Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1996, Vol. 70, No.

4, 797-809

Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/96/$3.00

Relation of Shame and Guilt to Constructive Versus Destructive Responses to Anger Across the Lifespan
June Price Tangney, Patricia E. Wagner, Deborah Hill-Barlow, Donna E. Marschall, and Richard Gramzow
George Mason University This study explored the relation of shame proneness and guilt proneness to constructive versus destructive responses to anger among 302 children (Grades 4-6 ), 427 adolescents (Grades 7- l l ), 176 college students, and 194 adults. Across all ages, shame proneness was clearly related to maladaptive responses to anger, including malevolent intentions; direct, indirect, and displaced aggression; selfdirected hostility; and negative long-term consequences. In contrast, guilt proneness was associated with constructive means of handling anger, including constructive intentions, corrective action and nonhostile discussion with the target of the anger, cognitive reappraisals of the target's role, and positive long-term consequences. Escapist--diffusingresponses showed some interesting developmental trends. Among children, these dimensions were positively correlated with guilt and largely unrelated to shame; among older participants, the results were mixed.

Anger is a universal human emotion. In the course of day-today life, people of all ages inevitably experience anger. What is not universal, however, is the manner in which children, adolescents, and adults manage and express their feelings of anger. Some people are inclined to aggress. In their fury, they lash out at those around them and take steps to "even the score." Others tend to hold their anger in. They stew over perceived injustices without directly expressing their ire, or they attempt to ignore, minimize, or distract themselves from their anger. Still others orient themselves in a constructive direction. They draw on their anger to make changes for the better, such as opening lines

June Price Tangney, Patricia E. Wagner, Deborah Hill-Barlow, Donna E. Marschall, and Richard Gramzow, Department of Psychology, George Mason University. Patricia E. Wagner is now at Hutchings Psychiatric Center, Syracuse, New York; Richard Gramzow is now at the Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This research was supported by a grant from the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (R01 HD27171 ). Portions of these results were presented at the August 1992 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. We thank the many graduate and undergraduate students who assisted in various stages of the project: Tania Abi-Najm, Gayathri Adikesavan, Kauser Ahmed, Ruth Barrientos, Mary Bolton, Julie Kaplan Borenstein, Sarah Clements, Joe Constantin, Michelle Covert, Brit Creelman, Devra Dang, Robin Dold, Carey Fletcher, Laura Flicker, Marcelle Fozard, Dee Dee Atkinson Furr, John Gavlas, Alice Hansbarger, Bill Harman, Tricia Jacobsen, Christina James, Karen Johnson, Leslie Kirk, Conrad Loprete, James Maxfield, Natalie Migliorini, Tim Mohr, Julie Morig, Yvette Nageotte, Heather Phillips, Adam Rabinowitz, Diana Rodriguez, Karen Rosenberg, Tricia Roy, Karey Rush, Gary Russell, Provie Rydstrom, Veronica Sanchez, Jennifer Sanftner, and Siyon Yi for their assistance with the larger study from which this report was drawn. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to June Price Tangney, Department of Psychology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030. 797

of communication, resolving conflict, and setting things right. What accounts for these individual differences in anger-management strategies? What factors "tip the balance," allowing people to make constructive, as opposed to destructive, use of their anger? Some of our previous work on shame and guilt suggests that these moral emotions may play an important role in mediating the social consequences of anger. Shame and guilt are often cited jointly as two emotions that inhibit socially maladaptive behaviors, including aggressive responses. Our research, however, has underlined important differences in the nature and psychosocial implications of shame and guilt--differences that may well lead to contrasting modes of managing anger in everyday contexts.

P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Differences Between S h a m e and Guilt What is the difference between shame and guilt? Shame and guilt are both negative self-relevant emotions. People typically experience shame, guilt, or both when they behave in a manner they view as morally or socially unacceptable. Shame and guilt differ, however, in the ways in which such negative self-relevant events are construed (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1990, 1995). Moreover, it appears that such differences in the "framing" of events are related to quite distinct patterns of affect, cognition, and motivation, as indicated both by qualitative case study analyses (e.g., Lewis, 1971; LindsayHartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995) and several systematic empirical studies of the phenomenology of shame and guilt (e.g., Tangney, 1989, 1993; Tangney, Miller, & Flicker, 1992; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). When shamed, a person's focal concern is with the entire self. Some negative behavior or failure is taken as a reflection of a more global and enduring defect of the self. There is a painful scrutiny and negative evaluation of the entire self, with corre-

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TANGNEY, WAGNER, HILL-BARLOW, MARSCHALL, AND GRAMZOW guilt (Tangney, 1992; Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, & Wagner, 1994). In fact, anger and related direct and indirect aggressive responses were cited by relatively few adult and child respondents as causes of personal shame or guilt experiences, compared with other categories of failures and transgressions. A second possibility is that the experience of shame itself fosters feelings of other-directed anger and hostility. For example, from a series of case studies, both Lewis (1971) and Scheff (1987) have suggested that the acute pain of shame can lead to a sense of"humiliated fury" directly toward the self and toward a real or imagined disapproving other. As noted earlier, shame typically involves a very painful condemnation of the global self, coupled with an awareness of how the self would appear to others. Because shame involves this sense of exposure and disapproval from sources outside of the self, self-directed hostility is easily redirected out toward others involved in the shame-eliciting situation. Observing others may be held in part responsible for the ugly feeling of shame. In addition, Lewis (1971) has suggested that such other-directed hostility may serve a second, defensive function. In redirecting anger outside the self, shamed individuals may be attempting to regain a sense of agency and control, which is so often impaired in the shame experience. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Averill's (1982) studies of adults' everyday episodes of anger indicated that a common cause of anger is a "loss of personal pride" or a loss of self-esteem--very likely shame-related experiences. Finally, Berkowitz's ( 1993 ) notion of"aversively stimulated" anger and aggression is relevant here. As noted earlier, numerous empirical studies have indicated that shame is typically a more painful experience than guilt (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1989, 1993; Wicker et al., 1983). In his reformulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, Berkowitz proposed that negative affect, in general, fosters feelings of anger and the "instigation to aggress." Thus, from this perspective, it may be the pain of shame that accounts for its link with indexes of anger and hostility. In sum, there is now converging theoretical, clinical, and empirical evidence to indicate that shame may motivate not only avoidant behavior but also a defensive, retaliative anger and a tendency to project blame outward. In contrast, guilt has been associated with a tendency to accept responsibility and, if anything, with a somewhat decreased tendency toward interpersonal anger and hostility. Some question remains, however, about how shame-prone individuals are likely to handle their anger once they become angry. Among fifth-grade boys, shame was linked to teachers' reports of direct aggressive behavior as well as self-reports of anger (Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, et al., 1991). But in a study of college students, shame was related to measures of anger, hostility, resentment, and indirect aggression but not to measures of more direct aggression (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). This raises the possibility that shame-prone adults are prone to a seething, bitter, resentful kind of anger that they find difficult to express directly. Alternatively, the negligible links between shame and direct aggression may be an artifact of problems with the Buss-Durkee aggression scales used in the latter study. This warrants careful consideration because the Buss-Durkee measure was primarily designed to assess cogni-

sponding feelings of shrinking and being small. The shamed person feels, in the moment of shame, worthless and powerless. The self is impaired. Furthermore, because shame also involves a sense of exposure (before a real or imagined "audience"), there is a press to hide, to sink into the floor and disappear. In contrast, when experiencing guilt, a person's focal concern is with a specific behavior or failure, somewhat apart from the global self. There is a clear scrutiny and negative evaluation of the behavior, with a corresponding sense of tension, remorse, and regret over the bad act that was done. But the processes involved in guilt stop short of a generalization to the entire self. When feeling guilt, a person feels bad (perhaps very bad) about his or her behavior but not necessarily about him- or herself. That is, the behavior may be deemed objectionable, even reprehensible, but the self remains relatively intact and unimpaired. With the tension, remorse, and regret of guilt comes a press toward reparative action, such as apologizing, undoing, or in some way repairing the harm that was done. Much of our previous research has demonstrated that shame and guilt have very different implications for many aspects of psychological and social functioning (Tangney, 1991, 1995; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). This seems to be true both when considering the states (shame and guilt) and also when considering the traits or dispositions (proneness to shame and proneness to guilt). Of special relevance here are our findings that shame and guilt are differentially related to anger arousal, hostility, and externalization of blame.

Shame, Guilt, and Anger Arousal

In several studies of college students, for example, the tendency to experience shame was associated with anger arousal, suspiciousness, resentment, irritability, a tendency to blame others for negative events, and indirect (but not direct) expressions of hostility (Tangney, 1990; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). Proneness to "shame-free" guilt, on the other hand, was inversely related to externalization of blame and some indexes of anger, hostility, and resentment. A similar pattern of results was observed in a study of several hundred fifthgrade children (Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow, & Fletcher, 1991 ). Among the fifth-grade boys, shame proneness was positively correlated with both self-reports of anger and teacher reports of aggression, whereas guilt proneness was negatively correlated with self-reports of anger. Among the fifthgrade girls, shame proneness was also positively correlated with self-reports of anger. This link between shame and anger is evident at the situational level as well. For example, Wicker et al. ( 1983 ) found that college students were more likely to report a desire to punish others, as well as a desire to hide, when rating personal shame versus guilt experiences. Similarly, Tangney, Miller, and Flicker (1992) found an analogous trend among college students who reported more feelings of anger in connection with narrative accounts of shame versus guilt experiences. What accounts for this rather counterintuitive link between shame and anger? One possibility is that, once angered, people often feel ashamed of being angry. Analyses of the situational determinants of shame and guilt, however, show little evidence that feelings of anger are more likely to result in shame than

SHAME, GUILT, AND ANGER tive and affective aspects of anger and hostility rather than behavioral aggression.

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Shame, Guilt, and Constructive Versus Destructive Responses to Anger

We recently extended our investigation of the differential role of shame and guilt in anger by taking a much more in-depth look at how these individual differences in moral affective style are related to the ways in which people characteristically manage their anger across the lifespan. That is, once people become angry, what are they likely to do? In a cross-sectional developmental study of several hundred children (Grades 4-6), adolescents (Grades 7-11 ), college students, and noncollege adults, participants completed the age-appropriate versions of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989), which provides indexes of shame proneness and guilt proneness. Participants also completed age-appropriate versions of our newly developed Anger Response Inventories (ARIs; Tangney et al., 1996 [the companion to this article ]), which assess a range of possible aggressive and nonaggressive responses that people might select when angered. The ARIs consist of a series of developmentally appropriate situations that are likely to elicit anger in everyday contexts. Similar in structure to our Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI; Tangney, Burggraf, Hamme, & Domingos, 1988) and TOSCA measures of shame and guilt, respondents are asked to imagine themselves in each situation and then rate a number of associated responses. The ARI scales (see Appendix) represent four broad categories of anger-related dimensions: (a) Anger Arousal; (b) Intentions (e.g., malevolent, constructive); (c) Cognitive and Behavioral Responses to anger (including realadaptive behaviors such as aggression, adaptive behaviors such as nonhostile discussion, escapist-diffusing responses, and cognitive reappraisals); and (d) participants' assessment of the likely Long-Term Consequences of the anger episode. On the basis of our previous findings, we expected to find that anger would be more problematic for shame-prone individuals than others, at all ages. We expected that shame-prone people would not only be more prone to anger in general compared with their less shame-prone peers but would also be prone to do unconstructive things with their anger. In this regard, shameprone individuals appear to have a number of liabilities. First, our previous research has shown that shame-prone people are more angry than those less shame prone (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). So to begin with, the shameprone person has a good deal of anger to manage. Second, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that this anger may often be an irrational, defensive response to real or imagined threats to the self (Averill, 1982; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1987; Tangney, 1990; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). Thus, the shame-prone person's reactions to such events are likely to be exaggerated or out of proportion to the reality of the situation, often biased by an assumption of malicious intent on the part of others. Third, in several previous studies, we have found that the shame-prone person is not an empathic person (Tangney, 1991, 1995). That is, shame proneness has been consistently negatively associated with a capacity for other-oriented empathy. Thus, the shame-prone person's response to anger-

eliciting situations is unlikely to be tempered by an empathic appreciation of others' perspectives and feelings. In light of these liabilities, we expected shame proneness to be associated with higher levels of anger; more malevolent intentions, once angered; a range of hostile, aggressive, and nonempathic responses toward the target of the anger; and generally negative long-term consequences as a result of the entire anger episode. In contrast, previous research has indicated that a tendency to experience "shame-free" guilt is associated with somewhat lower levels o f anger, a tendency to accept responsibility for self-relevant negative events, and an enhanced ability to empathize with others (Tangney, 1990, 199 l, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992 ). Thus, we expected that, in the context o f anger, guilt proneness would be associated with largely constructive intentions, constructive behaviors, a tendency to "reappraise" both parties' roles in the situation, and ultimately beneficial long-term consequences as a result o f the exchange. We expected shame proneness and guilt proneness to be differentially related to characteristic anger-management strategies in general, as described earlier, across individuals o f all ages. But because the experience of guilt and empathy hinge on a number o f developmentally relevant achievements (e.g., a clear differentiation between self and behavior, and the ability to differentiate between one's own and another's perspective and affective experience) that likely continue to develop through childhood and adolescence, we expected the links between guilt and constructive anger-related dimensions to become more pronounced with age. That is, the hypothesized association between a guilt-prone style and characteristic constructive intentions, constructive behaviors, and so forth were expected to be strongest among college students and adults. Method

Participants
Participants were 302 children (Grades 4-6), 427 adolescents (Grades 7-11 ), 176 college students attending a large state university, and 194 adult travelers passing through a large urban airport. Child and adolescent samples were drawn from several public schools in an East Coast suburban area that serves an ethnically, socioeconomically, and culturally diverse community. Initially, letters were sent to the parents of students at participating schools, asking permission for their child's (or adolescent's) participation in the study. A cover letter provided a description of the investigation as well as assurances of the voluntary and confidential nature of the study. Only those students for whom we received a signed form and who themselves agreed to participate were included in the study. Child participants ranged in age from 8 to 14 years (M = 10.6). Fifty percent were female; 47% were White, 41% Black, 8% Asian, and 4% other ethnicity. Mothers of 21% reported their primary religious affiliation as Catholic, 46% Protestant, 1% Jewish, 19% other affiliation, and 12% no particular affiliation. Adolescent participants ranged in age from 12 to 20 years (M = 14.5). Fifty-two percent were female; 47% were White, 44% Black, 1% Asian, and 7% other ethnicity. Mothers of 34% reported their primary religious aliil-

Requests for the ARI or TOSCA measures should be addressed to June Price Tangney at the address listed in the author note.

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TANGNEY, WAGNER, HILL-BARLOW, MARSCHALL, AND GRAMZOW in the adult TOSCA are appropriate for adults of all ages, not specifically college students, as was the case with the SCAAI. Third, results from several studies indicate that the TOSCA measures are equivalent to, and in some respects more psychometrically sound than, the original SCAAI measures. The TOSCA-A version for adolescents was the last of the three measures developed. To construct the TOSCA-A, we drew on scenarios and responses from the TOSCA and TOSCA-C, rewriting items and revising the format to yield an age-appropriate measure. A preliminary version of the TOSCA-A was then piloted in one-on-one interviews with adolescents in Grades 7 to 12. This version was revised and then administered to 223 students in Grades 7 to 12 attending several East Coast suburban public schools. Students also completed the Children's Social Desirability Questionnaire--Short Form (CSD; Crandall, Crandall, & Katkovsky, 1965 ). From a psychometric analysis, the best 15 scenarios were selected for the final version of the TOSCA-A. Reliability and validity of the TOSCAs. The internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) estimates of reliability for the TOSCA Shame scales were ,74 for adults (TOSCA), .74 for college students (TOSCA), .77 for adolescents (TOSCA-A), and .78 for children (TOSCA-C). The internal consistency estimates for the TOSCA Guilt scales were .61 for adults (TOSCA), .69 for college students (TOSCA), .81 for adolescents (TOSCA-A), and .83 for children (TOSCA-C). These estimates of internal consistency are generally quite high, given that the alpha coefficient tends to underestimate reliability because of the situation variance introduced by this scenario approach. (In other words, the items of a given scale share common variance because of the psychological construct of interest, but each item also includes unique variance associated with its own scenario.) Of the three measures, the TOSCA for adults has been used most extensively. Previous studies offer strong support for the validity of the adult Shame and Guilt scales in terms of their differential relationship to indexes of psychopathology (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992); aspects of interpersonal functioning (Tangney, 1993, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992); and family functioning (Hamme, 1990; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1991 ). Similarly, a large-scale study of fifth-grade children provided strong evidence for the reliability and validity of the Shame and Guilt scales from the TOSCA-C (Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow, & Fletcher, 1991 ; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1991 ). Our preliminary analyses of the TOSCA-A show comparable evidence for the validity of the adolescent Shame and Guilt scales, as indicated by their relationship to indexes of anger, empathy, and psychological symptoms. Anger Response Inventories (ARIs). The ARIs are a series of parallel paper-and-pencil measures designed to assess characteristic responses to anger. The ARI-C (Tangney, Wagner, Hansbarger, & Gramzow, 1991) is appropriate for children (ages 8-12), the ARI-A (Tangney, Wagner, Gavlas, & Gramzow, 1991 a) is appropriate for adolescents, and the ARI (Tangney, Wagner, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1991 ) is appropriate for adults. In these scenario-based self-report measures, respondents are presented with a series of common, developmentally appropriate situations that are likely to elicit anger. They are asked to imagine themselves in each situation and then rate on a 5-point scale (a) how angry they would be in such a situation (assessing anger arousal ); (b) their intentions-what they would feel like doing, not necessarily what they would actually do (constructive, malicious, fractious intentions are assessed); (c) their likely behavioral and cognitive responses (including a variety of aggressive and nonaggressive behaviors, escapist-diffusing tactics, and cognitive reappraisals); and (d) their assessment of the likely long-term consequences (for self, target, and relationship). The Appendix summarizes the dimensions assessed by the ARIs. Reliability and validity of the ARIs. Several independent studies

iation as Catholic, 32% Protestant, 1% Jewish, 15% other affiliation, and 16% no particular atfiliation. College students were undergraduates attending a large East Coast state university who received credit toward an undergraduate course requirement in return for their participation. A cover letter provided a description of the investigation as well as assurances of the voluntary and confidential nature of the study. The students ranged in age from 16 to 51 years ( M = 22.5). The majority (76%) were female; 70% were White, 7% Black, 16% Asian, and 7% other ethnicity. Thirty-four percent reported their primary religious affiliation in childhood as Catholic, 35% Protestant, 2% Jewish, 20% other affiliation, and 9% no particular affiliation. The noncollege adult sample was composed of travelers passing through a large urban airport. Data collection took place on weekends to avoid an undue bias toward business travelers, and we were able to obtain a fairly broad sample in terms of age, sex, ethnieity, and socioeconomic status. A cover letter provided a description of the investigation as well as assurances of the voluntary and confidential nature of the study. Adult participants ranged in age from 16 to 77 years ( M = 39.2). Forty-six percent were female; 87% were White, 5% Black, 4% Asian, and 3% other ethnicity. Thirty-six percent reported their primary religious affiliation in childhood as Catholic, 43% Protestant, 4% Jewish, 8% other affiliation, and 10% no particular affiliation. Regarding education, 2% had earned less than a high school degree, 9% were high school graduates, 21% had some college or trade school experience, 26% were college graduates, and 41% had some postgraduate education.

Measures
Tests of Self-Conscious Affect ( TOSCAs). The TOSCAs are a series of parallel paper-and-pencil measures designed to assess individual differences in proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, externalization of blame, detachment-unconcern, pride in self (alpha pride) and pride in behavior (beta pride). The TOSCA-C (Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow, & Fletcher, 1990) is appropriate for children (ages 8-12); the TOSCA-A (Tangney, Wagner, Gavlas, & Gramzow, 1991b) is appropriate for adolescents; and the TOSCA is appropriate for adults. These measures were modeled after the earlier SCAA1 and the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory for Children (SCAAI-C; Burggraf& Tangney, 1989). The TOSCA measures are each composed of 15 brief scenarios ( 10 negative and 5 positive in valence) that respondents would be likely to encounter in day-to-day life. Each scenario is followed by a number of associated responses, two of which capture phenomenological aspects of shame and guilt as described in the theoretical, phenomenological, and empirical literature (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tanghey, 1989; Wicker et al., 1983 ). The measures are not forced-choice in nature. Respondents are asked to rate on a 5-point scale their likelihood of reacting in each manner indicated. This allows for the possibility that some respondents may experience both shame and guilt in connection with a given situation. In contrast to the original SCAAI and SCAAI-C, the TOSCA for adults and TOSCA-C for children were developed from "participantgenerated" as opposed to "experimenter-generated" items. The scenarios were drawn from narrative accounts of personal shame, guilt, and pride experiences provided by a sample of several hundred college students, noncollege adults, and children. Likewise, the associated responses were drawn from a much larger pool of affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses provided by a second sample of noncollege adults and children. Preliminary longer versions of the measures were subjected to extensive pilot testing and psychometric analyses. These new TOSCA measures have several advantages over the original SCAA1 measures. First, the ecological validity of the measures was enhanced by the use of participant-generated scenarios and responses. Second, the items

SHAME, GUILT, AND ANGER provide support for the reliabilityand validity of the ARIs (Tangney et al., 1996 [the companion to this article]). Together, estimates of internal consistency and test-retest correlations indicate that the ARI scales are quite reliable. Mean internal consistency estimates (Cronbach's alpha) were .76 for children, .80 for adolescents, .78 for college students, and .80 for adults. In addition, the mean test-retest reliability over a 3 to 6 week period among college students was .72. Regarding validity, theoreticallyconsistent patterns of correlations were observed with (a) global self-report measures of hostility, aggression, and anger-management strategies (adult ARI); (b) teacher reports of behavioral and emotional adjustment, including aggression, delinquency, social problems, and anxiety-depression (child and adolescent ARIs); and (c) self- and family members' reports of respondents' behaviors in specific anger episodes (adolescent and adult ARIs; Tangney et al., 1996 [the companion to this article]). In addition, Tangney, Borenstein, and Barlow ( 1995 ) have found theoretically consistent developmental changes in the group means of ARI dimensions and theoretically consistent correlations among the ARI scales across different age groups.

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Procedures
Children (4th, 5th and 6th grade) completed the ARI-C and the TOSCA-C, and adolescents (Grades 7-11 ) completed the ARI-A and the TOSCA-A, as part of a larger questionnaire study involving several small group sessions conducted on separate days. Research staff read aloud all instructions and items as the students proceeded through the questionnaires. College students completed the ARI and TOSCA as part of a larger questionnaire study involving several sessions conducted on separate days. The noncollege adult sample (airport travelers) completed the ARI and TOSCA as part of a single questionnaire package that was completed in the airport waiting area.

Results Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the relation of shame and guilt to anger-related indexes for children, adolescents, college students, and adults. The coefficients presented here are part correlations in which shame was factored out from guilt and vice versa. Across a range of studies, our indexes of shame proneness and guilt proneness have been substantially correlated. In the current studies, the correlations between shame and guilt measures were .48 for children, .40 for adolescents, .42 for college students, and .42 for adults. This covariation between shame and guilt is likely due to several factors. First, these emotions share a number of features in common (e.g., both are negative emotions that involve self-relevant negative evaluations of one sort or another). Second, shame and guilt can co-occur with respect to the same situation. In isolating the unique variance of shame and guilt, respectively, we are focusing on individual differences in a tendency to experience "shame-free" guilt and "guilt-free" shame. As discussed in Tangney, Burggraf, and Wagner ( 1995 ), it is particularly important to identify the degree to which individuals can experience feelings of guilt (about specific behaviors), uncomplicated by feelings o f shame (about the global self). The pathogenic nature o f shame has been well documented (e.g., Harder, 1995; Harder & Lewis, 1987; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, & G r a m zow, 1992 ). Shame proneness has been consistently linked to a range of psychological symptoms and interpersonal prob-

lems. We have suggested that the global negative self-evaluations inherent in shame typically present people with an insoluble dilemma. To the degree that a specific failure or transgression is taken as a sign of a more enduring defect in the self, the options for repair are severely limited, because at issue is a malignant self, not a malignant behavior. In contrast, feelings of guilt are likely to be relatively adaptive because the implicit distinction between self and behavior, inherent in guilt, serves to protect the self from unwarranted global devaluation while at the same time keeping the door open for reparation or repair. " B a d " behaviors can be altered, fixed, or atoned for much more readily than a " b a d " self. From this perspective, one would expect guilt with an overlay of shame to function very much as shame per se. A guilt experience that begins with the notion of"Oh, look at what a horrible thing I have done," but which is then magnified and generalized to the self " . . . and aren't I a horrible person" lands people solidly in the midst of a shame experience, with all its attendant problems. In effect, the shame component of a guiltto-shame sequence then becomes the psychologically dominant feature. Consistent with this notion, we have found across a range of studies (e.g., Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, 199 l, 1995) that the effect ofpartialing out guilt from shame is generally negligible. Bivariate correlations involving shame are largely similar to part correlations involving shame residuals. In contrast, the effect of partialing out shame from guilt can be quite pronounced, with guilt residuals showing a negligible relationship to indexes of psychopathology and distinctly positive relationships to aspects of adaptive interpersonal functioning. To streamline the presentation of results in the current studies, we present part correlational results only. Conceptually, the guilt residuals represent people's tendency to experience feelings of guilt without globalizing to the ugly feeling of shame.

Relation of Shame and Guilt to Anger Arousal

Table 1 shows that, across all ages, proneness to shame was substantially correlated with anger arousal, thus replicating our earlier findings with more traditional measures of anger. In contrast, proneness to guilt uncomplicated by shame showed a modest negative correlation with anger among children and virtually no relation to anger among adolescents, college students, and adults. (The correlation for children was significantly different from the correlation for adolescents, p < .05, but not from the correlations for college students and adults.)

Relation of Shame and Guilt to People's Intentions Once Angered

The next cluster of variables assessed people's characteristic intentions when angry. Here, respondents were asked to rate what they would feel like doing, not what they would actually do, with reference to each scenario. Again, there were striking differences in the correlates of shame ~nd guilt (see Table 1 ). Across all age groups, proneness to shame was consistently positively correlated with a propensity for both malevolent intentions (e.g., felt like

802 Table 1

TANGNEY, WAGNER, HILL-BARLOW, MARSCHALL, AND GRAMZOW

Relationship of Shame Proneness and Guilt Proneness to Anger Arousal and Intentions in Samples of Adults, CollegeStudents, Adolescents, and Children
Adults (n = 192-194) Anger-related scales Anger Arousal Intentions Constructive Malevolent Fractious Shame .38*** .00 .46*** .40*** Guilt -.09 .16* -.20** -.08 College students (n = 176) Shame .39*** .05 .46*** .38*** Guilt -.03 .22** -.25*** - . 13 Adolescents (n = 424-427) Shame .21"** .02 .24*** .20*** Guilt .03 .36*** -.23"** -.05 Children (n = 299-302) Shame .18*** -.08 .20*** Guilt - . 13* .36*** -.23"**

Note. These are part correlations, in which shame was factored out from guilt and vice versa. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
getting back at the target of the anger) and fractious intentions 2 (e.g., felt like "letting offsteam"). Shame was essentially orthogonal to constructive intentions (e.g., felt like fixing the situation). In contrast, proneness to guilt was consistently positively correlated with constructive intentions and negatively correlated with malevolent intentions. Individual differences in guilt were unrelated to fractious intentions. We had anticipated that the link between Guilt and Constructive Intentions would become more pronounced with age, owing to the older individuals' enhanced capacity to differentiate between self and behavior, and between self and others' perspectives. In fact, if anything, the reverse was true. The correlations between Guilt and Constructive Intentions became less pronounced with age. (The differences between adult and both child and adolescent correlations were statistically significant, p < .05.) In contrast, proneness to "shame-free" guilt was consistently negatively correlated with these indexes of aggression across individuals of all ages. That is, guilt-prone individuals reported that they were less likely to engage in all m a n n e r of aggressive behaviors, compared with their less guilt-prone peers. The last two scales in this cluster--Anger Held In and SelfAggression--are a little different. Rather than assessing otherdirected aggressive responses of one sort or another, these variables focus on more self-oriented responses to anger. The Anger Held In scale assesses a ruminative kind of anger that is not expressed directly (e.g., "I thought about it over and over, and became more and more angry"). Table 2 shows that this tendency to hold anger in in a ruminative fashion was strongly positively correlated with shame across all age groups but only moderately negatively correlated with guilt. Among adolescents the inverse link between ruminative anger and proneness to "shame-free" guilt was nonsignificant. In general, however, the pattern of results involving Anger Held In was similar to the

Relation of Shame and Guilt to Aggressive and Maladaptive Responses to Anger

The next several clusters of variables assessed what people thought they would actually think or do when faced with a range of c o m m o n anger-eliciting situations. The first behavioral cluster assessed a range of aggressive and maladaptive responses to anger? Table 2 shows that shame-prone individuals are not only in general more prone to anger than their non-shame-prone peers but also more likely to do unconstructive things with their anger. Across individuals of all ages (8 years through adulthood), shame proneness was clearly related to maladaptive and nonconstructive responses to anger. This was true for indexes of direct physical, verbal, and symbolic aggression--aggression aimed directly at the target of the anger. (The Symbolic Aggression scale measured nonverbal behaviors that communicated anger without direct physical contact, such as shaking a fist at the person, slamming a door in front of them, etc.) This pattern also held true for the Indirect Aggression scales, including harming something important to the person (e.g., breaking a friend's toy) and malediction (talking maliciously behind the person's back). Also, the same pattern held true for the Displaced Aggression scales, which assess aggression that is displaced onto someone or something other than the target of the anger (e.g., a person may be angry at his or her boss but then take out the anger on a spouse).

2 Fractious intentions were assessed only for adolescents, college students, and adults. In our initial pilot testing, we had considerable difficulty in conveying this concept effectively to younger children. 3 As discussed in Tangney et al. (1996), our intention in designing the ARI measures was to provide a fine-grained assessment of the various possible cognitive and behavioral responses to anger. Not surprisingly, there was considerable covariation among many of these variables (especially those assessing aggressive responses). Nonetheless, we have elected not to use data reduction procedures, such as factor analyses, for two reasons. First, traditional factor analytic procedures would be inappropriate for these data because items are embedded in a range of different scenarios. A prohibitivelylarge sample would be needed to use structural modeling techniques to separate out construct variance from "scenario" variance. Second, and most important, the extant literature has made important theoretical distinctions between, for example, physical and verbal aggression, direct and indirect aggression, and target-directed and displaced aggression. It has been suggested that these different classes of behaviors may be differentially related to such diverse factors as depression, self-esteem, intellectual ability, and sex of respondent. Because relatively little empirical work has directly addressed the practical importance of these distinctions, we decided to retain thes.e rather detailed a priori subscales until the weight of evidence (across a range of constructs of interest) clearly indicates which distinctions are useful.

SHAME, GUILT, AND ANGER Table 2

803

Relationship of Shame Proneness and Guilt Proneness to Maladaptive Responses to Anger in Samples of Adults, College Students, Adolescents, and Children
Adults (n = 192-194) College students (n = 176) Adolescents (n = 424-427) Children (n = 299-302)

Anger-related scales
Maladaptive Responses Direct

Shame

Guilt

Shame

Guilt

Shame

Guilt

Shame

Guilt

Physical Aggression Verbal Aggression Symbolic Aggression Indirect Harm Malediction Displaced Physical Aggression Verbal Aggression To Object Self-Aggression
Anger Held In

.19** .19** .28*** .32*** .29*** .27*** .34*** .20** .34***

.44***

-.32*** -.26*** -.26*** -.27*** -.21 ** -.33*** -.24*** -.22** .14*

- . 16*

.14

.27+** .25*** .31"** .22** .21 ** .37*** .25*** .26***

.45***

-.28*** -.30*** -.37"** -.24** - . 19* -.27*** -.25*** -.29*** .19*

- . 16*

.18*** .18*** ,26*** .26*** .21 *** .27*** .33*** .25*** .37***
.33***

--.39*** - . 18*** -.22*** -.28*** - . 16*** -.36*** -.24*** -.25*** .03

-.07

.21 *** .29*** .29*** .32*** .25*** .23*** .28*** .30*** .36***
.35"**

-.37*** -.35*** -.35"** -.34*** - . 18** -.36*** -.30*** -.35*** .07

- . 13*

Note. These are part correlations, in which s h a m e was factored out from guilt and vice versa. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

pattern observed in connection with the more "other-oriented" aggressive scales. Results involving the Self-Aggression scale stand in sharp contrast to the other aggression scales in this cluster. Self-Aggression assesses a tendency to become disproportionately angry with the self for the anger-eliciting situation (e.g., "I was furious with myself for trusting him/her in the first place"). This Self-Aggression scale was positively correlated with shame across all age groups. In addition, Self-Aggression was moderately positively (not negatively) correlated to proneness to "shame-free" guilt among college students and adults. (Among younger participants, the correlations between Self-Aggression and Guilt were nonsignificant, but post-hoe tests indicated that they were not significantly different from the adult and college student correlations.) This is an intriguing pattern of results among the older participants, given that Table 2 presents part correlations, in which the variance shared between shame and guilt was factored out. The meaning of these findings will be discussed later, in connection with cognitive self-reappraisals, which showed a similar association with shame and guilt. In sum, apart from the Self-Aggression scale, these indexes of maladaptive and aggressive responses to anger showed a remarkably consistent differential relation to individual differences in proneness to shame and proneness to guilt. Individuals prone to feel shame about the entire self were much more likely to endorse a range of different types of aggressive responses than their less shame-prone peers. In contrast, individuals prone to experience guilt about specific behaviors, uncomplicated by shame about the entire self, appear far less likely to engage in aggressive behaviors when angered.

assessed respondents' likelihood of rationally discussing the matter directly with the target of their anger in a nonhostile fashion. The Corrective Action scale assessed respondents' likelihood of taking some other direct corrective action to "fix" a key aspect of the anger-eliciting situation (e.g., fixing a toy broken by a friend). The pattern of results involving these constructive responses to anger are strikingly different from those involving maladaptive and aggressive responses to anger. Here, across all four age groups, proneness to "shame-free" guilt was positively correlated with these constructive anger-management strateg i e s - w i t h only the correlation between Guilt and Corrective Action among adults failing to reach statistical significance. In contrast, proneness to shame was largely unrelated to the constructive responses to anger, except among adults where Shame was moderately inversely related to the Discussion With Target variable. As with constructive intentions, we had anticipated that the link between guilt and adaptive responses to anger would become more pronounced with age. But here, too, no support was found for the hypothesized developmental trend. In fact, post-hoc tests revealed that the correlation between Guilt and Discussion With the Target was significantly lower among adults than among children and adolescents (p < .05). Similarly, the correlation between Guilt and Corrective Action among adults was significantly lower than among the other three groups (p < .05).

Relation of Shame and Guilt to Escapist-Diffusing Responses to Anger

The next cluster of scales--the Escapist-Diffusing res p o n s e s - a r e not clearly adaptive or maladaptive. These inelude attempts to diffuse the anger (e.g., by engaging in some distracting activity such as taking a walk, watching TV, etc.); minimizing the importance of the event (e.g., "Oh well, it wasn't that big of a deal anyway"); removal (e.g., walking away, leaving the situation); and simply doing nothing.

Relation of Shame and Guilt to Direct Constructive Responses to Anger

The first cluster of variables in Table 3 represent clearly constructive responses to anger. The Discussion With Target scale

804

TANGNEY, WAGNER, HILL-BARLOW, MARSCHALL, AND GRAMZOW likely to result in positive long-term consequences for the participant, the target, and their relationship. Our analyses of the longterm consequences of these reappraisals (Tangney, Borenstein, & Barlow, 1995) indicated, however, that such reappraisals are not unambiguously positive, particularly those focused on the role of the self. Moreover, the current results involving shame and guilt similarly indicate that cognitive reappraisals of anger-eliciting events are somewhat of a mixed bag. Table 3 shows that Reappraisals of the Target's Role in angereliciting events were consistently positively correlated with a tendency to experience guilt, across all ages. Shame proneness was generally unrelated to Reappraisals of the Target, except among college students, where there was a modest negative correlation between these two variables. The correlation for college students was significantly different from the correlations for children and adolescents (p < .05) but not for adults. Cognitive Reappraisals of the Self's Role in these anger-eliciting events showed a different pattern of results, mirroring the findings involving Self-Aggression presented in Table 2. Such self-reappraisals were generally positively related to both shame and guilt across all levels of development. (The coefficient for college students' shame was nonsignificant but in a direction consistent with the other age groups, and post-hoc tests indicated no reliable differences in the magnitude of correlations across the age groups.) This is an intriguing pattern because, as indicated earlier, here we are considering part correlations, in which the shared variance between shame and guilt has already been factored out. This suggests that there are two very different processes occurring with respect to self-reappraisals. Our guess is that self-reappraisals among guilt-prone participants most likely involve cognitive reappraisals of the self's role that lead to an other-oriented constructive response (e.g., "Gee, I wonder if I did play a role in this situation, and maybe I should try to help fix it"). In contrast, self-reappraisals among the more shame-prone participants may involve cognitive reappraisals of the self's role that lead to self-condemnation and possibly further anger or withdrawal (e.g., "Gee, I wonder if I did play a role in this situation, and oh, what a horrible person I am! And how could you have put me in such a bind?!"). So our guess is that self-reappraisals may have their costs as well as their benefits, depending on the nature and implications of the reappraisal, and this very likely depends on whether the individual is predisposed to shame or guilt.

The findings involving these Escapist-Diffusing responses were more mixed and showed some interesting developmental trends. Proneness to shame was largely unrelated to the tendency to adopt escapist-diffusing strategies, with the sole exception of Removal, which showed a modest positive correlation with Shame across all age groups. Sharp developmental differences were observed, however, when considering Guilt. Among children and adolescents, each of the four Escapist-Diffusing scales was clearly positively correlated with "shame-free" guilt. In contrast, among older participants, the link between Guilt and Escapist-Diffusing responses dropped off sharply. Post-hoc tests revealed that for each of the Escapist-Diffusing scales, the guilt correlations from the child sample were significantly different from the corresponding correlations observed in both the college and adult samples, at at least p < .05. For Diffusion, the adolescent correlation was significantly different from the adult correlation. Taken together, the pattern of results suggest a possible development shift in the meaning and function of the EscapistDiffusing responses--a pattern that parallels our analyses of developmental differences in the long-term consequences of these strategies (Tangney, Borenstein, & Barlow, 1995). Most notably, for children these attempts to diffuse or ignore anger-eliciting situations appear to have fairly positive long-term consequences. In other words, it appears that it is fairly adaptive for children to use a variety of means to "keep a lid" on their anger. These strategies, however, seem to become less adaptive with age. As people get older, they likely develop a range of more proactive responses to anger, and it seems that simply sitting by, letting the situation pass, is not always the most constructive strategy for adults in the long run. Similarly, the current results indicate that proneness to guilt (uncomplicated by shame) is unambiguously related to a tendency to use escapist-diffusing responses to anger during childhood and adolescence--the phases of development when such anger-management strategies are most adaptive. The relation between guilt and escapistdiffusing responses, however, becomes less pronounced at later stages of development, when such anger-management strategies are less clearly constructive.

Relation of Shame and Guilt to Cognitive Reappraisals of A nger-Eliciting Situations

The next cluster of variables involves two types of cognitive reappraisals of anger-eliciting situations. Once angered, people often rethink or reexamine the target's role in the situation, their own role in the situation, or both. The scale assessing cognitive reappraisals of the target's role includes reappraisals of the other person's intentions, motives, or actual behaviors in bringing about the anger-elieiting event (e.g., "Well, maybe he didn't really mean to do it," "Maybe she couldn't help it"). The scale assessing cognitive reappraisals of the self's role includes self-reappraisals of the participant's own intentions, motives, or behaviors that may have contributed to the anger-eliciting event (e.g., "I wonder ifI made a mistake"). We had initially thought that these cognitive reappraisals would be among the most adaptive responses to everyday episodes of anger. To the degree that such reappraisals may involve flexibility, empathic perspective-taking, and self-reflection, they seemed most

Relation of Shame and Guilt to the Projected Long-Term Consequences of Everyday Episodes of Anger
The last cluster of variables concern the likely long-term consequences of episodes of anger. For each scenario, participants were asked to consider the event itself and their likely responses to the event, and then rate what they thought the long-term consequences of the entire episode would be. Where applicable, they provided separate ratings for consequences for themselves, for the target of their anger, and for their relationship with the target. Table 3 shows that proneness to shame was generally inversely related to positive long-term consequences. The results were most consistent among older participants and when considering consequences for the self and for the relationship, but post-hoc tests indicated that the magnitude of the correlations was not reliably

SHAME, GUILT, AND ANGER Table 3

805

Relationship of Shame Proneness and Guilt Proneness to Adaptive Behaviors, Escapist-Diffusing Responses, Cognitive Reappraisals, and Long-Term Consequences in Adults, College Students, Adolescents, and Children
Adults (n = 192-194) Anger-related scales Adaptive Behaviors Discuss With Target Corrective Action Escapist-Diffusing Responses Diffusion Minimization Removal Doing Nothing Cognitive Reappraisals Target's Role Self's Role Long-Term Consequences For the Self For the Target For the Relationship *p<.05. **p<.01. Shame - . 15* .04 .16* -.04 .16" -.00 -.05 .20** -.24*** - . 16* -.24"** Guilt .26*** .12 .09 .08 .07 .04 .22** .25*** .18" .10 .14 College students (n = 176) Shame -.06 -.08 -.04 -.09 .16" .02 - . 15* .14 -.16" -.08 -.21 ** Guilt .40*** .40*** .16* .09 .17" -.01 .31"** .19* .16" .13 .16* Adolescents (n = 424-427) Shame .00 -.05 .07 -.06 .16"** .03 .07 .19*** -.15"* -.06 - . 10* Guilt .45*** .29*** .28*** .23*** .21"** .15** .32"** .26*** .05 .22*** .18*** Children (n = 299-302) Shame .08 -.02 -.06 - . I0 .12" .03 .07 .18** -.10 -.05 Guilt .43*** .31"** .42*** .39*** .39*** .33*** .38*** .31 *** .10 -.25***

Note. These are part correlations, in which shame was factored out from guilt and vice versa.
***p<.001.

different across the age groups. In general, shame-prone individuals were considerably less optimistic about the long-term consequences of their anger episodes than their less shame-prone peers. Shame-prone individuals reported that the long-term consequences of their anger episodes would be, on balance, more harmful and less beneficial than the norm. In contrast, guilt proneness was generally positively associated with projected beneficial long-term consequences in connection with anger-related episodes. Again, we had anticipated that the link between guilt and beneficial long-term consequences would become more pronounced with age. But no support was found for this hypothesized developmental trend. In no case did the magnitude of findings differ significantly across the age groups.

Social Desirability
One question that arises is the degree to which the relationships of shame and guilt to anger-related dimensions are simply a function of social desirability biases. As discussed in greater detail in Tangney et al. ( 1996 [the companion to this article]), the ARIs assess a broad range of responses, some of which are in fact clearly socially undesirable (e.g., various sorts of aggression) and some of which are in fact socially desirable (e.g., constructive intentions, rational nonhostile discussion with the target of the anger). Thus, one would expect many of the ARI scales to be moderately correlated with measures of social desirability. This is what we found. The child sample in the current study completed, in addition to the TOSCA-C and A R I - C , the CSD. Also, in a recent second study of 253 undergraduates attending a large state university, students completed the ARI, TOSCA, and Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). In each case, the correlations of ARI scales with social desirability were moderate. In the child sample,

these correlations ranged from a low o f . 10 to a high o f - . 3 9 , M = .24, disregarding sign. In the college sample, correlations ranged from a low of.00 to a high o f - . 3 2 , M = .20, disregarding sign. Similarly, the TOSCA measures of shame and guilt are moderately correlated with social desirability. In the child sample, bivariate correlations of shame and guilt with social desirability were - . 0 0 and .27, respectively. Part correlations (shame and guilt residuals) with social desirability were - . 15 and .31, respectively. In the college sample, bivariate correlations of shame and guilt with social desirability were - . 0 5 and. 17, respectively. Part correlations (shame and guilt residuals) with social desirability were - . 16 and .22, respectively. Although scales from the ARI and TOSCA measures were each moderately related to social desirability, secondary analyses indicated that the relationships of shame and guilt to ARI dimensions remain largely unchanged when social desirability is partialed out. For example, in the child sample, none of the 14 statistically significant correlations involving shame dropped below statistical significance once social desirability was covaried out, and only 2 of the 22 statistically significant correlations involving guilt (Anger Arousal and Anger Held In) became nonsignificant. (Two previously nonsignificant correlations with shame--Discussion With the Target and Reappraisals of the Target--edged above statistical significance with the covariate.) Similarly, in the college sample (the results of which very closely mirrored the results from the college sample in the current study), only 1 of the 19 statistically significant shame correlations (Direct Physical Aggression) and 3 of the 21 statistically significant guilt correlations (Fractious Intentions, Displaced Verbal Aggression, and Reappraisals of the Self) dropped below statistical significance when social desirability was partialed out. (Again, one previously nonsignificant shame

806

TANGNEY, WAGNER, HILL-BARLOW, MARSCHALL, AND GRAMZOW sodes of anger would be more harmful and less beneficial than those of their less shame-prone counterparts. In contrast, guilt-prone children, adolescents, and adults appear to adopt a third, more proactive and constructive strategy for managing everyday anger. Consistent with Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton's (1994) observation that guilt serves a range of relationship-enhancing functions, proneness to "shame-free" guilt was positively correlated with constructive intentions and negatively correlated with all indexes of direct, indirect, and displaced aggression. Rather, compared with their less guilt-prone peers, guilt-prone individuals appear more likely to engage in constructive behaviors, such as nonhostile discussions with the target of their anger and direct corrective action. Guilt proneness was also associated with cognitive reappraisals of the target's role in the situation (e.g., "Maybe he didn't mean to do it" ) and of the self's role in the situation ( e.g., "Maybe I had something to do with the situation"). Finally, proneness to shame-free guilt was associated with respondents' assessments of positive long-term consequences as a result of the entire episode of anger. What allows guilt-prone individuals to make constructive use of their anger? First, it seems likely that the types of situations that anger guilt-prone individuals are qualitatively different from the types of situations that anger shame-prone individuals. Because guilt involves a negative evaluation of a specific behavior, somewhat apart from the global self, guilt experiences are less likely to involve severe threats to the self and hence are less likely to motivate a retaliative, defensive sort of anger. Thus, guilt-prone individuals are not typically saddled with the problem of irrational, shame-based anger as a desperate attempt to rescue a devalued self mired in shame. Rather, their anger is more likely to arise largely in response to reality-based violations and infractions committed by others. At issue, then, is a real and concrete infraction that can be addressed in a direct and rational manner with the perpetrator or can be "fixed" by direct constructive action. Such strategies are not readily available to shame-prone individuals in those instances when they become angry as a means of extricating themselves from painful feelings of shame. As noted by Lewis ( 1971 ) and Scheff( 1987 ), one dilemma posed by shame-based retaliative anger is that the shamed (and angered) individual, on some level, recognizes that his or her anger is irrational and unjustified. In such instances, rational, proactive, and problem-oriented responses may be less viable alternatives for the shame-prone person. Second, guilt-prone individuals are less likely to be impaired by global and debilitating feelings of shame, and thus may feel more able to take direct, constructive action when faced with situations involving interpersonal conflict. Not only is their sense of self-et~cacy unimpaired by local feelings of shame, several empirical studies suggest that guilt-prone individuals may have stronger skills in the interpersonal realm, compared with their less guilt-prone peers (Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, et al., 1991 ). These factors, together, may contribute to the guilt-prone person's preference for one key adaptive response to anger in particular--rational, nonhostile discussion with the target of his or her anger. Given their enhanced sense of self-efficacy and relatively strong interpersonal skills, guiltprone individuals may be drawn to "talk things out" with others

correlation--Constructive Intentions--edged above statistical significance with the covariate.) In sum, the relationships of shame and guilt to anger-related dimensions appear to be quite robust. The findings presented in the current study appear to be largely independent of the influence of social desirability. Discussion Psychologists have long identified shame and guilt as two key moral emotions that serve to regulate the expression of interpersonal hostility and aggression. The findings of the current study, however, underline that shame and guilt are distinct affective processes with strikingly different implications for anger-related intentions and behaviors, and here guilt clearly emerges as the more "moral" or constructively oriented emotion. Across individuals of all ages, proneness to guilt was associated with participant-reported likelihood of constructive means of handling anger, whereas proneness to shame was associated with maladaptive and unconstructive responses to anger. Shame is a painful, ugly feeling that involves a global negative evaluation of the entire self. When people feel shame, they feel devalued as a person. Their sense of self---and self-etfcacy--is impaired. And their awareness of others' negative evaluations (real or imagined) is highlighted. Psychological theory, clinical observations, and some empirical findings suggest that shamed individuals have at least two clear routes for managing their feelings of shame. The more passive route involves interpersonal withdrawal--shrinking, withdrawing, hiding from the shameeliciting situation. The more active route involves reactivating the impaired self through other-directed anger (e.g., by "turning the tables" and externalizing blame onto others involved in the shame-eliciting situation). Consistent with the notion that feelings of shame often set the stage for subsequent other-directed anger and hostility, we found that shame-prone individuals of all ages (from early childhood through late adulthood) experience more anger than their less shame-prone peers. Moreover, once angered, the shame-prone person's subsequent motivations and behaviors differ considerably from those less shame prone. Because the shame-prone person's anger is more likely to represent a defensive, retaliative reaction to shame, it is not surprising to find that shame proneness is associated with malevolent and fractious intentions and a likelihood of engaging in all manner of direct, indirect, and displaced aggression. Alternately, shamed individuals have the option to withdraw from shame and anger-eliciting situations. Our findings indicate that individual differences in proneness to shame were not only related to active aggressive responses but also to a passive, internalized strategy for managing situations involving interpersonal conflict. Shame proneness was clearly associated with anger held in (a ruminative, unexpressed anger), self-directed hostility, and a tendency to withdraw from anger-related situations. Thus, shame-prone individuals appear to adopt one of two strategies when faced with situations involving interpersonal conflict--active aggression or passive withdrawal--neither of which is likely to foster a positive change in the situation or relationship at hand. In fact, shame-prone individuals reported that the likely long-term consequences of these everyday epi-

SHAME, GUILT, AND ANGER who have angered them, in part because they view this strategy as likely to result in a successful outcome. Finally, the enhanced capacity for interpersonal empathy observed among guilt-prone individuals of all ages (Tangney, 1991, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, et al., 1991 ) likely plays a key role in shaping the guilt-prone person's responses to anger. Such feelings of other-oriented empathy no doubt contribute to the observed tendency of guilt-prone individuals to cognitively reappraise the target's role and intentions in angereliciting situations. And this ability to take the other person's perspective, even when angered, likely paves the way to constructive intentions and actions (such as a nonhostile discussion with the target of the anger) while at the same time diffusing malevolent intentions and aggressive behaviors aimed at harming or "getting back" at the target. In considering substantial samples of children, adolescents, college students, and adults, the current study provided an opportunity to assess the stability of findings as well as to explore the possibility of developmental shifts in these links between moral affect and anger-related behaviors and outcomes. In particular, we had hypothesized that the relationship of guilt proneness to constructive anger-related dimensions would become more pronounced with age, owing to the older individuals' enhanced capacity to differentiate between self and behavior and between self and others' perspectives. Post-hoc tests revealed relatively few age differences in the shame and guilt correlates of anger-related dimensions in general. Regarding constructive responses to anger, the few statistically significant comparisons suggested that, if anything, the guilt correlates were stronger among younger participants. The most pronounced developmental trend was observed in connection with the Escapist-Diffusing responses. Paralleling our analyses of developmental differences in the long-term consequences of these strategies (Tangney, Borenstein, & Barlow, 1995), "shame-free" guilt was substantially related to each of the four Escapist-Diffusing responses among children and adolescents (i.e., during the phases of development when such anger-management strategies are most adaptive). The relation between guilt and Escapist-Diffusing responses, however, dropped offsharply at later stages of development, when such anger-management strategies are less constructive. Apart from the developmental trend involving the EscapistDiffusing cluster, however, the stability of results from middle childhood through adulthood was quite remarkable. Across individuals of all ages, proneness to shame was associated with maladaptive and destructive responses to anger, whereas proneness to "shame-free" guilt was associated with constructive anger-management strategies and outcomes. The consistency of these findings across the four age groups is all the more striking when one considers that the child and adult measures of shame, guilt, and anger-related processes were each based on entirely different age-appropriate scenarios and responses. (The adolescent versions of these measures were composed of some child and some adult items, modified for adolescents as appropriate.) In other words, this pattern of results is robust across qualitatively different items assessing these constructs and across a broad range of development. Taken together, these results suggest that a consideration of shame and guilt (and the distinction between the two) may be

807

very helpful when intervening with individuals who present with aggressive or antisocial behaviors. Feelings of anger, and acts of aggression, are by no means always rooted in shame. But our results suggest that shame may often be part of the picture. It seems especially important to entertain this possibility because feelings of shame are frequently overlooked in clinical and educational settings. People often have difficulty verbalizing their shame experiences (Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1989, 1993), so shame tends to lurk "underground," beyond the notice of therapists, counselors, teachers, or clients and students themselves. Interventions with aggressive and acting out behaviors may be more effective to the extent that we develop a "third ear" for identifying and addressing feelings of shame and low self-worth, which are likely to be involved in many instances of maladaptive responses to anger. Moreover, the observed link between shame and maladaptive anger underlines the importance of avoiding, wherever possible, interventions that would further serve to "shame" people with aggressive problems. For example, in a school setting, it may be especially counterproductive to intervene with aggressive students by focusing on global, characterological aspects of the person because such a strategy is likely to foster further feelings of shame and, in turn, continued maladaptive anger. A more useful and effective intervention would involve underlining the consequences of specific aggressive or antisocial behaviors, a strategy that is likely to foster feelings of other-oriented empathy and an enhanced capacity for "constructive" guilt. References Averill, J. R. (1982). Anger and aggression: An essay on emotion. New York: Springer -Verlag. Baumeister, R. E, Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. E (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 243-267. Berkowitz, L. ( 1993 ). Aggression: Its causes, consequences and control. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Burggraf, S. A., & Tangney, J. R (1989). The Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventoryfor Children (SCAAI-C). Unpublished instrument, Bryn Mawr College. Crandall, V., Crandall, V. J., & Katkovsky, W. (1965). A children's social desirabilityquestionnaire. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 29, 27-36. Crowne, D., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 24, 349-354. Gramzow, R., & Tangney, J. E (1992). Proneness to shame and the narcissistic personality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 369-376. Hamme, H. (1990). Family correlates of proneness to shame and proneness to guilt. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr College. Harder, D. W. ( 1995 ). Shame and guilt assessment and relationships of shame and guilt proneness to psychopathology. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 368-392 ). New York: Guilford Press. Harder, D. W., & Lewis, S. J. (1987). The assessment of shame and guilt. In J. N. Butcher & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Advances in personality assessment (Vol. 6, pp. 89-114). Hillsdale, N J: Erlbaum. Lewis, H. B. ( 1971 ). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International Universities Press. Lindsay-Hartz, J. (1984). Contrasting experiences of shame and guilt. American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 689-704.

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TANGNEY, WAGNER, HILL-BARLOW, MARSCHALL, AND GRAMZOW Tangney, J. P., Marschall, D. E., Rosenberg, K., Barlow, D. H., & Wagner, E E. (1994). Children ~ and Adults'Autobiographical Accounts of Shame, Guilt, and Pride Experiences: A Qualitative Analysis of Situational Determinants and Interpersonal Concerns. Tangney, J. E, Miller, R. S., & Flicker, L. ( 1992, August). A quantitative analysis of shame and embarrassment. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. Tangney, J. R, Wagner, R E., Burggraf, S. A., Gramzow, R., & Fletcher, C. (1990). The Test of Self-Conscious Affect fi)r Children (TOSCAC). Fairfax, VA: George Mason University. Tangney, J. E, Wagner, E E., Burggraf, S. A., Gramzow, R., & Fletcher, C. (1991, June). Children's shame-proneness, but not guilt-proneness, is related to emotional and behavioral maladjustment. Poster presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Society, Washington, DC. Tangney, J. R, Wagner, E E., Fletcher, C., & Gramzow, R. (1991, April). Intergenerational continuities and discontinuities in proneness to shame and proneness to guilt. In J. E Tangney (Chair), Socialization of emotion in the family Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Seattle, WA. Tangney, J. P., Wagner, R E., Fletcher, C., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Shamed into anger? The relation of shame and guilt to anger and selfreported aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 669-675. Tangney, J. P., Wagner, R E., Gavlas, J., & Gramzow, R. (1991a). The Anger Response Inventory .for Adolescents (AR1-A). Fairfax, VA: George Mason University. Tangney, J. E, Wagner, E E., Gavlas, J., & Gramzow, R. (1991b). The Test of Self-Conscious Affect for Adolescents (TOSCA-A ). Fairfax, VA: George Mason University. Tangney, J. E, Wagner, P., & Gramzow, R. (1989). The Test of SelfConscious Affect (TOSCA). Fairfax, VA: George Mason University. Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, and psychopathology. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 469-478. Tangney, J. E, Wagner, P. E., Hansbarger, A., & Gramzow, R. ( 1991 ). The Anger Response Inventory for Children (AR1-C). Fairfax, VA: George Mason University. Tangney, J. P., Wagner, R E., Marschall, D., & Gramzow, R. ( 1991 ). The Anger Response Inventory (ARI). Fairfax, VA: George Mason University. Wicker, E W., Payne, G. C., & Morgan, R. D. (1983). Participant descriptions of guilt and shame. Motivation and Emotion, 7, 25-39.

Lindsay-Hartz, J., de Rivera, J., & Mascolo, M. ( 1995 ). Differentiating shame and guilt and their effects on motivation. In J. E Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment, andpride (pp. 274-300). New York: Guilford Press. Niedenthal, E, Tangney, J. E, & Gavanski, I. (1994). "If only I weren't" vs. "If only I hadn't": Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 6 7, 585595. Scheff, T. J. (1987). The shame-rage spiral: A case study of an interminable quarrel. In H. B. Lewis (Ed.), The role of shame in symptom formation (pp. 109-149). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Tangney, J. P. ( 1989, August). A quantitative assessment ofphenomenological differences between shame and guilt. Poster presented at the meetings of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA. Tangney, J. E (1990). Assessing individual differences in proneness to shame and guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 102-111. Tangney, J. P. ( 1991 ). Moral affect: The good, the bad, and the ugly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61. 598-607. Tangney, J. P. ( 1992 ). Situational determinants of shame and guilt in young adulthood. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 199-206. Tangney, J. P. ( 1993 ). Shame and guilt. In C. G. Costello (Ed.), Symptoms of depression ( pp. 161-180 ). New York: John Wiley. Tangney, J. E (1995). Shame and guilt in interpersonal relationships. In J. E Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-eonscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 114-139 ). New York: Guilford Press. Tangney, J. E, Barlow, D. H., Wagner, E E., Marschall, D. E., Borenstein, J. K., Sanftner, J., Mohr, T., & Gramzow, R. (1996). Assessing individual differences in constructive versus destructive responses to anger across the life span. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 780-796. Tangney, J. P., Borenstein, J. K., & Barlow, D. H. (1995). Developmental differences in constructive vs. destructive responses to anger Manuscript in preparation. Tangney, J. P., Burggraf, S. A., Hamme, H., & Domingos, B. (1988). The Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory ( SCAAI ). Unpublished instrument, Bryn Mawr College. Tangney, J. P., Burggraf, S. A., & Wagner, E E. (1995). Shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and psychological symptoms. In J. E Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 343-367 ). New York: Guilford Press.

SHAME, GUILT, AND ANGER Appendix ARI Framework and Scales

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I. Anger Arousala II. Intentions A. Constructive Intentionsa (Desire to fix the situation) B. Malevolent Intentionsa (Desire to hurt or get back at target) C. Fractious Intentionsa (Desire to "let off steam"; adults and adolescents only) 111. Behavioral and cognitive responses to anger A. Maladaptive responses 1. Direct aggression (toward the target) a. Direct Physical Aggressiona (e.g., hitting, shoving, throwing things at the target) b. Direct Verbal Aggressiona (e.g., yelling, scolding, making a nasty remark) c. Direct Symbolic Aggressiona (e.g., shaking a fist, slamming a door in the target's face) 2. Indirect aggression a. Maledictiona ("bad-mouthing" the target to a third party) b. Indirect Harm a (harming something important to the target or denying or removing some benefit customarily enjoyed by the target; e.g., destroying something owned by the target, refusing to speak to the target) 3. Displaced aggression (against someone or something not directly involved) a. Displaced Physical Aggressiona (against another person) b. Displaced Verbal Aggressiona (against another person) c. Displaced Aggression To Objecta (against a nonhuman ob~ject not connected to the target; e.g., kicking the dog, hitting a wall) 4. Self-Aggressiona (e.g., berating one's self for the situation) 5. Anger Held In a (brooding, ruminating over the incident without expressing) B. Adaptive behaviors 1. Discussion With Target a (rational, nonhostile discussion with target of anger) 2. Corrective Actiona C. Escapist-diffusing responses 1. Diffusion a (attempts to diffuse anger; e.g., distracting activities) 2. Minimizationa (minimizing the importance of incident) 3. RemovaP (leaving situation) 4. Doing Nothing" D. Cognitive reappraisals 1. Cognitive Reappraisals of Target's Role a (reinterpret the motives or actions of the target; e.g., "He didn't mean it"; "She was just trying to help") 2. Cognitive Reappraisals of Self's Role" (reinterpret one's own role in the situation; e.g., "It was partly my fault; Maybe I should have been more careful.") IV. Long-term consequences A. Long-Term Consequences For Self" B. Long-Term Consequences For Target a C. Long-Term Consequences For Relationship"

Note. ARI = Anger Response Inventory. From "Assessing Individual Differences in Constructive Versus
Destructive Responses to Anger Across the Lifespan," by J. P. Tangney, D. HiU-Barlow, P. E. Wagner, D. E. Marshall, J. K. Borenstein, J. Sanftner, T. Mohr, and R. Gramzow, 1996, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, p. 796. Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association. a Denotes ARI scale. Received May 10, 1993 Revision received N o v e m b e r 13, 1995 Accepted N o v e m b e r 16, 1995