Democracy and the political culture orientations of ordinary citizens: a typology for the Arab world and beyond

Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao Political culture orientation and its relevance for democracy
These insights are derived primarily from the study of new democracies. Less commonly examined are the politically relevant attitudes, values and behaviour patterns of citizens in Studies of democracy and democratic transitions non-democracies, especially those in the Arab place emphasis on the attitudes, values and world. Against this background, the present behaviour patterns of ordinary citizens. This analysis uses recent survey data from Jordan, the research argues that successful democratisation Palestinian Territorires (West Bank and Gaza) requires not only support for democracy among a and Algeria; three very different Arab polities, signicant proportion of a countrys population to investigate the nature and structure of but also that its citizens poscitizen orientations related sess norms and behaviour to democracy and governMark Tessler is Samuel J. Elversveld patterns that are conducive to ance. It also considers the Collegiate Professor in the Department democracy in other words, degree to which patterns of Political Science at the University of Michigan, where he is also Vice Provost that they possess a democratic and relationships observed for International Affairs. His public opipolitical culture orientation. in these three political comnion research in the Middle East has been Some analysts suggest that this munities may be generalifunded by the National Science Foundais a precondition for a demosable to other Arab countion, the US Department of State, and the cratic transition (Huntington tries and perhaps beyond. US Institute of Peace. He is Principal Investigator of the Arab Democracy 1993, p. 13). More common is Almond and Verbas Barometer Project. the view that democratic work, The civic culture, was Email: tessler@umich.edu norms and behaviour need the rst major attempt at Eleanor Gao is a doctoral student in the not precede, but rather can understanding the relationDepartment of Political Science at the follow, an elite-led transition ship between citizen orienUniversity of Michigan. She specializes in involving the reform of polititations and democracy Middle East politics and has worked and studied in the West Bank and Syria. She is cal institutions and procedures (Almond and Verba 1963, the co-author with Professor Tessler of a (Rose 1997, p. 98; Schmitter 1980). Among the partirecent article in Journal of Democracy. and Karl 1993, p. 47). Indeed, cular orientations they according to this argument, explore are obligation to citizen orientations conducive to democracy participate, sense of efcacy and level of intermay emerge in response to the experience of a personal trust. Although Almond and Verbas democratic transition. Debates about timing study was later criticised for a number of and sequence notwithstanding, there is general limitations, such as its failure to examine subagreement that sustainable democracy ultimately cultures, it was the rst large-scale comparative depends not only on the commitments and actions survey of its kind and established the importance of political elites but also on the normative and of studying the attitudes, values and behaviour behavioural predispositions of ordinary citizens. patterns of ordinary men and women. Since that
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time, especially during the last decade and a half, there have been many empirical investigations of citizen orientations and their relationship to democratisation. The general conclusion, as summarised by Inglehart, is that culture plays a crucial role in democracy . . . its survival depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens (Inglehart 2000, p. 96). These studies have examined a broad array of attitudes, values and behaviour patterns. Almond and Verba focused on political cognition, feelings toward government and politics, levels of partisanship, sense of civic obligation and political efcacy. Using World Values Survey data from 1990 and 1995, Inglehart investigated the relationship between democratic achievement and adherence to self-expression values, including trust, tolerance and political activism. In another empirical study based on data from Eastern Europe, the authors examined support for freedom of expression, political tolerance, respect for competing ideas and preferences, political interest and a willingness to participate in the political process (Rose et al. 1998, p. 98). Dimensions of political culture that have received attention in other studies include political interest, political tolerance, valuation of liberty, rights consciousness, support for civil disobedience, support for media independence and political participation (Booth and Richard 1998; Dalton 2000; Garcia-Rivero et al. 2002; Gibson et al. 1992; Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Nathan and Shi 1993; Rice and Feldman 1997). Although many analyses have focused on the extent and distribution of these and other democratic norms throughout a population, it is possible that these dimensions of political culture do form a coherent syndrome. In other words, there may be no one-dimensional democratic political culture orientation, meaning that a citizen who possesses one kind of democratic norm is not necessarily likely to possess others. This seems particularly probable in countries such as those in the Arab world, where ordinary men and women have had relatively little experience of democratic governance. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that there are no interconnections at all among relevant attitudes, values and behaviour patterns. In light of these possibilities, a goal of the present investigation is to understand the degree to which normative and behavioural predispositions

relevant for democracy are associated with one another and, more specically, to offer insights about the conceptual meaning of the patterns that are observed.

Elements of democratic political culture orientation

As noted, different authors have placed emphasis on different attitudes, values and behaviour patterns when discussing the elements of a democratic political culture orientation. Among these are six that may be examined with the data available for the present study: support for gender equality; tolerance; interpersonal trust; civic participation; political interest and political knowledge. The importance and relevance of each of these is briey discussed. The most recent Arab Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Programme (2006) discusses the importance of gender equality and womens empowerment both in general and with respect to the Arab world in particular. Democracy is meaningless if half the citizens of a country do not have equal rights and equal access to political inuence and power. But granting these rights is not sufcient to promote the involvement and inclusion of women in public life: rights can be granted without removing the social barriers that prevent women from becoming full citizens. For a polity to be truly democratic there also needs to be broad public support for the principle and practice of gender equality: ordinary citizens need to appreciate that gender equality is desirable for ethical reasons and is in the public interest. It is in this connection that a recent study by Inglehart and Norris (2003) documents the difference between western and Muslim societies in public attitudes towards womens rights and opportunities and suggests that a lower level of support for gender equality is among the reasons why democracy lags in Muslim countries. Similar ndings are presented by Fish (2002). Not only should all citizens be accorded equal rights; their diverse ideas and preferences should be respected as well. Tolerance and respect for diversity are necessary in order for democracy to function effectively. At the most

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basic level, a tolerant citizenry can prevent civil strife, since the abridgement of minority rights by a dominant majority can lead to violence and conict (Gibson 1995, 1996, 1998). Beyond this, however, tolerance is an indispensable feature of democracy for two interrelated reasons. On the one hand, democracy requires the equality of all citizens before the state and under the law and for this to be accepted as legitimate it is necessary that the right to hold and express views with which one disagrees be accepted as well. On the other hand, tolerance for diverse and opposing viewpoints is necessary for the political contestation and open exchange of ideas that are essential for democracy (GarciaRivera et al. 2002). Without respect for the right to advocate, argue, dissent and debate, citizens would be unable to hold their leaders accountable and government by the consent of the governed would not be possible. Along with tolerance, citizens must trust one another in a functioning democracy; they must believe that most men and women are fairminded and reasonable and, accordingly, that citizens like themselves are the best judges of how a country should be governed. Otherwise, they are unlikely to distinguish respect for the rule of law from uncritical deference to those in authority (Rose et al. 1998). In addition, interpersonal trust is necessary for citizens to coalesce and engage in collective political action, which is also essential for democracy to function effectively. Putnam (1992) is among those who make this point, arguing that trust is a requirement for strong civic organisations, which in their turn improve the quality of governance in two important ways. On the demand side, citizens in communities with high levels of trust can insist upon better government. They can engage in collective action if the government is unresponsive to their needs. On the supply side, representative government benets from a reserve of citizens as potential lawmakers. Trustful citizens understand the necessity of cooperation and compromise in a democratic regime. Civic participation is another important component of a democratic political culture orientation. First, a vibrant civil society is an important check on the power of the government. Interest groups and other civic associations allow citizens to monitor government

actions, articulate and aggregate interests and exert political inuence. This is important in new democracies, as norms of governance have not been well established and power can be easily abused (Diamond 1999). Second, civic participation fosters the development of some of the skills that are useful for democratic citizens. Those who have learned how to organise activities, direct meetings and prioritise goals are more likely to be effective in organising a demonstration, circulating a petition or preparing a ballot initiative. Civic engagement can also increase feelings of efcacy, which, in turn, promotes political involvement (Verba et al. 1995). On a cognitive level, political interest and political knowledge are also very important for effective democracy. Individuals who are interested in politics are more likely to follow political affairs and to participate in civic activities (Verba et al. 1995). Engaged citizens are also likely to make effective monitors of public policy and government action. Political knowledge, which is associated with political interest, is important for the same reasons. Citizens are more likely to learn about politics and make informed assessments when an issue is important to them and if they possess relevant political knowledge (Delli Carpini 2000). Political interest and political knowledge can thus improve the quality as well as the quantity of participation by allowing citizens to make enlightened choices and helping them to resist elite manipulation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).

Cases and data

Data from representative national surveys carried out in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza), and Algeria in 2003 2004 are used to examine the political orientations of ordinary citizens in these three Arab non-democracies. Surveys were conducted in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories in December 2003 and in Algeria in summer 2004. These three countries were chosen for both practical and analytical reasons. The practical reasons include the availability of local scholars and institutions with substantial experience in the conduct of rigorous survey research and, as reected in their Freedom House ratings as

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partly free, a political climate that permits the conduct of public opinion research. The analytical considerations included system-level differences that make cross-national comparison instructive. Algeria, a republic, is one of the largest states in the Arab world, with considerable wealth from oil and natural gas and possessing a tradition of state socialism and centralised planning. For much of the time since its independence in 1962 Algeria has been governed by a cohort of military and civilian leaders, with military ofcers having preponderant inuence. Jordan, a monarchy, tends to be socially conservative, is organised to a considerable extent along tribal lines and is among the less populous and also the poorer countries of the Arab world. Jordanian society is also marked by an important cleavage between the Jordanians of Palestinian origin and other Jordanians. The Palestinian Territories, which are struggling for statehood, have a tradition of secular nationalism and strong relations with the Palestinian diaspora. Until very recently the Palestinian national movement had been symbolised and led for nearly four decades by a single individual. The three political communities also differ with regard to their history of foreign relations. Algeria has a legacy of intense French colonialism and continues to have very important ties to France. The British were the dominant imperial power prior to Jordanian independence and Jordan is today one of the most important American allies in the Arab world, while the Palestinian political experience is shaped by its historic and continuing relationship with Zionism and Israel. In the context of the Arab world, these three countries constitute something of a most different system research design. Although none resembles the small, oil-rich countries of the Arab Gulf, they are otherwise at least somewhat representative of the regions republics, monarchies and strong presidential systems. Any pattern observed in all three countries may thus be at least somewhat generalisable to other parts of the Arab world, since it will have been found to obtain under widely differing conditions. For the same reason, patterns common to Jordan, the Palestinian Territories and Algeria may also be applicable to non-democracies in other world regions. Alternatively, the unique attributes and circumstances of

each country will help to dene in conceptual terms the locus of applicability of patterns found only in that country. With only three cases, it will not be possible to eliminate multicollinearity; so that differences among the countries will remain over-determined. But Jordan, the Palestinian Territories and Algeria are different enough to be able to offer plausible propositions about the country-level attributes associated with particular within-system patterns and relationships. The surveys in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories were funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation and the survey in Algeria was funded by the American Institute for Maghreb Studies. All are based on representative national samples. The survey in Jordan was conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, the survey in the Palestinian Territories by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah and the survey in Algeria by a team at the University of Algiers. All three surveys involved three-stage cluster sampling based on the most recent national census; 1994 in Jordan, 1997 in the West Bank and Gaza, and 1998 in Algeria. In Jordan and the Palestinian Territories, districts or clusters were rst randomly selected from the list of all clusters in the national census, followed by a random selection of households within each of the selected clusters, and a Kish table was nally used to choose the person in each household to be interviewed. In Algeria, governorates and then communes were selected randomly and quota sampling based on age, sex and education was employed at the commune level. Census data were used to establish the quotas. The same interview schedule was administered in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. It was used in Algeria as well, although here it was supplemented by a number of items dealing with domestic policy issues in that country. The survey instrument contained items measuring the six normative and behavioural orientations discussed above, including support for gender equality, tolerance, interpersonal trust, civic participation, political interest and political knowledge. Each of these orientations is measured by an additive index constructed by combining two or more highly inter-correlated items from the interview schedule. Further, in all three countries, each index was constructed

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Satellite dishes in Al Anaser, Algiers, Algeria, February 2006. AFP/Fayez Nureldine

using the same items, all of which are given in the appendix to this article. All the items possess face validity. In addition, evidence of reliability, further condence in validity and an indication of crossnational conceptual and measurement equivalence are provided by the consistently signicant inter-correlations among the items; the same items are related to each other to a statistically signicant degree for each one of the six indices in each one of the three countries.

Analysis and ndings

Dimensions and types of political culture orientation
Factor analysis was used to explore interrelationships among the six indices of normative and behavioural orientations discussed above. As stated, each index is composed of the same signicantly inter-correlated items in Jordan, the

Palestinian Territories, and Algeria, thus maximising conceptual and measurement equivalence across the three countries. Strikingly, the results of the factor analyses, shown in Table 1, are the same for the three countries. In each case a two-factor solution emerges. Both prior to and after rotation, political tolerance and support for gender equality load highly on one factor; political interest, political knowledge, civic participation, and interpersonal trust load highly on a second factor. All factor loadings are robust, with the partial exception of interpersonal trust, which loads most strongly on the same factor but at a somewhat lower level in all three cases. Table 1 shows that the elements of political culture explored in this investigation neither form a one-dimensional political culture orientation nor are completely unrelated to one another. Rather, they consistently subdivide into two identiable clusters. One, composed of political tolerance and support for gender equality, might be characterised as a pluralism or diversity dimension. The other, composed of

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political interest, political knowledge, civic participation, and interpersonal trust, might be characterised as an involvement dimension. The data not only permit the delineation of
Table 1: Factor loadings of indices measuring political tolerance, support for gender equality, political interest, political knowledge, civic participation and interpersonal trust in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories and Algeria Unrotated solution Rotated solution

First Second First Second Political tolerance Jordan 0.132 0.728 0.149 0.725 Palestinian Territories 0.173 0.657 0.076 0.675 Algeria 0.176 0.578 0.093 0.597 Support for gender equality Jordan 0.131 0.757 0.113 0.760 Palestinian Territories 0.050 0.730 0.057 0.729 Algeria 0.323 0.677 0.003 0.750 Political interest Jordan 0.674 0.025 0.675 0.009 Palestinian Territories 0.698 0.145 0.712 0.042 Algeria 0.676 0.379 0.773 0.047 Political knowledge Jordan 0.752 0.148 0.755 0.130 Palestinian Territories 0.738 0.192 0.703 0.298 Algeria 0.666 0.394 0.771 0.066 Civic participation Jordan 0.722 0.216 0.717 0.233 Palestinian Territories 0.674 0.094 0.680 0.005 Algeria 0.697 0.150 0.562 0.438 Interpersonal trust Jordan 0.217 0.144 0.220 0.139 Palestinian Territories 0.383 0.334 0.427 0.274 Algeria 0.434 0.216 0.297 0.383 Note: Figures are in bold for items that have a high factor loading and consequently help to show what the factor measures.

these conceptually distinct dimensions; they also demonstrate their empirical independence. While some citizens possess the orientations associated with both dimensions or neither dimension to a signicant degree, the political culture orientation of other citizens is characterised by the norms of one dimension but not the other. Table 2 shows the four possible ways these two normative and behavioural dimensions might intersect: (a) a strong pluralism orientation and a strong involvement orientation; (b) a strong pluralism orientation and a weak involvement orientation; (c) a weak pluralism orientation and a strong involvement orientation; and (d) a weak pluralism orientation and a weak involvement orientation. For convenience, and also as a step towards conceptual clarication, these combinations may be described, respectively, as (a) democratic, (b) indifferent, (c) activist and (d) parochial. Although they are to some extent ideal types, each represents a particular political culture orientation that characterises a subset of ordinary citizens in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, and Algeria and, quite possibly, in other non-democratic societies in the Arab world and elsewhere. An individual whose political cultural orientation may be described as democratic is tolerant of diverse political views, supports gender equality, is interested in politics, is knowledgeable about politics, participates in civic and associational life, and is trusting of fellow citizens. One whose orientation may be described as activist is not tolerant of diverse political views and does not support gender equality but is interested in politics, knowledgeable about politics, active in civic and associational life, and trusting of

Table 2: Political culture orientation based on pluralism and involvement dimensions taken together Pluralism dimension Strong Involvement dimension Strong Democratic: A democratic citizen is tolerant of diverse political views, supports gender equality, is interested in and knowledgeable about politics, participates in civic and associational life and is trusting of fellow citizens Indifferent: An indifferent citizen is tolerant of diverse political views and supports gender equality but is not interested in and knowledgeable about politics, does not participate in civic and associational life, and is not trusting of fellow citizens Weak Activist: An activist citizen is not tolerant of diverse political views and does not support gender equality but is interested in and knowledgeable about politics, participates in civic and associational life and trusting of fellow citizens Parochial: A parochial citizen is not tolerant of diverse political views, does not support gender equality, is not interested in or knowledgeable about politics, does not participate in civic and associational life and is not trusting of fellow citizens

Weak

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fellow citizens. Perhaps reecting a more ideological perspective, this person engages with political and public life but does not accord legitimacy to alternative views, preferences and lifestyles. An individual whose political cultural orientation may be described as indifferent is tolerant of diverse political views and supports gender equality but is not interested in politics, is not knowledgeable about politics, does not participate in civic and associational life, and is not trusting of fellow citizens. This person is both disengaged and non-judgemental, unconcerned with either political affairs or the behaviour of others. Finally, an individual whose political cultural orientation may be described as parochial is not tolerant of diverse political views, does not support gender equality, is not interested in politics, is not knowledgeable about politics, does not participate in civic and associational life, and is not trusting of fellow citizens. Three possibilities were explored to combine, respectively, the two inter-correlated indices associated with a pluralism dimension and the four inter-correlated indices associated with an involvement dimension: rst, factor scores were generated; then a scale was constructed by adding indices, each of which was rst adjusted to a range between 1 and 10 to provide measurement equivalence; and nally an additive scale was constructed in the same way with adjusted indices weighted in proportion to their factor loadings. These three possibilities yield virtually identical results. In no case was the correlation coefcient between any two of the three possible involvement dimension measures or any two of the three possible pluralism dimension measures lower than 0.950. In the additive measures as well as the factor scores, and regardless of which measures are used, the two political culture dimensions are independent of one another. In no case was the correlation coefcient between any measure of the pluralism dimension and any measure of the involvement dimension greater than 0.050. It is thus the case that there are a signicant number of respondents in all four of the categories described in Table 2. While some respondents are either high or low on both the pluralism and involvement dimensions, there are many others who have dissimilar tendencies on the two dimensions.

Cross-national variation in political culture orientation

It is necessary to specify cutting points that distinguish between strength and weakness on the pluralism and the involvement dimension in order to juxtapose the two dichotomised measures and classify individuals with respect to the four types of political culture orientation described above. For purposes of the present analysis, the cutting point selected was the midpoint between the highest and lowest score of the unrotated factor scores for each dimension. Table 3 shows the proportion of Jordanian, Palestinian and Algerian respondents with strong and weak ratings on the pluralism and the involvement dimension based on these cutting points. Table 4 shows the distribution of political culture orientations among Jordanians, Palestinians and Algerians that results from a juxtaposition of these dichotomised measures of the pluralism and involvement dimensions. Table 4 shows both some similarities and some differences in the distribution of political culture orientations across the three countries. The distributions are fairly similar in the Jordanian and Palestinian cases. In both countries only 1112 per cent of the respondents have

Table 3: Pluralism and involvement dimensions of political culture of Jordanian, Palestinian and Algerian respondents Jordan Palestinian Algeria (%) Territories (%) (%) Pluralism dimension Involvement dimension Strong Weak Strong Weak 26.4 73.6 36.9 63.1 31.5 68.5 33.2 66.8 70.1 29.9 53.5 46.5

Table 4: Types of political culture orientation of Jordanian, Palestinian and Algerian respondents Palestinian Jordan Territories Algeria (%) (%) (%) Political culture Democratic 11.2 orientation Activist 15.2 Indifferent 25.7 Parochial 47.9 All 100 11.9 21.3 19.6 47.2 100 37.0 16.5 33.1 13.3 100

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a democratic orientation while 4748 per cent have a parochial orientation. Among those who have neither orientation, an activist pattern is somewhat more common among Palestinians and an indifferent pattern is somewhat more common among Jordanians. This former nding may be the result of the particular Palestinian situation, with a heightened degree of political consciousness and ideological militancy developing in response to Israeli occupation. More generally, however, the ndings suggest that comparatively few individuals in either country possess a political culture orientation that is democratic with respect to both of the dimensions examined, and that nearly half of the ordinary men and women in each country do not have a democratic orientation with respect to either dimension. The Algerian case stands out from Jordan and the Palestinian Territories in that a strong rating is more common than a weak rating with respect to both the pluralism and the involvement dimensions, and so there is also a higher proportion of citizens with a democratic political culture orientation. Specically, 37 per cent of the Algerian respondents possess a democratic orientation. This may be partly explained for the pluralism dimension by some wording differences introduced on one question by the Algerian research team.1 But the difference between Algeria and the other two cases is similar for the involvement dimension, for which question wording and coding were identical in all three countries. Thus, even allowing for some minor measurement-related variation, it seems reasonable to conclude that some of the history and political experience that set Algeria apart from Jordan and the Palestinian Territories have contributed to the greater emergence, in relative terms, of a democratic political culture. Among the factors that may help to explain the difference between Algeria and the other two countries are Algerias prolonged and intense colonial experience, which introduced severe social dislocation and undermined traditional institutions and relationships, the mobilisation and modernisation resulting from Algerias extended experience with centralised planning and socialist development after independence and, closer to the present, the countrys relatively deeper experience with partisan diversity and competitive elections.

The latter observation, if correct, suggests that experience with partisan competition helps to foster a democratic political culture orientation, which would be an important nding given debates in the literature about whether such an orientation is a precondition for democratic transitions or can follow elite-led transitions involving the reform of political institutions and procedures.

Conclusion
The preceding comments are not intended to be an adequate explanation of the observed crossnational variation in political culture orientation patterns. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Nor should it be assumed that the distributions reported in Table 4 are unchanging, since global, regional or countryspecic events might alter the relative importance of some political culture orientation categories in one or more countries. But while these are subjects for future investigation, with both longitudinal data and data from more countries, the present analysis provides evidence for several signicant conclusions. First, although the literature identies a number of attitudes, values and behaviour patterns associated with a democratic political culture, in none of the three countries considered in this study do these norms constitute a onedimensional orientation. Instead, the six normative and behavioural measures that have been examined consistently subdivide into two distinct and independent dimensional clusters, and these clusters are the same in Jordan, the Palestinian Territories and Algeria. One dimension, which we have termed pluralism, is composed of political tolerance and support for gender equality. The other, which we have termed involvement, is composed of political knowledge, political interest, civic participation and interpersonal trust. That identical patterns should be found in these three countries with very different political, economic and social attributes suggests that this dimensional structure may be present in a broad array of non-democratic countries, including, perhaps, some outside the Arab world. Second, the analysis also suggests the utility of juxtaposing the dimensions of pluralism and

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involvement in order to form a two-dimensional typology of political culture orientations associated with democracy. Individuals with strong ratings on measures of both pluralism and involvement resemble the ideal democratic citizen described in the literature. Their political culture orientation may be termed democratic. Other individuals, however, have strong ratings on the measure of only one dimension, or on measures of neither pluralism nor involvement. Their political culture orientations may be termed, respectively, activist, indifferent and parochial. Although the proportion of citizens who possess each political culture orientation to a degree depends on the way the two dimensions are dichotomised and juxtaposed, it is signicant that there are substantial cross-national differences in these proportions when the same classication procedures are employed. This suggests that while the typology may be useful for mapping political culture orientations, future research should undertake to identify the country-level attributes and experiences that account for variance in the distribution of these orientations. Future research may also rene

this typology by incorporating dimensions that go beyond pluralism and involvement. Finally, the analysis shows that there is signicant cross-national variation in the withincountry distributions across the four political culture orientation categories. This, in turn, raises important questions for future research, both about the causes and the consequences of variation across and within countries. On the one hand, it will be instructive to investigate the reasons why a particular kind of political culture orientation is more common in some countries and less common in others. It will be similarly instructive to ask why some citizens in a country exhibit one kind of political culture orientation while others exhibit a different orientation and to investigate the factors that either promote or discourage a democratic political culture orientation. On the other hand, the consequences of particular distributions deserve attention as well. For example, are some distributions of political culture orientation more conducive to democracy than others, or to particular kinds of ideological tendencies or policy preferences? These questions offer a rich agenda for future research.

Note
1. As shown in the appendix, one of the two items pertaining to tolerance was different in Algeria from that in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. This item pertains to the rights of nonMuslim citizens.

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Appendix: items used to measure dependent and independent variables

Political tolerance People sometimes talk about the factors that make a person qualied for national leadership. On this card are listed six of the qualications to which different people would give priority. Please say which one of these you yourself consider the most important. Which would be the next most important? And which would be third? Coded according to whether openness to diverse political ideas ranks rst or second. Jordan and the Palestinian Territories: Do you disagree or agree with this statement: Christian citizens of our country should have the same rights as Muslim citizens to hold any political ofce, including the president of the state. Algeria: People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next 10 years. On this card are listed four of the goals to which different people would give priority. Would you please say which one of these you yourself consider the most important. Which is the second more important and which is the third most important? Coded according to whether assuring equal rights for all citizens, regardless of religion or gender ranks rst or second. Do you disagree or agree with this statement: On the whole men make better political leaders than women do? Do you disagree or agree with this statement: A university education is more important for a boy than a girl? Do you disagree or agree with this statement: A woman may work outside the home if she wishes? How important is politics in your life? When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never? Can you name the Foreign Minister? Can you name the Minister of Finance? Can you name the Speaker of Parliament? How often do you read the newspaper? How often do you interact with people at social, cultural or youth groups? How often do you interact with people at your mosque or church or at religious associations? How often do you interact with people at political groups, clubs or discussion groups? How often do you interact with people at your professional associations? How often do you interact with people at sports or creation groups? Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that most people cannot be trusted? I will read some statements about social and political issues. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each. You can trust no one these days.

Support for gender equality

Political interest

Political knowledge

Civic participation

Political trust

r UNESCO 2009.