Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
h 1.1, ,. 14
30 .
Vol. AXXViII, 4, p. 10d.
31.rl1e Field Artillery Sc.l-}ool, "3ecret Information .3u.1mar-j !':urn
bel" One" (Fort ..3111, Oklaho:na, Feb 44), 129. ('This re90rt has been
declassified).
Information Service, ]0. 4,t 46.
]i3
'toJ'as surprisingly litUe mention of th.is as a disadvantage during tiorld
dorld II. :'iaj C. a. P..evie, who commanded a equipped at fi rst
v..i th tOl-Ied 105' s, and laotar loTi th s, considered uprime ver out-
ca.'1non outll a significant disadvantage. 33
'1't<10 factors te!lded to cloud the issue of out-
cannon out,tt per se, as a first was t..'le of
ri!aintenance ...,roblams. If a co:ttr.1ander had f61f !Jroblems in kee!>ing all of
his pieces o!,erational, then "!,ri:ne r.1over out--cannon out" had little
si gnificance for him. (Aaintenance proble:i15 'Hill be folic fl
ing.) Ibe second factor was the difference in of in
artillery batteries; batteries ha.d four cannon, the:.7 batteries,
six.
34
, 35 .A aJ.'tillery battalion with six
pieces out of aotion could still set as much steel on the target as his
towed artillery' oounte11>art.
36
(
orgblems.--All machinery :;>oses
self-nronelled oannon had more towed cannon and their
.
?ril:19 movers primaril..v be cause the:}r lo1ere !ilOre machines th r;,ore
parts. .Uso, the lack of expertise in maintaining track-layinfj vehicles
33u::LntervieloTS on Cor:1..lnand Activities ldth Officers o.r the
1st Ar.nored Division: Italy, :rovamber 16-29, 1943," p. 38.
s., -..ra:r Departlilent, 'ractics and Technique: i3atta.lion and
2attery, F:l 6-101 C'iashington: U, S. Government Printing
Office, 28 Jun 44 , p. 220.
35u. S., Department, Armored DiV1si.on ArtilleI;,", 6-105
C,'lashington: U. S. CDvernment Printing Oftice, 15 Aug 44), p. 2.
361he U. S. Army changed to six cannon per firing batter'J for
all light and medium artillery units after II, largely based
on the greater destruction wrought by six cannon compared to four, :!is
demonstrated by armored division
39
contr-.l.buted to the n"..!r.ber of of self-uro
palled artillery. ,self-oro,elled artillery's disadvantage of f?;reate:'
:1aintenance ::>roblens was in the second :,hase of t.he arst..t:nqnt
nrior to II. .:ajor Revie (CO, ho\ritzor, later
,:7, battalion) considered maL"ltenance as a serious disadvantage.
reported that hi s :':7' s needed one to tl[O days of maintenance
for every 500 rules travaIled. J? ine 1st U. 3. abo:!':.
.:.7' s, pointed out increased as a disadvantage of self-Jr')
naIled cannon; 33 ) did the field ArtillezrJ in its Sllr.'t'n&r'j 0 f
artillery activities in COi"llbat.39 :Jut not all considered ita dis&dfan
tage. Colonel cO""1."!1anded an .:7 battalion in the sa."1e
di vision as .:ajor Hevie) felt that r:'laintenance procedures elL'lli
nated 40 Th.e 1st w. ::;. Ar:f'.y t re?Orting on the .:12,
stated that after six of combat, aU 1.reapons in three battalions
stil:!. in action. It attributed this to construction of -the
chassis and eood unit maintenance, backed u? by excellent Ordnance
Lieutenant Scoffer, lmting about one of these ba.ttalions,
stated that in the nursuit across Northern France, the had
fa,,-: maintenance ::>roble:ns. Colonel (CO, !Av:i.. siC'in
J7"Interviews on Armored Command Activities with Officers of
the 1st Armored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 1943," ? 33.
33'Artillery Information Service, :IemorandUC1 No. 1til p. 1).
J91f3ecret Information 3ummary, One," 129.
40UInterviews on Armored Command Activities with Of'ficers of
the 1st A..'t1fnored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 194J,ft p. 39.
41.. Artiller-.f Infomation Service, No.7, rt "9. 21..
42
Scoffer, JO.
that there was increased wear the cannon ?arts
the s and . s cO:'1!Jared to t!1e to"rec. 10.501''n howitzers and 15.5:'11\
guns. 43
It that :naintena.l'lce were not as serious a cis-
advantage as had been earlier, and that then, as today,
they could by 9roper
"Inflexible 'OM.me :nover."--This disadvantage is linked to the
"pri!l1e mO"J'er out--cannon out" disacivantage, but had not been considered
too i.11?ortant prior to .'K>rld II. JiPparently the experience of ti1.e
war showed "inflexible -ori'11e ::laver" to be a runor disadvantage, too.
Both Revie and the Field Artillery 3chool listed it as a disadvan
tage of artillery. 45 Colonel cited the
flexibility of towed artillery movers as an advantage of towed
utillery. 46 All of above artillerymen oonsidered Itinflexib1e
mover
r
in the of a..'T1.'nu."'li.tion
Concealr.1ent, --lAfficulty of concealment was considered more or
a disadvantage in the first phase 't.i-}an in the second phase of the a.rgu
ment prior to 1.I-ar II. 'he 10th field Artillery Batta.lion
this as a deficiency of artillery,47 as did the 1st U. S.
Anr;y.43 Both organizations considered the high silhouette of the :!'7 the
43
Kurtz, 13.
44Ulnterviews on Armored Corarnand Act!vities wit.h Of"ficers of
the 1st ArtBored 1li.vi s1?n: Italy, 16- 29 t 194Jt" p. 3d.
4.5uSecret Inromation Summary, Number One," '9. 129.
46.. t 15
z, 9.
47"Notes and Lessons of the Sicilian Ca:n9aign," p. 1.
48., Artillery Inf'onnation service, Hemorandum No.1, If 13.
41
drawback in this res;>ect. Colonel f.urtz cited the smaller target !'rE
sented by towed pieces as an advantage of towed artillery. 49 1ajor
Ravie thought the hard to c&r.1ouflage, and additionally, he stated
that it left tell-tale tracks into the oosition area, whereas the tOl-red
could be manhancUed.5
0
traverse.--rhis disadvantage had never been considered
as significant as others. Lt Col I. 3. tlashburn, c01":\enting on the .:7,
sta.ted that it had to be realigned to its airrdns stakes quite often be
cause it was to shift to fire on many targets to the
and rea.r.51 (He imolied that targets tro:n all quarters "1a5 a hazard
COITlZ'lon to artillery wi th divisions.) Revie thought that
,..
just the turning of the was more difficult than
trails on the towed howl tzer. 52 But ':Alonel (Cu, 4th Armored
Division Artillery) felt the 2':7 could shift faster than the towed 10.smm
howitzer. 53
Other disadvantages.--deither the nor the A12 had an in.'1erent
capability for high angle fire. Colonel t..'tis lL"dta
tion as a disadvantage. 54 Q)lonel Kc?heeters (CO, battalion) was
able to high angle fire by siting his s on reverse slo:.'es.55
49Kurtz, 15.
50UlnterviEnls on Connnand Activities with Officers of
the 1st Ar:nored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 1943,11 p. 38.
S1 Lt Col I. B. 9,Jashburn, "Armored FA. Across France,tI Field
Artillery Journal, Vol. xrJ..V, No. 4 (Apr 45), pp. 204-205.
5
2
nInterviews on Armored Command Activities with Jfficers of
the 1st .Armored Division: Italy, November 16-29, 1943,11 38.
p. 16. 54"Kurtz, p. 15.
55"Interviews on Armored Command Activities with Officers of
the 1st Armored Division: Italy, NOV8.11ber 16-29, 194;,tt p. ;P.
42
There "UlS very little othe:, cor.rnent on this limitation. fuel con-
or self-:>ropelled pieces a disadvantage in the view of the
1st 0. S. Ar-::rry and Colonel 56, 57 Colonel a'\urtz esti:r:ated that
self-oropelled weapons consWled twice as much fuel as the mo vers
for t.,wed cannon. 50 'laere l-laS 1itUe other com.'11ent on this disadvan
tags; this dearth of cO::1lments might be viewed. fro!U the aspect that se:"f
pro-pelled artiller'lJ was sUl'!,orting amored divisions which Here geared
for laree fll.el :':ajor and the 10th Field Ar:.illery Ja't
talion Doth re"9c "',ed one the cramoed firing crew
on t ne ' "7 It was felt that for this reason, the towed '\oTeapon space
could fire faster than the version.
59
,60
TIle Consensus
listing of advantages and disadvantages as above is useful
in analyzing the of :tlar II th respect to the argu
ment of towed versus in the J. 3.
nouever, the listing is not the tmole sto!'Y. It migl'lt a:opE:&r t.lo}at the
disadvantages of self-propelled artiller-f outweighed the advantages by
the listing in this chapter, in numbers of i te.llS and nu"'lbers of
CO='UTlents. 3ut how did t."'e artiller:P1en feel overall, in 1
artillerf with towed artillery?
battalion commanders believed self-,!,ro!,elled artillery
56ft Artillery Information 3e:"Vice, .'iernorandun Jo. 1t" ? 13.
5?Aurtz, 9- 15. 5
3
Ibid
59"Intervitnrs on Armored Corr.und A.ctivities with Officers of
the 1st Armored Divisi< : lta4r, November 1&'29, 194;," !:>. 33.
6OUNotes and Lessons of the S1.cilian Cam?aign," ? 1.
bettel'" because of its zreater ty. One .. battalion cO:7l.':1ander
't-trote: "'.."he arrnorec s wi. th l-mch we wer'e
u
were truly wonderful
felt their orotection
':9Y to their sU':>eriori t:Y.. over towed 61 me 1st !j. Ar:1Y
well of the because of its and value in assault
fire russians. One ar;nored division artiller.l cO::1:na."lder, discussin2
artillery for eli visions, stated: tt It hOes in.. thout sa,ving tilat
all these llea!'ons should be self-?l"opelled. It 62 di vi
sion thought all at,tillery should be self-o:oo?el.led
.6ut one a....""'nored division artillery co:n:r.:.ander, \\rhile
artillery for divisions, listed nar
v
advantages
of tal-Tea artillerJ. faIt there l.as a need for towed ur..:i ts in non-
di vi sion 3-pecificallyt he both the l.5SrlM hot-Ii
and gun r.lobile enough for combat in 0) 'J.be J. .J.
considered that the had no marked ove!' the towed 10,5rrtn
lhe 10th Field Artillery 3attalion, had referred to
the .:17' s as "",rl'.i te elephants, II obviously towed artillery'. 30
did one light artillery battalion who had had co'Tlbat e:...rperi
ence "'1i th botcl tOl-Ted and self-pro?elled 105:un ho\ritzers.
On the basis of these artillerynen's views overaL:_
t
the oon
sensus was self--;>ro:::>elled artillery--for armored eli visions, at
least. consensus must be weighed by two factors. First, as
\<-ras stated at the begi.nning of this chapter, the dirac":.
for armored divisions was by units,
and the 'Oredominate infantry division direct su!'port by to'W"'9d units.
61 .
;1U
tt
on, '!'. 251.
was, then, a vel-VY li:nited basis for best CO:7l'oar
ison ,,1. th tao toued i7'.ed:..tt"1 a:r-tille!'y; hEn-e the self
version \;as favored because of i ts Li t?
.::Jecond t st of the artiller'ften c::i. i:1 thi 5 cha')ter uere
closely involved 'uith co:nbat o?erations and right have only 1I:'11e
trees t and not the forest." :low ::::a.r(! :orotection iMoor
tant because :lne of their ba.tteries had to off an infantry
attack? dow illl?reSsed with the ::'lobillty of
artillery as the:'t a '..lni t--or felt the o;:>'?osi te oe
ca'.lse had to be used t., thai r I;.'," S on i C.l roads? j'
intensity of cor.'i'.Jat ":....ould ca'.tse incidents to :lave :>rofoiJnd
effects on their views.
Further, what about the interaction:> of
armor 8(l hO\1 .1UC:l was its incre3.sed wei ght t!
:r nobility effected b:r \'1&S 3.."1 ad
V'antaGo, hOioT :n.lch of a di i.ras the increased fuel
Ihase questions a.."ld others as :J1ey :>ertained to t.'-l1 of
self-':')roIJelled versus artillery in tho U. .,:;. Arr.1Y \\'9_"'9 n:>t
anSlrerad by the exnerlenc.e, ,?Gr se, of 'dorld ',ie II. A o".1eo
t.i v'a '!)ost-l:ar analysis would have to be conducted to
,Ii tho t,o end of the \-Tar, and even before, mDJ\.v bo lords of 0::.1'1
cars '.,rore convened to tho e:-:perience of .:o=ld ',iar I:L. .:Jri.s
portion of 11 ?resent tho of t:te !10re irl"'Jor
.1944 Field Artille2"'f Cchool ;tenort. --In 1 Q. s:>ecial
board of officers ,-las convened at the !"i.eld ArtillerJ" to ravimr
develo!J!nents in field artillar-J. l!eaded by :-iaj ::len
lic r. Pennell, t."le school' s the boa!'d was to conduct
,Tith a vie\.; to imtiatine guidelines fo!' current and ?OSt-t-1Gr
develop:nent. 1 th respoct to artiller"J transport, th9 board concluded:
30th tal-Ted and self-?ro?elled weapons are necessat"J in var,/1 ng 9ro
?ot-tions lTithin any a!'tillor'J echelon. Ina relative r>rol')ortion of
will be deter::dned by' the r.u.ssion, the rr..obili ty and the
theater. '!he range of this pro!'Jortion include all
and \to to include the 155-m:n gun..r1 and hot-ritzAr.
1'hi5 re;.>ort tto10 sificant !JOints. i?i.rst, rTas
l TIte Field Artiller-.r School, ItHe!,ort of ::30ard
to Review ihvelop.-nents in Field Artiller-.t' (Fort Sill,
27 0. 1.
2
A later nodel gun than G. P. F.
of Board Appointed to aeview Develo!,ments in
Fi eld Artillery', II o. 4.
45
no discussion in the the and cons of towed vel
artiller-J. 'lbere '!-tas no c;=?lanat::'on of :10l.' the
Ilva:r,-lin; proryortions
Cf
llere to be detOl":"lined, nor any indica":.ion to
t:le effect the rission 01' theater have on the 0: touod
to sclf-IJro:Jellod artiller,.,l. Second, there lfas no eli rae
t::)!'s -:6.ich led th.e board to rocOi:lollend that all calibers hav3 a
4
1944 /..xny :1round Forces convened a
board in lata 1944
5
to stud;}-" all used by the .:;. Ar:rry ane to
,
cha..Y1ge to the '9ost-uar C It
reco4":1mended tilat self-pro!>elled chassis should be developed for all
cannon calibers, the ?.5tit1l !>ack howitzer. Further, it reco::'.:ended
t."'lat in de",eloping artillery !l1ateriel, chassis be de
signed s:oecirica.lly for artiller:r, in order to save
Height. chassis of \.'iorld ";[tlr I: had been chassiz de
for tan<s and Foro quite neavy.? 'ilie oo9.rd concluded, in the
sa..'11e a.s neld Artillerj" f';chool .:leport "both to';jOO
The relative )ro'Oortion of each -Nill be by the
nobility and tho Again:. l1as eA-pl3.'1ation
_._------------
4At this the only se!:f.'-,!,ropelled arttller-J lar[;el"
lae Doa.r Has fr-Lven a copy of the .'l3stervelt Ho!X>rt as a
the 105::1.-:1 ho'tritzer in 11se the .<12 (155;n., gtm). Other !=ieces
under devolo,:t.ent.
5.r1' d "I
6
Jir.1Y Ground Forces t rr Ra!JOrt of Board of Orfice,-.s
to 'the Zquip:nent of the Post A..'"'mY" l:'1e Amy (;ar
College, 20 Part I.
:>
7.,... A__ D 2
Ad
,nunex ,:? .
of how the "va.rying pro?ortions
et
were to be determined, nor My incica
tion as to the affect the !','1i.ssion or theater would have on :.he
1945 r.::'heatar 3oa..""<i latu .Ieadquarters,
Theater of Operations appointed a board to the strategy,
tactics, and administration of the ..>. Anrry in the theate r- during the
war. 9 .r.,e board's a!'!>roach see.""!1ed to be: the U. 3. Arar.r had to
fight the i:1 Euro?e again, \o1hat would be done as before, and what
'Hould be done dirrerentl
J
"7 'There was litUe consideration of the nature
or future liars. me "7805 di videa. in to many sections to exam:)',e
in detail the 'Ian;y facets involved. One hundred thirty-one seoarate
studies u::> the entire ..t. Geroane to this are studies
by the Artillerf and G) sections.
found that the .':7 very successful in
sup-port, primarily because of i ts ?2 otection,
tacti.cal :nobillty, and ability to occupy posi. tions rapidly.10 'lbe sec
tion reco:1rl1ended that armored divisions be with self-!Jropelled
lieht and artille:-y for t.."le sa.":1e a.dvantages demonstrated by the
:';7.
11
It citeo. the folloldng as advantages of towed artillerf for
infantry divisions:
--fower Maintenance problens
--easier to emplace and conceal; less noi.se
--lighter ireight, tor bridges
--better tactical mobility in bad (mud and ice;'
9Headquarters \.hi ted states Forces, European J."heat..er ot Opera
tionSt of the General stuc:tr of the OrganizlLtion and
Equipment of Field Artillery ::..hits" (,SA. 1946).
__ t
l1Ibi<!. o. 13.
10.:i:bid., "9. 12.
43
..- better strategi c cr.obilit:r
fire ca!labili ty
on-carriage traverse
fuel
::''16 folloHinc 1.;ere ci tad as advantages of for
divisions:
--better tactical !nobilltr in "lea.ther
-- fo!' the creW'
--ability tC' positions
ilia Artillery ')action concluded that infantl9J" division liCht and :neditr.'l
artillery should be towed.
14
The G3 Section, in its stuctl of the infantr.r did n:>t
agree with the Artiller:l ;.)ectiQn' s concernin:;: infantry di vi
sion art:lllerJ .ibe section considered armor ?rotection V8r'J
important foY:' artillery because of air attao}:s and the prcxir.'.i ty fuze.
It division be 'tdth self-
propelled their 1he section recognized
the .,:7 to be too heavy, TTl thout overl1ead and 'Wi t.'lout a high
angle capability, but a.dvocated infar.try division be
t1i th s at that
For non-division artiller-J, the Artille:-y Jection recor.=:lended
the because it mig."lt be in of amor units. 'llle section lo1ent
"d
13Ibid., ? 4.
p
5
15.:ieadauartars :hited 3tates Forces, ;]m"opean '!heater of O?ex-a
tions, l'?e,ort of the ,study of the
and 'l'aotical of the Infantry Jlvislon
il
(.2.!. 1946),
p. 9.
on to state tha. t the :17 had oroved its worth because of i 'reod tacti
cal :nobility.16 It tha.t in addition to battalions, so:r.e
15.5.'1l.11 g-un battalions be self-oro"Oelled, and all other non-dvision
artillery be towed.!7
Of the considered thus far in this cna9ter, the 1)45
3urooean :heater aoard :ieport was by far the detailed and exhaus
tive. It is curious that there should be thH conclusions
reached artillery for the infant:r;r ell vision.
1j
If one con
siders the by the 3ection of the of
artillery for int'lt!".Y divisions, one might lVonder why towed
.
.
was not also recol1l'11ended for ar.-nored di visions. the hand, the
Artillery Section in non-division artillery, felt that on
those occasions \-Then .,17 battalions had infantry :;nits, t.i1e
had been ?erha?s, because of tria thoughts
of self-?ropelled artillery arTIored forces and the associ
ation of self-?rooelled artillery the war, a tra.di tion of lIself
propelled for towed for infantry" had been established
artillery:nen.
1946 Artillery Conference.--In :iarch 1946, an artillery confer
enoe was conducted at Fort 3ill to discuss 821 phases of
10
to for future and
of the General 3oard: 3tudy of the Or?anization and
of Field Artillery :.inits," 1'. 19.
17Ibid., 46-47.
ldrhe Artillery took cognizance of the GJ s
conclusions; knowing, it still dissented.
19The Field Artillery 3chool, "rieport 3ased on Jtudies Conducted
at the Artillery Conference" (Fort 3111, Oklaho;ua, .iar 46).
50
tion the conference
c:101acad
--less road
, t uf'. 20
--coeaner 0
--botter tactical
--ar"ilOr nro:'E"; _ ion, ryri:7lc!1rily for ticm
--bette:- for devcloJ:Tlont of ..tcal a!i':'.llmi tion
--:ess ?ersonnel required
ilisadvantaces :
--lack of for ali'l."!'!uni tion
--difficulty of conceaLroent becauso of silhouette
--no high Mgle fire
strategic z10bility.21
The corni ttee' s opinion of dar II self-.9ro!'elled Has
that it had not 9roved entirely satisfactor"J beca.use it Has cO:lstructed
fro;.} and tank chassis. 'The cor.mt tee .':1ajori ty
recorl.nended the for to be all weapons It
_____0 _
2O'Ihis advantage not substantia.ted in the report. does
not seem reasonable, in vie;r of all other opinions that
cannon \'rere expensive to !>roduce.
.dased on .studies Conducted at t.."le It.rtille1''Y Confer
ence: Co!'rnittee O!1 1A, pp. 1-J.
51
recoli1.'7lended t.."lat self-:.>ro:oelled artillery be developed with the hi Ghest
However, for the present, the cOIl"_7.ittee majority reco!n!llended
that armored division and non-division light artillery be self-pro
?olled, and that infantry division artillery be towed until a lighter
mount t,.dth a lower silhouette could be developed. It reco:ll11ended that
both toued and self-propelled versions of mee:ium and heavy artillery be
develo!,>ed, c0l"?s artillery to be self-propelled, amy to be towed. 22
'l11e committee's recommendations 101ore not unanimous. Ibere viere
two dissensions--at ends of the One estinated
t..i.at i t ten years to develop a completely satisf.3.ctor'.1 self-
propelled and it urged t.."at divisions be e'luipped
immediately l:i light artiller.r_ Ibis
considered that lisht self-!)l-opelled artillery must have a lUgh angle
fire oapabili ty to be com,!,letely sati sfactory. 23 The other groU?
recommended that infantry division artillery be towed because
artillery was too It cited greater maintenance
y>roble:ns and "il'lflexible pr:LYJle :nover" as other disadvantages of self-
propelled Further, considering the aspects of
transport, this group thought self-propelled cannon to be
expensive and that the Jnited States could not enough to equi!,
the entire f..:rrrw in war.
24
'lbese last two disadvantages of self-
propelled artillery are similar to tl"ose listed during the second phase
of the argument prior to "..iarld ilar II.
lhe 1946 Artillery Conference was more inclined to consider
favorably self-propelled artiller'J for infantry divisions than had
00. 1-4 2
J
Ibid
., Tab 1B, p. 3.
24
Ibid
., p. 4.
- ..
-------- -----
si.'7ti.lar bodies 1)L'h also tI'lO
ei'i'ects of future techtl.ical 2.dvances tha'1 si:rl.l.l:''' had before.
30ard was established in 19
/
+6 to ty?6S of equi'1:',lent reauired
for the post-1'1ar J\nn:;.25 As Do nrafaco to its for
all of tho boa.:-d vTrote it felt that
.states' 'Oroduction ca?D.ci ty w"'O'..ud not be o:"Ou3ht to ocar In future ,rars
as it had in :/iar II, and that future l1US ,;ould ha.ve to bo fO.lght
Hi th the or. hand at the outset. 26 tho baed
recol-:1mcndod the of both tovreQ and self-:Jro?o::!.lcd artill Jry,
!
1)7
except ver;/ li and tcry h9avy artiller:t. . ca."l.&'1on
be used for both a."'ld configU:'atj.ons, and since
self-,ropelled :"lore difficult to dev'elop, the Ca."'l110:l
should 00 for calf-propelled and ada?ted or use
U'J.
. th.4-
",01010
d
t""
:!....:....J.cry.
23
",res the reverce of practi ce for con
'.lorJ..d ",7a.r II artillery Lastly, t..'1e board
artillor:{ th splinter-proof amor, overhead
for
1949 Field Forces .AdvisorY ?ane1 on J.eld .Artillea.--::n
1949, the Field Forces eotablished an advisor"J !lanel to rev:\_ew t:'le
25Letter, '1.bG Adjutant General's Office, Subject:
of 'liar De!1a1"tr.!ent &ard" (2 Oct 45).
26.. C' .1 De t . J_ t r t' 1 De rt t' .&0.
oJ. .:.., :,Iar ,ar",-'!:en , .1 ""por 0 .'le: ar . ::>a
:'1ent !:ioa:....d
ll
(.:lashington, 19 Jan 45), p. 1.
27.J.11e implied that very light artillery was the hOH
i tzer. 30th very light and heaV"J artillery was to be tal-red only.
2.3
r'He?ort of the De!)ar'tMent .30 ard," ?_ 23.
29Ibid., !>. 24.
5J
Ci,U'rent u .::. doctrine, and cha:acteristics
nertaining to field artillery wea?ons. Lieaded by Ge:l :Uft
the !lanel Has also to initiate actions to secure :U..litaro}
characteristics for field a!'tillery wea?ons and equi!,2ent. LasUv, it
'tolas report on the of reco.i:'lendations of the 1940
Artillel"".1 Conference and the De?artment .::quipment Joa!'d .-.e
port.)O
Th.e !Janel made 8SSUl1?tions fo:!' wars of the futU!'e.
First, t.'1e earliest najor war ,.;ould not occur until 1952, 2.1ld
this war would be a nuclear in which thE! battlefield woU:d be dl3vas
tated, particularly lines of co,-.rr.unications. Jecond. the ona.'nY would
have From these the
tha.t the :i. 3. :llust have a hi.gh degree of cross-country mobility,
and the Jnited :Jtates niust its superior and p:-oductil,n
?otential to i.'nprove mechanical l':leanS of waging war. 31 From
the panel cO:lcl'.Idea that all ne\oT artiller'J weapons should be
self-propelled (exce:;>t special types
J2
), and field artille:-'.1 uea
?ons in the infantr"J division artillery should be air transportable. 3.3
These conclusions implv that the envisioned the elimination
or reduction of the heaV'J disadvantab8 of artil
lery. 2.11e nanel stated requirements for self-propelled models
30 U. 3., .De!>artment of the Army, .. Report of the Field
Forces Panel on Field Artillery" (',\ashington, 18 Feb 49), ? 2.
31 'L4
Ibid., .r
32'I'he It special tYges
lt
were not defined.
3J"P.eport of the Army Field Forces hivisory Pa."el on Field
Artillery," p. 6.
of t21e 21o,.ritzc:" 15S-r:11 :3:t and
hawi tzar. me key self-nronelled art i ller:-... in
the panol' s "Aas its better cross-cotmtrJ :,10bility
end ot the oost-,.;ar analysi.s.--It is not t'eall:; T)ossible
to establish a ?recise ti.,e or event t.hat the end of the a"laly
sis, \<rith to of :1:1. -:he 1949
Ar:rw Field ?anel on :nade little l'efer
ence to the late waT; its re?ort \vas of a forecast of f',,1turc
rat:ler than an analysis of the ?a.st. Other boa.."'"Ci and panel
that ;followed "rare f:-om similar vieV\'P0ints. this tine
1949 J't:r.;ry Field torces Pa.'1el on Field :'5 "lsed
in th::.s Ylaper tlS the ?oint of the ?Ost-l-:ar
Connict
ilie l:.:orean conflict had chara.cteristics a.rfectinE artil
It 'lIas for the -part, over terrain nueh :'":lore
than in 8urone; i.t waSt at the 'oegi.:1nin:;, a of move:nent, and for
of the uar, onE) of static fronts of ":,'orld 'dar I.
'r-nero were man:r times when ?"sitions lJTere over!"un and cannon
lost; those actions had the vivid impact on
Tnere was not as high a of artillerJ
as in durlngl:orld II; there no divisions in
Iorea.. ::.bare "tare, however, non-elivision battalions that sau ::luch
action. Lt Col 1eon F. Lavoie, or a se?arate self-propelled
15.5rnr.1 hOldtzer battalion in considernd tactical mobility tOe 1,ey
advanta{;9 of towed Lwti:le%"J. i!e felt t..'l.e
55
protection of salf-p!'o?alled artillerJ to gi. ving t.."le c a.
r
U10n the
8.01li ty to defend ves. :'ie also t.l1ought any i:1CreaS9d :lainte.
nance ,roble::ls of artiller:-l could be o"/erco .,e. 35
Col F. Dunn, of a seoarate self-oro?elled
15.5.ill:l gun battalion the conflict, on the role of self
artiller-j' in static battalion
assau.l t fi!'e .,,:issions, which he felt we!'e cO"!'_'!lon static w8.rfare :r.issions
..:elf-"O!"ooelled a.r tL!..ler.l 'tofas bettel for these ssions bec:a'...lse it iad
amo!' could a.l"ld \.1. thdra"tT -;>osi tions raDi ely. 36
The k"t111e!'Y' ..;chool, in a stuct. v of artillery of the
conflict, concl'.1ded that artillery 'Was ",han towed
for that c:Jnflict. The cited better tactical r1obil:.t:.. for em?loy
went on broad f:-onts over rOUGh terrain, and arnlor -;>rotec:.ion
'9osi tion defense as !{ey 'j,"he study au':' that self
be able to fire angle fire be truly
superior towed artiller:r. 37
Colonel La Voie, wri tin; about botr. ",:ar II 9J'ld the ::orean
oonflict., considered the ability of self-'Jl'opelled to ;>rotect
itself very _{is studies ShOl-Ted towed artillery uni.ts
were overrun often than self-orope11ed units in both wa.rs. .:n
attributed better record in
35'::'t Col ison F. La ".:ake ::i.ne 3P,u U, .j, i:rm..v
Forces Journal, Vol, II, i-to, 7 (Feb 52), )2-JJ.
36Lt Col Jerry F, Uunn, "3e1i'-Pro'9'911ed Artillery in ?ositional
.tIhe Army forces Journal, vol. I if, ]0. 4 53).
?p. 1'-4-17.
371ha .Artille:J Sc."lool, .. i\rtillal'jr in (Fort 3:1.11,
Oklahoma, 1953), 9.
56
its ta.ctical :nobility, its a.."1d its ability t,
oositions raoidly. l-ie did not, hOH9ver, advocate abandoni.n:::
to\o:ed artiller.? cO:T:>letely.
ihe of the conflict uoon tne of towed
self-oronelled in the 0. J. was to emohasize
of al.. tillery in defendinp; itself. ..::t did n-:>t
brin=?; out a"lV facet of the ar:;ltnent.
The t"'uture
the of tOttled versus self-urooel1..ed artiller"f on essentiall)'
the sa."!le as Nhen it stal:-tod. A :leH was introduced as
f:!'tL"'11e of this ends. In 1952, Lt. Col !jidwell ._oo:,e lon-ote
that the U. .Y had never :tad self-orouel1ed light arti llery. :i. 3
described four categ'ories of destroyer artiller"j',
assault ';U1'\ artillery, ar:nored artillery, and sel.f-?roT?elled ;;'-:i.
grouped first three as all )ro-
taction, resu.lted in their being quite heavy. sel;'-pronelled
ne felt, have no and be on a cnas
sis. l'his 1:ould oe a "'..,rea"90n T",;d.th excellent tactical ty and
able to OCCUryy factors, he thought, for
transoort.39 .?erha"Js ferT artiller:men \tr.)'J1d with Colonel s
was a concept that was to be considered carefully.
}3.Lt Col F. La iToie, Artillery is tho :J1ing,"
.Ar:nor, Vol. L.:u, ]0. 5 52), 10-13.
39 Col 3idwell t lI i Jhy Jot 3?1," -t'le Army Co:lOat Forces
J oumal, "/01. III, :\:0. 52), 30- J1.
l
57
A variation on the r":1cU!'!t \las
Gosted bJl' John c. aumey, J=. in 1954. ;us idea 1-TaS to develoD a
self-?ro?olled or cun, a.bout four tons, :.hat couLd
be air-drop:;:>ed. :fo folt the tactical : ty of a :ras
to 1. ts value th airbomo forces. 40
'1':10S6 conceptz, callin:.:; for a. cannon embnetrin::
nel.... end the accoll."'1t of the argullont of to\icd self-
propelled artil in the U. nrior to 1955. foU!'
decades it had been an ir1portant a:10ne; and it Has
to conti!luQ to be i i:T')Ortant one. 3ut in the future, it 'liould con
ducted wi thin fra:nel,'lork of a technolo?y that ,.,as chansin:: '":1uch !:lore
ra?idly than it ever had before.
40
Capt John C. Bumey, Jr., "Self-propelled Guns Can ae
Dropped, It '!he Army Q>mbat Forces Journal, Vol. V, No. :3 (Oct
pp. 52-54.
AiiALISIS, D ..
3urn:nary
The r:lost significant factor in the argunent of
versus tovred artiller:l in the U. S. ,Ar:ny prior to 195.5 was the lir.ti ted
a'llount of ma.teriel upon proponents of ei ther of artillery
transport could base their .judgsnents. (l.bwed artillerJ transport
showed the :advance in the period prior to II,
evolving, in the case of artillery transport, !rare U.rea-mile-an
hour tractors to the 2} ton 6 x 6 truck capable or 45 mph on the
highways. lbi.s reflected the ascendent posi.tion of the li'-..ited States
in !notor transport during the tvlO decades between the \lorld (iars.
Sel:f'-pro!'elled artillor'J advanced very 11ttle in the same two
decades. j,lle only !:lodels of self-!>ro!,elled artillery t..'lat saw exten
51va cO::lbat were L'nprovisations that utilized neither the s'dll of 'the
guns:ni.th nor the technology of the automotive engineer. Jobe slo", p:.-'O
gress !:lade is reflected in the cOr.1!,arison in Table 6 or or the
characteristics of the earliest light artiller"J and the
II salt-:!,ropelled light artillery pieces. 'mis table does
not. shot,r other important characteristics such as reliability
and time to prepare to fire t but 1t does suggest that 11tUe improV9
\-Ias made in 22 years.
59
Calibor
3?eed
: elevation
:"'ota.l. traverse
i\r.mor
gun
.. I to
:J.t ns
15 :non
"50
23
none
105:.itr. hOldtzar
tons
4!"'.ainst .'r.l'Ound f'iroJ
oi'Uy1 no :
?rotection .
a,Above, 'P. 3.
.:a.uove, p. 11
Ihe uwG\l"lent of tot'led versus self'-pro?elled ctillcry quic!<ly
took sha-oe a.s to the advantages of one of transport to
other. As ani:nal transpo!'t 'Was re!,laced by :notor transport, the
argUl::ent took the form of the advantages and disadv8...9'}tages of 5e1
!,ro?elled artiller'J, to tol'Ted artillery. Fu.!'t..'ler, ,dth the
bef9.nnine of the G. S. an10red forces, thore gret., an incre.1.sing tend
ency to consider self-propolled artillery solely for annor9d forces.
'.L'his tendenc:y was :'I'1a.nifestad iT.! the eX?erience of :Iorld .lar II,
lri th artillery supporting elivisions alnost
exclusively. It Has natural for the artillol"j!!len fightins t..'1e uar to
consider self-propelled and to"red artillery in this light. :J11e :lost-uar
analysis have to carefully other possible application?
of both tOvred and self-propelled artillery.
6J
me ?Ost-l;ar a'lalysis, initially-at least, did not ;:iva
careful consideration. 'l"na state."r..ont, IIboth to'Hec and
lrea'Oons are necessar-J in J>l''O?ortions In.thin artiller::r
lon,,,1 trit:l0ut any fu...-ther oX!1lanation the ",ri1.h
vrhich the experience of vTar Has viel-red. tionally,
a..""lalysis a,!)earod to be bound to t110 of salf-pro!->clled
artillery for tOt-red for infantr-J. It was only to'W2rd t:te end of
of elivisions. 'lbere seems to have been no consideration fror.l the
site stand!)oint--tovred artillory for all typos of divisions
t
includ..t'lG
"
annored divisions. 'llie l;:Orean oonflict mar;nified the of
sel-pro?elled artillo!'Y in itself', but added litUe else to
the ..
'l."he in 19.55 had not changed from that of 1919, as
indicatod b:l 'fable 7, l.mch co!npares the -.iestervelt 30ard Report
"dth the Artiller.f Conference Report ooncaming the advantages and
disadvantages self-!Jro:!'slled artillery to towed
Only l-rith the of ne9,o, could the grounds uoon vmich the
argument of to"led versus sell-propelled artillery in t!le t. 3. be
expected to change ver"'J much.
1
P!J. 4;, lJ.6.
'l.'lLiLE 7
Cited by 30th
--Jetter tactical mobility
- - .feavy eht
--Poor strategic ::lobi::!.i ty
lli. sadv3..Y1ta;;es Cited by thor Report
-- U?r:l:-le ;.'.over oat--can..l'lO!l out"
--: :aintona.'l'lco 'Problems
alJJove, ?p. 16-1'1.
b
Above, p. 50.
of tins chapter "rill ackireois itself to the analy
sis of t.1.e validity of reasons used in the argu.r4ent of self
toHed artil1.ery. '1'he fo:-mat t.nIl be a di 5cussion of
the !!lost often cited advnntases and disadva."ltages of
.ilgva..,tages of self'--oropelled artillery, --1hroughout the :,eriod
discussed in t.."lls pa:::>cr, the ::'lost often cited advantage of self
:orouelled artiller-.f was i ts ty for being rapidly a:nplaced. In
the case of medi un and heaV'J artiller'J, self-pror>elled cannon could
into action almost one-ha.lf hour sooner than its towed eql.ti.valent. rhe
62
difference in ti"ne for t.he bM> artille2"J Has '"'leas
s'd' .. 1. uS'Ja.1" .. SSlon 0... urad in "!'.inutes,2 con '1. l' ht a. r",l_ ""1' er:, s .;'
direct sU')l)ort. these :!"in'ltes ",rere often crucial.
artillery' in ra'Oid occu'Oation of 'Oositio:1 ;vas a
advantage.
he next often cited was
rrreater tactical fais was attributed to
cannon because, in all10st all cases, l-lere trac:<:-laY:L!1g
In the earlier :rears of the when towed arti llery l-laS by
+.... ack-laying tra(;w.)l"s, this advantage was not cited too c!ten. iLS
trucks oeca-ne the for towed arti llary, self-nrooelled
artillelj oeca:lle to be considered as naving greater tacti cal :nobi Ii ty.
ihe exnerience of Jar does not give self-propelled a
clear advantage in res?ect, in sand. The
analysis often cited self-pro,elled artiller,y as having freater tacti
cal '!'his appears to been based :nora on
ra.ther tha..'i1 fa.ct. Self-')ro!'elled artillery did !'lot have a
in tactioal !T!o:>ili tv to have a si!!"ifioant in t.his res"Ject.
Armor orotectio"l was considered as an for self-
pro-::>elled artillery in the '.ater years of the arg\tnent. It was con
sidared particularly for esoecially for
V. ving cannon the ca::>abili tjr for se'.f-defense against attack.
rakan by itself, was a marked advantage for
2;). S., D9partrnent of the Ar:T1Y, Field Artil:l;,e!X
li'..... 6-40, Change 2 U. s. GtJvam'nent rrintinf; Office,
16 Sep 64), :.:'able 1.
63
arti.llery, but consi.derlnr; the weight ar1:')T added to t.'1e piece,
ar:nor orotection beca.'11A less si f;nifi For ':'ladi and heavy arti. 1
ler,:r, rihich was usually tht3 li!'le of contact than
li
5
ht arnot' orotection ;,-1as not Ii adva!1ta;:;-e.
Overall, then, t!1e only clear-cut of self-r)ro".Jelled
arti ller"f orioX' to 1955 was its capabi li ty for rapid tion of
posi tions.
of _self-:Jronelled artille!:!.--All1ost ever'I
article artiller-,/ listed thE! heavy ..,eizht
as a disadvantap;a; both and ouoo
nents of artiller:r listed it. :lore often than !'lot,
heav)r wei ':,T8.S ci ted as the serious disadvantage. :ieavy wei gh t
lessened tactical and increased fuel
'treiC?;ht resulted, in part, f'rom inherent characteristics of track-layin.,:
vehicles tdth tneir neavJ -t,racks a."d requirement for more "Oowerful
heavier ene1-nes. For ,"world ,"iar II models, use of tank chassis,
which were arr:lo-red, and the addi. tlon of armor ?late added :nore weight.
Heavy weight, '!Jer l-TaS not significant; it was significlmt in its
effect on other factors, tactical
!he disadvantage mover out--cannon out" inherent to
artillery. It became a disadvant&ge from two asoects:
inoperabi11ty of the piece because ')f action, and
because of mechanical failure. there were several of
action, fire was the greatest threat.
ability to dis?lace rapidly from, as well as
into, positions tended to reduce the threat fron counterbnttery tire.
failure was tied closely with
64
associated wi. th the 'l1o.:"e (than towed) self-Dro'Oelled weanons.
In the years of the arsument, was in
1. ts infancy, '"1aintenance Here :-:tany and su'.)oortE)d
out--can!'1on out
tf
as a ilie exoerience of ''-orld ';iar II
and the Aorean conflict did not show oroble.T.s to be a :;,ajor
di3advantage of artillerJ to towed
"Prime mover out--cannon O'..lt" vIas an intuitive reason agai!:st self
artillery; the facts do not support it as a significant dis
advantage.
30th liTdted traverse and of a for angle
fire were mechanical lirni tations of the cannon itself as it "ras ;'lotL"lted
on the Increased traverse could have been obtainEld by the use
of a turret, albei t adding 'oJeight, and higher elevations by
mou"lting or shortening the recoil distance. Both were wi thin the state
of the ;lrt in the period prior to 1955. It is undGrstandahle that
using self-propelled in these two
disadvantages of their weapons in particular,
but it is not so cIgar wn}" those making the post tiorld II analyse,')
still considered these general of self
propelled artillery. traverse and a lack of high. angle fire
were not signiflcant disadvantages of self-propelled artil
lexnJ.
The di sadvantages of self-!Jropelled artillery distill to one:
heavy and attenda.1'lt li:nitations. i'iithin the limitations of tb.e
materiel available, and the technology that coulri be hear.r
weight was a significant drawback that to be inherent to self
artillery "Crior to 1955.
65
Conclusions
By 1955. mach could be said in favor of both towed self
artillery. l'here was a tendenC'J. because of ad,rar..ces in
for self-prooelled artillery to be considel'ed lr.cre favorably
as a u..u.versal mode of artillery transport. dut by 1955, net clear-cut
of opinion existed for either towed or
artillery. 'l'ft1.S was ?robably just as well; lluoh remained to be done to
improve the materiel for towed and self-propelled. artillery.
:'he artille!"J in the iJ. 3. in 1955 Has bot.'l selof-orooelled
and This of artiller,y was due to the argu
Inent that had been conducted through the years. In general, the
argwnent had been conducted well, by nroponents of both fon1S of
lery trans"9ort. 'llie only criticis:n that :night be !Tlade would be towards
those in the post .,jorld ;,jar II era who failed to base their judgement
on what could be done, rather than what had been done.
And this is the lesson that can be drawn from the at"gu1I'1ent of
towed versus self-propelled artillery in the U. 3. Army pri:>r to 1955:
In the present age ..,r rapid advances in technology, it is i.nportant to
take appropriate cognizance of equi?l'lent that be made, as well as
that is made. Further, to best use technology, soldiers
learn to establish characteristics desired in materiel and require
to design to these characteristics.
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---_.
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Conolly, Lt ChI lie a. n:1ot-:>:- Transportation tor Artillery, II !he Field
Artillery Journal, Vol. IX, J 25.5-275.
Cox, Lt Col Landon G. and r,t Col Harold G. "me Armored
Division,f' 'lbe Field Artillery Journal, Vol. AXXVl:X, No, 6
1949), 254-257.
IAmn, Lt Col Jerrr,f F. tf3elf-Propelled Artillery in Positi.onal
'lhe -r\rmY Col"!1bat Forces Journal, Vol. IV, 4 195:3),
14-17.
":he Ex'oeri."ental J.lechani zed Force, It Ibe Field Juotillerr
Vol. do. 4 (July-August 1928), 3<16-3;>2.
Lt Col IIF!'o:!'l :'iorocco to 6erlin," Lbe .?ie:!..d ,'..rtiller-l
Journal, '/01. 3 (.:ay-Ju."1e 4
1943), 162-163,
toster, Capt I'l'arl L. IlA fest of a."l
leroY: Joumal, '{ole ;.;0. :3 (:':ay-J'Jne 1931), 321-329.
Facts and It
6
Jeard, Capt It me Ievelo,ment and "l'actical Ehloloy-=nent of
,
Portee Artiller".I,tI Field Ar:tillery Journal, '/01. ... .;0. 2
1929), 119-127.
ilibbs, Ya.j .}en 7.ouis::;. on t..'I)e li'ield Artillery Conference,"
'rhe Field ktille2;l JQ.!!rl1al, il0 1. JOt 7 (J"..tl,:r
4IJ7-413.
If ::Orses, 'i'ractors nnd .'.:0u.."'1t s ,II
JourJlal, :':0. r; Lecember 192JT, 472-492.
:ioyle, >.aj t ..ene De:l. zat Lon," .1le Fiold v'ouY'nal,
'101. I .. VIII t ::0. 3 June 1923), 2}3-248.
';oie, Col Leon F. ArtilleI"".1 1s the TIUng,:I ..,or,
101. .jo. 5 (..")9?te!nbor-Octobe!' 1952), 10-13.
___-I :'line .:A-- t H J. 3. Q>;;:'uat Jouma:l:" Vol ..I.':',
'1 (Peb:-uary )2-3:3.
C3.?t d. 1I of ArtiUer'J in If
n.,e1,d Artillea Journal, LZO. 2 1925),
131-134
.iooctr, ChI ':'ucian.3. Artiller:r, II Ar.n:r '/01. .L,
1 (July-Aur;'lst 1920), d-14.
____ .. l'ranS'?ort,h It 6
(.:a..v-June 1921), 303- 306.
____ l'ransnort for Field iu-tillery," Field k"tillery
J01IDlal, Vol. Vi, 1 ..
J:.,t Col 3idwell. 3Pi" TIle Arrrri Fo%:,ces
'/01. 4 1952), 30- 31.
Ca.rriages for Divisional Artillery," 1he Field Artillery Joumal,
lJol. Xi, !"-Jo. 4 (July-August 1921), 412-
l
}1J.
Trans!,ort for HeaV'"j' Field Artillery," :!he Field Artiller'(
"'01. '{i, Jo. 2 (JLpri1-June 1916), 201-213.
7'J
.. d.cha:"d Guns: Develo'tJ:':'le.i1ts and.
'j,'rands, If \'01. LX, 0 .December 1951), 6-11.
\fOver 5igaal ltort Sill, CJ.claho:;'la, ,rith a batter:-r of
field Field .Attillerv Journal, Vol 3
June 1922), 24J{-2
J
.,,7.
. - ." II t f.... .. _. J t ' till
Pen.l"le11, .. li. :'.CJ.. '_:1e 0 a .L4lrr,.l ILr ery
rlegiment of ?leld "Tith Tractors,:' rme)Fi91d
Journal, lol. ):I, ..io. 5 (Seota:nber-October 1921 , ,:J.6o-475
.itu:nboU3h, Aaj J. II'rest of 1st Jattalion,3)rd Artil
leryt ,. l1:l.ELfle1d Artillery Jou...""'T1al, Vol. 6
Decenber 539-555.
Scoffer, Levns H. "An 3attalion in Combat," .J1.e fl'lld Artiller..z
Journal, Vol. 1 1945), 29-31.
Gen C. uField .t:..rtillery ?rograss," ilia Field
., 1 11 1 . '''.'
0
"( J b De
ce=n
b
\,N
.:t\4-t.r\J
vO v., .'10. er- er .JV' JJV.
If\Jnivorsal Cross Cou.'1tr'J Cargo 'lehicles,1f '!he Field Arti.llo:x Journal,
'/01. 12:11, jOe 3 192)), 250-255.
:'t Col I. 5. FA Acros s France," 1n8 Finld .Artillery
Journal, Vol. Jo. 4 (A;:>ril 1945), 204-205.
dilSO!l, Capt .Arthur. "Field iLrtiller-J ..-J1th the Force, II
'llie Field .Artillory Journal, "101. A.X:L:, ]0. J (.':ay- 1931),
2.53- 26
r
?
on file at
fi,a U. S, Arrr.y General Starf
Q,11ege Library, Fort .Leavenworth. Kansas
l\r:ny GrotU'ld Forces 30ard, uInterviews on Anno:-ed Corn;::land .I.ctivi ties
with Officers of the 1st Arnored Ld.vision: Italy,
:{ovember 16-29, 1943. It
.deadquarters Army Ground Forces. It M!,ort of Joard of Off! cars Q,nvened
to Study the Equip:nent of the Post "'iar tt -.._ashington:
'_'jar College, 20 September 1945.
:Ieadquarters lhi ted Army. C1Artillery Infon.:ation Service,
No. 1 t" .!:. January 19'''4.
w
"Artillery Intonnation Service, .:Iemorandum l;.,,, vunc 1944.
____ Information Service, Aemorandun No. '( ,r,
1944.
Jeac.qaarters Ul1i ted ?orces, :'lleater of Operations.
:, of the 3eneral .":tudy of the Or;;ani zation a.'1d
of Field '.mi ts. :I .!. 1}40.
____ of the General 3oard: ,.)tuet of the Jrganization,
and lactical of the Infant:"'".! J.i. vision.;1
sA.
j,"'ne Jolt ..a.'1ufacturin6 Com';'Jany. nil :el! ?hoto:;raphs .:iho\-rin:; Cater'Oillar
Development fOl" . :iIitary ?u..",?oses.
1I
.!. 1922.
Letter, :.be Adjutant General' 5 Jffice. ...;ubject: ult.:.')l)oint::i.ent of ,iar
iJepart.rn9!lt .iqui 3oal-.d." 'J October
........., of t,he l..r:TJ. ;r !;.e?ort of the Ar.':lY Field
Advi on Field Arti11e1'7 If ,;ashington,.1 j .Februal?
J.9
1
}1.
,)., t. if 0;: the .. .. 3oarcj. II
,'-asm.n ::ton, 1) Ja.."'luar::.r 1946.
____a UA of the itr""lamO?lt, Calibers a"d i:,rpes of
::.inds and ?ro'1ortion of iV!L"r.'.Uli tion
t
and 1:ethods of of
the to be i ..ssi:'1\ed to a Field im:..y." 5. 1919.
Aberdeen Ground, :'roof Gun and Carriag'3
I'Final of l'hree Chrl.stie J',beeled Cater)illar
for 155 ::l/r:. 191,) (Fil1oux). It 2l
j,'ile Artillel"J"::';choo:!.. H ArtillezrJ in I' ?ort ...;ill, 01(!.ahoma.
1953. (l)raft
.. .:;ccool. 3ased on Jtudies Cond'lcted at the
Conference: on 11,
19
J
k5.
__e tf :)f 'igecial :3oard A!,,,?ointed to ::'..evie11 :.:,ere:o?!:lents in
Artillery. U Fort .Jill t Oi-:lahona. 27 1944.
____a If :i:nfomation St1r.1!nary Ono." Fort ,;'ill, Oklaho:1a.
1944.
Gene:-a2. A Forces, of the Chief
of ..Artillery. iI?rocgedings of the .:3oard of ::>ffice:s. a
9 1913.
I
'/ )
, ....
loSt :,,:. :'ra::1cis "O!"f:anization.
of JielJ A:."tiller:-/ "r.i.th ..echanized Cavalr'J.;'
fo!' tha Advance eo'..lr-SO, I'ie
Field Ar Jchool, :"ort -;ill, O;{la:lo .193=.
lOth !Il'ti i..ler:r Jatta.lion. ;i a.."d Lassons of tjo
.licilian 2'-) 1)/,-).
Lt Co1 ?aul F., et al, of ?i. 910
Jattaltons: A ;'.esearcil II .:.cho)1,
l'J10X, 1949-19.50.
:iutton, Col Carl I. l' .. F.ield Artillel.7 COr.trAand<9::' in
'::'U:-o.)ea21!neater. II ?ort 11, 1951.
Col... Artillcr.-.,.,
v :)<1 J. i..n'.l.'T .Artillor:: lQh5.
O!'fico, Cltic.r :)f .::-: eld
,.e.1"C!1 .191).
Off:.ce, C:Uef of Ol'Wlance. on Javelol1:r:ent .a.t3riel:
:o'to!", .I\:-t
22 1. 9)