FORM AND EMPTINESS: AQUINAS AND NAGARJUNA

Paul OGrady

This paper compares arguments from Aquinas and Nagarjuna on contingency and necessity, examining the ways in which they arrive at opposed positions. However, neither set of arguments is unproblematical and both require appeal to further positions to support them. A curious parallelism begins to emerge between the positions when seen with their background assumptions, despite their obvious differences.

Introduction
In this article I wish to compare Aquinass argument for a metaphysical source of necessity in the third way of the famous ve ways of the Summa Theologiae with Nagarjunas rejection of such a position in the Mulamadhyamikakarika and assess the relative merits of each position. However, before beginning the comparison, I wish to discuss some possible objections to the very idea of such a project. The notion of incommensurability has come to be used more and more in recent times in philosophical discussions. Gaining its currency from Kuhns work in philosophy of science where he suggests that there may be different paradigms for scientic research which are incommensurable with each other, the term has come to have wider use. It is used to signal a multiplicity or heterogeneity of approaches to a thinker or topic, none of which can claim pre-eminence. So, for example, in a recent survey of studies of Thomas Aquinas, Fergus Kerr (2002) repeatedly notes the incommensurability of approaches taken, generally viewing this in a positive light, as a sign of the fruitfulness and pluralism of studies in this area. However, talk of incommensurability often comes up short when faced with issues about truth. While difference may well be celebrated and methodological or hermeneutical agility embraced, few enough want to commit themselves to relativism about truth. That is, most recognise that accepting relativistic accounts of truth leads to problems of self-refutation and self-stultication. So, to avoid that cul-de-sac, diversity of interpretation is emphasised, which by precisely afrming difference, avoids problems about contradiction. Things which simply differ do not contradict each other. To form a contradiction there has to be a connection, one has to afrm p and not-p, whereas with difference there is p and q, different things happily co-existing. Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 6, No. 2, November 2005
ISSN 1463-9947 print/1476-7953 online/05/020173-188 q 2005 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14639940500478687

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One way of ensuring such peaceful co-existence is to emphasise the notions of the hermeneutical and the contextual. Reading texts in context allows the proliferation of difference, since the differences of context disallows rst-order debate between positions. So, for example, Hume comes out of an entirely different context to that of Aquinas, and hence his concerns cant address the same issues as Aquinas. A theologian reading Aquinas comes with different questions and presuppositions to a philosopher, and so they have incommensurable approaches. A fortiori, Aquinas and Nagarjuna have different contexts, different cultures, different questions, different inheritances, different presuppositions and so different positions. Therefore, on this outlook, it would be just too crude to think of them as actually dealing with the same issue. Overemphasising incommensurability is a generally unfruitful way of reading thinkers. It evades the fundamental issue which motivates the inquirer, the quest for truth. While contextualisation is vital and hermeneutical situating is essential, these are nevertheless but preparatory for dealing with substantive issues. General arguments for this view have been offered and I shall not rehearse them here (see OGrady 2005). However, I believe that a specic demonstration of the engagement of such philosophers with each other will dispel some of the doubts deriving from considerations of incommensurability. What emerges in the case of Aquinas and Nagarjuna is that they genuinely address the same metaphysical issue: that both approaches fall prey to various problems, that a curious structural parallelism emerges in their positions as they strive to avoid these problems and that elements of Aquinass position may well prove vital to a coherent defence of that of Nagarjuna. In the next section I shall introduce the two protagonists, contextualising them and providing background information for the specic debate. The third section looks at the key point of conict between them. Initially there is a broader conict of general positions which crystallises into a specic disagreement on a basic question in metaphysics, namely whether there has to be a source of metaphysical necessity in existence (Aquinas), or whether absolutely everything can be contingent (Nagarjuna). After presenting the sharp clash in views, I then want to examine various problems besetting both positions. Aquinass argument is notoriously difcult to interpret, and I shall examine attempts to make sense of it. Nagarjuna, likewise, lends himself to different schools of interpretation and questions of the stability of his position arise. In the sixth section, I want to suggest that modications of both positions required by their internal tensions push them both to an oddly similar sequence of metaphysical distinctionswherein the differences between them soften, if they still dont disappear.

The Protagonists (a) Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas (12251274) was a thirteenth-century Italian Dominican friar who is best known for the voluminous writings he produced over a relatively

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short career of 20 years as a university teacher in Paris and at various places in Italy.1 He studied and taught at the University of Paris at one of its most turbulent stages, just over half a century after its foundation. Two main opposed tendencies in the university were a conservative religious appeal to Platonically inspired thinking, fostered by the religious authorities and a radical appeal to an interpretation of Aristotle, heavily inuence by the Islamic philosopher Averroes, which ourished in the arts faculty. Aquinas attempted to steer between these two tendencies and engaged in controversies with both sides. Therefore Aquinas, in some respects, exemplies the Buddhist doctrine of the middle way. However, his approach is not a kind of syncretism, seeking easy assimilation of disparate views by blending them all together. Rather, there is a genuine openness to other participants in the search for truth and an attempt to seek out what is true in other positionsignoring whether they appear to be friends or foe. Aquinas notes,
just as in a courtroom you cant make a judgement until you have heard both sides of a case; so also, if you are going to be a philosopher, you have to listen to all the thinkers with their opposing positions in order to have more resources for making a good judgement.2

This even-handedness goes with a tough-minded approach to the questions he addresses. Reading Aquinas, one gets a sense of a relentless intellect making distinctions, clarifying, arguing, seeking supporting argumentation, analysing claims, offering reasons. The argumentation is compact, explicit, tight and has little rhetorical excess. Using William Jamess typology of philosophical intellects, however, this tough-minded approach is linked to tender themesthe existence of God, free will, virtue ethics, immortality. The mode of argumentation is closer to Russell or Ayer than to Augustine or Pascal. He combines a religious sensibility with an analytical approach to philosophy.3 His philosophical work constitutes a genuine innovation in the history of western thought. Sometimes derided as merely Christianised Aristotelianism, Aquinas uses Aristotle in distinctly unAristotelian ways. His account of existence, the eternity of the world, the virtues, the soul, while all based in a generally Aristotelian framework, nevertheless constitute developments of Aristotles work (see Owens 1992). A recent scholarly issue has been a re-evaluation of the role of Platonism in his work. This comes out most clearly in his discussion of the metaphysics of participation (dismissed by Aristotle as a mere metaphor) and in his account of the divine ideas. Aquinas harnesses together both Greek traditions and articulates a rational position which attempts to make sense of the JudaeoChristian worldview (see Booth 1983; Boland 1996). Hence Aquinass work constitutes one of the classic articulations of a philosophical theism. The account is subtle, non-anthropomorphic and metaphysically nuanced, drawing on Jewish and Islamic sources. He presents an account where there is space for faith to co-operate with reason, but in the reasoned parts his claims make no special pleading. It is intended as rationally compelling for any disinterested party. Now clearly this position doesnt have the

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same force in the modern world where Aristotelianism is by no means universally acceptedwhich has led to some curious contortions among theologians wanting to read Aquinas as really a deist and not attempting to offer straightforwardly philosophical defences of his beliefs (Kerr 2002; Rogers 2004). Finally one might note that Aquinas, as a pre-modern, appears unusually attuned to contemporary movements in philosophy which seek to throw off some of the more characteristic features of modern philosophy. Since he has no investment in Cartesian subjectivity, or in solipsistic notions of the self, his views can seem interesting to those in recovery from modernity. The agenda of his epistemology is not set by scepticism. His view of ethics doesnt suffer from the characteristic modern split of on the one hand having realistic psychology with a dubious account of normativity, versus on the other a worked-out story of normativity in a thoroughly implausible psychology. Hence a steady growth in secular interest in Aquinass work in recent years.

(b) Nagarjuna
It is probable that Nagarjuna was a second-century Indian Buddhist monk. Little is known with any certainty about his life.4 We do know that he wrote a number of important textsbut issues about the exact number of authentic texts and the status of the extant texts are fraught. Schools of Buddhist thought distinguish themselves by their interpretations of his texts. His most important work is called the Mulamadhyamikakarikaor fundamental verses on the middle way.5 The middle way is traditionally ascribed to the teaching of Buddha who, like Socrates, put nothing in print. Despite many pious protestations about the inability of putting such sublime teaching into mere human language, an enormous amount of writing was generated by it, including philosophical treatises.6 Classical Indian philosophy was basically characterised by systems which presented views on reality (Brahman) and the individual soul (Atman), grouped together under the label orthodox by virtue of their recognition of the Vedas as an authoritative vision of the world. Buddhism was unorthodox in that it rejected any special role for authoritative revelations, privileging individual experience, rejecting the view that there is such a thing as the stable reality called Brahman and rejecting the notion of a substantive self (Anatman) (see Williams 1998). Early schools of philosophical Buddhism resembled Logical Atomism in western philosophy (see Gudmunsen 1977). Reality was analysed into conventional and ultimate reality. Conventional reality was a construction made on the basis of the more fundamental atomistic realities which existed, called Dharmas. Such Buddhist schools were called the Abhidharma and much of their work consisted in giving extensive lists of categories of Dharmas. For such schools, the notion of the ultmate furniture of the world made senseeven if it consisted of a kind of Heraclitean eeting play of atoms. Nagarjuna inaugurated a new kind of approachdenying the very validity of the idea of the ultimate furniture of reality. This approach was called Madhyamika

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and it consitutes the philosophical basis of one of the two main strands of Buddhismthe Mahayana tradition. Tibetan Buddhism and Zen Buddhism both, in different ways, represent developments of the Mahayana ideal and see Nagarjuna as a key gure in their development. The key idea articulated by Nagarjuna is emptiness (Sunyata). The most salient feature of reality is this emptinessnot substantial things, or even eeting atoms. However, making sense of this idea of emptiness is central to the philosophical divisions within Buddhism. Buddhism after Nagarjuna had a ourishing philosophical diversity. Some held that Nagarjuna advocated that the fundamental nature of reality is ineffable, that rational thought cannot reach to it, yet non-rational, intuitive thinking, whose best exemplars are in various kinds of meditative practice, can pierce the veil of illusion and get to reality as it is (see Battacharya 1990). Others rejected this approach, holding that the core doctrine is that there is no ineffable reality, that emptiness really is empty itself and that one has to constantly beware of falling into reifying modes of thought.7 Others still, saw Buddhism as articulating genuine scepticism (see Matilal 1986). One remarkable feature about Nagarjunas position is that the philosophical positions and manoeuvres taken by him are the ones which usually characterise militantly antireligious thinkersfor example Sextus Empiricus, Hume or Nietzsche. He appears as a naturalistwith rejection of design, of essence, of causation, of necessity. Nevertheless these views are articulated within a thoroughgoing religious culture, with meditative practices, rituals and monasticism. In different Buddhist traditions he is treated as a saint or a revered teacher of the dharma. So there is this paradox of what is in the West extremely antireligous thought being housed in what would be seen in the West as archetypally religious practicereeking of what Hume disdainfully called the monkish virtues.8

The Conict
It certainly looks, from a general survey of their work, that Aquinas and Nagarjuna defend opposed philosophical positions. Aquinas can be characterised as a metaphysical realist. He holds to the reality of essences, of genuine causal powers and the ability of mind to grasp reality as it is. Nagarjunas system is much more sceptical. His basic method of argument is the reductio ad absurdem, which he uses against Indian realists to attempt to show the instabilities and problems of their systems. Many of the positions he attacks are ones held by Aquinas (i.e. attacking essences, attacking genuine causal powers). At this general level one might be tempted to adopt the strategy outlined in the Introduction and suggest that they offer incommensurable views of the world and that it is an issue of tradition, training, culture or temperament as to whether one nds Aquinas or Nagarjuna congenial. One might characterise it in the manner that debates between theists and atheists have come to be seen in some quarters, as expressing outlooks on the world, strategies of interpretation of reality.9 However, such an easy resolution of the debate goes against philosophys

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interest in trying to achieve a reasoned analysis of the conict. It is a too ready concession to a general scepticism about the possibility of achieving insight and truth by means of reasoning. It is possible that this latter may well be the truth of the situation (i.e. scepticism may be true)but it cannot be taken as the initial default position. Much more work needs to be done to show that it is true and that a resolution is not available. In the meantime it is important to try to understand how exactly they differ from each other. The general clash of approach concretises in a specic point on which they hold opposed views which arises as part of Aquinass sequence of arguments for theism.10 There is a great deal of interpretative debate as to how Aquinas actually viewed the famous ve ways for demonstrating the existence of God.11 Does he think of them as a rational foundation for the rest of his edice? Or are they rather internal to a religious worldview and should be interpreted accordinglynot as free-standing rational supports for that worldview? Are they to be construed as original arguments or are they perfunctory presentations of what Aquinas and his contemporaries viewed as non-gainsayable truths accepted by all rational people? For the purposes of a dialogue with Nagarjuna I shall read them as freestanding metaphysical arguments designed to convince a philosophical opponent of the truth of the conclusion.12 The third of the ve ways is the one which is most relevant to this discussion. Aquinas begins by noting that things in the world come into being and pass away out of being. He then argues that everything cannot be like this. If everything were like this, then at some time there would have been nothing. If there ever had been nothing, there would be nothing now. Since that is patently not the case, then it must be the case that not everything is coming to be and passing away, but there are some things which must benecessary beings. Given such necessary things, Aquinas asks whether this necessity comes from themselves or from another? If from another there would be an innite regress unless one postulates a necessary being whose necessity is not explicable in terms of any other being. Aquinas, as is his fashion, says this is called God. There are two main parts to this argument. An initial stage argues to the existence of necessary beings. Such necessity is not logical necessityit is not a covert ontological argument. The mere existence of such necessary beings does not yield God. Aquinas accepts a multiplicity of such necessary beingones which do not corrupt. Examples in his worldview include the heavenly movers and rational souls. Because of their metaphysical lack of composition of matter and form, they do not, so to speak, have the wherewithal for corruption. He then argues that among such necessary beings there must be one which is uniquely singled out as the source of necessity in the others. It is that which is called God. To specify the point of conict with Nagarjuna, Aquinas argues that there is a unique source of metaphysical necessity in existencenot everything is dependent. Nagarjuna holds that the metaphysical core of reality is captured in the notion of dependent co-origination.13 This is a way of understanding the Buddhist idea that everything that exists is eeting, depending on other things for its existence.

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The central ethical teaching of Buddhism, the Four Noble Truths, holds that suffering characterises the human condition (see Conze 1959, 186). The origin of suffering is attachment to eeting reality, which is doomed to disappoint us. The remedy for suffering is the realisation of the transitoriness of all things, and the corresponding cultivation of detachment in the face of this. Nagarjuna supplies a metaphysical gloss on the meaning of the transitoriness of reality. His view is that entities lack any self-existence (svabhava).14 All things are dependent. His arguments for this position, in general, are along the lines that if you attribute self-existence to any entity, you end up with unacceptable consequences, a classic reductio ad absurdem strategy. What is most important about his position is that this is absolutely general. There is no single being which escapes this transitoriness. All beings are characterised by emptiness. And emptiness is itself emptyhe is not articulating a kind of negative theology, where the word covers a hidden reality, in the manner of Denys the Areopagite, for example. So Nagarjuna articulates a position which diametrically opposes that of Aquinas. Aquinas says not everything can be transitory and erects a doctrine of theism on this view. Nagarjuna holds that everything is transitory, and enlightenment comes about by the personal realisation of this truth. Lets look in some more detail at each side of this impasse.

Aquinass Realist Argument

Aquinass argument is by no means perspicuous or straightforward. It is the focus of a great deal of interpretative controversy and there is no single clear canonical interpretation of the argument which is regarded as obvious by most commentators. For the sake of clarity, lets look at the argument in logical reconstruction. 1. There are contingent things. [uncontroversial observation of the world] 2. Contingent things are such that they dont exist at some time [explanation of
contingency]

3. If everything is contingent then at some time there is nothing [crucial move] 4. If at one time there was nothing there would be nothing now. [accept ex nihilo
nihil t ]

5. That conclusion is falseso there never was nothing. [observation and modus
tollens ]

6. If there never was nothing, then not everything can be contingent [from 3] 7. If not everything is contingent, then there is something necessary [from the
meaning of contingent]

8. Whatever is necessary derives its necessity from itself or another [truism] 9. No innite regress of necessary beings [general argument against innite
regress]

10. 10 A rst necessary being must exist. [conclusion] The rst phase of opposition lies in challenging line 3. As it stands it contains a gross logical errorpounced on by critical commentators such as J. L. Mackie

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(1982, 89) and Anthony Kenny (1969, 56). It contains a quantier error. The move from everything is capable of going out of existence to at some time everything goes out of existence is fallacious. It is analogous to making the inference from All roads have an ending to there is one ending to which all roads lead. Now Aquinas wouldnt have been familiar with the label quantier error, but would nevertheless have been familiar with the kind of fallacy involved, known in Aristotelian parlance as the fallacy of composition and divisionwrongly applying properties of an aggregate or group to a member of that group.15 So the question arises whether Aquinas just simply failed to see the error, or whether there was a deeper reason why he didnt think this move was fallaciousthat there were hidden premises operating. Given his knowledge of the kind of error involved and his general logical acuity, the principle of charity counsels us to look for such hidden ways of making the argument come out as valid. One suggested solution is that Aquinas is assuming the eternity of the world (see, e.g. Lovejoy 1964). Given an innity of time and a genuine possibility, that possibility must be realised. Hence if it is a genuine possibility that everything could cease to exist simultaneously, this would actually come about. If it didnt come about then it wasnt a genuine possibility and its negation would be necessary, namely it would be necessary that not everything is capable of ceasing to exist. Such a suppressed premise would make valid the argument and get rid of the fallacy. Unfortunately Aquinas cannot make use of such a premise, since he actually believes it to be false. While he doesnt think there are good philosophical reasons showing that the world is not eternal, he nevertheless holds on the basis of revelation that the world did actually begin. Because he holds the eternity of the world as actually false, he couldnt have it in mind as a suppressed premise in the argument (Davies 2001). Another proposed solution is to gloss everything is such that it does not exist at some time as meaning everything is dependent (Davies 2001). This moves straightforwardly to the argument that not everything can be like this, since dependent things only exist by virtue of something else. Holding that absolutely everything is like this is incoherent. Hence there are some things which are not dependent, that is, which do not come to be by generation and which are perishable. Of these things one can ask whether they have this property intrinsically or by virtue of another. An innite regress of such things is not possible, and so one has to posit a rst cause of necessity. The rst problem with such an interpretation is that it moves from the text quite a long wayit doesnt explain away the quantier error, it ignores it (Wippel 2000, 464). Secondly, it collapses the third way into an argument rather like the rst waya rst cause argumentremoving any particular use for the notion of necessity. Thirdly, it doesnt have the resources to answer critics such as Kenny (1969, 69) who note that even if the argument is valid, it is compatible with positing eternal matter as the source of necessity. Fourthly, and most importantly in this context, it simply begs the question against a position like Nagarjuna. It doesnt argue that everything cannot be dependent, it merely asserts it.

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A different, more fruitful and quite traditional way of looking at this argument is to think that it implicitly involves the distinction between essence and existence which is the keystone of Aquinass metaphysical position. Things are given a metaphysical analysis, in that they consist of essence (their structure) and existencethe instantiation of that structure in reality. These are two distinct principles which make up a thingprinciples which are not things themselves. Aquinas holds that nothing in the world contains the basis for its own existence within itselfexistence always comes from without. Contingent things rely on other contingent things for their existence. Even things which do not go out of existence require an external source of their existence. Such a source of existence would be a reality whose essence is to existwhatever that might be like. This would be an absolutely independent reality. It wouldnt be quite right to call it a beingsince it is the source of all being, and the sole reality in which the principles of being are identical, essence existence. On this way of looking at the third way, the argument is indeed about dependence, but it is explicitly about dependence in respect of existence. If absolutely everything which exists were dependent in this way, then there would be nothing. An independent reality is required. Objections to this reading query the intelligibility of the distinction between essence and existence. The bare idea of existence, removed from all other possible specications of a thing, is seen as an empty idea, a non-genuine predicate. While there may be an intuitive basis for this distinction, namely that there is something to be said about the instantiation as distinct from the non-instantiation of properties, the full-blown metaphysical distinction of essence and existence is not sustainable. Existence is a kind of metaphor, a residual Platonically-inspired reservoir idea of being, wherein all things are connected. English-speaking commentators on this idea generally tend to be sceptical about such metaphysics. However, for the moment, I want to mark it as a plausible candidate for interpreting the third way as a valid argument.16

Nagarjunas Anti-Realist Argument

Nagarjuna begins his assault on realism by challenging realist notions of causation.17 This holds that entities have real causal powers, that causes feature in the genuine list of things which exist in reality. Nagarjuna changes the focus of explanation. When confronted with the vast web of interconnections which is nature, we select and note aspects which reect our explanatory needs. We select regularities and nodes of interaction which have salience for usbut we should beware of projecting such patterns into nature itself. Such patterns are conditions but conditions, unlike causes, are not occult metaphysical entities with mysterious powers. Rather they play a role in explanationuniting explanandum and explanansbut with no commitment to the metaphysical reality of causes. Observed regularities explain nature. We trace patterns and make predictions. However, this is possible in a metaphysically light-weight fashion. One way of characterising this light-weight approach is to deny the notion of essence.18

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There are no objective patterns existing in nature which hold independently of the web of interconnections. Even the separation of entities into self-standing discrete realities involves choice, arbitrary separation from what is contiguous, from what went before and goes after, from causes and results. Nature does not carve itself up into explanatory unitswe do that. Our discriminations, which are natural habits, mask the metaphysical emptiness of reality. There are no self-standing independent existents, independent of categorisation of them. Note that this blocks all forms of metaphysical realismspecically it doesnt sustain idealism, which holds that the real nature of entities is that they are constituted by mind. This denies any validity to the very idea of the way things are in reality. Nagarjunas distinctive thesis on this is to deny that entities have svabhava, or independent existence, sometimes glossed as essence.19 Another way of expressing this is to say that emptiness (sunyata) characterises entities. The fundamental metaphysical nature of things is that they are empty. Now such a view is at face value difcult to sustain and seems to be a straight form of nihilism. To hold that entities are empty seems to be to hold that entities do not, in fact, exist. Opponents of Nagarjuna picked on this very point and indicated the troublesome consequences of such a view.20 All the apparatus of Buddhism would crumble on such a viewno Four Noble Truths, no Buddha, Dharma (the teaching) or Sangha (community). Rather than sustaining and explicating the Buddhist world-picture, such a view would wipe it out. To respond to this criticism, Nagarjuna has recourse to a doctrine of two perspectives on reality, a view which would be familiar to his Buddhist audience.21 There is a conventional way of looking at reality, in which one posits beings, causes, events, properties and all the familiar paraphernalia of the world. This is the normal, pre-critical way of seeing the world. However, there is also a more reective philosophical way of looking at realitythe absolute perspective. On such a view one can see the conventions which hold together the conventional view of the worldand realise that all things are in fact empty, that there is no self-existence. Such a view does then bolster the Buddhist worldview. It explicates the eeting nature of reality and the natural human tendency to cling to what is really transient. How the absolute perspective relates to the conventional perspective is at the core of Nagarjunas position. It does not eradicate it, or supersede it. What it amounts to is a principled denial that there is an ultimate way things are and as such is in agreement with contemporary forms of anti-realism. Thus Nagarjunas notion of emptiness is not a reied metaphysical reality. It is the denial of the kind of reality which metaphysics usually holds to. So the absolute perspective doesnt eradicate the conventional. In fact it allows a deeper realisation of the conventionality of all that we call reality. What exists is the ux of change, which we conventionally sort and pattern for brief periods of time, with entities appearing and disappearing. Thus the doctrine of emptiness coincides with the doctrine of dependent origination. Nagarjuna therefore answers the challenge that he is really a nihilist by indicating that the doctrine of emptiness doesnt wipe out conventional reality.

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It doesnt hold that absolutely nothing exists. Rather it gives a characterisation of conventional reality, showing that such reality is precisely conventional (see Gareld 1995, 307ff). Included in the scope of this conventionality is the very notion of the self. There is no trancendental ego which constitutes reality, the ego is a conventional realityand Nagarjuna would agree with standard Buddhist analyses of the self into aggregates (see Gethin 1998, 135ff). However, what is distinctive of his position is that the aggregates themselves are not substantial they lack independent existence. The most obvious line of objection to this is to accuse his position of undermining itself. The distinction between absolute and conventional is itself conventional and so not real. Therefore it is an unusable distinction, and cannot be used to sustain his position. Nagarjunas response, of course, would be to say that one must understand the distinction itself as conventionalthat from the absolute level it also lacks reality, but this doesnt make it unusable (see Gareld 1995, 316ff; Huntington Jr 1989). Like Wittgensteins ladder in the Tractatus, it helps one see things rightly. Yet it still seems of doubtful coherence to use a distinction which is under suspicion to defend the use of that very distinction. One requires a different line of argument to avoid charges of begging the question.

Structural Parallels
It should now be clear that Aquinas and Nagarjuna are dealing with the same metaphysical issue and coming up with contradictory accounts of it. Aquinas defends the existence of a single independent source of necessity for all beings. Nagarjuna denies the existence of any such source and afrms the dependence of absolutely everything. As we have also seen, neither Aquinas nor Nagarjuna have positions which avoid internal problems. To make sense of Aquinass argument for a source of necessity, one had to invoke the metaphysical distinction of essence and existence and even using that, it is still questionable whether it really avoids logical error. One might think that perhaps a parallel argument could be made using Aquinass ingredients, but the one Aquinas actually offers is awed. On Nagarjunas side, despite his protestations to the contrary, it is not at all clear that he escapes the charge of nihilism. However, what I want to draw attention to here is a curious alignment of both their positions, despite the fact that they appear diametrically opposed. Nagarjunas worked out position entails a distinction between conventional and absolute reality. Within conventional reality it makes sense to speak of essences or forms, while in absolute reality it makes no sense to so speak. Given Nagarjunas view that emptiness characterises all of reality, we can nd a distinction of form and emptiness in conventional reality. Forms have conventional reality, but emptiness is their absolute reality, and this emptiness pervades even conventional reality. The essence of the Prajnaparamitra literature, which Nagarjuna is interpreting, is summed up in the refrain form is emptiness, and the very

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emptiness is form.22 From an absolute perspective there is an identity of what, from a conventional perspective, seem distinct. Nagarjuna is therefore committed to two related sets of distinctions: Conventional / Absolute and Form / Emptiness The second distinction (form/emptiness) occurs in the rst half of the former distinction (conventional reality), while it collapses in the second half (absolute reality). Conventional Form / Emptiness / Absolute Emptiness

With this set up, one can see a striking structural parallel to Aquinass position. He likewise has two sets of distinctions, where the second distinction holds in the rst side of the former distinction and collapses in the second. His initial distinction is between Dependent (created) reality and Absolute (uncreated) reality. The second distinction is between form and existence. Dependent / Absolute And Form / Existence Form and existence are distinct in dependent reality. All things that exist in the world are constituted by the metaphysical distinction between form and existence. However, in the second half of the distinction, absolute reality, this distinction goes. What remains is self-subsistent existent, a unique reality whose essence is to exist. Thus the parallel to Nagarjunas position: [Nagarjuna] [Aquinas] Conventional Form / Emptiness Dependent Reality Form / Existence / / Absolute Emptiness Absolute Reality Existence

Now despite the structural parallel, the fundamental difference between the intended positions remains. For Nagarjuna, the whole structure (Conventional/Absolute) is dependent, whereas for Aquinas there is an independent reality. Is there a way of adjudicating this stand-off? In relation to the objections levelled against their respective positions, it seems that Nagarjuanas position is less stable that Aquinass. Despite Nagarjunas awareness of the danger of nihilism and his insistence that his position isnt nihilist, it still seems he falls into it. It is unclear that he can sustain the view that holding all entities are empty isnt nihilistic. His way out of nihilism is to invoke the conventional/absolute distinction. Emptiness is as things are seen from the absolute stance and this doesnt wipe out the conventional. Yet the employment of this very distinction doesnt seem defensible, it doesnt seem

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possible to sustain it without invoking some independent argument for it. The situation is akin to C. I. Lewiss observation about coherentism. Lewis holds that it is absurd to think that beliefs can support each other when they themselves do not stand on anythingit being like two drunken sailors attempting to stand up by leaning against each other. It just dont get off the ground!23 Likewise with the conventional/absolute distinction. Without appeal to independent existence, it is unclear how such a distinction is possible. Furthermore, given that Nagarjuna denies that emptiness is equivalent to nihilism and complete nothingness, it seems as if emptiness has to have some positive content. With even a residual amount of positive content, the distinction between conventional and absolute could be sustained. What might such content be like? Well, it is merely to hold that emptiness has some reality independent of that of conventional reality. A plausible candidate for such contentful emptiness would, ironically in this context, be Aquinass notion of existence. Aquinas doesnt reify existenceit is not a thing and neither is it a form or essence. It is not the possible object of conceptual knowledge, since concepts track essences, not existence. Hence substituting existence for emptiness yields the distinction

Conventional / Absolute

Form / Existence Existence

The required feature of the conventional realm is preserved, in that things come to be and pass away, they do not have independent existence. Yet the very possibility of this contrast is assured by having an independently contentful notion of existence on the absolute side of the distinction. Thus Nagarjunas distinction is altered by accepting Aquinass notion of an independent reality, but underwritten by the postulation of that very reality. A contextual response to the objection that Aquinass notion of existence is unintelligible would be to contrast it with Nagarjunas emptiness. The kinds of critic hostile to existence would be even more hostile to emptiness. So while not ` an absolute rejoinder to such critics, it strengthens Aquinass position vis-a-vis Nagarjuna.

Conclusion
I began by noting a currently fashionable doubt about the possibility of bringing protagonists from different cultural and historical periods into dialogue with each other, and then proceeded to engage Aquinas with Nagarjuna. At a surface level their positions are diametrically opposed, Aquinas afrming a source of metaphysical necessity, Nagarjuna denying this. On closer inspection both sets of arguments had troublesome dimensions. Aquinas might overcome the objections to his position by invoking the essence/existence distinction,

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Nagarjuna responding to charges of nihilism by deploying the conventional/absolute distinction. I then noted a structural parallel between their sequence of distinctions and indicated that Nagarjunas position still seemed vulnerable to charges of nihilism. It seems as if something resembling Nagarjunas position could be salvaged by using Aquinass notion of existence. Does that then turn Nagarjuna into a theist? No. The positing of existence as a metaphysical principle which serves as the basis on which to make the conventional/absolute distinction doesnt say anything about what such existence has to be like. It merely accepts the point, which Aristotle makes about Heraclitus, that change presupposes some form of xity. Whether such a metaphysical xed point has any further characteristics which point in the direction of theism is another matter altogether. The current argument merely holds that in the dialectic of the debate between the postulation of a metaphysical source of necessity and the rejection of such, Aquinass position appears to be more secure than that of Nagarjuna. NOTES
1. The best recent biographical study of Aquinas is Torrell (1996). 2. Commentary on the Metaphysics Bk.3 lect.1. 3. For an interpretation of Aquinas in this way see OGrady (2005). For competing interpretations see papers by Rogers and Jordan in the same volume. See also n.12 below. 4. For some discussion see Murti (1955, 87ff). For criticism of Murtis interpretative presuppositions see Burton (1999, 5ff)although Burton doesnt attempt any claims about the historical gure. 5. Translated as The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Jay N. Gareld, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 6. For a survey of Buddhist writings see Gethin (1998, ch. 2, The Word of the Buddha: Buddhist Scriptures and Schools). 7. Garelds commentary furnishes this interpretation. 8. And as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting penance, mortication, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve no manner of purpose. . . Enquiries Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section IX, part 1, #219. 9. Consider the following: The main themes of postmodernism thus become clear. They amount to a comprehensive rejection of virtually everything that the Enlightenment in general and Descartes in particular believed in. There is a sharp criticism of the received ideas of representation, objective Truth,

FORM AND EMPTINESS: AQUINAS AND NAGARJUNA Reason and historical progress, leading eventually to the death of man, a thoroughly wholesome loss of interest in the individual subject, his selfmastery through self-consciousness, his moral autonomy and the justication of his knowledge of the world. Instead we turn more to language, the sign, communication, art and culture-criticism. (Cupitt 1989, 39). Hence the theist/atheist debate becomes pretty small beer indeed. A problem for positions such as that of Kerr is how to articulate clearly how he can distinguish his view from this one, without re-inating the traditional Thomism he is seeking to overcome, and without simply acceding to deism. In Summa Theologiae Ia q.2 a.3. See Kerr (2002, ch. 4 Ways of Reading the Five Ways) for a good survey. See Aquinas, Philosophical Theology and Analytical Philosophy for a defence of this view. This current paper, generating a dialogue between Aquinas and Nagarjuna, furthers the claim of that paper, by means of a particular study. Those who want to read Aquinas as essentially a Christian theologian, without an essentially philosophical dimension, have to hold that his initial confessional presuppositions would preclude such an encounter between the views of Nagarjuna and Aquinas. They just dont connect; they could perhaps proselytise each other, but not engage in disinterested philosophical argument. This is the very reason why such a reading impoverishes Aquinas. Pratityasamutpada. Whoever sees dependent arising also sees suffering and its arising and its cessation as well as the path. MMK ch24.40. See Burton (1999 ch. 2) for a defence of the view that Nagarjuna is not a sceptic and that the denial of svabhava is a positive doctrine. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, ch. 4. For the proliferation of thirteenthcentury textbooks based on this, see Ebbesen (1982). Theres scholarly dispute over whether Aquinas himself wrote such a textbook, the De Fallaciissee Torrell (1996, 523). The point is, however, that he would have been well aware of the aw involved. For examples of the kind of objections which can be levelled at this kind of reading, see Kenny (2002). As I noted above I use the English translation of the Mulamadhyamikakarika (hereafter, MMK) given by Jay Gareld in his The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. I also accept his generally anti-realist reading of Nagarjuna, in contrast to, say, T. R. V. Murtis absolutist reading in Murti (1955). For the attack on a realist account of causation see MMK ch. 1. MMK15. See Gareld p. 89 n.4 on translating this term. A plausible interpretation of MMK 24. 7 14 sees Nagarjuna responding to such opponents. MMK 24.18. The Heart Sutra in Conze (1973, 142). Argument cited in Haack (1993, 27).

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10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

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REFERENCES
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Paul OGrady, Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland. E-mail: pogrady@tcd.ie