War, Peace, and Strategy: Study Terms and Concepts

War/Peace o Clausewitz: War is an instrument of policy. Tendency towards extreme Requires political goal Never fully unexpected Probability o Fussell War sucks, but sometimes its necessary. We wont know till weve been there o Howard War of professionals in the 18th century Wars of revolutions, nationalism for the first time. Army is population. Clausewitzs time. Wars of Nations, after Napolean, went back to aristocracy and Bismark, incredibly militarized Pacifism o Fussell has pacifist tendencies, but he isnt because he acknowledges that it is necessary sometimes Absolute (Total) War vs. Limited War (Real War) o Clausewitz o Absolute war is an abstraction, an ideal type extreme. Ex. Napolean came closest to absolute war. o Real war is restrained by political purposes LIMITED WAR How best to win a war, aims of war o Sun Tzu Best way to win war is through coercion, break enemy without fighting. Substitute diplomacy for force Broader framework than Clausewitz o Clausewitz Compel enemy to do your will Disarm enemy Causes of War Used in Waltzs images later o Permissive/Efficient Permissive: allow something to happen Efficient: Makes something happen o Necessary/Sufficient Necessary: required to make something happen Sufficient: Is enough to make something happen o Proximate/Underlying Proximate: Immediate cause Underlying: Deep rooted cause o Synergistic

Two insufficient things come together to be sufficient What causes stability? o Unipolar Clausewitz Blainey hegemonic stability because when there is disagreement over power, then there is war. Gilpin same as Blainey. Argues that when power gets closer, there is hegemonic war that is gigantic, makes the world bipolar, and then in the end there is a clear winner. o Bipolar Waltz - Bipolarity makes the balance of power clear. Neither superpower worries whether one of the allies may change sides, because one ally defecting to the other wouldn't change the balance too much, whereas in multipolarity, alignment will upset the balance. This was based on the inference from the Cold War. There's less and less apparent danger of WW3, because both sides of the two poles negotiated that war was not a rational option. Mearsheimer (Cold War) Only 1 dyad, rather than possibility of smaller wars around that can escalate. Powers will create alliance with the smaller countries, so system is rigid. If one defects, nbd. Traditional Balance of Power Theory, Blainey, Gilpin (Peloponnesian War) o Tripolar Traditional Balance of Power Theory, Schweller o Multi-polar Traditional Balance of Power Theory, Claude (best of worst situations) Waltz Theories of IR o Realism Mearsheimer security conflict will remain prevalent above economics Waltz 3 images Criticisms: amoral if not immoral, too general, ineffective in accounting for change in economy and domestic politics o Liberalism Fukayama death of ideological conflict, conflict will be between those stuck in history and those who are liberal Doyle Democratic Peace Theory Kant Perpetual Peace Criticisms: Idealistic and moralistic, too general and sometimes contradictory o Constructivism Huntington culture vs. culture rather than state vs. state Latin, Japanese, African, Western, Confucian, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox.

Mead War is an institution Mueller Obsolescence of war Criticisms: Closet liberalism, assumes we will create good social constructions when sometimes there can be bad social construction of identities. Waltzs 3 images o 1st image: Mead, Mueller Individual Level War is because man is evil, so the way to change it is to change PEOPLE Waltz says this is not the underlying cause, just efficient cause o 2nd image: Doyle, Kant, Lenin, Schumpeter State Level Change regimes into democracy. BUT democracies also fight wars Once again, not underlying, just efficient o 3rd image: E.H. Carr, Angell, Rosecrance, Blainey, Waltz International Level Anarchy results in war Ending war means need world government, but then there will be international civil war Imperialism o Lenin Capitalism as highest stage of imperialism o Schumpeter Imperialism a vestige of monarchism, fail trade o Carr Moral Ideology is to keep people down o Angell Trade means that its pointless to be imperialist, useless o Blainey Trade over imperialism any day. Interdependence ftw. Interdependence o Rosecrance FDI, not trade, prevents war. Hurts country to make war o Waltz From military perspective, interdependence is terrible! o Angell Great Illusion ~ Globalization and trade expansion is faster than war o Keohane and Nye This subsumes realism, whereas Mearsheimer says realism subsumes interdependence/neoliberalism Challenging these: States are coherent units Force is effective High politics dominates low politics Argues that: Societies are connected, not just state but also interstate, transgovernmental, transnational Issues are not clear hierarchy, so military security does not consistently dominate agenda Interdependency disallows force o Milward: Japan and Germany invade for economic reasons Rationality

o Rationality not always a good explanation, sometimes there are EMOTIONS and those cannot be replaced. People are not always rational, which is why its hard to predict the other side, and so many miscalculations o Jurgensmeyer Terrorism based on religion Economics in War o Military Independence vs. Efficiency Waltz vs. Rosecrance o Machiavelli Money isnt the sinews of war, good soldiers are Carrs Utopianism and Realism o Utopianism gives emotion and morality to ideology, and realism exposes its hypocrisy. Neither can live without the other. Absolute vs. Relative Gains o Economics: Absolute and relative gains are argued to be useful o Military: Relative gain is usually the one that matters more, especially in conventional military Strategy vs. Tactics vs. Logistics o Clausewitz Strategies should determine the tactics. Ideally, linear logic of war. Doesnt really consider logistics in his analysis. o OHanlon Logistics problems are really important even though Political Science and strategic studies dont really focus on it. QUALIFIES CLAUSEWITZ: Sometimes logistics can and do determine tactics. Ex. Landing ship transports WWII planned to do attacks in Normandie, but then everyone needed LSTs and there werent enough so they had to delay plans. o Geyer Just having tactic without strategy wont help. Blitzkrieg works for Hitler until Operation Barbarosa SU too big for blitzkrieg, but Hitler had no strategy. Cannot just string together tactical victories to create a strategic victory. Balance of Power, Balance of Threat o Not the same thing, power can be there without threat and there would be no need for conflict. o Balance of threat is focusing on people who want to hurt you o Does it matter? Alternatives? Terrorism is not a balance of power problem Liberalism: International Law Neoliberal: Mitigate anarchy through collective security, not the same as harmony! But realists like Jervis says this is impossible, norms depend on reciprocation but security is too important to risk reciprocation when it is needed. No one wants to go to war for someone else. o Claude

Automatic Semiautomatic Manual o Mearsheimer o Hudson Locarno Treaty, League of Nations, must define ally system if we want to have one. Revisionism o Hegemonic war will produce revisionist ideologies if a different hegemon rises. o Revisionist powers are bigger threats, less stable because they want to change. o Crowe vs. Munich papers Was Germany revisionist? o China Betts/Christensen vs. Ikenberry Collective Security vs. Security Institutions o Hudson Locarno Treaty, League of Nations, must define ally system if we want to have one. o But realists like Jervis says this is impossible, norms depend on reciprocation but security is too important to risk reciprocation when it is needed. No one wants to go to war for someone else. o Hudson But because of this, countries in collective security will try to prevent each other from entering war keeps peace! Intervention o Betts: Delusion of Impartial Intervention ~ gotta go all out! Limited and Impartial seems best, but its not. Makes things worse. Stop thinking there will be a compromise. There is going to be no compromise. Impartial just makes us seem weak and the situation confusing to both parties. Eg. Worst is Bosnia, Somalia, meh in Cambodia, best in Kosovo o Fortna: Intervention works if the civilians want it, and if there is enforcement Must show credibility, must be consent based Eg. Mozambique, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone (but there is contraband financing because of diamonds so no good) Crisis Management o Coercion Schelling Tripwire, Connectedness, Salami Tactics. Adversary doesnt have a choice not to comply, because it forces the opponent to take responsibility for the whole thing Pape Force adversary to change behavior without defeating. Adversary must still have choice not to comply o Strategies Pape Punishment Inflict cost on civilians (Douhet Model) doesnt work because territorial stakes are too important for security, governments are willing to withstand a lot and

accept higher costs. Also, coercion happens during wartime, when country is already willing to accept higher costs. Risk Punishment over a long period of time, start gradually and escalate (Schelling) Decapitation Going after leadership (In BoA, thats what they did, and also in Kosovo according to Clark) Denial going after adversarys military and deny him ability to fight back. Strategic bombing no good. Interdiction strike at lines of supply between military production and the combat theater as well as theater logistics Schelling Risk Compellence: Imma do this until you beg me to stop Brinkmanship: Escalate, till someone stops Salami tactic Tripwire Rational to seem irrational: Eisenhower did this! o Scorpion on camel Clark Used Decapitation technique in Kosovo o Deterrence (defensive) Capability able to deter Credibility able to convince other side youre not bluffing Compellance (offensive) compel him to act the way you want Nuclear power as deterrence, even though its an offensive weapon Geopolitics o Geography, Demography, Ethnography Kaplan Shatter zones places more prone to conflict than others India, middle east, Arabian peninsula, crescent between Mediterranean sea and Iranian Plateau, Persian core. o Tactical Geography Tail to Teeth Ratio o Tail = supply, cooks, services, etc. Teeth = military o Cost of fielding/supporting/sustaining battle o Most productive = less teeth to tail ratio. Linebacker 1 vs. Linebacker 2 o Linebacker 1: Conventional bombing in mid 1960s, failed because of inability for conventional arms to coerce during insurgency o Linebacker 2: Bombing worked all of a sudden because N. Viet started to fight conventional war. Lines of Communication o Gordon: Lines of communication cut means disconnect between front lines and political theaters, result in unraveling of strategy and tactics o Keegan:

Battle of the Somme? British bombing the Germans? Technology and Innovation o Geyer: Technology requires mass support War dominated now by technocrats rather than strategists, now less interest in theories and technology substituting for strategy (blitzkrieg) but this is totally NOT a strategy. o Biddle: Not just that you have to have good technology, you also have to have good training to use that good technology o Cohen, Crane, Horvath, Nagl Paradox: The more you try to use technology to save expending troops, the more you lose. o Army concept: reliance on fire power to minimize casualties (Krepinevich) o Milward: Technology hasnt made war more costly, not according to GNP. War stimulates technological growth, policy and investment decision E.g. Internet was invented for communication during war. Now, we substitute technology for lives o Cohen technology will soon replace PEOPLE o Biddle no technology will not replace people, at least not yet. Offense/Defense Theory o Weaponry Mearsheimer depends on how you use it Nukesoffense weapon but yet, we use it for deterrence o Clausewitzian Theory Defense is negative object, must switch to offense at some point o Snyder vs. Sagan on Schleiffen Plan o Levy Offense/defense is perceptual, so its useless. o Biddle says offense/defense not as useful as how armies use their weaponry Culminating point of victory o Clausewitz point after which your war fighting power dissipates and you run out of energy. At that point, stop offensiving and start defending what you gained o Gordon Iraq and Afghanistan, Cobra Military Constraints affecting war o Clausewitz: Friction only concept that distinguishes real war from war on paper. o Examples: Killer Angels: Where Chamberland tries to hold the hill, but runs out of ammunition. o Gordon, Iraq and Afghanistan Friction from LOC = disconnect between front lines and political theaters, ended war prematurely

Friction from sand storms Friction from not knowing who owns the airspace o Battle of the Somme re: Keegan o Woodward Obamas dilemma o Uncertainty if youre even the least bit uncertain, should not preemptive nuclear war. Center of Gravity o Clausewitz: Center of gravity is locus on what you need to focus on, most crucial point at which everything depends, focus of all military efforts In unconventional warfare, center of gravity is population o Summers vs Krepinevich Vietnam, Summers believe center of gravity is conventional forces. Krepinevich believes is people of S. Vietnam. o Gordon: Cobra, assuming it was conventional and therefore misperceived center of gravity. Linear Model of Strategy vs. Circular Model o Clausewitz Linear Model is ideal, but friction makes it circular o Linear: Plans: Policy Strategy Operations Tactics Execution: Tactics Outcome of Battles Outcome of Campaigns Outcome of War THIS IS WHAT WAS IN ARAB COUNTRIES according to Pollack, and this is why they sucked! o Circular: Plans to Execution, feedback at every level (policy/grand strategy, strategy, military doctrine, operations, tactics) Conventional vs. Unconventional Warfare o Supraconventional and Subconventional o Vietnam war re: Summers and Krepinevich o Geyer, unraveling of Clausewitz and inverting o Gordon: Cobra, assuming it was conventional and therefore misperceived center of gravity. o Clausewitz on how unconventional warfare can be effective, peoples war But its a last resort, because its a tactic not strategy Works only when its asymmetric and war is not decided by a single decisive battle. o Lawrence science of guerrilla warfare Need a place insurgents can disappear to, and enemy cannot be too large. Need sympathetic population Rebels must be able to destroy or paralyze enemys LOC o Morrison Ex. British and US about Germany

Guerrilla War o Popular during Napoleonic wars to stop the French o WWII, resistance movements formed guerrilla units to harass German and Japanese o Cannot defeat government, so builds rebel movement until it can evolve into conventional war. BATTLE OF ALGIERS: TERRORISM IS JUST TO GET THE ATTENTION, AT SOME POINT THE VIOLENCE HAS TO STOP AND THE PEOPLE HAVE TO BRING IT THROUGH. Counterinsurgency Strategies o Strategy and reverse strategy o Cohen, Crane, Horvath, Nagl Manage info and expectation Use measured force Learn and adapt Empower at lowest levels Support host nation o Kilcullen Accidental Guerrilla Infection - Preexisting conflict/social breakdown/civil war/health crisis - some kind of problem in the local context setting is infected by a very small number of people from external source (terrorists?) who come into the local arena. Not part of that society originally, not that popular either (displace local authority, dispossess them, forge business links), locals a lot of times are very wary of what they're doing Contagion (Mechanisms of globalization) - Terrorist groups (very small number) have a disproportionately large influence because of globalization pathways that are available (global television, easy travel, transmission of funds, networking opportunities, propaganda, recruitment), influence then spreads. Intervention - After contagion, there are reactions to it. US military intervention, External intervention, sending security and law enforcement in When Western intervention, entire dynamic of conflicts shift instead of being an outsider and seen as suspicion by inside group, the collateral damage we create end up alienating the society and there's a primary group cohesion response where people essentially bond closer to each other against the distant person. Original extremist group is no longer an outsider! They bond with each other against foreign invader! CRITICAL STAGE This stage is like PAPE (who talks about foreign intervention and occupation), suicide bombing is strategic because it's meant to compel outside power to leave a particular territory. Not perfectly symmetrical, but close enough Rejection - Entire society goes against intervener, most of local population has been turned into a band of accidental guerillas

o Jones Why COIN didnt work Afghanistan Didnt listen to what the country needed. Government was weak, but US totally didnt help out with the government. Didnt garner support from local population Army Concept o Summer vs. Krepinevich o Armys perception of how wars ought to be waged and is reflected in the way the intensity/conventional war, and reliance eon high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties o CROSSOVER POINT killing faster than they can repopulate Suicide Terrorism o Refutes Post: not socially dysfunctional people. Normal smart people who believe they are achieving a good cause. Escalation (Strategic judo) o Nuclear! o Kahn! 44 rungs???? o Brinkmanship Schelling o Waltz: This is good (more may be better) Terrorism o Types of movements across history o Crenshaw vs. Post Terrorists are rational or crazy? o Jurgensmeyer religious radicalism o Bin Laden Rational actor, people have power to change their government o Sageman vs. Post global Salafi Jihad, people attracted to this are welleducated middle class who dont think their treatment are in accordance with their education. Post looks at ethnic and ideological movement o Battle of Algiers: Terrorist groups are like tapeworms you can cut them up infinitely, but they always continue to regenerate. The captain wants to use decapitation method to get rid of the organization Nuclear War o Waltz more may be better o Freedman o Kahn o Countervalue vs. counterforce = city vs. missiles o 2nd strike capability = MAD, scorpion in bottle o Tactical weapon? Will need to find limited way o Eisenhower (Dulles) vs. Kennedy (McNamara) Civil War o Valentino Genocide. Small groups, we should move people outta the place o Kaufman: split them o Kumar: no doesnt solve o Huntington: there will be regional splits o Kaplan: based on geopolitics

o Mansfield and Snyder Democratization usually leads to civil war but we just need to be more careful Ethics o Utilitarian vs. morality = Fussell vs. Waltzer o Waltzer: Supreme emergency Soldiers vs. civilians o Fussell: Bomb was okay because it saved people in the end Germany o Shils and Janowitz bond with primary group o Bartov eastern front they scary Grand Strategy o Morrison: US vs British on Germany o Posen/Ross Neo-isolationism Selective engagement Cooperative security Primacy o Ikenberry

1st image: 2nd image: Doyle, Kant, Lenin, Schumpeter 3rd image: E.H. Carr, Angell, Rosecrance, Blainey, Waltz