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Why U-Boat Warfare Failed Author(s): Kurt Assmann Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, No.

4 (Jul., 1950), pp. 659-670 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030803 . Accessed: 01/02/2013 22:28
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WHY U-BOAT WARFARE


By Vice Admiral Kurt
ONE

FAILED

Assmann

Staff received from the of the first orders which the German Naval II read: "The Naval Fuehrer on the outbreak of World War High that incidents is to wage the war at sea in such a manner Command In September States are avoided under all circumstances." with the United that the United Grand Admiral Raeder was of the opinion 1939, however, naval States would enter the war sooner or later regardless of how German warfare was waged. It is to be assumed that Adolf Hitler held the same view. States into the The objective, therefore, was to delay the entry of the United secure. In World War war until Germany's military position was sufficiently believed that its military I the German Army High Command position was secure after the conquest of Rumania in the winter of 1916-1917, and that the had therefore arrived. The High submarine warfare time for unrestricted was wrong. leaders resolved not to repeat In 1939, the German Command the error in judgment. II the German Naval High Command In World War from the accepted start the restrictions which were imposed for political reasons, and it worked friction. As was its duty, it constantly with the Foreign Office without sought to sharpen the effectiveness in submarine combat, of the methods employed but it always recognized the primary position of policy in the conduct of the
war.

had accepted In 1936 the German Government the London submarine that a merchant agreement of 1930. This agreement provided ship could be sunk only after visit and search, and after adequate provision had been made for the safety of the crew. It was not deemed "adequate" if the crew were to put out in lifeboats on the high seas. These the opportunity merely given prize rules provisions were quoted almost word for word in the new German before the outbreak of the Second World which were promulgated shortly
War, and U-boat commanders received orders to conform strictly to them.

international law they were relieved of the re In agreement with accepted to visit and search in the cases of definitely recognized troop trans quirement or airplanes, and of merchant of merchant escorted by warships ports, ships in warlike in actions or were used to transmit ships which participated
formation.

A few hours after the outbreak of the Second World War a German U-boat in the North At sank the British passenger liner Athenia without warning Staff had no report of the lantic with the loss of 120 lives. Since the Naval that a U-boat then at sea, and could not believe sinking from the U-boats of a would act in disregard of his orders, it denied the participation captain Staff maintained submarine. On command of the Fuehrer the Naval German this denial even when it turned out that U-30 had in fact sunk the Athenia. The captain believed at the time that the ship was an auxiliary cruiser?an far off error which had some substance in that the Athenia was encountered Staff had no part in pub British shipping route. The Naval the peacetime

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that the ship had been sunk by a bomb ex Hshing the foolish hypothesis which Mr. Churchill had arranged in order to inflame American feel plosion the Naval Staff could not ings. This was a product of German propaganda; even protest the publication of the story since it knew nothing of it. case were very undesirable The consequences of the Athenia for German naval warfare, for it not only created the impression abroad that Germany was already waging unrestricted U-boat warfare in violation of the London submarine but also resulted in orders that, in order to avoid agreement, on passenger even steamers similar should be made incidents, no attacks when they were proceeding under escort. This special provision for passenger steamers went far beyond what was provided in the prize rules and lasted until the summer of 1940. the first weeks of war another restriction which went beyond the During rules was imposed on the Naval High Command. The Fuehrer wished prize to make France open hostilities, and directed that no action be taken against French ships except in defense of an attack; he directed, moreover, that the rules were not to be invoked against French merchant thus put prize ships, ting the French in a more favorable position than the neutrals. The prohibi tion of attack on French ships was lifted on September 24, 1939. The of the prize rules, and of the London strict observance submarine could of course be based only on the premise that the merchant agreement, laid down for them. But the British ships would obey international provisions merchant had orders to report by radio the sighting of German U-boats. ships lights at night, and were armed; they They were also directed to run without as well as defensively had express orders to use their weapons upon offensively a U-boat. In conformity with the rules of international law, the encountering information caused the of British merchant employment ships in gathering to use arms Staff to issue the order of September German Naval 24, 1939, ships which made use of their radio when stopped. The against all merchant should strive to rescue the crews. On October order also provided that U-boats 2 all restrictions on the attack on darkened since dark ships were removed, at night. However, from auxiliary warships ened ships are indistinguishable for the time being, the lifting of this restriction was limited to the waters and France. around the United Kingdom The first case in which a merchant ship made use of her armament against a U-boat occurred on September 6, when U-38 was fired upon by the British steamer Manor. On September 26 the First Lord of the Admiralty announced the arming of British merchant ships to combat the U-boats. This announce to mer 1 by the directive of the Admiralty ment was followed on October announces that German submarines chant shipping: "The British Admiralty are pursuing new tactics. British vessels are called on to ram every German
submarine."

answer was the order of the Fuehrer on October 4, by which The German the U-boats received full freedom to attack merchant ships which were defi nitely known to be armed, though all possible provisions were to be taken no protection for the rescue of the crews. Since this order gave the U-boats armament which carried concealed it was extended merchant ships against on October the end of 17 to include all enemy merchant ships. This marked

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to hold a privi liners continued the first phase of U-boat warfare. Passenger even though they were as before, could not be attacked leged position and, Court of Justice gave the in convoy. The International armed or steamed on October the propriety in Nuremberg i, 1946, concerning following verdict of the German U-boat war against enemy shipping: in accordance with "Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty, of 1938 to the merchant of Instructions its Handbook navy, armed its mer them with armed escort, gave orders in many cases convoyed chant vessels, to send position reports upon sighting submarines, thus integrating merchant network of naval intelligence. On October into the warning vessels I, 1939, announced that British merchant the British Admiralty ships had been or if possible. dered to ram U-boats of this case, the Tribunal "In the actual circumstances is not prepared to for his conduct of submarine warfare hold Doenitz guilty against British armed merchant ships." II in accordance with international The problem of treatment of neutrals law was more difficult. If the war against the British was lines of communication to show decisive results then commerce by neutral ships must also be inter law ships, international rupted. Besides the right to visit and search merchant contained the so-called contraband "Contraband" all provisions. comprised for military those things which could be utilized directly or indirectly pur enemy war poses or, more broadly, all materials which served to strengthen could be brought into port; A neutral ship which carried contraband potential. that more than half her cargo and if it could be established with certainty was contraband, she could be sunk on the spot (in accordance with Article 73 to bring her into of the prize rules) if for naval reasons it was impossible to observe the prize-rule endeavored provisions port. The U-boat strictly neutral merchant ships, but errors were made because the U-boat governing neutral flags, and some that enemy ships were misusing captains suspected it soon be times because the procedure of the neutrals was inept. Moreover, to came evident that in this age of the airplane it is a military impossibility the process of visit and search for which a submarine must be sur undertake when near the enemy's faced for a considerable length of time, particularly coast. In consequence the U-boat war in the North Sea had to be discontinued as early as September 30, since at that time the prize rules were still in effect. to attempt to induce neutrals to forego the it became necessary Therefore routing of shipping to British ports. At the beginning of the war the German and Japanese had orders not to stop Italian, Spanish, Russian U-boats ships, from the Foreign Office hoped to stop the transport of contraband because in conformity with these friendly states by political means. On November 4, forbade American the United States neutrality ship law, President Roosevelt the German this precedent ping to enter the so-called war zones. Following on November Government 24 addressed a note to the other neutrals which in the waters around warned them of the dangers which they might encounter and French coasts. After the way had been thus prepared for an the British the declara of naval warfare there followed on January 6,1940, intensification

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A in the waters area"?Zone t?on of the first so-called "operation northeast and the Shetlands?in which the Orkneys the U-boats would of Scotland, other zones sink neutral as well as other ships without warning. Subsequently were specified until on May 24, 1940, a ring had been closed around England. all ships coming within a strip 60 to 100 nautical miles wide around Therewith and on the French coasts were subject to attack without warning. England Even now passenger liners, the merchant ships of the neutrals previously men tioned as friendly to Germany, agree and, by reason of a special economic ment with Denmark, the so-called Danish "Malteser" ships were exempted. since The exemptions presented an almost insoluble problem for the U-boats to determine on short notice the nationality of merchant ships they still had in the area where the enemy defense was strongest. encountered of naval warfare against Brit On August 17, 1940, with the intensification Isles were ain after the downfall of France, all the waters around the British of enemy aerial patrol in the declared an operation area, and the extension zone westward. to extend the previous it necessary coastal waters made even passenger liners were now attacked boundaries these designated Within without only the merchant ships of the Irish Free State were as warning; and particu announced sured of free passage when they had been previously marked. larly Staff It is, I think, fair to conclude at this point that the German Naval the U-boat warfare with skill and intensified had carried on and gradually law. It is of interest to refer again to the verdict with regard for international to the Court, in Nuremberg. Court of Justice of the International According in which neutral merchant of "operation the declaration areas," ships were submarine of the London without warning, was a violation sunk agreement. on which the verdict against the following statement, But the Court made Grand Admiral Doenitz was based: "In view of all the facts proved and in on May announced of an order of the British Admiralty 8, 1940, particular and to which all vessels should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, according that unrestricted Admiral Nimitz the answers to interrogatories stating by States submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United is the war, the sentence of Doenitz from the first day that nation entered law of sub not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international
marine warfare."

Ill for the con States was of decisive The attitude of the United importance war. As we have noted, Adolf Hitler gave the Naval High duct of the U-boat strict orders on the outbreak of war to wage naval warfare so that Command States would be avoided. This effort was very incidents with the United all in the Act which was passed the American facilitated much Neutrality by reversed last years before the war. On November 4, 1939, however, Congress a "cash and carry" for the arms embargo the neutrality law, substituting was the for the German Naval High Command clause. Even more significant of "combat areas," which American President by the American proclamation to enter. The boun citizens and American ships of every sort were forbidden areas which Staff had declared the German Naval daries of the operational

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on August around England 17, 1940 in the waters essentially corresponded with the extent of the combat areas. This offered extraordinary relief for the
German conduct of the war at sea.

In September States de 1940, however, came the transfer of 50 United to the British Admiralty, from the United and States Government stroyers to support then a succession of measures the British conduct of the war. "Ways must be found," declared Secretary of State Hull, "to insure that aid for Great Britain reaches its destination in the shortest time and maximum of Iceland In accordance with this concept, after the occupation capacity." for the (July 7), the United States assumed a large part of the responsibility of British convoys between United States ports and Iceland. In Sep security for the convoys tember the United States assumed the further responsibility to 26o W, and, in the northern in the entire western half of the Atlantic even beyond. German that leaders could only conclude part of the Atlantic, to a state of the United States had tacitly passed from a state of neutrality
undeclared war.

Still German naval forces were required to try to avoid incidents with American and the German captains sometimes let a sure-kill pass rather ships, than risk the danger of political entanglement with the United States. None the sinkings of the Greety the Kearney and the Reuben James fol theless, a vote of 212 to 194 lowed. On November 14 the United States Congress by the provisions of the neutrality law which forbade the arming of repealed American merchant ships, the entering of combat areas and the use of enemy had to the German Naval ports by American ships. Now High Command make a fateful decision. Should the war on commerce be continued unchanged within the current operations naval warfare be re areas, or should German to avoid incidents with the United stricted in the endeavor States? The for mer course would unavoidably into the war; the United States openly bring the latter would in practice mean abandoning the effort to cut Britain's sup Staff was spared the necessity of deciding by ply lines. The German Naval 11 the German Govern the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. On December ment declared a state of war between the United States and Germany. We can only speculate as to the reasons which motivated the German Gov ernment to take the initiative in declaring war. For Adolf Hitler the develop ment of German-American relations was closely linked with the Japanese stand on the Three Power Pact. If war between the United States and Ger as a should result from German actions which could be construed many was danger that the Japanese of the United States, then there provocation on would not regard the Three Power Pact as binding. When Government December the curtain which had previously veiled the development 7, 1941, of events in the Far East had dropped and the attack on Pearl Harbor had to war, the way was then open to the committed the Japanese definitely German Government. The reaction may have been so strong that all the ani the German Government in the war mosity which had been built up within the attitude of the United States suddenly found release, and years against even now have admonished and restraints which might all deliberations its leaders to caution were swept away.

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On September had a total of 57 U-boats, of 3, 1939, the German Navy which 46?a for immediate very high percentage?were ready employment. I and IX (700 tons) and type VII (500 tons)?were Of these only 22?types for use in the Atlantic; suitable II (250 tons)? the remaining 24?type had could be used only in the North Sea. Before the war the German Navy amount of U-boat because until undertaken construction, only a moderate leaders that Great Brit late in 1938 it had accepted the view of the political ain was not to be regarded as a probable enemy. Moreover, due to the politi at that time, the Naval High Command cal relationship with Soviet Russia was concerned primarily with the conduct of war in the Baltic Sea and con on preparing a defense against the Russian submarine fleet. Ac centrated could Naval Treaty of 1935, the German Navy cording to the German-British in the fall of 1939, if it had chosen to accept a relation have had 72 U-boats ship of 45 percent with the British submarine fleet, and a total of 160 U-boats increase which was to be if it had utilized the 100 percent limit. The monthly as a result of new German construction averaged only two sub expected
marines.

was for of available U-boats Thus the number completely inadequate to experience, one-third of the U-boats effective submarine warfare. According which were available for action were always under overhaul at the base, one area and only one third were enroute to, or returning from, the operation third were available in the operation area. Immediately upon the outbreak of a large scale construc undertook war, therefore, the Naval High Command tion program, by which deliveries would be gradually stepped up to 30 per
month.

of numbers, however, the Naval High Command the inadequacy Despite and its weapons held great hope for the effectiveness of this arm. The U-boat had been considerably since World War I. Progress had been made improved an unob thus facilitating in rendering the submarine quieter in operation, served approach to the enemy; and the bubble which revealed the firing of a the passage of an air-driven torpedo, and the track of bubbles which marked had effect of the torpedoes had been eliminated. The destructive torpedo, in the intelligence and a marked been considerably increased, improvement a number to concentrate service had made it possible for the High Command of U-boats for purposes of attack even when the submarines were operating a development of great tactical importance against convoys. submerged, in performance which were hoped for as a result Aside from improvements that the vast expansion of of the lessons of World War I, it was expected of U-boat the German Air Force would contribute greatly to the effectiveness is its limited range of vision, of the submarine warfare. A primary weakness its almost un due to the lowness of the lookout tower; the airplane, with can be of invaluable in informing assistance limited speed and perspective, a submarine about the location of the enemy. In view of the small number Staff was at the start of the war, the German Naval of U-boats available trade routes. aware that this arm alone could not cut the British overseas to bring to bear all weapons of it sought from the beginning Consequently, is to say, not war which could be employed against enemy shipping?that

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cruisers and mines?but surface ships, auxiliary U-boats, only the Navy's at the disposition of the Air Force. also the weapons The Naval that such concentration in the course of would Staff believed time show decisive results upon enemy commerce. that the It also expected construc shortage of U-boats would gradually be remedied by the accelerated tion program. The relative naval strengths of Germany and Great Britain, no to give battle with surface fleets, permitted which forbade the Germans factors in the reckoning of other course. However, there were two uncertain the Naval Staff, one of which affected German strength and the other the Prior to the war the potentialities of air power as an instrument of enemy's. sea power had hardly been probed. Moreover, the German Air Force had to meet purely continental for its suitability been developed requirements; of the Air Force, naval tasks had been neglected. The Commander-in-Chief the necessity of providing for the tasks of Field Marshal granted Goering, the air arm in naval warfare, but despite constant pressure on the part of the also this program always came off second best. The Field Marshal Navy forces or mat?riel he pro wished to retain under his own command whatever the outbreak of of naval matters. Upon vided, though he had no knowledge that about the modifications the war, the Naval High Command brought to the tasks of naval warfare, and the would adapt the Air Force armament problems of command were also solved. But these changes came late. It was the inadequacy of German air power which was fatal for the success of U-boat
warfare.

factor in the calculations of the Naval The other uncertain Staff was the speed with which the enemy would be able to improve and expand its defen and planes, and to replace the ship losses. In sive weapons against U-boats the given situation, time worked for the enemy, since the German war poten the decision in tial was largely required for the land campaigns. Consequently a period of the war on commerce had to be achieved fairly quickly?within this with the means about two years at least. The prospect of accomplishing at the beginning of the war was small, particularly available in view of the hostile attitude of President Roosevelt toward Nazi Germany. The Germans of the United had to expect that before long the inexhaustible war potential States would be thrown into the balance on the side of the Allies. As it happened, the degree to which the monthly sinkings of merchant increased up to April 1942, then diminished ships exceeded new construction until the end of the year 1942. From then on new construction exceeded the and by Sep sinkings. This was the turning point of the war on commerce, tember 1943 tne shipping tonnage at the disposal of the Allies was as large as it had been at the beginning of the war and was increasing rapidly. These few sentences tell the story of tjheGerman war on commerce. The Foreign Merchant Staff kept a Shipping section of the German Naval running and detailed study of the balance which resulted from the monthly vital balance of the naval war. Most of sinkings and new construction?the the ships sunk could be listed by name, and when they could not be named the to considerable of new con discount. The estimate reports were subjected struction was based in part on German and in part on in intelligence reports formation given out by the enemy Powers. In general it can now be said that

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the actual figures by a good deal, that the estimate of total sinkings overshot of the U-boats alone was slightly overestimated, and that the achievement were somewhat for new construction below the production achieved figures by the enemy. to the German in the war on the monthly According reckoning sinkings commerce during the first six months was about 250,000 gross registered tons. this period the number of U-boats was reduced from 57 to 50. Even During the monthly losses averaged only two-and-a-half boats, the additions though to the submarine fleet from the prewar building program were insufficient to cover the losses. In March and April 1940 there was a sharp falling off of in the Norwegian and Air Force were employed sinkings, since the U-boats to light a serious deficiency of the U operation. This undertaking brought for in northern latitudes the torpedo could not be fired magnetically, boats, to the magnetic Pole. North (In by reason of the proximity presumably the torpedo can be exploded under the bottom of the ship, firing magnetic when percussion the most vulnerable part of the hull.) Moreover, firing was turned out to be of the torpedoes resorted to, the depth control mechanism the targets. In short, underran and the torpedoes frequently undependable was apparent that the U-boats had no effective it torpedo arm! This crisis lasted for some time. it only minor naval advantage, of Norway The occupation brought with coast which followed soon thereafter but the capture of the French Atlantic of operation for the in the conditions in a very great improvement resulted bases looked out on the broad Atlantic. The German Navy. Now the German reduced; the per length of the journey to the combat area was considerably the in that area increased. At the same time, however, of U-boats centage area west of the British Isles was pushed farther and farther west operation of the the activity ward, as the enemy defensive measures?in particular in strength and range. And it was now that the British Air Force?increased air support began to be very seriously felt. As the of the German deficiencies area of operations it became more and more difficult became more extended which were scouting the U-boats, to locate the convoys and to concentrate over a larger area, when a convoy was found. The need for aid from the Air Force became more and more urgent, but as the distance of the combat area from the coast increased, the range of the available German planes proved
more and more inadequate.

for Britain. From May the situation was becoming Nonetheless, dangerous to the beginning of 1941, the a month of particularly 1940, heavy sinkings, of sinkings were about double those of the winter of 1939-1940. The figures received the the British Admiralty agreement with the United States whereby 50 destroyers was timely aid. There had been no increase in the number of in 1940, and the low point in the number of available for operation U-boats came on February there were only 21 U-boats 1, 1941, when operational were 55 in training. But from the beginning of for action. There available increased by an average of 20 per 1942, the number of operational U-boats the number of U-boats and as the losses remained relatively moderate, month, were commissioned dur action increased sharply. All told, 1,105 U-boats in
ing the war.

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in the number of operational The considerable increase is re U-boats flected in the increase in ship sinkings in 1941; the successes in the first half of this year were particularly States into the great. The entry of the United war that December for at resulted in a great extension of the opportunities tack, and hence brought a large increase in sinkings; it took the United States a considerable time to organize the defense of the coastal waters. The year was the high point in the German war on commerce; 1942 during six months of this year the Foreign Merchant Staff cal section of the Naval Shipping more than 1,000,000 tons. This culated that the monthly sinkings averaged
estimate was somewhat exaggerated; nevertheless, the successes were extra

to an official British report the losses of 134 ships with ordinary. According 860,000 tons in November 1942 were the greatest of any month of the war was now new construction for the Allies. However, American and British full blast and began to approach the curve of sinkings. going The range of the U-boats was considerable; they operated not only in the and in the Indian Ocean. In order to in Caribbean Sea but also off Capetown crease the period of operations in these distant waters submarine supply ships were developed to provide fuel and ammunition. the primitive living Despite crews proved to be almost unlimited. the endurance of the U-boat conditions, of the In the summer of 1942, the gradually increasing defense measures had forced the United in the coastal waters of the western Atlantic States to shift their main hunting grounds to the middle Atlantic, where U-boats there was a gap between air patrol in the west and the British the American in the east. As yet the Allies did not have enough aircraft carriers to bridge assault on one this gap. The so-called "wolf pack" tactics?the simultantous one command?now its of a large number of U-boats under convoy proved the de worth. Some convoys were almost completely However, destroyed. as fense against the U-boats was steadily growing as enemy air superiority serted itself more and more; plainly it would not be long before this gap in the Atlantic was closed. The German Naval Staff seems not to have viewed the danger impending from the growth of enemy air strength with the neces sary dispassionate judgment. The growing vessels number of corvettes, frigates and other defensive also served to limit the attack of the U-boats. The vicinity of a convoy came more and more to resemble a zone in coastal waters in which surface passage areas to their operation of a U-boat was impossible. U-boats still advanced on the surface, however, and when they located a convoy tried to get as close to it as possible before submerging for the torpedo attack. Very logically, of the advantages the defense sought ways and means to deprive the U-boat it possible for of her surface speed. Radar solved this problem, and made to locate surfaced U-boats. As early as the end of 1942, radar-equipped planes from arriving and departing planes scored their first successes, when U-boats to surprise attacks from the air during French coastal waters were subjected that the U night passage on the surface. The planes appeared so suddenly could not avoid them by diving. boats to be helpless in the face of this new method of The submarine appeared To and from 1943 on German losses took on threatening attack, proportions. be sure, it did not take long to equip the U-boats with the first protective

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devices against this new danger, but this apparatus, intended to give the U boat warning that enemy radar was searching for her, itself disclosed to the at approximately double the enemy aircraft the position of the U-boat?and at which distance the plane's radar could otherwise locate the submarine. to mount; Losses were continued in May 1943 almost 40 U-boats lost, as an average increase by new construction of about 20 U-boats. Yet against the ever-increasing difficulties of attack, shortly before?March 1943?despite to 900,000 tons. had amounted sinkings of merchant ships In the course of 1943 all U-boats were equipped with efficient instruments which gave warning of enemy radar search without their own posi betraying tion. Moreover, armament of the U-boats was increased, so the anti-aircraft that it was possible for them to fight off attacking planes. These measures afforded some relief, but the fact remained that the enemy air force, con increased and using skillfully in strength the new radar equip siderably could no ment, was enabled in time to establish a zone in which the U-boats came to the charging of the batteries longer operate on the surface. Even a most difficult problem. present V What conclusions did the German leaders draw from this new situation? First they made the only possible decision, i.e. to withdraw the U-boats from to assign them to Atlantic?and in the main danger area?the operations other areas which would probably be less fruitful but which were also less subject to pressure from the enemy air force. The German Air Force was too air power weak, and planes were too greatly needed on all fronts, for German to challenge successfully the enemy air superiority. However, this interruption of U-boat warfare in the Atlantic could be only a temporary expedient. Could decisive results again be expected from U-boat warfare? That was the fateful in that had to be answered. Only if this question could be answered question to put into the forced program of U-boat the affirmative was it reasonable construction the enormous quantities of scarce industrial material which it 60 percent of the program required. The building required approximately entire output of the German electrical part of the industry, and a considerable And beyond all this was the cost in lives of the U-boat steel production. these sacrifices justifiable? campaign. Were of the Navy, Under influence of the Commander-in-Chief the dominant who was also the former Commander of U-boats, Grand Admiral Doenitz, the in the affirmative. The German answered German High Command leaders never abandoned hope that U-boat warfare could be revived and could exert to this atti factors contributed decisive effect on the war. Various positive tude. A U-boat with a radically new drive had been developed, which would have a speed submerged of about 18 knots and a larger under-water range. tactical weakness of the U-boat? This appeared to ameliorate the greatest area. The higher sub the slowness and danger of its trip to the operation of the new boats relative to the speed of a convoy would also, merged speed of attack and it was hoped, make possible new and more effective methods for action by the available defense. It was hoped to have the new U-boats none got into action before the war ended. summer or fall of 1944. Actually

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available U-boats were, however, being fitted with the so-called "snor a trunk which supplied atmospheric air for the diesel motors and per kel," lessened the danger mitted the charging of batteries underwater. This greatly to operate again in the coastal waters the U-boats of air attack and permitted from which they had been driven by the enemy air force. were employed in the summer of in operations The first snorkel U-boats in The boats returned from three weeks all expectations. 1944; they fulfilled areas with strong pursuit and radar defenses having scored from three to five sinkings. They did not surface a single time during the whole period. To be of U-boat cruises radically altered the fundamentals sure, these submerged were still further of scouting from the U-boat for the possibilities warfare, became more or less blind, the U-boats air reconnaissance reduced; without a convoy in the open sea was more or less a and the possibility of finding matter of chance. It was evident that worthwhile operating areas for the new U-boats would be found only near the harbor approaches. of the U-boat, of the main weapon considerable Moreover, improvement device by which the torpedo, was in process. This consisted of a supplemental the propeller noises of a fast ship pulled the torpedo toward it. This weapon, was available after September 1943 designated by the code word Zaunkoenig, was particularly Even so the U the escort destroyers. and effective against screen to get at boats could seldom break up the strong enemy destroyer the merchant the real object of the war on commerce, ships. of the U-boat war with all for the continuation Another strong argument forces was the burden which it placed on the war potential of the enemy. The the building of patrol threat of U-boats required the formation of convoys, of merchant the construction vessels and defensive weapons, ships, and the tied of which the oceans?all of an air organization maintenance spanning in other phases down men and materials which might have been employed of the war. This was no doubt a factor of very great importance; but it had to be weighed against the drain on German war potential. to the Fuehrer with all the When Grand Admiral Doenitz represented that the U-boat war should remain a weight of his position and personality primary aspect of the German war effort, he was no doubt influenced by the built up on the alleged lessons of U-boat warfare of exaggerated expectations leaders that successful U-boat World War I. But the illusion of the German warfare could be revived after the reverses of the spring of 1943 was smashed II. To be sure, the by the hard realities of the last two years of World War success curve shows a slight increase of sinkings after the summer of 1944?a anti-radar apparatus, of the U-boat, which was due to technical improvements the monthly sink snorkel and the Zaunkoenig however, torpedo. Thereafter, seldom exceeded 250,000 tons, as against an increase of enemy merchant ings the of over 1,000,000 tons per month. When shipping by new construction on which such great hopes had been placed were ready first new U-boat types
for action, the war was over.

estimate of the situation should have foreseen A sober and critical German this result. The blow which the U-boat war suffered during 1943 was induced was responsible by the enemy use of radar, but it is not true that this device trend failure of U-boat warfare. The reasons lie deeper. The downward for the

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670

FOREIGNAFFAIRS

the gap ?nU-boat warfare had set in at an earlier period?April 1942?when between merchant began to decrease. The ship sinkings and new construction two major factors were the tremendous effort undertaken in the enemy ship to replace the lost tonnage, and the attainment by the enemy of air yards were apparent in the spring of in the Atlantic. Both developments supremacy The and ?n the nature of things could not be altered by Germany. 1943? effort was beyond the reach of German war measures; American ship-building from the enemy in the air supremacy and there was no question of wresting the Reich itself. had begun to be felt within when his air superiority Atlantic to understand how the German it is difficult these circumstances Under new era of a decisive to inaugurate leaders could reasonably have expected situation on other in the fall of 1944, even if the dangerous U-boat warfare were dis fronts and the effects of enemy bombing on German production in Ger record of American counted. The production shipyards was known a lull in U-boat warfare many; lasting only until the beginning of the "new to result in an increase of Allied era" would 10,000,000 shipping of about
12,000,000 tons.

the U-boat war al it would not have been wise to discontinue Naturally but there was a middle course. The submarine campaign could have together, new construction the stepped-up been continued without program, by con in service on June I, use. There were 435 U-boats in servation of U-boats the high losses suffered in May?an figure appreciable 1943, after deducting at the beginning of the war. Great quantities with the 57 U-boats compared for planes, available of valuable war mat?riel would thereby have become have pre would and these U-boats tanks and anti-invasion preparations; vented the enemy from slackening his defense measures. To be sure, such a had ceased to be that the U-boat decision would have been a clear admission for such an a decisive factor in the war. The strength of character necessary leaders. from the responsible German admission was not forthcoming the heroic war service After the spring of 1943 deep tragedy overshadowed crews. Their courage and their readiness to sacrifice right to of the U-boat the end could not alter the fact that they were fighting a losing battle. Of about !,i6o German U-boats which were in service during the war, 630 were lost by enemy action up to the end of April 1945. In April there were availa ble about 400 operational U-boats, including those used in training. During 108 more U-boats the first part of May, up to the conclusion of the armistice, naval were scuttled by their crews. Of 40,000 German were sunk, or which 89 truth were lost in action?in the submarines, 30,000 personnel which manned a frightful proportion. far the greatest part of the losses were suffered in By this catastrophe may the period of decline, 1943-1945. Those who survived them: has to say concerning note with proud satisfaction what an opponent "There is no reason to suppose that they would not have fought on in a los if the defeat of the German Army had not brought collapse and ing campaign reads the to the bitter end." Thus surrender. Their morale was unimpaired official British record.

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