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1 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

General
Human Rights Prerequisite to Democracy Islamist Politics Support Terrorism Terrorism Increase

Syria
Lack of U.S. Involvement= Radicalism Lose Sphere of Influence Russia Threatens Middle East Stability

Egypt
Oil Volatility-Bombings etc. Islamists Voted In Lose Ally A2: Egypt Democracy

Bahrain
Sunni-Shiite Divide

Yemen
Radical Danger Deny U.S. Counterterrorism Access Air Force Down A2: Yemen Democracy

Iran
Help Iran

Libya Economy
Foreign Aid A2: Improve Economy

Countries (General)
A2: Algeria A2: Morocco A2: Oman A2: Kuwait A2: Lebanon A2: Jordan

Hegemony
Arab Spring in Spite of U.S.

Democracy
Transition Democracies Enter War Autocracies Better A2: Successful Democracies A2: Democracies Stop Terrorism A2: Democracies Help the Economy

Alternatives
A2: Link A2: Air Pollution A2: Climate Change/ Global Warming

2 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Jobs Camp Topic Con Cards

Studies
A2: Cheney (Brookings)

3 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

General
Human Rights Prerequisite to Democracy 1. Free elections can only come without restrictive laws etc. Egypts Revolution & the Impact on U.S. Middle East Policy/ Kaitlin Travers (Marist College)/ February 2011/ http://nextgenjournal.com/2011/02/egypt%E2%80%99s-revolution-the-impact-on-u-smiddle-east-policy/ According to Joe Stork, deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Human Rights Watch, The combination of restrictive laws, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests is making it extremely difficult for citizens to choose freely the people they want to represent them in parliament. Repression by the government makes free and fair elections extremely unlikely. The future of U.S. policy will need to retract previous positions of hypocrisy in the human rights arena, pledging for full democratic and accountable governments. The tolerance for these abuses coupled with the actions of the political elite starving the country have stirred discontent and provided the ingredients of the Lotus Rebellion.

4 Stettin/ Ebenger Islamist Politics Support Terrorism Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Poll demonstrates New Study: Political Islam Correlated to Support for Terrorism/ Patrick Poole/ American Thinker/ June 2007/ http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/06/new_study_political_islam_corr.html A new study by the US Institute for Peace (USIP) of polling data from fourteen different Muslim countries finds that support for a role for Islam in politics strongly correlates with more likely support for terrorism. This statistical analysis is certain to draw protests from the usual propagandists of radical Islam in the US, even though the USIP can hardly be considered a neo-conservative institution.

5 Stettin/ Ebenger Terrorism Increase Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Youths over expectations of democracy will result in disappointment then terrorism How the Arab Spring Could Embolden Extremists/ Phillip Mudd/ Combatting Terrorist Center at West Point/ April 2011/ http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/how-the-arab-spring-could-emboldenextremists The euphoria over the toppling of reviled leaders masks the reality that prospective jihadist recruits are part of societies that probably are too optimistic that these democratic and economic transitions will occur quickly. Looking at some of the indicators in key North African countries, the economic malaise that forms the backdrop to the communities that might again become recruiting grounds cannot be cured by any quick political fix. The jumbled view that political revolutions and openness will somehow result in a better economic life could lead to disillusion in a few years if these pools of youth suffer from a hangover effect after revolution, growing convinced that democracy still means they face little prospect of good jobs or vibrant growth; worse, that the parties and leaders who replaced despots are themselves corrupt. Instability in the region, coupled with the disarray among security services that have resulted in increased crime, further adds to the likelihood that these countries will face an uncertain economic future. Economic performance this year will no doubt suffer as a result of the revolutions, and potential investors will look not only for what new governments say about foreign investment, but also for whether more criminality worsens country risk. To be sure, predicting whether disaffected youth will turn violent against domestic parties or instead resuscitate international jihadists is guesswork, but the environment in which violent extremists could recruit would certainly be more attractive for them than it is today. 2. Sectarian politics within Middle Eastern democracy How the Arab Spring Could Embolden Extremists/ Phillip Mudd/ Combatting Terrorist Center at West Point/ April 2011/ http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/how-the-arab-spring-could-emboldenextremists Increased political debate, seen by many in the West as a long-term stabilizer, might also fuel violence. The blooming of political parties could serve as another factor that opens ethnic and religious fissures that turn violent. Sectarian attacks stemming from confessional politics in some countries might also provide an opening for extremist groups such as al-Qa`ida. Sunni states with relatively open democratic processesLebanon and Iraq, for exampleelect candidates from parties that define themselves by religion and campaign on sectarianism. Polling data shows that public support is high for a prominent role for religion in politics elsewhere in the region; religion is guaranteed to play a role in North African politics as well.

6 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Syria
Lack of U.S. Involvement= Radicalism 1. Allows radicalism The Syrian Revolution and Washingtons Miscalculations/ Zagros Osman/ FIKRA Forum/ May 17, 2012/ http://fikraforum.org/?p=2241 The way the U.S. administration has dealt with the Syrian crisis has been shocking to the Syrian people as well as major democratic powers. All were surprised by the negligent U.S. attitude toward the Syrian regime, which has committed crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, and the fact that Washington has offered only meager moral support for the Syrian revolution in opposition. This is both contrary to interests of the Syrian people in their democratic transition, and to American strategic and oil interests in the Middle East. By taking this position, President Obama has only further distorted the U.S. image among Arab and Islamic publics and has challenged the credibility of American calls for freedom and democracy, prompting even the liberal forces in Syrian society to lose trust in the American administration and leading to an increase in the number of radical elements opposing the U.S. in Syria. The absence of an American role provides the opportunity for radical powers to utilize the revolution to advance their ideological viewpoints, to consolidate, and to win the Syrian street to their side, therefore weakening the forces of liberalism and secularism in the Syrian revolution. The reluctance of the U.S. also paves the way for Russian and Iranian influence, and for this reason, the development of events in Syria will not benefit the U.S.

7 Stettin/ Ebenger Lose Sphere of Influence Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Russia gains The Syrian Revolution and Washingtons Miscalculations/ Zagros Osman/ FIKRA Forum/ May 17, 2012/ http://fikraforum.org/?p=2241 Many Syrians have come to the conclusion that the U.S. administration is protecting the Syrian regime because it has not offered diplomatic, political, financial, or logistical support to the revolution in equal measure to what Russia has given the Syrian regime. Even without resorting to the military option, Washington could have done a great deal to present a firm warning to the Syrian regime so that it would stop killing peaceful protestors and withdraw its weapons from the cities. This would have hinted to Moscow the U.S. willingness to resort to another option--outside of the Security Council--in order to force Russia to abandon its blind support for the Syrian regime and to warn the rest of the regimes allies to stop providing money, weapons, and combatants. It also would have permitted the Friends of Syria to provide assistance to the Syrian revolution until the balance of power on the ground shifted in favor of the Syrian people and towards the destruction of the ruling power. Washington sponsorship of Syrian opposition parties would have pushed the parties to agree on a national program that guarantees the rights of all components of Syrian society and establishes a strategic relationship guaranteeing American interests in Syria and the region. If the actors of the Syrian opposition such as the Syrian National Council and the Syrian Kurdish National Council felt the seriousness of U.S. support for the revolution, then they would abandon their reservations and be ready to discuss the fate of Syria with Washington.

8 Stettin/ Ebenger Russia Threatens Middle East Stability Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Fuels conflict between Sunnis and Shiites The Syrian Revolution and Washingtons Miscalculations/ Zagros Osman/ FIKRA Forum/ May 17, 2012/ http://fikraforum.org/?p=2241 If the U.S. is truly afraid for the security and stability of the region, then it must intervene in the Syrian crisis before it is too late, in order to put an end to Russian arrogance. In announcing its bias toward the Shiite against the Sunni, the insolence of Moscow has become more Shiite than the Iranian regime. And what can we call such a pronouncement, except an invitation for conflict between Sunni and Shiite in the Middle East all for the protection of the Syrian regime. If Russia is successful in this, then it will exploit the withdrawal of the American role and cooperate with the Iran, the Syrian Regime, and Hezbollah to overthrow the emerging democracy in Arab Spring countries as well as bring down moderate Arab countries, re-producing dictatorial regimes in the region. The end result of this would be the establishment of dictatorship as a global pole, standing in opposition to the American pole.

9 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Egypt
Oil Volatility-Bombings etc. 1. Examples American Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring/ Oz Hassan/ London School of Economics/ http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR009/hassan.pdf The Arab Spring introduces uncertainty in the pursuit of these interests. It is not clear whether democratic consolidation will take place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and even if it does, it is not clear that democratisation is compatible with Americas other interests in the region. The early days of the spring have foregrounded these issues, with Egyptian protesters storming the Israeli embassy in Cairo, Egypt allowing two Iranian warships to transit through the Suez Canal, a Shiite uprising in Bahrain generating fears that Iran could gain influence affecting neighbouring Saudi Arabia, alarm that Islamists could come to power throughout the region, and increased volatility in the price of oil. 2. 13 attacks on pipeline (Egypt suspects al Qaeda Effects of pipeline attacks spread beyond Egypt/ Sarah Lynch/ USA Today/ 3-14-2012/ http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-05/egypt-natural-gas-pipeline-jordanisrael/53520880/1 Egyptian natural gas provides fuel for power plants in both countries, but the gas has flowed rarely in the past year. The pipeline has been sabotaged 13 times since Hosni Mubarak was ousted from office in Egypt.

10 Stettin/ Ebenger Islamists Voted In Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Salafi Dont Just Do Something, Stand There!/ Gregory Gause/ Foreign Policy/ December 2011/ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/america_arab_spring_do_nothing?page=full The surprise of 2011 has been how willing some Salafi Islamist groups -- extreme religious conservatives -- have been to embrace democratic politics. The most obvious case is Egypt, where the al-Nour Party did extremely well in the first round of parliamentary voting, winning some 25 percent of the vote and 20 percent of the seats. But Salafi involvement in democratic politics has also been a reality in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Yemen for some time now. Even in Saudi Arabia, important Salafi activists have signed petitions calling for an elected legislature. 2. Dont work with U.S. Dont Just Do Something, Stand There!/ Gregory Gause/ Foreign Policy/ December 2011/ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/america_arab_spring_do_nothing?page=full The third, most obvious, trend of 2011 is the success of Islamists at the ballot box. Islamist parties won pluralities in the Tunisian and Moroccan elections and might secure an absolute majority of the seats in the new Egyptian parliament, if trends from the first round of voting hold up. This is not necessarily a bad thing for their societies. Islamists might provide better governance in Arab states than their more secular predecessors. They might be real democrats, willing to accept rotation in power based on regular elections. They might make such mistakes in power that their citizens, over time, turn away from them. We will have to see how they govern. But Islamists most certainly will be less willing to cooperate with the United States on a whole range of U.S. foreign-policy goals in the region than the autocrats they are replacing. Islamists are suspicious of American goals in the region and American cultural influences in their countries. There is no getting around the fact that a more Islamist Arab world will be one that is less willing to cooperate with the United States. 3. Sunni radicals could take power Americas Second Chance and the Arab Spring/ Kenneth Pollack/ Foreign Affairs/ December 2011/ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/05/americas_second_chance?page=full The strong showing of Salafi movements, which appear to have captured approximately a quarter of votes, was the surprise of this round of elections. These Sunni extremists are growing in number and, if the system begins to break down, might try to seize control of the government like modern-day Bolsheviks. Some of Egypt's most popular leaders are dangerous demagogues who could plunge the country into all manner of problems. Democracy is a long road, with many perilous intersections, and Egypt has barely started on its way. What's more, Egypt will likely require considerable political, military, and even economic support from the United States and the rest of the world if it is to make that critical, dangerous, transition successfully.

11 Stettin/ Ebenger Lose Ally Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Legal challenges between U.S. and Egypt Rethinking U.S. Relations with a Changing Egypt/ Michele Dunne/ Project on Middle East Democracy/ March 22, 2012/ http://www.pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/POMEDPolicy-Brief_Dunne.pdf Furthermore, tensions between the U.S. and Egyptian governments are unusually high due to the unprecedented crackdown on Egyptian and American civil society organizations that was carried out by Mubarak-era holdovers in late 2011 and continues today. Although American defendants have been allowed to post bail and leave Egypt, the trial and investigation go on, making it difficult for the U.S. administration to certify that Egyptian transitional government has met congressionally mandated conditions for continued military assistance.

12 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Egypt Democracy Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Military has too much power; barrier to democracy The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications/ KATERINA DALACOURA/ The Royal Institute of International Affairs/ 2012/ http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_1/88_1dalacou ra.pdf The dominant position of the army following the overthrow of Mubarak is an advantage in terms of continuity and stability but could pose a serious threat to the prospects of democratic reform. Only a short time after the overthrow of Mubarak, there were already complaints against the continued gagging of the media and the referral of journalists to military courts, and concerns that police were returning to the old practices of violent and arbitrary behaviour. 2. Parliament dissolved in Egypt In Egypt, Court Says Its Decision On Dissolving Parliament Is Final/ Eyder Peralta/ National Public Radio/ July 9 2012/ http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/07/09/156510295/in-egypt-court-saysits-decision-on-dissolving-parliament-is-final First, Egypt's high court reaffirmed that its decision to dissolve parliament was final and binding. Over the weekend, the newly-elected President Mohammed Morsi had called parliament back into session defying the court's earlier decision. Reporting from Cairo, Kimberly Adams told our Newscast unit that this sets up a "political showdown." "Some analysts claim Morsi's decree doesn't contradict the judicial ruling which said some of the members of parliament were elected illegally it just reverses the way the ruling military generals interpreted that ruling," Adams reported. "The generals decided because some of the parliament was elected illegally, the entire People's Assembly should be disbanded. President Morsi says the Islamist-led body should serve until there is a new constitution." 3. Civil-military problems Democratization in the Arab World/ Laurel E. Miller/ Rand Corporation/ 2012/ http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1192.pdf These expectations do not match a more sober reading of Egypts near-term outlook. Although the revolution succeeded in removing President Mubarak from power, the main pillar of the regimethe militaryremains firmly in control of the transition process. The military has taken steps to appease the street, including instituting presidential term limits, strengthening judicial independence, and bringing previously excluded groups into the formal political process. But it also has retained tight control over decision making, held fast to the emergency law, and articulated its preference for a future constitution that grants it extensive powers as well as exemption from civilian oversight. A struggle lies ahead over reshaping civilmilitary relations that will for the first time pit the military against political forces that have democratic legitimacy. It is not clear that the results of this struggle as well as the transition process more broadly will satisfy the political aspirations of the Egyptian protestors. That disconnect could lead to a return to street politics and, with it, an erosion of domestic stability.

13 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Bahrain
Sunni-Shiite Divide 1. Lose-lose situation The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 The strong U.S. Naval presence in Bahrain makes it difficult for the United States to avoid taking a stand on the crisis, and the U.S. leadership is clearly worried about the deeply polarized relations between Sunnis and Shi'ites in that country. A tolerant attitude toward Bahraini repression could therefore offend a variety of Shi'ites well beyond Bahraini shores. Such an approach could also help radicalize Bahraini Shi'ites and perhaps even cause many of them to view Iran as a potential savior. Conversely, breaking all U.S. relations with Bahrain, including military relations, would be a serious strategic setback for the United States and a major benefit for Iran.

14 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Yemen
Radical Danger 1. Al Qaeda control possibility The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 With its massive foreign aid needs, no Yemeni government will seek to indulge radical impulses that will alienate potential aid donors. Rather, the most serious danger in Yemen is that the country will drift into anarchy, and fragment into a number of autonomous political entities some of which could be controlled or influenced by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This possibility represents a major threat to U.S. interests, which both the government and political opposition have promised to deal with, although neither is focused on that now because of the power struggle in Sana'a.

15 Stettin/ Ebenger Deny U.S. Counterterrorism Access Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Harms U.S. fight against al-Qaeda Unrest in the Middle East: Potential Implications for International Terrorism and Counterterrorism Policy/ Nathan E. Shields/ Global Security Studies/ Spring 2012/ http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Shields%20Arab%20Spring.pdf Regime change in Yemen could greatly affect U.S. CT efforts in the Arabian Peninsula, due to the large influence of Al-Qaeda in the country. Hull points out that some reports suggest that security forces in Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan, recently acquiesced in the town's takeover by Islamist militants. (Hull, 2011) This shows us that Al-Qaeda indeed has a greater influence in this country. With such influence, the over throw of President Ali Abdullah Saleh could lead to the U.S. being denied access to the country and a key ally in fight Al-Qaeda on the Arabian pensile.

16 Stettin/ Ebenger Air Force Down Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Al Qaeda attack on Yemen Yemens Arab Spring Leaves Its Air Force In Disarray/ Sharon Weinberger/ Aviation Week/ March 19, 2012/ http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_03_19_2012_p71433477.xml&p=1 On March 4, a brazen attack by Al Qaeda insurgents on an army base in the south of Yemen caught government soldiers by surprise. Some reports placed the death toll at nearly 200, with eyewitnesses describing a nightmarish scene of mutilation and beheadings. Yet, as the Al Qaeda insurgency boils over in southern Yemen, the majority of the country's air force is not currently involved in counterterrorism operations or even flying regular air patrols. Rather, many top air force officers and pilots are sitting in makeshift tents in the capital, Sanaa, demanding the removal of the air force commander, who they say has systematically destroyed the service. 2. Stopping fight against al-Qaeda Yemens Arab Spring Leaves Its Air Force In Disarray/ Sharon Weinberger/ Aviation Week/ March 19, 2012/ http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_03_19_2012_p71433477.xml&p=1 With thousands of other officers striking alongside Al Yemeni, the protest has brought the air force to a near standstill at a time when Yemen is a central theater of operations in the ongoing U.S. war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The result, despite several hundreds of millions of dollars in security assistance from the U.S. to Yemen over the past four years, is that a key tool in the global war against Islamic terrorists is essentially grounded.

17 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Yemen Democracy Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Yemen elected the vice president who was unopposed

18 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Iran
Help Iran 1. Egypt allows Iranian warships Is Iran Benefiting from Middle East Revolutions?/ Reza Aslan/ Council of Foreign Relations/ March 1, 2011/ http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-benefiting-middle-east-revolutions/p24662 The fact that the new Egyptian government has allowed Iranian warships to pass through the Suez canal. Makes it very clear that the relationship that the new post-Mubarak Egypt is going to have with Iran is going to be different then the Mubarak regime with Iran. 2. Normalize relationships Is Iran Benefiting from Middle East Revolutions?/ Reza Aslan/ Council of Foreign Relations/ March 1, 2011/ http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-benefiting-middle-east-revolutions/p24662 What we are going to see in Tunisia, in Yemen, in Egypt, in Libya is an attempt to normalize relations with Iran instead of what we have seen in the past, which is to contain Iran. 3. Supports nuclear program Implications of the Arab Awakening for U.S. Policy in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan/ Thomas Pickering/ U.S. Middle East Project/ July 2011/ http://www.usmep.us/usmep/wp-content/uploads/2011-18USMEPolicy-Brief1.pdf But overall, the Arab Spring has not helped the U.S. contain Iran. Aside from the fractured Arab IsraelU.S. alliance, the intervention in Libya supplies the Iranian regime with a talking point along the lines of, Look what happens when you strike a deal with the United States to give up your countrys weapons programs: they turn against you at the first opportunity.

19 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Economy
Foreign Aid 1. Lots of U.S. money spent abroad Obama proposes $800 million in aid for "Arab Spring"/ Susan Cornwell/ Reuters/ Feb 13, 2012/ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-usa-budget-foreign-idUSTRE81C1C920120213 Most of the economic aid for the Arab Spring countries -- $770 million -- would go to establish a new "Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund," the president said in his budget plan. 2. Lots of U.S. money spent abroad Obama proposes $800 million in aid for "Arab Spring"/ Susan Cornwell/ Reuters/ Feb 13, 2012/ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-usa-budget-foreign-idUSTRE81C1C920120213 It would also build on other programs for the area, including up to $2 billion in regional Overseas Private Investment Corporation financing, up to $1 billion in debt swaps for Egypt, and approximately $500 million in existing funds re-allocated to respond to the region last year, the budget document said.

20 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Improve Economy Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Economy collapsed in nearly every country Unfinished business/ The Economist/ Feb 4th 2012/ http://www.economist.com/node/21546018 Inflation is on the rise, though exact figures are hard to find. Worried Egyptians are depositing far less money in their banks, fearing a devaluation of the currency. Unemployment is also rising fast. One estimate sees an increase in the official rate from 10% to 15% in Egypt. Youth unemployment is reckoned to be at least 25%. Tourism, on which some 15m Egyptians depend, has been harmed, too. Workers in once-busy resorts on the Nile have flocked to Cairo, the capital, hoping to pick up menial work. In Tunisia many hotels remain closed. Having bought one in a fire sale, a new owner says, I'm buying the walls, nothing else. He dismissed all the staff. Foreign investment has been hit hardest of all. A Tunisian analyst reckons 120 foreign firms shut up shop, cutting 40,000 jobs. Yazaki, a Japanese cable manufacturer, pulled out of a poor rural region. Overall foreign direct investment dropped by more than a quarter (see chart). In Egypt it plunged from $6.4 billion in 2010 to $500m last year; in Libya it dropped from $3.8 billion to almost nothing.

21 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Countries (General)
A2: Algeria 1. Algeria wont have democratic revolution The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 The Algerian regime does not appear to be threatened at this time, and Algerian authorities are significantly more effective than those in Tunisia in suppressing, disrupting, and containing opposition efforts to organize large demonstrations. The Algerian population is also especially aware of the dangers of prolonged civil war. As a result of that experience, no one in Algeria can reasonably believe that regime change will be easy.

22 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Morocco Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Will not help or harm the U.S. The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 Additionally, the opposition in Morocco is not dominated by Islamists and is not making Moroccan foreign policy an important part of their dissent. The United States has maintained a productive relationship with Morocco for decades and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future by working with the King and the new government.

23 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Oman Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Not democratic revolution; situation isnt even a revolution The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 Oman has experienced problems with demonstrations during the Arab Spring, but these difficulties have been containable and have not risen to be regime-threatening. Throughout the process of confronting the government, demonstrators have not called for the resignation of Sultan Qaboos, but some have sought a strong legislature to serve as a counterweight to monarchical power. Their main demands nevertheless remain economic. Sultan Qaboos responded quickly to the unrest in February by firing 12 ministers, increasing the minimum wage, and promising to create 50,000 new jobs. These and other efforts appear to have stabilized the situation.

24 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Kuwait Camp Topic Con Cards

1. No democratic revolution The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 Kuwait is currently suffering political turmoil within its parliament which was aggravated by the Saudi-led invasion of Bahrain as well as the examples of other populations rising against their governments because of corruption issues. Kuwait as a wealthy country does not have the same types of problems of poverty that fed the early revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, and Kuwaitis are not engaging in mass uprisings.

25 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Lebanon Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Not impact of democratic revolution The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 Lebanon is currently in political turmoil and a second civil war is not impossible, although these developments are the result of domestic political differences and perennial Syria meddling in Lebanon rather than a reaction to the Arab Spring.

26 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Jordan Camp Topic Con Cards

1. King can always overrule= rights not protected The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications/ KATERINA DALACOURA/ The Royal Institute of International Affairs/ 2012/ http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_1/88_1dalacou ra.pdf Although these moves may seem a step in the right direction,36 and could have unforeseen consequences in diluting monarchical authority, they are in fact further manoeuvrings by liberalized autocracies seeking to secure their hold on power.37 The king of Jordan frequently dismisses his government and sets up a new one with a reform mandate, which is never quite implemented. In both monarchies, the manner in which the recent constitutional amendments emergedproposed by royal fiat, their contents decided by panels appointed by the kinghas caused much dissatisfaction (the 20 February protest movement in Morocco rejected them for this reason). The changes to the Moroccan constitution opened up the political system to a degree and included some important reforms, for instance strengthening parliament and making Amazigh (Berber) an official language. In the case of Jordan, the amendments would strengthen the judiciary and the protection of civil and political rights. However, in both cases, the kings executive powers remain undiminished and they retain the right to appoint the prime minister.38 2. No potential for revolution The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 Jordan has sometimes been described as close to revolution, but these concerns are exaggerated. Large segments of the population are loyal to the Hashemite monarchy, while oppositionists do not have a viable alternative to offer. 3. Revolution would not be feasible The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World/ Dr. Andrew Terrill/ Strategic Studies Institute/ August 2011/ http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/The-Arab-Spring-and-the-Future-ofUS-Interests/2011/8/2 Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship comprise at least half of the Jordanian population, and a democratic Jordan in which the Palestinian segment of the population was dominant would be under constant pressure to renounce the peace treaty with Israel and also to normalize relations with the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Group, Hamas. Such policies would probably halt U.S. aid and perhaps threaten European aid as well. While many Palestinian-Jordanians may like to see a democratic government they are aware that populist policies would destroy their country economically because of the foreign backlash.

27 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Hegemony
Arab Spring in Spite of U.S. 1. US losing influence Implications of the Arab Awakening for U.S. Policy in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan/ Thomas Pickering/ U.S. Middle East Project/ July 2011/ http://www.usmep.us/usmep/wp-content/uploads/2011-18USMEPolicy-Brief1.pdf It is important for the U.S. to understand that the Arab Spring is seen more widely in the Muslim world as reflecting Americas declining influence in the region, and that this perception will increase as the U.S. prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan.

28 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Democracy
Transition Democracies Enter War 1. War because they dont have democratic infrastructure Electing To Fight Why Emerging Democracies Go To War/ Edward D. Mansfield (University of Pennsylvania) and Jack Snyder/ MIT Press/ 2004/ http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2004BB/papers/Snyder-CSAE-BB2004.pdf Instead, we find that war is most likely in incomplete democratization that has stalled during the transition from an authoritarian regime to a mixed regime, when the state suffers from serious institutional deficits. Weak institutions per se do not increase the chance of war; they do so only during the early phase of an incomplete democratic transition. It is often a strategic mistake for an institutionally weak state that is handing over power to its people to initiate war, and yet such states often do exactly this. Why? Such states face a gap between rising demands for broad participation in politics and inadequate institutions to manage those popular demands.24 Where the institutions of autocratic authority are crumbling, yet new institutions of democratic accountability have not yet been constructed to take their place, routine institutional authority is lacking, and political leaders frequently turn instead to ideological or charismatic appeals to bolster their rule. Rallying popular support by invoking threats from rival nations is a common expedient for hard-pressed leaders who seek to shore up their legitimacy. During the unraveling of the Yugoslav Communist regime, for example, Slobodan Milosevic employed demagogic rhetoric about the alleged danger of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo to gain a popular following in Serbias first elections.25 The institutional weaknesses of early democratization create both the motive to use this strategy of rule and the opportunity to dodge accountability for its high costs and biased rhetoric. 2. Warrants for war Electing To Fight Why Emerging Democracies Go To War/ Edward D. Mansfield (University of Pennsylvania) and Jack Snyder/ MIT Press/ 2004/ http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2004BB/papers/Snyder-CSAE-BB2004.pdf Although much of the belligerence of the Islamic public is fueled by resentment of the U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes under which many of them live, simply renouncing these authoritarians and pressing for a quick democratic opening is unlikely to lead to peaceful democratic consolidations. On the contrary, unleashing Islamic mass opinion through a sudden democratization could only raise the likelihood of war.36 All of the risk factors are there: the media and civil society groups are inflammatory, as old elites and rising oppositions try to outbid each other for the mantle of Islamic or nationalist militancy.37 The rule of law is weak, and existing corrupt bureaucracies cannot serve a democratic administration properly. The boundaries of states are mismatched with those of nations, making any push for national self-determination fraught with peril.

29 Stettin/ Ebenger Autocracies Better Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Pretty cool rhetoric Fareed Zakaria (in his book) The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad/ 2007/ Then the American gently raises the issue of human rights and suggests that Egypts government might ease up on political dissent, allow more press freedoms, and stop jailing intellectuals. Mubarak tenses up and snaps, If I were to do what you ask, Islamic fundamentalists will take over Egypt. Is that what you want? The conversation moves back to the latest twist in the peace process. Over the years Americans and Arabs have had many such exchanges. When President Bush urged Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to agree to the Camp David peace plan that had been negotiated in July 2001, Arafat reportedly responded with words to this effect: If I do what you want, Hamas will be in power tomorrow. The Saudi monarchys most articulate spokesman, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, often reminds American officials that if they press his government too hard, the likely alternative to the regime is not Jeffersonian democracy but a Taliban-style theocracy. The worst part of it is, they may be right.

30 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Successful Democracies Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Examples how democracy will not take root The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications/ KATERINA DALACOURA/ The Royal Institute of International Affairs/ 2012/ http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_1/88_1dalacou ra.pdf Whatever the demands or hopes of their participants (and the hard facts about these are still lacking), most rebellions will not lead to democracy in any shape or form in the near future. In Syria, violent confrontation and the threat of civil war make democratization unlikely. In Yemen, weak state institutions, unable to sustain the rule of law, do not bode well for the emergence of a democratic system. In Libya, the dictator was overthrown, but not as a result of a unified internal movement for change. The longstanding weakness of state institutions and civil society in that country, as well as the presence of numerous armed militias and the current absence of a strong central authority following the civil war, do not bode well for democratization. In Bahrain, civil war is not on the agenda at present, but the suppression of the insurrection and the shrinking of the middle ground have extinguished any prospect for meaningful democratic reform. Following a ferocious crackdown on Shiis and some Sunni liberal activists (which included mass arrests, the destruction of Shii places of worship, arbitrary detention and torture, and the dismissal of hundreds of protesters from their jobs), the state of emergency was lifted on 1 June and the regime initiated a process of national dialogue. This did not prevent further repression, however, and scheduled elections have been described as panels in Bahrains democratic veneer.35 2. Speedy revolutions as seen in Arab spring fail Electing To Fight Why Emerging Democracies Go To War/ Edward D. Mansfield (University of Pennsylvania) and Jack Snyder/ MIT Press/ 2004/ http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2004BB/papers/Snyder-CSAE-BB2004.pdf In countries that tried to take shortcuts to democracy, Dahl argued, elites tended to feel threatened by political change, and leaders often deployed nationalism as a justification for intolerance and repression.23 We find exactly these causal mechanisms at work in many wars of democratization. 3. What democracies need (especially if they are rushed) Electing To Fight Why Emerging Democracies Go To War/ Edward D. Mansfield (University of Pennsylvania) and Jack Snyder/ MIT Press/ 2004/ http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2004BB/papers/Snyder-CSAE-BB2004.pdf These countries had a number of important advantages. They tended to enjoy relatively high percapita income and literacy; thus, their citizens had the resources and skills to build the institutions and civil society organizations that democracy needs. Before the transition began, many of these success cases had well-developed state institutions, and in particular, administrative bureaucracies that functioned in a reasonably efficient way to advance state objectives with minimal corruption. Some of these successful states enjoyed the benefit of some past experience with independent legal and journalistic institutions that could be adapted for use by the democratizing state. In most of these states, powerful elites did not feel threatened by a successful transition to democracy, in part because trusted state institutions made guarantees that they would have a soft landing credible, so they were less likely to put up resistance to change.

31 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards 4. Rushed democracies fail Electing To Fight Why Emerging Democracies Go To War/ Edward D. Mansfield (University of Pennsylvania) and Jack Snyder/ MIT Press/ 2004/ http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2004BB/papers/Snyder-CSAE-BB2004.pdf Our most general rule is to start the process by building the institutions that democracy requires, and then encouraging mass political participation and unfettered electoral competition only after these institutions have begun to take root. Too often, as in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, elections have come too soon and merely locked in the dominance of illiberal elites who won votes by playing the nationalist card.45

32 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Democracies Stop Terrorism Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Nah, history shows otherwise Think Again: Middle East Democracy/ MARINA OTTAWAY (Carnegie Endowment) and THOMAS CAROTHERS/ Foreign Policy/ NOVEMBER 1, 2004/ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/11/01/think_again_middle_east_democracy?page=full Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country's history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government's promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country's stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region. 2. Worse in transitioning democracies Think Again: Middle East Democracy/ MARINA OTTAWAY (Carnegie Endowment) and THOMAS CAROTHERS/ Foreign Policy/ NOVEMBER 1, 2004/ http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/11/01/think_again_middle_east_democracy?page=full The experience of countries in different regions makes clear that terrorist groups can operate for sustained periods even in successful democracies, whether it is the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the ETA (Basque separatists) in Spain. The ETA gained strength during the first two decades of Spain's democratization process, flourishing more than it had under the dictatorship of Gen. Francisco Franco. In fragile democratic states -- as new Arab democracies would likely be for years -- radical groups committed to violence can do even more harm, often for long periods, as evidenced by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or the Maoist rebels in Nepal.

33 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Democracies Help the Economy Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Democracies have to listen to the people; not necessarily in the countries best interest Does Economic Success Require Democracy?/ Kevin Hassett/ The American (American Enterprise Institute)/ May 2007/ http://www.american.com/archive/2007/may-june-magazine-contents/doeseconomic-success-require-democracy Arrow was able to show that no voting scheme can be devised that will create a government that has rational preferences, where rationality is defined precisely by Arrow as meeting a number of conditions. Democracy might be a form of government that many prefer to live under, but there is nothing theoretically compelling that suggests that it is the form of government that best reflects the underlying preferences of citizens. As a result, democracies will not necessarily outperform other types of mechanisms for preference aggregation as a route to economic prosperity. Democracies will not always win. In the latter half of the 20th century, this observation seemed irrelevant. The United States, with its free markets and democracy, defeated the Soviet Union, with its centrally planned economy and party dictatorship. But in the 21st century, things look different. Dictatorships, as in China, appear to have learned from the failure of the Soviets. While they continue to oppress political opponents, they allow a high level of economic freedom within their borders. So far, this approach is working, and in a big wayas the chart illustrates. An organization called Freedom House rates the level of political freedom of the worlds nations on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 the most free. For example, according to the 2006 survey, countries like the United States and Italy are rated 1, while Singapore is rated 4.5, China and Saudi Arabia 6.5, and North Korea 7. In addition, the Fraser Institute in Canada rates the economic freedom of nations, looking at taxes, regulation, trade barriers, and the like.

34 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards 2. Warrants and examples Does Economic Success Require Democracy?/ Kevin Hassett/ The American (American Enterprise Institute)/ May 2007/ http://www.american.com/archive/2007/may-june-magazine-contents/doeseconomic-success-require-democracy The chart tells a striking story: the countries that are economically and politically free are underperforming the countries that are economically but not politically free. For example, unfree China had a growth rate of 9.5 percent from 2001 to 2005. But China was not the whole story Malaysias GDP grew 9.5 percent from 1991 to 1995, Singapores GDP grew 6.4 percent from 1996 to 2000, and Russias grew 6.1 percent from 2001 to 2005. The unfree governments now understand that they have to provide a good economy to keep citizens happy, and they understand that free-market economies work best. Also, nearly all of the unfree nations are developing countries. History shows they grow faster, at least for a while, than mature nations. But being unfree may be an economic advantage. Dictatorships are not hamstrung by the preferences of voters for, say, a pervasive welfare state.

35 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Alternatives
A2: Link 1. Not in our interest to put ourselves in prison in order to force ourselves to get an education. Similarly, we shouldnt need an increase in oil prices (which harms our economy) to invest in alternatives.

36 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Air Pollution Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Opposite effect Facts Not Fear on Air Pollution/ Joel Schwartz/ National Center for Policy Analysis/ December 11, 2006/ http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st294.pdf The pattern of hospital visits for asthma suggests air pollution cannot be signicantly exacerbating the condition. For example, emergency room visits and hospitalizations for asthma are lowest during July and August, when ozone levels are highest.36 Similarly, a study of California children found that while higher ozone was associated with a greater risk of developing asthma for children who played three or more team sports (8 percent of children in the study), higher ozone was also associated with a 30 percent lower risk of asthma among all children in the study. Other air pollutants, such as nitrogen dioxide and particulate matter, were also associated with a lower risk of developing asthma. Popular portrayal and reality also diverge when it comes to the long-term effects of air pollution on respiratory health. In addition to asthma, the Children's Health Study assessed the relationship between air pollution and growth in children's lung function.39 After following more than 1,700 children from age 10 to 18 over the years 1993 to 2001, the study reported no association between ozone and lung growth or capacity.40 The Children's Health Study included communities with higher ozone than have ever occurred anywhere else in the country, and even the CHS communities no longer have ozone anywhere near that high. This suggests that even the worst ozone levels in the country are not affecting children's lung development.41

37 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Climate Change Camp Topic Con Cards

1. Control for temperature increases etc. = no global warming Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of the Alleged Scientific Consensus/ Richard S. Lindzen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)/ Cato Institute/ Spring 1992/ http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv15n2/reg15n2g.html The global average temperature record for the past century or so is irregular and not without problems. It does, however, show an average increase in temperature of about .45 degree centigrade plus or minus .15 degree centigrade with most of the increase occurring before 1940, followed by some cooling through the early 1970s and a rapid (but modest) temperature increase in the late 1970s. As noted, we have already seen an increase in "equivalent'' carbon dioxide of 50 percent. Thus, on the basis of models that predict a four degree centigrade warming for a doubling of carbon dioxide we might expect to have seen a warming of two degrees centigrade already. If, however, we include the delay imposed by the oceans' heat capacity, we might expect a warming of about one degree centigrade--which is still twice what has been observed. Moreover, most of that warming occurred before the bulk of the minor greenhouse gases were added to the atmosphere. Figure 2 shows what might have been expected for models with differing sensitivities to a doubling of carbon dioxide. What we see is that the past record is most consistent with an equilibrium response to a doubling of about 1.3 degrees centigrade--assuming that all the observed warming was due to increasing carbon dioxide. There is nothing in the record that can be distinguished from the natural variability of the climate, however. 2. Just cycles Global warming? It doesn't exist, says Ryanair boss O'Leary/ Martin Hickman/ The Independent/ September 2010/ http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/global-warming-it-doesntexist-says-ryanair-boss-oleary-2075420.html "Well, hang on, we've had an ice age. We've also had a couple of very hot spells during the Middle Ages, so nobody can deny climate change. But there's absolutely no link between man-made carbon, which contributes less than 2 per cent of total carbon emissions [and climate change]."

38 Stettin/ Ebenger A2: Jobs 1. Give me a number not a ratio 2. Not U.S. jobs Top Ten Energy Myths/ Tom Tanton/ Pacific Research Institute/ November 2009/ www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20091102_Top_Ten_Energy_Myths.pdf http://www.google.com/#q=percent+of+carbon+from+natural+seepage&hl=en&prmd=iv&ei=_AmQT M6mHJDLOJGi8d8M&start=10&sa=N&fp=6052204b889acdd8 There is also, however, another angle to the replace oil with renewables argument that is most often overlooked when discussing energy security. The reality is that much of the technology and equipment used in renewable energy is imported. For example, the majority of wind turbines are currently imported. The most recent data shows that, in 2007, 55 percent of wind turbines installed in the U.S. were imported from countries like Denmark, Germany and India, continuing the trend of the prior five years. 3. Not long term jobs Wind Energy Update/ Wind Powered America/ Larry Flowers/ National Renewable Energy Laboratory/ June 2010/ http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/wpa/wpa_update.pdf 100-200 jobs/100MW during construction 6-10 permanent O&M jobs per 100 MW 4. Lots of oil jobs Energy and the Environment: Myths and Facts 2nd Edition/ Drew Thornley/ Manhattan Institute/ April 2009/ http://www.manhattan-institute.org/energymyths/myth1.htm Many of these losses would come from our nations oil and natural gas industries. According to the Independent Petroleum Association of America, almost 1.8 million people were directly employed in the United States oil and gas industries in 2007, up from just over 1.5 million in 1975.[59] Moreover, because coal emits twice the carbon of natural gas when burned, a regime that penalizes carbon could lead to even greater job losses in the coal industry. In 2007, 81,278 workers were directly employed in the U.S. coal industry.[60] The significance of the potential harm to the coal industry must not be overlooked, as any losses in the industry that generates roughly half of all electricity produced in the United States will surely be felt throughout the economy. Camp Topic Con Cards

39 Stettin/ Ebenger Camp Topic Con Cards

Studies
A2: Cheney (Brookings) 1. Not successful Democratic Change in the Arab World, Past and Present/ Eric Chaney (Harvard University)/ Brookings Institute/ March 2012/ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/spring%202012/2012_spring_bpea_chaney.pdf Despite these limitations, at some level the structural changes the region has undergone over the past 60 years have made the Arab world more fertile ground for sustained democratic change today than at any time in the past. Indeed, the widespread protests that swept across the region in 2011 have no precedent in the regions history. That having been said, in some countries of the Arab world (e.g. Egypt or Yemen) the present-day political equilibrium seems more similar to the historical equilibrium that has accompanied autocratic institutions than in others (e.g. Tunisia). In this sense, history suggests that democracy is less likely to emerge in the former group of countries than in the latter.

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