American Empire?

Ancient Reflections on Modern American Power

Robinson, Eric W.
Classical World, Volume 99, Number 1, Fall 2005, pp. 35-50 (Article)
Published by Classical Association of the Atlantic States
DOI: 10.1353/clw.2006.0018
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35
AMERICAN EMPIRE? ANCIENT REFLECTIONS ON
MODERN AMERICAN POWER
*
The American Empire, or, more properly, whether America has
an empire, is a fiercely debated topic these days. You see the is-
sue arise in newspaper editorials, magazine articles, television discussions,
and prominent new books. Historians in particular have taken up
the question. The short term cause, of course, is the controversial
U.S. invasion and ongoing occupation of Iraq, which has dominated
headlines ever since its beginning. But for years before this sec-
ond U.S.-Iraq war, talk about the United States as Empire had been
on the rise, stemming from the fact that since the fall of the So-
viet Union the United States has been seen as the worlds lone
superpower. This phrase is a clich by now, but it points to an
undeniable truth: no other nation on earth comes close to match-
ing Americas combination of military power, military reach, alliances,
advanced technology, and economic strength. And since the psy-
chologically devastating attacks on the country on September 11,
2001, American policy has changed regarding the use of its unri-
valled power around the globe. In 2002 the president boldly announced
a new strategic doctrine of preemption, whereby the United States
reserves the right to launch attacks against perceived foes anywhere
in the world at any time simply because the government thinks a
hostile act might be in the offing somewhere, at some time. In the
official U.S. government policy statement The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America one reads:
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inactionand the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemys attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively. The United States will
not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats,
nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for
aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of
civilization openly and actively seek the worlds most
destructive technologies, the United States cannot
remain idle while dangers gather.
1
35
*
I wish to thank for their help with this paper at various stages David Courtwright,
Nino Luraghi, Ellen Wagner, Joshua Fineberg, Carwina Weng, Ralph Rosen, Matthew
Santirocco, and the anonymous readers for Classical World. Responsibility for any
remaining errors (and dubious opinions) is entirely my own.
1
The full security strategy statement (from September 2002) is available from
the White House at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. It is also archived as: U.S.
Executive Office of the President, The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America (Washington, September 2002), available at GPO Access: http://purl.access
.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22467 (retrieved July 18, 2005).
36
Combining such ominous policy statements with Americas vast power
and especially the campaigns launched in recent years in distant
Afghanistan and Iraqboth stunning initial military successes with
as yet uncertain long-term political outcomesone understands how
and why many observers have come to see Americas place in the
world as increasingly imperial and have sought to compare the
American Empire with previous empires.
To a large extent historians and classicists should welcome the
interest in this subject. It is always good to see public attention
turn to history and efforts made to place current events into a broad
historical context. But, of course, it is even better to get the right
context, and I do have some concerns about the easy labeling of
the United States as an empire. Being a classical historian, I have
had plenty of occasions to teach the history of the Roman Empire
and Greek empires that preceded it, especially that of fifth-cen-
tury B.C. Athens. The history and terminology of these classical
empiresand later ones as welloffer insights about how one may
define what is an empire and whether it is correct to describe American
power as imperial; it may also help us understand where America
is (or is not) headed as a great power.
Historians and others offering views on the subject often fa-
vor one of two terms to describe contemporary American preeminence
in international politics: empire or hegemony. The first has be-
come increasingly popular since the military interventions in Afghanistan
and Iraq and sometimes seems to be employed especially for its
shock value. Syndicated columnists like to use the term, and un-
distinguished, opportunistic books like Jim Garrisons America as
Empire have appeared on the bookshelves of major chain stores.
Some professional historians have even brandished the term in protesting
the Iraq War.
2
But there are also scholarly debates about the idea
of an American empire or American hegemony, and these promise
to be more illuminating.
3
Proponents of the notion of American
empire generally concede that in one respect it does not fit tradi-
tional understandings of empire: unlike Rome, a touchstone case
for empire in the Western consciousness, the United States does
not, for the most part, annex and directly govern foreign territo-
ries, but relies instead on more indirect kinds of influence. An
empire, however, does not have to exert complete administrative
2
See the on-line petition circulated by the group Historians Against the War.
The document declares its opposition to the expansion of United States empire
(http://personalpages.tds.net/%7Emarcbecker/petition2.html [retrieved July 18, 2005];
see also the story published March 23, 2004, on the History News Network, at http://
hnn.us/articles/4319.html [retrieved July 18, 2005]).
3
See, for example, N. Fergusons recent books Empire (New York 2002) and
Colossus (New York 2004); A. Bacevich, American Empire (Cambridge, Mass., 2002);
P. K. OBrien and A. Clesse, Two Hegemonies: Britain 18461914 and the United
States 19412001 (Aldershot 2002); and most recently the series of articles devoted
to imperialism and American empire in Daedalus 134.2 (2005), especially A. Iriye,
Beyond Imperialism: The New Internationalism, 10816.
ERIC W. ROBINSON
37
control of subject states to get its own way, politically or eco-
nomically. Furthermore, there are structural features which suggest
that the United States qualifies as a de facto empire: the attempts
(even if not always successful) to enforce its will on other states
militarily, from Guatemala to Cuba to Viet Nam to various Middle
Eastern countries; the promulgation of a set of cultural and ideo-
logical values within and beyond its area of influence (everything
from democracy to Disney); and the allies around the world that
often behave like client states. One might perceive a two-tiered
system, in fact, in which Americas major allies are permitted to
disagree, but smaller states on the frontiers are sometimes made
an example of.
4
Not all scholars concur with the imperial American thesis, however.
Even if one grants that empires can sometimes rule indirectly without
formal occupation and administration, some would say that the is-
sue still comes down to political control: an empire possesses final
authority over its subjects; hegemony, on the other hand, connotes
acknowledged leadership, even dominating influence, but leader-
ship within a diverse community of independent polities. As one
scholar has put it, a hegemon is first among equals; whereas
an imperial power rules over subordinates, and thus, though some
may fear true imperialism down the road if the United States con-
tinues certain policies, so far hegemony better describes the current
state of its leadership in the world.
5
Comparing empires from different historical eras can give us
some perspective on the question at hand. One of the more inter-
esting recent scholarly attempts to define and classify historical
empires comes from Thomas Barfield, who uses the case of con-
federations of nomadic peoples of the steppes bordering northern
China c. 200 B.C. to 200 A.D. as a starting point for categorizing
different kinds of imperial power, then draws on the examples of
Greece, Rome, Egypt, Nubia, China, Turkey, Britain, Portugal, and
many others.
6
He first distinguishes primary and secondary empires:
a primary empire is a state established by conquest that has sov-
ereignty over subcontinental or continental sized territories and
incorporates millions or tens of millions of people within a uni-
4
This sketch relies especially on the arguments of C. Maiers An American
Empire? Implications for Democracy, Order, and Disorder in World Politics, a revi-
sion (kindly provided to me by Prof. Maier) of the paper Waiting for the Barbarians?
Empire, Order, and Disorder in Twentieth-Century World Politics delivered at the
2003 annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago. For an op-
posing paper from the same conference, see next note.
5
P. Schroeder, Is the U.S. an Empire? published February 3, 2003, on the
History News Network and archived at http://hnn.us/articles/1237.html (retrieved July
18, 2005).
6
T. J. Barfield, The Shadow Empires: Imperial State Formation Along the Chi-
nese-Nomad Frontier, in S. E. Alcock, T. N. DAltroy, K. D. Morrison, and C. M.
Sinopoli, eds., Empires, Perspectives from Archaeology and History (Cambridge 2001)
1041.
AMERICAN EMPIRE?
38
fied and centralized administrative system.
7
The Achaemenid Per-
sians, Rome, dynastic China, and other such famous cases are all
examples that perfectly suit this primary kind of empire. Second-
ary, or shadow, empires, on the other hand, take over some of
the outward appearances of primary empires (often acting as a parasite
on or in reaction to a primary empire) but lack their substance
and can only with some difficulty be considered real empires. They
can take many forms, of which Barfield outlines four. Maritime
trade empires leverage limited occupied territory and minimum forces
to obtain maximum wealth; mirror empires (like the Xiongnu and
later Mongolian nomad confederacies) depend upon harassing rich
primary empires into paying them tribute, prospering or suffering
in direct proportion to the primary empire; vulture empires arise
on the margins of declining primary empires (e.g., Nubia and Manchuria
relative to Egypt and China); and, finally, nostalgia empires take
up the trappings and exploit the memory of faded primary em-
pires (e.g., the Carolingians with respect to Rome).
Applying Barfields carefully considered schema to the con-
temporary United States yields intriguing results. On the one hand,
American influence seems to fall rather clearly outside the realm
of primary or true empire. Acquiring vast new subject territories
via conquest (in the manner of ancient Rome, imperial China, or
early modern Spain) hardly characterizes current American prac-
tice. Rather, it would seem to qualify at best as a kind of shadow
empire, perhaps a variation on the paradigmatic maritime trading
power, given the vast wealth the United States accrues from the
global trading system it supports and its efficient use of a flex-
ible military to effect its will without long-term occupations or
annexations. And yet if one looks at some of the further charac-
teristics Barfield finds in primary empires, the case for the United
States as empire regains ground. Empires, according to Barfield,
thrive on diversity and become more cosmopolitan over time; they
develop advanced transportation systems with military and economic
benefits; they develop new systems of information communication;
they project a cultural identity (values, material culture, artistic
standards, etc.) that leaves a broad and lasting legacy. It is not
hard to see how the rise of the United States to mastery in the
last half-century could be seen to fit these descriptions in every
respect.
8
And yet much room for disagreement remains, not least about
the criteria and language Barfield or others might use for estab-
7
Barfield (above, n.6) 29.
8
Consider, for example, the areas of transportation and information technology.
Where the Romans built roads and facilitated trade and transport on the Mediterra-
nean, America has excelled in the use of airspace to establish military superiority,
expand economic profitability, and exchange information with extraordinary rapidity.
For the ramifications of the unprecedented American exploitation of the air, see D.
Courtwright, Sky as Frontier (College Station, Tex., 2005), esp. chs. 11 and 12.
ERIC W. ROBINSON
39
lishing categories in the first place. Indeed, at the conference out
of which came the Barfield essay and other contributions to the
same volume (on the comparative dynamics of early empires), it
was the definition of empire that proved particularly divisive among
participants.
9
We may, therefore, find a key to sorting out the issue by con-
sidering the roots of the words in question: empire, and the oft-raised
alternative for describing American power, hegemony. As it hap-
pens, both come from the world of the Greeks and Romans, whose
language and history have been remarkably influential in shaping
present-day concepts of imperial power.
10
The word empire de-
rives from the Latin noun imperium, which itself comes from the
Latin verb imperare, to command. Imperium can be used in a va-
riety of ways, but two basic meanings predominate: the first and
most essential meaning is the power of command given to senior
Roman magistrates elected annually at Rome. Having imperium meant
that a magistrate could command armies and impose judicial deci-
sions, including capital punishment. It was the ultimate expression
of the executive power of the populus Romanus, and a weighty
authority. During the Republic it was carefully controlled and checked
by various means, including short terms of office and colleagues
who could countermand each other if necessary. Consuls and praetors
held imperium during their one-year terms; the rarely invoked of-
fice of dictator exercised it for a mere six months. Imperium could
also be assigned to officials standing in for consuls and praetors,
the so-called pro-magistrates, like propraetors and proconsuls, who
were typically appointed for a fixed period of time to fight con-
tinuing military campaigns abroad or to govern foreign territories.
The Romans assumed that in the legendary past before the Repub-
lic their kings had wielded imperium; and after Augustus triumphed
in the civil wars that destroyed the Republic in the first century
B.C., he established the dynastic rule of the Caesars, and each succeeding
Caesar naturally held imperium.
The idea of command that goes with this fundamental mean-
ing of imperium is underscored by consideration of the verb from
which it derives. Imperare means to command. It could be gener-
alized, to demand something of someone, but it was particularly
associated with military leaders (hence, to direct or levy troops,
requisition supplies, or require subordinates to take some action).
In time this authority also came to be linked with the ruling power
9
K. D. Morrison, Sources, Approaches, Definitions, in Alcock et al. (above,
n.6) 19, at 3.
10
In scholarship coming from the European tradition, ideas of and about one
empireRomehave contributed definitions and constituted foils for all subsequent
discussions of the concept of empire (Morrison [above, n.9] 12). The repeated
use of Rome as a model of empire, from the Christian and Islamic middle ages, through
the early modern period into more recent times, is well known (G. Woolf, Invent-
ing Empire in Ancient Rome, in Alcock et al. [above, n.6] 31122).
AMERICAN EMPIRE?
40
of the emperors from Augustus forward. There are countless ex-
amples of the verbs use in this way, but my favorite comes in
the historian Tacitus famous line about the unfortunate Galba, who
was briefly emperor in 68 A.D. before making a number of mis-
steps and ending up murdered by his own praetorian guard in January
of 69. Tacitus says: He seemed too great to be a subject, so long
as he was a subject, and all would have agreed that he was equal
to the imperial office if he had never held it.
11
Imperial office
here translates imperium, and the phrase if he had never held it
renders nisi imperasset, with the verb imperare.
Clearly, then, the imperium once held for limited terms by elected
magistrates is taking on here a broader sensethe ruling power
of the emperor. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that in the same
time that the emperors came to rule Rome, we get our first uses
of the now familiar phrases, imperium Romanum and imperium populi
Romani. In such uses imperium refers to Roman control over a
specified territory or Roman rule in the world generally. In an ar-
ticle entitled Imperium Romanum: Empire and the Language of
Power, J. S. Richardson argues that the terms progression in meaning
from the magisterial power of command (a meaning that it never
entirely lost) to conquered territory and/or Roman suzerainty as a
whole, is natural, even inevitable, once imperium comes to be centered
in the person of a single autocratic ruler. Just as Caesars unri-
valled imperium encompassed the whole Roman world, from the
sands of Egypt to the British Isles, from the Balkans to the Span-
ish peninsula, so could the terms meaning. Richardson also notes
that the Latin word provincia shows a similar broadening of meaning
over the same time: where it once stood for the task that an offi-
cial with imperium was to undertake, such as defeating this or that
foe, it later comes to mean a localized area under Roman ad-
ministration. From there it is not far to modern senses of province.
12
In sum, the term from which our modern word empire derives
is, in its essence, about command. Whether referring to the ruling
authority vested in a high official, or the realm in which Roman
authority held sway, imperium indicates the exertion of lawful control
over one entity by another, control that extends even to the power
of life and death. Such a term would seem to work perfectly well
to describe the essence of most empires in the history of the world,
from that of the Romans to the Spanish to the British and many
more, wherever subject states were expected to submit to the ulti-
mate authority of the central power in matters of crucial importance,
such as law, revenues, and foreign policy. It does not, however,
work as well for the modern United States, for however powerful
11
Hist. 1.49, from the Loeb edition (Tacitus: The Histories Books 13, tr. C. H.
Moore [Cambridge, Mass., 1925]): maior privato visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium
consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset.
12
JRS 81 (1991) 19. The provincia discussion is at 7, n.58.
ERIC W. ROBINSON
41
and influential America has become, it finds itself in no position
to command the French or the Germans or the Turks (sovereign
nations all) to obey its wishes, even on matters of real impor-
tanceas became apparent when the United States urgently but
unsuccessfully sought their cooperation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
How about hegemony, then? Does it seem a more appropriate
term? Hegemony comes from the Greek word i,
13
which is
an abstract form of hegemon, meaning one who leads. This kind
of leadership could involve power on a grand scale, as with the
application of the title hegemon to Philip II of Macedon after his
crushing defeat of Greek forces at the battle of Chaeronea in 338
B.C. Philip imposed a common peace on Greece that nominally
allowed for autonomy among the Greek states but more truly (to-
gether with strategically placed garrisons) established preeminence
for the Macedonian king.
14
Indeed, in some respects, Greek i
overlaps in sense with Latin imperium: it, too, in extended form,
can refer to the ruling power of a dynast or a nation. Thus the
fifth-century B.C. Greek historian Herodotus uses i to de-
scribe the sovereign power of the family of Croesus, king of the
Lydians (1.7). i also features in the Greek translation of
the Res Gestae of the Roman emperor Augustus: imperium populi
romani becomes i i i i i si in Greek (my emphasis).
15
But such usages of i are not so common or so funda-
mental as others. The term derives, after all, from a word meaning
one who leads or one who goes first (to include even a guide),
not a word like Latin imperare, to command. Consider, for ex-
ample, the revealing use of i by Thucydides at one point
in his history of the Peloponnesian War (4.91). During a campaign
against the Athenians, we are told, a Boeotian commander named
Pagondas holds temporary i within a body of twelve offi-
cials, of which he is one, so he exercises primacy within this group.
But, as it happens, Pagondas is the only one of the twelve who
wants to attack the Athenian forces during his interval of i.
In order to get his way he has to give a speech to the troops to
get support for his course of action; only after he has persuaded
the Boeotians generally can he go forward. So his power here is
13
The English usage of the termnot nearly as common as empirenever-
theless goes back centuries and is closely tied to the Greek sense (see below) of
leadership exercised among Greek states (OED, s.v.).
14
Diod. Sic. 16.89; IG II
2
236. See discussion in J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian
Imperialism (London 1976) 197210.
15
E. Badian, in writing about the nature of Roman imperialism in the second
century B.C., employs the term hegemonial imperialism (citing Rostovtzeff) when
describing the non-annexationist policies Rome followed with regard to Greece. Rome
did not behave less arrogantly with the Greeks or avoid interventionsimperialism
was still at workbut the peculiar Roman reluctance to annex and directly rule the
Greeks for decades on end requires explanation, providing the impetus for Badians
book and his invocation of the qualifying term hegemonial (Roman Imperialism in
the Late Republic [Ithaca 1968], esp. 18, with n.9).
AMERICAN EMPIRE?
42
not absolute. He leads, with the prerogative of initiative, perhaps,
but must obtain the consent of his fellows before enjoining col-
lective action. A Roman magistrate invested with imperium would
not have these problems with subordinates. Indeed, when the Ro-
man consuls Paulus and Varroboth with imperiumwere at
loggerheads about whether to engage Hannibal at Cannae in 216
B.C., the way they resolved it was not by persuasion, but to take
turns commanding absolutely by days. On the day the overeager
Varro held command, he went ahead and used his imperium to take
the Romans into battle (and a crushing defeat) without so much
as consulting his colleague, according to the account in Livy (22.45).
In nonmilitary contexts i can also show limitations in
the power conveyed. In Aristotles Constitution of the Athenians
(23.12) there is a famous passage where he records that the Ar-
eopagus council, a relatively conservative body in the context of
the democratic constitution at Athens, achieved i within the
state after the Persian wars, reversing the trend to that point of
greater and greater democracy.
16
Scholars have often doubted the
veracity of this statementthere is no corroborating evidence that
the democracy at this time became constitutionally weakenedand
blame scanty and biased sources Aristotle must have been using
for this section of his work.
17
Regardless of the degree of its his-
torical accuracy, the account of Aristotle describes the leadership
the council took in the state with careful qualifications: Aristotle
says the council grew stronger and directed the city, gaining
the leadership (i) not by official resolution (dogmati) but
because of its beneficent deeds in the recent war, through which
the council rose in esteem (axiomati) as compared to the elected
officials. So the political i Aristotle has in mind is not ab-
solute control over the state, but rather a superior influence based
on prestige and deference.
18
Examples could be multiplied, but there is no need. Typically,
the kind of rule indicated by i is that of a leader more
than a sovereign; whatever his other powers or his capacity for
the employment of military force, the holder of i must at
times work through persuasion or a high public opinion to gain
the consensus needed for collective action.
19
Taking this result with what we have already discovered about
imperium, a solution is at hand to the query about the situation
of contemporary America in world affairs. If we are to pay any
16
See also Ath. Pol. 25.1 and Pol. 1304a1724.
17
See P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Ox-
ford 1981) 28292; defending Aristotle here is M. Ostwald, The Areopagus in the
i i, in M. Pirart, ed., Aristote et Athnes (Fribourg 1993) 13953.
18
Ostwald (above, n.17) reconstructs the probable powers of the Areopagus in
this period as having involved long-standing (but limited) judicial powers combined
with less formal political and social influence.
19
On Thucydides use of i for Athens role in the early Delian League
and a for the later, more oppressive periodsee below.
ERIC W. ROBINSON
43
attention to the root meanings of our words, hegemony makes a
much better descriptor than empire. For all its far-flung power and
influence, the United States leads far more often than it commands
on the international stage. It has allies rather than subjects and
does not require their submission. If it did, there would have been
French and German troops to accompany the Americans (and Brit-
ish) invading Iraq in 2003and they would have been able to come
from the north through Turkey. Nor are monetary contributions com-
pelled, as they were from Roman provinces or constituent cities
of the fifth-century B.C. Athenian empire. It is true, of course, that
the United States sometimes acts the bullying hegemon, attempt-
ing to intimidate, bribe, or otherwise apply pressure to get its way,
especially with weaker powers (with mixed results, howeversee,
again, Turkeys refusal to allow a northern front into Iraq despite
the strenuous efforts of the American administration). It also, on
occasion, leads where few wish to follow. True to the Greek, leading
sometimes means going first, without many others joining in, such
as happened with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. More
typically, however, the United States gathers broad coalitions or
seeks action or approval from the United Nations, as has happened
on myriad occasions involving economic or diplomatic sanctions,
and militarily with the joint operations of the (first) Gulf War and
the fighting in and around Kosovo, not to mention the ongoing
post-invasion rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the attempts
to rein in the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran through
multilateral negotiations. Indeed, America operates in a world of
alliances and international agreements and trading pacts (many of
which it played a lead role in forming, of course) that depend on
the consent of its adherents to function, and also constrict some-
what the realm of actions open to it. Finally, even when America
does go it alone, or mostly alone, it no longer seeks to add impe-
rial territories, ruled directly or through surrogates, to a greater
United States. The hurry to transfer power to a newly elected Iraqi
government and limit the term and size of the U.S. troop commit-
mentall in spite of ongoing instability and bloodshedmake the
campaign in Iraq an obvious case in point.
According to the fundamental meanings of our terms, then,
speaking of an American hegemony is at this point more accurate
than an American empire. But might this change, if the relatively
aggressive current policies of the United States continue? Some
have expressed this very fear, and no doubt accusations of Ameri-
can empire (not to mention imperialism
20
) stem in part from
20
Imperialism as a word has been avoided in the discussion to this point be-
cause of the highly charged, pejorative sense that has long attached to it, even in the
context of scholarly discussions of ancient history. (See, for example, P. D. A. Garnsey
and C. R. Whittaker, Introduction, in Garnsey and Whittaker, eds., Imperialism in
the Ancient World [Cambridge 1978] 16.) For the origins of the negative connota-
tion in nineteenth- and twentieth-century political/economic discourses, see B. Semmel,
The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam
AMERICAN EMPIRE?
44
an understandable concern about where Americas power to domi-
nate might be leading the nation and the world. Once again, turning
to classical history may help clarify matters. A careful compari-
son of various ancient and modern attitudes to the interrelation of
freedom, empire, and democracy will add useful perspective to the
question of the course ahead for the United States.
Let us start by posing the question: can empire and political
freedom ever prosper in the same time and place? Some doubt it.
Paul Schroeder, referring to the supposedly imperial U.S. habit
of trying to spread democratic institutions abroad, puts it this way:
Those who speak of an American empire bringing
freedom and democracy to the world are talking of
dry rain and snowy blackness. In principle and by
definition, empire is the negation of political freedom,
liberation, and self-determination.
21
Schroeder writes eloquently here, but is he right? If one has in
mind the example of ancient Rome, still so influential to our
conceptions, it would seem that way. The Romans from at least
the first century B.C. viewed themselves as the rightful masters of
a universal empire and gloried in the extent of their imperium.
The gods themselves had picked them out to rule, and the liberty
of those conquered must necessarily give way.
22
At the same time,
while the Romans considered that they enjoyed liberty themselves
in the sense of liberty from despotism or foreign dominationthey
heartily disliked the rather extreme and Greek idea of democratic
governance, discouraging it abroad and never entertaining it at home.
23
As Romes imperium matured and the oligarchic Republic gave way
to increasingly autocratic individual rulers, the empire appears to
Smith to Lenin (Baltimore 1993). Nevertheless, the term has been employed frequently
to characterize (negatively) American actions in the world, underscoring the polemi-
cal value of associating a nations policies with empire.
21
Schroeder (above, n.5).
22
P. A. Brunt, Laus Imperii, in Imperialism in the Ancient World, 15991 (= Roman
Imperial Themes [Oxford 1990] 288323). See, e.g., Cic. Phil. 6.19: Populum Romanum
servire fas non est, quem di immortales omnibus gentibus imperare voluerunt. . . .
Aliae nationes servitutem pati possunt, populi Romani est propria libertas (Subser-
vience is not appropriate for the Roman people, whom the immortal gods themselves
have determined should rule all nations. . . . Foreign peoples can endure servitude;
liberty belongs to the Roman people). On earlier Roman attitudes, see J. A. North,
Roman Reactions to Empire, SCI 12 (1993) 12738.
23
Contra the arguments (which have failed to gain general acceptance) of Fergus
Millar and some others that, by the time of the late Republic, Rome had in fact be-
come a kind of democracy. F. Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann
Arbor 1998), with earlier articles cited therein; see the judicious comments by J. A.
North, Democratic Politics in Republican Rome, P&P 126 (1990) 321. Interest in
the question has continued since: H. Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in Late Republi-
can Rome (Cambridge 2001) firmly rejects the Millar thesis. On the Roman distaste
for and discouragement of Greek democracy, see the discussion in G. E. M. de Ste.
Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (Ithaca 1981) 30615.
ERIC W. ROBINSON
45
have left less and less room for political freedom, democratic or
otherwise.
Nevertheless, to claim on this basis that political freedom can
never mix with empire is to paint with too broad a stroke. This
comes clear from the example of the ancient Athenians. For, as
noted above, in the fifth century B.C. Athens had a democracyin
some ways more truly democratic than the kind modern nations
practice, in other ways less so, but a democracy nonetheless
24

and yet for half a century Athens simultaneously maintained an

oppressive empire. Subject states within the empireimportantly,
many of them also democracieshad to pay annual tribute to Athens.
Their loyalty to Athens and its military policies was not just ex-
pected, it was positively required by oaths before the gods. Any
attempt to abandon allegiance to Athens met with brutal force; and
when under pressure of war the Athenians felt no compunction about
demanding that vulnerable third parties join their empire or face
extinction. The Greek word most often used to describe this em-
pire, naturally enough, was not i, but a. Thucydides,
the historian of the Athenian empire and the war it fought with
Sparta, constantly uses a when referring to it. Other meanings
of a also accord well with Latin imperiumfor a could signify
at times a public office, the power that a public official wields,
or his command of military forces.
25
So the Athenians of the fifth century B.C. showed quite clearly
that true empire and democracy could coexist. That it does not in
the modern United States, as I hope I have demonstrated, is espe-
cially worth noting given the striking similarities in the rise to
power of each state and the concomitant radicalization of their
democracies. It has not often happened in the history of the world
that democratic states have attained dominant economic, cultural,
and especially military power on the international scene, like Ath-
ens and the United States. Both achieved their status by helping
to win massive wars: World War II for the United States, the Per-
sian wars for the Athenians. Both then went on to form grand new
alliances to solidify the gains from the struggles recently concluded
and to protect themselves and others from foreign threats coming
from the East. Where the Americans established NATO, the Athe-
nians formed the Delian League, a voluntary alliance of Athens
with smaller Greek states located in and around the Aegean Sea
and thereby most vulnerable to the Persian threat. The Persians
may have been defeated in their famous invasions of central Greece
24
The literature on the Athenian democracy is vast. Useful starting points are
M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley 1986);
M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford 1991);
E. W. Robinson, Ancient Greek Democracy: Readings and Sources (Malden, Mass.,
2003).
25
For the use of terms like a and a in Thucydides, see E. A. Betant,
Lexicon Thucydideum (Hildesheim 1969; first pub. 1843).
AMERICAN EMPIRE?
46
in 490 and 480 B.C., but they did not disappear from the scene
afterwards. The huge Persian Empire remained, continuing to oc-
cupy many eastern Greek cities and possibly threatening further
danger in the future. Thus, as the United States and NATO were
faced with the Soviet Union and its empire, Athens and its league
confronted the Persians.
Another key parallel to point out is that, for both the United
States and the Athenians, in the decades following their wartime
victories as they shouldered their new international obligations their
democracies at home were deepening in important respects. In the
United States, one thinks of the civil rights movement and womens
movement; in Athens, a number of changes similarly made it easier
for marginalized groups to play fuller roles in the state. I refer to
members of the thetic class, who owned little or no property, and
poor residents in Attica generally, who during this time partici-
pated more actively and visibly in the state, in part because of
public programs like payment for service on juries and for rowing
in the fleet.
26
And yet, despite these striking similarities of the growth and
prospering of democratic power, the courses of Athens and the modern
United States have diverged. First, as already noted, Athens took
up empire. What had begun as a voluntary league of Aegean states
against the Persians changed over the years into an involuntary
one, in which members were compelled to remain in the league,
assaulted or colonized if they balked, and required to send tribute
to Athens long after the threat that had originally justified the con-
tributions had receded. Thucydides, the author who traces this evolution
for us, uses i and its cognates to describe the initial Athe-
nian leadership (at 1.9697), and then switches to a or its cognates
when Athens takes up a more imperial role (at 1.99). It is true
that Athens continued to treat a few members of its league almost
as allies rather than subjects: for decades the island states of Chios,
Lesbos, and Samos provided their own military forces to joint ventures
instead of paying annual tribute to Athens, and thus retained a
greater sense of independence than the others.
27
But Athens remained
in sole command, and brooked no disobedience from these states
any more than the others. Eventually, and at different times, each
found itself trying to revolt from or otherwise contravene the wishes
of Athens, and each predictably faced a forceful, belligerent reac-
tion. The contrast with American behavior is noteworthy: however
willing the United States has shown itself to intervene militarily
26
For a good summary of social and political changes in the Athenian democ-
racy at this time, see K. A. Raaflaub, The Transformation of Athens in the Fifth
Century, in D. Boedeker and Raaflaub, eds., Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in
Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge, Mass., 1998) 1541.
27
Aristotle calls them guardians of the empire [a] and stresses their au-
tonomy at Ath. Pol. 24.2. See T. J. Quinn, Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios,
478404 B.C. (Manchester 1981).
ERIC W. ROBINSON
47
around the world, it does not target core allies, from whom dis-
sent is tolerated.
28
Such dissent, it should be stressed, has included
not only verbal castigation of U.S. policy, but refusals to join in
American ventures, defection from key alliances, denial of over-
flights, dismissal of U.S. bases, and withdrawal of troops in the
middle of joint operations (as with the Spanish and others recently
in Iraq). No ally of Athens could have contemplated behavior
of this kind without anticipating military assault in response.
Why this different course? We may find a clue in a further,
subtler contrast, one involving the attitude of the Athenians and
Americans toward democracy outside their homeland. The United
States takes it as its mission to spread the benefits of freedom
and democracy wherever it can.
29
It has become central to the American
approach to foreign policy. Consider this striking statement placed
at the very beginning of the official National Security Strategy
document cited earlier:
The great struggles of the twentieth century between
liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory
for the forces of freedomand a single sustain-
able model for national success: freedom, democracy,
and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only
nations that share a commitment to protecting ba-
sic human rights and guaranteeing political and
economic freedom will be able to unleash the po-
tential of their people and assure their future
prosperity. People everywhere want to be able to
speak freely; choose who will govern them; wor-
ship as they please; educate their childrenmale
and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits
of their labor. These values of freedom are right
and true for every person, in every societyand
the duty of protecting these values against their
enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving
people across the globe and across the ages.
30
28
So comments Maier (above, n.4).
29
The degree to which U.S. governments have succeeded (or even tried very
hard) to spread democratic ideals over the years can be debated, of course; and the
very terms freedom, liberty, and democracy are often used vaguely or as simplistic
slogans in public speeches. Nevertheless, the oft-repeated mantra of the United States
as friend and supporter of democracies everywhere is in itself significant (see be-
low), and recent actions in Iraq and Afghanistan (and more indirect ones in Ukraine
and elsewhere around the world) show that the United States can in fact be a power-
ful force for bringing democracyor at least more pluralistic styles of governmentto
states around the globe.
30
For still more recent statements from the White House about American sup-
port for and encouragement of democracies abroad, see in particular two prominent
Presidential addresses: G. W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004);
Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at GPO Access: http://purl.access.gpo.gov/
GPO/LPS1769 (both retrieved July 18, 2005).
AMERICAN EMPIRE?
48
The universality of democratic values and benefits assumed here,
and the crusading spirit invoked, are remarkable.
31
Moreover, this
document cannot be dismissed as some peculiar ideological text
from a partisan Bush White House: all recent American administrations
have endorsed the policy goal of supporting freedom and democracy
around the world, a very popular notion in the United States. So
have rival presidential candidates.
32
Indeed, if there is one thing
Americans seem to agree on, it is the benefits of democracy.
Consider, for example, the national debates about whether to
invade Iraq before that invasion took place and those about how
to proceed once occupying the country. Amid all the questions,
opinions, and assertions made about the justifications for intervention,
the (putative) weapons of mass destruction, the disapproval of many
of Americas allies, the unending bloody fighting against insurgents
since the invasion, the one thing that everyone has seemed to agree
on, from liberal opponents of the administration to the most con-
servative backers, is that establishing a lasting democracy will be
a good thing for the people of Iraq. This belief remains a con-
stant in the messy post-major combat operations period, as U.S.
forces occupy the country and take the lead in rebuilding efforts.
Arguments fly about the methods being employed, the effective-
ness of the current Iraqi regime, or the likelihood of success in
the end, but no one seems to doubt the worthiness of the ultimate
goal, a pluralistic democracy. Americans trust in its desirability
even against manifest evidence that a great many Iraqis do not.
An early poll (carried out in late 2003) by the Psychological Re-
search Center of Baghdad University indicated that 53.3 percent
favored a monarchy over a republican government; and 70 percent
or more thought the government should be Islamic regardless of
its other characteristics.
33
More recent polls carried out by Oxford
31
It is remarkable not least because of the ironic truth that at its founding the
United States considered itself to be no democracy at all; indeed, the architects of the
new government purposely avoided that term and its dangerous (classical Athenian)
connotations, preferring the title Republic after the allegedly more stable and sober
Roman government. Over time, of course, and especially by the later nineteenth cen-
tury, America embraced the language and ideals of democracy. See the Federalist Papers,
especially #10; B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cam-
bridge 1967) 2254; G. S. Wood, Democracy and the American Revolution, in J.
Dunn, ed., Democracy: The Unfinished Journey (Oxford 1992) 91105; G. Wills, Lincoln
at Gettysburg (New York 1992); and J. T. Roberts, Athens on Trial: The Antidemo-
cratic Tradition in Western Thought (Princeton 1994) chs. 911.
32
Consider this statement from John Kerrys 2004 campaign Web site: Support
for democracy, human rights and the rule of law are among the most fundamental
principles on which America was founded, and John Kerry and John Edwards will
fight to restore Americas longstanding, bipartisan commitment to supporting the spread
of democracy, with the understanding that America will be safer in a world of de-
mocracies (Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, Development and Rule of Law
[retrieved Oct. 1, 2004, from http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/national_security/
democracy.html; archived at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/
kerry_natl-security-plans_democracy.htm [retrieved July 18, 2005]).
33
Reported by Andrew Hammond of Reuters (Nov. 20, 2003).
ERIC W. ROBINSON
49
Research International in February and June 2004 also show mixed
results, with answers to some questions suggesting substantial support
for the idea of democracy, especially in the long term, and others
highlighting equal or greater preference for a single, strong cen-
tral leader.
34
But Iraqi opinions on the subject do not seem to matter
to the American leadership or people, who are convinced that de-
mocracy is the answer. President Bush has repeatedly trumpeted
this goal in his public statements, and clearly expects it to reso-
nate with Americans.
35
This strong sense of mission Americans have to spread the
benefits of democracy was not shared by the ancient Athenians.
True, when the Athenians found themselves in a position to back
or install a government, they would usually (though not always)
back or impose a democratic one.
36
But when they did this, they
did it for reasons of narrow self-interest, it being thought that the
newly enfranchised poorer classes would keep the state loyal to
the Athenians. There is no indication in any of the contemporary
literary textswhich otherwise have much to say about fifth-cen-
tury Athenian government and empirethat the Athenians were zealous
about exporting democracys glories for the enjoyment of others
or because it was the common calling of freedom-loving people,
as asserted by the current American administration. Democracy was
fine for the Athenians; but they need not bother about the allies
and subject states so long as they remained loyal.
37
This difference in attitude about spreading democratic values
offers an explanation, I think, for Athens eagerness to combine
34
The most revealing answers in the February 2004 poll are those to questions
15 through 19. Question 17 shows Democracy and Democrats winning out over
Strong Leader and Islamic State/Religious Politicians. But question 15B indi-
cates a preference for A (single) strong Iraqi leader over An Iraqi democracy, at
least in the near term. In the June poll, question 21 A through C continues to show a
slight preference for A (single) Strong Leader over democracy in the near term,
with a somewhat greater preference for democracy in the longer term. Full results of
this survey are at http://www.oxfordresearch.com/publications.html (retrieved July 18,
2005).
35
In American foreign-policy circles the presumptive and broadly perceived benefits
of democracy have been further reinforced in recent years by the theory of demo-
cratic peace, which holds that, statistically speaking, open warfare has been extremely
rare between states sharing liberal or democratic forms of government. The more de-
mocracies we can plant across the world, the implication seems to be, the more peaceful
it will become. Political scientists, historians, and others still debate the validity of
the theory for various eras, but the notion is especially enticing to an American audi-
ence already convinced of democracys virtues and desirous of promoting it around
the world. For a debate on the theorys applicability to the ancient world, see The
Journal of Peace Research 38.5 (2001). For a critique of the idea that quickly in-
stalling democracy abroad is always the best course, see F. Zakaria, The Future of
Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York 2003).
36
For discussion of Athenian policy in this regard, see R. Meiggs, The Athenian
Empire (Oxford 1972) 20813.
37
For an argument that the Athenians did not feel as personally invested as is
sometimes supposed in democracy at home either, see L. J. Samons, Democracy,
Empire, and the Search for Athenian Character, Arion 8.3 (2001) 12857.
AMERICAN EMPIRE?
50
empire and democracy. What seems like an obvious contradiction
to us, to celebrate equality and freedom at home while engaging
in despotic rule over others abroad, was simply the way things
worked to the Athenians (and it worked very nicely for them, as
the tribute money rolled in, beautiful new temples like the Parthenon
went up, and the triremes multiplied). Indeed, as far as we can
tell from our sources, the alliance formed after the Persian wars,
which became the basis of the Athenian empire, never proclaimed
political freedom as its rallying cry; rather, vengeance against the
Persians was the stated goal
38
(and for all their imperialism, the
Athenians did a pretty good job of this). Why should they let the
ideals of their internal political system get in the way of their
obvious interests abroad?
An Athenian-style detachment of constitutional values from foreign
policy pursuits, it seems to me, is not possible for Americans, at
least not over the long term. Some scholars worry that the Bush
administration, with its new policy of preemption and its invasion
of Iraq, has embarked the country on a road to true empire.
39
I
cannot agree. While no onenot even classical historians, alas
can predict the future, the above considerations suggest to me that
what is happening now will not set America on an imperial course
like that of Athens of turning on its friends great and small, de-
manding their absolute obedience, and devastating the recalcitrant.
Nor could the United States, like Rome, assume an imperial mantle
that ipso facto requires others to forfeit their own liberty. To do
so would be so alien, not only to Americas current practice, but
to its very self-conception as a democratic society, as to be un-
sustainable. For better or worse, the American hegemony will continue.
As long as it is driven by an unbounded fear of terrorism and an
eagerness to act alone with violent force, the world shall have to
get used to the more aggressive, unilateral approach on display
from 2002 forward. But American Empire will remain a misno-
mer.
Harvard University ERIC W. ROBINSON
Classical World 99.1 (2005) ewrobins@fas.harvard.edu
ERIC W. ROBINSON
38
Thuc. 1.96.1, 6.76.3; but see 3.10.3. Meiggs (above, n.36) 4247, 46364.
39
Schroeder (above, n.5).