Kant: Critique of Pure Reason Logic is a science which provides nothing but a comprehensive exposition and strict proof

of the formal rules of thought. In logic reason (understanding) deals with nothing else but itself and its forms. The difference between knowledge and science in German, since according to Kant to acquire knowledge, one has to look to (rely on) sciences properly and objectively. And in fact there three since they are Science, Knowledge, and Cognition? To judge such knowledge, one presupposes Logic. Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori. A priori cognition is a cognition that ascertains something about objects before they are given to us (to be understood or cognized). Nature the sum of the objects of experience. Experience (as a way of cognizing) is that in which objects of senses/perceptions can be cognized. Any object of the sensible intuition is an appearance. For any cognizing one needs understanding, and this latter has its own rules. The rules of understanding must be presupposed within me even before the object is given (in order to be cognized). There are two types of reasons cognition: concept). 2. Practical cognition (to make the object actual) In both cases (theoretical and practical) the pure part, i.e. the part in which reason determine its object entirely a priori, must be expound (set forth) by itself and must not be mixed with other resources. 1. Theoretical cognition (which determines the object and its

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason Thales found out that what he need to do is not to investigate (trace) what he saw in the figure (properties?), nor to investigate the mere concept which leads him to know about the properties. He must rather bring out the properties that the figure had by virtue of (from) what he himself was thinking into it a priori and exhibiting (presenting). And he found out that in order to know anything a priori and with certainty (securely) about the figure, he must not attribute anything to the thing except what necessarily follows from what he himself put into it in accordance with its (his) concept (of it). Reason & Nature: reason has insight only into that which it produces according with its own plan. It is necessarily Reason which- using laws underlying its judgments- proceed and compel nature to answer its questions. If Nature is not lead and instructed by Reason, then all (scientific) observations would be contingent (incoherent). Reason approaches Nature to be taught by Nature, but not in way of a pupil who lets the teacher to tell him whatever he wants, Reason approaches Nature as a judge (questioner) who puts questions in front of the witnesses and compel them to answer. So a revolution occurred in the way of mans thinking based on this idea, the idea is that: physics (or natural sciences in general) must seek, in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature, in nature whatever reason must learn from nature and would know nothing on its own. So there must be laws put by reason in nature, these laws must be sought once again by reason itself in nature, so reason recognizes itself in nature once again. And it is right here, i.e. in this seeking and knowing of the reasons laws according to what is put by reason in nature that

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason sciences occur, and it makes a science to be referred to as science of such and such kind. The question by posed by Kant or actually by the history of metaphysics itself: why does metaphysics, despite being the highest of all sciences and most enduring ones, is not on the secure path of {being} a science, or has been unable to find the secure path of a science? In metaphysics, reason is reasons pupil, i.e. it approaches itself and learns of itself, it seeks the laws of reason within reason itself and nothing else. Is it possible for metaphysics at all to be on the secure path of a science? If yes how? If no how is it that other sciences (e.g. physics) are able to be on that path by seeking in nature what reason itself puts inside nature, but metaphysics which approaches reason via reason (i.e. pure reason) is not able to be on that path? In short, if sciences are forms of seeking the rules of reason in whatever, then why metaphysics as the highest form of this seeking has not been thus far able to be on the safe route of science? The relation (properly speaking conformity) between cognition and objects in regard of which there are two assumptions (presuppositions): 1. Our cognition must conform to the object. But if thats the case, then how is it possible at all to assert the possibility of establishing something a priori about them through concepts (i.e. about whatever one cognizes)? 2. The second assumption (presupposition) is that object must (necessarily) conform to our cognition. This assumption is consistent better with the demanded possibility of an a priori cognition of objects. The same can be assumed for intuitions and objects in metaphysics, i.e. if we assume that our intuition must conform to 3

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason the character (constitution) of the object, and then there remains no reason why there must be anything a priori about that character or constitution. But one can not stay with intuitions, but they are to be come cognitions, so they are referred to objects which must be determined by them, for this determination one needs concepts and here again the question of conformity emerges, i.e. is it the concept (through which the determination is brought out) that conforms to the object or is it the object that conforms to the concept? For if we make/admit the first assumption then we face the same perplexity/difficulty with regard to the possibility of knowing anything a priori in the object. But if we assume that the object or the experience of the object conforms to the concept then there one can find an easier way out (of difficulty/perplexity). For in every experience (as a way/form of cognizing) there is an understanding, and any understanding has its rules which must be presupposed within me even before the object (the perceptual object here) is given to us. Objects that can be merely thought, but can not be given in experience. The changed way of thinking provides us with a touchstone: what we cognize a priori in things is what we ourselves put into them. This changed way of thinking (objects must conform to the concepts and not the other way round) provides us with two accomplishments: we can readily/without difficulty explain how a priori cognition is possible (the possibility of cognizing anything a priori). And furthermore we can provide satisfactory proofs for the laws lie at the basis of nature. On the previous procedure neither of these accomplishments was possible.

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason The first part of metaphysics deals with the possibility a priori cognition of concepts for which appropriate objects are given to us in experience. The deduction gained in the first part of metaphysics produces/brings about a disturbing difficulty while we deal with the second part of metaphysics (which deals with going beyond the boundary of experience): the difficulty is that with this power/faculty of cognizing a priori we can not go beyond the boundary of possible experience; i.e. it makes the second part of metaphysics to encounter a crisis in reaching its end. The question here posed is as follows: does our a priori rational cognition deal with/apply only experiences and what is given in them? Does it not also (and truly above all) deal with/apply things in themselves and does it leave them uncognized by it? This question is answered in this way: what impel reason to go beyond any boundary of any experience and all appearances is the unconditioned that is demanded by reason itself in things in themselves. The unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction if we assume that our experiential cognition conforms to the objects as things in themselves, because in this case experience would be the highest form of cognition, since it deals with and cognizes things in themselves. But if we reverse the assumption the other way round then the contradiction will vanish, i.e. if we assume that our experiential cognition does not conform to things in themselves, but rather the things as appearances that conform to our way of presenting them. So if we are to go beyond the boundary of experience, we have not to assume that we cognize things in themselves, but, rather, we have to assume that things we experience are appearances which conform to the way of our presenting (perceiving). 5

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason There is still another option that is to discover in the practical cognition data which enable us to determine reasons transcendent (suprasensible) concept of unconditioned. The critique is a treatise on method of the science of metaphysics, and not a system of the science in general. Yet it does set down the entire outline of the science including its bounds as well as its entire internal structure. Speculative reason consists in the described attempt to transform the procedure thus previously used in metaphysics. It has a twofold peculiarity: first, it can and should/ought to measure its own capacity/ability according to different ways in which it selects objects for its thought. For in a priori cognition nothing can be attributed to the object except those which the thinking subject takes (out) of himself. Secondly speculative reason can and ought to/should enumerate its various ways of posing problems to itself, and in this way it can set down the entire outline of the system of metaphysics. As regards the cognitive principles of speculative reason, it is an entirely separate, self-subsistent unity in which as an organized body each member exists for the sake of all and all for the sake of each. So we can take no principle in one relation, but it has to be investigated in a thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason. What enables metaphysics to complete its task is to deal merely with principles and with the restrictions determined by these principles themselves. Speculative reason does not go beyond the boundary of experience (this is an instruction of this critique which can be referred to as a negative one). One of the tasks of this critique which can be referred to as a negative role is to restrict the principles of speculative reason (which are related to sensibility) 6

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason in order to keep it from expanding the bounds of the sensibility to that extend until it embraces every thing, and thus even threatens to displace the pure use of reason. So in this restriction it is negative, but in doing this negative task it becomes positive by removing the obstacles that restricts and even threatens to annihilate/wipe out the practical of use reason. Taking things in two different ways: to the rules and laws of nature 2. Taking them as things as such or things in themselves, not subject to conform to natural laws hence free. Outer object & outer sense. Inner intuition 1. Taking them as objects of experience (appearances), conforming

Introduction
I. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PURE AND EMPRICAL COGNITION
All our cognitions begin with experiences (i.e. they rouse our cognitive power/faculty to its operation). But to begin with experiences dont mean they arise from them! The objects stirring our senses in part by themselves bring about/produce presentations. And in part, they set in motion our understandings activity to compare, connect and separate these presentations, and thus to process/work up/develop raw materials of senses in to a cognition of objects which is called experience.

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason A priori cognition is the one which is absolutely independent of experience. Posteriori cognition or empirical cognition whose sources are posteriori or through experiences. Pure a priori cognition is that cognition with nothing empirical is mixed, i.e. nothing from/through experience. So there are some cognitions that are a priori but not necessarily pure, e.g. every change has its own cause is a priori but not a pure one, since change is a concept obtained only from experience.

II. WE ARE IN POSSESSION OF CERTAIN A PRIORI COGNITION, EVEN COMMON UNDERSTANDING IS NEVER WITHOUT THEM
Experience teaches us of something to be thus or thus, but it cannot teach us that it cannot be otherwise (i.e. it cannot not teach us of its necessity to be thus and not so). If we have a proposition that in thinking it we at the same time think of its necessity then it (i.e. the proposition) is a priori judgment. And also if it is not derived from any proposition except the one which itself has the validity of a necessary proposition then it is absolutely a priori. If a judgment is thought with strict universality, i.e. thought in a way that no exception whatsoever is allowed as possible, then this judgment is not derived form experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. For experience never provides its judgments with strict universality, but always through inductions with assumed and comparative universalities, so we should, properly speaking, say as far as we have observed until now no exception is to be found to that rule. So in empirical

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason universality there is an upgrading from one that holds in most cases to one that holds in all. When universality is strict and belongs to the judgment essentially, then it points to a special cognitive source for the judgment, i.e. power of a priori cognition. So necessity and strict universality are two safe indicators of a priori cognition, indicators which belong together inseparably. The concept of cause contains the concept of necessity in the connection of the cause with the affect/change/alteration, and the concept of strict universality of the rule (governing the connection of the cause with the affect). But one does not need such examples, in order to prove that the pure priori laws and principles are actual in our cognition. For how could otherwise the very experience be possible without these first principles? I.e. any experience insofar as it is an experience contains an understanding, and any understanding, in turn, consists of its indispensable laws and rules which are a priori and through which the experience (as a stage/grade of understanding) gets its certainty and is regarded as an experience. In other word how could one prove the necessity of an experience, if all the principles of the experience were themselves empirical and hence contingent? So in every experience there must necessarily be some rules which are a priori by which an experience proceeds. When a concept has such an absolute necessity with which it presses itself upon us, then we must admit that this concept resides a priori in our cognitive faculty.

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

III. PHILOSOPHY NEEDS A SCIENCE THAT WILL DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITY, THE PRINCIPLES, AND THE RANGE OF ALL A PRIORI COGNITIONS
There are certain cognitions that leave the realm of all possible experiences, their corresponding objects of which can not be given in the realm of experience. And in these cognitions resides our reasons inquiry (inquiry into our reasons unavoidable problems). The unavoidable problems of reason are God, freedom, and immortality. And the science whose final aim, involving the sciences entire apparatus, is directed solely toward solving these problems is called Metaphysics. A large part of the critique consists in the dissecting/analyzing what concepts of the objects we have. But in this kind of analyzing we do not expand the concepts, but we spell the out/explain in details.

IV. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHENTIC JUDGMENTS

There are two kinds of judgments in accordance with the way the relation between subject and predicate of propositions is possible: analytic judgments (elucidatory/ judgments of clarification/ explicative) & synthetic judgments (expansive/ judgments of amplification/ augmentative): A. Analytic judgments are those in which the predicate B contains (though covertly) in the concept of the subject A. It means whenever we think of the concept A the predicate B (as a characteristic of A) is already there in the concept of the subject A. This kind of judgment is called 10

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason expansive since it does not add any thing to the concept (subject A) through the predicate B, but rather dissects/analyzes it (the concept of subject) into its component concepts which have already been thought within the concept. An analytic judgment can not be based on experience, because in this kind of judgment one does not need to go beyond the concept of subject A in order to find the predicate as connected with (or actually contained in) the concept of subject A. But all one needs to do is to dissect/analyze the concept in order to find the predicate in the concept: e.g. all bodies are extended. It must be noted that an analytic judgment does not expand our cognition of the concept, but it spell it out and make understandable for myself the concept I already have. B. Synthetic judgments are those judgments in which the predicate B lies quite outside the concept of subject A, although it is connected with the concept. This sort of judgment is called expansive/ampliative/augmentative because it adds a predicate to the concept which is not thought in the concept and cannot be distracted from it through any dissection. For example all bodies are heavy; here the predicate is something quiet different from what one thinks in the mere concept of body. Adding such a predicate which is quiet different from the concept yields/produces a synthetic judgment. In a synthetic judgment while the predicate B does not lie within the concept of subject A, so besides the concept there must be something else X on which the understanding relies in order to cognize nonetheless that

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Kant: Critique of Pure Reason predicate B belongs to the concept A. there are two types of synthetic judgments: that lies outside the concept and make possible the synthesis of the predicate B with the subject A). b. A priori synthetic judgments (the X cannot be sought in the realm of experience, so the connection of the predicate B with the concept A cannot be taken from experience). As regards b this question arises that how is it possible that something outside the concept is [necessarily] said about it, while it is not contained in the concept? Since the predicate is said with a high universality and necessity then its connection with the subject must be entirely a priori. In empirical

judgments this X is the experience of the object. a. Experiential/empirical synthetic judgments (experience is the X

V. ALL THEORETICAL SCIENCES OF REASON CONTAIN SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGMENTS AS PRINCIPLES

Mathematical judgments are one and all synthetic. Principle of contradiction is a principle of logic according to which predicate must contradict the subject. Synthetic proposition can be comprehend according to the principle of contradiction, however not through the proposition itself, but by presupposing another proposition form which it is deduces. And that is why mathematical propositions and judgments are synthetic (though a priori). Mathematical propositions are a priori judgments. The proposition 7+5=12 is a synthetic judgment, since the concept of the sum contains only the unification/union of the two

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Kant: Critique of Pure Reason numbers into one single number, but it does not contain what that single number is. In order to get to that single number one has to get assist from intuition. But it can never be gained by mere analyzing/dissecting of the concepts. Arithmetic propositions, therefore, are always synthetic judgments. The same is true of the geometrical propositions, i.e. they are also synthetic. The proposition straight line between two points is a synthetic judgment, since the concept of straightness refers to quality but not quality, and within this concept itself one cannot find the shortness, so it must be added to it from outside the concept. Identical propositions are those propositions which express the identity. Although the adherence of the predicate to concept contains a necessity, but still it does not mean necessarily that the proposition is an analytic one, since it is not the question whether what we add to the concept, but rather what we actually think in the concept. So when the predicate is not thought in the concept, in spite of being necessarily adhered to the concept, then, the judgment/proposition/ cognition is not analytic but rather synthetic. Natural science (physics) too contains synthetic a priori judgments as principles. Metaphysics is to contain synthetic a priori cognitions.

VI. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF PURE REASON

The general/proper problem of pure reason contains in the following question: how are synthetic [a priori] judgments are possible [a priori]?

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Kant: Critique of Pure Reason Standing and falling of metaphysics depends on the solution of the problem of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible, and also the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Answering that question which is contained in the general problem of metaphysics leads to solving other problems/questions concerning the possibility of pure use of reason in establishing and accomplishing all sciences which contain theoretical a priori cognition of objects; i.e. we also answer these questions: how a priori natural sciences are possible & how a priori mathematics is possible? The possibility of [actuality of] metaphysics as a science. Metaphysics is actual as a natural predisposition. I.e. reason by her very nature faces herself with questions that can not be answered by referring to any experiential use of reason. So all human beings, due to the nature of their reason and expansion of their reason to the point where they speculate, have a certain kind of metaphysics in themselves. But we must, through these predispositions, expand our pure reason and set for it limits that are reliable and safe. Hence we come to this question: how metaphysics as a science possible? So ultimately the critique [of pure reason] leads to the science of metaphysics. Dissection/analyzing of whatever concepts that are in our reason a priori is only a preparation and prearrangement for what is called metaphysics proper, but the purpose itself, since the purpose is to expand our cognition synthetically.

VII. IDEA AND DIVISION OF A SPECIAL SCIENCE UNDER THE NAME OF CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

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Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

Reason is the power/faculty which provides us with principles of a priori cognition. Hence pure reason is that reason (faculty/power) which contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori.

A priori cognitions are acquired and brought about by/according to principles, the sum of these principles is called organon of pure reason.

This sum of principles would become a system of pure reason (transcendental (the sum). philosophy) by comprehensive/exhaustive/thorough application of the organon

A critique [and not a doctrine yet] of pure reason is the science that judges pure reason, its sources and its bounds. It is a propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. The benefit of such a propaedeutic/critique is only negative in regards for speculation. Since it would only purify our reason and would not expand it but would keep it from errors.

Transcendental is all cognitions that deal not so much with objects as they deal with the way of cognizing them a priori. The system of these concepts (concepts of a priori cognitions of objects) is called transcendental philosophy.

The critique is a preparation for such an organon [of those a priori cognitions]. The object of inquiry [of this critique] is not the nature of objects/things which are inexhaustible/never ending, but rather the understanding that makes judgments/judges about things, and this understanding in turn is concerned with regards to its a priori cognition.

Transcendental philosophy as an idea of a science requires an outline of its plan which is made by the critique from the 15

Kant: Critique of Pure Reason principles, and with the guarantee of completeness and reliability of all the consisting components of the edifice/the transcendental philosophy. The necessity of a doctrine of elements insofar as the division of the science is concerned. Human cognition has two stems: sensibility/power of sense and understanding. Through the sensibility the objects are given to us, and through understanding they are thought.

I.

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS

PART ONE TRANSCENDENTAL AETHESTICS

Intuition is the direct/immediate way of relation of any cognition to objects, and that at which all thought/thinking as a means aims.

Intuition takes place only insofar as the objects are given to us. Objects are only given to us when we are affected in a way or another by the object.

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Kant: Critique of Pure Reason When we are affected by the objects then as a result of the way we are affected we acquire presentations/intuits. The capacity/faculty/power of acquiring presentations/intuiting is called sensibility. [The faculty of] sensibility is that through which the objects are given to us and it alone supplies us with intuitions. Through understanding objects are thought, and from it arise concepts. Sensation: is the effect of object on our capacity/power/faculty for presentation (sensibility). Empirical intuition: is the intuition which relates to the objects through sensation. Appearance (object): is the undetermined object of empirical intuition. Matter of appearance: is that which corresponds to the sensation. Form of appearance: is whatever in an appearance which brings about the fact that the manifold of the presentations can be ordered in certain relations. We are affected in a way or another by the objects as result of which we acquire related [re]presentations, and in this being affected and acquiring representations the objects are given to us, through this giving of objects intuitions take place. There must be a capacity/faculty for acquiring presentations which is called sensibility. It is through this capacity that we are affected by the objects and hence the objects are given to us and we acquire presentations i.e. we intuit. Sensibility provides us with intuitions. When we are affected by an object, this effect occurs on our sensibility, i.e. on our capacity to acquire presentations. This effect is called sensation. Sensation makes the intuition possible, the intuition that refers to the object in this way, i.e. through sensation, is called empirical

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Kant: Critique of Pure Reason intuition. The empirical intuition deals with appearances, i.e. it has appearances as its undetermined objects. -

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