Babak: So look, what is important about the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is that it surprised many of the analyst and

the thinkers for two reasons. One is that it was one of the most massed passed revolutions arguably in human history, even the French Revolution or the Russian revolution did not come close as to how many people were in the streets. So it was very much a street politics which eventually overthrew a centuries long monarchy. And the second significant thing, is that it established an islamic theocracies. That has never happened, at least in the modern context, it never happened before. So this was a major turning point not only in the history of the middle east but one could even say on a global scale. So the argument whether the Iranian Revolution actually caused the rise of Islamism, thats incorrect. Islamism was already there in the middle east all the way from the 50s and the 60s. The main cause probably for the rise of Islamism in the region was Communism. The spread of Communism in countries in countries like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Iran kind of caused a lot of concern among muslim thinkers, muslim activists and many of them were also modeling themselves after the communist project of establishing a political party based on an ideal society. Of course in the islamic term it was supposed to be Islam not Communism. So that was the origin of Islamism in the 50s and 60s. And then it became radicalized because of the way the governments in countries like Egypt and Iran are reacting to the rise of Islamism they became more increasingly radicalized. In the 70s they become very radical and to a point of becoming militant. So, when the Iranian Revolution happened it did surprise a lot of people, but it should have not been surprising because Islamism was already there in the region. Now one thing is also unique about the iranian experience is that iranians 92% of iranians are Shia muslim not Sunni. So, Islamism is not just like a monolithic thing and the iranian experience basically had the Shia expression of Islamism and as a result it did not necessarily pick up or become a model for other islamist movements, the revolution did, but not the ideology of the revolution of Iran. So, that was another interesting tension that changed the balance of not only power but also changed the balance of islamism in the region. Now islamists were now increasingly competing against each other for public opinion in the region. And the Shia experience of islamism the way it toppled the regime was a very interesting thing to look up by the Sunni Islamists but at the same time they were not happy with the message that Shia Islam or the Shia revolutions were giving to the region because it was basically saying that our version of Islam is better, ours is more universal. So, that was a major tension so it was a turning point on many different levels yes but this turning point was not necessarily something that gave rise to islamism it simple complicated islamism and islamism was already there it only basically expanded the spread of islamism in the region all the way up to the 1990s. After the 1990s you see a decline of it. Al Qaeda is an exception to the story and it was not inspired by the Iranian Revolution it was mostly inspired by the Egyptian Islamist movement and never the less to this day the Iranian model of Islamic Revolution is still there among many islamists they look it up the way in which the particular strategies the Iranians used to topple the regime. But the ideology is mostly rejected because of the sectarian tension between Sunni and Shia Islam. Connor: As far as the most specific turning point, as far as the timeline of the revolution what do you think was the tipping point?

Babak: I think that the most important thing, one was the referendum of April, I believe it was April 1979, that was a major referendum because you got 98% of the iranians voting for the Islamic Republic of Iran. So it twisted the whole story, it was not just a bunch of Islamists coming to power as a political party, they came to power because of democratic will so that was a twist. The other interesting aspect of the Iranian Revolution was the hostage crisis because it suddenly changed the dynamic of the revolution that was fundamentally against the monarchy now its changing by 1979, November 1979, it changed to kinda an anti US agenda. And as a result it created a lot of changes in balance of power in the region and suddenly you got a number of Sunni monarchies, Sunni Arab monarchies, taking sides with the US because they are afraid of the iranian influence and the spread of revolution and the iranians of course are taking sides with other revolutionary movements who are actually anti american. So that was a major turning point, the hostage crisis of course that lasted for 444 days. We now look back we think of it as just normal ordinary days but back then no one knew exactly when the hostages would be freed. So, it was that aspect of not knowing exactly what's going to happen that added to the dynamic of the Iranian Revolution just a year after it started in 1979. So that was the second most important thing, the hostage crisis. Isaac: So you speak of all these changes, so what in your view would you say is the most important of all them? Babak: I think offering a new model for doing political activities and having a new model of statehood, governance in the region that was radical, you now have a theocracy in region that has not seen one probably for centuries. So that was a major thing, in fact it was not just about Iran, it was about the whole globe. The fact that you now have this one unique theocracy who is claiming, sure at the same time it has elections and people are voting for some representative but ultimately, the ultimate claim to authority is God. Suddenly you have a different way of looking at politics because by that time, by understanding, people understood politics mostly based on the communist agenda or the liberal democratic agenda so this was very unique. And I think this was the most significant contribution of the Iranian Revolution. Connor: Would you mind talking a bit about your experience living in Iran and the Shah? Babak: I was six when the revolution happened and my father was actually in the Iranian army, he was a high ranking military officer. So, we experienced the revolution coming from the side of at least my family, coming from the side as seeing it in a defensive way. You know my family was not in favor of the revolution, of course I was young at the time I did not know what was going on but my personal experience was that something major happened. And suddenly the school I used to go to at the age of 6 was no longer there, we had to leave the city we were leaving in and go to the capital city and while driving from Northwestern Iran where my father was stationed to the capital city Tehran, which is central Iran, we saw the revolution all over the country people were showing the pictures of Khomeini and shouting slogans and suddenly the average old iranian that was probably mostly interested to go to the cinema or go to the coffee shop now was interested to talk about revolution and politics. So that was a major, for me as a six year

old boy that was shocking and by the time we got to the capital city, we drove to the capital city I saw a city in revolution, a city almost in a war zone. So on a personal level the revolution as a young boy was shocking to me and mostly the reason why it was shocking is because the way my entire childhood changed not only mine the generation that I came from we all changed as a result of the revolution the way we thought about reality, the way we thought about ourselves, the way we thought about others, it completely changed. In many ways it added a new dimension to the way we saw reality and in life. But in another way it also complicated our understanding of what we were as children, so we did not live the so called normal childhood. So on a personal level that's what happened to me and ofcourse the years that followed after the revolution and the blood and the violence and the war that followed added to that complexity in which made all of us, our generation think about life in a very different way than some of you guys say we do in Southern California at the age of six or seven or eight. Connor: What do you think was the biggest tipping point for the Iranian people that triggered the revolution? Bapak: There was not a single tipping point, I think there were a bunch of them and much of it had to do with perception. Remember perception in many ways is reality. By 1978 many iranians did not think that the revolution first of all could take place and fundamentally the Iranian Monarchy will be toppled, the monarch, the Shah of Iran was of course an autocrat but he presented himself to be this all powerful authority figure, a king, a major king so when people went to the streets and chanted slogans they probably just did that thinking they were just going to express some of their feelings, they never imagined that this would become a revolution, probably the most massed based revolution in human history and also eventually they could actually topple the regime. So when they began to see cracks in the Iranian Monarchy and they began to see some of the people in the monarchy and the government backing away from the government and the shah himself coming on TV and saying I have heard your voice of revolution. Suddenly things began to change people began to believe you know what something's happening this revolution gonna happen, people began talking about revolution as revolution not just as a dream but as something that could happen. And especially young people all the way from the age of seventeen to twenty five. Men and women when they were able to grab hold of arms and guns, that completely changed the whole dynamic and it brought this level of violence that would eventually topple the regime. And he did it very quickly. And that just goes to show how much all governments require some level of perception of legitimacy. So, the reason why we except the US government the way it is, is because we all excepte it. That makes it legitimate. But just imagine if perception changes and all of us think that government is a tyranny believe it or not that government could be changed, that government could be taken out. The best example of course we have, is the American Revolution when the perception throughout the two or three decades before the revolution made people change about the way they look at the government and they started to have a revolution same thing with the Iranian Revolution. Connor: As far as the Tudeh party went what influence did that have with the US involvement during the revolution or even before when the Shah was instituted and what

authority they had during the time of the revolution? Babak: I think the American Intelligence Community knew that the Tudeh party, this is the communist party, the official communist stalinists party of Iran, did not have much of a mass support versus the Islamists had. They knew this, so they weren't worried about the Tudeh party much. They were probably worried mostly about the other leftist militant groups and there were a bunch of them that they broke away from the Tudeh party in the 60s and the 70s. They were probably worried about them and the way the Soviets might back them up. But at the same time they were aware that the Soviets did not fully and officially back the other leftists either. But just a note that the American Intelligence Community and the Policy Community quite honestly they were very much unaware of many things that were happening in Iran a decade all the way to the decade before revolution, so many of them did not even imagine a revolution of the sort happening in Iran. So they were worried about Tudeh, they were worried about all these other leftist groups but they just simply did not tie a larger picture together seeing all these different groups working together into a revolution. I don't even think they imagined it at least the records and documents we have show that the Americans were aware of something happening on the ground but nothing of the sort that we saw in the 1979 revolution, they simply did not predict it. They did not predict that the Islamists and Communists could actually join hand and hand in the revolution and that was a big surprise.