Althusser and Structuralism Author(s): Alison Assiter Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.

35, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 272-296 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/590235 . Accessed: 20/02/2013 12:51
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Alison Assiter

Althusser

and

structuralism

SUMMARY

' ', 'Structure social structure' and, recently, 'structuralism are 's terms that are frequently used in sociology. Louis Althusser and work is often mentionedas being both structuralist Marxist. In this article I first raise, and attempt to answer,the question: and 'Whatis structuralism?', then I go on to arguethat Althusser I and Marxistsimultaneously. conclude, is not both structuralist work is concernedtherefore, that, at least as far as Althusser's of and his writingsare often takento be paradigmatic structuralist and Marxism- it is misleadingto lump together structuralism Marxism. The terms 'structure'and 'social structure'are widely used in sociology and have been since Spencerintroducedthe term 'structure' into the field in the nineteenthcentury. Relativelyrecently, under a the influenceof Frenchworkin linguistics, new term 'structuralism' of in has appeared the writingsof practitioners the discipline.Indeed, ErnestGellnerwrote, in 1970: 'a spectreis hauntingthe intellectual ,l scene - structuralism,or better "le structuralisme". It may be fashionableto use the term, but its meaningis rarely explained.I the attemptto answer, question: shouldlike to raise,in thispaper,arsd is 'What this spectre,or what is structuralism?' One individualwhose work is often cited, in texts on sociological and Marxist,is Louis theory, and elsewhere, as both structuralist are Althusser.2Indeed, the writingsof Althusser sometimestakento Thisis Marxism. of be exemplary,indeed paradigmatic 'structuralist' to despite Althusser'sown refusal to apply the label 'structuralist' ambiguity,the his work: 'Webelieve that despite the terminological profoundtendencyof our texts wasnot attachedto the "structuralist" ideology.'3 I shall argue,here, that there are sometimesreasonsfor describingAlthusser'swork as structuralist.Undeniably,too, he is themes. But, I shallclaim,he is not both often dealingwith Marxian
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structuralistand Marxistsimultaneously.I shall also suggest that Althusser's structuralism sometimes prevents him from solving of problemshe poses in the interpretation historicalmaterialism. It is misleading,therefore, as least as far as the work of Louis and Althusseris concerned,to lump togetherstructuralism Marxism. Sometimes, where Althusser is most clearly a structuralist,his 's structuralismproduces theses which make some of Marx ideas nonsensical. Structuralismmay perhaps have something to offer but, in so faras we take Marx's sociologists, and so might Marxism, work as exemplary,the juxtapositionof the two can givenothingto anybody.
THE BACKGROUND

In the literature, one finds a number of different definitions of Many of these would probablybe denouncedby those structuralism. who might, for other reasons,wish to call themselves'structuralist'. logic, philosophyof theoriesin mathematical Thereare structuralist in in science,4in biology, in anthropology, linguistics, sociology. has Piaget suggeststhat 'structuralism' slightly differentsenses in as it each of these variousareas.He describes generally a theory that wholes.But,in mathematics, dealsin self sufficientand self regulating it is opposed to 'compartmentalism'-it dealsin wholesratherthan in isolated elements; in linguistics, it representsa departurefrom diachronicstudies of isolated linguisticphenomenato a synchronic study of unified linguisticsystems (in other words, it moves from a study of the variationin linguisticunits over time to a comparative at analysisof differentlanguages any one point in time). In psycholis ogy, structuralism contrastedwith atomism;and in philosophyit is opposedto historicism. and The varietyin types of structuralism in areasof its application has causedA. L. Kroebezto say this: to appears bejust yieldingto a word that has a perfectly 'Structure' but suddenly becomes fashionablyattractive. . . good meaning everythingthat is not wholly amorphoushas a structure. . . what adds to the meaningof our phraseseemsto be nothing, 'structure' except to providea degreeof pleasantpuzzlement.S MiriamGlucksmannderivesthe word 'structure'from the Latin to from 'struere': construct.6Accordingto her: 'structuras Its meaningwas exclusivelyarchitecturaluntil the 17th century when its use was extended to the study of anatomyand grammar. of The arrangement the organsof the body came to be viewedas a

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kind of construction,and language understoodas the arrangewas ment of wordsin speechhavinga 'structured' character.7 In the nineteenthcentury,she tells us, the termwas introducedfrom biology to the new 'sciencesof man'by HerbertSpencer. Originally,then, the term referredto a propertyof somethingor the way somethingis constructed.A structurewas an abstractproperty of somethingelse: somethingpossessedby somethingelse. And for what it is worth, this sense accords with some contemporary Englishusage-buildings havestructure, arguments havea structure. One could not have an argumentor a buildingwithout a structure: their structuresare part of what makesthem buildingsor arguments. On the other hand, the buildingor the argumentis not to be identified with its structure-without a structurethereis no building,but the buildingand its structureare not one and the same. They are both instantiatedin the same object; one is a propertyof the other. Structure,however, is not attached to particular thingsin the way that, say, being made up of a collection of bricksis a propertyof a particular house. Get rid of all the bricksand you have destroyedthe house, but replacingthe bricks and rebuildingthe house leaves the structureof the buildingintact. Whateverelse an analysis of a randomselection of cases might reveal about structure,it tells us this: structureseems not to be a thing in its own right. A. Schaff sharesthis view. According him, to originallya structurewas a structureof something:'The way those elements are interconnectedwithin a given system, i.e. the totality of the relationsamong them, is termeda structureof that system.'8 A system was 'a whole consistingof elementsbearing such a relation to one anotherthata changein the positionof one resultsin a change in the position of the rest.'9 Therecould be no structurewithout a system andvice versa.Schaffinformsus that de Saussure-according to many,one of the mainstructuralists-did not use the term 'structure' at all, but only system. A system, then, is a kind of entity-an abstract entity - and a structure is one of its properties. Some scientistsaim, in theirwork, to uncoverthe structureof a system. But Schaff goes on to say that 'structure'is also used to mean 'system something which has a specified structure. This usage, ': indeed, is common amongstrecentstructuralists-particularly those in the Frenchschool (see LeviStrauss, Barthesand Althusser himself) and also amongst commentatorson this school and others.l This usage, then, has become commonplacein the literature.So thereis a quite specificambiguityin the meaningof the term. Theremaynot be anyset of featureswhichall 'structuralists' would uphold, but is there a collection of views which would entitle us to put them all togetherin a school? A. Schaff lists the followingfour characteristics which form, he suggests,an intellectualtrend: first,

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structuralistsapproach the subject matter of their research as a specific whole which dominatesall its elements.They are criticalof atomism, where things are studiedas discreteparts of an aggregate, and where wholes are no more than the sum of their parts. The formsa systemwhose elements whole, accordingto the structuralist, are interconnectedand where the structureof the whole determines believethat every the position of each element.Second,structuralists system has a structure:the task of science is to find out what that are structureis. And third,structuralists interestedin 'morphological' but ' laws.Thelawsdeal not in changes with co-existence. or 'structural They thereforetend towardshavinga static approachto facts. And, would not deny that the dynamicor the finally, most structuralists diachronicis importantin science, but they would say that this is to wholly complementary synchronicanalysis. Those are four featureslisted by Schaff. Thereis a fifth we might mention, one which figuresin C. Sumneras the definingfeatureof as and structuralism, that is to see 'structures' the real thingswhich and underlie the appearances, which are usuallyopaque to the eye. is Sumner: 'Structuralism a method which examinesphenomenaas the outward expressionsof their inner, invisiblestructures.'ll And for this featuresee also Keat and Urry.l2 are Let us see how these propertiesof structuralism exemplifiedin those who apply the label to their work. The first featureof strucof description the functionof language. in turalismappears Saussure's 13 as he Language characterizes a system of signs. Collectionsof noises count as languageonly when they serveto expressor communicate ideas; and to communicateideas, they must be part of a system of conventions:a system of signs. A sign is a union of a 'form which might signifies' - a signifier;and the idea signified. (Philosophers label these, respectively,the word and the concept-although they the claimdoes not distinguish might say that, as it stands,Saussure's 'referent'of the sign-what it picks out, from its sense;what Frege describedas the 'mode of presentation'of the sign.)l4 The linguistic there is no naturallink between the is sign, for Saussure, arbitrary: signifierand the signified.Thereis no link, for instance,betweenthe and soundof the signand its signification, signschangetheirmeanings -for instance,a 'silly'personwas once happy,blessedand pious. Signifiersare not autonomous,but they are defined by theirrelagivesthe word'brown' of tions with other members the system.What anythingintrinsicto it, but its differencefrom other its identityis not colour words. The identity of the sign consists in its place in the system ot slgnl:lers. is And the first of the outlined featuresof structuralism apparent who perceivesceremonies,rites, methodsof cooking Levi-Strauss, in relationsthey not as discreteentities but in terms of the contrastive bear to each other. 'Like phonemes, kinshipterms are elementsof
^ . . ..

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Assiter Alivon
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are acquire meaning only if they of like meaning; phonemes, they 'are terms, for him then 15 into integrated systems. Kinship italics)Each (Levi-Strauss' same the type as linguisticphenomena'.l6 expressionof the total food etc. containsa partial system-kinship, to culture. According him, too in Levi-Strauss. Thefifth featureis apparent linlinguistics,which moves fromconscious are we to use structural in the study infrastructures, phenomenato their unconscious guistic systems. kinship of as Saussure a distinctionbetween This fifth featureappearsin de signsunderlying everydayspeech langue-the systemof linguistic 'We must take la langue as our la and patterns, the latter: le parole. the normof all other manifestaas and of point departure use langue structuralism apparentalso in is of This aspect of system tions language.'l7 in Bartheslie in the 'garment' that work of Barthes.Examples the is not just semiology,food in and the 'food' system. In Barthes' signify.l8 Withinthis system, which is but also a system of signs find de Saussure's langueon the one to according Barthes,one can of exclusion (alimentary taboos); (ii) hand-it is made of '(i) rules the type of which remainsto be oppositions of units, of signifying (iii) type savoury/sweet); rules (for determined instance, the (at the level of a dish) or successive either simultaneous association, italics) One finds also, level of the menu etc.'l9 (Barthes'sthe menu, for Barthes, atthe 'parole'.So the do. within system, de Saussure's has meaningin the way that sentences kind of language,and And a is from variousmenus. meaningof a menu has to be 'read' structuralisms particThe of some we here uncover another feature the 'real essence' is way in which ularlysemiologicalones -that with the 'appearance'. Barthes, For from an aquaintance uncovered like of significance' a has a 'code the a menu, or a system of clothing has a structuredetermining The menu has a grammar. language is to be extracted by of possible menus. This structure the menu may not be nature structure of 'reading'the menu. Thus the actual menus;for they present the from recoverable transparently in the hermeneutictradionly partially,or opaquely. As structure structuresof systemsfrom only tion, one may have to reconstruct partialevidence.20 common to most structuralisms We have uncoveredfive features in semiologicalstructuralism. and a sixth which appearsparticularly and other 'signsystems'is language In the latterthe analogybetween furnituAe For Barthes,menus, car systems, taken to be important. as languages havemeaning. just systems2lhavemeaning I Althusser'sstructuralism, should Before proceedingto discuss one mightlevelagainst structuraljust like to mentiona few criticisms ism as so farpresented.

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CRITICISMS

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De Saussure,for instance, emphasizesthat elements in a language should be combined,but it could be said to be a failingthat he does not offer detailedremarkson the way in which this combinationis to be effected: on how individualwords combine to form sentences Morerecentlinguistsand logicians, and how sentencesformlanguages. of e.g. Chomskyand D. Davidsonhave stressedthe importance rules governingthe combinationof units in a languageand have offered detailedaccountsof the way the ruleswork. of A moredetailedcriticismmightbe presented thosestructuralists -the semiologists-who extend the idea of a sign system outside the realm of language.Saussurehimself envisagedthis extension of his thinking.He said: 'A science that studies the life of signs within it society is conceivable; would be a part of social psychology . . . I shall call it semiology (from Greeksemeion 'sign'). 2 In the workof as Levi-Strauss, we have seen, anthropologycame to be seen as a branchof semiology;and with Barthesall sorts of aspects of reality - traffic light systems, furnituresystems, menus etc. are seen as do. havingmeaningin the way that languages They are said to have structureand are supposedto be able to be used to convey information of some kind. But it is a little difficult to see how the analogy structurea menuhas is without semanticimport. can work.Whatever it A menu does not have a grammar; does not have a way of deterof miningthe contributionof the meanings the partsto the meaning whether of the whole. And hence therecanbe no way of determining or not unactualizedmenus are legitimateaccordingto the structure. The problemof how it is that a person can produceinfinitelymany sentences on the basis of a knowledgeof a finite numberof partsis one that occupied Chomskyand also Davidson.23In other words, of they were concernedto show how a knowledgeof the 'structure' language-for Chomskythe rulesof syntax, innatein the mind,and of for Davidsona knowledgeof the meanings the partsof a language ' together with an understandingof the 'logical rules building up meaningful wholes fromparts-yields the possibilityof distinguishing unutteredsentences.But there can be no such profrom meaningless in cedurein the case of a menu. Any proposedstructureis arbitrary by sense-it is not limitedas is language a strongerthan Saussurean the constraintof the possibilityof communication.Some unuttered sentencesmust be ruledout on the groundsthat they haveno semantic import; ultimately they cannot be used to say anything. But, though some meals may be ruled out as inedible, this will not be becauseof the structureof any menu. A menu may havea perfectly acceptable structureand the meal still be inedible;alternativelythe at menu may appearto have no acceptablestructure all yet the meal could be very tasty.

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It appears, then, that there are difficulties with some sorts of variety. with those of the semiological and structuralism, particularly and structuralism. I proposenow to go on to discussAlthusser
ALTHUSSER AND STRUCTURALISM

upholdsenoughof the thesesI haveidentifiedto be labelled Althusser and emphasizes'totalities',24 He a 'structuralist'. dislikesempiricism the 'structure a d ominante 25 and 'complexwholes. 26 Theseentities are not separablefrom the elements they compose27nor are they nothing but the sum of their parts-they are elements:relationsof production, forces of production etc. connected in specific ways. by Indeed the natureof eachpartof the whole is determined its role practice,for example,does not exist on its in the totality. Economic own but only as partof the 'complexstructure'.
Althusser and the first prtnciple of structuralism I shouldlike now to

'totality'fits or describein more detail the way in whichAlthusser's I first outlined feature of structuralism. shalldescribe fails to fit the totality of which he is critical;and I shall drawon the the type of ideas of a thinker whom he acknowledgesas havinginfluencedhis views in this area:Spinoza.ThenI'll ask whetheror not it tallieswith the other outlined properties of structuralism.k discussingeach picturecan be feature, I shall raise the question whetherAlthusser's appliedto that of Marx. by fromit is described Althusser Societyor at leastsomeabstraction articuas a 'complexwhole' which has '. . . the unity of a structure He lated in dominance.'28 contraststhis whole with the CHegelian' materialtotality and the type of totality assumedby Cmechanistic ists.'29 He believes that these two mistakenpositions derive from What is common to the two viewpoints, common presuppositions. and the respect in which they areboth wrong,is theirbelief that one of can 'readoff' an understanding the essenceof some phenomenon in (Thisdoctrineappears 'empiricism', by looking at its appearances. as materialism the view from which Althusserderives Cmechanical' in and 'abstractionism', it appears Hegelas the theory that the events of in historyareto be treatedas manifestations the Idea.) Althusserclaims that he and Hegelhavein commonthe use of the word 'totality'30but that the conceptionsto whichthe wordrefersin every totalityis 'simple';3l each case arevastlydifferent.TheHegelian in featured (it) for examplecivilsociety,the state, difference' Cconcrete religion,philosophyetc, is 'negatedas soon as (it is) affirmed.'32 to In Hegel,according Althusser; (all the concrete differencesare) no more than 'moments'of the

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simple internal principle of the totality, which fulfils itself by negatingthe alienated difference that it posed; furtheras alienations - phenomena - of the simple internal principle, these that differences are all equally 'indifferent', is practicallyequal besideit ... and thereforeequalto one another....33 (Althusser's italics)

of In Hegel'sPhilosophy Right,to givean example,the State is dealt as it pertainsto the courseof developmentof the with only in so far 34 Idea. In contrastwith the Hegelian'totality', it looks as though AlthusHis ser's 'whole' fits tenet one of structuralism. totality, his abstract It model of society, is a 'complex' one 'structured-in-dominance'. contains four levels or elements, each of which is itself structured and is describedby Althusseras a 'practice'.Practicein generalhe as characterizes
givenraw material of any process of transformation a determinate into a determinate product, a transformationeffected by a determinatehumanlabour,using determinatemeans (of 'producitalics) tion').35 (Althusser's There are four types of practice going to make up the totality: economic practice, political, ideological and theoretical practice. Economic practice is the practice of producinguse-valuesby the activity of men and women working with means of productionin production relations.36Political practice is that one organizedon the basis of historical materialism,and which transformsits raw material -social relations -into new ones.37 Ideologicalpractice transforms its object - people's consciousness. And theoretical theoretpracticetakes two forms: on the one handit is 'ideological' ical practice-the forms that go to make up the pre-historyof a science and their philosophies;and on the other it is 'scientific theoretical practice'. The term 'Social practice', then, coversall of these types. Althussertells us that every 'simplecategory'e.g. labour whole of society.38 the or productionpresupposes structured is Now I believe that Althusser conflatingtwo typesof explanation here. He confuses a logical connection between two things with a factual -in this case historical-relation between them. He says that every 'simple category'presupposesthe existence of the struchere either tured whole of society. One might interpret'presuppose' in a logical or in a factual historicalmanner.Viewed in the former and view is structuralist conformswith the thinking way, Althusser's of his mentor, Spinoza. It is also compatiblewith his sympathetic reference to Marx'scritique of the concept 'production-in-general'. However, Althusser'sview, on this reading, does not allow us to

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Assiter Alison

Understoodin the sense make of other aspects of Marx'sthought. some examplesof sense of picturemakes fashion, Althusser's latter favourof actual evidencehe, Althusser,presentsin a strucand Marx of the not only is Althusser picture. Seen like this, however,not his does not fit with the ideas by turalist criterionone, but his thinking with a ratherboring his Spinoza.Moreover, ideas are compatible definitely out of of is quite which of reading 'production-in-general' structuralMarx'scritiqueof the concept. So Althusser's another, uith tune thinkingbut not to conforms to one part of Marx's ism failsto fit a different his wherehe is not a structuralist, thinking while then conform to those of his In Marx. addition, his ideas do not Spinoza. mentor describesSpinozaas Althusser daringto pose the only theoreticianwho had the unprecedented of a whole by elements of (the problemof the determination the first solutionto it....39 outline a the structureof the whole) and bringinto the open the Let us look brieSy at Spinozain order to bringto light the conflict of points similaritybetweenthe two and to thinking. Althusser's in a worm livinginside the In a letter, Spinoza paints a picture of worm,he suggests,each From the point of view of the bloodstream. and not part of a total of drop blood appearsto be independent of each drop of blood nature But system. in fact, says Spinoza,the only in the context of and the bloodstreamitself can be understood which the bloodsystem of ofa largersystem. The nature of the one can identify each is stream a part must be understoodbeforethe system as a whole dropletof blood. Similarly,in any system, the part. The natureof mustbe graspedbefore one can understand system.40 by thepart is determined its role in the whole is somethinghe refers 'whole' in which Spinozais interested beingtwo namesfor The these to as 'Godor Nature'(or God and Nature; whichhe definesas a substance, thesamething).41The whole is through itself: in other that which is in itself and is conceivednot need the conception words that the conception of which does of anotherthingfrom whichit must be formed.42 as 'that which the Substances'have' attributes,which are defined essence'.43 Attriits intellect perceivesof substanceas constituting substance,ratherthey a butes, D. F. Hallett says, do not 'inherein attributingsomethingto Any proposition45 its essence.44 constitute of that substance.Since a substancewill be exhibiting the essence necessarytruth. Spinoza a each proposition is doing this it will be propositions.As Macyntre doesnot acceptthe existenceof contingent

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Althusserand structuralism puts it: '(Spinoza)fail(s) to distinguishthe identifylngfrom the des- 281 cribing functions of expressions,he cannot distinguishbetween a substance incorrectly identified and a substance incorrectly desAll cribed'.46 truths,for Spinoza,then, arenecessarytruths. So, revertingto the example of the worm and the bloodstream, in if the drop of blood is an attributeof the bloodstream accordance to question,in fact, since the with definition 4 (though this is open and wouldnot be a Spinozist'substance' even supposing bloodstream of its essentialattributes) it were, the drop of blood may not be one then the drop of blood 'presupposes'the bloodstreamin a very special sense: propositionsassertingof the drop of blood that it is 'in' the bloodstreamwill be necessarilytrue, and the proposition relatedto the proposition: 'that'sa drop of blood' will be deductively 'that's the bloodstream'. Returningnow to Althusser,if we interprethis claimto the effect that every 'simple category'presupposesthe existence of the structuredwhole of society in Spinozistfashion,we have to say that every proposition expressinga relationbetween the social whole and one of its elementswill be a necessarytruth. But, it is difficult to think of examples which make sense in this light. Some of Althusser's examples, following Marx, of simple categories are 'labour'and 'exchange'. Of the first, he says, 'the individualproducer - the individualas the subject of productiononly appearedin developed the economicactivitypresupposes capitalistsociety.' Here,individual existence of capitalistsociety. And, of exchange,he says, quoting Marx,that it 'did not appearhistoricallyin all its intensityuntil the most developedstates of society.'47He concludes,then, that 'it is the structuredwhole which gives its meaningto the simple category.'48 Can one say that Althusserreally means that all descriptionsof exof change entail descriptions society? Thiswouldbe a highlyimplausible claim,and would not be what Marxintended. Perhaps,rather than using quite this strong Spinozist sense of 'presuppose' Althusser means something weaker. According to P. F. Strawson: ( ) a statementS presupposesa statementS' in the sensethat the truth of S' is a preconditionof the truth or falsity of S.... This is the relationbetween the statementthat all John's childrenare asleep (S) and the statement that John has children,that there exist childrenof John's (S').49 Similarlywe could say 'an act of exchangehas taken place (S) and 'a society exists' (S'). As in the first case, the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth or falsity of S. But our secondcase is not so clearrelationif We cut as is that of Strawson. can only get the appropriate that exchangescannot assumption-namely we build in the required

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take place outside of society. If society is defined in such a way as to make it true by definition that exchangestake place in it, the relationholds, but only in a trivialsense.So, if we interpretAlthusser in Spinozist fashion, as he apparentlywishes us to do, we cannot make much sense of the particular exampleshe offers us of 'simple categories'presupposingthe existence of the structuredwhole. We could on a Spinozist readingof Althusser,however,make sense of Althusser's sympatheticreferenceto Marx'scritiqueof 'productionin-general'. Production,on the Spinozistreadingof Althusser, would be more like a large particular thing-more like Spinoza'sGod or Nature-than like a concept. It would not be somethingof which particularproductions were instances. Rather, particularacts of ' production would be simply exemplificationsof 'production'.In producing a part of a car in the capitalistmode of production, I would be simplyexemplifying productionfor exchangevalue. So there is a way of makingAlthussera structuralist criterion by one, but though this readingof him allows us to give a certainkind of meaningto one idea of Marx's,it does not make much sense of some of the examplesfromMarxAlthusserhimselfcites. These examples are made more intelligibleif we interpret 'presuppose' in 'simple categoriespresupposesociety' in an historical fashion. As a matter of historicalfact, exchangeandproductiondid not appearoutside of society-they presuppose society only in this weak sense. Althusserhimselfappears readthe examplesthis way. to But, seen in this light, they do not of coursejustify any connection with KSpinoza. Reading them this way, indeed, is compatiblewith referringto production-in-general' Althussersometimesseems to as want to, as a generalconcept, which has instances.'Production' in 'productionpresupposessociety' is a particular case of the concept production-in-generalIt is conceivable(thoughunlikely that there '. ) are other types of productionoccurring outsidesociety. So, the answer to the question: 'is Althussera structuralist by criterionone?' is 'yes and no'. If he is reada la Spinoza,he is a structuralist,but his own examplesfromMarx,then, makeno sense. And if he is not readthroughthe eyes of his mentor,he is not a structuralist. In such circumstances, however,Althusserfails to do justice to anothertheme of Marx.
THE SECOND CRITERION FOR STRUCTURALISM

Whatabout the second criterionfor being a structuralist? Althusser occasionallymentionsthe word 'system'and describesit as havinga structure,Sso at least sometimeshe is a structuralist this tenet. by He does not discusslaws of co-existence(at least not by that name) instead he emphasizesthe particulartype of causation'metonymic

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Althusserand structuralism causality' which is characteristicof his structuralism. But in fact, 283 what he actuallymeansby 'cause'may be morelike what othershave characterized 'co-existence'.So he may indeed be a structuralist as by the third criterion.Let us have a look at Althusser's concept of causation in order to see whether he is a structuralistin the third sense. Althusserand causationAs vvithhis pictureof the natureof the totality, here too Althusseris influencedby Spinoza. In discussingthe relationshipof the structureto its elements,Althusserrefers to the latter. He says: . . . the structureis immanentin its effects, a cause immanentin its effects in the Spinozistsense of the term, that the whole exastenceof thestructure consasts its effects . . .51 (Althusser's in italics) Let us look once moreat Spinoza,this time to understand whathe meant by cause. The cause of any being, for Spinoza,is that which makes it what it is. Causesproducetheir effects necessarily.'Froma given defined cause, an effect necessarily follows.... If somethingis the adequate cause of something else, the latter can be adequately conceivedthroughthe former.'52 The conception of an effect dependsupon and involvesthe conception of cause. 'x is not the cause of y' entails'y cannot be understood by x'. There is thus a very close connection, for Spinoza, betweenthe causeof a being(whatmakesit what it is) and the beings' essential properties. To explain somethingcausally is to show the necessaryconnection of the essentialpropertiesof a substancewith the substanceof which they areproperties.Thatis to say, to explain something causally is to show, of an essentialproperty,that that is w zat lt lS. Spinoza'sconception of causalityis in markedcontrastto that of the person whom many regardto be the primerepresentative the of empiricisttradition: DavidHume.According Hume,the connection to between cause and effect is never necessary; is alwaysconceivable it that a given cause might be conjoinedwith the negationof its usual effect.53 Causalrelationsare analysedas regularsuccession of the effect upon the cause. Not only is the notion of necessaryconrlection between cause and effect expelled from Hume'sanalysis,but so too is any idea of causalpower or agency. In a sense, then, Spinoza'sconception of causalityis more like a law of co-existencethan like a law of succession:if, for instance,a table is defined as a body with four legs and a top, then possessing four legs and a top is necessarilypart of what makes the tablewhat it is. The legs and the top 'co-exist' in the table. But it would be harderto understandsuccessivephenomenain this Spinozistlight.
. .

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his mentorkSpinoza, conceptionof causefits that of Althusser's Soif by criterionthree. wants as he it to, then he is a structuralist as describes his 'Spinozist'conmakesmuch of what he Althusser of causality. ception an essence outside the economic Thestructure, he says, is not theiraspect,formsand relations which comes to alter phenomena as an absentcause,absentbecause andwhich is effective on them of the cause in the structure's it is outside them. The absence is not thefault of the extertorcausality'on its effects on 'metonymic to the economicphenomena; ity of the structurewith respect the interiorityof the structure, of the contrary,it is the veryform italics) in its effects.54 (Althusser's asa structure, of a from this is this: 'the 'essence' Onething that seemsto emerge a 'transcendits appearance, is structurenot something'underlying' realm.Rather,for Althusser reality distinct from the knowable overand aboveits appearent' is nothing the here, essence of a structure Of course, it is possible Essence and appearancecoincide.55 ance. realistAlthusser;56 there is no conflict with the epistemological may not be seen that may coincide, but the two and of essence appearance they may be identical,but because coincide. Metaphysically, be unawareof their identity. Someto limitations,people may and human of the relationbetweenthe real of like thing this was Locke'sview is the set The real essence nominal essence of a substance. the set of properties means the by for which causallyaccount properties nominalessence. identified-the its which the substanceis normally of propertiesof gold would include be example, the real essence For would essenceproperties number,and some of its nominal For most of us, though atomic malleabilityetc. itsshiny yellow colour, its But unknowable. if we were God, essenceis not known,it is not real knowableand known and we essencepropertieswould become connection between real and real wouldbe able to see the necessary and properties those in essence. In other words,realessence nominal thenominalessencewould coincide. relation between reality and the Does this Lockean reading of in one guise,Althusser presentis views, fit appearance Marx,whose doctrineof fetishismas a phenomenon mentionsMarx's ing?Althusser One case of that doctrineis the his pictureis appropriate.57 the cost of reproducing the forwhich to following:really wagesare equivalent Really the labourerworks family). labourer (and sometimes, his to the cost in to producean equivalent value for the than is sufficient longer value surplus him/herself.He or she produces is being given an of reproducing labourer the capitalist. But it appearsas thoughshehascontributed producing. to to thatwhichhe or in coincide equivalent value and appearance essence to Is it appropriate say that really

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Althusserand structuralism here, and it just seems to us that they differ?Of course, if we take to appearance be equivalentto what Marxdescribedas reality,then the two will coincide. But Marx-and Althussertoo -wants to is make the point that the capitalist'appearance' as much 'reality'as is the one he has analysed.And surelyit is just not true that were we God - were we to have perfect knowledgeof existing reality, of would coincide. capitalist social relations-essence and appearance The distinction Marx drew attention to, between the essence and just of appearance the capitalistworld, would not disappear through our coming to understandthe reality-on the contrary,action has to be takento do awaywith it. In this respect,the distinctionbetween is in essence and appearance Marx'sanalysisof capitalism absolutely unlike that, for instance, in a Lockean substance.And, one could offer a parallelargumentagainstthe Spinozistreadingof Althusser and on cause and the relationbetweenappearance realityfitting this just as much with example from Marx.Marx would have disagreed and the Spinozistclaim that appearance reality coincide, as he does with the Lockeanview that really they coincide, but they are not seen to be the sameby we, limited,beings. into disappearing the reality And the emphasison the appearance which is on the Spinozistemphasis, is very differentfrom Althusser's or 'structure' the 'essence'being nothingoutsideits 'effects';in other words, he seems to want to collapse the distinctionin favourof the appearance.So it seems that it does not make much sense of the examplesfrom Marxto describethem as caseswhere'really'essence coincide, but it just seemsotherwiseto us, limited, and 'appearance' human beings. It seems then that thereis, indeed,a conflict between and readingof Althusser the Spinozistreading. the 'realist' then, it is plausof we Where take the 'Spinozist'reading Althusser, by ible to say that he is a 'structuralist' criterionthree. But as in our so, discussion of the first property of 'structuralism' here, does it he is appearthat, to the extent that Althusser a 'structuralist' cannot Marx. claimto be analysing readingAlthusser, Perhaps,however, we can get a 'structuralist' by this criterion,one whichis compatiblewith Marx,if we look elseof where in Althusser for an understanding the way in which he appliesthe concept of cause.
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causes and Cause:anotherattempt Remember that, for kSpinoza, Thereis anotherimeffects are necessarilyrelated to one another. to portant featureof cause, for him, which on the face of it, appears relationshipbetween the two. This be in conflict with the necessary is that the concept of causeis 'conceivedas action'.58How are these two ideas reconciledin Spinoza?The answeris that the concept of activity, here, is that of makingexplicit somethingwhich is already latently there: it is activity in the sense in which the proof of a

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theoremcould be said to involvethe activityof applyingaxiomsand rules. The 'effect', the theorem, is producedfrom the 'cause':the axiomsandrules. So, the cause 'contains'the effect. It may be that this Spinozist concept of cause is relevant to Althusser's conceptionof reading,for Althusser says: . . . a philosophicalreadingof Capitalis only possibleas the application of that whichis the very object of our investigation, Marx's philosophy.... It is thereforea question of producing,in the precisesense of the word,whichseemsto signifymakingmanifest what is latent . . .59 This passageis directlyreminiscentof Spinoza.In orderto understand the way in which the concept of cause has application,we must examine the theory of reading.Let us look at this theory,and see whether we can produce an interpretation Althusser's of structuralism, this sense,whichis compatiblewith Marx. in
RE ADIN G

The notion of reading, for Althusser,is connected, in some way, with the questionof the scientificityof what is expressed Capital: in 'We read Capital (in order to pose) the question of scientific discourse.60 Readingshould not be 'innocent''thereis no such thing as an innocent reading.'6l'Innocent readings'go along with 'the empiricist conception of knowledge'.62Althusserdislikes the conception of knowledge which, in his view, underpinsa technique, and not a particular techniqueor particular techniquesof reading.(One could of course criticizea techniquewithout criticizing view of knowlthe edge underlyingit -one might suggest that a techniqueof for instance placing emphasisupon particular words when readingEliot's The WasteLand, fails to do justice to the meaningof the poem.) Althusser criticizes 'innocent readings'for viewing the relation between the text and its subjectmatteras an 'expressive' one. This, as we alreadyknow, is an empiricist way of seeingthe relation.As an example of an innocentreading,take our readingof Marx's Capital'Whenwe read Marx,we immediatelyfind a reader who reads to us, and out loud.963 (Althusser'sitalics) When Marx reads to us 'innocently', '(he) readshis predecessors discourse(Smith's instance) for throughhis own discourse.'64 Whenhe readsin his way, Marx's text is just Smith'swith a few thingsadded. Althusseris concerned,not with methods of reading,generally, nor with just any method of readingCapital. He is interestedquite specificallyin the way to read Capital in orderto understand Marx's

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Althusser and structuralism

relation to the classical political economists. The question of the scientificity of historicalmaterialismis seen here as that of Marx's relation to Smith and Ricardo.So Althussermakescertainassumpthe tions about the way of going about answering questionof scientltlClty.

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betweenAlthusser's On the faceof thingstherearesomesimilarities conception of readingand that of Derrida(althoughDerridais, in Accordingto the latter, the fact, critical of earlier'structuralisms'). text is a 'de-centredstructure'.65There is an infinite numberof the of possible'readings' a text. Eachact of consuming text produces a differentreadingof it. The text is not a given entity with a fixed meaningis producedby a readingfrom meaning.Rathera particular the 'semioticfield'. The text is, as it were, produced' in the process of readingor consumingit. The text, for Althussertoo, is not simply given. Its meaningis there producedby the readingof it. And wherethereare similarities are shared difficulties. The text ceases to have any identity-how does one distinguishKing Lear from The Third Policeman?The of words on the page might produce identical 'readings' each. But there are differencesbetween Althusserand Derrida.There may be as of an infinity of possiblereadings a text for Althusser, for Derrida, but for him only one of these resultsin a knowledge.Only one readthe ing of Capitalis correctfrom the viewpoint of uncovering scientificity of historicalmaterialism. We will see that Althusser'spicture is directly reminiscent of Spinoza's view of the iproduction'of nature by God: nature is a necessaryeffect of God's productivity,as the proof of a theoremis the necessaryeffect of the applicationof axiomsandrules.In Althusser, the text and the theory of scientificityare the necessaryeffects of a readingof the text. In order to see how this is, we will need to take a little detour.
LECTURE SYMPTOMATIQUE

of Spinoza,accordingto Althusser,gives us the beginnings a correct view of reading.Spinozaproposed: '. . . a philosophyof the opacity 66 of the immediate. Spinoza 'linked together (in this way) the essence of readingand the essence of history in a theory of the difand ferencebetween the imaginary the true'.67 The correctview of readingis what Althussercalls 'symptomatic': On 'lecturesymptomatique'. thisconception,we must not understand as Marxas having operatedwith the same assumptions the classical political economistsbut simply to have seen morethan they did, on those assumptions.We must not readthe texts of Smithand Ricardo as containinggapswhich Marxfilled in. On the contrary:

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what classicalpolitical economy does not see, is not what it does not see, it is what it sees; it is not what it lacks, on the contrary, it is what it does not lack;it is not what it misses,on the contrary,
itiswhatitdoesnotmiss.68

The oversight,then, is not to see what one sees, the oversight no longer concernsthe object, but the stght itself.69 (Althusser's italics)

what is wrongwith the classicalpoliticaleconomistsis contained So and in intheir texts: what they see, concealswhat they don't see;elimindo see had to be to order see what they don't see, what they from the field of visionor at least radicallytransformed. ated theory Consideringthe texts of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, theCapital, he quotes fromMarx's comesup with is as follows; Althusser XIX, on wages.70Marx,in that passage,is dealingwith the Chapter politicaleconomists'calculationof the valueof labour.Marx classical how tellsus that the classicalpolitical economistsbeganby asking They recognizedthat oscillations theprice of labouris determined. only insupplyand demandcould explainnot the priceof labour,but and certainnorm. As soon as supply thevariationin price arounda balanced,the price of labourno longer dependedon their demand in by action,and mustbe determined somethingelse. He arguesthat, price'or the or AdamSmith's'natural price theirview, the necessary goods valueof labour, is determinedby the value of subsistence and reproductionof the labourer. necessaryfor the maintenance quotingMarx,goes on: Althusser, of for It thusunwittinglychangedterrainby substituting the value apparentobject of its snvestigations labour, up to this point, the perthe value of labourpower, a power which only exists in the is as different from its function, sonality of the labourer,and italics) (Althusser's labour,as a machineis from lts performance.71 not And he continues: 'The result the analysisled to, therefore,was of says italics).Althusser (Althusser's a resolutionof the problem.a72 this that the classicalpolitical economistsproduceda correctanswer to to a question that was neverposed. He mentionsEngels''Preface' to the the Vol. 2 of Capital,whereEngelscompares relationof Marx and economiststo that betweenLavoisier Priestley. classicalpolitical and phlogisticchemistry,producedoxygen, so the Just as Priestley, to classicalpolitical economistsproduced surplusvalue. It was left produced.And however,to identify the substancePriestly Lavoisier, surplusvalue. Althussersuggeststhat was left to Marxto identiJfy it the the texts of Smith and Ricardo are at fault. He formulatestwo political economists in appropriatesentence of the classical possibleways as follows:

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AltStusser structuralism and (i) 'The valueof labour( ) is equal to the valueof the subsistence goods necessary for the maintenanceand reproductionof labour. (Althusser's '73 italics) and (ii) The value of labour is equal to the value of the subsistence goods necessaryfor the maintenance and reproductionof the labourer.74 (Althusser's italics) And he says: '(the first)sentencemeansnothing:what is the maintenance of "labour?" what is the reproductionof "labour?" And '75 in the secondsentence, the term at the end of the sentence(now) clasheswith the termat the beginning: they do not havethe samecontent and the equation cannotbe made,for it is not the labourer who is boughtfor wages, but his 'labour .76 Althussergoes on to tell us that there is presentin the answerthe absenceof its question.Marxcan go on, he tell us, to 'pose the unuttered question', simply by 'utteringthe concept presentin an unutteredform in the emptinessin the answer.'77 (Althusser's italics). How does the theory look? The examinationof the text of Capital is to play a crucialrole in determining historicalmaterialism's scientificity. How exactly does it do this? We will find the answerby examining anotherconcept whichis importantas faras the scientificity of historicalmaterialism concerned.Marx,in Capital,produced is a new object: labourpower. Impliedin the productionof this new object was a transformation the entireterrainand its entirehorizon,which of are the background againstwhich the new problem produced. . . is the production of a new problem endowed with this crztical character(criticalin the sense of a critical situation) is the unstable index of the productionof a new theoretical problematic,of which this problemis only one symptomaticmode.78(Althusser's italics).
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Canthe conceptsproblematic' throwlighton the techniqueof reading Capitaland its relevancefor the theory of scientificity and can it reveal a sense of Althusser'sstructuralism which is compatiblewith Marx?To facilitateanswering these questions,it would be usefulto list a few occurrences the concept, in Althusserhimself, and in a of couple of his commentators. Callinicos A. says:

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becomesthat of the underlying theconceptof theory'sproblematic of possiblethe raising certainquestionsin a whichrenders structure of form, whilerulingout the raising others.79 particular heurisconcept with Lakatos' Althusser's And Callinicoscompares (scientific) discoveries 'the theoretical structures that made tic: more or less with There is one usage in Althusserwhich accords '. . . it is not so says: In this. discussingthe young Marx,Althusser reflectedas the way the the much immediatecontent of the objects ideologicalessence are problems posed whichconstitutesthe ultimate an of ideology.82 the presuppositions So, in this sense, problematichas to do witha text. reading a of theory, and not with the concept of Marx,characterizes 'probleBen Brewster,in his Glossaryto For as matic' the view that: in isolation; it only A word or a concept cannot be considered in which it is exists in the theoreticalor ideologicalframework problematic that used, its problematic. . . It should be stressed thought of an the essence of the is not a world view. It is not from a body of texts individualor epoch which can be deduced it reading; is centeredon the absence by an empirical,generalizing as the problematic muchas their of problemsand concepts within be realised by a symptomatic presence, it can therefore only model of the Freudian reading(lecture symptomaleq.v.) on the analystsreadingof his patients'utterances.'82
possible'.80

his accountof 'ProbleBrewstermentions the notion of readingina symptomatic reading. by A matic'. problematic,he says is realized procedure. with Freud's Andhe comparesthe latternotion in operationin So there are at least two senses of 'problematic' term,a pairof two sensesof the PaulPatton distinguishes Althusser. On I have distinguished. the one to senseswhich corresponds those hand,'problematic' existence of a science, may refer to the conditions of historical On the other hand, problematic which are external to it.... svhichdefine refers,in the case of a science, to the 'conditions'and semantic the formal the science as such, that is, which definein orderthat a statement of whichis required rulesthe observation the intelligibilityof its belong to the science, and which governs the discourseof the discourse. These conditions are internalto scienceitself.83
by pointing out that as far Patton goes on to illustrate the distinction

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Althusserand structuralism as the latter sense of 'problematic' goes, Marx'sconceptionof the capitalist mode of productionand exchangeimpliesa non-Hegelian theory of the form of the social totality and its parts;whereas,as faras the first sense goes, 'Hegel'sconceptionrepresents essential, an historical condition of the possibilityof Marx'scritiqueof political economy.84 It is the second, Spinozistsense of 'problematic' whichis relevant to the outlined picture of reading. Althusseris drawingboth on Freudand on Spinoza. Letus take Freud's Interpretation Dreamsprocedure illuminof for ation. In interpreting dreamFreudpays as much attention to the a 'errors' and 'omissions'of the dreamas he does to what he termsits 'manifest'content.85 The latter, in his terminology, is a 'condensed'and 'displaced' version of the dreamthoughts.86It is by enlarging the manifest on dreamcontent and replacingsome of it that one arrives the latent at dream thoughts. The latter are responsiblefor the dream;and the dream has the function of fulfilling wishes which are expressedin those thoughts. Freud 'reads' a dream in a particularway, taking into account 'absences'in it, which he obtains from elsewhere,in order to arrive at the latent dream thoughts. Althusserreadsa text in a particular way, also taking into account 'absences'which he, too, gets from elsewhere, in order to obtain the problematicof that text. And sometimes, that problematicwill contain the theory of scientificity (for the science expressedin that text). In Althusser's view, just as Marx 'symptomaticallyreads' the classicalpolitical economists, so do we 'symptomatically read'Marx'sCapital.Wereadit in this way, in orderto uncoverMarx's philosophy-or the theory of scientificity for Capital. In fact Marx employed philosophicalconcepts which were 'essentialto his thought,but absentfrom his discourse.'87 And, just as the classical political economists producedan answer to a question they were unable to pose, so did Marxproducethe answer to a question he did not 'havetime' to pose; the question,namely 'what is the specific difference distinguishing Marxistdialectic the from the Hegelian dialectic? Althusser 'reads Capital from a 88 ' particularpoint of view, taking into account what is not there as much as what is there, and obtains, by this means, the theory of scientificity, or Marx's philosophy. Althusserreads Capitalin this way and causally 'produces',in Spinozist fashion, the theory of scientificity. Just as the proof of a theorem is 'containedin' the axioms and rules, and its productionis the productionof what is already, latently, there; so too the production of the theory of scientificity is an act of makingmanifest what is already,latently there. The theory of reading is crucially required for uncovering Marx'sphilosophy. The Spinozist conceptionof the causalrelation
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and between 'appearance' reality has clearapplication:the 'probleis matic', the appearance, the set of techniquesemployedto uncover the 'reality':the theory of scientificityin Capital. picture. But there are difficulties with this SpinozistlFreudian Indeed the Freudianclashes with the Spinozist one to produce a Whichabsencesneed to be takeninto account problemfor Althusser. in the readingof Capital?Clearlyit is not just any old idea which of happens not to be in the text -the theme of Blake'sMarrsage Heavenand Hell for instance.In Freud'scase, we know the answer: the relevant absences are culled from the waking thoughts of the individualwhose dream is undergoinganalysis. (And it may be a problemfor Freudwhetheror not the decisionas to whichthoughts ones makesthe whole procedure the are to be considered appropriate But of analysiscircular.) what are the relevantabsencesin Althusser? If we are to take what he says he takesinto accountas givingus some idea of what he considersto be relevant,he tells us that the absences philosophy.And herewe get the Spinozism. containMarx's A philosophicalreadingof Capitalconstitutesthe causal'producof tion' in the SpinozistsenseS what is alreadythere. An uncharitable interpretationof Althusserhere would be to say that he is simply text what he wantsto find. Marxhimselfcould in' 'reading to Marx's not have producedthe rules and procedurenecessaryto understand the scientificityof his own theory, for livedin did not providehim, and he could not acquire the age Marx in his lifetime, an adequateconcept with which to think whathe produced:the concept of the effectivity of a structureon its elements.89

in' is We could say, then, that Althusser 'reading to his understanding he of Marx'stext the very generalization wants to discover.Might text? How there not be other techniqueswhichare 'latent'in ^'Iarx's is do we knowthat Althusser's the rightone? Whyshouldwe accept betweenthe type his reading?Thereseems to be a crucialdisanalogy of case Spinoza offered us and the one Althusseris presentingus with. It makessense to say that the axioms and rules are 'latent'in the proof of a theoremand that if the proof works out, the axioms and theorems were the right ones. And similarly,because of the to God is supposedto possess,according Spinoza,it makes properties being latent in natureand God as cause with sense to talk of God Natureas effect being the 'right'cause. But it doesn'tmakesensein beingthe 'right'one problematic the sameway to referto Althusser's becauseit for the productionof the theory of scientificityin Capital, does not makesenseto referto the relationbetweenthe problematic and the theoreticalobject as a necessaryone in the way that the and it others are. So there could be other possible 'problematics'

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and Althusser structuralism

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of becomes viciouslycircular Althusserto 'readin' to his understandhe sciences,the verygeneralization wantsto discover. ing of particular It seems, then, that if Althusser'sSpinozistnotion of causeis like 'law of co-existence'then he is indeeda structuralist the structuralist has by criterion three. This time his structuralism led him into a different kind of difficulty. Whereas,in the previous two cases, but Althusser'sviews either fitted the tenets of 'structuralism' did not tally with the ideas of Marxor compliedwith the ideasof Marx this but not of structuralism; time the problemis different.Althusser is tryingto answera questionhe thinksis latent in Marx,the question scientific?'And this time his strucnamely; 'Is historicalmaterialism that questionin a non-circular turalismpreventshim from answering fashion. Althusseris at painsto emphasizethat the 'socialformation'is not it revealedfor what it is to the untutoredeye: grasping requiresthat by So one penetrate the appearances. he is a structuralist the fifth in criterion.Here indeed, he is like Marx; severalplacesMarxholds a slmli vlew. ar to If one takes 'structuralism' indicatea trend, it is not necessary that every structuralistexhibit all of the features picked out as shouldupof characteristic the trend,nor indeedthat any individual hold all of them. Such tidy fitting of the facts is not characteristic any or of e.g. the 'Enlightenment' Protestantism more than it need in Althusser a structuralist so far as his thought is be of structuralism. of fits at least some of the properties the phenomenon.So, although A. Schaff may be right when he criticizesAlthusserfor using terms he ambiguouslyand for lackingin logicalprecision,90 is goingtoo far when he refers to Althusser'sthought as 'pseudo-structuralism'.9l too, is too criticalwhen he labels'Frenchstructuralism' Timpanaro, and charlatanry'; talksabout as (includingAlthusser's) 'sophisticated 'old literary foxes who, as their final and most sophisticatedtrick, of have taken to playingat science'.92If fitting the principles structhen Althusseris one, and not a turalismmakes one a structuralist, 'pseudo'one.
* . .

CONCLUSION

fits It seemsthatthereis someevidencethatAlthusser the structuralist bill, though it is difficultto give any overallconceptionof the nature and of his version of the view. Sometimeshis thinkingis ambiguous he one. Clearly of only one of the interpretations it is a structuralist believes in 'wholes' and he thinks of them as somethingmore than the the sum of their elements. Furthermore, conception of cause with which he is sympatheticmakeshis view out to be closerto the structuralistone of emphasizinglaws of co-existence rather than

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causal laws in the sense of relations between temporallydistinct items. Despite his renunciationof the structuralist label, then, his thinking is close to structuralism severalways. But, often where in Althusseris a structuralist, cannot be describedas a Marxist.His he structuralism conflicts with his Marxism. Althusseris reputedto be the paradigmatic structuralist Marxist.I have arguedhere, however, that often, where he is one, he is not the other. Sociologists,therefore, should not lump together 'structuralism' 'Marxism'. and The two terms refer to very differentbodies of thought;traditionsthat areunlikelyto be happilymarried.
Alison Assiter School of Humanities ThamesPolytechnic

NOTES

1. E. Gellner, On Structuralismin Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Cause and Meaning in the Social Henley and Boston, 1975, p. 124; R. Sciences, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Bhasker, 1975, p . 24, and throughout the book and see C. Sumner: Reading Ideologies: an investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law, Academic Press, London, New York, San Fransisco, 1979. 11. Sumner,1979, p. 102. 12. Keat and Urry,1975, p .124. 13. F. de Saussure: Course in General Linguistics, in R. and F. de George (eds), The Structuralists from Marx to Levi-Strauss, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York,1972, p. 67. 14. P. Geach and M. Black (eds), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege, Blackwell, Oxford, 1960, pp.56-78. 15. Levi-Strauss,1963; p .34. Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought,A Comparison the theories of 16. Ibid., same page. 17. F. de Saussure,1966, p.9, quoted of Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis Althusser, Routledge & Kegan Paul, in S. Timpanaro, On Materialism, NLB, London,1975, p. 143. London, Boston and Henley, 1974, 18. See R. Barthes, Elements of p. 15. Semiology, Cape, London, 1967, 7. Ibid.,p. 15. 8. A Schaff, Structuralism and Chapter 1, Sect. 2,3, pp. 27-8. 19. Ibid.,pp.27-8. Marxism, Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, 20. See H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Frankfurt, 1 9 7 8, p . 4. Method, Sheed&Ward, London,1979. 9. Ibid., same page. 21. See Barthes,1967, pp. 26-9. 10. See , for example R . Keat and 22. F . de Saussure, Course in General J. Urry, Social Theory as Science, Linguistics, C. Bally and A. Sechehaye London, 1 9 7 3. 2. See e.g. J. Piaget, Structuralism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, p. 101; S. Hall Class and Class Structure, (ed.) A. Hunt, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1 9 7 8. 3 . Althusser & Balibar, 19 7 0, p . 7 . 4. See J. Piaget, Structuralism, 1971, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Henley and Boston, 19 71. 5. A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology, New York, 1948, quoted in C. LeviStrauss: Structural An thropology, Basic Books, New York, London, 1963,p. 278. 6. M. Glucksman, Structuralist

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and Althusser structuralism

(eds), in collaboration with A. Riedlinger. McGraw-HillBook Company, New York, Toronto, London, 1966, p.16. 23. See N. Chomsky, Knowledge of Langllagein Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1975, and D. Davidson,Meaningand Truth, Synthese, 1967. 24. See e.g. Althusser, 1969, pp. 102-3,202-4, and elsewhere. 25. See, ibid., pp. 204-7, 209-11,
213-17.

295 Loggsal Theory, Methuen London, 1960,p.175. 50. See e.g. ibid., pp. 231-3. 51. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 189. 52. Spinoza C1 Ethics, quoted in A. Naess: Freedom, Emotion and SelfSubsistence, Universitats Verloget, Oslo,1975. 53. See Hume, 1968, Part III, Sects. II, III, IV and XIV. 54. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 188. 55. See Paul Patton: Althusser's Epistemology: the limits of the theory of theoretical practice, in Radical Philosophy, No. 19, Spring 1978, for an account of the conflicting senses of the term 'production' in Althusser -one derivingfrom a Spinozist reading of him, and the other from a 'realist'reading. 56. See Chapter 1 of my D. Phil thesis: 'The Limitsof Althusserianism', Sussex University, 1983, for a description of the epistemologicalrealist Althusser.Accordingto this Althusser, there is a contingent causalconnection between 'essence'and 'appearance'. 57. See Althusserand Balibar,1970, pp.191-2. 58. See H. F. Hallett: Benedict de Spinoza: The Elements of his Philos, ophy, The Athlone Press London, 1957,p. 9. 59. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 34. 60. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 14. 61.Ibid.,p.14. 62. Ibid., p. 35. 63. Ibid., p. 18. 64.Ibid.,p.18. and Dif65. See J. Derrida:Writing ference, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Henley and Boston,1978, pp.278-81. 66. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 16. 67. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 68. Ibid., p. 21. 69. Ibid., p. 21. 70. Seeibid.,p.20. 71. Ibid., Althusser quoting Marx, p. 20.

26. See, ibid., pp. l 94-202. 27. See Glossary,ibid., under Structure. 28. Ibid., p. 202. 29. See, ibid., p.202. 30. See, ibid., pp. 202-3. 31. See, ibid., p. 203. 32. Ibid., p. 203. 33. Ibid., p. 203. 34. See T. M. Knox (trans.), Hegel's Philosophy of Right, OxfordUniversity Press, London, Oxford, New York, 1980. 35. Ibid., p. l 66. 36. See, ibid., p.167. 37. See, ibid.-,same page. 38. See, ibid., p.196. 39. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 187. 40. See Spinoza to Oldenburg, in J. Wild (ed.), Spinoza Selections, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, Boston,1930,p. 291. 41. See Spinoza, Ethics, in Wild, 1930. 42. Wild,1930, p.94. 43. Wild,1930, p. 94. 44. H. F. Hallet: Substance and its Modes, in M. Grene (ed.), Spinoza: A Collection of CriticalEssays, Doubleday, Anchor Press, New York, 1973. 45. All of which, are of subject predicate form, see A. Macyntre: Spinoza, in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Macmillan, London, and the Free Press, New York 1967, p. 532. 46. Macyntre,1967, p. 532. 47. Althusser,1969, p. 196. 48. Ibid.,p.196. 49. P. F. Strawson:Introduction to

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296
72. Ibid., Althusser quoting Marx, p. 21. 73. Ibid.,p.22. 74.Ibid.,p.22. 7 5. Ibid., p. 22. 7 6. Ibid. , p . 2 2. 77.Ibid.,p.23. 7 8. Althusser and Balibar, 19 7 0, pp . 24-5 . 7 9. Callinicos, A., 197 6, pp. 34-5 . 80. Ibid., p. 54. 81. Althusser, 1 969, p . 69. 8 2. Ben Brewster in Althusser, 19 69, pp. 252-3.

Alison Assiter
83. Patton,1978, p. 13. 84. Steibid.,p.13. 85. See S. Freud: TheInterpretation of Dreams, Avon Books, New York, 1965. 86. Ibid., Sect. IV, (A) & (S). 87. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 30. 88. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 33. 89. Althusser,1970, p . 29. 90. Schaff,1978, p. 40. 91. See Schaff,1978, ch. 2. 92.. See Timpanaro,1975, pp. 171 -2.

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