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27-32 DIGESTED CASES ARTICLE 27

TUASON vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Maria Tuason and Emilio Tuason were a married in 1972 and this relationship produced children. Maria now claims that Emilio manifested psychological incapacity through violence causing her physical injuries and drug use which causes him a suspended penalty. Maria then filed a petition for annulment by reason of this. Tuason responded with denial stating that their relationship was lived in harmony until some differences manifested themselves. The marriage was annulled and eventually Maria filed for administration of conjugal properties which Emilio opposed. His counsel asked the court to have the hearing moved because the counsel was out of the country. On the day of the hearing Emilio failed to show up and so he was declared to have waived his right to present evidence. The court declared the marriage null and void. Maria then filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was eventually contested by Emilio and he later on filed for relief from the decision of the court. This was denied and the CA affirmed this decision. ISSUE Whether or not Emilio may claim for relief from the judgment of the CA RULING The court ruled in the negative. It is necessary when attempting to have a final judgment set aside to be justified by fraud, accident or mistake. In this case it was the negligence of petitioner which caused his failure to present evidence. He claims that it was for medical reasons that he was not able to make it to the hearing but failure to notify counsel is not the fault of the court. He was given the chance to be in court but he negligently threw away this chance. He cannot blame the court for this because said decision was well within due process of law. This means, he cannot claim relief from judgment. _____________________________ Cant Find Pilar vs Sanggunian ____________________________ ARTICLE 28 UNFAIR COMPETITION

NO DIGEST FOR US VS MANUEL ____________ ARTICLE 29 Sapiera vs Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999] FACTS: Petitioner Remedios Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, was issued by one Arturo de Guzman checks as payment for purchases he made at her store. She used said checks to pay for certain items she purchased from the grocery store of Ramon Sua. These checks were signed at the back by petitioner. When presented for payment the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Petitioner was acquitted in the charge of estafa filed against her but she was found liable for the value of the checks. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for the value of the checks even if she signed the subject checks only for the identification of the signature of Arturo de Guzman. RULING: Petitioner is liable for the value of the checks. As she (petitioner) signed the subject checks on the reverse side without any indication as to how she should be bound thereby, she is deemed to be an unqualified indorser thereof. Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course that, on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it. _________________ Sapiera vs Court of Appeals Facts: Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items, mostly cigarettes and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed by Sapiera on the back. When they were presented for payment, the checks were dishonoured because the drawers account was already closed. Respondent Ramon Samua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner but both failed to pay. Hence, four charges of Estafa were filed againstSapiera while two counts of BP 22

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was filed against Arturo de Guzman. These cases were consolidated. On December 27 1999, the RTC Dagupan city acquitted Sapiera of all charges of Estafa but did not rule on the civil aspect of the case. Arturo de Guzman was held liable for the 2 BP 22 cases and was ordered to pay Sua 167,150 Php as civil indemnity and was sentenced for imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day. Respondent Sua appealed regarding the civil aspect of Sapieras case but the courtdenied it saying that the acquittal of petitioner was absolute. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals praying that the appeal be given due course, this was granted. On January 1996, CA rendered a decision ordering Sapiera to pay 335000 php to Sua. Sapiera filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA the issued a resolution noting that the admission of both parties that Sua already collected 125000 for the 2 check paid by De Guzman on the BP 22 cases. It appears that the payment should be deducted on her liability as they involved the same two checks which Sapiera was involved in. the CA deducted the liability to 210,000 Php. Hence this petition by Sapiera claiming that the CA erred in rendering such decision because she was acquitted and the fact from which the civil liability exists did not exist. Issue: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against her. Held: Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless this shows that the fact from which the civil liability is based is proven to not have existed because of such acquittal. Civil liability is not extinguished where: (a) the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt. (b) Where the court expressly declares that the liability is not criminal but only civil, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act. The decision of the casewould show that the acquittal was based on failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her and De Guzman. Since all checks were signed by Sapiera on the back, sec 17 of Negotiable instruments law says that she would be considered an indorser of the bill of exchange and under section 66 thereof would be held liable for breach of warrantyand is held liable to pay the holder who may be compelled to pay the instrument. ______________

305 Sapiera vs. CA | Bellosillo G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999 | 314 SCRA 370 FACTS On several occasions, Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monrico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one

de Guzman, signed at the bank by Sapiera. When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Private respondent Sua informed de Guzman and Sapiera about the dishonor, but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, 4 charges of BP 22 were filed against Sapiera, and 2 counts of BP 22 against de Guzman before the RTC. The RTC held de Guzman guilty and acquitted Sapiera of all charges of estafa. However, it did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable. Sua filed an appeal with the RTC with regard the civil aspect, but it refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the acquittal of Sapiera was absolute. It then filed a petition for mandamus with the CA, which was granted. The CA also ordered Sapiera to pay Sua P335,000, representing the aggregate face value of the 4 checks indorsed by Sapiera plus legal interest. Sapiera filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that Sua had already recovered P125,000 under the criminal proceedings. The CA then corrected its previous award by deducting such amount. Hence this petition. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CA erred in requiring Sapiera to pay civil indemnity after the trial court had acquitted her of criminal charges. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI SAPIERA MAY BE ORDERED TO PAY CIVIL INDEMNITY DESPITE ACQUITTAL OF CRIMINAL CHARGES FOR ESTAFA.

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Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the RoC provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the NCC16.
16 When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal is that the two liabilities are separate and distinct from one another. While it is just and proper for the purposes of imprisonment of the accused that the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt, there is no such evidence required for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. For the latter, only a preponderance of evidence should be required. Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED. ____________
No Digest for SADIO VS RTC OF ANTIQUE ____________________ No Digest for Machinery and Engineering vs Quintano, 1956 ___________ Santos vs. Pizardo (2005) FACTS: Dionisio M. Sibayan, a driver of Viron Transit Bus collided with a lite ace van which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van's passengers. A criminal action for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries was thereafter filed. There was a reservation for filing a separate civil action arising from the crime. Sibayan was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. A separate civil action for damages was filed against Sibayan, Viron transit and its owner, citing the judgment convicting Sibayan. As a defense, Sibayan, et al filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. RTC decision: dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. CA decision: dismissed the petition for certiorari for the reason that it was not the proper remedy. ISSUE: WON there was prescription.

The exoneration of Sapiera was based on the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her and the other accused (de Guzman). However, Sapiera had admitted having signed the 4 checks on the reverse side. Hence, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof, and thus made herself liable for the payment of said checks. The dismissal of the criminal cases against Sapiera did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.

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RULING: None. A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners' claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. 15 Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. _____________ ARTICLE 31 No Digest for Republic vs Bello ___________ TAYAG V ALCANTARA 98 SCRA 723 CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac (dismissing petition for damages) FACTS - Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, which caused his instantaneous death. Pending the criminal case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus Inc) and the driver. In turn, the company and driver filed a motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the criminal case was still pending. Judge Alcantara granted this motion. - In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on reasonable doubt. The company and driver then filed for dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Judge Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case. ISSUE WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the ground of no cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver HELD 1. NO Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict Reasoning - Art. 31, NCC provides: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter - Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. The complaint itself shows that the claim was based on quasidelit, viz: 6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. Otherwise, the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have occurred; All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present: (1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the part of respondent (2) damage caused by the said act or omission (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission and (4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside, case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings.

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belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the TFM may be held liable for their acts under an official duty Respondents: They have immunity from suit of a state for they only followed the orders of the President when he called them out. It was their constitutional duty to exercise their functions. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, THEIR DUTY TO SUPPRESS LAWLESSNESS IS NOT A BLANKET LICENSE WHICH IGNORED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: 1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention; 2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; 3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; 4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concur] - I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which according to the Code Commission, "acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana". Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term "physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095). - Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. - The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law. _______ ARTICLE 32 CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

273 Aberca vs. Ver| En Banc G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988 | 160 SCRA 590 FACTS Then President Marcos had already lifted Martial Law but the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was still suspended. General Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa (TFM) to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. Plaintiffs filed a complaint which contained allegations of searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects

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5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness. The complaint alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of complainants private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. _________
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Tags: damages, digest, fortune tobacco, torts, vinzons-chato, vinzons-chato v. fortune tobacco Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco (2007) / Ynares-Santiago Facts Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subject to ad valorem [accdg to value] tax [20-45%]. Two days prior (1 Jul '93) to RA 7654's effectivity, VC [Comm., BIR] issued the RMC reclassifying the brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% AV tax (brands were subjected to RA 7654, Sec. 142 (c)(1) before it took effect). On 2 Jul, BIR Deputy Comm sent a copy of RMC to Fortune via fax. It was only on 15 Jul when Fortune received a certified photocopy of the RMC. Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC's recall but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV tax deficiency (9M~) was demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which issued an injunction enjoining RMC's implementation (defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the CA, and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune filed a complaint for damages against VC in her private capacity in the RTC, saying that she should be held liable for damages under NCC 32 (RMC issuance violated right against property deprivation without due process + equal protection of the laws). VC filed a motion to dismiss since she issued RMC in the performance of her fxn, within authority, and said that being an agent of RP, the latter is the one responsible for her acts, and that the complaint did have a cause of axn because there was no allegation of malice/bad faith. RTC denied VC's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case as well, saying that under NCC 32, liability may arise even if defendant did not act with malice/bad faith. CA also said that Admin Code is the general law on puboff's civil liab while NCC 32 is the special law governing this case, and that malice/bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. VC filed this complaint, saying that what shld be applied is the Admin Code [liab attaches only when there is a clear showing of bad faith / malice / gross negligence] and said that Admin Code is the special law, and that NCC is the general law. Issues and Holding 1. WON a puboff be sued in his private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of ofc fxns. YES, when [#3] 1. GEN RULE: PubOff not liab for damages which another suffers from just performance of official duties, within scope of tasks + RP not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent 1. HOWEVER, puboff not immune from damages in personal capacity for acts done in bad faith (not protected by mantle of immunity) [See cited Admin Code provision + Sec 39 of the same] 2. Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA - puboff who in/directly violates another's consti rights may be sued for damages under NCC 32 even though there is no malice / bad faith 3. SO: puboff may be sued [...]

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1. when there is malice, bad faith, negligence 2. when he violated a consti right of plaintiff 2. NCC 32 or Admin Code Sec. 38, Book I? NCC 32 1. LegMeth knowledge - gen, special law shld be harmonized if possible; special law prevails; the circ that special law is passed before or after gen law does not change principle 2. Discussion of Code Comm (Dean Bocobo) 1. There was a proposal re NCC 32 that puboff be held liable for consti right violation only if there is malice / bad faith but he said that Code Comm opposes this 1. Nature of NCC 32 - wrong may be civil or criminal 2. To make such a requisite would defeat main purpose (effective protection of individual rights) 3. Object is to put an end to abuse by plea of good faith; in US the remedy is in the nature of tort 3. NCC 32 patterned after Am law tort - WRONG, TORTIOUS ACT DEFINED AS THE COMMISSION/OMISSION OF ACT BY ONE, WITHOUT RIGHT, WHEREBY ANOTHER RECEIVES SOME INJURY IN PERSON, PROPERTY, OR REPUTATION 1. Liab in tort not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent 4. Aberca v. Ver - With NCC 32, principle of puboff acctability under Consti acquires added meaning, assumes larger dimension 5. Admin Code - bad faith, malice, negligence vital elements to make puboff liable for damages; subject is general ("acts" done in performance of duties, without specifying action/omission that may give rise to civil suit) 1. IN CONTRAST TO NCC 32 which specifies clearly the acts that may give rise to axn for damages (tort for impairment of rights, liberties) 3. WON VC may be held liable for damages. YES (no explicit / direct answer on this though) 1. Complaint brought under NCC 32 which does not require bad faith and malice, so the failure to allege it will not amount to failure to state cause of action _____________________________

FACTS On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands 'Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack." On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in

279 Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation| Nachura G.R. No. 141309 December 23, 2008|

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent's counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same. On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss; the case was subsequently elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. [It seems that in effect both RTC and CA ruled in favor of Fortune Tobacco and held Vinzons-Chato liable for damages under Art. 32 of NCC) In a decision dated June 19, 2007, SC affirmed the decision of the CA. MR denied, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En Banc. She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Can a public officer, in particular, BIR, be held liable for damages under Art. 32 of NCC for violating the respondents consti right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws, on the basis of the courts decision holding that the RMC issued by said official is defective, invalid and unenforceable? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. When what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he

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may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. The remedy in this case is not judicial but political. The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improper performance or nonperformance of his public duty. There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing to the public collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to particular individuals, thus: 1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury. The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they were duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather than to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular individual of the community. 2. Of Duties to Individuals. - The second class above referred to includes those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them. A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector, each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the particular individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.

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An individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. A contrary precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an improper performance or nonperformance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might have the like-the complaining individual has no better right than anybody else. If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded. Juxtaposed with Article 32 of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this Court's pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioner's motion for reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort for impairment of rights and liberties."

It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In the instant case, what is involved is a public officer's duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, we declared as having "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance." A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule. Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A

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careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase "financial and business difficulties" mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a "particular injury." In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93. The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondent's complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA), where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance." If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of respondent's cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be paragraph 2.01, which reads Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying specifically "Champion", "Hope" and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX "A". The issuance of a circular and its implementation resulted in the "deprivation of property" of plaintiff. They were done without due process of law and in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics supplied.) But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, "done without due process of law" and "in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws" are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in petitioner's motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are not deemed as facts. Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, were availed of by the respondentwithout even having to pay the assessment under protest-as recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA. The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies, contradict the respondent's claim of due process infringement. The Court discussed the American jurisprudence on this matter and in summary it provides that when the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms

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for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, additional Bivens remedies (Art. 32 of NCC in the Philippines) cannot be claimed. Lastly, citing Section 227 of RA 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997) which provides that any judgment, damages or costs recovered in an action brought against any Internal Revenue officer shall be satisfied by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him. The exception being where the person has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression. Because the respondent's complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State. Petitioners MR is GRANTED and the case pending in the RTC against the former (for damages under Art. 32) is DISMISSED.