Afterword

Doctors of PhiIosophy
JOHN DURHAM PETERS
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
Isaiah Berlin once summed up Judaism`s Iate thus: 'Too much history, too
little geography. With the rise and diIIerentiation oI the modern sciences,
philosophy had a similar problem. In the high middle ages, the sun never set
on philosophy`s empire: All inquiry was philosophy. The legacy lived on
long aIter the empire had Iaded, with 'philosopher designating any
intellectual in the early modern period, down to our current PhD, which
makes any proIessional scientist or scholar into an honorary philosopher, a
postcolonial relic oI Iormer glory rather like the Union Jack that adorns a
quadrant oI the Ilags oI several Iormer British colonies. Today in many
European universities the 'philosophical Iaculty still houses the natural and
social sciences, humanities, and Iine arts. Philosophy provided the culture
and language Ior the modern disciplines much in the way that English is
spoken in India, Jamaica, and New Zealand. But what was leIt Ior
philosophy itselI? What was its unique cognitive claim when the modern arts
and sciences were bursting with so much wealth? A disciplinary crisis has
shaped modern philosophy at least since Kant, and an enormously varied
range oI answers have since been given to the question oI philosophy`s
mission by spirits as diverse as Hegel and Marx, Peirce and Dewey, Russell
and Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Carnap. Philosophy was an owl Ilying at
dusk or a cock crowing at dawn, a theory oI signs or a tool oI social
criticism, the Ioundation oI mathematics or a kind oI therapy, a reIlection on
being or a logic oI scientiIic knowledge. In a plaintive behaviorist reduction,
500 , John Durham Peters


Rorty calls philosophy a kind oI writing, rather a comedown Irom some
traditional claims. The debate continues apace.
Communication studies Iaced an almost exactly inverse disciplinary le-
gitimation crisis. While philosophy was ancient and prestigious, communica-
tion studies, emerging to Iield status in the postwar era, was newIangled and
oI uncertain intellectual heIt. Philosophy has an incontestably important
canon oI texts and can justly claim to be the most Iundamental oI all intellec-
tual practices. Communication studies has no such patrimony. Philosophy is
a high prestige and high-rigor Iield that is undersubscribed by students;
communication studies is a low-prestige, variable-rigor Iield that is oversub-
scribed by students. Communication`s potential territoryeverything sym-
bolicwas too much Ior any Iield, let alone an undercapitalized one, to
annex. Communication studies, in short, had too much geography and too
little history.
InIlecting each Iield`s legitimation crisis is a similar public relations
problem. Both Iields claim proIessional status Ior topics with huge amateur
Iollowings. The titles 'philosophy and 'communication lack the signiIiers
such as '-ology or '-ics that typically designate Iields oI study.
1
Starting
with the Iace-oII between Socrates and the Sophists, philosophy has hosted a
long debate about the legitimacy oI the proIessional quest Ior truth. Socra-
tes`s complaint about the Sophists was not just that they were paid but that
they made something that was supposed to be natural to every humanthe
desire to knowinto a technique. In the long meanwhile, starting already
with Plato`s Academy, some became experts in philosophy, harbingers oI
those who, in the European middle ages and modernity, dedicated their lives
to the!ria (contemplation, theory) in monasteries and then universities. Phi-
losophy diIIerentiated into a specialist as well as an amateur enterprise. (So
did every other art the ancient Greeks thought natural to humans). And yet
philosophy retains a strong pull toward the love oI wisdom in general Ior
amateurs in the original sense oI lovers. Everybody thinks they have a phi-
losophy.
And everyone thinks they communicate. Although just about all people
use money, language, and brains, no one expects economics, linguistics, or
neuroscience to be instantly intelligible. The same permission is rarely
granted to communication studies. II a communication theorist is diIIicult to
understand (such as Habermas) some will think it Iair game to point this out
as iI it were a damnable irony. The widespread sense that communication
means the unproblematic transmission oI meaning makes it seem to some
people like a Iunny topic Ior an academic Iield. Somehow the rights to spe-
cialization typically given to academic Iieldsthe permission to be obscure,
AIterword , 501


to be unskilled at public relations, to be disorganized in classic proIessorial
waysare rarely given to communication studies. Because oI the universal-
ity oI their reach into things held basic to being human, philosophy and
communication are uneasy disciplines. The popular suspicion both Iields
evoke might even be a backhanded comment on their centrality (no one
doubts the right oI spectroscopy or otolaryngology to special knowledge and
analytic tools). Both communication and philosophy suIIer Irom the Ielt
trauma oI lost grandeur.
As this volume shows, philosophy and communication theory are not
strange bedIellows; they share much in common and when put together can
tell us much about our time and about some oI its most urgent questions.
'Communication in many ways was the key term oI the twentieth century.
It was an urgent theme about which almost everyone who was anyone had
something to say at some point. Modern liIe impelled the need Ior a philoso-
phy oI communication. The massive changes in the organization oI space,
time, and body brought by new electrical media and the large-scale persua-
sion and entertainment industries were one source. Another was the astonish-
ing violence oI the age. Many oI the thinkers in this volume had their lives
disrupted by Hitler and lost Iamily in the HolocaustArendt, Buber, Cas-
sirer, Levinas, and Wittgenstein. Davidson, Deleuze, Lacan, and Ricoeur, all
non-Jews (though Lacan`s wiIe was Jewish), witnessed Iirsthand the eIIects
oI World War II. Arendt, Buber, and Levinas spent much oI the rest oI their
lives trying to sort out what had happened, and the deep pathos oI Wittgen-
stein`s thoughta pathos with many sourceswas certainly intensiIied by
his experience oI both world wars. The devastation oI war, the apparent suc-
cess oI propaganda campaigns, the nuclear risk oI planetary annihilation,
hearts grown cold in close personal relationships, the dream oI intelligent
machines that might make our brains irrelevant, the mind candy churned out
by the culture industries: so many things conspired to make communication
and its discontents the problem oI the postwar era. Unspeakable things made
questions oI communication paramount.
Not only the moral quandary oI mass killing and its apparent enabling
through mass media but also the experiential and technical spinoIIs oI war-
Iare gave rise to philosophical thought about communication. Davidson
served in the US Navy in World War II, trained pilots to spot Axis and Ally
aircraIt, and served himselI as a spotter in the invasion oI Italy. This is a liIe-
and-death problem oI perception oI the sort that he would think about later in
more placid environments.
2
It is tempting to speculate that his view that the
only available meaning is public owes something to his experience dealing
with the low-redundancy communication conditions oI wartime. We do
502 , John Durham Peters


know that J. L. Austin, the OxIord philosopher, was a manager oI logistics
Ior the D-Day invasion at Normandy ('Operation Overlord). In such a set-
ting the insight that you can do things with words would be plainly evident,
since his weekly reconnaissance newsletter could have Iatal eIIects Ior peo-
ple on the ground. The philosophy oI speech acts can be seen as a humanist
residue oI the battle command.
3
Both world wars gave birth to techniques
and ideas oI communication that exploded into wider intellectual culture
sending and receiving, the concept oI code, signal and noise, the notion oI
communication breakdown, and media and channels oI communication. A
wide range oI contextstechnical, sociological, historical, and intellectual
put the vocabulary oI communication at the IoreIront oI the intellectual
imagination.
4

These concepts were honed in a variety oI remarkable midcentury inter-
disciplinary projects. In the Macy ConIerences on Cybernetics Irom 1946 to
1953 and wartime bureaus such as the OIIice oI War InIormation and the
OIIice oI Strategic Services, scholars Irom many Iields converged on com-
munication as a topic oI raging interdisciplinary interest, and this work con-
tinued to resonate through the 1950s and into the 1960s. Diverse thinkers
came to see communication as the Iocus oI a new metascience to be modeled
on cybernetics or 'communication theory (i.e., Claude Shannon`s mathe-
matical theory oI communication) that would span all domains oI learning.
5

In the two decades Iollowing the war, the notion oI communication claimed
to subsume all learning as philosophy once had. Thinkers Iascinated by
communication in this period included anthropologists, biologists, classicists,
composers, engineers, geneticists, historians, lawyers, linguists, literary theo-
rists, logicians, mathematicians, musicologists, neurologists, novelists, phy-
sicians, physicists, political scientists, psychiatrists, psychologists,
rhetoricians, semanticists, sociologistsand oI course, philosophers. They
were all communication theorists without IorIeiting their disciplinary pass-
ports; an exclusive disciplinary identity around communication hardly even
existed. Communication was an umbrella interest that would host people
Irom diverse disciplinary homes, an oasis where many passed but Iew tar-
ried, in the words oI Wilbur Schramm (who would be the key Iigure in the
establishment oI communication studies as a permanent spot).
6
Communica-
tion was still a topic oI interest, not an institutionalized Iield.
'Communication in the postwar Ierment was not necessarily conceived
as limited to human beings; thinkers were quite radical in imagining its outer
limits. As Norbert Wiener put it, 'In a certain sense, all communication sys-
tems terminate in machines, but the ordinary language systems terminate in
the special sort oI machine known as a human being.
7
Communication was
AIterword , 503


an expansive concept that allowed thinkers to rewrite the world so as to bring
such actants as robots, computers, extraterrestrials, dolphins, great apes, the
Freudian unconscious, and human beings into relationships with each other.
Postwar analytic philosophy took part in pushing the limits oI communicabil-
ity. Quine`s analyses oI linguistic interdeterminism, Ior instance, start Irom
the situation oI an anthropologist in an unknown culture trying to make sense
oI native terms such as 'gavagai.
8
(Others such as Gilbert Ryle and Derek
ParIit would mix philosophy oI mind with science Iiction in imagining alter-
nate Iorms oI embodiment and consciousness.) The same was true among
continental philosophers worrying about the question oI technology and the
possibility oI interpretation. Philosophy in the postwar eraalong with cin-
ema, music, painting, sociology, literature, and scienceIaced horizons oI
radical otherness and wrestled with the problem oI codes in collision.
What happened next deserves a Iull-length history. No metascience or
Iully interdisciplinary Iield oI communication ever emerged. The conIluence
around cybernetics and communication theory met the same Iate as logical
empiricism and about at the same time. (Kuhn`s Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions, the last volume published in Carnap`s Encvclopedia of Unified Sci-
ence in 1962, is a traditional marker Ior the collapse oI logical empiricism.)
Cybernetics and logical empiricism were both metascientiIic programs that
Iaced accumulating anomalies (and in cybernetics, communication break-
down among the participants). Most oI the advocates Ior communication-
centered inquiry soon returned to their disciplinary homes, leaving Bernard
Berelson Iamously to declare one version oI communication research dead in
1959.
9
Certainly the boom in interdisciplinary thinking about communication
continued in systems theory and other currents, but there was a new discipli-
nary interest in communication as well. Rather than overturning the logic oI
the whole academic system, as cyberneticians and communication theorists
had claimed to do at their most delirious moments, academic entrepreneurs
in two extant Iields, journalism and speech, leapt upon the cachet oI 'com-
munication around 1960 as a ground Ior rechristening and reviving their
disciplines. Communication studies became one academic department among
others, and 'communication theory became a specialty, eventually with its
own journal, instead oI the great instauration that would reorder all knowl-
edge.
The philosophy oI communication was a topic long beIore it was a Iield.
The phrase 'philosophy oI communication seems Iirst to have been used in
English in 1850 to reIer to mesmeric (psychic) connections between peo-
ple.
10
Many twentieth-century philosophers, most notably Karl Jaspers, made
a point oI developing a 'philosophy oI communication Irom the 1920s on-
504 , John Durham Peters


ward. From a very diIIerent point oI view, a leading electrical engineer in
1950 proposed the need Ior a 'philosophy oI communication to accompany
new developments in signal processing.
11
But one oI the Iirst eIIorts at a phi-
losophy oI communication Irom within an independent disciplinary perspec-
tive came Iive decades ago in Dean Barnlund`s 'Toward a Meaning-
Centered Philosophy oI Communication (1962). In this once very inIluen-
tial maniIesto, he berated the Iield oI speech Ior its 'theoretical sterility,
'Iractionalized character, and narrow Iocus on speech making to the neglect
oI a much wider array oI symbolic acts. 'Communication oIIered a better
basis Ior developing 'theories oI suIIicient scope and stature to command the
respect oI other disciplines or oI the larger public.
12
Barnlund enlisted many
oI the stars oI 1950s interdisciplinary communication theory in his reIur-
bished Iield oI speech, such as Ray Birdwhistell, Kenneth Burke, Leon
Festinger, Edward Hall, S. I. Hayakawa, Suzanne Langer, George A. Miller,
Charles Osgood, Carl Rogers, Jurgen Ruesch, I. A. Richards, and Norbert
Wiener. (Langer was the sole philosopher in the mix, though several had phi-
losophical interests.) He wanted to harvest such multiIield thinking Ior re-
building speech as a Iield.
There was also a recent book on his list that signals an important turn.
David Berlo`s The Process of Communication (1960) was signiIicant be-
cause it was also written Irom within a disciplinary imagination, understand-
ing communication institutionally as a new Iield rather than intellectually as
a topic oI interdisciplinary Ierment. Drawing on Shannon`s model oI com-
munication as 'source-message-channel-receiver and the 1950s conIluence
in general, the young Berlo envisioned communication as a behaviorist social
science that included some oI the epistemic selI-reIlective ambitions oI cy-
bernetics. For him, communication took place uniquely among humans; it
was complex but it was not uncanny. The Process of Communication con-
tributed to the emerging tradition oI empirical interpersonal communication
research, which today is still one oI the dominant modes, but the book do-
mesticated the 1950s weirdness.
Wilbur Schramm took rhetorical advantage oI the same interdisciplinary
conIluence to push journalism and mass communication research in a similar
behaviorist direction. Social psychology was the working core oI both Iields
that Berlo and Schramm sought to build, though each one spiced his interdis-
ciplinary borrowings somewhat diIIerently. The speech tradition took more
readily to ideas Irom systems theory and psychiatry (Gregory Bateson was an
important inIluence) while the journalism tradition built directly on applied
research on media eIIects that emerged Irom war and the radio industry. Dis-
ciplinary renovation required an idea oI communication that was largely out
AIterword , 505


oI scale with what the Iields could support. For Barnlund, the philosophy oI
communication was 'an immense undertaking requiring one to question the
nature oI our discipline, the legitimate boundaries oI our scholarship and the
character oI our actions as teachers.
13
The stakes were huge. Figures such as
Barnlund, Berlo, and Schramm exploited the postwar interdisciplinary com-
munication boom Ior enhancing or revolutionizing speech and journalism.
Today that revolution is complete: Hardly a department oI speech exists,
schools oI journalism universally have the study oI communication as a cen-
tral mission, and communication studies is a widely recognized disciplinary
unit, though still with a limited but important toehold in the US Ivy
Leaguein sharp contrast to many other countries, where communication
studies ranks much higher on the disciplinary Iood chain. No university
would dream oI not having philosophy, but no such indispensability holds
Ior communication studies, though all agree that communication is crucial.
Things have changed since 1962, and the present volume is ample evi-
dence. In 1970 Frank Dance, Iamous Ior his list oI 126 wildly disparate deIi-
nitions oI communication, wrote, 'The looseness oI the concept oI
communication is reIlected in the looseness oI the Iield or Iields identiIied
with the study oI communication.
14
Today conceptualizing communication
seems to have been decoupled Irom questions oI disciplinary deIinition. This
volume presents the philosophy oI communication as a happy plurality oI at
times incompatible views. Conceptual variety or even incommensurability in
deIinitions oI communication seems no longer scandalous.
15
Dennett sees
communication as the transmission oI inIormation; Levinas sees communica-
tion as the interruption oI such Ilows; Luhmann says that only communica-
tion can communicate. We could argue that such is a sign oI healthy
diversity or even oI Lyotard`s 'postmodern condition, in which the old le-
gitimations oI knowledge no longer hold.
16
It could also be a sign oI a re-
laxed disciplinary maturity. Whitehead quipped that the last thing to be Iixed
in a science is its Ioundations. Many academic Iields today, in Iact, seem
happy to deIer indeIinitely all eIIorts at Iixingin any sense oI this punIul
term. No one takes the soul seriously in psychology, nor is biology paralyzed
by Iailure to have reached a satisIactory deIinition oI 'liIe. Nor do all phi-
losophers, Ior that matter, seek 'wisdom. Perhaps kenosis oI its central term
is the sign oI a mature Iield. (Just because Ilourishing Iields oIten have
empty designators does not oI course mean that all Iields with empty desig-
nators are Ilourishing!) Though many oI the thinkers examined here wrestled
mightily to deIine communication systematically, most oI the chapter authors
are happy to write around communication rather than through it. With some
exceptions, communication has lost its halo. It is treated pragmatically rather
506 , John Durham Peters


than messianically. I seriously doubt that we will ever again see the same
kind oI pandisciplinary Iascination with 'communication. That word now
belongs to the marketers, coaches, and psychotherapists as much as the
scholars. It serves more as a magnet Ior attracting students and resources
than an intellectual program.
Communication Iaces a mismatch between its intellectual claims to
grandeur and the relative obscurity oI its institutional Iooting. Like philoso-
phy, it Ieels the loss oI its erstwhile empire. For some, it is an endless sad-
ness that other Iields do not know oI our work. Barnlund`s hope that 'a
substantial discipline oI communication will require students in other Iields
to be equally Iamiliar with our contributions
17
was hardly IulIilled by ensu-
ing events. (What are the odds that a philosopher would think oI editing a
volume on the relevance oI communication theory Ior philosophy?) In Iact,
such asymmetries are not always IearIul. Being an importing Iield can have
certain advantages. Rather than as dependence or immaturity, we can read
communication theory`s hunger Ior work Irom abroad as displaying the vir-
tue oI hospitality. Communication scholars host many Iields, and this volume
allows philosophers to meet in new ways. While visiting a Iar country, you
oIten make Iriends with countrymen you would never beIriend at home. Note
the surprising neighbors here: Brandom and Buber, Davidson and Deleuze,
Dennett and Gadamer. Here in exile they all meet as philosophers oI com-
munication.
Like comparative literature, communication studies has been especially
hospitable to continental philosophy. On many North American campuses,
Hegel or Heidegger, Deleuze or Derrida, Luhmann or Levinas, Ior instance,
are more likely to be read in departments oI communication or comparative
literature than philosophy, like scraps that Iall Irom a table dominated by the
analytic tradition. In this volume, though the interest in French- and German-
language thinkers remains clear, there is a salutary nudge toward a Iuller en-
gagement with analytic philosophers. The volume`s many analytic
continental synapses are a key contribution. Both traditions, despite diIIering
emphases on 'intelligibility and 'excitement,
18
converge on a view oI
communication as radically public webs oI sentences, reasons, and actions
embedded in Iorms oI liIe rather than the older view oI communication as
overlapping mental content. Here philosophy sees itselI as a practice embed-
ded in certain kinds oI communicative exchanges.
Communication, like philosophy, has always had a slightly disreputable
odor, and their overlap compounds the eIIect. There are more than a Iew
oddballs and outlaws in this collection. Peirce was unemployed Ior much oI
his career, and except Ior a short, largely unsuccessIul stint on the Iaculty at
AIterword , 507


Johns Hopkins, worked mostly Ior the US Coast Survey as a geodesist; Ar-
endt never held a tenured proIessorship; in later liIe Levinas saw himselI as a
philosophical explicator oI the Talmud; Lacan was a practicing psychoana-
lyst and Iormer surrealist poet; Wittgenstein had a very odd career Ior such a
gigantic imprint, steadIastly resisting incorporation into the apparatus oI pro-
Iessional philosophy (or academics at all). This volume also has lots oI sin-
gletons. Harding is the only Ieminist, Lacan the only Freudian, MacIntyre the
only neo-Thomist, Luhmann the only systems theorist, Cassirer the only neo-
Kantian. Peirce and James are older than everyone else by several decades.
Deleuze is a consummate lone wolI, an antiphilosopher, 'an adept oI no
school. Wittgenstein is the only Austrian, but he is oIten a category sui
generis, a misIit in whatever box you try to place him, including perhaps his
own body. Marginality, though painIul, can be enormously generative intel-
lectually, and so we can be glad that this volume in many cases is centered,
as it were, on peripherals. Jason Hannan has done a remarkably good job oI
putting into play all the major philosophical traditions relevant Ior communi-
cation theory. Seen through a generous squint, the diverse cast oI characters
here represents the chieI philosophical traditions relevant Ior communication
theorycritical theory, phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, neo-
Kantism, neo-Thomism, Ieminism, pragmatism, analytic philosophy, Deleuze`s
assemblages, and religious thought. This volume pushes communication theory
beyond its already ample Irame.
19

A Iinal question: Are communication theory and philosophy oI commu-
nication the same thing? In the original Greek, the!ria demarcated the do-
main oI philosophy itselI, the contemplation oI the cosmos as a beautiIul
totality, implying a concomitant education oI the observer`s soul. But things
have changed. Theory now belongs largely to the practice oI science. It has
become tied to hypothesis testing and veriIication and has largely lost its
ethical and aesthetic dimensions.
20
It is also closely tied to the community oI
inquiry. Theory must ultimately be discussed, written, and published while
philosophy can be oral or even completely esoteric. (We can be glad that
those present at the lectures oI Aristotle, Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Kripke
were armed with quills, pens, and tape recorders, to say nothing oI Plato`s
remediation oI Socrates.) Theory is not concerned with metaphysics or the
ultimate order oI the universe; philosophy is. (The Vienna Circle`s excision
oI metaphysics wanted to bring philosophy closer to theory, that is, to make
it a kind oI aid to science.) 'Theory is the distinctive mark oI academic
work in general: it is what sets research apart Irom other human endeavors.
Every Iield prizes theory. Theory is now very much part oI the 'world, as
Arendt would say: Theory has become one oI the means by which we 'act
508 , John Durham Peters


upon others and things. Philosophy, in contrast, is serenely passive: It is
happy to be completely unworldly.
For a relatively modest Iield such as communication studies (and mod-
esty is another virtue), it has been easier to embrace theory than philosophy,
a distinct Iield with an intimidatingly brilliant tradition and demanding tools
oI the trade and unclear payoIIs. Almost everyone in the Iield oI communica-
tion would claim to be a theorist at some level, but philosophers are rela-
tively Iew. Communication theory is not always philosophicalit certainly
was not Ior the key Iounders oI the Iield halI a century ago, and the journal
Communication Theorv is only rarely philosophical. Philosophy, as a sus-
tained reIlection on Iundamentals, on world, truth, existence, liIe, death,
meaning, language, beauty, goodness, and knowledge, has no necessary
claim to utility, progress, community, or paying the bills. 'Povera et nuda vai
philosophia, said Petrarch: Philosophy goes about poor and naked. Philoso-
phy is a primary good. In philosophizing we desire to know truth and thereby
to nurture a certain way oI liIe and kind oI community. We also make enor-
mous trouble Ior others and ourselves. Every thinker, said Dewey grandly,
puts the universe in peril. The Iounders oI communication studies might have
given philosophy short shriIt, but this volume declares that those days are
over. Nothing is saIe Irom critical examinationeven the term communica-
tion. Now that philosophy has so decisively discovered communication, it
might be time Ior communication scholars to take seriously their claim to be
doctors oI philosophy.
21


University oI Iowa
Notes


1
Proctor, '-Logos,` -Ismos,` and -Ikos.

2
Davidson, 'On the Very Idea, 206. Here the problem oI intersubjective agreement in
identiIying a distant vessel Iamously shows up as telling a ketch Irom a yawl (two sorts oI
sailboat).

3
I owe this point and phrasing to Amit Pinchevski.

4
Schttpelz, 'Von der Kommunikation zu den Medien.

5
See Gleick, Information.

6
Schramm, 'Communication Research.

7
Wiener, Human Use of Human Beings, 79.

8
Quine, Word and Obfect.

9
Berelson, 'State oI Communication Research.
10
Dods, Philosophv of Electrical Psvchologv, 208.
11
Golay, 'Philosophy oI Communication, 1517, 64.
12
Barnlund, 'Toward a Meaning-Centered Philosophy, 202.
13
Ibid., 197.
AIterword , 509



14
Dance, 'Concept` oI Communication, 210.
15
Miller, 'On DeIining Communication, or Dance, 'Concept` oI Communication. CI.
Murphy, 'No More What is Communication.`
16
Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, 5361, passim.
17
Barnlund, 'Toward a Meaning-Centered Philosophy, 208.
18
Davidson, 'On the Very Idea, 196.
19
Craig, 'Communication Theory as a Field.
20
Habermas, 'Knowledge and Human Interests.
21
I am grateIul to David Depew, Jason Hannan, Amit Pinchevski, Benjamin Peters, Peter
Simonson, and David Stern Ior very helpIul comments on earlier draIts, though none are
accountable Ior deIiciencies.
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