13 D Addelfio

Giuseppina DAddelfio
'Dipartimento di Filosofia, Storia e Critica dei Saperi`

Universitv of Palermo Italv

1

The Educative Value of Empathy within the Capability Approach

My contribution orbits around the educative value oI empathy, within the capability approach. In
particular, I intend to examine this topic with regard to Nussbaum`s list oI central human
capabilities.
AIter a brieI overview oI the notion oI empathy, the key role oI imagination and emotions will
be pointed out. I will start with the Aristotelian account on phantasia, to highlight empathy as a
valuable and promising ethical and pedagogical category, especially Ior our multicultural world. For
empathy will be shaped as a Iorm oI thought, the importance oI an appropriate education will
appear too. By Iollowing Nussbaum hints, I will stress the importance oI narrative works, because
oI the imaginative activities they stimulate, as well as oI the care received during inIancy and the
educative cultivation oI the narrative attitudes. Then, regarding empathy as a pedagogical category
will lead us to the Iundamental role oI 'recognition i.e. oI being recognized by someone else
Ior the a real flourishing.

1. On Empathy

As it is well known, the term empathy was coined in the early 20th century (by Theodore Lipps),
with special reIerence to aesthetic experience, as the correspondent to the German Einfhlung.
The notion oI empathy was studied chieIly by psychogists and psychoanalysts. According to
Carl Rogers, to be emphatic means 'to perceive the internal Irame oI reIerence oI another with
accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto as iI one were the
person
1
. Heinz Kohut, who can be considered the leading theorist oI empathy within
psychoanalysis, deIined empathy a 'vicarious introspection, meant as the 'capacity to think and
Ieel oneselI into the inner liIe oI another person
2

I am not going to deal with the psychological relevance oI empathy. Nevertheless these studies
allow us to state that empathy is a particular ability: the one to read another person`s emotions,
putting oneselI in his/her own place and understand or, as we will argue, try to understand
his/her Ieelings, desires, troubles, ideas, and actions. To put oneselI in another`s place and, so to
speak, inhabit it requires two elements: the capability oI an appropriate emotional response and
imagination.

1
Rogers C. R. (1959), A theorv of therapv, personalitv and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-
centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A studv of science, New York: Mc Graw Hill, Vol. 3, pp. 210 - 211
2
Kohut H. (1984), How does analvsis cure? Chicago: The University oI Chicago Press, p. 300, p. 82. He considers the
analyst`s 'empathic immersion in the patient`s material as the essence oI psychoanalysis.
See also: Morris C. G., Psvchologv - An Introduction (Ninth Edition) by, Prentice Hall, 1996, p. 442.

2
Empathy, thereIore, is an experience oI comprehending and sharing in the emotional state oI
another person. This leads to higher levels oI understanding. Actually, as you get to know others on
an emotional level, you know them more deeply (we may say, you really know them) and are likely
to see similarities between your Ieelings and theirs, and between your needs and theirs. Empathy is,
thereIore, a Iorm oI social awareness; which is important in the development oI a moral sense. It is
closely linked to justice.
To explore this link, Nussbaum`s account on compassion is precious. In Upheavals of Thought,
she states that the emotions are judgments oI value, that mark oI patterns oI salience. Actually,
since the Iirst months oI liIe, 'the child`s emotions are recognitions oI where important good and
bad things can be Iound and also oI the externality oI these good and bad things, thereIore also oI
the boundaries oI its own secure control. |...| |The emotions| demarcate the world, and at the same
time map the selI in the world
3
. Furthermore, among the emotional responses to external word,
some are such to expand the boundaries oI selI, like love and compassion.
By Iollowing Aristotle, Nussbaum deIines compassion as a 'painIul emotion directed at another
person`s misIortune or suIIering
4
. She maintains that three are the cognitive element oI
compassion: 1) the belieI that the suIIer is really grave and weighty; 2) the credence that the
suIIerer does not deserve it (the suIIer is not worth oI blame); 3) the awareness that the possibilities
oI the person, who Ieel compassion, are similar to those oI the suIIerer.
For my purposes, the third requisite is particularly important.
By the way, the other ones are linked to Nussbaum`s capability approach too. Actually,
compassion requires a notion oI Iault and responsibility, praise and blame, as well as the awareness
oI the fragilitv of goodness, that is the belieI that there are serious bad things that may happen to
humans beyond their responsibility. In this perspective, she states that the list oI the central human
capabilities tells that certain misIortunes are particularly serious and, Iirst and Ioremost, that they
are strongly unjust
5
. To Ieel compassion means, thereIore, to be more attentive and sensitive to this.
Let us turn our attention to the awareness oI similar possibilities necessary to compassion.
Nussbaum recalls Aristotle, who states that, in order to Ieel pity, we must be capable oI
understanding that painIul and destructive evils may happen also to us or to some oI our loved ones;
we pity, thereIore, above all those who are like us in age, temperament, social standing, birth: in all
these cases it appears more likely that their bad luck might also beIall us. Moreover, the philosopher

3
Nussbaum M., (2001), Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University
Press, pp. 206 207.
4
Nussbaum M., Upheavals of Thought, p. 306.
5
See Nussbaum M., Upheavals of Thought, p. 418

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states that compassion can be Ielt only by someone who experimented suIIering and can never be
Ielt by someone who is so arrogant to consider himselI/herselI above suIIering and take no account
oI the possibility that something evil will happen to himselI/herselI .
6
This means that compassion
requires the ability to recognize similarities and connections between oneselI and the others.
Compassion requires empathy. Its cognitive structure is particularly relevant Ior us.
According to Nussbaum, empathy is 'an imaginative reconstruction oI another`s person
experience, without any particular evaluation oI that experience
7
; such evaluation is instead
included in compassion, which stems because oI negative and painIul events
8
. Empathy operates to
produce a concern and an appropriate emotional attitude, by stimulating the judgement oI similar
possibilities: 'By reconstructing in my own mind the experience oI another, I get sense oI what it
means Ior her to suIIer that way, and this make me more likely to see her prospects as similar to my
own
9
.

Imagining
The reconstruction in the mind oI another`s experience is the activity perIormed by imagination.
With regard to this 'central human capability, we can recall Aristotle again, insoIar as Nussbaum
seems to inherit his view. So, how does imagination work?
In Aristotle`s On the Soul, we read about the phantasia: whereas the sensation is possible only
when the object is present, thus depending on something that the subject does not rule but receives
Irom outside, the phantasia opens up a new space. The phantasmata, i.e. the images, indeed,
'appear to us even with the eyes closed
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. When we imagine something to be IearIul or threatening
Aristotle argues , we are unaIIected as persons, like who is looking at a painting oI some
dreadIul scene. This means that, thanks to imagination, human beings can space out and keep
oneselI at distance Irom the sensation, hence think an act in a human way. I deem that not by
chance the Iourth item oI Nussbaum`s list is 'Sense, Imagination, and Thought: this utterance is
clearly based on the Aristotelian idea oI human soul.

6
See: Aristotle Rethoric, II 8, 1385 b 14 II. This is the reason why Nussbaum does not translate eleos, the emotion that,
according to Aristotle`s Poetics, the Greek tragedy intends to arouse, with pity: this term implies an idea oI superiority.
7
Nussbaum M. Upheavals of Thought, p. 302
8
In Nussbaum`s view, empathy is evidently and sharply distinguished Irom compassion. Actually, she argues that, on
the one hand, a person may have empathy also with joyIul experience; on the other one may have a remarkable
empathetic understanding oI someone else whose suIIering he/she reIuses compassion. In any case, empathy constitutes
a moral attitude, insoIar as it allows to recognize other humanity: 'when empathy did arrive on the scene |...| the result
was a breakdown in the mental mechanism that sustained moral denial (Upheavals of Thought, p.335)
9
10
Aristotle, On the Soul, DA III 3, 428 a 16.

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Furthermore, in the Aristotelian writing On Memorv and Reminiscence, the image is presented
as a 'mnemonic token and the picture example is used again. Even though we do not concern
ourselves with the Aristotelian account on the genesis oI memory, it can be useIul to stress that,
according to him, when a person remembers, he remembers the objective thing Irom which the
impressed aIIection, which is in his soul, was derived. This is possible because 'there is in us
something like an impression or picture: when one remembers, 'this impression is what he
contemplates. Then, he argues that a picture painted is 'at once a picture and a likeness: that is,
while one and the same, it is both oI these, although the being oI both is not the same, and one may
contemplate it either as a picture, or as a likeness, i.e. as a mnemonic token
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.
Aristotle seems to me to tell that thanks to imagination, it is possible to keep in mind what is not
present. So, Ior example, when someone contemplates the painting in the picture as being a
likeness, and without seeing the real person, Aristotle says the real Koriskos, contemplates it as a
likeness oI Koriskos. Thanks to imagination, contemplating what is not visible is possible. This
means that imagination has an intrinsic educative value: it makes possible to discern and gaze what
is not yet here, thus what is possible. Imagination allows us to plan, without remaining bounded and
enclosed to what is present.
Let us now concentrate on the educative value oI imagination, insoIar as it is linked to empathy.
As stated, it can be considered 'an imaginative reconstruction: when we empathize with another
person`s experience, we show to be capable to contemplate what is impossible to see, i.e. his/her
inner liIe. Empathetic imagination is in Iact a IruitIul and, Ior many aspects, irreplaceable source oI
understanding. Without any empathetic attempt, indeed, we remain obtuse and unable to make
sense oI what we see; so, some human behaviours and choices (especially, as I argue later, iI
perIormed by men and women coming Irom a cultural context really diIIerent Irom our one) can
oIten remain remote and misunderstood. Instead, a good educator has to imagine what the person
he/she should take care oI, is living, Ieeling, and suIIering. So, he/she can consider whether the
behaviour visible hides preIerences deIormed by injustices, material and cultural deprivations,
lacking awareness oI alternatives. Empathy tells us that education deals with what is not visible: not
yet visible, i.e. the possible and the Iuture, absolute invisible and secrete, i.e. the inner world oI
another person.

11
Aristotle, On Memorv and Reminiscence, 450 a b 26 II. More precisely, Aristotle argues that in this way, we have to
regard the mnemonic presentation within us: as it is considered in itselI, it is an object oI contemplation; but when
considered as relative to something else, e.g. as its likeness, it is also a mnemonic token.

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OI course, there should be no violent and paternalistic demand: the inner liIe oI another person
will be never totally understood. This is the reason why I have stated that empathy is the ability to
put oneselI in another own place, trving to understand his/her Ieelings, desires, troubles, ideas, and
actions.
Empathy needs the distance that imagination makes possible. Again we can quote Aristotle, who
stresses that compassion cannot be Ielt not only by those who are moved by a disposition to
arrogance, but also by those are moved by great Iear: terriIied people are taken up with what is
happening to themselves and cannot Ieel compassion. Only those who are between these two
extremes can Ieel pity. Consistently, he also states that the people we pity are those whom we know,
but only iI they are not very closely related to us: in that case we Ieel about them as iI we were in
danger ourselves.
To be empathic, one should be able to Ieel himselI/herselI involved in, but not overcame and
overwhelmed by what he/she gazes. Empathy is a Iorm oI thought, not an impulse; in Iact, I am not
speaking about an 'emotional contagion but, rather, about an 'intelligent Ieeling
12
. Remarkably,
according to C. Rogers, to be emphatic means 'to perceive the internal Irame oI reIerence oI
another person |...|as iI one were the person, but without ever losing the 'as iI condition.
13

In this connection, Nussbaum maintains that 'empathy is like the mental preparation oI a skilled
actor
14
: it implies a participatory and concerned enactment oI the situation oI another person, but
also the awareness oI being a separate and diIIerent person. This stress seems to me to be related
with Nussbaum`s view oI the ontological separation among human being and, thus, with her
constant hinting at the importance, in a just and Iair political arrangement, oI considering each and
every person: one`s Ilourishing cannot balance another`s misery.
Speaking about empathy, Nussbaum pinpoints that it does not imply any Iusion: one should not
think one`s own responses as Iused with those oI the suIIerer. Empathy requires the sharp
awareness oI one`s own separate liIe. The same can be said Ior compassion: 'Ior iI it is to be Ior
another, and not oneselI, that one Ieels compassion, one must be aware both oI the bad lot oI the
suIIerer and oI the Iact that it is, right now, not one`s own. |...| One both imagines what it is like to
be in the suIIerer`s place and, at the same time, retains securely the awareness that one is not in that
place
15
. Otherwise, he/she Iails to comprehend the situation oI another as other.

12
See: Bellingreri A., Per una pedagogia dellempatia, Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
13
Rogers C. R., A theorv of therapv, personalitv and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-centered
framework, p. 211.
14
15
Nussbaum M., Upheavals of Thought, p. 327

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So, also in this perspective, putting oneselI really and entirely in another liIe appears impossible.
And to claim this is unIair and can be, especially in education but also in clinical therapy, love,
and justice issues very dangerous: it means jeopardizing other`s Ireedom. Nevertheless, trying to
imagine how could be to stay in another liIe, considering this as an inIinite task something like a
Kantian regulative ideal , is 'associated with good moral character, as Aristotle would say
16
.
Empathy is a virtuous attitude.
At this stage, we can consider empathy as a valuable tool Ior establishing connections and
signiIicant relationships with others. Again the educative value oI empathy can be highlighted: the
educative eIIorts and practices can be accomplished, only when the young Ieels to be object oI real
concern by an empathic educator and notices that his/her own perspective are appreciated. Thus,
empathy can be re-deIined as a Iorm oI intersubjectivity which, on the one side, encourages to
enlarge the sight and, on the other side, allows another person to Ireely express himselI/herselI.
Hence, empathy is closely linked with socialization, altruism, and moral liIe.

Empathy and Justice.
At this stage, we can maintain that the judgment oI similar possibilities, that empathy makes
possible, is an epistemological and moral aid: a source oI knowledge as well as oI Iair human
relationships and a tool Ior the extension oI our concern.
Nowadays there is an increasing need Ior empathy, even though or, perhaps, exactly because
to ignore others` real need seems to be a wise choice. To imagine how living another liIe could be,
seems to be a trivial activity. Surely, empathy and its lack cannot be measured directly, but it is
possible to do so, through intolerance, prejudice, unIairness, violence we see. Empathy involves
justice.
Nussbaum argues that 'a society pursuing justice might legitimately rely on and cultivate
compassion
17
and that empathy would play a signiIicant role 'in compassion where the object oI
compassion is a very diIIerent Irom oneselI, and diIIicult to understand
18
. She thinks compassion
in connection with the Iorm oI political liberalism aimed at gaining an overlapping consensus
among men and women Irom diIIerent social and cultural backgrounds and at respecting individual
Ireedoms which has led her to envisage the list oI capabilities: compassion could be a good basis
Ior a pluralistic democracy, insoIar as it makes deeper insights into human liIe possible. And, Ior

16
See Aristotle, Rethoric II 9.
17
18

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compassion entails the awareness that there are serious misIortunes that can happen to human
beings beyond their Iaults, an empathetic society is based upon a powerIul idea: people are
digniIied agents, but can also be, and oIten are, victims. Nussbaum does not recognize any stark and
binary choice between considering people as active and considering them as passive: the agent and
the victim role are not irreconcilable; nor she thinks that all human dignity consists in agency,
whereas passivity is dishonourable. This implies a stress on the importance oI concrete
circumstances where persons live.
Nussbaum has repeatedly argued that an appropriate imaginative exercise the one that the
narrative artworks stimulate, as I will show can provide inIormation about human liIe without
which no Iair political decision can be shaped. She deems that emotions can give signiIicant
contribution to ethical deliberation, both in individual and public liIe; thus, a social order should
cultivate emotions, 'rather than simply creating a system oI just rules
19
. This is particularly true in
today`s context, where multiculturalism is a Iascinating, but also demanding task. We can no more
consider ourselves citizens oI a nation, surrounded by strangers and Ioreigners. As Nussbaum argue
in Cultivating Humanitv, we should think ourselves and educate our pupil as citizens oI the entire
world. At this stage, we can accept Edith Stein`s deIinition oI empathy: 'the experience oI Ioreign
consciousness in general
20
.
Nussbaum states that the lack oI empathetic imagination, with which new happenings in distant
part oI the world is oIten met, is to be considered as a moral and political Iailure. According to her,
thanks to empathy, human beings could be involved in the Iate oI other people outside their own
national and cultural boundaries: they could know through an higher understanding, that is not
only learning some Iacts about groups, races, and nations diIIerent Irom than their own but, rather,
being drawn, so to speak, into those lives and inhabit them something about the troubles distant
people have to Iace to flourish. These empathetic insights might be involved in the construction oI
society, in the envisagement oI distributional principles as well as oI a tax code and a welIare
system, and in the reIlection about the responsibilities and the duties oI rich nation toward poorer
ones
21
.

19
20
Stein E. (1989), On the problem of empathv, Washington: ICS Publications. (Original work published 1917), p. 11.
21
See Nussbaum, M., Upheavals of Thought, p. 405. The author argues that the relationship between compassion social
institutions should be twoIold: on one hand, compassionate persons can give rise to institutions 'that embody what they
image; (p. 405) on the other hand, such institutions can support the development oI compassion. Actually, according to
Nussbaum, institution play a signiIicant, even though oIten hidden and undervalued educative role: they employ and
teach ideals a good liIe and citizenship, give a conception oI responsibility and civic judgement, shape representation oI
Iorms oI human relationships which become normative.

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In any case, we have to stress again that empathy allows an higher comprehension oI the other,
but also entails the awareness oI the ontological separation and the irreducible qualitative diIIerence
among humans: it would be unrealistic and unIair 'to claim that we have a perIect empathetic
understanding oI people whose liIe are very diIIerent Irom our own or, Ior that matter, even oI
those who are closely to us, such as our own parents, or our child
22
.

How to learn empathy
We have stated that empathy depends on one`s capacity to put oneselI in the other person's place
and to experience an appropriate emotional response: namely, it entails the capability to imagine, as
well as selI-awareness and other-awareness. This means that it requires mature cognitive and
perceptual abilities, thus an appropriate education.
We have oIten speak about educative role, educative value and, oI course, education. At this
stage, a remark can be useIul. I bear in mind the idea oI education entailed in the capability
approach. On the one side, education is viewed as a basic good, then a goal oI social democracy,
just like health and social participation: namely, Ireedom will be only an abstract, hollow, and
ineIIective notion, unless it will be recognized that it has material preconditions - including
adequate education. On the other side, the entire purpose oI promote flourishing human life can be
meant as an educative task, insoIar as it requires to recall Nussbaum`s list being able to use
'senses, imagination, and thought in trulv human way, that is 'in a way inIormed and cultivated by
an adequate education. In other words, to Iunction as human beings always requires education.
What I want to argue there is that such education can be more eIIective iI shaped as orbiting around
the notion oI empathy. An empathetic attitude will be the Iirst quality oI educators as well as the
attitude we are aimed at arousing in our pupils.
II empathy is innate is an open question, but surely can be also learned. For it is an 'intelligent
Ieeling and a virtuous behaviour, it can be improved and educated. So, how to teach empathy?
How to envisage an education Ior empathy? On the basis oI the way in which empathy was here
shaped, two crucial elements are to be included in such education: emotions and imagination.
According to Nussbaum, an appropriate compassion is crucial Ior a good citizenship in our
world, thus education should promote and cultivate the capability to imagine the experiences oI
other`s and participate to them. Nussbaum, thereIore, deals with the educative strategies and tools

See: Abbate F. (2005), Locchio della compassione. Immagina:ione narrativa e democra:ia globali::ata in Martha
Nussbaum, Roma: Studium.
22

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by which this capability can be taught: she speaks about exercises Ior the extension oI empathy and
argues that, to promote it across cultural and social barriers, we should turn to works oI art that both
present these barriers as relevant in concrete way and encourage to gaze the common humanity. The
realist social novel like Dicken`s novel is one such work oI art: 'it exercises the muscles oI the
imagination, making people capable to inhabiting, Ior a time, the world oI a diIIerent person
23
. So,
arts can play a vital educative and political role, because oI what they do in the emotional liIe.
Furthermore, in Cultivating Humanitv as well as in Poetic Justice, Nussbaum highlights the
importance oI inIancy in the development oI empathy: namely, she pinpoints that, many child`s
simple stories and songs stimulate to imagine the inner world oI another, thus to endow inhuman
and mute Iorms with liIe, emotions, ideas, needs, and so on. In particular, Nussbaum recalls the
popular song 'Twinkle, twinkle, little star, how I wonder what you are, to stress that the child
develops, thanks to it, a sense oI wonder and mystery. In other terms, the child learns to gaze what
is not visible, Iorming the habit oI empathy. Narrative artworks arouse narrative attitude towards
oneselI as well as the others. The narrative imagination is the room Ior the creative eIIort oI the
higher understanding that empathy makes possible. It indeed gives nourishment to wonder and
curiosity, arousing the ability to gaze other people in non instrumental way, as objects oI respect.
Let us come back to empathy. It was observed that, by the age oI two, human beings begin to
display behaviors oI empathy by showing to intend what others believe and having an emotional
response that corresponds with another person
24
. Empathy increases as the child Iorms a 'selI-
concept: the more aware the inIant is oI his/her emotional states, the more he/she explores his/her
limitations and capabilities. Actually, the capability to empathize is dependent on the ability to Ieel
his/her own Ieelings and identiIy them. Higher emotional sensitivity leads to higher levels oI
empathy. By recognizing and ascribing to people around him/her, the new insights about
himselI/herselI, the child develops a moral sense and inhibits the anti-social impulses.
In an education Ior empathy, each person should be taught to share inner Ieelings, to listen to and
understand the other`s viewpoints and ideas. In other terms, to help the child to stay 'in touch with
his/her Ieelings is crucial. The child should be supported in making experience oI his/her own
emotions: he/she needs to acknowledge, identiIy, and accept Ieelings. This means that, Iirst oI all,
parents and educators have to be open to them, then, they should not invalidate child`s Ieelings by
ignoring, diminishing, devaluing, and judging them; nor they should use labels like 'immature or
'childish with regard to emotional experiences. Otherwise, many oI us, that seem to be unable oI

23
Nussbaum M., Upheavals of Thought, p. 431
24
Feldman, R.S. (1997), Development across the life span, New York: Prentice Hall.

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empathy, were probably told that cultivating the rational part means to be 'mature and 'adult:
they are led to believe that emotions are 'upheavals oI thought, irrational, signs oI weakness, and
so on.
In Upheavals of Thought, Nussbaum speaks about the role oI parental cares and inIantile
attachment: already in the Iirst months, such cares shape the person`s attitude toward its own
condition oI neediness, its agency and capability oI establishing signiIicant human relationships,
and, Iirst and Ioremost, towards its own emotional liIe. Consistently, the IiIth item oI Nussbaum`s
list, i.e. 'Emotion is explained as Iollows: 'Being able to have attachments to things and people
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care Ior us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to
love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justiIied anger. Not having one`s emotional
development blighted by Iear and anxiety. Supporting this capability means supporting Iorms oI
human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.
When the emotional development is 'blighted, the children become adults avoiding their
contemplative sight Irom their own inner world and hiding their need Ior others. Nussbaum argues
that this can easily become a vicious cycle, insoIar as inhibited, unexamined and unknown emotions
remain at an inIantile level and are Ielt as threatening and shameIul power, totally disconnected
Irom the 'true and 'adult selI.
Speaking about emotions and inIancy, Nussbaum recalls some Winnicott`s concepts, which are
valuable also in order to explore the educative value oI imagination and empathy: 'holding,
'Iacilitating environment, 'child`s ability oI be alone, and 'transitional objects
25
. About the Iirst
one, Winnicott has argued that an educative environment is one in which the alleged omnipotence
oI the inIant which is truly vulnerability and deIencelessness, as the demand to be always at the
centre oI attention shows is acknowledged. In the space oI 'holding, the inIant receives Iood,
protection, encouragements, and care. Moreover, in the relationship between inIant and caretaker, it
is crucial that the Iormer shows sensitivity to child`s needs and rhythms. Nussbaum, as well as
Winnicott, argues that this can be achieved by a person who uses imagination to put oneselI in the
child`s place. So an empathetic attunement is crucial Ior an environment really Iacilitating. Kohut
(1971) has stressed that, through it, the caregiver becomes aware oI the inIant`s inner experience
and uses this awareness to guide all attempts toward comIorting the inIant.
Then, Nussbaum recalls Winnicott`s envisagement oI the development oI child`s ability to 'be
alone: when the child is able to be alone, he/she can devote itselI to activities and projects that it

25
See: Winnicott, D. W. (1965), The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, New York: International
University Press.

11
has shaped, rather than continuously looking Ior protection and reassurance. The Ioundation oI this
ability is, in an apparently contradictory way, the presence oI someone else. Actually, Winnicott
speaks about the capability oI 'be alone in the presence oI the mother. For the child has
experimented the care oI a reliable caregiver, it can experience a sense oI saIety, by Ieeling held
even when not being physical held, i.e. protected by the environment
26
.
In the development oI the ability oI be alone is essential the role oI the 'transitional objects,
such as a stuIIed animal or something else through which the inIant Iaces and relieves his/her need
Ior protection, without seeking the physical holding oI caregivers. Again, we may stress that
imaging means to contemplate beyond the visible. Moreover, Nussbaum highlights that the capacity
to be alone is Iacilitated and strengthened by the narrative play: storytelling with the transitional
objects is a Irequent and, as we have seen, valuable children`s activity.
Interestingly, the author pinpoints that 'both the concept oI playing and the concept oI the
transitional object give a crucial role to imagination: as the caregiver uses imagination to meet
with the appropriate sensitiveness the child`s need, so the child uses imagination playing with
his/her transitional object, 'imagining a saIe world in the absence oI visible source oI saIety
27
.
At this stage, we can state that speaking about empathy as a pedagogical category gives the
opportunity to moves a critique to Nussbaum`s list: aIIiliation the capability that deals with
intersubjectivity should be not only a capability among the other, even thought provided with a
special importance but, rather, a pre-requisite oI a true Ilourishing oI each and every capability.
Actually, to Iunction in a truly human way that is to achieve the capabilities oI the list each oI us
needs Iirst oI all to be welcomed in a social interaction where his/her liIe and growing is important
Ior someone else, that is in an empathic and educative environment. My point is that a person can
learn empathy, then compassion and altruism, only iI he/she is the object oI empathy: to receive the
appropriate care is crucial. In other words, empathy is learned by someone who, as said, perceives
to be object oI real empathetic concern oI someone else.
Speaking about empathy as a pedagogical category, thereIore, means speaking about the
Iundamental role oI 'recognition i.e. oI being recognized by someone else Ior the discovering,
the gain, and the growing oI Ireedom. Hence, an education Ior empathy is an 'empathy-based
education. As P. Ricoeur argued and as the importance oI the caregivers` empathetic care shows,
recognition is a 'giIt
28
, i.e. something received undeservedly, beIore and beyond our agency. By

26
See: Nussbaum M., Upheavals of Thought, p. 208.
27
Nussbaum M., Upheavals of Thought, pp. 208 209.
28
Ricoeur P. (2004), The Course of Recognition, Harvard, Harvard University Press. The author envisages recognition
in three Iorms: as involved in the knowledge oI objects, by stressing the role oI recognition in modern epistemology; as

12
recalling Nussbaum`s idea that there is no stark and binary choice between regarding people as
active and considering them as passive, so by reIuting the idea oI an incompatibility between
agency and passivity, we could reshape the item A oI AIIiliation` as Iollows:
'Receiving appropriate care and empathetic concern; being able to live in an educative
environment, with and toward others, to imagine the situation oI another and to have compassion
Ior that situation, to recognize and show concern Ior other human beings, to engage in various
Iorms oI social interaction, to have the capability Ior both justice and Iriendship.
I deem that these variations, with a slight diIIerent sequence oI the particular capabilities
involved, can drive our attention to the importance oI passivity without denying, oI course, to
considering human being as source oI agency in our experience and to the role oI education as
prerequisite oI a truly flourishing human life.

To conclude: what is promising in Nussbaum`s account on empathy, within the Iramework oI
capability approach, is the stress on the ethical and political role oI imagination. Nussbaum points
out the need Ior ways to include imagination and empathy in public judgment. It does not mean
throwing away a 'scientiIic calculative approach; rather, it means that science should have a
deeper sight. Without narrative i.e. empathetic , habits, public rationality is bounded to be oIten
incomplete and obtuse. A close link between empathy and the basic insight oI the capability
approach can be, thereIore, recognized: in order to shape a view on quality oI liIe and development
issues as alternative to ones that Iocus on resources, i.e. considering how these resources are
working and implementing human Ilourishing, 'we must image the whole picture oI a liIe
29
. In
other terms, without empathetic imagination, important Iacts oI human liIe, linked with Ireedom
and justice, remain remote and hidden. A capabilities-based approach aims at considering the 'same
type oI rich human inIormation that a good novels gives us, stimulating us to think empathetically
about the possibilities oI people in any diIIerent nations and oI groups within nations
30
. This is the
reason why Sen and Nussbaum placed a page Irom Dicken`s Hard Times at the beginning oI the
volume on The Qualitv of Life. We can, thereIore, state that our common work has begun Irom a
narrative attitude, Irom imagination and empathy.

recognition oI responsibility, by considering the envisagement oI agency and moral responsibility Irom the ancients up
to the present day; Iinally, as involved in the notion oI identity, by developing Hegel`s theme oI the struggle Ior mutual
recognition up to contemporary arguments about identity and multiculturalism. Ricoeur pinpoints and examines the
transition Irom an active to a passive voice that can be seen in these various senses oI the verb to recognize. It seems to
me that, in this perspective, an irreducible passivity is considered as a capability constitutive oI the selI.
29
30
M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 440.


13

ReIerences
- Abbate F. (2005), Locchio della compassione. Immagina:ione narrativa e democra:ia globali::ata
in Martha Nussbaum, Roma: Studium.
- Aristotle, On Memorv and Reminiscence, translated by J. I. Beare.
- Aristotle, On the Soul, translated by D.W.Hamlyn.
- Aristotle, Rethoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts.
- Bellingreri A. (2004), Per una pedagogia dellempatia, Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- Kohut, H. (1984), How does analvsis cure? Chicago: The University oI Chicago Press
- Morris C. G., Psvchologv - An Introduction (Ninth Edition) by, Prentice Hall, 1996.
- Nussbaum M., Sen A. (eds) (1990), The Qualitv of Life, OxIord: Clarendon Press.
- Nussbaum M. (1992), Human Functioning and Social Justice. In Defense of an Aristotelian
Essentialism, Political Theory, Vol.20, n.2.
- Nussbaum M. (1995), Aristotle on human nature and the foundation of ethics, in J.E.J.Altham and
R.Harrison, World, Mind and Ethics, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum M. (1995), Poetic Justice. the Literarv Imagination and Public Life, Boston: Beacon
Press.
- Nussbaum M. (1997), Cultivating Humanitv. a Classical Defence of Reform in Liberal Education,
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nussbaum M. (2000), Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge
UK, Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum M. (2001), Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge UK,
Cambridge University Press.
- Orstein P. H. (ed) (1981), The Search of Self. Selected Writing of Hein: Kohut. 1978 - 1981,
Madison: International University Press.
- Ricoeur P. (2004), The Course of Recognition, Harvard, Harvard University Press.
- Rogers C. R. (1959), A theorv of therapv, personalitv and interpersonal relationships, as developed
in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A studv of science, New York: Mc
Graw Hill, Vol. 3, pp. 210 211
- Stein E. (1989), On the problem of empathv, Washington: ICS Publications. (Original work
published 1917).

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