III NEGLIGENCE

B. DEFENSES 4. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

AFIALDA V HISOLE 85 Phil 67 REYES; November 29, 1949 NATURE: Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo FACTS - This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. While tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as consequence of his injuries. The action was filed by the sister of Loreto, and contended that the mishap was due neither to Loretos own fault nor to force majeure. 1 - She uses Art.1905, CC (now Art.2183 ) as ground for the liability: The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. - Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action, which the CFI granted. Hence, the appeal. ISSUE WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker (as opposed to a stranger) HELD 1. NO Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. Reasoning - The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the CC, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been negligent or at the same code. - Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff contends that art. 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. - The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for any damages it may cause and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. - In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. - On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art. 1902, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
1

- In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa, the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be a veritable accident of labor which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905, CC. The present action, however, is not brought under labor laws in effect, but under Art.1905. Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.

Page

ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) 179 SCRA 5 PARAS; November 6, 1989 FACTS - 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls) attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law, upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. - 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. - 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he could not see any INELCO lineman. - Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, there was a hollow wound. In the afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there. - Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The cause of' death was ,'circulatory shock electrocution" - In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, which sought to prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. (5) They also presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly, the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. The switch must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29, 1967 - CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attys fees

Page

- CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees ISSUE WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO HELD NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the deceased went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCOs consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCOs negligence Reasoning - INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. - In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office. - INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision, except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.

5. DUE DILIGENCE
RAMOS V PEPSI COLA 19 SCRA 289 1967 NATURE: Appeal from a CA decision FACTS - The facts with regard the accident that Andres Bonifacio caused is not in the case. The Court limited its ruling on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant Pepsi Cola from 2 liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There was, however, a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent. - The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of one Anasco with regard the process and procedures followed by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. The SC ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the credibility of Anasco is one of fact and not of law. It went on to stay that the CA is a better judge of the facts. ISSUE WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability HELD NO - The Court ruled that based on the evidence and testimonies presented during the trial, Pepsi Cola exercised the due diligence of a good father in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. This being the case, the Company is relieved of any responsibility from the accident. Reasoning - In its ruling, the court citing its ruling on Bahia as follows: From this article (2180) two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or master either n the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after the selection, or both, and (2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law), and consequently may be rebutted . - It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. - It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy itself that Bonifacio possessed a drivers license. A background check was done and he was required to submit various clearances, previous experience, and medical records. He was also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving tests prior to being hired as driver. In terms of the aspect of supervision, the petitioners raised no questions. Given this, the proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good father of a family has been met. Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible, Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
2

Page

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) 223 SCRA 521 REGALADO; June 21, 1993 FACTS - At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. - While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. - As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiffappellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. - She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2). - A complaint for damages was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision. - Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner MMTC, a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees. - Defendant Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. ISSUES 1. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without the presentation documentary evidence, prove that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field 2. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees HELD 1. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even subject evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we

cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. - Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. - It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. It is entirely within each of the parties discretion, consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby, to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position, provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. - Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. 2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family, which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the observance. - Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. - Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. - The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180. - Article 2180 applicable only where there is an employeremployee relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The diligence of a good father of a family required

to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. - With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. - Due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. - In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. - Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's award, without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof, especially since private respondent did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a matter of right.

6. PRESCRIPTION
KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) 178 SCRA 289 GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989 FACTS - The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. - The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the

Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. Petitioners claim: - that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve - that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD YES - Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. - In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period. Disposition petition is dismissed.

Page

ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) 178 SCRA 526 GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989 NATURE Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC Judge of Manila and Allied Banking Corp.,"1 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. FACTS - Mar 25, 1977 - Respondent Yujuico, a ranking officer in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a member of the family owning control of the said bank, obtained a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. Private respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK. - March 25, 1977 the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Phil. It was followed by another resolution ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. - In the Memorandum of Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK, Allied acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK, including the receivable due from Yujuico. - Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI Manila (now RTC). - First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. This decision declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK. It was then that Yujuico filed the third party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed against him 3 by the petitioner to the proposed third-party defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. - Second and current proceeding (1987) Yujuico filed a motion to admit Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. The complaint alleged that by reason of the tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he should not be held liable thereon. RTC Judge Mintu denied the third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental answer. The case was re-raffled where presiding Judge Panis reiterated the order made by Judge Mintu. Both parties filed for motions of partial reconsideration, which were both denied. - CA, in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied motions, rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. The RTC judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was ordered to admit the third-party complaint. - Petitioner claims that the cause of action alleged in the thirdparty complaint has already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference," petitioner asserts that under the CC on quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25, 1981. On the other hand, private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12,1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became final and executory. It is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on
A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third party complaint is independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint.
3

June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7, 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. ISSUE 1. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint 2. WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed HELD: 1. YES - The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. - The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. There is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note, they are seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the third-party complaint, it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. While these allegations in the proposed third-party complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit, it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. - The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim" are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based, or whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiffs claim. (Capayas v CFI Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent herein, can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) abovementioned. 2. YES - The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. - It is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. (Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Admistration) - While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted. Disposition petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void, and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party complaint.

7. DOUBLE RECOVERY
Art. 2177, CC. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Page

IV. CAUSATION
A. PROXIMATE CAUSE 1. DEFINITION
BATACLAN V MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957 FACTS - Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after midnight. While the bus was running very fast on a highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four passengers could not get out, including Bataclan. It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. Ten men came to help. One of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the four passengers trapped inside. - The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. ISSUES What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers? HELD The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus. - see definition of proximate cause under A1 - It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, "If through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected -even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

-(I guess this case says, if not for the overturning of the bus then the leak and the fire wouldnt have happened)

Page

FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao) 208 SCRA 714 MEDIALDEA; May 8, 1992 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property for the reemptying of the septic tank of Agdao. Invitations to bid for cleaning out the tanks were issued, which was won by Bascon. However, before the date they were to work, one of the bidders, Bertulano, and four other companions including an Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. The City Engineers office, upon investigation, found that the men entered without clearance or consent of the market master. They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly empty. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body. Their lungs had burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the waste matter in said tank. *Di nakalagay sa case, pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia Fernando yung Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay yung asawa nya - Upon dismissal of the case by the TC, petitioners appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment and rendered a new one, granting the families of the deceased men P30k each in compensatory damages, P20k each as moral damages and P10k for attorneys fees. - Both parties filed their separate MFRs; the CA rendered an amended decision granting Davao Citys MFR, dismissing the case. Hence this petition. ISSUES 1. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence 2. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims HELD 1. NO - Although public respondent had been remiss in its duty to reempty the tank annually (for almost 20 years), such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the market master about the need to clean said tank, it immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Public respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. Also, public respondents failure to empty the tank had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead and was air-tight. In fact, the public toilet connected to it was used several times daily all those years, and all those people have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the petitioners witnesses. The only indication that the tank was full was when water began to leak, and even then no reports of casualties from gas poising emerged. - Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts. Neither did they present competent evidence to corroborate their testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindadas testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been complied with. - The Court also does not agree with petitioners contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed around the area of the toilets and septic tank. As defined in Art 694 of the NCC, they are not nuisances per se which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. - Petitioners contention that the market master should have been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. Work on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the

winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on Awardshence, there was nothing to supervise. 2. NO - Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. To be entitled to damages, one must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendants negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. A test for such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. which states that a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. - A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by opening the tanks cover. The accident is thus of the victims own doingan ordinarily prudent person should be aware of the attended risks of cleaning out the tank. This was especially true for the victim, Bertulano, since he was an old hand to septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job. The victims failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. - When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in what he attempts to do. As the CA observed, the victims would not have died, had they not opened the tank which they were not authorized to open in the first place. They find it illogical that the septic tank which had been around since the 50s would be the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20 years later, especially since no other deaths or injuries related to the tank had ever occurred. Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED

Page

URBANO V IAC 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ JR; January 7, 1988 NATURE: Petition to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS ON oct. 23, 1980, Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. As a result of which, Javier suffered a 2inch incised wound on his right palm. On November 14, 1981, which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980, Javier died in the hospital. - In an information, Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City. - The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. The lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. He was sentenced accordingly. - The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal. - Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980. He states that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his

bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. ISSUE WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death HELD: YES. - The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." - The record is clear that - The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. - PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." - The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. - Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected. - Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be

Page

impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied) - Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. - In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. - Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. - A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause DISPOSITION :. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL) VS. IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO, MARCH 10, 1987 NATURE: Petition for review FACTS -About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal, Makati) from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken a shot or two of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. At Bangkal, Makati (not far from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. (PHOENIX), which was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIOs lane). The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel (CARBONEL), its regular driver, with the permission of his employer PHOENIX, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. DIONISIOs claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix PHOENIX + CARBONELs claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass; if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. TC: in favor of Dionisio, awarded damages in favor of Dionisio IAC: in favor of Dionisio, reduced the damages awarded ISSUES Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial justice without remanding the case to the lower court since both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners) 1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night 2. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; 3. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck 4. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Substantial Issues: 5. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked a. WON the drivers negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel b. WON the court, based on the last clear chance doctrine, should hold Dionisio alone responsible for his accident 6. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver 7. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified

Page

HELD: FACTUAL 1. NO. none was found with Dionisio. He was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. (It is important to nd determine if he had a curfew pass to shed light to the 2 and rd 3 factual issues) -Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to Makati Med testified that none was found with Dionisio. Although Dionisio offered a certification attesting that he did have a valid curfew pass, the certification did not specify any serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. 2. YES. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that people gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisios Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID NOT have its HEADLIGTS ON. Ratio. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule but rather as part of the res gestae. Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. -Dionisio claimed that he was traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuynos testimony was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. -BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck. 3. YES. Phoenixs theory more credible than Dionisios. DIONISIOS CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck PHOENIXs CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection (less than 200m away). 4. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE ANYTHING. EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati med + Dionisio admitted he had taken a shot or two - not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. "One shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently. SUBSTANTIAL 5. YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that

consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts a. NO. Besides, this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United States, the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited. - the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause; Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. FROM PROF. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter am the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause." "Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. x x x In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
4

Page

within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; x x x. The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it - - " b. NO. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. -The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 6. NO. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. 7. YES. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners, the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. As to the other awards of damages, sustain. 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be home by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be

home exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES) 234 SCRA 435 PUNO; July 25, 1994 NATURE: Petition for review of CA decision FACTS - FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks. These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. in amount of P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of P11.4T due Oct.12. - To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T from his savings account and have it deposited with his current account with PILIPINAS BANK. - PILIPINAS BANKS Current Account Bookkeeper made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. - On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. - It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The same thing happened to the Oct.12 check. The payee then demanded a cash payment of the checks face value which REYES did if only to save his name. - Furious, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. That was only when they noticed the error. RTC: ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages, P100T moral damages, P25T attorneys fees, as well as costs of suit. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and P25T attorneys fees and costs of suit. ISSUE 4 WON Art.2179 of NCC is applicable HELD: NO - For it to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Definition of Proximate Cause: "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. - The bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. Dispositive Petition denied.

10

. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
5

Page

QUEZON CITY V DACARA PANGANIBAN; JUNE 15, 2005 NATURE: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS -On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. -As a result, Dacara, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. -Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however, yielded negative results. -Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son, filed a Complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon. -Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. -In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident, and that the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latters negligence and failure to exercise due care. -RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and other costs of suit. -Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. -Hence, this Petition ISSUES 1. WON petitioners negligence is the proximate cause of the incident 2. WON moral damages are recoverable 3. WON exemplary damages and attorneys fees are recoverable HELD 1. Yes. -Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. -What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. -The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. -That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower courts finding: Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to

11

the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman, none was found at the scene of the accident. 5 -The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to negligence which renders the City government liable -Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light traffic, as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. -These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. -It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. -Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondents car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion. 2. No. -To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury--whether physical, mental, or psychological--clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. -Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. -In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondents son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. -It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. -Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. -Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings.

3. Yes. -Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. -In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his car. -Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasidelicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. -Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. -Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. -The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. -Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.

the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto, in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem of the three children, Conchita Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for the purpose of recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta. Judge awarded damages to the widow to which decision Araneta appealed. ISSUE; WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof HELD: NO. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away. Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED.

2. DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER KINDS REMOTE

GABETO V. ARANETA 42 Phil 252. October 17, 1921 Street FACTS: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb, by one or the other it makes no difference which and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside

Page

URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES) 157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ; January 7, 1988 Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then IAC FACTS:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one responsible for what happened. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. Appellants claim: -there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death -the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980 - Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death

12

Art. 4. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x x." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
6

Page

13

HELD: Yes. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Reasoning: 6 -The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. -The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. -In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: "x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief. It is as follows: "x x x 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.' (at pp. 185-186) -The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the cause -Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. - Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If,therefore,the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. -Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remaquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118). "'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. '(45 C.J. pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)

CONCURRENT
FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) 297 SCRA 30 REGALADO; October 1, 1998 NATURE Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable FACTS - On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4. - Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. - When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. - After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the

Page

Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. - The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25. PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE - The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85: SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. - In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. - Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. xxx xxx xxx Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD YES. - The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. PILOT

- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. - Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. MASTER - In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. - Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. - The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC. CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS - As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. - There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.

14

Page

SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL 17 SCRA 1088 CONCEPCION; August 31, 1966 NATURE: Pet. for review by certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. As a result, Custodio was injured and died. To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks. Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. hereinafter referred to as the carrier and its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence 2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver HELD 1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance. 2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to

ride on the running board of the bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. Dispositive Judgment affirmed.

3. TESTS BUT FOR

VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957 NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite FACTS - Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about 18 passengers, including the driver and conductor. - At about 2am, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. - the three passengers Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. - Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus. Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank. - That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Bataclan. His widow, Salud Villanueva brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. - the CFI awarded P1,000 plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan ISSUES 1. WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon, thus making him liable. 2. WON the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus. HELD 1. NO.

15

Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blowout, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their 7 goods. 2. YES Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. - According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers - The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. - In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for

the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Note: This case was under the heading but for. I dont know if the italicized phrases are pertinent, but these were the only ones that contained but for. DISPOSITION In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased to P6,000 and P800, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively.

SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC & CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., 189 SCRA 158 MEDIALDEA/Aug. 30, 1990 NATURE: CERTIORARI FACTS: - This case is for recovery of damages for the 3 jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision between the Phil. Rabbits bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo. - Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical injuries. - It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio, the jeepneys right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an unbalanced position. -Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). -The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit - Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway, or after stopping for a couple of minutes, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the said deaths and injuries. - At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair. - A criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. - Manalo was eventually convicted and was imprisoned. The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. ***As regards the damages. - Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses (owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon, (jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbits driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. - Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. - As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. - Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. (the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas. - Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were for medical expenses, burial expenses, loss of wages, for exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. - Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

ART. 1733 ART. 1755 ART. 1759 ART. 1763

7

Page

16

Page

- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-use during the period of repairs. - TC: found the couple and Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of the contract of carriage with their passengers; ordered them to pay the damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it was the jeepneys insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney party for actual damages. - IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found delos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was negligent. ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS ARE LIABLE. REASONING: TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS CONCERNING MANALOS NEGLIGENCE. (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact; (3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road \was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was removed;" (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac, as a result of the collision, and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured on the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus. SC: -The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al. v. Buo et al.) -On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence: would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. ***With regard to the substantial factor test: - The IAC held that . . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither

foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney. -The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC. But the SC was not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. - Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided the collision because as was shown, the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. - Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. - To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him. - Also, It was shown by the pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of space and time. - That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane: Under such a situation, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn. -SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice. - In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the 2 New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger 3 was due to a fortuitous event (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657). - To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . . -In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus

17

Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75). ***On the sole liability of the Jeepney Owners (excluding Manalo) -the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. CA, et al., April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). - if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal, contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC. DISPOSITION: TC S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. INC WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.

CAUSE VS CONDITION
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC v IAC (DIONISIO) 148 SCRA 353 FELICIANO; Mar 10, 1987 Nature: Petition to review the decision of the IAC FACTS: - at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. - Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away from his car. - The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of the street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights or any socalled "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. - The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning. - Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. - As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. - Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the lower courts ruling, with modification on award of damages. Petitionerscomments - the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. - if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. (NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which SC noted in is decision) Private respondents comments

Page

18

- the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix ISSUE: WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisios negligence (driving faster than he should have, and without headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck. HELD: - it is the drivers negligence. (see previous digest) - ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c, page 5 of outline) - petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States. These arguments, however, do not have any validity in this jurisdiction. - Even in the United States, the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear: Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter (is) the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause." - the truck driver's negligence, far from being a "passive and static condition", was an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision would not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck drivers negligence

MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO 99 PHIL 117 MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956 NATURE: Review by certiorari of a CA decision FACTS: - Efren Magno went to his stepbrothers 3-story house to fix a leaking media agua, (downspout). He climbed up to the rd media agua which was just below the 3 floor window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua, electrocuting him and killing him. - His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal. ISSUE WON the Companys negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate cause of the death HELD No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur). Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter's length of 6 feet. - The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. Disposition CA decision reversed. Complaint against company dismissed RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY STREET; November 19, 1921 NATURE: Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS: Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a locomotive engine. The fire was communicated to four houses nearby. All of these houses were of light construction, except that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials. Plaintiffs say

that the company failed to supervise their employees properly and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without smokestack protection for arresting sparks. They also say that the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the company Bataan coal. Defense said Rodiguezas house stood partly within limits of land owned by company. Rodrigueza didnt mind the warnings from the company. His houses materials included nipa and cogon, this indicates contributory negligence on his part. Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which appealed. ISSUE: WON damage was caused by Rodriguezas contributory negligence HELD: Yes. - Manila Railroads defense is not a bar to recovery by the other plaintiffs. - There was no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon companys property. His house was there before the railroad companys property. He may be at risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the companys negligence. - The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage was the negligent act of the company. That Rodriguezas house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that cant be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE because that condition was not created by himself and because his house remained by the toleration and consent of company and because even if the house was improperly there, company had no right to negligently destroy it. The company could have removed the house through its power of eminent domain.

Page

19