferringsupport of Italia Nuovato private sources. Although these measureswould have cut in half (to S/. I090) the Nucleo's budget, they also were rejected
as too extravagant. Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, I5 and 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6. Galeazzo Ciano to MSP, Rome, 9 Dec. I936 (DGAP), Peru I936, busta 3. Rocco to Grazzi, Rome, 24 Feb. I937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6. Ibid. Grazzi to Talamo, Rome, 3 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5.
13-2

44 45
46

47

48

376

Ora.io A. Ciccarelli

He cajoled his contacts on the Lima newspapers to publish articles and photographs Talamo had received from the Ministry of Popular Culture. This approach could hardly ensure propaganda success, and Bianchini reminded Talamo that payments had to be made every time non-Italians were used to spread propaganda, since only a few Peruvians like Jose de la Riva Agiiero and Carlos Arenas Loayza could be counted on to support Italy unselfishly. Otherwise, Bianchini wrote, 'we must resign ourselves to the abandonment of systematic press campaigns of the type conducted in the last two years because we have lost the collaboration of the newspapermen we utilised for just such works of propaganda'.49 The insufficiency of funding led to the disbanding of the Nucleo in 1937, followed by a dramatic decrease in the appearance of pro-Italian articles in the Lima press and a noticeable change in the tone of the international news published in Peru. A major cause of this change was the press's dependency on AP and UPI,50 international news agencies considered by Talamo anti-fascist and thought to supply most of the misinformation which for the first time was infusing a hostile tone in 'a press which until now had been excellent toward us'. If this trend was not halted, he warned, anti-fascism would become entrenched in the press and in Peruvian public opinion.51 Talamo was probably unrealistic in believing that the Lima press could again be influenced as thoroughly as it had been in 1936. Even if the Italian government had chosen to invest much larger sums, successful control of the press, made highly unlikely by the reluctance of the Italian community to lend financial assistance and to embrace fascism, was rendered virtually impossible by the growing United States-inspired antiAxis campaign spreading through Latin America. Until the middle of the I930S the Western Hemisphere seemed so secure from external threats that the United States army and navy war planners 'had to display much dexterity in conjuring up a plausible enemy to plot against'.52 However, by the end of 1936 and for the remainder of the decade the United States government came to believe that the security of much of Latin America - and by extension that of the United States - was imperiled. The confidential information from and concerning Latin America reaching Washington was usually of an alarmist nature and it was this information
49 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 9 Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 7. 50 Talamo to MAE, Lima, I6 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5. 51 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 28 Aug. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 3. Talamo pointed

specifically to APRA as the principal source of anti-totalitarian propaganda. He referred to the party as 'the school for anti-fascism'. 52 Haglund, Latin America, p. z.

Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-39

377

which helped mobilise United States officials into an active and aggressive policy in defence of American security.53 What concerned Washington was the uncertainty over whether the Latin American republics would or could resist the threats and/or the blandishments of the Axis powers. This uncertainty, according to Haglund, 'began to be experienced mildly at first, by American policy makers in late 1936; by 1938 the uncertainty had turned to dread; by May and June 1940 the dread had turned to paranoia'.54 It is debatable whether the Axis threat was as serious as imagined by the United States.55 Nevertheless, the string of imperialistic successes by the Axis powers in Europe, Africa and Asia had rendered United States officials understandably concerned about the security of the Western Hemisphere.56 The growing concern in Washington over the Axis threat to the Western Hemisphere, fuelled by Latin America's leftist and democratic forces and by British intelligence reports,57 led the United States to undertake a series of diplomatic, military, and cultural initiatives intended to develop continent-wide security cooperation.58 At the same time, the United States launched a propaganda campaign exalting liberal-democratic principles and portraying Latin America as a continent sliding into
53

Ibid., p. i6.

54 Ibid., pp. 34, 52-3, 56, 65-6. It was after February I937 that United States officials started to sense that matters were not going well in the Western Hemisphere and that the danger of Nazi and fascist penetration was growing. Such concerns were deepened when late in 1937 Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany and Japan, and Getulio Vargas established a dictatorial regime viewed on both sides of the Atlantic as representing a definite shift by Brazil towards the Axis. 55 Ibid., p. 78. Ironically, while the United States believed that the Axis powers were making headway in Latin America, Italy, Germany, and Japan were equally convinced that the United States was making greater advances. In the case of Peru, Italian ministers there had repeatedly informed Rome of the dominant position enjoyed by the United States and of the unlikelihood that it could be dislodged. 56 Adding greatly to United States concern was the appeasement policy practised by England and France culminating in the Munich agreement. The outcome of the conference had raised doubts in Washington about the reliability of England. It had also increased the probability, as seen by United States officials, of an Axis attack on America. See Haglund, Latin America, pp. 52-3. 57 Ibid., pp. 51-2. Some of the more influential Latin American works were: Ernesto Giudici, Hitler conquista America (Buenos Aires, 1938); Genaro Arbaiza, 'Are the Americas Safe?' CurrentHistory, vol. 47, no. 3 (Dec. 1937), pp. 29-34; Manuel Seoane, Nuestra America y la guerra (Santiago de Chile, 1940); Hugo Fernandez Artucio, The in Nazi Underground South America (New York, 1942). 58 Haglund, Latin America, p. 78; Samuel Guy Inman, Inter-American Conferences, 1826-19i4: History and Problems(Washington, I964), pp. i60-95. For an official response to cultural penetration in Latin America see J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginningsof U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948 (Washington D.C., 1976), pp. 1-157.

378

Ora.io A. Ciccarelli

the Axis orbit. Germany, and to a much lesser extent Japan, were the totalitarian nations identified, particularly after 1938, as posing the greatest threat to the security of the Americas. Nonetheless, at least until 1938, Italian activities in Latin America were presented in as sinister a way as those of Italy's Axis partners.
Throughout 1937 and I938 United States diplomatic despatches from

Lima painted an alarming picture of Italian activities in Peru. R. M. de Lambert, the US charge'in June 1937 expressed the concern to his superiors in Washington that 'Peru is being strongly drawn toward the Fascist system',59 and in October of the same year, ambassador Laurence Steinhardt alarmingly wrote of the 'intense Italian activities in Peru', of the Italian government's 'none-too-well concealed determination' to exploit Peru's resources after first acquiring 'a firm grasp on various Peruvian Government agencies, including military and naval aviations'.60 He warned that 'the steadily increasing Italian influence in Lima should not be underestimated' and that Italy's determination to exploit the advantages already gained in Peru should be 'viewed in light of present
Italian imperial
ambitions'.61

By early 1938 Steinhardt

reported

that

Italian influence had grown to 'serious proportions' and that Italy's objective was to turn Peru into an Italian colony. He warned that 'while the Peruvian flag would remain the national emblem and the country nominally retain its sovereignty, only a relatively moderate further extension of Italian influence over the present government would virtually place the vital interests of Peru under Italian domination'.62 These alarmist official reports of Italian threats to Peruvian sovereignty were accompanied by paranoid expressions of concern from United States journalists and writers. They charged that the rich Italian community in Peru, its leading institutions, such as the BancoItaliano, and its educational, cultural, and social organisations were instruments of the Italian government and as such were tools to be used in the spread of fascism in the South American country. Italy's nefarious activities, they charged, were succeeding because President Benavides was a fascist sympathiser intent not only on establishing a fascist state, but on turning control of the armed forces over to Italian missions. They pointed out that Benavides had brought an air force mission to Peru to take control of the aviation arm of the navy, he had invited a police training mission to run the
59 60 61

Ibid.

R. M. de Lambert to USSD, Lima, 9 Oct. 1937 (USSD), file no. Steinhardt to USSD, Lima, 9 Oct. I937 (USSD), file no. 723.65/7.

710,

no. 5192.

62 'Memorandum on Italian Fascists and German Nazi Activities', file no. 3850.

Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39

379

institution and to organise a spying network intended to silence opponents of Benavides and fascism, and he had allowed the establishment of a Caproni aircraft manufacturing plant outside of Lima thus permitting Italy the use of Peru as a base for the potential conquest of South America and for possible attacks on the strategically crucial Panama Canal. Finally, the news media also alleged that Peru's slide to fascism was being assisted by the country's major newspapers, which made fascism appear to be the wave of the future while liberal democracy was portrayed as a decaying and antiquated ideal, by the Peruvian Church and by the country's elite both of which were reportedly propagating fascist ideology and assisting Italy in its penetration of Peru.63 The dire warnings emanating from the United States press, and generally shared by the government in Washington, were wildly exaggerated. The Italian community, as we have seen, was not a tool of the fascist government. Benavides was not a fascist, a point repeatedly made by the Italian minister in Lima.64 Peru's military institutions were
63

The list of works is particularly long after I937 when the alarmist tone described was assumed even by some of the period's well known Latin Americanists. See, for example, Samuel Guy Inman, DemocracyIVersusthe Totalitarian States in Latin America (Philadelphia, 1938); Carlton Beals, The Coming Struggle; Beals, 'Totalitarianism in Latin America', Foreign Affairs, vol. I7, no. i (Oct. 1938), pp. 78-89; Beals, 'Black Shirts in Latin America', Current History, vol. 49, no. 3 (Nov. 1938), pp. 32-4; John Gunther, Inside Latin America (New York, 194I); Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors. Other Countries(New Haven, 1941); David Effron, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Seventeen 'Latin America and the Fascist Holy Alliance', Annals of the American Academy, vol. 204 (July I939), pp. 17-25; Richard F. Behrendt, 'Foreign Influence in Latin America', Annals of the American Academy, vol. 204 (July I939), pp. i-8; Gaston Nerval, 'Europe Versus the United States in Latin America', Foreign Affairs, vol. 15, no. 4 (July 1937), pp. 636-45; Nathaniel Weyl, 'Latin America Faces Fascism', The New Republic,vol. 96, no. 1243 (28 Sept. 1938), pp. 209-o0; N. P. McDonald, 'The Axis in South America', Fortnightly, vol. 151 (1938), pp. 336-43. For one of the few non-alarmist tracts on the subject, see J. Fred Rippy, 'The New Pan Americanism and the Fascist Threat', in Robert E. McNicoll and J. Riis Owre (eds.) Lectures Delivered at the Hispanic American Institute, no. i (Coral Gables, I939). Rippy minimises the fascist threat as well as the Latin Americans' attraction to that

ideology. 64 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 9 Feb. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 10 July, 7 Aug., 12 Nov., io Dec. 1937. Since 1934 Italian representatives in Lima had written hopefully of Benavides' fascist 'sympathies', 'tendencies' and 'orientations', continuously raising the possibility that Benavides would openly embrace his real ideological inclinations. Such an optimistic picture of the Peruvian president was permanently shattered by Talamo in 1937. In his despatches to Rome he increasingly questioned Benavides' usefulness to fascism and Italy and concluded finally that the president's 'liberal-democratic background, age, and temperament precluded the possibility' that he either would or could be a fascist.

380

OraZio A. Ciccarelli

under the control of Peruvian officers largely loyal to Benavides.65 The Caproni plant, plagued by production and personnel problems, manufactured only about a dozen airplanes.66 The Peruvian elite, seen by Italian officials in Lima as socially selfish and politically unsophisticated, contained only a small group of men the Italian government could rely on.67 The Peruvian press was influenced less by ideology than by dominant political currents and financial considerations; the Italians had dominated the four major Lima newspapers in I936, but after the Nucleo was disbanded and the Italian contributions to propaganda declined, the positive coverage of Italy and fascism in the Lima press declined along with it.68 And finally, the Italian government did not have the means, the will, nor the interest to press forcefully for a fascist penetration of Peru. By I937 the Italian treasury had been drained by Italy's adventurist foreign policy in Ethiopia and Spain. More importantly, by late 1938 the Italian government, lacking a clear and consistent Latin American and increasingly overshadowed by its German ally, had become policy69 a minor player in Latin American affairs.70 Finally, in the case of Peru by 1938 even the Italian mission in Lima, which had earlier pleaded with for fascist Rome to take advantage of the available opportunities had grown more cautious and less optimistic as a result of the expansion, growing United States-led offensive against totalitarianism. According to Italian officials in Lima, United States economic and political influence in
Davies and Villanueva, 3oo documentos, 24. The authors forcefully argue that the army p. was never opposed to Benavides and that it supported the president at every turn. 66 Talamo to MAE, Lima, i6 Nov. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 8 Sept. 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 8; Alcide Fusconi to Ministero dell'Aeronautica, Lima, 23 July 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta II; 'Peru, Situazione politica nell'anno I938', Lima, 4 Apr. 1939 (DGAP) Peru 1939, busta i2; Steinhardt to USSD, Lima, 12 Nov. 1937, file no. 723.65/II. 67 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 9 Feb. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Ciano, Lima, 9 Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 7. Two good examples of Peruvian fascists, according to Talamo, were Riva Agiiero and Carlos Arenas Loayza. They, Talamo reported, understood fascism and could be counted on to assist its expansion in Peru. Talamo's remarks on the paucity of real fascists within the Peruvian elite is not shared by Jose Ignacio L6pez Soria who in El pensamiento fascista (190o-194y) (Lima, I98i) attaches the fascist label to a rather large segment of the Peruvian elite. 68 Talamo to MAE, Lima, i6 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 28 Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 3. 69 The lack of clear direction was evident even in Brazil where Italy made a major effort in 1937 to extend its influence by supporting the Integralista party. See Ricardo Silva Seitenfus, 'Ideology and Diplomacy: Italian Fascism and Brazil (1935-38)', Hispanic American Historical Review, 64, no. 3 (Aug. I984), pp. 503-34. The author's conclusion is that, unlike Germany and the United States, Italy did not have a well-defined objective in its relations with Brazil.
65

70 Alan Cassels,

Fascism (Arlington

Heights,

I975),

pp. 79-80.

Italian Fascists in Peru, '933-39

38

Peru was so overwhelming as to render pointless any effort at dislodging it.71 They suggested instead that Italy should try to protect its position in Peru against the expanding activities of Germany and Japan, and that it should concentrate its efforts on strengthening cultural and political bonds within the community.72 By 1939 these facts were apparently acknowledged by United States officials whose concerns about Italian fascism became negligible compared to the dread of German subversive activities.73 Nevertheless, in 1937 and 1938 United States propaganda regarding Italian activities in Peru was intense. Its effect was to change the tone of the Peruvian press regarding Italy and fascism, and to strengthen the predisposition of the Italian community to proceed cautiously in regard to its support of Italian propaganda activities and of Italy's assiduous courting of Benavides. Still another effect of the growing United States concern with Axis activities in Latin America and of the diplomatic and propaganda campaign it launched against them was APRA's public embracing of a unified continent-wide campaign against the machinations of the 'black international'. As part of this undertaking, the party published manifestos, pamphlets, books and newspaper articles warning of the imminent absorption of Peru into the Axis sphere and blaming the Benavides government, along with the country's elites, for the impending loss of Peruvian sovereignty. Benavides was accused of selling Peru to Italy rather than see it governed by APRA; that he had already turned control of the police and air force over to Italy and was facilitating Italy's subjugation of the army; that the Peruvian president had given Italy control of Peru's industry, commerce and finances, and that he was
71

Haglund, Latin America,p. 164-202; Farallito MAE, Lima, i Aug. 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. Faralli suggested to Rome that Italian efforts in Peru should be concentratedon 'saving whateverwas salvageable'.Faralli'spessimismstemmedfrom his perceptionof growing United Statesinfluencein Perudue largelyto its propaganda efforts.The belief that the United States was dominantin Peru had been expressedby

Italian representatives in Lima throughout the 1930s. It was also the view often expressed by Italian observers of Latin America - see, for example, Gioacchino Volpe, 'Italia e America Latina' in Mediterraneoorientale,protocolli di Roma. Italia e America Latina. Le notiie prime. Societa dele Nationi (Milan, 1937), pp. 177-92. 72 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru I940, busta i6. Italian ministers in Lima saw Japan and Germany as competitors in Peru not allies. This point was made repeatedly in despatches whose content is summarised in the legation's annual reports on Peru's international relations. Faralli to MAE, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 73 Haglund, Latin America, pp. I64-202; 1940, busta i6. According to Faralli, even among the more democratic sectors of Peruvian public opinion, Italy was not associated with its Axis allies, Germany and Japan - a situation Faralli found embarrassing.

382

Orazio A. Ciccarelli

allowing the Italians to brainwash Peruvian children.74 Control of Peru, the apristas warned, was only one of Mussolini's aims. His major goal was occupation of the Panama Canal and subjugation of all of South America.75 This, according to the apristas, would be achieved in part by using the fleet of aircraft being built up in Lima by the Caproni factory. The company, APRA charged, had already built most of Peru's 'five hundred planes' and had the capacity to construct 'three hundred more' per year.76 APRA's alarmist portrayal of a scenario linking Benavides to an Italian drive to subjugate Peru and the rest of South America was patently false. Also false was the party's increasing identification with democracy's struggle against totalitarianism in the Americas. Party documents show that its leader Victor Raiil Haya de la Torre had been eager to make opportunistic agreements with Nazi and Fascist organisations if they could enhance the party's chances for power.77 Thus, the party's antitotalitarian propaganda was intended to further sour United States relations with Benavides, expedite the president's removal from power, regain legality status for the party - denied it by Benavides - and use its popularity and organisation to gain power.78 The end of the Benavides regime in 1939 did not bring APRA to power. However, the party did in fact help raise the level of the anti-Axis campaign being waged in the Americas. It also provided journalists in the United States with additional ammunition with which to portray Italy as a threat to Peruvian independence, to nations bordering Peru, and to United States political and commercial interests on the west coast of South America. The growing anti-totalitarian sentiment being fomented by the United States and other parties in the Western Hemisphere came to be reflected increasingly in the Peruvian press, important segments of which by 1938
74 Le6n de Vivero, Avance del imperialismofascista en el Peri (Mexico D.F., I938), pp. 75 11-13, 15-17, I9. Ibid., p. I8.
76

Ibid. The total number of airplanesin the Peruvian arsenal was Io and they were mostly of Italian, United States, and French make. See Livio Garbaccio to MAE, 4
73-6, 79-80,
83-4.

Apr. 1939, p. 9 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 12. 77 Davies and Villanueva, Secretos electorales,pp. 68-72, Benavides (pp. 21-4).

Torre even attempted to engage the Chilean Nazi Party in the struggle against

Haya de la

78

Ibid.See the documenton pp. 21-4 as an exampleof APRA's effortsto alarmthe United Statesabout Benavides'supposed ties to the 'black international'.Hayaalso presented himselfand the partyas supportersof a continent-wideallianceof all democraticforces
against totalitarianism. See also Faralli to MAE,
ii

Peru I938, busta 9. Farallireported'violent attacks' by the United States ambassador against Italian influence on the Peruvianpress.

Feb. and Io May 1938 (DGAP),

Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-j9

383

had embraced demands for the safeguarding of Peru's economic and political independence against Axis threats.79 Japan, and to a lesser extent Germany, rather than Italy, were the countries accused of threatening Peruvian sovereignty. Nonetheless, as Talamo indicated, the tone of the press had changed, and it no longer seemed to be within the reach of Italy to influence the press as it had done in 1936 nor to redirect its course into one favourable to fascist ideals and goals.80 That Italy was spared from the attacks of the Lima press was due largely to the prestige enjoyed by the Italian community and by its members' successful integration into Peruvian society. Part of the reason, however, at least until 1939, was the warm relationship existing between Italy and the Benavides regime.81 Throughout his six-year tenure President Benavides and several of his officials, most notably Lima's Prefect Jorge Meave Seminario, proved themselves to be friends of Italy and protectors of her good name against detractors, so that even when anti-Axis propaganda intensified after 1937, rarely did anti-Italian material appear.82 For example, when the columnist Ayax (Victor Andres Belaunde) wrote a column in which he implied that King Victor Emanuel was a mere figurehead, Talamo angrily protested to the director of La Prensa and threatened to have the newspaper closed by the government unless the matter was corrected immediately. The following day the newspaper printed a retraction and apology, the editor who had let the offending story pass was dismissed, and the column itself was temporarily
discontinued.83

In 1939, as anti-fascist propaganda increased, the acting Italian minister

79 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 14 Dec. i937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937. 80 In the questionnaire to all legations and embassies circulated in 1940 by the Ministero della Cultura Popolare- the ministry which in I937 had replaced the MSP - one question enquired about the possibility of fascist success if active propaganda were pursued. The minister in Lima answered that the moment was not propitious for an open propaganda campaign because of the strong 'ultra-democratic and ultra-nationalistic winds' blowing across Peru. See Italo Capanni to Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MCP), Lima, 5 May 1940 (DGAP), Peru 194I, busta 17. The experiences of the Japanese community in Peru were a source of concern for the Italians. Throughout the 1930S the anti-Japanese campaign in Peru was fierce, leading to official restrictions on Japanese immigration and commercial activities. For an analysis of the forces behind the campaign see Orazio A. Ciccarelli, 'The Anti-Japanese Campaign in Peru in the 193os. A Case of Economic Dependency and Abortive Nationalism', CanadianReviewof Studies in Nationalism (spring I982), pp. 113-33. 81 Italian ministers to Peru repeatedly and consistently referred to Benavides as a friend of Italy and admirer of Mussolini although they never labelled him a fascist. 82 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, i Sept. I939 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta I2. 83 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 April 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

384 OrazioA. Ciccarelli Livio Garbaccio appointed a special team of observers, drawn from the ranks of the Italian community and assisted by the Italian police mission, to survey Lima's 'cultural scene' for the purpose of identifying and eliminating insulting material. The squad apparently took its assignment to heart and scoured Lima's movie houses, cabarets, and theatres for any evidence of anti-Italian material. Thus, it had the play 'The Italian Murderer' suppressed even though it was not truly offensive and was being presented by a small theatrical group in a rundown theatre of the city; the squad also forced a Brazilian band in a local night club to remove from its repertoire a song mimicking Faccetta Nera, an Italian ballad written in conjunction with imperial expansion in Africa; and it was able to have offensive portions of commercial films cut and to have unfavourable editorial comments deleted.84 The squad's success was attributed largely to the support received from Prefect Meave Seminario. Married to an Italian, he used threats of closure and outright censorship to keep potential critics of Italy in check.85 Official sympathy and reduced levels of propaganda activities after 1937 helped shield Italians from the more severe aspects of the anti-totalitarian
propaganda of the late 1930s. Italian officials in Lima after 1938 had

changed their propaganda tactics to reflect the reduced financial resources available to them and the cautious attitudes of the Italian community. Thus, beginning in 1938 Italy funded a propaganda campaign which, while still attempting to encourage favourable treatment in the news media, sought to strengthen cultural and political bonds with the community and safeguard Italy's position against inroads being made by the Japanese and Germans. To achieve those ends, Rome finally gave permission to the legation in Lima to establish a press office - Oficina PrensaItaliana (OPI) - under the directorship of Toto Giurato, a leader of the Lima Fascio and publisher of its organ, L'Italia Nuova. The office carried out all the Legation's press services in addition to the transcription and translation of the Radio Roma service, baptised locally as AgenZia Italia. The office also prepared the bi-weekly Spanish language bulletin II Littorale, offered free and thus used extensively by provincial newspapers. The Press Office also circulated articles from the 'Roma Press' agency of Buenos Aires and from the AgenZia dell'Italia e dell'Impero whose translated and edited bulletins were disseminated to daily newspapers in Lima and Callao. The Press Office also distributed photographs
84 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, I July I939 (DGAP), Peru I939, busta 12. 85 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, I Sept. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1938-9, busta 13-I5; to MAE, Lima, 8 Nov. 1939 (DGAP), Peru I939, busta I2. Faralli

Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-39

385

originating from the Ministry of Popular Culture, published Italia Nuova and RomanaGens, another official publication of the Fascio, arranged local radio broadcasts of news bulletins and cultural programmes of general interest produced by professors of the CollegioItalianoin Lima,86'oriented' the activities of sympathetic Peruvian newspapermen, and contracted for publication of favourable stories on Italy. The most ambitious contract was signed with Rafael Larco Herrera's La Cronica,which published two special numbers on Italy; the first in January 939 ran to 20 pages; and the second, in July of the same year, contained 24 pages.87 The operations of the new propaganda structure did not always run smoothly. Budget appropriations were erratic and usually insufficient for the fulfillment of the stated strategy; the news bulletins from Radio Roma were transmitted at a time when few people were at home, and the frequency used was usually unclear.88 Of more serious consequence were the shortcomings afflicting Radio Roma's news service. Carried only by El Comercioand dependent on the translation and transcription of bulletins from Radio Roma, this service, according to Minister Faralli, 'does not shine either for the volume or importance of its news and even less for the freshness of its materials'.89 Faralli complained to Rome that Radio Roma transmitted only ten to twelve news stories instead of the thirty to fifty required to fill the space set aside by El Comercio,and that their content was usually outdated, irrelevant, and extracted from non-original sources. Even news events originating in Italy were reported more quickly and more completely by the AP and UPI. Faralli pleaded with Rome for immediate improvements in the operations of Radio Roma. He urged that there be a very substantial increase in the number of news stories, that they be current and interesting, and that they deal with various aspects of Italian life rather than with summaries of stale journalistic opinions. Without such improvements, he warned, the Radio Roma service might be dropped. El Comercio was already under pressure from AP and UPI to do so or risk the loss of its contract with the two North American organisations. A similar threat, according to Faralli, had earlier been used successfully against La Crdnicaand it might succeed
86 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 9. 87 Faralli to MAE, Lima, i8 March 1938 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9; 'Peru: situazione politica nell'anno XVII', pp. 27-8, Quaderno no. 5I (DGAP), Peru I940, busta I6.
88 89

Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, 31 Aug. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1938-9, to MCP, Lima, 5 May 1940 (DGAP), Peru I94I, busta 17.

busta 13-I5;

Capanni

Faralli to MAE, Lima, io March

1938

(DGAP), Peru 1938, busta io.

386

Orario A. Ciccarelli

again, especially if El Comerciocould not be guaranteed a larger and consistent supply of fresh, interesting and relevant news.90 Although irregularly, El Comerciocontinued to carry Radio Roma's service; its shortcomings, however, were never resolved.91 As a result, the most consistent source of news about Italy became the weekly fascist organ Italia Nuova, whose readership was almost exclusively confined to members of the Italian community, making its propaganda value minimal. Italia Nuova had never been deemed a very important propaganda vehicle. In fact, from time to time its termination had been recommended as an economy move. Its value increased slightly after 1940 when propaganda outlets in the Peruvian press became increasingly difficult to find. Nonetheless, the newspaper remained so narrowly focused on the activities of the Lima Fascio as to have minimal influence on the Peruvian
reader. 92

Marginally more successful, if only because of the brevity of the experiment, was the Italian mission's effort to turn venerable old Italian institutions in Peru towards fascism, such as the Societb di BeneficenZa
and the Circolo Italiano, to revitalise the ones created since
1922,

and to

create new organisations more directly under the control of the Italian minister in Lima. This cultural propaganda campaign got underway in 1937 as part, it appears, of the new direction taken by the Foreign Ministry in Rome following the appointment of Ciano as its leader. The men appointed to head the mission in Lima, Talamo, Faralli, and Italo Capanni, were, unlike their predecessors, militant fascists. Talamo and Faralli in particular proceeded aggressively, but ultimately unsuccessfully, to 'discipline' the Italian community.93 They appointed faithful fascists to head their institutions, tried to infuse new vitality into fascist organisations
such as the Fascio, the Istituto Italo-Peruano, and the Ente del Libro, and

founded and nurtured chapters of the Dopolavoroin Callao and Lima social clubs where members of the community could engage in social intercourse and be subjected to political indoctrination.94 Even greater
90 Ibid. 91 Capanni to MCP, Lima, 5 May I940 (DGAP), Peru 194I, busta I7. 92 See Italia Nuova for the years 1939-41. The BibliotecaNacional in Lima does not have the complete run of this weekly newspaper. 93 Talamo to MAE, Lima i6 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. Talamo frequently commented on the difficulty of converting Italian institutions to fascism because of the resistance to it by community members. 94 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE, Lima, 5 June I937 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta ii; Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. I940 (DGAP), Peru I940, busta i6.

Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39

387

attention was given by the Italian ministers to the education and indoctrination of the young. Holding little faith in the possibility that the older community members could be made to defer their interests to those of the mother country, they saw in the early indoctrination of the young the future formation of a more pliant community.95 To this end they forced a change in the curricula of the CollegioItaliano in Lima, the Maria Margheritaschool in Callao, and in the schools run by the Italian-based Salesian brothers. They also forced the hiring of fascist teachers from Italy, sent deserving students to Italy, organised youth summer and winter camps outside of Lima, and conducted reunions throughout the year in the same premises used by the Dopolavorowhere the young people sung, played, and discussed current events.96 These methods of cultural propaganda may have served in time to strengthen community loyalty to fascism. However, the outbreak of war in Europe and Italy's intervention in it in June 1940 brought the campaign to an early end. For a brief period members of the community again rallied to the defence of the mother country and organised a committee - ComitatoItaliano Fondo Unico Pro Patria - to collect monthly pledges for the purpose of conducting propaganda activities in defence of Italy's position.97 Anaemic by 1936 standards, this organised campaign included the publication in Spanish and the free distribution of Italia Nuova, the daily collection and distribution via mail of Radio Roma's news bulletins to two thousand 'of the people of major consideration in this country', the diffusion of some of the same news bulletins to local of newspapers, and a one hour nightly transmission on Radio Internacional a programme called Ora Italiana.98These and other minor efforts won very little sympathy for Italy, and they were unceremoniously terminated when the United States declared war on the Axis powers, and Peru proceeded to curtail all activities by citizens of those nations.99 The anti-Axis measures undertaken by the Peruvian government during the war were aimed largely at the Japanese and German communities. The
95 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. i937 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9. 96 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE, Lima, io March 1938 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta ii; Garbaccio to MAE, 'Peru, relazioneannuale, 1938', Rome, 4 April 1939 (DGAP), Peru I939, busta 12; Farallito MAE, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru I940, busta I6. 98 Ibid. 97 Capannito MAE, Lima, i8 July 1940 (DGAP), Peru I940, busta i6. 99 The curtailingof Italianactivities had intensifiedthroughout I941, although the real target of the restrictivelegislation had been Japan. See MinisterCapanni'sdespatches
for I94I and early
1942.

388

Ora.io A. Ciccarelli

Italian colony was relatively unaffected because it had never been perceived as a serious threat to Peruvian sovereignty. The community's commitment to fascism had never been strong, and its support of fascist propaganda activities had been subordinated to the greater need of safeguarding the Italians' economic and social position in Peru. Moreover, the Italian government had not been willing to commit adequate resources and energy to Latin America, judging its interests there less crucial than those in Europe and Africa. Thus, Italy's most aggressive efforts to influence public opinion in Latin America came in connection with the Ethiopian crisis when support of the American republics was needed to combat the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy. Once that crisis passed Italy's interest in Latin America again abated. Thus, if, as charged, Italy had ever had tutelage over Peru, it was lost as early as 1937 when the Italian community reduced drastically its contributions to propaganda activities, and the Italian government resisted demands to assume a larger financial role in their continuation. By 1939 the increasingly aggressive anti-totalitarian propaganda waged by the United States, APRA and sectors of the Peruvian press, combined with Benavides' replacement by Prado, had ensured the eventual success of liberal democratic ideas in Peru, and for Italy the loss of all remaining gains made during the Benavides years.