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An analysis of UK cruelty towards asylum seekers.

Wyon Stansfeld, February 2013, (email: wyonstansfeld@gmail.com)

Introduction
This article is divided into three sections: 1. The case for thinking that the current UK response to asylum seekers is cruel. 2. Analysis of some of the root causes of the cruelty, and factors that sustain it. 3. Recommendations for ensuring a reduction in the cruelty. The main focus is on UK institutions and systems for managing asylum seekers particularly the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), though references are also made to the immigration courts, prevailing legislation with respect to asylum seekers, subcontracted security firms running the asylum and deportation system and the tabloid press. The intention is not to be destructively pejorative but rather to understand and explore the underlying roots of the problem in order to conclude with viable, constructive and ethically preferable recommendations which should reduce levels of cruelty within the system without making heavy demands on the public purse (and probably even saving money). The word cruelty is used in its broadest sense of indifference to suffering rather than in the more limited sub category of taking pleasure in anothers suffering, or sadism, which implies a more deliberate and conscious intention on the part of the perpetrator. Most of the cruelty towards asylum seekers in the UK occurs unintentionally, unconsciously and through indifference. Although there are not infrequent examples of deliberate and targeted sadistic attacks on asylum seekers for instance the violent assaults on them by members of the general public, or in a few instances by staff at Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) and during the deportation process, these instances, though highly reprehensible, form only a small part of the overall cruelty towards asylum seekers in the UK and are not our main concern here primarily because they are more likely to be defined as illegal, and therefore potentially manageable through a rigorous application of existing legislation. 1. The case for thinking that the current UK response to asylum seekers is cruel.

1.1 The imprisonment of asylum seekers in IRCs without charge and for unspecified periods. In the UK people are routinely imprisoned simply for claiming asylum from persecution. People held in this way are not advised how long they will be held for. Nor is there any absolute limit to the amount of time they can be held for, or any requirement for imprisonment decisions to be reviewed after a period of time. The initial decision to detain an applicant is normally taken without a thorough assessment of the nature of their asylum claim thus failing to adequately screen out those who are particularly vulnerable to re-traumatisation through being imprisoned. For instance significant numbers of torture victims or people who have been unlawfully imprisoned in their own

country end up being imprisoned.1 Confused and distressed, those imprisoned in this way struggle to understand the complex asylum procedure in a stressful and sometimes hostile environment. Many will at the same time be trying to cope with traumas experienced in their home country prior to escape or during the process of escape. Conditions within IRCs (which are prisons by another name) are widely recognised and well documented as being far from ideal. A series of unannounced Governmental inspections have exposed significant systemic deficiencies and major on-going concerns about the standards of care.2 Additionally there are not infrequent reports of riots, outbreaks of violence, escape attempts, arson, suicides, bullying and unexplained deaths.3 The UK immigration detention estate is one of the largest in Europe with between 2,000 and 3,000 migrants held in detention at any given time (with the capacity having increased to 3,500 in June 2011). Only just over half of these detainees remain for less than two months, the rest can stay considerably longer and between 5 and 10% are held for over a year. Of these cases over half are asylum related cases:4 The detainment of asylum seekers in prison is particularly cruel for those who have escaped or endured unlawful imprisonment in their own country. 1.2 The administration of asylum applications The consensus amongst those who have worked on behalf of UK asylum seekers for any period of time is that the system here is unfit for purpose. It is grossly inefficient, underresourced, and lacking in transparency. It is commonplace for letters not to be answered or lost without trace. A number of recent investigations into the UKBA confirm these conclusions. In July 2012 the Home Affairs Committees report into the work of UKBA (December 2011-March 2012) found a backlog of 276,460 outstanding immigration and asylum cases which they described as totally unacceptable. In November 2012 a report by John Vine, Chief Inspector of Immigration reported that senior UK Border Agency officials had misled parliament by wrongly claiming they had dealt with a backlog of asylum and immigration claims5 when in fact the operation to deal with them was so inefficient and

Rule 35 is supposed to prevent torture victims from being detained in this way but there are many examples of it being inadequately applied eg: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/torture-claims-handling-at-dover-immigration-removal-centre-criticised-8049441.html. Another example is in the most recent independent inspection of Harmondsworth IRC where the inspectors reported: Rule 35 reports and subsequent responses to detainees who may have been the victims of torture or who were unfit to detain were often insufficient or formulaic and gave limited assurance that the needs of individuals had been fully considered. http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmipris/immigrationremoval-centre-inspections/harmondsworth/harmondsworth-2011.pdf 2 See for instance: http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmiprisons/immigration-removal-centres 3 At the time of writing an investigation is taking place into the as yet - unexplained death of a detainee at Harmondsworth (one of 6 since 1989). http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/inquiry-under-way-into-the-death-of-detainee-at-the-harmondsworth-immigration-centre8274514.html 4 See: http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-uk. 5 See: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/asylumimprovement-project/aip.pdf?view=Binary. Many claims by UKBA in this report were later disovered

poorly managed that at one point more than 150 boxes of mail, including correspondence from applicants, lawyers and MPs, lay unopened in a room in Liverpool. At its peak this included 100,000 items of post, including 14,800 unopened recorded delivery letters and 13,600 unopened first and second class letters containing crucial information and documents about cases. All of this resulted of course in the asylum seekers concerned being kept in limbo for an average of 7 years and in some cases for much longer6. These inefficiencies and the huge waiting periods many asylum seekers endure heighten their anxiety, and undermine their hope of ever securing justice and sanctuary. Applicants are frequently blamed for UKBA errors and inefficiencies and have to suffer the consequences of this. For instance if a letter is reported as not having been received by the Home Office it is frequently presumed by the courts that it was never sent, whereas the Home Office may well have mislaid or failed to attend to it. Applicants with valid claims give up in despair of the process, a few commit suicide7 and many go underground as a result. Many of those who get refugee status only achieve this after a prolonged and traumatic process. 1.3 Travesties of justice The right to seek asylum from persecution is a fundamental human right, enshrined in Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights8 and set out in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the UK is a signatory. This is a mechanism that has saved countless lives. Despite this the UKs application of the convention is marred by injustice. Nearly 30% of the initial refusals of asylum are later overturned by the courts each year indicating that there are serious systemic flaws in decision-making by UKBA. For a full and often scathing analysis of the inadequate and sometimes spurious arguments made by officials to justify so many of the initial decisions against asylum seekers the reader is referred to the Mark Hendersons excellent 2003 Independent Law Practitioners publication.9 The appeal system that follows the initial decision is also stacked against the asylum seeker applicants often struggle to find any or competent legal representation10, and many end
to be manifestly untrue for example: We have completed reviewing the legacy of over 450,000 unconcluded asylum cases ahead of schedule 6 Though current annual recording of Home Office statistics means it is very difficult to be derive longitudinal statistics and average waiting periods could well be longer than seven years. The oldest case the inspectors found in a sample of files had been waiting since June 1995 for a decision. The author has also come across examples even older than this. 7 Cohen J, Safe in our hands?: A study of Suicide and Self Harm in Asylum Seekers, J Forensic Leg Med. 2008 May;15(4):235-44. doi: 10.1016/j.jflm.2007.11.001. Epub 2008 Jan 28. 8 Article 14(1): Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 9 Best Practice Guide to Asylum and Human Rights Appeals. 2003, Mark Henderson. Immigration Law Practioners Association http://www.ein.org.uk/resources/fullBPG.pdf 10 This is a situation that has been exacerbated by progressive changes in the criteria for allocating legal aid to solicitors and their firms for asylum work. Additionally the combination of the fast tracking system and limited solicitor availability means that many asylum seekers are unable to secure legal advice within the limited time available to them.

up in court without a lawyer or without even knowing their rights. Those under the fast track system are frequently sent home without being afforded the opportunity to appeal in this country.11 If and when an applicant eventually gets to court the integrity of arguments used within court by the Home Office is often woefully inadequate (though frequently successful). For instance the wedge technique frequently used by the Home Office in which an apparent inconsistency in an appellants case is then used to erroneously argue that since the appellant has been found to be inaccurate/dishonest in one aspect of their application then their whole application is thereby rendered unsafe. This fails to take into consideration other explanations for an appellants inconsistency for instance confusion on account of PTSD or inadequate understanding of the language (or poor or biased interpreters). Common examples here are inconsistencies in the spelling of a surname or around dates of birth. The first can be ascribed to translation difficulties across different alphabets and/or illiteracy on the part of the applicant. The second to different cultural systems for recording dates or the fact that in many countries dates of birth are not customarily remembered. I have seen both used as a basis for undermining a case. The fact that a person may have deliberately lied in the misguided belief that that might increase their chances of success does not mean that they did not have a persuasive case without lying a fact that is rarely acknowledged in court. Another argument frequently used by the Home Office is that if these things really happened then why didnt the person report them earlier? This is particularly heinous in the case of rape in which allowance is rarely given to the fact that the applicant may have been too ashamed or embarrassed to admit such an event to a complete stranger on the point of arrival. It is also common for the Home Office to use spurious arguments to undermine apparently high quality evidence. To give one example from my own experience: I successfully smuggled out of Uganda a paper containing a wanted notice for a Ugandan politician whom I knew in the UK who had escaped and was claiming asylum. The notice had been published by the police in The Daily Monitor, one of Ugandas two leading newspapers. Pleased to have tracked down this evidence I navely thought that it would be a lynch pin in the mans case. However his reputable and effective solicitor advised that to present such evidence might even be counter-productive. She said that the Home Office would say that the notice was the result of a bribe to the paper (even though he was at the time already in Britain and
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This relates primarily to the so called white listed (sic) countries such as Serbia which the Home Office have decided do not persecute but additionally a smaller number of appellants from a variety of countries who are certified as having manifestly unfounded claims and returned without right of appeal. This policy, though pragmatic, is prone to the objection that it allows no reliable mechanism whereby Home Office assessments (of cases or countries) can be challenged. Affording people the right to appeal from their home country may not protect them, or be possible, if they are in fact justified in their claim for asylum because their persecution on return will compromise their capacity to appeal. Moreover because no one has successfully appealed from a home country (at least I have been unable to find any instances of this happening) this could be used as an erroneous circular justification for saying that that country must be a safe and the policy thereby justified.

very poor) and to give them the opportunity to make this allegation would risk compromising his credibility. The fact that it would have been tantamount to suicide for the Daily Monitor to be caught accepting such a bribe, thereby giving the countrys ruling regime an excuse to disband them, was not, she said, an argument that could be usefully made. It followed that similar allegations of bribery could be made about a warrant for the mans arrest (also smuggled out of the country) and a letter and membership card from the opposing political party that he was involved with. In this way much good evidence may never reach the court, or will be rendered useless or worse if it does, and the Home Offices stance on such evidence is challenged all too infrequently because of fears that producing such evidence will undermine rather than substantiate an application. But having no evidence is also, of course, a reason for a case to be dismissed. So it frequently becomes a matter of damned if you do (provide evidence) and damned if you dont.12 The adjudication of a persons entitlement to asylum is one the most significant decisions to be undertaken by of our judicial system since a mistaken verdict can result in execution, torture or unfair imprisonment on the appellants return to their home country. The acid test for discerning the justice of the system is to see if this has in fact occurred. Although the fate of deported asylum seekers remains largely undocumented, a number of organisations have compiled evidence that the human rights of refused asylum seekers are being violated upon return. Deportees are often arrested, put in prison, and tortured. Some are charged with treason; some disappear altogether. Often the very fact that they have claimed asylum in another country is used to justify persecution on their return. Here are some examples of deported asylum seekers being imprisoned, tortured or executed on return: Sri Lanka13, Iran14, DRC15, Uganda16, Kenya17, General 18. An official review of information on return conditions in home countries19 though unable to get accurate information for a number of significant countries with a likely risk of persecution nonetheless identified accurate information about risks in a number of other countries, for example: Algeria: risk of execution or incarceration, China, risk of imprisonment or torture, Eritrea: arbitrary detention, torture and death, Iran: imprisonment, Somalia high risk of sexual violence

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For more on perverse and unjust *asylum+ decisions arising from the culture of disbelief within the Home Office see The Independent Asylum Commissions (IAC) Report 2008a and also Souter 2011. The IAC has further warned that some of the UKBAs targets regarding the number of returns have led to a culture in which every application for asylum is viewed as a potential refusal. The focus is on removal rather than on the provision of sanctuary to those in need (IAC 2008b: 15). Confronted with disbelief and poor representation, genuine refugees are unable to put forward their claims properly. 13 http://rac-vic.org/?p=380; and http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/15/united-kingdom-haltdeportation-flight-sri-lanka 14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rahim_Rostami 15 http://justicefirst.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/UNSAFE-RETURN-DECEMBER-5TH-2011.pdf 16 http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/64236 17 http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Refugee-at-centre-of-deportation-saga-dies/-/1056/1647200//mxrufm/-/index.html 18 http://oxmofm.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Leana-and-Charlotte-FINAL.pdf 19 Review of information on return conditions of origin for asylum seekers in the UK. Report prepared for the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information Michael Collyer and Dulani Kulasinghe

towards returned female asylum seekers. These are all countries to which refused asylum seekers had been forcibly deported from the UK in 2009, at the time of the report. 1.4 Destitution amongst asylum seekers. Despite the long periods they often have to wait for a decision asylum seekers are not allowed to work. The vast majority are also subject to no-choice dispersal around the UK and forced to rely on very limited cash support from the state to try to meet their essential living needs. Most live in poverty asylum support rates are less than 70% of income support and inefficiency, delay and maladministration mean that many do not even receive the meagre amount to which they are entitled. Numerous research reports by charities show that children, women, older people, those with mental health needs, and survivors of torture and sexual violence are among those living in destitution, vulnerable to further abuse and exploitation.20 Because of this situation some asylum seekers seek unofficial work or break the law out of desperation (e.g. with theft, prostitution etc). If discovered this then undermines their application for asylum and can prejudice courts to adjudicate against them. 1.5 The treatment of refused asylum seekers. Many refused asylum seekers do not believe that they will be safe if returned to their home country and remain in the UK without being deported21. The precise number remaining in this way is unknown but prior to the Legacy Cases Review was thought to be somewhere in the range 155,000 to 283,00022. Refused asylum seekers are not allowed to work and are deprived of the rights of normal citizens including the usual statutory support safety nets, thereby rendering them effectively stateless and powerless. The few that receive state support (only about 5 per day) and housing23 (usually poor), can only get this if they are prepared to agree in principle to be returned home something which many are afraid to do. As a result large numbers of refused asylum seekers, including women and children, become destitute and homelessness. Refused asylum seekers seeking emergency homeless accommodation (night shelters etc.) are usually refused this as well because they are not entitled to housing benefit. The fact that they are not allowed to work means that many refused asylum seekers end up working illegally, often in very exploitative conditions, or they are forced to earn money through prostitution and begging. Refused asylum seekers have to sign regularly with UKBA (often travelling long distances at their own expense to do so). This has the effect of regularly re-sensitising their fear of deportation and contributes to many disappearing.
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See full list of research at http://stillhumanstillhere.wordpress.com/resources/ Most refused asylum seekers are not in fact deported. For instance only 13% were deported between April 2011 and February 2012: http://www.workpermit.com/news/2012-12-13/ukimmigration-watchdog-says-only-13-of-failed-asylum-seekers-deported 22 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12356617. The figure should be significantly lower by now although UKBA reporting on the matter has been subject to considerable criticism and probably seriously overestimates the reduction. 23 Those that are housed in this way under the NASS scheme have no say in where they are housed (so are frequently cut off from diaspora support). They can also be re-housed at short notice at any moment.

1.6 Practices around the deportation of refused asylum seekers Refused asylum seekers are frequently not given time to put their affairs in order, collect their possessions or say goodbye to their loved ones in this country before they are forcibly deported. Some are illegally gagged or injected with tranquilisers. Deportation methods are frequently extremely violent and the use of racist language by contractors is commonplace. In 2008 a report by Medical Justice24 examined nearly 300 alleged assaults on asylum deportees and led Dianne Abbot MP to comment that it was: one of the most shocking reports about our immigration system that I have seen in 20 years as a Member of Parliament. The report Outsourcing Abuse catalogues the frightening state-sponsored violence that happens to asylum-seekers when they are being deported. This report suggests a complete failure [by the Home Office] to investigate many of the allegations This report is distressing and upsetting for anyone to read. But for Ministers it is a damning verdict on their inability to inject even a shred of humanity into a flailing immigration system. Shocking as this report was to some MPs it did not however enable them to stop the practice and two years later in 2010 Jimmy Mubenga was killed whilst being deported. Sadly Jimmys case is by no means the only time death has occurred on account of deportation from the UK (and for that matter other European countries).25 26 A year after Jimmys death in October 2011 the Guardian reported no improvement in deportation techniques27 and Jimmys wife, five children and his wider family were advised two years after his death in July 201228 that the Crown Prosecution Service had decided not to prosecute. Violent deportation techniques are still in use because they are an inevitable consequence of compulsory deportation. Despite denials from the UKBA, there are ongoing concerns that guidelines against particular techniques are still being flouted,29 and another case came to light only a few days before this article was completed (February 2013).30 1.7 Incidental cruelty.

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http://www.medicaljustice.org.uk/content/view/411/88/ http://www.irr.org.uk/news/analysis-deaths-during-forced-deportation/ This includes the account of a Jamaican woman being deported from the UK: In front of her 5-year-old son, they held her down to stop her struggling and placed a body belt around her waist, bound her wrists to handcuffs attached to a belt and tied her thighs and ankles with leather belts. They then wrapped 13 feet of tape around her mouth to stop her screaming. She was taken to hospital in a coma from which she never recovered (she died of brain damage caused by lack of oxygen). None of the officers involved have been convicted or disciplined.
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Deaths have also been associated with many other aspects of the asylum system with the Institute for race relations reporting 77 deaths on account of asylum and immigration policies in the four years leading up to 2010. amongst the 7 reported of dying in IRC custody was a Sudanese man found hanged after erroneously being told he was to be deported. All as reported by Karen McVeigh in the Guardian Weekly 22/10/10.
27 28

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/12/jimmy-mubenga-death-deportation http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/20/jimmy-mubenga-case-charges-perverse 29 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jan/26/deportation-techniques-mps-warn 30 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21384435

Sometimes the devil is in the detail. Those that work on behalf of asylum seekers encounter myriad examples of incidental cruelty which whilst not illegal or a direct contravention of human rights nonetheless causes extra suffering to asylum seekers and contributes to making their experience in this country unpleasant. For the sake of brevity I have restricted myself to four out of many examples from my own experience: Asylum seeker who fled to this country in 2001 after being beaten, and tortured in Zimbabwe. He was refused asylum and instructed to return voluntarily. Unconvinced that this would be safe he stopped signing and worked for several years illegally. Finding that this was unsustainable with great reluctance and trepidation he eventually reported himself to UKBA and asked to be sent home, justifying it to himself as the lesser of two evils. It took him some time to find the right official at the UKBA to make his request, but when he did he was advised that they werent deporting people to Zimbabwe because it isnt safe there. When he asked if that meant he could claim asylum, work or get benefits he was advised that he couldnt because his case was exhausted. A man with a strong case for making a fresh claim for asylum was advised that he needed to personally bring his application to Liverpool. He could not afford the very expensive fare to Liverpool and asked if he could post the application, but was refused. He enquired whether there was a purpose to the visit for instance would he be interviewed, or fingerprinted, or anything of that nature, and was advised: no, all we will do is take the letter from you. Asylum seeker who, though living in Oxford, was asked to sign in London. When I phoned to ask if arrangements for signing could be transferred to Oxford I was advised that this never happened. When I quietly corrected the person advising her of other instances I knew of in which applicants are allowed to sign in Oxford she said that the policy on this had changed (not in fact true). I then asked if in that case the asylum seeker could apply to have his expenses paid and she said No, but if he doesnt like it he can always return to home. Following this I asked to speak to the case-workers manager who advised that the man was in fact entitled to apply for expenses but that in order to do this he was required to make a separate, unpaid for, trip to London in order to make the application in person for future expenses to be paid. Refused asylum seeker who had been living in Oxford for 10 years was advised, with three days notice, that he and his son were to be moved to NASS accommodation in Plymouth so that the flat they were in (provided by Social Services) could be used for another purpose. No account was taken of the support network they had built up in Oxford or the sons settled and happy attendance at school. The man and his son had insufficient time to say goodbye to all their friends or to adequately pack the chattels that had been acquired over 10 years (including a washing machine acquired with a charity grant). When the van arrived to transport them to Plymouth the irritable driver refused to allow them to take more than a two suitcases in total. They had no financial means, or remaining time, to arrange to return for the rest of their belongings. 2. Analysis of some of the root causes of the cruelty, and factors that sustain it. 2.1 The UK is by no means unique in its cruelty towards asylum seekers. There are many parallels in the treatment of asylum seekers across the world and, as far as I am aware, cruel components to the processing systems of every country to which they escape. Interestingly

also it seems that many countries have developed cultures for processing asylum seekers that are remarkably similar in detail to that adopted by the UK. Another interesting phenomena is that systems for processing asylum seekers frequently appear to mirror what has happened to applicants up to the point that they claim asylum. The table on the next page outlines some of these mirroring reflections.

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2.2 Mirroring effect of the UK asylum process.

Situation in the home country
Many of those who become asylum seekers in the UK have been imprisoned without charge and for indefinite periods. During imprisonment it is hard or impossible for them to access any or adequate legal assistance and they are not automatically advised of their rights. Many asylum seekers have been arrested and interrogated e.g. for their assumed political beliefs and activities.

Mirror in the UK
Many asylum seekers are imprisoned without charge for indefinite periods The same. For example although asylum applicants are allowed to have legal representation in their critical first interview it isnt a requirement that they are advised of this (and many arent). Many asylum seekers are unable to access any or competent legal help. Shortly after claiming asylum, asylum seekers asked a lot of questions (To establish the basis on which they are claiming asylum and its credibility). For instance if they claim to have fled because of persecution for their political beliefs the questioning will include detailed questions about their political activities in the country from which they have escaped. In this way many asylum seekers are asked very similar questions to those that they were being asked during interrogation at home. The same

Those asylum seekers who have been imprisoned in their home countries often find that the legislative context is weighted against them with an implicit assumption of guilty unless found innocent. There is a culture of disbelief. Many asylum seekers have been tortured prior to coming to this country.

Once arrested many asylum seekers did not know how long they would be held for or if they would be tortured or punished or indeed if their period of incarceration would culminate in execution. The judicial systems of the home countries from which many asylum seekers originate frequently had a political component e.g. justice was more likely to be stacked against those coming from a particular ethnic, religious or 31 tribal or other category . Many asylum seekers have been imprisoned without having committed a crime. Because of the ethnic, religious, tribal or other category to which they belong many asylum seekers have been unable to flourish in their countries of origin. For instance they have been denied the right to vote, or to receive the same benefits as other citizens or the right to particular sorts of work or status. In short they found the system against them. Many have been deliberately targeted for abuse in their home country the extreme form of which is genocide. Many asylum seekers risk their lives to reach the UK, frequently at the expense of becoming separated from their belongings, families and loved ones. The journey is often traumatic. They dont know what awaits the other end and any hopes they may have of finding some measure of safety and protection are frequently frustrated after arrival.
31
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Apart from sporadic and unofficial physical violence asylum seekers arent physically tortured but the mental anguish associated with the asylum process should not be underestimated. I have lost count of the number of times that asylum seekers have said to me that their suffering in this country on account of the asylum process here has been similar in effect to their experiences in their home country. Similar. Asylum seekers with a genuine fear of being punished tortured or executed on their return have to wait in fear, for an indefinite period, to see if this is going to happen. As such their experience can be akin to being on death row. Similar. Although the British judicial system is meant to be separate from politics the administrative culture surrounding asylum seekers inevitably has a political component. Most politicians are anxious not to be perceived as being lax/nave with respect to asylum seekers who are disadvantaged under the law compared to ordinary citizens. 32 The same. Same, and in some aspects worse. The category asylum seeker as we have seen is distinctly disadvantageous. In particular they have no right to work or vote. Refused asylum seekers have even fewer rights, for instance they do not have a right to routine medical care. No other 33 group, even suspected terrorists , can be held indefinitely without charge. Not as severe, but a similar process. Asylum seekers are prone to being scapegoated picked out and blamed for everything. The same. As we have seen enforced deportation from the UK is itself potentially dangerous and the consequences of being returned home can be fatal.

Can include gender and sexual orientation. Many asylum seekers reach this country with perfectly legal and valid documentation. Others have to forge documents in order to escape or have no documents. Whether this should constitute a crime in the context of claiming asylum is controversial but it isnt in any case needed as a justification for their imprisonment. 33 See: http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.php for the temporal restrictions on terrorist detention without charge.

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2.3 It is important not to stretch the mirroring analysis beyond credibility or usefulness. Its inclusion here is partly because it is so often referred to by asylum seekers themselves, and those trying to represent them. But the phenomena is nonetheless startling and instructive. Together with the fact that so many countries around the world, just like the UK, have developed inbuilt systemic cruelty in the processing of asylum claims, it suggests that there is something intrinsic to the very fact of coming into contact with asylum seekers and encountering and witnessing their claims that undermines the humanity and impartiality of those responsible for processing them. On the face of it this is hard to understand. Asylum seekers are arguably amongst those who have suffered most in the world and by our own admission despite all the difficulties associated with applying for asylum a significant number of them demonstrate genuine reasons for requesting sanctuary and help. Why then is the system so manifestly cruel in the way that it responds to them? 2.4 I believe that the main answer to this is psychological. It is precisely because many asylum seekers have suffered so much that the reactions to them become so systemically entrenched in cruelty. There are essentially only two reactions we can make in the face of great suffering. The first is to believe and engage with it, opening our hearts and relating to it empathically and expansively. The second is to contract and defend against it. 2.5 The first (expansive) reaction is difficult and onerous. This is because the process of opening up to anothers suffering is intrinsically painful. Empathy involves imagining ourselves in someone elses skin and allowing ourselves to feel some of their pain. This is painful34. Moreover because we now understand and believe the person or persons concerned we feel called upon to help them, and this too can be painful in its implications because it might be at the expense of our own limited resources and peace of mind. Indeed the more suffering that is witnessed, the more painful it is to empathically open ourselves to it and the more likely we are to (unconsciously) take the second option of defending against it. It is for this main reason that I believe that the cruelty of the system has developed as a defence against the pain of those operating it. For the majority, who are not directly involved with the asylum system, the defence against suffering primarily manifests as denial, indifference and passivity towards asylum seekers. But for those operating the system there is a danger that their defences against the suffering of asylum seekers become distorted by the powerful and toxic psychological forces involved. In particular the gate keepers to the system, the border guards, prison warders, Home Office prosecution lawyers, judges, sub-contracted security and escort guards and UKBA processing staff are all at risk of becoming (largely unconscious) accomplices in the generation and perpetration of the suffering experienced by asylum seekers.

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Or more accurately, both the process of moving towards opening (to anothers suffering) and the opening itself are painful though the latter has its compensations. Integral to moving towards anothers suffering is the need to disarm ourselves of our defences and strategies for avoiding suffering. This can be frightening because we are abandoning coping strategies and opening ourselves up to the unknown. And as we do so it is common to recognise our own complicity in the others suffering either through our actions or our passivity, and this can also bring with it powerful feelings of guilt and shame. But the opening up itself, once we reach it, can also be experienced as a cathartic exchange. Although we are now experiencing a small part of the others pain by opening up to it we have also reduced our own (painful) feelings of alienation, powerlessness, and separateness.

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2.6 Quite why the manner of treatment of asylum seekers often mirrors persecutory experiences in their home countries is a subtle and complex matter without a single explanation. One reason is that genuine asylum seekers arrive with an acquired (rational and experience based) distrust and fear of authority and of the machinations of the state. This fear and typecasting then projects, through the process of transference, onto the new personnel they encounter. In a sense they transfer the persecutor onto the new officials. The officials, in so far as they are unaware of the psychological dynamic involved (transference), are at risk of internalising the projection, being limited by it, or even acting it out (counter-transference) thereby inadvertently becoming the persecutor or replicating some of the structures of persecution. Another more obvious reason is that the psychological defences (against opening to suffering) to which personnel in the receiving country are prone are the very same defences of the personnel involved in the incarceration, torture and interrogation of eventual asylum seekers in their home countries. They too have developed a cocktail of defences against empathising with the suffering of the people that they process. And the methods, systems and institutions that arise from these defensive orientations are correspondingly similar. We will now look at some of the detail of how these defensive strategies work both at an individual level and as embodied within institutions. For the purposes of this analysis the focus here is primarily on how these phenomena manifest in receiving countries (though in line with the explanation above many of them are also transferable to an understanding of the processes involved in home countries). 2.7 The contracting, defensive strategies that are adopted in order to avoid experiencing anothers suffering can be characterised in terms of six Ds: disbelief, disassociation, depersonalisation, disempowerment, distortion (of feelings), devalidation and defamation as follows: Disbelief This is where the suffering of genuine asylum seekers is avoided through disbelieving them. It manifests as generalised prejudices: asylum seekers fabricate their stories. They are just manipulating the system. They are really economic migrants. Their stories are unbelievable it cant have been this bad, surely there was something else they could have done. This is the culture of disbelief already referred to. Of course it is also supported by the fact that it is sometimes right some asylum seekers are bogus. Some exaggerate or embellish their stories in order to try and improve their chances of being accepted.35 Some are purely economic migrants.36 The defence becomes problematic however when it automatically generalises to cover genuine asylum seekers (the phenomena of guilty until proved innocent).

35

This is frequently (from the asylum seekers point of view) a disastrous strategy as the exposure of a single lie can undermine a whole case (that was otherwise justifiable) see 1.3 above the wedge technique. One way erode this phenomena would be to increase the access and availability for asylum seekers of early, competent, legal advice in which, hopefully, they will be strongly advised of the strategic advantage in sticking to the truth. 36 Though this is somewhat complicated by the fact that persecutory regimes are usually also associated with poor economic policies and the resultant poverty. And poverty itself can become a method of persecution e.g. when certain groups within a country are denied the opportunity to become prosperous. The denial of economic opportunity is not an easy basis on which to argue for asylum, even though it can constitute a form of persecution.

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Disassociation. This is the orientation of not taking personal responsibility, e.g.: I dont have to think about these people because this isnt my problem. They arent from this country charity begins (and ends) at home. It isnt my concern that there is persecution in another country. Someone else should take responsibility. This particular way of thinking may have helped inform the 1990 Dublin Convention which developed the safe third country concept allowing receiving countries to reject asylum claims if the applicant had already transited through a safe country. Other ways of dissociating from the problem have been to keep boats of would-be asylum seekers off shore (because as long as they dont enter the country then responsibility doesnt have to be taken), or (as France and Australia have done) to create special airport zones that are designated not to be part of a countrys territory for the purposes of claiming asylum thus enabling the country to exempt itself from full responsibility under the UN Convention. Depersonalisation. Here the suffering of asylum seekers is avoided by the act of depersonalising them. They become, as it were, numbers and categories to be processed rather than individuals with unique and separately distinct suffering. It is frequently the detail of suffering that makes it both believable and hard to let in and depersonalisation is one method for keeping it at bay. An early analysis of this phenomena was undertaken by Isabel Menzies Lyth in her seminal work Social Systems as a Defence against Anxiety, 196037 . Here she describes how the depersonalisation of both of staff and patients in the hospital she was studying became an unconscious mechanism for coping with anxiety (and suffering). For example nurses often talked about patients not by name, but by bed number or by disease or diseased organ: the liver in bed 10, or the pneumonia in bed 15. The nurses themselves viewed themselves as interchangeable something re-enforced through the use of uniforms. Whilst of course the anxieties in looking after sick people in hospital are inherently different from those associated with looking after asylum seekers in IRCs there is nonetheless considerable overlap. Both institutions are suffused with anxiety: the patients are anxious about their health - with an ultimate fear of death. Genuine asylum seekers fear deportation and whatever that might represent in many cases death. By keeping themselves aloof and disinterested in the detailed stories of specific asylum seekers those charged with looking after them can avoid opening up to the individual instances of suffering. In this way asylum seekers come to be categorised by their countries of origin, or the stage of their application process, rather than their individuality per se. And, as with the nurses, the guards themselves can protect their anonymity through wearing a uniform and through inter-changeability of their roles.38 Needless to say the depersonalisation of asylum seekers also contributes to the suffering that they experience (some examples of which are referred to above under 1.7: Incidental Cruelty. Another example is the way in which asylum seekers are apparently dispersed around the UK without any regard being given to their individual preferences to be settled close to known diasporas from their country of origin, culture or religion.

37 38

http://www.moderntimesworkplace.com/archives/ericsess/sessvol1/Lythp439.opd.pdf Similar processes of depersonalisation have been noted by many other psychological researchers and are associated in particular with Total Institutions (of which IRCs are an example) a term coined and defined by American sociologist Erving Goffman in his paper "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions" 1957

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Disempowerment This is where those charged with managing asylum seekers separate themselves out from taking personal responsibility for any suffering that they are involved in causing by believing (either consciously or unconsciously) that they have no choice and are just following orders. The extraordinary capacity of people to do this was famously demonstrated by Milgrams experiment39 in which he showed how most ordinary people were prepared to inflict pain on others (or at least what they believed was pain) sometimes even when they believed that this would be fatal - simply because they were being instructed to do so. The rationalisation of just following orders (though not allowed as a defence during the Nuremberg trials) is a frequent justification given by those administering torture and other forms of abuse. Another subtler version of this tendency manifests when different players within the system defer responsibility to others. Thus civil servants can blame the politicians/government they are just following orders. Politicians often argue that the opinions of their voters have forced their hand. The opinions of voters are arguably informed by the tabloid press and the tabloid press counters by arguing that it is simply echoing popular opinion. Distortion of feelings. Witnessing extreme forms of suffering in others can lead to a range of different emotional responses. To the extent that these are sometimes unpalatable to the witness they can then distort into other feelings. For example guilt sometimes becomes distorted into anger. An example of this was given by Bruno Bettleheim, survivor of the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps 40. Bettleheim observed that the Nazi guards responsible for granting sick leave to camp inmates would be less likely to oblige if the person making the plea displayed their desperation and distress, whereas those making more dispassionate requests, even if they were actually less ill, were much more likely to receive merciful treatment. Bettleheim reasoned that the stronger pleas aroused unpalatable feelings of guilt in the guards who were therefore more likely to cope by belittling the justification of the persons claim and becoming reactively angry and dismissive as a result. Another pair of feelings that appear to couple up in this way are fear and aggression. An example of this is when the guards responsible for running a penal establishment cope with their fear that things might get out of control (e.g. through a prisoner uprising) by becoming increasingly aggressive. Some light is thrown on this by Philip Zimbardos classic Stanford Prison experiment41 in which 24 clinically sane individuals were randomly assigned to be "prisoners" or "guards" in a mock dungeon located in the basement of the psychology building at Stanford University. The planned two-week study into the psychology of prison life ended after only six days due to emotional trauma being experienced by the participants who quickly began acting out their roles, with "guards" becoming sadistic and "prisoners" showing extreme passivity and depression. One danger of feelings becoming distorted in these ways is that the process can regress into a negative feedback loop: i.e. the increasing guilt and/or fear of the official translates into
39 40

Stanley Milgram, 1963 and his seminal book: Obedience to Authority: an Experimental View. Bruno Bettleheim: The Informed Heart: A Study of the Psychological Consequences of Living Under Extreme Fear and Terror, 1960. 41 1971, See also his book: The Lucifer Effect, How good people turn evil, 2007

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further merciless and/or aggressive acts which give rise to further and (increasingly justified) feelings of guilt and fear. Devalidation. Here the case for helping asylum seekers is devalidated by myths with respect to the overall numbers and trends of people claiming asylum in the UK, the rigor with which they are assessed and how all this compares to other countries. These myths are also frequently perpetuated and built upon by the tabloid press. Here are some examples of myths (and their refutations): Myth Huge numbers of asylum seekers come to the UK. 44% of Britons believe it is 100,000 per annum or more.42 Numbers of asylum seekers arriving in the UK are increasing dramatically year by year. Asylum seekers are the same as immigrants (or are a huge proportion of total immigrants). UK takes more than its fair share of refugees. In a 2002 survey, 82% in the UK thought that we had more than our fair share of asylum applications44 and a MORI poll (also 2002) found that on average the public believes that the UK hosts nearly a quarter of the worlds refugees and asylum seekers. The UK is too lenient in its processing of asylum seekers and attracts them as a result. In a Mori poll in 2000 80% of respondents agreed with the statement that asylum seekers come to Britain because they believe it to be a soft touch Myth buster In 2011, only 17,380 asylum seekers came to the UK of whom only 7,091 were granted status They have been decreasing since the early 1990s and 2011 saw a 14% reduction on the previous year43 Asylum seekers are a tiny sub-category of all immigrants currently less than 4%. The vast majority of the worlds refugees remain outside Europe less than 2% come to the UK. Comparing the UK with Europe shows we are average in terms of numbers/member of our population and below average if you take numbers/GDP45 Not the case. The UK currently only gives around 33% of all asylum seekers either refugee status or humanitarian protection/discretionary leave to remain. A more precise refutation of this myth is complex, but see reference46

The perpetration of these distortions is used as a rationalisation for not helping. Defamation (also scapegoating). An exaggeration and development of the tendencies of disbelief and depersonalisation already discussed. Asylum seekers become accused of stealing
42 43

http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/archive/press/2011/april/20110418_refugeepoll.htm http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02654. Figures are not yet available for 2012 44 Source ESS Round 1, edition 6/.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at: http://ess.nsd.uib.no/. 45 Asylum Policy in the EU. The Case for Deeper Integration, 2012. Timothy Hatton. http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_16_12.pdf 46 But see Timothy Hatton: Seeking Asylum, Trends and Policies in the OECD, 2011, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/books/cepr/Seeking_Asylum.pdf for a fuller analysis of this multi-faceted subject.

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jobs, benefits and housing,47 are perceived as being given unfairly prioritised access to services, and are variously categorised as scroungers, greedy, lazy, unskilled, benefit frauders, criminals, drug dealers and terrorists. The phrase Asylum Seeker acquires a connotation that is sharply at odds with its true meaning with the distinction between asylum seeker, immigrant and even terrorist becoming systematically blurred. It becomes a category/label about which it is acceptable to express extreme forms of prejudice whilst at the same time avoiding overtly racist language and the concomitant risk of censure.48 Alongside this in some sectors asylum seekers become increasingly blamed for every problem and all societys ills, or in other words, scapegoated.49 2.8 The factors examined in this section do not claim to be an exhaustive analysis of the factors that cause or justify people in acting in a cruel way towards asylum seekers. Many of them have been generalised over from other contexts by way of offering pointers towards an explanation. There is a clearly a need for research specific to the treatment of asylum seekers. I have also not clearly divided the factors between those that are situational and those that are individual. The analysis therefore does not resolve the question of the prime aetiology in respect of the cruelty towards asylum seekers (i.e. is it the result of the situations in which ordinary individuals find themselves operating in, or individual personality traits and predispositions that lead directly to unethical behaviour within the system?). This is because I believe that the answer probably lies in a dialectic combination of the two. Certainly some individuals may be drawn towards cruelty whatever their situational context and some situational contexts are such that ordinary individuals find themselves acting in cruel ways. Situational contexts also have a life of their own perhaps drawing initially on the indifferent or cruel predispositions of a few founding individuals a culture of institutionalised cruelty can become established and, once established, can be hard to shift because individuals working within the institutions have become fixed in their ways. The debate amongst some social psychologists (situational vs individual) may therefore be somewhat arid in this context - and if we wish to reduce cruelty towards asylum seekers it seems logical to address simultaneously both aspects by improving both the calibre of personnel and the contexts in which they are operating. How to do this effectively forms is covered next. 3. Recommendations for ensuring a reduction in the cruelty.

It is beyond the scope of this short article to suggest more than a few broad recommendations for reform or to conduct a thorough cost benefit analysis of the financial
47

Though as we have seen they are not entitled to work, benefits received are significantly less than for citizens and the accommodation they are given whilst seeking asylum is either secure (within IRCs) or far from ideal (NASS accommodation). Even once they have obtained status asylum seekers, contrary to popular belief, are not entitled to preferential treatment with respect to council housing and indeed frequently become homeless when their NASS accommodation is withdrawn). 48 Lewis, M (2005), Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes, Institute of Public Policy Research, London: www.ippr.org.uk/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fasylum%5Ffull%2Epdf. 49 A MORI survey of prejudice undertaken for Stonewall in 2003 found that almost two thirds of people in England (64 per cent) could name at least one minority group towards whom they felt less positive. Around one in three people felt less positive towards refugees and asylum seekers (Stonewall, 2003).

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implications of those recommendations. All the recommendations however have been made with an eye to their viability in two respects: A) In this time of recession they need to be financially possible: i.e. at no significant expense to the tax payer and preferably a net cost saving B) They need to be politically viable in the sense that they will be likely to have the broad support of the electorate and politicians unduly deterred by a fear of unpopularity50. The following recommendations are made: Decisions around how many asylum seekers come to this country should be made at a European level (3.1) Only refused asylum seekers awaiting imminent deportation should be imprisoned. (3.2) All policies leading to destitution should be abandoned (3.3) Those managing asylum seekers should be properly recruited, trained, supported and supervised. (3.4) Radical reform of UKBA. (3.5) Politicians need to take courage and take the lead (3.6)

3.1 Decisions around how many asylum seekers come to this country should be made at a European level. In recent years there has been a vigorous debate about reforming asylum policies at the international level and the need for international cooperation has been stressed by almost all sides of the debate. The UNHCR made a proposal for reform in 2003 which was rejected for multifarious reasons. However a new proposal which overcomes the deficiencies of the UNHCR proposal was put forward by Hatton and Williamson, 200451. They proposed a scheme that sets for each EU member a fixed contribution to the European Refugee Fund (say, in proportion to the countrys GDP) and a resettlement quota (say, in proportion to the population). For any EU member that took refugees in excess of its quota there would be a per-refugee rebate. In this way the number of refugees that a country accepted would be determined by its preferences for refugees and by the costs of resettling them, rather than simply on the number who happen to apply to that country. It would also mean that countries would be dis-incentivised from inappropriately raising the bar of proof for successfully claiming asylum in order to reduce numbers accepted (since quotas would now be allocated centrally). Calculating the allocation of refugees on the basis of comparative population would leave total numbers coming to the UK roughly unchanged under current circumstances52 thereby improving the likelihood of the recommendation being acceptable to the general public. 53 It
50

So, in this respect, although the author is not personally in favour of either the imprisonment or the enforced deportations of refused asylum seekers it is recognised that this policy is unviable because it would be too unpopular at the present time ever to get onto the statute books. 51 Hatton and Williamson, 2004, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10680.pdf
52

See reference 44 under Devalidation above.

53

Interestingly also Hatton notes that despite the tendency for public opinion towards asylum to be negative a surprisingly high proportion of voters would prefer to see immigration policies set at the

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would have the added advantage, by taking the debate out of the domestic political arena, of allaying concerns within the UK that we are taking more than our fair share of asylum seekers (though, as we have seen, this isnt the case). Also European countries would lose motivation to compete against each other by implementing increasingly draconian policies in a race for the bottom designed to competitively deter asylum seekers. In this way policies around the management of asylum seekers could be allowed to focus on ensuring their fair and humane treatment. 3.2 Only refused asylum seekers awaiting imminent deportation should be imprisoned. This should only include those for whom there is a clear, time limited (not more than four weeks), and implementable plan around deportation. It would exclude those refused asylum seekers for whom deportation isnt possible on account of a Home Office assessment that their country of origin isnt safe to return to, or due to unresolved complications around a home country refusing to accept someone back54. The humanitarian basis for seeking to reduce the imprisonment of asylum seekers in this way has been outlined under 1.1 (i.e. cruelties intrinsic to, and associated with, imprisonment). But for the policy to have a realistic chance of implementation it is important also to address the arguments used to justify the imprisonment of asylum seekers. These are now addressed separately: a) Asylum seekers represent a threat to the community.

The vast majority of asylum seekers do not of course represent a threat to the community. The widespread and populist perception that they might is probably rooted in tabloid rhetoric and confusions amongst the public as to what exactly an asylum seeker is and how they are distinguished from other immigrants and indeed from terrorists. For instance widespread use of labeling such as illegal or bogus in connection with asylum seekers has perpetuated a notion that asylum seekers are intrinsically unlawful/criminal (rather than recognising that for many the only way of escaping persecution to legitimately claim asylum is through being smuggled and/or through the use of forged documents)55. These confusions also explain to some extent why detention centers currently appear to be pitched more towards the containment of seriously violent or dangerous criminals than the humane and sensitive holding of applicants for asylum until such a time as their requests for sanctuary can be processed.

supra-national level. See Hatton, 2012, Asylum Policy in the EU: The Case for Deeper Integration, http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_16_12.pdf
54

Both of which grounds could arguably in any case be considered grounds for accepting that someone should be given humanitarian protection or leave to remain. If this policy were introduced it would at a stroke reduce the large number of refused asylum seekers who cannot be deported but nonetheless continue to reside in this country without proper status, rights or permission to work. 55 A point recognised by the Press Complaints Commission Guidance notes for the press on Refugees and Asylum seekers (October 2003): there can be no such thing in law as an illegal asylum seeker. Also: An asylum seeker can only become an illegal immigrant if he or she remains in the UK after having failed to respond to a removal notice

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The very small number of asylum seekers for whom there are proven grounds for fearing that they might pose a risk (for instance through their involvement with terrorist groups, serious criminal activity or intent etc.) would be most appropriately handled under legislation and within institutions dealing with criminals and terrorists. b) If it we dont lock up asylum seekers they will abscond/go underground.

Most destination countries have a spectrum of alternatives to imprisoning asylum seekers. Research into these alternatives suggests that they are, in fact, effective in ensuring that asylum seekers do not disappear. For instance Field 200656 concludes: For the worlds major destination States, existing evaluations of alternatives including monitoring of appearance rates during unconditional release or unsupervised stay in the community support the position that asylum seekers very rarely need to be detained, or indeed restricted in their movements, prior to a final rejection of their claim or prior to the point at which their removal becomes a practical reality. A study in New York57 of using the alternative of supervision and assistance of asylum seekers within the community to detention found that: Implementing such alternatives will result in more deportations of those whom the law excludes, and less detentions of those permitted to remain in the US. and concluded: the case for community supervision as an alternative to detention (is) compelling. Using community supervision as a substitute for detention before final orders are made will increase the efficiency of the expensive detention system and it will allow those who win relief () to avoid the pains of detention altogether. The research also found that supervising people in community did not compromise their eventual attendance at court: When the project began, practitioners, including judges and lawyers, insisted that no alien would come to court if she knew that she would be detained if she lost. Not so. There are of course also pragmatic reasons for not imprisoning all asylum seekers because of fears that they will go underground. The UK currently imprisons around 2000 asylum seekers (and refused asylum seekers) at any one time. This compares with a figure of around 17,000 new applications for asylum each year and uncertain number of refused

56

Field, O (2006), Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series No 11, United Nations 57 Stone 2000, Supervised release as an alternative to detention in removal procedings: some promising results,http://www.vera.org/pubs/supervised-release-alternative-detention-removal-proceedings-somepromising-results

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asylum seekers still at large post the UKBA legacy cases review58. Clearly there need to be some selective criteria for deciding who to imprison and the proposal resolves this dilemma by selecting those for whom there is the highest likelihood of absconsion. i.e. the ones who have lost their cases and for whom there is a plan of deportation. Using this criteria would be more than viable within the present availability of detention facilities provided there were sensible limits to maximum detention times.59. c) If we dont lock up asylum seekers more people will be encouraged to apply for asylum in the UK. Again the research evidence does not substantiate this theory. A paper by Timothy Hatton60 draws on extensive research and concludes that the number of asylum claims in a particular country is much more likely to be influenced by policies around access to the country and processing (e.g. likely success rates of applications) than by policies relating to the welfare of asylum seekers. In other words prospective asylum seekers are most influenced by their chances of eventually succeeding in claiming asylum in a particular country rather than on the conditions in which they would be kept during the application process. More specifically Hatton concludes the: effect of relaxing harsh detention regimes is likely to be weak The concern, in any case, is rendered irrelevant if levels of asylum are set at a European rather than a national level, as recommended. d) Being able to lock up asylum seekers is convenient for UKBA.

UKBA convenience may be at the root of the policy but it hardly qualifies as justification for this hugely expensive and, as we have seen, cruel practice. Detaining asylum seekers solely for convenience also contravenes United Nations guidelines61 which state that the detention of asylum seekers or other immigration clients should be a measure of last resort where no other alternatives are available. It is the contention of this article that for the vast majority of asylum seekers there are cheaper, more viable and more proportional alternatives. Financial implications of changing the basis for imprisonment of asylum seekers

58

UKBA would have us believe that the number of longer term refused asylum seekers falling into this category should now be approaching zero, though their credibility has been greatly compromised by repeated reviews which have found them to be far from transparent. See: http://themigrationist.net/2012/12/26/2012another-year-of-ups-and-downs-at-the-uk-border-agency/ 59 In the year ended June 2012, there were 5,374 enforced removals who had sought asylum at some stage. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigrationasylum-research/immigration-q2-2012/removals-q2-2012. This number would easily be accommodated within existing facilities of around 2000 at any one time and indeed would enable a reduction in these facilities. More about the financial implications of this follows below.
60 61

Timothy Hatton, Seeking Asylum, Trends and Policies in the OECD, 2011

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum seekers (1999), p 1.

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The financial implications of the recommendation are far reaching. The Home Office generally does not publish figures on the financial costs of immigration detention. However in 2007 following a request made under the Freedom of Information Act, they revealed that in 2005/6 the weekly cost per detainee ranged from 511 (Lindholme IRC) to 1,344 (Colnbrook IRC). The cost of detaining someone in the DFT system in the now-closed Oakington IRC cost 1,620 per week (ICAR 2007). Then on 4 February 2010, the UK Government reported in Parliament that the average overall cost of one bed per day in the immigration detention estate is 120 (Hansard 2010).62 Using this figure we can calculate current annual costs of imprisoning 2000 refused and other asylum seekers at over 87 million per year. Under the recommendation (assuming deportees are held for an average of two weeks), this figure comes down to just under 11 million a saving of approximately 76 million per year. This figure would be offset by the cost of keeping asylum seekers in the community but even allowing for this there would be a saving of approximately 55 million63. 3.3 All policies leading to destitution should be abandoned.

In particular: The policy of not allowing refused asylum seekers and asylum seekers to work.64 The policy of not giving asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers either any benefits or benefits equal to those considered minimal to the survival of ordinary citizens. Benefit entitlement should include the right to emergency housing (e.g. night shelters), and all forms of medical care. The humanitarian basis for these recommendations surely needs no justification in a modern, civilised, and relatively very rich country. Against the objection that it would lead to increased number of applications of asylum seekers to the UK is the research already noted under 3.2 (c) above which suggests that the use of destitution and other policies that make inroads into the welfare of asylum seekers is not significant in deterring them from applying to the UK (whereas the likelihood of eventually being accepted is of relevance). Also, once again, in the context of a European administration of asylum seekers this particular concern would no longer be relevant. To the objection that asylum seekers would take away jobs and other welfare provision that would otherwise go to British citizens one can counter by stressing the very small numbers involved (around 17,000 per annum less than 0.03 percent of the population). With respect
62

This enables us to estimate the annual costs of particular IRCs. For example, since we know that Campsfield House IRC usually operates at 90% capacity with 194 (of a possible 216) migrants detained there, we can estimate that this particular IRC costs approximately 8,497,200 per year to run. See: http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/immigration-detention-uk 63 Assuming an extra 1500 would be in the community. Extra welfare benefits would cost 4 m per annum (assuming none of them would work which would offset this cost). Accommodation would cost around 14m (25/day) per annum and supervision (one case worker to every 10 asylum seekers: 3m p.a. Total, around 21m p.a. 64 For some asylum seekers there are caveats to this rule but they are so hard to meet that few are ever successful in applying for permission to work. It is therefore suggested that it becomes an automatic right.

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to work it is noted that one of the popular objections to asylum seekers is that they are only in the UK to scrounge off the state and not to make a contribution (so in this context asylum seekers are in a bind they cannot transcend). Another option which might allay some public concerns would be to barter a reduction in the overall number of immigrants by reducing non-asylum immigrants allowed into the country. There are also several other clear benefits to allowing asylum seekers, and refused asylum seekers to work: It would decrease their involvement by default in illegal work such as for example work involving drug trafficking or prostitution. Reducing this would also represent savings to the tax payer in the costs of policing and prosecuting. In the absence of identity cards, National Insurance numbers are a very good way of keeping track of the whereabouts of both asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers within the country. By enabling asylum seekers to work from the point of their arrival in the UK the integration process can begin immediately. This means that those that are eventually gain refugee status may by that time already be significantly along the road to integration (in contrast to the current situation in which the re-traumatisation of asylum seekers can impede their eventual integration. With respect to benefits it is expected that the increased taxation paid by asylum seekers in work would offset the cost of extra benefits paid to them as a group. But a full analysis of this conjecture is beyond the scope of this paper and would also need reliable up to date figures as to the numbers of refused asylum seekers still at large without status (post the legacy cases review).65 As with allowing them to work, the payment of benefits to refused asylum seekers would enable a track to be kept of their whereabouts. In this way the costly system of requiring both asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers to sign could be withdrawn (since they will either now be signing regularly for benefits, or be registered at a known work location.) It would be important in introducing this policy to allay public concerns around the distribution of benefits by keeping the process around benefits for asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers transparent and equal. They should be treated on exactly the same basis as UK citizens and not receive preferential treatment (not that they currently do of course though this is a popular concern). 3.4 Those managing asylum seekers should be properly recruited, trained, supported and supervised. As we have seen the management of asylum seekers is prone to being contaminated by institutionalised cruelty. It is important to recognise that these cruelties frequently arise because of the powerful situational forces involved rather than character deficiencies in the staff. We need to recognise that the care of asylum seekers is a highly skilled task. Many asylum seekers, particularly those who have received harsh treatment by police and the
65

See note 56 above

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military in their country of origin, though outwardly compliant, may also be nursing a fear, suspicion and (less conscious) resentment of authority. They are likely also to be envious of the freedoms and privileges enjoyed by staff. As we have seen these projections can be hard to cope with by a workforce largely untrained in the psychological processes at large and immersed in a culture where the emphasis is not primarily on the safety and welfare of asylum seekers but on meeting targets around deportation, fast processing, and the tough assessment of claims. The removal of the task of assessing claims from these staff (dealt with under 3.5) should greatly reduce some of the tensions and double binds experienced by staff working for UKBA. It is also recommended that most staff should be recruited from health and welfare backgrounds rather than from the security sector. As well as recruiting for the normal good carer characteristics the selection processes also needs to rate highly the applicants abilities in the following areas: Cultural sensitivity and understanding. Sympathetic understanding of the reasons why people legitimately claim asylum. Sympathetic awareness of mental health issues and symptoms that can arise on account of traumatic experiences and from being held in custody Capacity to disagree with authority on matters of ethics and to whistle blow contraventions of ethics. These are also areas that should be developed through early and ongoing training and high quality supervision. Trainings should include first-hand accounts from accepted asylum seekers of their experiences in their home country, on their journey to the UK, and since being in the UK. These real-life first-hand accounts have been found to be particularly significant in shifting ingrained prejudices towards asylum seekers (which are often rooted in ignorance)66. The qualities mentioned above become all the more important in the selection of staff for management roles. Managers should be well trained in ways in which situational factors can allow the emergence of systemic cruelty - particularly in the context of secure environments. Institutions, particularly IRCs should be subject to regular, unannounced internal and independent assessments. Where cruelty from staff is uncovered at any level, this should be met with immediate suspension, pending an investigation, and those investigations which substantiate either staff cruelty or their passive acceptance of it in their colleagues should result in dismissal of the staff concerned. A zero-tolerance attitude to cruelty is at the heart of creating a new culture within the asylum system that prioritises the care and well-being of detainees above all other considerations. The failure to prosecute staff (for example in the example of someone being killed whilst being deported see 1.6 above) conveys an

66

Lewis, M (2005), Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes, Institute of Public Policy Research, London: www.ippr.org.uk/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fasylum%5Ffull%2Epdf.
http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/asylum_full_1364.pdf

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impression of tacit acceptance from above and an implicit license for such activities to continue. 3.5 Radical reform of UKBA. UKBA and the Home Office have of course been subject to many reforms over the years. And there are current plans to reduce the UKBA budget by 20% over the next four years and personnel by 5,200.67 However it is the view of this article that reforms currently proposed are unlikely to be successful either in terms of reducing cruelty towards asylum seekers or in terms of their own objectives. In the first place the overriding context of cost reduction does not reconcile well with other aims of improved transparency and the achievement of desired outcomes (for instance around times spent processing claims). You get what you pay for. Staff within the system are well known to be demoralised by successive waves of staff and cost cut backs. Most importantly the emphasis of reforms to date on greater efficiency and more stringent measures towards asylum seekers has failed to properly address the institutionalised cruelty that has invaded the system and robbed it of a meaningful overriding rationale to do with the humane treatment of asylum seekers. It is not within the scope of this article to provide an in depth analysis of UKBA, and what needs to change, beyond making one crucial point the current functions of UKBA, as they stand, are unlikely ever to be executed in a satisfactory and humane way because they are in conflict with one another. Specifically the aim of providing a fair, just, humane and competent management of asylum seekers is at odds with the other role of UKBA to assessment the validity of asylum claims and to conduct the prosecution of asylum seekers who appeal. The judicial role of UKBA (specifically the responsibility for prosecuting asylum seekers) should be removed from UKBA and given to another completely separate body. This is because it runs counter to all the caring aims of the organisation. Those responsible for the care and wellbeing of asylum seekers, and their fair processing, should not, at the same time, be charged with preparing cases against them. The current splitting and confusion of staff roles in this way has a contaminating influence - those responsible for caring for asylum seekers are at the same time responsible for challenging their entitlement to this care. It is this double bind that is at the root of the culture of disbelief pervading the system and any reform of UKBA must legislate away from this confusion to have any chance of success. 3.6 Politicians need to take courage and take the lead. Some years ago I had a pre-election doorstep discussion with my local MP around several of the asylum issues that have been discussed here. I was heartened to discover that he was in complete agreement in respect to all the issues that I raised (for instance the unnecessary detention of asylum seekers, the fact that they are not allowed to work, the culture of disbelief, unsatisfactory practices around deportation and so on). When I asked therefore why there werent clear proposals within the manifesto that accommodated these objections he replied that to include such reforms would be tantamount to political suicide. I recall
67

See Immigration and asylum policy: Government plans and progress made - Commons Library Standard Note 24/7/2012: www.ippr.org.uk/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fasylum%5Ffull%2Epdf.

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thinking shortly after this conversation (and regretting not saying it at the time!) that if this was the price of power then it wasnt worth it. But having read some of the research into public attitudes I now believe that there was a much better reply: the public are not in fact unreasonable, they are misinformed, and they are certainly not universally hostile to asylum seekers. Research into the attitudes of the public towards asylum seekers makes it clear that as well as being deeply ignorant about asylum seekers their position towards them is also deeply ambivalent and paradoxical. Here are some statistics: An analysis of 8 European (including the UK) countries showed that on average 63.85% respondents felt that genuine refugees should be given asylum. 68 Over three quarters of a sample of UK residents felt that those in fear of their lives should be allowed to remain. 69 62.9% of Europeans felt that asylum seekers applying for status should be allowed to 70 work. 47.7% of UK citizens would prefer decisions about asylum seekers to be taken at a European or International level rather than at a UK level71 70% of UK citizens agreed with a statement that it is a good thing that Britain is multicultural72 These figures seem surprisingly high given the extent of public ignorance around asylum and the widespread belief that it is out of control etc. already referred to.73 Despite the fact that the majority of the UK public are confused, and ignorant about asylum and that many believe the grossly exaggerated rhetoric at large the more positive attitudes reported in the bulleted statistics above have still manage to prevail. This leads to the more hopeful possibility that a more accurate and sober reporting of the facts could well have a significant impact in improving tolerance towards asylum seekers and enabling a tipping point towards greater humanity. Politicians are uniquely placed to do this by countering public prejudice towards asylum seekers at both a local and a national level with clear un-emotive fact giving and clarification. This need not lose them votes. On the contrary taking a more responsible stance, sticking to the facts and appealing to the better side of the nation (which clearly exists) may well win substantial support. The more people know the detail about asylum the more likely they are to be tolerant towards it and the less likely to have an alarmist reaction to progressive

68

Source: ISSP National Identity Survey at http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis. org/obj/fStudy/ZA2880. The figure for the UK alone was 42.9% 69 Lewis, M (2005), Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes, Institute of Public Policy Research, London: www.ippr.org.uk/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fasylum%5Ffull%2Epdf. 70 Source: ESS Round 1, edition 6.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/. 71 ESS Round 1, edition 6.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at: http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.
72
73

Mori 2003. British views on Immigration, London: MORI www.mori.com/polls/2003/migration.shtml To give one more example: Lewis 2005 reports: Nearly one third of respondents in Norwich estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 asylum seeker and refugees live in the city, and a few thought that there were over 50,000. The actual figure at the time of the survey was 150 dispersed asylum seekers. Lewis, M (2005), Asylum: Understanding Public

Attitudes, Institute of Public Policy Research, London: www.ippr.org.uk/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fasylum%5Ffull%2Epdf.

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policies74. The response of the UK public both to the Ugandan Asian crisis and also to the plight of Vietnamese refugees also suggests that the public is perfectly capable of responding positively, generously and proudly to the plights of those in need of help. There are also of course a huge number of smaller reforms (other than those already given and too numerous to list in full here) that politicians could introduce to reduce the incidence of cruelty within the system. These include: Setting time limits for the processing of claims with an automatic right of refugee status if the limit is exceeded. Removing the anomaly that asylum can be refused and at the same time the applicants home country be deemed unsafe to return to. Removing the need for refugees to re-apply for status at the end of a specified time period. Changing the policy of deporting some asylum seekers prematurely before they can appeal. Where deportation has to happen, ensuring that this happens humanely and setting up mechanisms for the successful re-integration of deportees on their return home country for instance by involving British Embassies in home countries in monitoring their ongoing safety. Requiring asylum seekers to opt out of receiving legal help rather than opt in and ensuring they receive adequate, ongoing and competent legal assistance. Making sure that the Commission for Racial Equality defines Asylum Seekers and Refugees alongside other minority groups in relation to prosecuting incidences of racism and of promoting equality and good race relations. Ensuring that the press are held liable when they incite hatred and alarm through inaccurate presentation of the facts. Supporting the widespread dissemination of more accurate facts about asylum (for instance as part of the national curriculum). Conclusion Our current ineffective, cruel asylum system causes terrible suffering to some of the worlds most vulnerable individuals and is not fit for purpose. But there is no need for those who have sought asylum in the UK do not need to remain at high risk of poverty, homelessness, destitution, injustice, deprivation of liberty, statelessness, violent and often wrongful deportation attempts and administrative contempt, indifference, and disregard. There is an urgent need to raise awareness of the facts about asylum and to assert the moral and humanitarian imperative for the UK to play its full part in protecting those fleeing persecution and to set an example to the rest of the world.

74

Lewis, M (2005), Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes, Institute of Public Policy Research, London: www.ippr.org.uk/members/download.asp?f=%2Fecomm%2Ffiles%2Fasylum%5Ffull%2Epdf.

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Britain can lead the way in developing an alternative system that models good practice, humanity, justice and compassion. The realisable recommendations made in this paper would enable a system that is better able to transcend the cruel systemic deficiencies that are currently endemic. With skilful handling and politicians courageous enough to take a lead, it is the contention of this article that this can be done without unduly taxing the public purse (and possibly even saving it money) - and with broad public support. We need to work together to establish a system which, has its roots not in ignorance, prejudice, misinformation and fear, but a robust intention to ensure that as far as is humanly possible no genuine refugee is ever denied our fullest possible support, and a safe haven. Wyon Stansfeld 12th February 2013. If you have found this article useful please: 1) Email wyonstansfeld@gmail.com quoting that it is version: 1.4, and to make any constructive comments or suggestions you wish to make as it is hoped that the article will improve in the light of feedback. 2) Distribute it widely.