Kriesi Et Al West European Politics in The Age of Globalization

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West European Politics in the Age of Globalization
Over the past three decades the effects of globalization and denationalization have created a division between winners and losers in Western Europe. This study examines the transformation of party political systems in six countries (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) using opinion surveys, as well as newly collected data on election campaigns. The authors argue that, as a result of structural transformations and the strategic repositioning of political parties, Europe has observed the emergence of a tripolar configuration of political power, comprising the left, the moderate right, and the new populist right. They suggest that, through an emphasis on cultural issues such as mass immigration and resistance to European integration, the traditional focus of political debate the economy has been downplayed or reinterpreted in terms of this new political cleavage. This new analysis of Western European politics will interest all students of European politics and political sociology.
HANSPETER KRIESI
is Professor for Comparative Politics in the Institute of Political Science at the University of Zurich.
EDGAR GRANDE
is Professor for Comparative Politics in the GeschwisterScholl-Institute for Political Science at the University of Munich. is a visiting scholar at the Department of Politics of New
ROMAIN LACHAT
York University.
M A R T I N D O L E Z A L is a researcher in the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute for Political Science at the University of Munich. SIMON BORNSCHIER
is a researcher in the Institute of Political Science at the
University of Zurich.
T I M O T H E O S F R E Y is a researcher in the Institute of Political Science at the University of Zurich.
West European Politics in the Age of Globalization

HANSPETER KRIESI EDGAR GRANDE ROMAIN LACHAT MARTIN DOLEZAL SIMON BORNSCHIER TIMOTHEOS FREY
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521895576 Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Timotheos Frey 2008 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2008
ISBN-13 978-0-511-42926-2 ISBN-13 ISBN-13 978-0-521-89557-6 978-0-521-71990-2
eBook (EBL) hardback paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
List of figures List of tables Preface and acknowledgments Part I 1 Theory and methods
page xi xiii xvii 1
Globalization and its impact on national spaces of competition HANSPETER KRIESI, EDGAR GRANDE, ROMAIN LACHAT, MARTIN DOLEZAL, SIMON BORNSCHIER AND
TIMOTHEOS FREY
3
4 9 14 20
A new structural conflict between winners and losers of globalization The impact of the new structural conflict on the structure of the political space The positioning of the parties within the transformed space An overview of the volume
Contexts of party mobilization

HANSPETER KRIESI
23
24 24 28 31 36 38 42 45 49
The societal context The relative strength of the traditional cleavages and the new cleavage Economic context conditions Cultural context conditions The political context The general framework: processes of dealignment and the established structure of the party systems Institutional opportunity structures: the electoral system and its consequences The interaction context and the dynamics of adjustment: strategies of mainstream parties Conclusion
vi
Contents
The design of the study: the distinguishing characteristics of our approach

MARTIN DOLEZAL
53
54 57 58 60 65 73
Selection of countries and elections Two sides of party competition: data collection and analysis Twelve issue categories Analysis of the demand side Analysis of the supply side Conclusion
Part II 4
Country studies
75 77
77 79 79 82 85 87 90 98 102
France: the model case of party system transformation

SIMON BORNSCHIER
Introduction Context conditions Traditional cleavages and dealignment in the party system Economic context conditions Cultural context conditions Political context conditions Analysis of the demand side: voters political potentials Analysis of the supply side: structures of competition in the party system Conclusion
Austria: transformation driven by an established party

MARTIN DOLEZAL
105
105 106 106 108 109 112 116 123 128
Introduction Social-economic and political context conditions Relative strength of traditional cleavages Economic context conditions Cultural context conditions Political context conditions Analysis of the demand side: voters attitudes and issue-priorities Analysis of the supply side: the parties programmatic offer Conclusion
Switzerland: another case of transformation driven by an established party

ROMAIN LACHAT
130
130 131
Introduction Traditional cleavages
Contents
Economic context conditions Cultural context conditions The political context Analysis of the demand side: the electoral potential for a new cleavage Analysis of the supply side: the articulation of the integrationdemarcation cleavage Conclusion
vii
134 136 138 143 148 152
The Netherlands: a challenge that was slow in coming

HANSPETER KRIESI AND TIMOTHEOS FREY
154
154 155 155 156 160 161 163 165 172 181
Introduction Social and economic context conditions The relative strength of traditional cleavages Economic context conditions Cultural context conditions Political context conditions The new right-wing populist challenge Analysis of the demand side: the voters political potentials Analysis of the supply side: the parties programmatic offer Conclusion
The United Kingdom: moving parties in a stable configuration

183
183 185 185 187 189 191 191 193 194 197 202 206
Introduction Social and economic context conditions The relative strength of traditional cleavages Economic context conditions Cultural context conditions Political context conditions Dealignment and realignment Difficulties for new challengers Transformation of major parties Analysis of the demand side: the voters political potentials Analysis of the supply side: the parties programmatic offer Conclusion
Germany: the dog that didnt bark

MARTIN DOLEZAL
208
208 209 209
Introduction Social-economic and cultural context conditions Relative strength of traditional cleavages
viii
Economic context conditions Cultural context conditions Political context conditions Dealignment Institutional structure Organizational capacity and leadership quality of the new challengers Strategies of mainstream parties Analysis of the demand side: voters attitudes and issue priorities Analysis of the supply side: the parties programmatic offer Conclusion
Contents
211 212 214 214 216 217 218 220 226 232
Part III 10
Comparative analyses
235
Demand side: dealignment and realignment of the structural political potentials

ROMAIN LACHAT AND MARTIN DOLEZAL
237
237 238 240 243 251 257 264
Introduction The structure of voters attitudes The relationship between economic and cultural issues Winners and losers of globalization The configuration of partisan groups The structural basis of the new divide Conclusion
11
Supply side: the positioning of the political parties in a restructuring space

ROMAIN LACHAT AND HANSPETER KRIESI
267
267 269 269 271 274 274 278 282 285 286 288 290 294
Introduction The structure of the political space The transformation of the basic dimensions of the space The degree of integration of the two dimensions The configuration of party positions Tripolarity Party families Comparing national party configurations The determinants of parties issue-positions Economic issues European integration and immigration Cultural liberalism and law and order Conclusion
Contents
ix
12
The electoral consequences of the integrationdemarcation cleavage

ROMAIN LACHAT
296
296 297 300 301 305 308 311 314 316 317
Introduction The issue basis of voting choices Strategy of analysis France Austria Switzerland The Netherlands United Kingdom Germany Conclusion
13
Globalizing West European politics: the change of cleavage structures, parties and party systems in comparative perspective
EDGAR GRANDE
320
320 322 328 335 336 338 341 343
Globalizing West European politics: dimensions of comparative analysis The transformation of cleavage structures and political spaces The rise of new parties and party families in Western Europe The fragmentation and polarization of party systems in Western Europe Fragmentation Polarization Still the age of moderate pluralism? Conclusion
Appendix A
Technical appendix
Introduction Analysis of the supply side of electoral competition: data collection Analysis of the demand side: list of datasets used Operationalization of social-structural variables Social class Education Religion and religiosity Measuring voters issue-positions Statistical methods Multidimensional scaling
345
345 345 348 349 349 353 353 353 359 359
Contents
Measuring the degree of integration of two axes in an MDS configuration Polarization measure Weighted Euclidian distance between parties in a multidimensional issue space
362 364 364
Appendix B References Index
Detailed statistical results
366 388 424
Figures
1.1 Expected positioning of party families with respect to the new cleavage page 15 2.1 Number of new asylum-seekers per year and country 37 3.1 The rise of globalization, 19702003 56 4.1 Demand side of party competition, 1978, 1988, 1995 and 2002 elections (France) 94 4.2 Demand side, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (France) 96 4.3 Supply side of party competition, 1978, 1988, 1995 and 2002 elections (France) 99 5.1 Demand side of party competition, 1975, 1994, 1999 and 2002 elections (Austria) 119 5.2 Demand side of party competition in Austria, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (Austria) 122 5.3 Supply side of party competition, 1975, 1994, 1999 and 2002 elections (Austria) 125 6.1 Demand side of party competition, 1975, 1995 and 1999 elections (Switzerland) 145 6.2 Distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (Switzerland) 147 6.3 Supply side of party competition, 1975, 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections (Switzerland) 149 7.1 Demand side of party competition, 1972, 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections (The Netherlands) 168 7.2 Demand side, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (The Netherlands) 170 7.3 Supply side of party competition, 1972, 1994 and 1998 elections (The Netherlands) 174 7.4 Supply side of party competition, 2002 and 2003 elections (The Netherlands) 179
xi
xii
List of figures
8.1 Level of industrial conflict, days not worked (in million) (United Kingdom) 187 8.2 Demand side of party competition, 1974, 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections (United Kingdom) 199 8.3 Demand side, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (United Kingdom) 201 8.4 Supply side of party competition, 1974, 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections (United Kingdom) 203 9.1 Demand side of party competition, 1976, 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections (Germany) 223 9.2 Demand side of party competition, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (Germany) 225 9.3 Supply side of party competition, 1976, 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections (Germany) 227 10.1 Strength of traditional and new divides among social groups 244 10.2 Distances between social groups on economic issue-categories 247 10.3 Distances between social groups on cultural issue-categories 247 10.4 Average location of education levels on the economic and cultural dimensions 249 10.5 Average location of social classes on the economic and cultural dimensions 249 10.6 Average location of partisan groups in the political space, 1970s 255 10.7 Average location of partisan groups in the political space, 1990s 256 11.1 Issue-positions and values of the integration indices in Austria, 1999 and France, 1978 271 11.2 Positions of party families in the political space 279 11.3 Positions of parties in the political space 283 13.1 Typology of ideological profiles of political parties 326 13.2 Typology of pluralist party systems 342 A.1 Screeplot of a factor analysis of the issue-categories, Netherlands, 1994 358 A.2 Factor loadings for the preferred solution and for two alternative solutions, Netherlands, 1994 359 A.3 Schematic representation of the distances on which the integration index is based 363
Tables
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 8.1
Strength of traditional cleavages in the six countries page 26 Social and economic indicators 30 Classification of cultural context conditions 34 Foreign population 35 Indicators of dealignment: volatility, party identification and party membership 39 Indicators of the party system: number of parties, type of democracy and ideological distance 40 Summary of hypotheses concerning national contexts of party mobilization 50 Elections 57 Issue-categories 59 Surveys used for the demand-side analyses 62 Issue-categories covered by the surveys 63 Selected newspapers 68 Parties according to current membership of party families 69 Election results and party system features 81 Demand side of party competition: results of factor analyses after varimax rotation 92 Election results and party system features 113 Demand side of party competition: results of factor analyses after varimax rotation 117 Election results and characteristics of the party system, Switzerland, 19712003 140 Structure of the Swiss political space: analysis of the demand side, 19751999: factor loadings after a varimax rotation 144 Election results and party system features 157 Demand side of party competition: results of factor analyses after varimax rotation 166 Election results, House of Commons: shares of votes and numbers of seats 184
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xiv
List of tables
8.2 Demand side of party competition: results of factor analyses after varimax rotation 9.1 Election results and party system features 9.2 Results of factor analyses after varimax rotation 10.1 Strength of the association between economic and cultural attitudes 10.2 Polarization of partisan groups on the economic and cultural dimensions 10.3 Degree of tripolarity of the party configuration 10.4 Impact of social-structural characteristics on voters attitudes towards a restrictive immigration policy 10.5 Impact of social-structural characteristics on voters attitudes towards European integration 11.1 Degree of integration of the left-integration and right-demarcation poles 11.2 Degree of tripolarity of the party configuration 11.3 Impact of party-level and country-level factors on average issue-positions: welfare and economic liberalism 11.4 Impact of party-level and country-level factors on average issue-positions: European integration and immigration 11.5 Impact of party-level and country-level factors on average issue-positions: cultural liberalism and law and order 11.6 Party family and period: percentages 12.1 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, France 12.2 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, France 12.3 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, Austria 12.4 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, Austria 12.5 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, Switzerland 12.6 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, Switzerland 12.7 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, the Netherlands 12.8 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, the Netherlands
198 215 221 242 252 253 260 262 273 277 287
289
292 293 302 303 306 307 309 310 311 313
List of tables
xv
12.9 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, the UK 12.10 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, the UK 12.11 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, Germany 12.12 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, Germany 13.1 Political and institutional opportunity structures for radical-right parties 13.2 Effective number of parties (based on votes at national parliamentary elections) 13.3 Party systems and party system change in Western Europe A.1 Days selected for the content analysis, by year and newspaper A.2 List of available indicators (Netherlands 1994, first wave) A.3 List of available indicators (Netherlands 1994, second wave) A.4 Factor loadings for the category cultural liberalism A.5 Factor loadings for the category anti-immigration B.1 Issue positions of French parties in the four campaigns B.2 Issue salience for French parties in the four campaigns B.3 Issue positions of Austrian parties in the four campaigns B.4 Issue salience for Austrian parties in the four campaigns B.5 Issue positions of Swiss parties in the four campaigns B.6 Issue salience for Swiss parties in the four campaigns B.7 Issue positions of Dutch parties in the four campaigns B.8 Issue salience for Dutch parties in the four campaigns B.9 Issue positions of UK parties in the four campaigns B.10 Issue salience for UK parties in the four campaigns B.11 Issue positions of German parties in the four campaigns B.12 Issue salience for German parties in the four campaigns
314 315 316 317 334 336 343 347 355 355 357 357 367 369 371 372 374 376 378 380 382 383 384 386
Preface and acknowledgments
This book is the result of a joint project of two teams of political scientists, one at the University of Zurich, the other at the University of Munich. The origins of this project date back to a hot summer afternoon in 2001, when Hanspeter Kriesi gave a presentation of some of his ideas about the impact of globalization on the transformation of Western European party systems before the special research programme (SFB) on Reflexive modernization at the Technical University of Munich. The presentation was well received by the small audience of dedicated colleagues who did bear with the heat. Edgar Grande reacted by proposing to set up a joint comparative research project designed to test these largely speculative ideas. Eventually, the project got going in late 2002, with the joint support of the German Research Foundation (SFB 536 Project C5), and of the Swiss National Science Foundation (1214-68010.02). Martin Dolezal together with several research assistants joined Edgar Grande to form the Munich team, while Simon Bornschier, Timotheos Frey, Romain Lachat and Hanspeter Kriesi constituted the Zurich team. The two teams closely collaborated from the start, and evenly divided the challenging task of data collection in six selected countries Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK between them. We assembled data both for the political supply by the parties, and for the political demand by the voters. Unsurprisingly, our decision not to rely on the readily available expert data for the supply side, nor to use the data provided by the Manifesto group, but to create our own data on the basis of an analysis of the public debate during election campaigns in the media, proved to be particularly consequential. We spent long months setting up the database and eventually coding the selected newspaper articles, ads and TV news. Let us add that, for the Dutch data, we got some decisive help from Jan Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators from the Free University of Amsterdam, who also provided us with the key methodological ideas for how to code the public debate
xvii
xviii
during election campaigns. With regard to the demand side, we used the available election surveys from the different countries. To render these surveys comparable across individual elections and across countries, and make them usable for our own purposes was, however, no mean task, given that there are no standardized formats for election studies in the various European countries. As we suspected, and as the reader will, we believe, come to appreciate on becoming familiar with our work, this investment into the data collection paid off handsomely. As the corpus on which this book is based was shaping up, we started to present our ideas and tentative results, first to our students and colleagues at our own universities and at the SFB, then to colleagues at conferences in Berlin (a WZB conference on political participation and protest mobilization in the age of globalization), Budapest (3rd ECPR General Conference), Chicago (Midwest Political Science Association), Duke University (workshop on the analysis of political cleavages and party competition), Mannheim (the working group Wahlen und politische Einstellungen of the German Political Science Association), Munich (a workshop explicitly organized on our preliminary results), Paris (a conference on right-wing extremism in Europe), Philadelphia (American Political Science Association), Rethymnon (a conference on political change and globalization) and Vienna (Austrian Political Science Association). We also presented some preliminary results to our colleagues at the SFB in Bremen, the Max-Planck-Institute in Cologne, the Cevipof in Paris, and at universities in Amsterdam, Dublin and Grenoble. We would like to thank all those who attended these presentations, and who provided us with comments. They allowed us to elaborate and revise our thinking about how party systems change in an age of globalization, to correct our interpretations of the six cases we are dealing with here, and to improve several aspects of our statistical analyses. Several colleagues also provided us with precious information on the election studies in their respective countries and helped us with the collection of data from newspapers and TV news. In particular, we would like to thank Kees Aarts, Ulrich Beck, Hans-Georg Betz, Lars-Erik Cederman, Tony Coxon, Roland Erne, Franz Fallend, Matthew Gabel, Olivier Grosjean, Niamh Hardiman, Jude Hays, Simon Hug, Achim Hurrelmann, Galen Irwin, Bob Jessop, Herbert Kitschelt, Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Frank Nullmeier, Philip Manow, Pierre Martin, Erik Neveu, Franz-Urban Pappi, Pascal Perrineau, Philip van Praag,
xix
Edeltraud Roller, Sabine Saurugger, Yves Schemeil, Kenneth Scheve, Tobias Schulz, Peter Selb and Michael Zrn. We also thank Axel Berger, Simone Debrunner, Fabienne Frei, Swen Hutter, Tina Knoll, Georg Martin, Vanessa Flge and Bettina Wapf for their research assistance. Finally, we would like to thank the efficient team from Cambridge University Press.
PART I
Theory and methods
Globalization and its impact on national spaces of competition

HANSPETER KRIESI, EDGAR GRANDE, ROMAIN LACHAT, MARTIN DOLEZAL, SIMON BORNSCHIER AND TIMOTHEOS FREY
The political consequences of globalization are manifold. On the one hand, the processes covered by this term lead to the establishment of new forms of political authority and of new channels of political representation at the supranational level and open up new opportunities for transnational, international and supranational mobilization (Della Porta et al. 1999). On the other hand, the same processes have profound political implications at the national level. National politics are challenged both from above through new forms of international cooperation and a process of supranational integration and from below, at the regional and local level. While the political consequences of globalization have most often been studied at the supra- or transnational level (Zrn 1998; Held et al. 1999; Greven and Pauly 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Grande and Pauly 2005), we shall focus on the effects of globalization on national politics. We assume that, paradoxically, the political reactions to economic and cultural globalization are bound to manifest themselves above all at the national level: given that the democratic political inclusion of citizens is still mainly a national affair, nationstates still constitute the major arenas for political mobilization (Zrn et al. 2000). Our study focuses on Western European countries, where globalization means, first of all, European integration. For the present argument, however, this aspect of the European context is not essential. Europeanization and European integration can also be seen as special cases of the more general phenomenon of globalization (Schmidt 2003). Zrn suggests that we view the processes of globalization as processes of denationalization (Beisheim et al. 1999; Zrn 1998), i.e. as processes that lead to the lowering and unbundling of national boundaries (Ruggie 1993). It is true that there are earlier examples of globalization, but there is plenty of evidence that this process has accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. Following David Held and his collaborators (1999: 425), who have probably presented the most detailed and measured
3
Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey
account of the phenomenon in question, we argue, however, that in nearly all domains contemporary patterns of globalization have not only quantitatively surpassed those of earlier epochs, but have also displayed unparallelled qualitative differences that is, in terms of how globalization is organized and reproduced. If we put these processes in a Rokkanean perspective (see Rokkan 2000), we may conceive of the contemporary opening up of boundaries as a new critical juncture, which is likely to result in the formation of new structural cleavages, both within and between national contexts. This is the starting point of the study presented in this volume. In this chapter, we shall outline in more detail our approach regarding the formation and articulation of new political cleavages. First, we discuss how we expect the processes of denationalization to lead to the formation of a new structural conflict, opposing winners and losers of globalization. This conflict is expected to constitute potentials for processes of political mobilization within national political contexts. Next, we examine how these potentials can be articulated at the level of political parties. In order to fully understand how new political cleavages emerge from the process of denationalization, it is crucial to focus both on the transformations in the electorate (the demand side of electoral competition), and on the kind of strategies political parties adopt to position themselves with regard to these new potentials (the supply side of politics).
A new structural conflict between winners and losers of globalization

Three assumptions guide our analysis:
First, we consider that the consequences of globalization are not

the same for all members of a national community. We expect them to give rise to new disparities, new oppositions and new forms of competition. Secondly, we assume that citizens perceive these differences between winners and losers of globalization, and that these categories are articulated by political parties. Thirdly, we expect that these new oppositions are not aligned with, but crosscut, the traditional structural and political cleavages.
The losers of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening
Globalization and national spaces of competition
of these boundaries as a threat to their social status and their social security. Their life chances and action spaces are being reduced. The winners, on the other hand, include people who benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced. The essential criterion for determining the impact of the opening up of national boundaries on individual life chances is whether or not someone possesses exit options. As Zygmunt Baumann (1998: 9) has observed, in the age of globalization mobility becomes the most powerful factor of social stratification. On the one hand, there are those who are mobile, because they control convertible resources allowing them to exit, and, on the other hand, there are those who remain lockedin, because they lack these resources. The scope of the structural changes induced by globalization is still a point of controversy. It is widely debated in political science and in sociology (see, for example, Albrow 1996; Beck 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Goldthorpe 2002). For our purposes, we can identify three mechanisms which contribute to the formation of winners and losers of globalization. First among these is the increase in economic competition, which results from the globalization process. Over the last decades, a series of transformations in the American economy has resulted in a massive pressure towards deregulations in Western European countries, leading in turn to a dramatic erosion of protected property rights. Schwartz (2001: 44) suggests interpreting the impact of globalization as the erosion of politically based property rights and their streams of income, and as reactions to that erosion. The individuals and the firms that are most directly affected by this erosion are those who worked in sheltered sectors, i.e. private sectors that were, since the 1930s, protected from market pressures through public regulation.1 Those measures disconnected income streams (in the form of wages, employment or profits) from the outcome of the market. In the context of globalization, Schwartzs distinction between sectors sheltered from the market, on the one hand, and sectors exposed to the market, on the other, has much in common with the distinction between export-oriented firms and firms oriented towards the
1
Such measures include: trade protection, minimum wages, centralized collective bargaining, product market regulation, zoning, the delegated control over markets to producer groups, and formal welfare states (Schwartz 2001: 31). The public sector also belongs to the sheltered sectors, but it is less affected by the erosion of established property rights.
domestic market.2 With the international pressure towards deregulation, the cleavage between these two sectors intensifies. Firms exposed to global market pressures try to impose market discipline on traditionally sheltered sectors, so as to bring down their own costs of production and to remain competitive on the international market. Firms in sheltered sectors, by contrast, seek to defend their property rights. Workers in exposed sectors also have an interest in the lowering of production costs, as their jobs directly depend on the international competitiveness of their firm. Workers in sheltered sectors, by contrast, have the same interest in protectionist measures as their employers. Globalization thus leads to a sectoral cleavage, which cuts across the traditional class cleavage and tends to give rise to cross-class coalitions. As a result of globalization, the increasing economic competition is, however, defined not only in sectoral, but also in ethnic, terms ethnic taken here in a large sense (including language and religious criteria). This is a consequence of the massive immigration into Western Europe of ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European population on the one hand, and of the increasing opportunities for delocalizing jobs into distant, and ethnically distinct, regions of the globe, on the other. Thus, the increasing economic competition is linked to a second mechanism an increasing cultural diversity (Albrow 1996). In the immigration countries, ethnically different populations become symbols of potential threats to the standard and style of living of the natives. Furthermore, the European welfare states have been granting some of their social rights and privileges though hardly any political rights to the migrants (Soysal 1994: 130), which increases the perception of competition (for the same scarce resources) on the part of the native population. In addition, the immigrants of ethnically distinct origins pose a potential
2
Schwartz, however, emphasizes the difference between the two classifications. Considering them as equivalent is misleading, he argues, because few commodities or services are not subject to international trade. Furthermore, he considers the stranded investments of the sheltered sectors to be a central problem, which is different from the issue of the opportunity costs of the export-oriented sectors. For a similar argument, see Frieden (1991: 440): The principal beneficiaries of the broad economic trends of the last two decades have been internationally oriented firms and the financial services industries; the principal losers have been nationally based industrial firms; and Frieden and Rogowski (1996: 46): exogenous easing of trade will be associated with increased demands for liberalization from the relatively competitive, and with increased demands of protection from the relatively uncompetitive, groups.
threat to the collective identity of the native population. To the extent that (parts of) the indigenous populations perceive that their life style, their everyday practices and their collective identity are challenged by the increasingly conspicuous presence and institutionalization (in the form of cultural centres, mosques, schools, associations etc.) of some immigrant cultures, we can speak of cultural competition which accompanies and exacerbates the economic competition. The potential economic and cultural threat may not necessarily be perceived and experienced in the same way by all members of a national community. In this respect, the individual level of education plays a key role. Education has a liberalizing effect, i.e. it induces a general shift in political value orientations towards cultural liberalism (cosmopolitanism, universalism). It contributes to cultural tolerance and openness; it provides the language skills which give access to other cultures. Individuals who are poorly educated are usually less tolerant and do not have the resources to communicate with foreigners or to understand other cultures in a more general sense (Lipset 1981; Grunberg and Schweisguth 1990: 54, 1997a: 1559, 168; Quillian 1995; Sniderman et al. 2000: 84). Moreover, higher education has also become an indispensable asset for ones professional success. It provides the necessary specialized skills which are marketable inside and across the national boundaries, thus considerably increasing ones exit options. It is certainly true that this development is less a consequence of globalization than of the processes of deindustrialization and of technological change. But, from the point of view of the affected groups, it is central to understand how they perceive their relative loss in life chances and to whom they attribute its causes. A third mechanism related to the opening up of borders increases the political competition between nation-states, on the one hand, and supraor international political actors, on the other. Most scholars agree that, as a consequence of globalization, nation-states are losing part of their problem-solving capacity and scope of action, which means that the citizens political rights, which are mainly tied to the nation-states, are hollowed out. Thus, the possibilities for an independent macro-economic policy have been drastically reduced because of the liberalization of the financial markets. This is obvious in the European context, where an autonomous national monetary policy has no longer been possible since the creation of a European central bank. These changes create winners and losers in specific ways, too. First of all, there may be material losers to
the extent that the reduction of a states autonomy may imply a reduction of the size of the public sector. But, more importantly, winners and losers also result from differences in their identification with the national community. Gorenburg (2000) has emphasized the importance of such identifications to understand support for nationalism. Individuals who possess a strong sense of identification with their national community, and who are attached to its exclusionary norms and/or to its political institutions, will perceive their weakening as a loss. Conversely, citizens with universalist norms will perceive this weakening as a gain, if it implies a strengthening of supranational political institutions.3 The attachment to national traditions, national languages and religious values plays a prominent role here as does the integration into transnational networks.4 To sum up, the likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community. Following the realistic theory of group conflict, we consider that the threats perceived by the losers and their related attitudes do have a real basis. They are not simply illusions or rest on false consciousness. However, we assume that individuals do not perceive cultural and material threats as distinct phenomena.5 As Martin Kohli (2000: 118) argues, identity and interests are mutually reinforcing factors of social integration. The new groups of winners and losers of globalization constitute political potentials, which can be articulated by political organizations. However, given the heterogeneous composition of these groups, we cannot expect that the preferences formed as a function of this new antagonism will be closely aligned with the political divisions on which
3
For the distinction between norms of exclusion and universalist norms, see Hardin (1995: Chapters 4ff.). Traditionally, integration into cosmopolitan networks was the preserve of a small elite. Today, however, the Jet Set is not the only group which is forming transnationally and which is developing identities that rival with territorially more circumscribed identities (Badie 1997: 453f.). Bobo (1999: 457): the melding of group identity, affect, and the interests in most real-world situations of racial stratification make the now conventional dichotomous opposition of realistic group conflict versus prejudice empirically nonsensical.
domestic politics have traditionally been based. This makes it difficult for established national political actors to organize these new potentials. In addition, the composition of the groups of winners and losers varies between national contexts, making it even more difficult to organize them at the supranational level, e.g. at the level of the European Union. This heterogeneity results in a twofold problem for the organization and articulation of political interests. First of all, it creates the already mentioned political paradox of globalization: due to their heterogeneity, the new political potentials created by this process are most likely to be articulated and dealt with at the level of the national political process. Moreover, it opens a window of opportunity for the formation of new political parties and the restructuring of the national party systems. We thus suggest that, paradoxically, the lowering and unbundling of national boundaries render them more salient. As they are weakened and reassessed, their political importance increases. More specifically, the destructuring of national boundaries leads to a sectoralization and an ethnicization of politics (Badie 1997), i.e. to an increased salience of differences between sectors of the economy and of cultural differences, respectively, as criteria for the distribution of resources, identity formation and political mobilization. As far as the ethnicization of politics is concerned, the theory of ethnic competition holds that majority groups will react to the rise of new threats with exclusionary measures (Olzak 1992). At a general level, we would expect losers of the globalization process to seek to protect themselves through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on national independence. Winners, by contrast, who benefit from the increased competition, should support the opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration. We shall refer here to this antagonism between winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between integration and demarcation.6
The impact of the new structural conflict on the structure of the political space
These arguments and hypotheses present a general framework for understanding recent developments in the structure of political competition and in electoral alignments in Western democracies. In this section, we
6
Bartolini (2000) refers to it as a conflict between integration and independence.
10
shall focus on the political articulation of the political potentials based on the integrationdemarcation cleavage by political parties and formulate a series of hypotheses. Our general position is that of Sartori (1990) and his followers (e.g. Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Gallagher et al. 1992), a position which emphasizes the role of the parties in the cleavage formation. The key problem addressed by Sartori is that of the translation of conflicts and cleavages into politics. Such a translation is not a matter of course, but crucially depends on political organization. Using the example of class, Sartori (1990: 169) put it most bluntly: it is not the objective class (class conditions) that creates the party, but the party that creates the subjective class (class consciousness). In our terms, what is at stake is the problem of the articulation of a structurally given latent potential by a political organization (in particular by a political party). The potentials are structurally given, i.e. they are not created by the party. The preferences of the voters change due to processes of social change that cannot be controlled by political organizations. But whether these changing preferences have political consequences or not fundamentally depends on their mobilization by political organizations such as political parties. Moreover, it is possible that the voters preferences are influenced by the process of their mobilization, given that the parties provide the instruments political identities, ideologies and issue-specific cues allowing the voters to position themselves in the political space. The political mobilization of a latent structural potential by political parties gives rise to two interdependent dynamics the transformation of the basic structure of the political space in a given country and of the parties positioning within the transforming space. On the one hand, the political potentials (conflicts, issues and issue-specific preferences in the electorate) are articulated by the individual parties, i.e. the parties are restructuring the space. On the other hand, the individual parties are repositioning themselves strategically within both, the emerging dimensional structure of the space and the emerging spatial configuration of their competitors, i.e. they are adjusting to the changing structure. Parties are changing their positions within a space, the dimensions of which are changing, too, as a consequence of their strategic action.7 It is
Van der Brug (1999: 151, 2001: 119f.) has already pointed out the interdependence between these two dynamics.
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only for expository purposes that we subsequently separate the two sides of the same coin. Let us first look at the transformation of the basic structure. In this respect, it is useful to distinguish between an economic dimension and a cultural dimension of the integrationdemarcation divide.8 On each dimension, an open, integrationist position contrasts with a defensive, protectionist one. In the economic domain, a neoliberal free trade position is opposed to a position in favour of protecting the national markets. In the cultural domain, a universalist, multiculturalist or cosmopolitan position is opposing a position in favour of protecting the national culture and citizenship in its civic, political and social sense. The orientations on the two dimensions need not necessarily coincide. One could also further specify the notion of integration by distinguishing between the removal of boundaries and other obstacles to free and undistorted international competition purely negative integration in Scharpfs (1999: 45) terminology and a process of reconstruction of a system of regulation at the supranational or international level a process that Scharpf calls positive integration. Next, we should discuss how the two dimensions of the presumed new structural conflict are expected to relate to the existing structure of cleavages in Western European politics. According to Rokkan (2000), four classic cleavages have structured the European political space the centre/periphery, religious, rural/urban, and owner/worker cleavages. This set essentially boils down to two dimensions: a cultural (religion) and a social-economic one (class) (Kriesi 1994: 2304). Class conflicts were omnipresent in Western Europe and structured politics around social-economic policy the regulation of the market and the construction of social protection by the state. The left essentially fought for social protection and market regulation, while the right defended the free reign of market forces. Religious conflicts prevailed between Catholics and Protestants in religiously mixed countries, and between the believing Catholics and the secularized in Catholic countries. In the Protestant North-West, Protestant dissidents contributed to religious conflicts. After World War II, these traditional cleavages have lost much
8
Our distinction of these two aspects of the purported new conflict follows Lipset (1981), who used to distinguish between socio-economic and cultural conservatism and liberalism respectively (see also Middendorp 1978; Grunberg and Schweisguth 1990).
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of their traditional structuring capacity for politics as a result of secularization, value change, rising levels of education, improved standards of living, and sectoral change (tertiarization) (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Inglehart 1990; Kriesi 1993). In their place, new structuring conflicts have developed since the late 1960s, which have been variously labelled as expressions of a new politics (Franklin 1992; Mller-Rommel 1984, 1985, 1990), a new value (Inglehart 1977, 1985, 1990, 1997) or a new class (Evans 1999; Kriesi 1998; Manza and Brooks 1999; Lachat 2004; Oesch 2006) cleavage. Following the new class approach, the new middle class or service class is itself divided between the managers, i.e. employees in administrative hierarchies who run an organization, make administrative decisions, command and survey the work of others, and professionals for whom the exercise of specialized knowledge and expertise is typical. While managers are expected to be above all loyal to their organization, professionals have at least one further point of reference: their professional community. It is common that professionals legitimate their claims for high levels of autonomy with reference to professional norms and the exercise of professional competence. Among them, an organizational orientation is, therefore, less likely. Compared to professionals with administrative or technical skills, identification with the organization is least likely among a specific group within the professional services the social and cultural specialists, who identify not only with their professional community, but also with their clients. As a result, the new class approach expects a strong antagonism about the control of work between the two opposite segments within the new middle class managers and socio-cultural professionals, with administrative and technical experts (the technocrats) taking an intermediary position. Both of these segments within the new middle class now find themselves on the winners side of the new structural conflict. But, in the aftermath of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, they had been in sharp opposition to each other. In particular, the social-cultural professionals constituted the driving force of a series of so-called new social movements which mobilized in the name of universalist values human rights, emancipation of women, solidarity with the poor of the world, protection of the environment (Kriesi 1989, 1993, 1998). Their vision was one of cultural liberalism and social justice/protection. These were essentially movements of the left, which often found close allies in the established parties of the left and, in due course, spawned a new set of
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parties the New Left and Green parties. Their concerns reinvigorated the traditional class cleavage and reinforced the lefts position on the social-economic dimension. In addition, they contributed to the transformation of the cultural dimension from a dimension mainly defined in terms of religious concerns to one opposing culturally liberal or libertarian concerns, on the one side, and the defence of traditional (authoritarian) values and institutions (including traditional Christian religion, traditional forms of the family, and a strong army), on the other. Kitschelt (1994, 1995) has perhaps most forcefully conceptualized the effect of this transformation on the structuration of the political space. It is crucial that the mobilization of these new social movements did not add any fundamentally new dimension to the political space, but transformed the meaning of the two already existing ones. The political space remained two-dimensional, defined by a social-economic and a cultural dimension. What changed was the meaning of the conflicts associated with these two dimensions. In a similar vein, we can now hypothesize that the new demarcation/integration conflict will be embedded into the two-dimensional basic structure that emerged under the impact of the mobilization by the new social movements, transforming it once again. This is our embedding hypothesis. On the social-economic dimension, the new conflict can be expected to reinforce the classic opposition between a pro-state and a pro-market position while giving it a new meaning. The pro-state position is likely to become more defensive and more protectionist, while the promarket position is likely to become more assertive in favour of the enhancement of national competitiveness on world markets. At the same time, the increasing sectoralization of concerns may drive a wedge between former allies on the pro-market side. On the cultural dimension, we expect enhanced opposition to the cultural liberalism of the new social movements as a result of the ethnicization of politics: the defence of tradition is expected increasingly to take on an ethnic or nationalist character. Furthermore, new issues should be integrated into the cultural dimension. In the Western European context we are studying here, central among these are the issues of European integration and of immigration, which correspond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalization. The demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterized by an opposition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to immigration.
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Instead of the new conflict becoming embedded into the already existing conflict dimensions, one might, alternatively, expect it to transform the national political space by adding one or even two new dimensions to the two already existing ones. The main reason, why we do not think that this is what happens, has to do with the adaptive capacity of the already existing parties. This is our adaptation hypothesis. The mainstream parties take up the new preferences, identities, values and interests, and interpret and articulate them in their own specific ways (Schattschneider 1960; Lipset 1981: 298f.; Mair 1983, 1989, 1993; Laver 1989). We suggest that established parties are repositioning and realigning themselves as a result of the rising new conflict. Accordingly, the increasing volatility in the Western European elections cannot be interpreted, as is usually done, only as the result of increasing issue-voting on the part of the electorate, but also as a result of this repositioning and realigning of established parties. This also implies that there can be much change in the party system behind an apparent continuity: the number and even the relative strength of the parties may hardly change at all, while the identity, the ideology and the structural support of these very same parties may have profoundly changed. It may be that some parties remain the same only in name.
The positioning of the parties within the transformed space

We can now discuss our hypotheses regarding the positions taken by political parties in this transformed political space. The different combinations of positions on the two dimensions represent the range of possible interpretative packages or ideological master-frames which are available to political entrepreneurs for the articulation of the new structural antagonism in the context of already existing political divisions. Figure 1.1 offers a schematic representation of the expected positions of the major groups of parties: we distinguish between three traditional party families of which we find representatives in all Western European countries the social-democrats, the liberals and the conservatives (often represented by Christian-democrats) as well as two groups of more recent competitors: the New Left and Green parties, on the one hand, and the populist right, on the other. This figure presents a map of the parties possible positions, which we discuss in more detail in the following paragraphs. The exact locations of parties in different countries are likely to vary, as they depend not only on the common trends linked with globalization, but also on the
15
Figure 1.1 Expected positioning of party families with respect to the new cleavage
parties strategic decisions and on specific contextual factors (which we shall discuss in Chapter 2). This figure can be considered as a general summary of our hypotheses regarding the transformed structure of the political space and parties positions within this space. Typically, mainstream political parties have so far taken a rather undifferentiated position with respect to the new cleavage. They seem to be uncertain about it, because (a) they are internally divided with regard to the question of integration, (b) they are divided as Euro-families as a result of their variable insertion into national party configurations, and (c) they are not in a position to form a strong alliance between different sectoral and cultural interests. Broadly speaking, whether on the left or on the right, they tend to view the process of economic denationalization both as inevitable and beneficial for the maintenance of their established positions. Thus, analyzing the main party families the Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats at the EU level, Hix (1999) has noted that, between 1976 and 1994, all three gradually
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converged on moderately pro-Integration positions. The findings of Hooghe et al. (2002) and van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) about the general preference regarding European integration of mainstream parties support this point. As a first hypothesis, we would suggest that, in Western Europe, (a) mainstream parties will generally tend to formulate a winners programme, i.e. a programme in favour of further economic and cultural integration, but that (b) mainstream parties on the left will attempt to combine the economic integration with the preservation of the social protection by the welfare state, while mainstream parties on the right will tend to reduce the role of the state in every respect. There are, however, variations of this general theme. On the left, mainstream parties are generally liberal in social and cultural terms, but they face the dilemma that market integration in Europe (and more globally) poses a threat to their national social achievements. Depending on their capacity to defend these achievements at the national level, mainstream left parties may vary with regard to the extent to which they endorse economic integration (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001). Accordingly, their positions are likely to vary mostly along the economic dimension of the political space. We may distinguish between a classical left position that sticks to a statist and more protectionist attitude and the position of the Third Way, formulated by the British Labour Party and later also discussed in other countries especially in Germany, which constitutes a novel attempt to come to terms with the problems posed by the new dividing line: Third Way politics takes globalization seriously, adopts a positive attitude towards it, and seeks to combine a neoliberal endorsement of free trade with a core concern with social justice (Giddens 1998: 64ff.). For the architects of the Third Way, taking globalization seriously also requires steps in the direction of positive integration, in the form of global economic governance, global ecological management, regulation of corporate power, control of warfare and fostering of transnational democracy (Giddens 2000: 12262). In the transformed political space, compared to the location of the traditional left, parties of the Third Way should be more favourable to further integration, on both the economic and cultural dimensions. On the right, conservatives also face a dilemma a dilemma that is precisely the opposite of the one faced by mainstream parties of the left (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001): economically they tend to endorse liberalization, but socially and culturally they tend to be
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nationalists and opposed to the opening up of the borders. Accordingly, their positions are likely to vary especially along the cultural dimension. Depending on the threat posed by integration to the national identity, the conservatives will be more or less opposed to integration. Given the British fear of losing the national identity and culture, a fear that is largely absent in countries such as Germany or Spain (Diez Medrano 2003), it is, for example, not surprising that the British Conservatives are much more Eurosceptic than the German or Spanish ones.9 Compared to the other two main political families, at first sight the opening up of the borders seems to constitute less of a challenge for the liberal family. Classical liberalism was both economically and socioculturally liberal, i.e. supported the free market and social and cultural openness and tolerance. On closer inspection, however, we can find that European liberalism has been characterized by a strong ambivalence regarding the leftright dimension. As a consequence, we can distinguish several variants within the liberal party family (Smith 1988). Most important is the distinction between liberal-radicalism and liberalconservatism. Whereas the former (e.g. the Dutch D66) has been leftof-centre on economic issues, the latter (e.g. the Dutch VVD) has been emphasizing economic freedom and market liberalization and tended to be right-of-centre. Faced with the opening of the borders, liberal-conservatives are distinguished by the fact that they tend to put the accent on market liberalization, i.e. on the negative integration with respect to the economy, while they oppose supranational political integration (Marks and Wilson 2000: 44850). On the basis of these empirical observations, we can expect two possible developments. The first development is an intensification of political conflicts within mainstream political parties as a consequence of their attempts to redefine their ideological profiles. In some cases, these conflicts have been successfully resolved by transforming the partys profile, Britains New Labour and the Austrian FP being two of the most significant cases. This is a specification of the adaptation hypothesis formulated previously. Mostly, however, the mainstream political parties are still characterized by their indecision and their
9
In this context, Christian-democratic parties stand out because they are confronted with both dilemmas at the same time. Traditionally, they have been (moderate) supporters of the welfare state and the strongest advocates of European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000: 4514). Hence, in a transformed political space, they need to redefine their position on both dimensions.
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tendency to opt moderately for the winners side. For these cases, we suggest a second general hypothesis our fragmentation or polarization hypothesis: in countries where these parties dominate, we face an increasing political fragmentation (Zrn 2001) with the strengthening of peripheral political actors, who tend to adopt a losers programme. Peripheral actors on the right are expected to be culturally more protectionist, and peripheral actors on the left to be socially and economically more protectionist than their respective mainstream counterparts. The positioning of the parties with regard to Europe may serve as an illustration of this hypothesis: analyzing the Euroscepticism of political parties in different European countries, Taggart (1998) found that it is the more peripheral parties (on both sides of the political spectrum), rather than parties more central to their party systems, which are most likely to use Euroscepticism as a mobilizing issue. The inverted U curve characterizing the shape of the relationship between leftright position and support for European integration has been confirmed by several studies (Hooghe et al. 2002; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004): parties of both the radical left and the populist right are most opposed to European integration. Furthermore, Hooghe et al. (2002: 977) add the insight that the positioning of a party on the cultural dimension exerts a strong, consistent, and, it must be said, largely overlooked effect on party positioning on European issues: independently of a partys positioning on the (social-economic) leftright dimension, traditional-authoritarian-nationalist parties are much more likely to be Eurosceptical than green-alternative-libertarian parties. The radical lefts opposition to the opening up of the borders is mainly an opposition to economic liberalization and to the threat it poses to the lefts achievement at the national level. The populist rights opposition to the opening up of the borders is first of all an opposition to the social and cultural forms of competition and the threat they pose to national identity. The main characteristics of the populist right are its xenophobia or even racism, expressed in a fervent opposition to the presence of immigrants in Western Europe, and its populist appeal to the widespread resentment against the mainstream parties and the dominant political elites. Right-wing populists are clearly protectionist on the cultural dimension. At the same time, they are populist in their instrumentalization of sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment as well as in their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense. The populist right builds on the losers fears with regard
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to the removal of national borders, and on their strong belief in simple and ready-made solutions. This national-populism constitutes the common characteristic of all organizations of the Western European populist right. As Betz (2004) observes, its position on immigration is increasingly becoming part of a larger programme, which poses a fundamental challenge to liberal democracies. He now describes this programme as a combination of differential nativism and comprehensive protectionism. In an earlier assessment (Betz 1993), he had still identified neoliberal economic elements in the programmes of the populist right. Similarly, Kitschelt (1995) had pointed out that not all right-wing populist parties shared this element, but had insisted that the most successful ones among them did at the time. According to Kitschelt and McGann, the combination of cultural protectionism and economic neoliberalism constituted the winning formula allowing these parties to forge electoral coalitions appealing both to their declining middle-class clientele and to the losers from the unskilled working class. This position corresponds to the lower right region of Figure 1.1, where it is labelled as New Radical Right. More recently, Kitschelt (2001: 435) also noted that some populist right parties have moderated their neoliberal appeals and started to focus more on the themes of a reactive nationalism and of ethnocentrism. We consider those parties that most successfully appeal to the interests and fears of the losers of globalization to be the driving force of the current transformation of the Western European party systems. In most countries, it is these parties of the populist right who have been able to formulate a highly attractive ideological package for the losers of economic transformations and cultural diversity. Following Hooghe and Marks (2004) and Diez Medrano (2003), who show the key importance of fears about national identities for Eurosceptic attitudes in the general public, we suggest that such fears are generally more important for the mobilization of the losers than the defence of their economic interests. This could explain why the populist rights appeal to the losers is more convincing than that of the radical left. Moreover, the mobilization of the losers is particularly consequential, because, in contrast to the winners, the losers typically do not have individual exit options at their disposal. To improve their situation, they depend on collective mobilization. While the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s have above all transformed the left, the mobilization by the populist right constitutes a major challenge for the established parties of the right as well as of
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the left (Kriesi 1999). One of its effects is the transformation of established liberal or conservative parties, who adopt the essential elements of cultural protection of the populist rights programme in order to appeal to the losers and essentially become part of the family of the populist right. The Austrian FP and the Swiss SVP illustrate this point. In both cases, an established party of the right radicalized and adopted a programme including strong national-populist elements. The mutation to a populist party can be the result either of the transformation of a formerly liberal-conservative party such as the FP, or of a formerly conservative party such as the Swiss SVP.
An overview of the volume

In the present study, we shall analyze the transformation of the national political space in six West European countries Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, France and the UK. We have chosen six countries where the party system has developed continuously over the last three or four decades. We have excluded from consideration countries such as Italy, where the party system has been fundamentally reconstructed during the period under study. Such a fundamental system change is typically not directly related to the underlying transformation of structural conflict potentials. As we argue in Chapter 2, the set of societal conditions (cleavage structures, economic and cultural context conditions) has created broadly similar latent political potentials in all six countries. However, the political conditions for the mobilization of these potentials vary considerably from one country to the other. These political conditions include the established structure of the national party system and its recent dynamics (dealignment), the institutional access to the national party system (defined by the electoral system), the rise of new challengers of the radical right and the strategies of the mainstream parties in reaction to the initial success of the mobilization by the new challengers. In discussing the political conditions influencing the mobilization of the latent potentials, we adopt a developmental perspective which distinguishes between the original electoral breakthrough of the new populist right parties, who constitute the driving force of the transformation of the national political space, and the subsequent reaction of the mainstream parties, which reinforces and stabilizes the transformation of the political space. The next chapter deals with these national context conditions which determine the emergence and the political
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articulation of the new structural potentials and their variation from one country to the other. Chapter 3 presents the design of our study. For the supply side, we describe the method of data collection a content analysis of the media during national election campaigns and the method of analyzing these data. Since these methods are quite original, we spend some time discussing their advantages compared to conventional methods used by other researchers. For the demand side, we describe the sources national election studies and our way of standardizing them. For our approach it is crucial that the notion of the national political space is operationalized by a spatial analysis a multidimensional scaling technique, which provides the means for visualizing the structural transformations in lowdimensional graphical presentations. With this technique, we can position the parties and the political issues they articulate, the electorate and its preferences with respect to the same political issues, or both, in a common space permitting the reader to immediately comprehend and evaluate the effect of the new cleavage on the configuration of the national political spaces. The discussion in this chapter will avoid technical details. These are provided in a technical appendix, Appendix A. In the second part of the volume, six country chapters present the transformation of the political space. As the reader shall discover, the dynamics of the transformation of the national political space vary considerably from one country to another. The presentation begins with France, a model case, where the party system has already, in the early 1980s, been challenged by a powerful party from the new populist right and where this challenge has contributed to the systems far-reaching structural transformation in spite of the fact that the context conditions, at first sight, were not very conducive to the rise of such a new challenge in France. The presentation continues with the three small countries in our selection Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands. In both Austria and Switzerland, no new challenger from the populist right succeeded in establishing itself permanently. Instead, in both countries, a (liberal) conservative mainstream party transformed itself and launched a powerful challenge to its direct competitors, thereby contributing to a moderate, but lasting, transformation of the respective party systems. As expected by our reasoning in Chapter 2, the Netherlands did experience the powerful challenge of a new party from the populist right, but this challenge was slow in coming. It was preceded by the moderate transformation of a liberal conservative mainstream party. When the challenge finally came,
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it caused a major shift in the positioning of all the parties, but its longterm impact is still far from certain. The United Kingdom constitutes a special case again. It is characterized by the double transformation of the two major parties, in the absence of a powerful challenge by a new competitor from the populist right. Germany, finally, represents a case where neither a new challenger from the populist right was able to establish itself, nor a mainstream party took it upon itself to formulate a functionally equivalent challenge. Accordingly, the transformation of the German political space has been rather limited, and, to the extent that there was any, it was propelled rather by new challengers from the left. Each country chapter begins with a discussion of the context conditions, proceeds with the presentation of the voters political potential (the demand side) and the parties programmatic offer (the supply side), and ends with a brief discussion pointing out the highlights of our interpretations and their relationship with the existing specialized literature. Our interpretations in the different country chapters are, we believe, in agreement with much of what country specialists have already said before, but they offer a new perspective on the transformation of the national party systems, a perspective which will allow the specialists to reinterpret some of the received views. The three chapters of the final part of this study present a comparative analysis of both the demand (Chapter 10) and the supply side (Chapter 11). They discuss the similarities and the differences between the six countries for each one of the two perspectives. Chapter 12 makes an attempt to link the two sides the political potentials defined by the demand side and the issue-specific positioning of the parties defined by the supply side by analyzing the determinants of the voters choices. The concluding chapter assesses the overall results in terms of stability and change of the national political spaces and draws out the implications of our study for a better understanding of West European politics. We are aware of the fact that our arguments are tailored to the situation in Western Europe, and may not be generalized easily to other contexts such as Central and Eastern Europe, or, indeed, countries beyond Europe. We believe that our arguments hold out some promise for other regions as well, but it is for others to test them in other parts of the world.

HANSPETER KRIESI
According to our assumptions outlined in the previous chapter, the political potentials created by the new cleavage are rather similar from one Western European democracy to the other. All these countries are characterized by increasingly comparable social, economic and cultural context conditions. Defined in most general terms, the relevant societal context characteristics which determine the political potential of the new cleavage in a given country include the relative strength of the countrys traditional cleavages, the overall level of its economic and human development, its traditional openness to the world markets and its integration into the global community, its current economic difficulties, and its definition of the national community and the perceived threat to this community by processes of denationalization. While insisting on the broadly similar societal contexts of our six countries, we shall also point out some variability with regard to these general context characteristics, variability which mainly depends on the size of the countries. Three of our six countries belong to the small European democracies Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands in that order while our three other countries France, the United Kingdom and Germany are the three largest European democracies. In this chapter, we shall first consider one by one the societal context characteristics before moving on to a presentation of the more political context conditions. The broadly similar latent political potentials determined by the set of societal context characteristics define the demand side of the mobilization by the political parties. They constitute the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the transformation of the national political space. Compared to the demand side, we expect the supply of mobilization efforts by the political parties to vary more strongly from one country to the other as a function of a set of more specifically political factors. These include processes of dealignment in the party system, the established structure of the national party system and the electoral system, as well as the strategies of the mainstream parties with respect
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24
Hanspeter Kriesi
to the mobilization of the new challengers. In discussing the political conditions influencing the mobilization of the latent potentials, we adopt a developmental approach which distinguishes between the determinants of the original electoral breakthrough of the parties constituting the driving force for the transformation of the national political space and the subsequent reactions of the mainstream parties which reinforces and stabilizes the transformation of the political space. As we know from Schattschneider (1960: 2), the outcome of all political contests is determined by the scope of public involvement in conflicts. We focus here on the political conditions that allow for the expansion of the scope of conflict with regard to the issues linked to the new structural cleavage. An issue does not become an issue, merely because someone says it is. An issue becomes an issue as a result of the mobilization of the political potentials based on structural cleavages. As Schattschneider (1960: 72f.) has formulated it: To understand the nature of party conflict it is necessary to consider the function of the cleavages exploited by the parties in their struggle for supremacy. Since the development of cleavages is a prime instrument of power, the party which is able to make its definition of the issues prevail is likely to take over the government. Following up on our argument of the last chapter, in making its definition of the issues prevail, a party not only imposes itself in the struggle for power, but, more fundamentally, also shapes the pattern of political contests and transforms the dimensions of the political space.
The societal context The relative strength of the traditional cleavages and the new cleavage
The relative strength of the traditional cleavages and the new cleavage determines the openness of the political system for new political conflicts in the broadest sense of the term. The stronger the relative strength of the traditional political divisions, the smaller is the capacity of the new conflict between winners and losers of the opening up of the national borders to destructure the national political landscape (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995). To put it simply: in a country, such as Northern Ireland, where entrenched religious conflicts predominate domestic politics, the new division between winners and losers will only play a subsidiary role. In such a situation, the new division will
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be instrumentalized by the opponents of the traditional conflict, but it will hardly be able to restructure the political space. According to this hypothesis, we expect a zero-sum relationship with regard to the strength of the traditional and the new cleavages. For the same reason, we also expect individual-level differences within national contexts: the stronger the integration of citizens in traditional political organizations like parties, trade unions, associations, but also in churches and confessional organizations, the more difficult it will be to mobilize them on the basis of the new structural conflict. Table 2.1 presents indicators for the strength of the two most important traditional cleavages the religious and the class cleavage in our six countries. With respect to the religious cleavage, we report five indicators: the level of church attendance, the share of those who are unaffiliated to any particular denomination, the average religiosity, the membership in religious organizations and the level of militancy of those involved in these organizations. These indicators come from the ESS (European Social Survey). With respect to all five of them, our countries can be compared to the overall average among the twenty-two countries covered by the ESS. According to these indicators, the religious cleavage appears to a large extent pacified in all of Europe, and especially so in our six countries. Austria is the only one among our countries where all five indicators consistently point to an above average intensity of religious involvement, and where, accordingly, we may assume that the religious cleavage is still of some relevance. The Netherlands and Switzerland are next in line, with France being the one country where all our indicators are characterized by particularly low levels. For the class cleavage, we have three indicators: the number of working days lost due to strikes, trade union membership and the level of militancy of those involved in trade unions. As far as the loss of working days is concerned, there are two measures one each for the early and late 1990s and the percentage difference between the two. Again, all indicators point to the pacification of the class cleavage in Europe overall, and in our six countries in particular. France constitutes the exception in this respect. While trade union membership is, and has traditionally been, weak in France, the strike intensity and the small core group of active trade union members is still rather militant. This confirms what has been found in a comparative analysis of the mobilization of social movements in four among our six countries France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland during the period
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Table 2.1 Strength of traditional cleavages in the six countries (a) Religious cleavage
Unaffiliated Membership Church to any in religious attendance church in Religiosity organizations Militancy in %a %b in %d meansc (means)e 11.3 19.2 12.2 7.7 12.6 9.2 18.0 7.7 (FR) 32.4 (I) 37.5 28.6 56.3 51.4 51.3 39.1 35.1 2.9 (GR) 70.3 (S) 5.2 5.2 5.1 3.8 4.3 4.2 5.0 3.1 (CZ) 7.7 (GR) 17.9 31.7 26.2 4.7 13.5 18.8 13.2 4.7 (FR) 31.7 (AT) . 2.1 (244) 1.6 (376) 2.4 (60) 2.3 (232) 2.0 (271) 1.9 (2325) 0.4 (GR) 2.6 (SW)
Country Switzerland Austria Netherlands France United Kingdom Germany Overall average Minimum Maximum
(b) Class cleavage

Trade union Working Working Difference membership in % of adult days lost days lost 9195 v. Militancy populationd 9195f 9600f 9600f (means)e Switzerland 1 2 Austria 6 1 Netherlands 33 4 France 95 68 United 24 21 Kingdom Germany 17 2 Overall 66 52 average Minimum 1 (CH) 1 Maximum 451 (ES) 182
a
100 83 88 28 13 88 21 50 60
10.0 21.5 21.6 9.0 15.6 14.0 21.5 5.2 (PT) 64.5 (DK)
. 2.7 (89) 1.6 (66) 4.1 (48) 2.5 (88) 2.9 (91) 2.3 (1573) 0.3 (HU) 4.1 (FR)
Source: ESS5.0, question C14: % attending church once a week or more frequently. Source: ESS5.0, question C9: % not considering themselves as belonging to any particular religion or denomination. c Source: ESS5.0, question C13: average scale value, 0 (= not religious at all), 10 (= very religious).
b
Contexts of party mobilization Notes to Table 2.1 (cont.)
27
Source: ESS5.0, questions E1 to E12. Source: ESS5.0, questions B15 to B24, summarized to participation scale, 0 (= inactive), 10 (= very active), calculated for those most militant in religious organizations/trade unions (questions E1 to E12). The most militant are defined as those who are involved in at least two out of four possible activities (= being a member, participating in the organizations activities, donating money, doing voluntary work). f Source: OECD statistics, reported in Joanne Monger (2003). International comparisons of labour disputes in 2000, Labour Market Trends, January: 1927. Reported are working days not worked per 1,000 employees in all industries and services.
e
197589 (Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995): the mobilizing capacity of the class cleavage proved to be much greater in France than elsewhere, while the mobilization by new social movements was comparatively weak in France confirming the general hypothesis of a zero-sum relationship between traditional and new cleavages. From the development of the working days lost, we note, however, that, even in France, the saliency of the traditional class conflict has been decreasing during the 1990s. Moreover, we also note from Table 2.1 that, compared to a country like Spain, where the number of working days lost is still much higher, by the end of the 1990s, even in France the class conflict has become quite pacified. From this discussion, we may deduce that, in all six countries, there is considerable political space for the formation of a new political cleavage focusing on the conflict between integration and demarcation. In other words, we may expect that the structural potentials created by the processes of denationalization will be articulated in the national political space of all six countries. Given the remaining mobilizing capacity of the class conflict in France, we expect that the traditional class-based opposition between (welfare) state expansion and market liberalization (economic liberalism) is likely to reduce the impact of the new conflict on the parties mobilization during electoral campaigns and, to the extent that the new conflict is articulated at all, the French public and the French political parties are expected to put a heavier accent on its economic aspects than their counterparts in the other countries. Given the remaining relevance of the religious conflict in Austria, we expect the traditional cultural opposition between cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and the defence of traditional cultural values concerning the
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church, the army and law and order, on the other hand, to be more resilient than in the other countries.
Economic context conditions

Next, we consider the set of economic context characteristics. The overall level of social and economic development can be expected to play a prominent role with regard to the restructuring of the national political space. In socially and economically highly developed countries, we expect the new cleavage to be particularly strong, not only because the traditional class cleavage tends to be pacified, but also because certain segments of their populations risk losing most in the globalizing competition. The economic opportunities in such countries tend to attract migrants from the less developed parts of the world. This, in turn, increases the ethnic competition inside of these countries and leads to defensive reactions on the part of the native population especially those who feel both culturally and economically threatened by the immigrants. In addition, the increasing international economic competition challenges the viability of these countries as places for production. The delocalization of productive capacities risks diminishing the life chances of those whose qualifications exist in abundance in less economically advanced countries. The corresponding fears are expected to be the more pronounced, the higher the unemployment rate in a given country. Thirdly, the more highly developed a country and the more privileged its citizens, the more likely it is that any form of supranational regulation will imply the sharing of some of the national economic advantages with less privileged populations. For less economically advanced countries, by contrast, opening up may constitute the opportunity to catch up economically, socially and politically. This is, for example, reflected in the attitudes of the populations of the EU member states with regard to the EU integration process. Membership in the EU is typically more favourably evaluated in countries that are among the net receivers of the EU budget than in countries that belong to its net contributors (Nissen 2004: 256). The impact of the level of economic development may be modified by the tradition of economic openness of a national context. In this respect, the small European countries have a long tradition of economic liberalism and integration into world markets (Katzenstein 1985). They have adopted strategies to compensate, at the national level, for the negative consequences of this integration. These strategies imply not only an expansion
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of the welfare state, but also measures specifically designed to protect those sectors of the economy which are oriented towards the domestic market. Such measures were especially important in the liberal-conservative variant of democratic corporatism, which characterizes Switzerland, among others (Mach 2003). With the globalization process, this kind of compensatory strategy is put under strong pressure, which leads to the creation of a large potential of losers in a country like Switzerland. Table 2.2 presents six social and economic indicators, in addition to the population size of the six countries. The first two the human development index and the GNP per capita corrected for purchasing power are general indicators for their overall level of development. According to these indicators, all six countries are characterized by very high levels of development. They all belong to the richest, most developed countries of the world. The three smaller countries Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland reach somewhat higher levels than the three large ones, but the differences are small, indeed. Given their overall level of development, all of our countries are also net contributors to the EU. France contributes least to the EU budget, less than 0.2% of its GNP; the other EU members contribute between 0.3 and 0.5% of their GNP. Switzerland would be the largest net contributor, if it were to become a member. As expected, the three smaller countries are also characterized by a greater economic openness with respect to the world markets. This is shown by our third indicator, which consists of the combined imports and exports measured as a percentage of a countrys GDP. In this respect, the Netherlands is the most open country. A more encompassing index of a countrys integration into the global community the globalization index confirms that the three smaller countries are considerably more open to the world than the three larger ones. Two of the three larger countries France and Germany, but not the UK appear to have more difficulties than the smaller countries in coping with the new economic challenges, as is indicated by their much higher unemployment rate. These two countries are also characterized by the highest level of social expenditures, which may have something to do with their particular economic difficulties. However, with the exception of the UK, the level of social expenditures of our selection of countries proves to be remarkably similar, as is illustrated by our last indicator. It is the liberal welfare state which sets the UK apart. The other five countries (even Switzerland) all have variants of the more generous continental European welfare state.
Table 2.2 Social and economic indicators

Import and export as % of GDP (2002/3)c Globalization Index, rank Unemployment (2005)d rate (2005)e 3 9 5 18 12 21 31 (Poland) 3.6 5.2 6.6 9.9 4.7 11.7 8.6 (Euro Area) 81.1 102.0 119.7 50.4 53.2 67.8 42.2 (OECD-18) 161.8 (BE) 23.4 (USA) 1 (Singapore)13.5 (BE) 29 (GR) 3.6 (CH) Social expenditures as % of GDP (1995)f 25.5 27.1 28.0 30.1 22.8 29.6 24.7 (OECD-18)
Human development GNP/capita, Population size (millions) index PPP, US$ (2003)a (2000) (2003)b
Switzerland Austria Netherlands France United Kingdom Germany Overall average
7.3 8.1 15.9 58.9 59.5 82.8
0.947 0.936 0.943 0.938 0.939 0.930 0.892 (OECD)
Maximum Minimum
0.963 (NO) 0.904 (PT)
32,700 30,800 30,400 28,300 30,100 27,600 23,300 (OECDEurope) 54,000 (LUX) 18,800 (PT)
33.4 (S) 15.7 (AUS)
Source: http://hdr.undp.org. Source: OECD. c Import and export of goods and services as % of GDP. Source: World Bank. d Source: www.atkearney.com. This index incorporates measures such as trade and investment flows, movement of people across borders, volumes of international telephone traffic, internet usage and participation in international organizations. e Source: The Economist, 29 October 2005: Economic and financial indicators. f Source: Scharpf and Schmidt (2000: 365, Table A.27a) (including private mandatory benefits).
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According to their generally very high level of development, the political potentials for the new cleavage are likely to be large in all six countries. This is especially true for the larger ones among them, which do not have such a pronounced tradition of economic openness as the three small open economies. However, the respective differences are not as pronounced as we might have expected. Even the three larger countries are characterized by a high degree of integration into the world economy and into the global community. What really distinguishes France and Germany (but not the UK) from the smaller countries is their greater level of unemployment, which points to more serious difficulties concerning their adaptation to the new realities of an increasingly integrated world economy. Ceteris paribus, these difficulties lead us to expect that the citizens in France and Germany feel more threatened by the international economic competition and that, in these two countries, economic appeals to the losers of the processes related to globalization will fall on particularly fertile grounds. Given that, as we have just seen, the class conflict in France has still a considerable mobilizing capacity, this economic appeal should be most pronounced in France.
Cultural context conditions

The impact of the economic context may be modified by the countryspecific cultural heritage. In our context, this concerns above all the definition of the national community and the perceived threat to this community by processes of denationalization. Thus, the way Europeans view the European integration process cannot only be explained by the relative economic benefits and costs accruing to a country from its membership in the EU. As Diez Medrano (2003) has observed, the country-specific images of the EU and of the European integration process have deep cultural roots. They are filtered by national or subnational cultures. The Europeans attitudes and opinions with respect to the EU are shaped by cultural repertoires which, in turn, are rooted in their national histories and their collective experience. The studies of Hooghe and Marks (2004) and Kriesi (2002) support this analysis by showing the key importance of national identities for Eurosceptic attitudes among the general public. For different reasons, the populations in three of our countries Germany, France and the Netherlands have generally viewed the European integration process quite favourably. They all belong to the core of the six original members. Austria is a latecomer to
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the EU its permanent neutrality was the main reason for its delayed application. When they had to express themselves about EU membership in the 1994 referendum, the Austrians embraced it with a two-thirds majority. However, more recently, with the exception of the Germans, the citizens of all these countries have become more Eurosceptical as the French and Dutch no to the EU Constitution in 2005, and the Austrian reactions to the transit traffic across the Alps and to the Haider affair in 2000 illustrate. The Swiss and the British have always been even more Eurosceptical. The British view EU membership at best as a necessary evil (Haller, 1999). Above all, however, they perceive EU membership as a threat to their national sovereignty (Diez Medrano 2003). Similarly, if the Swiss have not joined the Union so far, it is not so much for economic reasons. The main reasons for their Euroscepticism are cultural and political: the Swiss perceive the EU as a threat to their cherished political institutions neutrality, federalism and direct democracy, which constitute the core of their national identity. Just as the British, the Swiss are afraid to lose their national identity when joining the EU. Similarly, the presence of immigrants poses not only an economic, but also a cultural, threat to the national community, especially if they come from a culturally very distant background (Golder 2003; Lubbers et al. 2002; Perrineau 1997; Quillian 1995). Thus, on the basis of Eurobarometer data, Quillian (1995) has shown that racial prejudice against minority groups increases with perceived threats to dominant national groups. Perceived threat, in turn, is a function of both economic conditions and the size of the minorities. Accordingly, prejudice against immigrants and racial minorities increases with economic recession and with the size of these groups. But the impact of the presence of immigrants is also likely to be filtered by the cultural heritage, which, in this respect, consists above all in the conceptualization of a countrys political community, nationhood and citizenship. Following Koopmans et al. (2005) and Koopmans and Kriesi (1997), we can distinguish between two dimensions of citizenship. The first dimension refers to the extent to which immigrants and their descendants as individuals have access to a treatment fully equal to that accorded to individuals belonging to the indigenous population. At stake here is the extent to which access to citizenship rights is colour blind in the sense that every legal resident has access to equal citizenship rights. On this dimension, an ethnic position contrasts with a civic-territorial position. The second dimension refers to the extent to which assimilation of the
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immigrants to the dominant culture is required or not. Here, an assimilationist position requiring the prospective citizen to adapt to the dominant culture (cultural monism) opposes a multicultural position helping minorities to preserve their language, culture and religion (cultural pluralism). There are at least three models of citizenship and nationhood: the differentialist or ethnic model, which is both ethnic and assimilationist, the universalistic or republican model, which combines civic-territorial and assimilationist characteristics, and the multicultural model, which combines a civic-territorial position with multiculturalism. The three models differ sharply from one another with respect to their openness and integrative capacity (Koopmans and Kriesi 1997). We may expect them to have diverging implications for the development of the new cleavage. The ethnic and the republican models, which emphasize the cultural differences between the natives and the immigrants, are more likely than the multicultural model to contribute to a reinforcement of the new conflict. Koopmans et al. (2005) have studied the development of the conceptions of citizenship in five of our six countries from 1980 to 2002. They note some convergence on the first dimension, but increased divergence with regard to the second one. On the first dimension, the range of variation is considerably smaller in 2002 than in 1980, because the ethnic model of citizenship in Switzerland and especially Germany has lost much of its original sharpness. Both countries have come to terms with the fact that the former guestworkers are there to stay. On the second dimension, Britain and especially the Netherlands have embarked on the path of multiculturalism (with Germany, led by the red-green alliance, trailing behind them), while Switzerland and France have stubbornly continued to refuse concessions to immigrants in the cultural sphere. As a result, the distinction between culturally pluralist and monist approaches to migrant integration has become much more pronounced by 2002 than it was in the early 1980s. Britain remains different from the Netherlands, because of its weaker version of multiculturalism, France remains different from Switzerland, because its republican regime grants citizenship rights much more easily. Austria, the country not studied by Koopmans et al. (2005), is likely to resemble its two German-speaking neighbours in this respect. Combining the cultural preconditions with regard to European integration (conception of national sovereignty) and with regard to immigration (conception of citizenship), we arrive at the four-fold classification of our six countries presented in Table 2.3.
34 Table 2.3 Classification of cultural context conditions
Hanspeter Kriesi
Conception of citizenship Afraid to lose national sovereignty in EU Yes No Cultural pluralism (multiculturalism) UK NL Cultural monism (assimilation) CH A, D, F
The combined cultural conditions predict a particularly large potential for the new cleavage between winners and losers of denationalization in the Swiss case, where the two exacerbating conditions cumulate, and the smallest potential in the Netherlands, where both of these conditions are largely absent. The other four countries are intermediate cases, with British conditions favouring Euroscepticism and Austrian, German and French conditions favouring opposition to immigration. The combination of economic openness with a tradition of cultural closure and a cumulated cultural threat as in the Swiss case is likely to constitute a particularly explosive mixture which creates tensions that are difficult to resolve. A similar case would be the Flanders region in Belgium. As we have observed, the perceived threat also depends on the number and kind of immigrants. Table 2.4 presents some key figures concerning the foreign population in our six countries. Concerning the shares of the foreign population, two of the smaller countries stick out Switzerland and the Netherlands which both have a particularly large share of roughly one-fifth of residents with foreign origins. The difference between the two is that, in the Swiss case, these foreigners are nonnaturalized residents, while a large part of the residents with foreign origins in the Netherlands have become Dutch citizens. The Dutch not only have a much higher naturalization rate than the Swiss, they also have residents from former colonies with citizenship rights (e.g. the Surinamese). France, the Netherlands and the UK are all former colonial powers, which implies that their foreign populations have a large non-Western component. The German-speaking countries, Austria, Germany and, to some extent, the German-speaking part of Switzerland, by contrast, have large shares of immigrants from the Balkan and from Turkey two regions with a culture quite distinct from their own indigenous traditions. Although Switzerland has by far
Table 2.4 Foreign population
Country 2.0 7.1 28 63 54 66 48 41 4.6 3.6 2.5
Total population, in millionsa
Foreign (born) population, in %b
Naturalization rates as % of foreign % non-Western populationc (European)b Main origin of nonWestern Europeansb
Year 2004 2001 2004 1999 2002 2004
Switzerland 7.3 Austria 8.0 Netherlands 16.3
22.3 8.8 19.0
France 58.5 United 59.6 Kingdom Germany 82.5
5.6 8.3
8.8
Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey Turkey, Maghreb, Suriname Maghreb, Turkey India, Pakistan, Caribbean Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia
Source: Eurostat, Austria: www.statistik.at. Source: Eurostat, Austria: www.statistik.at; Netherlands: Allochtonen in Nederland 2004, Den Haag: CBS; France: www.ined.fr. For the Netherlands, the figure is from the Dutch SCP and presumably indicates the share of the population with foreign origin, whether naturalized or not. c Source: Koopmans et al. (forthcoming), for year 2000.
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the largest share of non-naturalized foreign residents, its foreign population is, overall, culturally least distinct from the natives. There is one category of foreigners that has become especially visible over the past decade political refugees who seek asylum in Western Europe. The visibility of this particular group is largely a result of their construction as a social and political problem, as Koopmans (1996, 1999) has shown. It is, therefore, important to consider the influx of political refugees over the last decade. Figure 2.1 presents the respective flows for the period 1995 to 2003 as a percentage of the resident population. As this figure shows, the German-speaking countries and the Netherlands were faced with a first wave of refugees in the early 1990s mainly a result of the catastrophic political events in former Yugoslavia. The Swiss and German figures are most impressive. Given the cultural heritage just described, it is not surprising that the question of the refugees became the most important problem in these two countries in the course of the 1990s. With the exception of Germany, these countries were hit by a second wave of refugees under the impact of the Kosovo crisis at the end of the 1990s. France and the UK are much less concerned by the refugee problem. What does this all amount to in terms of the expected potential for the new cleavage? Summarized most simply, immigration creates a considerable potential for the mobilization of the new cleavage in all six countries. In every one of them, the share of the foreign population is sufficiently large, and, even where it is relatively small, part of it is culturally sufficiently distinct to become highly visible and potentially threatening. Given the cultural heritage, the large share of foreign residents and the strong influx of political refugees seem to create a particularly large potential in Switzerland. But, even in the multicultural and traditionally pro-European Netherlands, where the foreigners are most easily naturalized, the fact that a large share of immigrants comes from a culturally quite different background constitutes a latent potential that is easily exploitable by political entrepreneurs bent on mobilizing those on the losers side of the new cleavage.
The political context

As indicated at the outset of this chapter, the form and outcome of the political articulation of the new cleavage and the consequent restructuring of the national political landscape depend, of course, on the political
37
Figure 2.1 Number of new asylum-seekers per year and country Source: Eurostat, Switzerland: Bundesamt fr Statistik
context conditions. Given that we assume the populist right to be the driving force of the expansion of conflict with respect to the new cleavage, we focus here on those political factors which have an immediate impact on its mobilization. Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2005)
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have shown that such a focus is very promising for the explanation of country-specific differences in the success rate of new right-wing populist parties. For our purposes, the explanation of the success rate of a new challenger from the populist right or its functional equivalent among mainstream parties is the key to the understanding of the larger question concerning the transformation of the national party systems as a whole, since we expect the breakthrough of a challenger from the populist right to be the driving force for the transformation of the national political space. We distinguish between three key aspects of the political context: processes of dealignment and the established structure of the national party system, which set the general framework; the electoral system in particular, which defines the institutional political opportunity structure for the breakthrough of new challengers; and the strategies of the mainstream parties which specify the interaction context between the major partisan protagonists and the dynamics of adjustment once a new challenger has broken through.
The general framework: processes of dealignment and the established structure of the party systems
The decline of traditional cleavages leads to processes of structural dealignment in the party system, i.e. to a weakening of the voters attachments to the established parties. These processes are expected to be further enhanced by three additional factors of change (Dalton et al. 1984; Lachat 2004, Chapter 1), which all contribute to functional dealignment, i.e. a greater detachment of the voters from the parties in general: the cognitive mobilization of the electorate, i.e. its greater political sophistication; the parties increasing difficulties in fulfilling their traditional functions; and the modernization of electoral campaigns, which also undermines the role of political parties more generally. While the dealignment based on the dissolution of traditional cleavages is expected to be temporary and may give rise to a realignment under the impact of the articulation of the new structural cleavage, the functional dealignment linked to the three additional factors predicts a generally declining structuring capacity of parties. Whatever their origin, the processes of dealignment are expected to lead to an increasing level of volatility and instability in the party systems, which facilitates the rise of new challengers and the transformation of established competitors. The indicators presented in Table 2.5 party membership,
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Table 2.5 Indicators of dealignment: volatility, party identification and party membership
Party identification (all identifiers) trend 197592b 0.09 0.52 0.86 0.81 Party identification (all identifiers) trend 197096c 0.33 1.12 0.57 0.67 1.89
Country Switzerland Netherlands Austria Germany France United Kingdom

a
Party membership change in % (19802000)a 29 32 30 9 65 50
Electoral volatility, per annum change 195090d 0.16 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.17 0.01
Mair and van Biezen (2001: Table 2, p. 12). Schmitt and Holmberg (1995: Table 4.1, p. 107): unstandardized linear regression coefficients for time trend. c Dalton (2000: Table 2.1, p. 25): unstandardized regression coefficients for time trend. d Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg (2000: Table 3.1, p. 41).
b
party identification, and electoral volatility generally confirm this expectation for all of our six countries. Apart from Germany, where the extension of the party system to the East during reunification temporarily increased membership in established parties, party membership has been decreasing everywhere and shows no sign of recovering. Party identification also tends to decrease in all six countries, while the available data indicate that with the exception of France electoral volatility is on the rise. If all national party systems are confronted with the same type of dealignment processes, i.e. with the same kind of challenge, they still differ with regard to their established structure, i.e. with regard to the immediate context for the adjustment by the mainstream parties to the new challenge. Following Sartori (1976; 1997: Chapter 3), the established structure of the party system may be described by the effective number of parties, which defines its format and the degree of polarization (or ideological distance) between the parties, which defines its mechanics. The number of relevant parties is essentially a function of
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three parameters the number of traditional cleavages, the electoral system and the degree to which party systems are nationalized. Countries with a large number of cleavages and countries with proportional electoral systems tend to have multiparty systems, while countries with few social cleavages and majoritarian electoral systems tend to have party systems dominated by few, possibly two, major parties. Moreover, in any kind of system, the lack of national standardization of the party system tends to increase the number of parties. We also notice this to be true in our six countries (see Table 2.6). Among our set of countries, Switzerland has traditionally been characterized by the largest number of cleavages, it has a rather proportional electoral system and the least nationalized party system (Caramani 2004). Accordingly, it also has had the largest effective number of parties in the post-war period (194596). The effective number of parties in the Netherlands has been almost as large, given the extreme proportionality
Table 2.6 Indicators of the party system: number of parties, type of democracy and ideological distance
Number of parties Effective Number of Dispronumber of Consensus/ cleavages portionality parties Ideological majoritarian (194580)a (194596)b (194596)c distanced democracye 3 2 2 2 2 1 2.5 1.3 2.5 2.5 21.1 10.3 5.2 4.7 2.5 2.9 3.4 2.1 39 31 38 26 52 46 1.77 1.23 .33 .67 1.00 1.21
Country Switzerland Netherlands Austria Germany Francef United Kingdom

a
Lijphart (1984: 130): number of issue-dimensions (only the four Rokkanean cleavages: culturalethnic, religious, urbanrural, socio-economic (= class), 194580). b Lijphart (1999: 162): average electoral disproportionality, 194596. c Lijphart (1999: 76f.): mean effective number of parties, 194596. d Budge et al. (2001: 546): distance between mean leftright party policy positions 194998 of most distant mainstream parties; own calculations for Switzerland. e Lijphart (1999: 312): factor score on the first, executives-parties dimension 194596. f For columns 14: Fifth Republic.
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of the Dutch electoral system. Austria and Germany have had moderately pluralist party systems with three relevant parties throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the British system has traditionally been dominated by two parties. In France, the number of parties is larger than we would expect on the basis of the extreme disproportionality of its electoral system. This unexpected result can be explained by the fact that France has a majoritarian runoff system for national elections, which allows smaller parties to survive in the first ballot, and it has adopted variants of PR for European, regional and local elections. As can also been seen from Table 2.6, over the post-war period as a whole the ideological distance between the most polarized mainstream parties has been rather low in Germany and in the three small countries.1 By contrast, the UK and France have been more polarized. The mechanics of a party system are first of all a function of the strength of the traditional cleavages. Countries with profound traditional cleavages are likely to have had more polarized party systems than countries with largely pacified cleavages. This partially accounts for the case of France. Secondly, with respect to the mechanics, the electoral system is only indirectly relevant insofar as it determines the number of parties in the system: the larger the number of parties, the greater the chance of polarization between some parties. As we have just observed, in proportional representation (PR) systems, the number of parties tends to be larger than in majoritarian systems. Accordingly, polarization is always possible in countries with PR systems. In Sartoris (1976) terms, they can tend towards polarized or moderate pluralism. But, what Sartori seems to have overlooked, the number of parties is also relevant for the possibility of polarization in majoritarian systems. Note that the two most polarized countries in our group have majoritarian electoral systems. Based on Downs (1957) seminal model, we would have expected the main competitors in majoritarian systems to converge towards the median voter. However, as Powell (2000: 198) has observed, the search for a voter plurality does not necessarily mean moving to the centre. In some circumstances it may and in others it may not. Whether the
1
The mainstream parties most distant from each other for the respective countries are the following: SP and FDP (Switzerland); PvdA and VVD (Netherlands); SP and VP (Austria); SPD and CDU (Germany); PCF and RPR (France); and Labour and Conservatives (UK). The distance is measured on the leftright scale and for each party the mean is taken over the whole period in question (see Budge et al. 2001: 546).
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parties in a majoritarian system converge or polarize depends on the number of the parties. The mechanics of Downs theory presume a twoparty system. In practice, even in majoritarian systems, the number of candidates is usually larger than two. There is only one consistent twoparty system (the US) and, even there, third-party candidates often participate in the presidential elections. Majoritarian systems face persistent coordination failures in that the anticipation of defeat does not sufficiently encourage third-party candidates and voters to join forces with one of the two larger parties. The series of electoral victories scored by the British Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher illustrates this point: they benefited from the split in the opposition and won in spite of their rather radical programme. In fact, ceteris paribus, polarization is more likely in majoritarian systems, because PR systems are part and parcel of a model of democracy Lijpharts (1999) consensus democracy that imposes institutional constraints on the degree of polarization. By dividing political power in such a way that no single actor can impose its preferences, consensus democracies require parties to cooperate. By contrast, the concentration of power in the model of majoritarian democracies allows the winner to take all and to impose his policies. As a result, the mechanics of majoritarian democracies are more competitive, while those of consensus democracies are rather characterized by perpetual negotiations between all major parties. The first dimension in Lijpharts (1999) empirical analysis the executivesparties dimension quite nicely summarizes the institutional constraints of consensus democracies for the mechanics of the party systems. As the last column in Table 2.6 shows, according to this indicator, our six countries fall into three quite distinct categories: the pure majoritarian democracies (France and the UK), the pure consensus democracies (Switzerland and the Netherlands), and the two intermediary cases (Austria and Germany), where the number of parties is limited in spite of the PR-dominated electoral systems.
Institutional opportunity structures: the electoral system and its consequences

The extent of the challenge faced by the established parties depends on the institutional access for new political parties. In this respect, there exists a big difference between majoritarian and consensus democracies.
43
In majoritarian systems, the access for newcomers is much less open than in consensus democracies. The key institution for the electoral breakthrough of a new challenger is, of course, the electoral system. Thus, the British majoritarian first-past-the-post electoral system goes a long way to explaining the failure of the radical or populist right in Great Britain (Ignazi 2003: 186). Generally, PR systems greatly facilitate the rise of new challengers. To the extent, however, that the electoral threshold is high, as is the case in Greece, Spain, Sweden or Germany, new challengers may also find it difficult to establish themselves in PR systems. Golder (2003) provides strong evidence that the success of the new populist right depends on electoral institutions: these challengers clearly fare better when the district magnitude is large and when there are more upper tier seats.2 Proportional systems facilitate the rise of new right-wing populist actors in yet another way. As we have seen, proportional electoral systems are a key characteristic of consensus-democracies (Lijphart 1999). In such democracies (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland), new populist challengers from the right not only benefit from easy access to institutions (e.g. because of proportional representation or multilevel governments), but also from the collusive arrangements that often exist among the established parties and the social partners in such countries. Grand coalition governments as we often find them in consensus democracies are conducive to the mobilization of new challengers from the right as well as from the left (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kitschelt 2002). Thus, the early success of the German neo-fascist NPD in the late 1960s was in large measure a reaction to the grand coalition formed by the CDU and the SPD. Once competitive party politics were re-established between the CDU and the SPD, the NPD disappeared from the national scene. Of course, the electoral breakthrough of a new challenger from the radical right not only depends on the institutional opportunity structure, but also on its own resources. Thus, Bornschier (2005) argues that the electoral breakthrough of the radical right has a lot to do with its strategic flexibility, which allows it to capture the issues other parties have neglected. He attributes this flexibility to the hierarchical internal
2
There is also some evidence to the contrary that proportional representation does not per se help to explain the variable success of the populist right (Carter 2002; van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005).
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structure of these parties, which sets them apart from the more open character of the mainstream parties. He notes that, where a mainstream conservative party was transformed programmatically, it also underwent an organizational change building up hierarchical structures allowing a charismatic leader to dominate the party. However, not all parties of the populist right are well organized and have a charismatic leader. Husbands (1998) maintains that such parties only gain electoral support when they have the required organizational capacity and leadership. The comparative analysis of Lubbers et al. (2002) confirms this hypothesis. Remarkably, in their study, the characteristics of the rightwing populist parties turn out to be more important for the electoral success of these parties than any other political factor in their study. According to this study, two of our six countries (Austria and France) have well-organized parties of the new populist right, while three have poorly organized parties of this type (Germany, the Netherlands and the UK). Switzerland was not part of their study, but there can be no doubt that, in the 1990s, the peripheral parties of the new populist right were badly organized and led, while the restructured mainstream Swiss Peoples Party was exceptionally well organized, funded and led (Kriesi et al. 2005).3 While majoritarian systems discourage the formation of new challengers, they provide strong incentives for the transformation of mainstream parties. For two reasons, we expect the restructuring of existing parties to be much more likely in majoritarian systems than in proportional ones. First, the number of mainstream parties is more limited in majoritarian systems and, as a consequence, their internal composition is likely to be more heterogeneous than in proportional ones. This is conducive to an increasing intensity of competition between factions within the mainstream parties, which opens up the possibility for major shifts in their internal power relations and, consequently, in their overall political orientation. Given that the new structural cleavage cuts across traditional political conflict lines, we have additional reason to believe that the mainstream parties in majoritarian systems will be under particular strain. Secondly, in majoritarian
3
These results are not as straightforward as they might seem at first sight. As van der Brug (2003) observes, the usefulness of the concept charisma is questionable for empirical studies: unless we define very strictly what is meant by charisma, the reasoning risks becoming circular, since successful politicians are easily called charismatic, while unsuccessful politicians never will become charismatic.
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systems, elections are zero-sum games, with the winner taking the prize. The lot of the opposition is particularly hard in such a system especially when the same party loses a series of elections in a row. This combination of factors suggests that, in majoritarian systems, oppositional parties in general, but especially conservative parties in the opposition (such as the British Conservatives) are particularly likely to expand the scope of conflict on issues linked to the new cleavage, i.e. to adopt a more radical stance with regard to such issues. Under PR systems, the situation for the transformation of mainstream conservative parties is also rather favourable in federalist states, where the parties are characterized by a high degree of regional sectionalism such as in Austria and Switzerland, but to a lesser extent in Germany (with the exception of Bavaria). In such territorially fragmented party systems, there is room for experimentation with the mobilization on new issues. One of the regional sections of a conservative party may be captured by new challengers, who may then proceed to transform the entire party according to their own designs provided they are sufficiently successful at the regional level.
The interaction context and the dynamics of adjustment: strategies of mainstream parties
A widely accepted hypothesis explains the success of new challengers of the populist right by the preceding strategies of the mainstream parties: according to this hypothesis, the rise of a new challenger in general, and a new party from the populist right in particular, is greatly facilitated when the mainstream parties have converged programmatically as they tend to do in consensus democracies. Variations of this hypothesis have been formulated by Abedi (2002), Hainsworth (1992), Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Kriesi (1999), Mair (1995), Rydgren (2005), Sauger (2004a) and van der Brug et al. (2005). The empirical record tends to support the convergence hypothesis, although at least one study (Lubbers et al. 2002: 264) cannot confirm it.4 As we have seen, our countries differ with regard to their degree of polarization. This is to suggest that the two more polarized countries France and the UK and the more competitive party system in Germany offer less favourable
The main discordant voice is Ignazi (2003).
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conditions for the breakthrough of new challengers than the less polarized and to some extent collusive systems of the consensus democracies. By focusing on the initial size of the niche, however, this hypothesis only deals with the preconditions of the electoral breakthrough of the new challengers. In her study of the success of niche parties, Meguid (2005) attempts to explain their subsequent electoral success by the strategic reactions of the mainstream competitors once the challengers have made their first entry into the electoral competition. According to her conception of strategies, parties compete by altering both policy positions and the salience and ownership of issue dimensions. This is very much in line with our own approach which, as we shall show in the next chapter, relies on both the parties issue-specific positioning and the salience they attribute to the various issues. Meguid distinguishes between three possible strategic options of mainstream parties with regard to the new issue raised by a niche party challenger: dismissive, accommodative and adversarial strategies. First, a mainstream party may decide to ignore the new issue. By adopting a dismissive strategy, it signals to the voters that the issue lacks merit. Although such a strategy does not call into question the distinctiveness or ownership of the challengers issue position, its salience-reducing effect will undermine the challengers electoral success. The issue ownership theory predicts that mainstream parties will opt for such a strategy. According to this theory, parties try to draw attention to issues on which they believe they have an advantage over their competitors (Budge and Farlie 1983a; Robertson 1976). Moreover, it assumes that parties cannot easily enter into direct issue-specific competition, since they have an identity to defend which is rooted in social cleavages and associated with specific issues, all packaged by an ideology with references to the partys history and to specific group interests: Parties are historical beings. They stand for something. Each party is expected to stand for something that separates it from competition (Klingemann et al. 1994: 24). Secondly, a mainstream party may decide to compete with the challenger by positioning itself close to the challengers position on the new issue. By adopting such an accommodative strategy, the mainstream party tries to close the niche for the new party. Kitschelt (1994) has called this the oligopolistic strategy. As Meguid points out, such a strategy undermines the challengers issue ownership and, a fortiori, its electoral success as the mainstream party tries to become the rightful owner of the issue. In this process the mainstream party is aided by its
47
legislative experience and governmental effectiveness as well as its greater access to the voters. Thirdly, the mainstream party may declare its opposition to the challengers issue position. This reaction calls attention to the challenger and its issue dimension, leaving voters primed to cast their ballots on the basis of this new issue. The adversarial strategy also reinforces the challengers issue ownership by defining the mainstream partys issue position in juxtaposition to that of the new party. As a result, this strategy is likely to reinforce the challengers electoral support. While the first two strategies are likely options for neighbouring parties from the same camp as the challenger, an adversarial strategy is most likely to pay off for a competitor from the opposite camp. As is stressed by Meguid, once we take into account that strategies may be used to alter issue salience and ownership, the standard conception of spatial models that parties can only affect the electoral support of neighbouring parties is no longer valid. The salience-altering aspects of adversarial tactics may allow mainstream parties who are not directly threatened by the challenger to use it as a weapon against their mainstream party opponents, along the lines of the old adage the enemy of my enemy is my friend. We should add one more twist to the strategic toolkit of mainstream parties with regard to new challengers: we should distinguish the treatment of the issue-specific challenge from the strategic reaction with regard to the challenger as organization. With respect to organizational matters, the key issue is recognition of the challenger as a viable partner (Gamson 1975) and the choice is between stigmatization and cooperation/cooptation. Stigmatization is the strategy of the cordon sanitaire which openly attacks the new challengers and their style of doing politics and avoids any cooperation with them, while cooperation includes the mutual support of candidates and the acceptance of the new challenger as coalition partner. Concerning the effect of such strategies on the success of the new challengers, there are two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, cooperation is expected to contribute to the success of the populist right (or its national conservative alternatives): by cooperating with these new competitors, mainstream parties confer upon them the quality of respectable political actors, which is likely to contribute to their success. Ignazis (2003) argument is a variant of this type of reasoning. The rise of the German National Socialists to power is the classic illustration of this hypothesis and the experience of the first breakthrough of the Front National in France is
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also frequently cited in its support (Mayer and Perrineau 1989: 345; Schain 1987: 239f.; Ignazi 2003). On the other hand, this hypothesis is put into question by the Austrian experience of the coalition government between the VP and the FP (since 2000), which suggests that a strategy of cooptation and castration by the bourgeois parties might well be the best way to fight right-wing populism (Luther 2003: 150). According to this hypothesis, their populism suits the parties from the populist right very well as long as they stay in the opposition, but it becomes a handicap for them once they join the government (Henisch 2003). Meguid is right to stress the strategies of mainstream parties with regard to new challengers. But stressing the importance of strategies is in no way incompatible with underlining the relevance of contextual structures: we would like to suggest that the type of strategy chosen by the mainstream parties as well as its effect depend on the format and mechanics of the established party system. With respect to the issuespecific challenge, our expectation is that dismissive strategies are most likely adopted in majoritarian democracies which are characterized by majoritarian electoral systems and tend towards two-party systems. In such settings, new challengers are less threatening to the established parties. By contrast, we expect accommodative or adversarial strategies to be more likely in consensus democracies, which are characterized by proportional electoral systems and multiple parties. In such systems, access for challengers is easier. Once they break through, the most proximate competitor is likely to gain from an oligopolistic strategy. Similarly, in a multiparty setting, the mainstream parties from the opposite camp are likely to adopt an adversarial strategy, since it allows them to weaken their mainstream competitors in the new challengers camp. With respect to organizational matters, stigmatization strategies are expected to be privileged by mainstream parties in majoritarian democracies, while cooperative strategies are expected to be preferred by established competitors in consensus democracies. In majoritarian democracies, mainstream parties tend to pursue catch-all or bonding (Norris 2004) strategies which allow them to win a majority/plurality of the votes. They are interested in enforcing an anti-populist norm (Hansen and Koehler 2005) especially when they are in government, but also to some extent when they find themselves in the opposition , since they have to moderate their discourse in order to appeal to the
49
median voter. By contrast, in consensus democracies, not only is cooperation the predominant strategy, mainstream parties may also be forced to cooperate with new challengers in order to be able to form a government coalition. To summarize, accommodate and co-opt is the expected combination of strategic reactions by direct mainstream competitors in consensus democracies, while dismiss and stigmatize constitutes their most likely reaction in majoritarian democracies. The reaction of mainstream parties from the opposite camp is likely to be similar to that of direct competitors in majoritarian democracies, but not in consensus democracies, where we expect it to be adversarial and stigmatizing. Although a mainstream partys initial strategy is contingent on a challengers degree of electoral threat, after his first breakthrough, the empirical record shows that most mainstream parties implement a cautious, low-cost, dismissive tactic in the first electoral encounter. Only later on, they tend to take more differentiated measures.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed the varying context conditions for the transformation of the national political space in our six countries. Table 2.7 presents a rough summary of the key hypotheses we have formulated based on these context conditions. First, given the far-reaching pacification of the traditional cleavages of class and religion, the high level of economic development, the large number of culturally distinct immigrants, and the generally increasing level of volatility and instability in the party systems, we expect the structural potential for a transformation under the impact of the new cleavage to be rather high in all six countries. In two of them France and Germany we expect the transformation to be framed in more economic terms, as a result of the serious economic problems faced by these two countries (reflected in comparatively high unemployment rates), of the lingering class conflicts (in France) and of the problems linked to reunification (in Germany). By contrast, in the UK and Switzerland, we expect this transformation to be above all framed in cultural terms, as a result of the intense threats to national sovereignty and to national cultural traditions experienced by the populations in these two countries. Although less typical in this respect, Austria and the Netherlands are more likely to resemble Switzerland and the UK than Germany and France.
Table 2.7 Summary of hypotheses concerning national contexts of party mobilization

Conditions for restructuring of mainstream party on the right Federalism/regional sectionalism + + /+ /+ + + + Consensus democracy Opposition in majoritarian system
Conditions for initial breakthrough
Country + + + + + /+ + +
Political potential
Electoral system
Grand Convergence coalitions
Austria Germany Netherlands Switzerland France UK
+ + + + + +
+ /+ + +
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According to our main hypothesis, the driving force of this transformation is likely to be a new populist challenger from the right and/or a mainstream liberal or conservative party. As to the political context conditions for the mobilization of the given political potentials by these two political forces, we have argued that the initial electoral success and the breakthrough of a new challenger depend on the institutional access provided by the electoral thresholds, the degree of convergence and collusion among the mainstream parties, as well as on its own organizational capacity and the personal attributes of its leaders. From this perspective, the conditions for the breakthrough of a new challenger from the populist right should have been particularly favourable in the consensus democracies (the Netherlands and Switzerland) and in the intermediary cases (Austria and Germany), but quite unfavourable in the UK and (at first sight) France. We have also argued that the conditions for the restructuring of an established liberal or conservative party are particularly favourable in a majoritarian democracy, where the main party of the established right has been in opposition for a series of elections (the case of the UK), or in a consensus democracy, where a PR system combines with federalism and regional sectionalism in the party system (such as in the cases of Austria and Switzerland). The PR setting generally induces the mainstream party to adopt an accommodate-and-coopt strategy, and the regional sectionalism increases the likelihood that a regional branch of such a party will make an attempt to implement this kind of strategy. In other words, based on this reasoning, in Austria and Switzerland, and to a lesser extent in Germany, too, conditions have been favourable both for the emergence of new challengers and for the transformation of some party of the established right. In the Netherlands, conditions have been favourable for the emergence of a new challenger, whereas in the UK, they have been conducive for the transformation of an established party. Surprisingly, according to this reasoning, conditions have generally been less propitious for the emergence of a new challenger or for the transformation of a mainstream party of the established right in France. The country chapters in the second part of this study will show how well these hypotheses hold up in each of the six cases. It is, of course, already apparent now, that they do not square with the developments in France and in Germany. As we have observed in the previous chapter, France constitutes the model case, where the party system has been
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successfully challenged by a powerful new party from the populist right. And Germany is the obvious example of the dog that did not bark in the night. This suggests that our rough summary hypotheses are not detailed enough, that they miss important aspects of the respective national political contexts, and that they imply too rigid a structural determination of the strategic reactions.
The design of the study: the distinguishing characteristics of our approach

MARTIN DOLEZAL
This study deals with changing conflict structures in West European societies and their mobilization by political parties. In general, there are two basic approaches to handling such a question: the first one concentrates on the changing relationships between political actors and often resorts to concepts of network analysis (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Laumann and Pappi 1976; Knoke et al. 1996; Scott 2000; Wassermann and Faust 1999). In this book, we follow the second approach and analyze issue-positions of parties as well as of voters, since we are especially interested in the thematic basis of political conflicts. This is not only the standard approach in political science (e.g. Kitschelt 1994, 1995) but has recently become even more important because of the growing significance of issue-based voting behaviour (Downs 1957; Key 1966; Budge and Farlie 1983a; Franklin 1985; Aardal and van Wijnen 2005). We expect the parties, the main political actors in West European democracies, to select the issues they articulate in party competition as well as their positions strategically. But we also look at the other side of this competition where we are interested in the changing issue-positions of the voters. However, contrary to pure rational choice or individualistic approaches, we combine the issue-based approach with a structural perspective which is focused on the political attitudes of groups. According to our point of view, membership in social groups still constitutes an important basis for the development of issuepreferences. As explained in the two introductory chapters, we conceive of contemporary cleavage structures as being thematically determined by issues linked to globalization and as being structurally rooted in social groups of winners and losers of globalization. In this chapter, we present the design of our study. First, we briefly review how we selected the countries and elections we cover. Then we explain the kind of methods we used in the analyses of party competition for which we always distinguish two sides: the demand side, i.e. the preferences of the voters, on the one hand, and the supply side, i.e. the
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parties programmatic statements, on the other hand. Throughout the subsequent chapters, both aspects of electoral competition will be addressed primarily with spatial concepts resulting in standardized figures that will allow the reader to follow the effect of the new cleavage on the configuration of the national political space in the countries compared. The dimensionality of the space, which is the number of basic lines of conflict, and the content or nature of these conflicts, are crucial points in our analysis. Note that we do not start with a priori assumptions of the spaces structure but regard the unfolding of its configuration and the substantive content of its dimensions as a major step of the analysis. As our approach is novel especially concerning the supply side analyses, we shall introduce this part of our exploration, the data sources as well as the method of calculation, in some detail and point out the differences to the dominant approaches in the literature.
Selection of countries and elections

The selection of countries and elections constitutes the first important step of our research design. As the implications of globalization, and the degree and the timing of political change, depend on national specifics (see Chapter 2), we have chosen to conduct a comparative analysis of several countries that controls for explanatory factors at the national level. Nevertheless, there are also pragmatic arguments that guide this step of analysis, concerning, among other things, the heavy workload of the content analysis (see below), other available data sets, and last but not least the language skills of the authors and collaborators. In order to analyze the impact of globalization on the national political space in Europe, we finally selected six West European countries: France, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany. We did not include East European countries in our sample because their democratization did not take place until the beginning of the contemporary era of globalization so that we cannot compare the political mobilizations before and after this crucial development. East European party systems and voter alignments are also rather fluid, which makes comparisons with established liberal democracies difficult. As regards Western Europe, we discussed including Italy in our analysis but we finally decided against it because political change in this country and the breakdown of the First Republics party system in the early 1990s is more the consequence of national idiosyncrasies than elsewhere (see,
The design of the study
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e.g., Newell 2000: 1778).1 Other South European countries, especially Spain, democratised only in the 1970s, which makes temporal comparisons again problematic. Scandinavian countries, finally, are not included in our sample because of lacking language skills of the authors. As was shown in Chapter 2, the six countries we finally selected are very similar in many respects, expressing a most similar systems design. All six are stable liberal democracies with consolidated political institutions and party systems, and all of them belong to the economically most developed and richest countries worldwide. More generally, the set of societal conditions (cleavage structures, economic and cultural context conditions) has created broadly similar latent political potentials in all six countries. However, as argued in the previous chapter, they also present some systematic contextual variations, and the political conditions for the mobilization of these potentials vary considerably from one country to the other. After choosing the countries, the second question concerned the kind of elections to be included. In general, election campaigns provide a perfect opportunity to study the major lines of conflict in a society, because the parties, still the dominant political actors in liberal democracies, are forced to express their opinion on all important issues in a rather short period of time in order to mobilize their electorate and win new voters. Thus, the important conflicts become visible for the researcher. Our comparative analysis focuses on national elections where we explore the changing conflict structures operationalized as combinations of the issue-positions of voters (the demand side of electoral competition) and of parties (the supply side) expressed in the context of election campaigns.2 We consider national contests still to be decisive for the structuring of the political space. They are more appropriate for our research purposes than European elections, as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Comparing, for example, turnout in national and European elections, it is clear that the voters regard the former as much more important; the parties too share this perspective as they clearly invest more resources in national campaigns.
1
Additionally, including Italy in our sample would have led to problems regarding available data for the demand analyses. This also means that we concentrate on the national level of party competition. Various sub-national configurations, as for example in East Germany or in the United Kingdom (e.g. in Scotland), are not dealt with.
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Figure 3.1 The rise of globalization, 19702003 Source: KOF Globalization index 2006 (ETH Zurich); see www.globalizationindex.org. This index averages the scores of 23 economic, social and political indicators of globalization in 123 countries. Economic indicators include, for example, trade flows, foreign investments and import barriers. Social indicators include tourism, outgoing telephone calls or Internet usage. Political globalization, finally, is operationalized with membership in international organizations and diplomatic relations with foreign countries.
Having decided which countries and what kind of elections we analyze, the last step of the selection process concerned the time period. Globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon, but, because several aspects of the processes related to it accelerated in the late 1980s (see Figure 3.1), we chose to focus primarily on the elections since the 1990s, when the political implications of denationalization became part of partisan politics. In order to analyze the changing conflict structures influenced by globalization processes, we therefore study four elections in each country: three from the 1990s and early 2000s and one from the mid-1970s. The latter serves as a point of reference from a period before the national politics were undergoing the presumed restructuring effect of globalization. We include several elections from the 1990s in our analysis because we assume, in line with a renewed realignment-theory (Martin 2000), that a structural transformation of national politics may occur across a
The design of the study Table 3.1 Elections

Point of reference in the 1970s Francea Austriab Switzerland Netherlands UK Germany
a
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Elections in the 1990s/2000s 1988 1994 1991 1994 1992 1994 1995 1999 1995 1998 1997 1998 2002 2002 1999 2002 and 2003 2001 2002
1978 1975 1975 1973 1974 (February) 1976
1978 election to the parliament; 1988, 1995 and 2002 presidential elections (as explained in the text). b We do not analyze the snap election of 1995 because this campaign was dominated to an extraordinary extent by the major parties.
series of critical elections over an extended period of time. In all countries but France, we analyze the national parliamentary elections. In France, the presidential elections are more important (Bell 2000: 1; Knapp 2004: 25), which is why we selected them for our exploration, with the exception of the election in the 1970s. Because no national election study was available for the presidential races in the 1970s, we exceptionally chose the parliamentary elections of 1978 instead. Table 3.1 lists all elections selected for this study.
Two sides of party competition: data collection and analysis

Throughout this book we distinguish between two sides of party competition: the demand side, covering the political preferences of the electorate, and the supply side, summarizing the issue-positions of the parties competing in the elections. Both sides determine the changing conflict structures in European societies. In order to analyse these structures, i.e. the configurations of the issue-positions of voters and parties in the national political space, we constructed a system of twelve issue-categories that cover (almost) all political subjects in Western democracies. These categories will be used for the analysis of both the demand and the supply side. After the introduction of these categories, detailed information will be given on how we collected and analyzed the data.
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Twelve issue categories

Analyzing the issue-attitudes of voters and issue-positions of parties builds the core of our study. For the supply side, we coded the issuepositions with great detail (see below), but, for the analysis, we had to regroup the sometimes more than 200 codes into more encompassing categories. This step is important for both theoretical and technical reasons. From a theoretical perspective, the specific issues raised during a campaign vary from one election to the next as a result of the policy attention cycle, which in turn depends on the development of the policymaking process in the various political subsystems of a given polity (see van der Brug 1999, 2001). Issues may come up on the electoral agenda as a result of internal dynamics in certain political subsystems or as a result of external shocks, catastrophes (such as September 11 in 2001, the flood in Eastern Germany in 2002 or the war in Kosovo in 1999) or economic crises. Although the specific issues raised during a given campaign are, therefore, somewhat unpredictable, they still refer to only a limited set of basic structural conflicts, which they articulate in various ways. The theoretical challenge is to regroup these issues into a limited, but exhaustive, set of basic categories that is capable of capturing the underlying dimensions of a conflict and generally applicable for the analysis of a longer time period. Not all national particularities could be taken into consideration. In Germany, for example, we had coded several issues connected to the countrys reunification, but, for the comparative analyses, we did not retain a specific code for reunification. Technically, we also need a limited set of categories in order to have enough cases per category for all elections covered (see below). In both parts of the analysis, the regrouping of individual, sometimes very detailed, issues into the twelve categories is therefore perhaps the most difficult part of the exploration because these decisions heavily influence all further steps of the analysis. As we are interested in how parties and voters respectively position themselves with regard to political issues (direction), it is important to distinguish between support and opposition; all categories are therefore defined in such a way that they include a direction. Table 3.2 lists and describes these twelve categories and includes the abbreviations that will be used in the figures. This system of categories will also be used when analyzing the preferences of voters (the demand side) to enable the comparison of supply and demand, which is a crucial point of our analysis.
The design of the study Table 3.2 Issue-categories

Abbreviation in the figures Description welfare
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Category Welfare
Budget
budget
Economic liberalism
ecolib
Cultural liberalism
cultlib
Europe
europe
Culture Immigration Army
culture immigration army
Support for an expansion of the welfare state; defence against welfare state retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character; calls for employment and health care programmes Support for a rigid budgetary policy; reduction of the state deficit; cuts in expenditures; reduction of taxes without direct effects on redistribution Support for deregulation, more competition, and privatization; opposition to market regulation; opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors of the economy Support for the goals of new social movements, with the exception of the environmental movement; support for cultural diversity, international cooperation (excluding the European Union and NATO); support for the United Nations; opposition to racism; support for the right to abortion and euthanasia; opposition to patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition, national sovereignty, and to traditional moral values; support for a liberal drug policy Support for European integration, including enlargement; support for EU membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria Support for education, culture, and scientific research Support for a tough immigration and integration policy Support for the armed forces (including NATO), for a strong national defence, and for nuclear weapons
60 Table 3.2 (cont.)

Abbreviation in the figures Description security
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Category Security
Environment environ Institutional reform iref
Infrastructure infra
Support for more law-and-order, the fight against crime, and denouncing political corruption Support for environmental protection; opposition to nuclear energy Support for various institutional reforms such as the extension of direct democracy, modifications in the structure of the political system, federalism and decentralization; calls for the efficiency of government and public administration, and new public management Calls for the improvement of the countrys roads, railways, etc.
The first three categories welfare, budget, and economic liberalism refer to the traditional economic opposition between state and market, which is the class-based opposition between left and right. The next six categories cultural liberalism, Europe, culture, immigration, army, and security all refer to the cultural dimension of societal conflicts. Finally, there are three additional categories that do not automatically belong to one of the two major dimensions of conflict: environment, institutional reform, and infrastructure. However, whether the twelve issue categories indeed build two basic lines of conflict, and which categories belong together, are always empirical questions.
Analysis of the demand side

For the exploration of the demand side, we rely on secondary analyses of existing surveys. In all six countries but Austria, national election studies are available and provide detailed information concerning most of our research questions. In the Austrian case, we depend on international surveys for the elections of 1975 and 2002, and on less perfect national polls for the elections of 1994 and 1999.3
3
Also, the Swiss survey of 1975 was part of an international study (see Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3 lists all surveys used for this study; detailed information on the variables is given in Appendix A. Two basic questions guide the exploration of the demand side of party competition: on the one hand, we want to analyze the structure of the political space based on the voters attitudes; on the other hand, we are interested in the positions of various social groups in this space: voters of the different parties, members of social classes, groups defined by their level of education and religious affiliations. As discussed in the introductory chapters, according to our theory, social class as well as the level of education are the most important features distinguishing between winners and losers of globalization. To make the analysis of the demand side comparable between elections and countries as well as with the analysis of the supply side, we use the same twelve issue-categories introduced above for both sides of the study. In a first step, in each survey all variables measuring issue-positions4 of the voters (or issue-priorities if no positions were asked for) were identified and regrouped into our system of categories.5 If more than one variable was available for a given category, we factor-analyzed them and used the common factor instead. In some cases, however, the issues we associated with a given category on theoretical grounds did not all load on a single common factor; in these situations, a second category had to be constructed. These exceptions will be explained in the country chapters. The variables included in the different surveys typically did not allow covering all categories, i.e. we usually did not have information on every aspect we are interested in. In particular, attitudes about the budget and infrastructural projects were very rarely asked. The most important categories are, however, covered by most surveys. Table 3.4 summarizes the issue-categories we are able to measure on the basis of the available data. In a final step, we performed factor analyses (with varimax rotation) of the available categories that always resulted in two-dimensional solutions.6 These configurations and the factor scores derived from the calculation constitute the basis for the graphical presentations concerning the demand side in the following chapters, which show the spatial positions of party voters and those social groups we are especially interested
4
5 6
Because we are interested in issue-positions, we did not select leftright scales, materialismpost-materialism scales, and all variables that seemed too vague, such as questions regarding the importance of solidarity or the like. For details, see Appendix A. For exceptions, see the country chapters.
Table 3.3 Surveys used for the demand-side analyses

Switzerland 1975: Attitudes politiques 1975 (20) (part of Political Action An Eight Nation Study) 1991: not availablea 1995: Swiss electoral study 1995 (1815) 1999: Swiss electoral study 1999 (6646)
France 1978: Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1978 (q0062) 1988: Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1988 (q0601) 1995: Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1995 (q0891) 2002: Panel lectoral franais 2002 (PEF 2002)
Austria 1975: Political Action An Eight Nation Study 1994: Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft 9409 1999: Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft 9908 2002: European Social Survey 20022003
The Netherlands 1972: Dutch parliamentary election study, 1972, 1973 (P0353) 1994: Dutch parliamentary election study, 1994 (P1208) 1998: Dutch parliamentary election study, 1998 (P1415) 20023: Dutch parliamentary election study, 20022003
UK 1974: British Election Study, February 1974 (UKDA study number 359) 1992: British General Election Study, 1992 (UKDA study number 2981) 1997: British General Election Study, 1997 (UKDA study number 3887) 2001: British Election Panel Study, 2001 (UKDA study number 4620)
Germany 1976: Wahlstudie 1976 (ZA0823) 1994: Nachwahlstudie 1994 (ZA 2601) 1998: Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Whlerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998 (ZA 3066) 2002: Bundestagswahlstudie 2002 (ZA 3861)
For 1991, there are insufficient issue-questions in the available survey, so we had to exclude this election from the demand analyses.
Table 3.4 Issue-categories covered by the surveys

Switzerland The Netherlands UK Germany
France
Austria
1978 1988 1995 2002 1975 1994 1999 2002 1975 1995 1999 1972 1994 1998 2002 1974 1992 1997 2001 1976 1994 1998 2002 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Welfare Budget
x x
x x
Economic
liberalism
Cultural
liberalism
Europe
Culture
Immigration Army
x x
x x
Security
Environment
Institutional
reform
Infrastructure
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in. To facilitate the interpretation of the corresponding figures, we always rotated the configurations in such a way that the economic leftright dimension is arranged horizontally and the cultural dimension vertically. Pro-state positions are always situated on the left and pro-market positions on the right of the horizontal axis. With respect to the cultural line of conflict, attitudes in favour of integration are always placed at the top, and those favouring demarcation at the bottom of the vertical axis. The figures for the demand side first include the positions of the voters of the various parties and, when they are not in a centrist position, of nonvoters. In general, parties (and all other groups) with less than ten voters in the survey were excluded because the measure of their position was considered unreliable. Apart from the party voters, the figures include the positions of various groups defined by their social class, their level of education, and their religious affiliation. The operationalization of the social classes differs between the explored countries and elections because the available information in the surveys varies widely. Whenever possible, we use a modified version of the Erikson/Goldthorpe class scheme, based on the work of Kriesi (1989, 1998) and Mller (1998, 1999). This classification distinguishes between eight groups: farmers, other selfemployed in non-professional occupations, semiskilled and unskilled workers including agricultural workers, skilled workers and foremen, routine non-manual white collar employees, managers and other professionals in social-administrative occupations, professionals with technical expertise, and social-cultural specialists. Additionally, we explore the attitudes of voters belonging to the non-labour force. With regard to the level of education, we always compare three groups: low education comprises all respondents who completed only compulsory school or less; medium education ranges from basic professional training (for example, Lehre in the German-speaking countries) to several kinds of high-school graduates (for example, Matura in Austria and Switzerland, Abitur in Germany); high education summarizes all kinds of tertiary education. Finally, concerning the religious cleavage, we compare the issue-preferences of Catholics, Protestants and the non-affiliated, as well as the differences between religious and non-religious voters depending on the country-specific nature of the religious cleavage. A respondents religiosity is always operationalized with church-going frequency (see Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995: 8791). As explained in Chapter 2, one of our basic hypotheses refers to a zero-sum relationship between the strength of old and the potential for
65
new cleavages. In addition to the figures that show the political space, all country chapters therefore include line diagrams indicating the strength of traditional cleavages as well as of new divisions, measured as the difference in the attitudes of their core groups.
Analysis of the supply side

For the analysis of the supply side of electoral competition, we assume that the structural change linked to globalization is articulated by the issue-specific positions taken by the parties in electoral campaigns as well as by the salience they attribute to the different issues. We also consider that the most appropriate way to analyze the positioning of parties and the way in which they deal with the new issues linked with globalization is to focus on the political debate during campaigns, as reflected by the mass media. Our research strategy, therefore, differs from the two so far dominant approaches in the literature: expert surveys (e.g. Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006) and the analysis of party manifestos, especially the comparative manifestos project (see Budge et al. 1987, 2001; Klingemann et al. 1994; Volkens 2001). Expert surveys are a useful and relatively feasible method for estimating policy positions. But we think there are several major disadvantages concerning the method per se as well as in relation to our research question. In general, it remains an open question on which information experts rely when estimating the parties positions (Mair 2001: 245). Sometimes it is also not clear which party the experts are positioning: the party leaders, the activists, the voters, or all three together; in addition, the designated time period is not always clear (Budge 2000: 1034). All three objections can be rebutted with a perfect research design (Steenbergen, Hooghe and Marks 2004), but two additional factors complicate the estimates: First, the positions of several parties especially of small parties are often difficult to judge because their attitude concerning issues that are not important for them are often unknown even to the experts.7 Secondly, experts tend to deduce a stronger polarization from a higher fragmentation of the party system
7
Consider, for example, economic or environmental positions of right-wing parties in Germany. Even experts in the field might have difficulties when asked to distinguish the differences between the Republikaner, the DVU and the NPD.
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and therefore provide more widespread estimates for countries with many parties (Mair 2001: 203). With regard to our research question, finally, developments over time cannot be analyzed with available data sets based on this method because the survey conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992) was the first that covered several issues-positions of the parties and there are no data available on the parties positions thirty years ago. In addition, it is also not possible to operationalize our system of issue-categories with the available expert surveys, since they asked too few questions about policy positions.8 The most important approach for estimating the programmatic positions of parties so far has been the analysis of their manifestos, especially with human coding.9 Without any doubt, the comparative manifestos project (CMP) is the dominant actor in this field of research. The great contribution of this project to comparative politics is the analysis of a large number of countries throughout the post-war period; with respect to the USA, the data set even goes back to the 1920s (Volkens 2001: 345). But at least four major problems make it necessary to think of alternatives for getting better information on parties positions. First, the CMP is based on the salience theory of party competition, which, in general, neglects the direction of parties statements. Extensive research based on party manifestos has, indeed, shown that parties tend to avoid direct confrontation and that they differ from each other mainly through the selective emphasis of their priorities. But we also know that new issues usually do not have a valence character and that direct confrontation i.e. parties advocating diverging positions on political issues is much more pronounced in the media and during electoral campaigns than in party programmes (Budge and Farlie 1983b: 281). The voters, too, see the parties mainly in confrontational terms, especially during election campaigns. Secondly, the CMPs system of issue-categories does not cover important new issues of the 1990s, especially immigration. Statements towards immigration are coded as part of per705 underprivileged minority groups, and because of the theoretical base of the CMP only favourable statements can be included. Thirdly, the overall relevance of party (or electoral)
8
The choice of policy positions for the survey also strongly influences all further explorations concerning the dimensionality of the space, especially when only few positions are asked for. For computer-generated coding see, e.g., Ray (2001); Garry (2001); and Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003).
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manifestos is disputable, because voters do not read them. Robertson (1976: 72) rightfully stresses that manifestos provide the basis for statements given by politicians during campaigns, but it is better to directly analyze those statements, which are heard or read by voters; and there is no doubt that contemporary campaigns are primarily fought with mass media. Finally, most manifestos have a kind of softfocus effect; thus, parties do address several issues but often deliberately avoid clear statements. European integration, for example, is rarely mentioned, and even Eurosceptic parties tend to stress the importance of international cooperation. Furthermore, controversial subjects are sometimes completely excluded from the manifesto. Existing programmatic differences between parties, therefore, tend to be blurred when relying on their manifestos. The mass media, on the contrary, often intensify statements of politicians, which makes it easier to observe the basic political conflicts in a given country. These methodological deficits of existing approaches led us to the conclusion that it is necessary to produce a new data set. In order to identify the salience of the campaign issues for the various parties and their issue-specific positions, we therefore conducted an extensive content analysis of articles in major daily newspapers based on human coding.10 For each country, we chose a quality newspaper, which can be interpreted as the leading medium of political coverage, and a tabloid to get a broader picture of how voters see the parties during the campaigns. We always selected the most widespread paper in each category among the newspapers that were published throughout the whole period covered by our study (Table 3.5). For each electoral campaign, all articles, except commentaries, related to the electoral contest or to politics in general were selected in both newspapers for the last two months before election day. Because political advertisements are very important in Switzerland, we included them in our analysis of this country. With regard to the quality newspapers, we used a sampling method and only selected the articles on three days (for details see the appendix). Because the tabloids have fewer articles, we selected all issues within the two-month period. In general, the sampling procedure was conducted in a way to get the same amount of information on the parties positions in each country. For the articles selected, the
10
The coding was done by some of the authors as well as by students and student research assistants.
68 Table 3.5 Selected newspapers

Quality paper France Austria Switzerland The Netherlands UK Germany
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Tabloid Le Parisien Kronenzeitung Blick a The Sun Bild
Le Monde Die Presse Neue Zrcher Zeitung NRC Handelsblad Algemeen Dagblad The Times Sddeutsche Zeitung
In the Netherlands, no widespread tabloid exists.
headlines, the lead, if available, and the first paragraph11 were coded sentence by sentence using a relational method of content analysis developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1997; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). This method is designed to code every relationship between political objects (i.e. either between two political actors or between a political actor and a political issue) appearing in the text. For the purposes of this study, we are only interested in relationships between political actors and political issues (actor-issue sentences). According to this coding procedure, each sentence of an article is reduced to its most basic structure, the socalled core sentence, indicating only its subject (political actor) and its object (issue) as well as the direction of the relationship between the two. The direction is quantified using a scale ranging from 1 to +1 with three intermediary positions indicating a potential or a neutral relation. If, for example, a politician says that in the future he might be in favour of or against a certain position we coded 0.5 or 0.5 respectively. Whenever there was a neutral relation that is no direction at all we coded 0. The issues were recorded with great detail; later we aggregated them to our system of issue-categories as described above. Political actors were coded according to their party membership. For the analyses in the subsequent chapters, we have regrouped them into a limited number of categories or observed just the most important parties respectively, from three in the UK to eight in France (Table 3.6).
11
For some tabloids we coded the complete articles because they are very short.
Table 3.6 Parties according to current membership of party families

Social Democrats Liberals Christian Democrats/ Conservatives
Communists/ Radical Left
Greens/ New Left
Populist Right
France
Austria
Switzerland
Front National Rassemblement pour la Parti Communiste Les Verts (The Parti Socialiste PSF Union pour la Greens) (Socialist Party) FN Dmocratie Rpublique RPR (Rally Franais PCF Mouvement des (National Franaise UDFb for the Republic) (French Radicaux de Front) Communist (Union for French Gauche MRGa Party) and Democracy) Trotskyist (Movement of Left parties Radicals) sterreichische Freiheitliche Die Grnen/Die Sozialdemokratische Liberales Forum LIF (Liberal Volkspartei VP Partei Partei Grne Forum) (Austrian Peoples Party) sterreichs sterreichs SP Alternative FPc (Social Democratic (The Greens/ Party of Austria) The Green (Freedom Alternative) Party of Austria) Christlichdemokratische Sozialdemokratische FreisinnigGrne Partei Schweizerische Volkspartei der Demokratische Partei der der Schweiz Volkspartei Schweiz CVPd Partei FDP Schweiz SPS GPS (Green SVPe (Swiss (Radical (Social Democratic Party of Peoples (Christian Democratic Democratic Party) Party of Switzerland) Party) Peoples Party) Liberale Partei der Switzerland) Schweiz LPS (Swiss Liberal Party)
Table 3.6 (cont.)

Social Democrats Liberals Christian Democrats/ Conservatives
Communists/ Radical Left
Greens/ New Left
Populist Right
Netherlands
GroenLinks (Green Left)
UKf
Germany
Lijst Pim Christen-Democratisch Partij van de Arbeid Democraten66 Fortuyn Appel CDA (Christian D66 (Democrats PvdA (Labour LPF (List Democratic Appeal) 66) Party) Pim Fortuyn) Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie VVD (Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy) Labour Party Liberal Democratic Conservative Party Party Bndnis 90/Die Sozialdemokratische Freie Demokratische Christlich-Demokratische Partei des Partei FDP (Free Union/Christlich-Soziale Partei Grnen demokratischen Democratic Party) Union CDU/CSU Deutschlands (Alliance 90/ Sozialismus (Christian Democratic SPD (Social The Greens) PDS (Party of Union/Christian Social Democratic Party Democratic Union) of Germany) Socialism)
It is difficult to classify the MRG into one of the major party families. It is rather left-of-centre and was one of the three pillars of the left-wing opposition in the 1970s (with the PCF and the PSF). But it cannot simply be subsumed into the social-democratic party family. b The UDF has both a liberal and a Christian-democratic component. c Until the mid-1980s, the FP was a liberal-conservative party. d Plus other minor centre parties. e Plus several small parties of the radical right. Until the early 1990s, the SVP was part of the conservative party family. f The Scottish National Party (SNP), which is difficult to classify in this table, is also included in the analyses.
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We cannot, however, consider all parties in all elections. As a matter of fact, some of them did not exist during the whole period. The Lijst Pim Fortuyn, for example, was only present in the Dutch elections of 2002 and 2003; the Liberal Forum, a splinter party of the FP, was visible only in the Austrian elections from 1994 to 1999, then it became irrelevant for voters as well as for the media. Some smaller parties also had to be excluded, as we do not have enough information on their issue positions. In each election, we mostly consider only those parties for which at least thirty issue positions were coded. Especially in Germany, parties of the radical right are not given coverage in newspapers, at least there is no information about their issue-positions (apart from immigration). Such parties, therefore, could not be included in our supply side analyses, which is one of the disadvantages of our methodological choice. But we are able to explore their voters attitudes in the demand analyses. The data resulting from our content analysis offer valuable information on two central aspects of the supply side of electoral competition: the positions of political parties regarding the various political issues, and the salience of these issues for a given political party. The position of an actor on a category of issues is computed by averaging over all core sentences that contain a relationship between this actor and any of the issues belonging to this category. The salience of a category of issues is based on the relative frequency with which a given political party takes a position on this category. As argued above, it is important to understand that both aspects are relevant for an adequate description of the political space. Parties differ from one another not only with respect to the positions they advocate, but also with respect to the priorities they set. It is also important to note that the salience of issues and parties can be computed in different ways. In this study, party-issue relationships are weighted by the number of statements of a given party in a given campaign and by the relative importance of the corresponding issue category for the party in question. This means that, for a given campaign, large parties and key campaign issues determine the configuration of the political space more heavily than marginal parties or secondary issues. On the basis of these data, it is finally possible to construct a graphical representation of the positions of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space, using the method of multidimensional scaling (MDS). MDS is a very flexible method that allows for the graphic representation of similarities or dissimilarities between pairs of objects (see, e.g., Borg and Groenen 1997; Cox and Cox 2001; Kruskal and Wish 1978). If a
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party from the left, for example, strongly supports an expansion of the welfare state, we would expect the distance between this party and the category welfare to be small. If we represent the parties and issues in a common space, this party and the category welfare should be located close to each other. The unfolding technique, the MDS procedure which we use here, allows for the joint representation of parties and issues in a common space.12 Furthermore, a variant of MDS, called weighted metric multidimensional scaling (WMMDS), enables us to account simultaneously for the similarities between pairs of objects (parties and issues, in our case) and for the salience of these relationships.13 This means that, when representing our data in a low-dimensional space, the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate than the less salient ones. Distortions of real distances are unavoidable, but with WMMDS these distortions will be smaller for more important relationships, resulting in a more accurate representation of the relative positions of parties and issues. Relying on MDS has an additional advantage crucial for our argument. With this method, we do not have to make any a priori assumption about the structure of the political space contrary to most analyses of parties positions that start from theoretically defined dimensions (see, e.g., Gabel and Hix 2002; Hix 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002; Klingemann et al. 1994; Pellikaan et al. 2003; Pennings and Keman 2003; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Here, by contrast, and similar to our strategy for the demand side analyses, we want to test our hypotheses regarding both the dimensionality of the political space and the nature of these dimensions. The structure of the political space that we estimate with WMMDS is not influenced by any assumption we could make on how the categories of issues are related to one another. When interpreting the supply-side configurations and comparing them with the demand-side figures in the following chapters, it is important to take some technical differences into consideration. Just as the demand-side figures, the supply-side figures are rotated so that
12
13
Van der Brug (1999, 2001) uses another MDS procedure that does not allow for the joint representation of parties and issues in a common space, which makes the interpretation of the results much more difficult. Weighted metric multidimensional scaling can be estimated using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented in SPSS.
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the economic conflict is arranged horizontally and the cultural conflict vertically; again, positions supporting cultural integration are placed on the top, those supporting demarcation at the bottom of the figure. But, in an MDS figure, the crucial aspect refers to the relative distances between points (for example, between a certain party and a certain issue category); their spatial positions are of lesser importance. If, for example, a party is situated on the bottom right side of a configuration, it does not necessarily strongly support market liberalism. One has to check its relative distance from economic liberalism and welfare respectively. Only if the party is much closer to economic liberalism can its position be interpreted as support for an economically right policy.
Conclusion
It was the purpose of this chapter to describe the design of our study, the data sources, and the methods applied. Our basic decision was to analyze changing cleavage structures in West European societies based on an observation of issue-positions of parties and voters in the context of electoral campaigns. We explained the comparative approach of this book and argued why we selected the six countries covered by our exploration and why we focus on national elections. Our sample of West European countries France, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK and Germany is quite homogeneous but it provides considerable variation with respect to the national context factors that may explain how the processes associated with globalization can be mobilized by political entrepreneurs, especially in connection with national elections. Distinguishing between demand and supply as the two sides of party competition, we explained the kind of data we use and how we construct our indicators based on these data. As regards the demand-side analyses, we rely on secondary analyses of available surveys. Concerning the supply side, we have built a new data set based on an extensive relational content analysis of the media coverage of elections. Both parts of the analysis use the same system of issue-categories that provides information on the direction of voters political attitudes and the parties programmes respectively, as well as on the salience of these issues. Once again, it is important to note that we start our analysis with as few a priori assumptions as possible, because
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the changing structure of the political space in both dimensions of competition is the core question of this book. With the statistical procedures selected factor analysis for the demand side and weighted multidimensional scaling for the supply side we use mathematical methods that are perfectly suited for such an explorative research strategy.
PART II
Country studies

SIMON BORNSCHIER
Introduction
France clearly is one of the countries whose political landscape has been profoundly altered in the past two decades. Although organizational stability has never been a defining feature of the French party system, the new institutions of the Fifth Republic established in 1958 did progressively bring about a more stable pattern of bipolar multipartism (Parodi 1989; Knapp 2002). Since the early 1980s, however, cultural conflicts related to the different conceptions of norms that should be binding in society, of the way community is conceived, and of the balance of power between the nation-state and the European Union have emerged. The appearance of these issues on the political agenda, and the rising prominence of an integrationdemarcation line of conflict lie at the heart of the transformation of the French party system that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. As a driving force of this transformation, and as one of the most successful right-wing populist parties, the French Front National represents something like the prototype or the avant-garde of a new party family. Earlier than in other countries, the extreme populist right achieved its electoral breakthrough in a number of second-order elections in the early 1980s. According to our theoretical framework, the early success of the Front National in comparative terms must be analyzed in the context of the country-specific political potentials and context structures. And, in fact, the rise of the political formation founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen owes a lot to the rather sudden decline in salience of the traditional cleavages and to a subsequent realignment in the countrys party system that took place in the early 1980s (Martin 2000; Perrineau 1997). The evidence presented in this chapter strongly rejects Kitschelts (1995) influential claim that the Front National represents the mastercase of a new type of radical right-wing party by virtue of the
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combination of an authoritarian and a pro-market appeal. Far from being consistently neo-liberal in the economic domain, the Front National in the 1990s in fact turned to a programmatic stance suitable to mobilizing those left behind by the structural transformations of the last decades. Denouncing globalization and European integration, and in 1996 even chanting slogans such as le social, cest le Front National (Perrineau 1997: 88; Betz 2004), the Front National has moved to a position of economic, as well as cultural, demarcation. As a consequence, a triangular structure of oppositions has emerged. At the same time, the 1990s have seen transformations within the French party system that reach beyond the emergence of this triangular pattern. First of all, the process of European integration has had a profound impact on party competition, producing a fissure both within the parties of the left, as well as within the right. It has been the failure of the European Constitutional treaty to gain majority support that has strikingly brought to the fore the simple truth that voters are strongly divided in their attitudes towards the integration project. Secondly, the stability of the three-block model is misleading in the light of a growing fragmentation of the French party system. In 2002, the number of candidacies reached unprecedented levels in the elections of that year, resulting in Chirac standing against Le Pen in the second round of the presidential contest. In that election, the integrationdemarcation opposition has become the prime political organizing criterion. Following the general plan adopted in this book, this chapter begins with a discussion of the economic, cultural and political context factors relevant to the transformation of the French party system. Here, the waning of the established cleavages, the repositioning of the Gaullist RPR (now UMP), and the rise of the European integration question emerge as critical determinants of the changes affecting the French party system. We then proceed to a comparative analysis of the positions of parties and voters in the transformed political space between 1978 and 2002. The analysis reveals a transformation of the cultural divide between 1978 and 1988, the years where the issues of immigration and security rose to unprecedented importance. In the same time period, the Front National has become durably entrenched in the party system, mobilizing an electorate that is clearly distinct from the others by virtue of its position at the demarcation pole of the cultural divide.
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Context conditions Traditional cleavages and dealignment in the party system

As elsewhere in Western Europe, the predominant cleavages in France have been class and religion. While there are no strong clerical parties, France represents a case where the parties of the right implicitly defended the prerogatives of the church (Rokkan 2000: 376). Thus, despite the apparent power of the class cleavage in French politics, it must be kept in mind that alignments have for a long time been more strongly structured by religious, rather than economic, structural oppositions in France (Bartolini 2000: 494; Knutsen 2004: 228). The powerful Communist v. anti-Communist/catholic opposition, generally considered as the deepest division in French politics (Parodi 1989; Martin 2000; Grunberg and Schweisguth 2003), was just as much a cultural as it was a class divide. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, the left received less than half of its votes from the working class, which sets the country apart from all other European countries but Switzerland and Italy (Bartolini 2000: 497). While the lines of cleavage have remained strong until recently, the weak institutionalization of the political parties, except for the Communist party, always favoured organizational fragmentation and frequent changes within the party system. Volatility between the left and the right blocks, however, has always been much lower than total volatility (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 111), underscoring the existence of stable cleavages in spite of organizational discontinuity within both the left and the right blocks. That said, the institutions of the Fifth Republic, with its two-round majoritarian electoral formula, did temporarily lead to greater stability. Progressively, the various parties of the non-Gaullist right merged into a federation of parties under Valry Giscard dEstaings leadership, and led to the establishment of the UDF in 1978. At the same time, Jacques Chiracs newly founded Gaullist RPR firmly institutionalized itself and progressively gained weight within the right after 1976. With the left dominated by the Communists on the one hand and Franois Mitterrands relaunched Socialist party on the other, the 1970s saw an institutionalization of the party system. As a result of the electoral rules, a bipolar pattern of opposition emerged, where the major parties within each block joined together to support a candidate of the left or the right, respectively, in the second round of the Presidential elections (Parodi 1989).
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Hence, looking at the overall period between 1950 and 1990, volatility has been in decline, as indicated in Chapter 2. However, since 1978, it has again been on the rise (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 118). With respect to the strength of the traditional cleavages, the decline of the impact of class on party choice is not very marked (Knutsen 2004). At the same time, Knutsens (2004: 1089) analysis reveals a declining impact of the religious cleavage, which is a consequence of the demise of the Communist and the catholic subcultures. The long-term trend of secularization has hit the Communist party and the UDF especially hard. Against this background, the early manifestation of the new integrationdemarcation conflict is perhaps less surprising, because it does not depend so much on the pacification of the socio-economic cleavage, which remains prominent in recent election campaigns. The growth of the Socialist party at the expense of the Communists on the one hand, and the rise of the Gaullist RPR and decline of the UDF on the other hand, constitute early signs of the later transformation of the party system. On the political left, the rather sudden decline of the Communist party in the late 1970s is to some degree attributable to the fact that the party retained an orthodox Stalinist ideology in spite of the growing disillusionment with the communist regimes of the east (Courtois and Peschanski 1988). This paved the way for the rise of the new Socialist party founded by Mitterrand (see Table 4.1). Less rooted in the industrial structure of conflict, and leaning more towards the middle classes, it established itself as the strongest party of the left under Mitterrands leadership. On the political right, the components of the UDF despite their attempt to stabilize their vote by forming a federation gradually lost ground to Chiracs RPR. The shift in the balance of power within the left and the right blocks from the Communists to the Socialists and from the nonGaullist right to the RPR can therefore be interpreted as concomitant to the transformation of the cultural divide. Both developments took shape during the realignment between 1981 and 1984, where new political issues such as immigration, law and order and multiculturalism arose (Martin 2000). As a consequence, the cultural opposition has evolved from a conflict over religious values and norms into an ideological conflict centring on the integration demarcation divide.
France: the model case of party system transformation Table 4.1 Election results and party system features (a) Parliamentary elections
Election Radical Left PCF PSF MRG Ecologistes UDF RPR/UMP Front National Other parties Party Four-party system votea features ENPb Election results
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1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 3.2 21.4 19.1 2.1 24.3 24.2 5.7 3.3 20.6 22.8 2.2 2.0 19.6 22.5 0.3 6.7 1.3 1.5 0.4 1.7 2.5 2.8 16.1 9.7 11.2 9.1 9.9 4.8 36.3 31.5 35.0 17.5 23.5 24.1 1.5 0.4 1.2 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.2 7.8 6.8 4.5 20.4 18.6 19.0 14.2 4.9 20.8 40.9 19.2 20.3 15.7 33.3 1.8 10.0 9.7 12.7 14.9 11.3 0.7 4.8 4.7 11.0 11.1 12.8
89.0 85.5 93.6 82.1 84.0 65.9 63.3 67.1 5.0 5.4 4.1 3.5 4.6 7.2 7.3 5.3
(b) Presidential elections

Election Election results Radical Left PCF PSF MRG Ecologistes UDF RPR/UMP Front National Other left candidatesc Other right candidatesc Four-party votea ENPb 1974 1981 1988 1995 2002 2.7 43.2 1.3 32.6 15.1 0.7 3.2 3.4 15.4 25.9 2.2 3.9 28.3 18.0 3.0 2.4 5.3 10.4 8.9 8.6 3.4 34.1 23.3 16.2 2.3 3.8 3.3 5.3 16.5 10.8 20.0 39.4 19.9 14.4 15.0 16.9 5.3 4.7 2.3
Party system features
90.9 87.6 79.5 71.3 50.3 3.1 4.9 4.7 4.1 8.7
Sources: Daniele Caramani, 2000, Elections in Western Europe Since 1815: Electoral Results by Constituencies, Basingstoke: Macmillan; www.assemblee-nationale.fr; various other Internet databases. Notes: a Four-party vote based on share of PSF, PCF, UDF and RPR/UMP. b Effective number of parties (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 79) calculated from vote shares of all candidates (or parties, in 1978).
82 Notes to Table 4.1 (cont.)

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For the names of the candidates from other parties or splinter groups, see list of candidates below.
Party abbreviations: Radical Left: Lutte ouvrire and other extreme left parties PCF: Parti Communiste Franais PS: Parti Socialiste Franais MRG: Mouvement des radicaux de gauche (197394), Parti radical-socialiste (19948), Parti radical de gauche (PRG, 1998) Ecologistes: Les Verts, other ecologist parties UDF: Union pour la Dmocratie Franaise, including small centre parties RPR: Rassemblement pour la Rpublique; renamed in 2002 as UMP: Union pour la majorit prsidentielle, later Union pour un mouvement populaire Names and grouping of presidential candidates 1974: RL: Krivine, Laguiller; PSF: Mitterand (second-round loser); Ecologists: Dumont; UDF: Giscard dEstaing (second-round winner); RPR (then UDR): Chaban-Delmas; Front National: Le Pen 1978 (parliamentary election): Radical left group comprises: Lutte Ouvrire, Parti Socialiste Unifi, small groupings. 1981: RL: Laguiller, Bouchardeau; PCF: Marchais; PSF: Mitterand (second-round winner); MRG: Crpeau; Ecologists: Lalonde; UDF: Giscard dEstaing (second-round loser); RPR: Chirac; other right-wing candidates: Debr, Garaud (both Gaullists). 1988 presidential elections: RL: Laguiller, Boussel; PCF: Lajoinie, Juquin; PSF: Mitterand (second-round winner); Ecologists: Waechter; UDF: Barre; RPR: Chirac (second-round loser); Front National: Le Pen. 1995: RL: Laguiller; PCF: Hue; PSF: Jospin (second-round loser); Ecologists: Voynet; RPR: Chirac (second-round winner), Balladur (supported by UDF); Front National: Le Pen; other right-wing candidate: de Villiers (Mouvement pour la France). 2002: RL: Laguiller, Gluckstein, Besancenot; PCF: Hue; PSF: Jospin; MRG: Taubira; Ecologists: Mamre; UDF: Bayrou, Madelin (Dmocratie librale); RPR/UMP: Chirac (second-round winner); Front National: Le Pen (second-round loser); other left-wing candidates: Chevnement (Mouvement des citoyens); other right-wing candidates: Mgret (Mouvement national rpublicain).

Among the countries under study, France is characterized by relatively low levels of trade openness and does not rank among the countries most strongly exposed to globalization, as shown in Chapter 2. Despite this fact, deindustrialization and technological change have hit the country heavily since the 1970s, and have introduced a far-reaching shift in the relationship between the state and the market. In France, the state had played a unique role among Western European nations in conceiving and implementing industrial strategies aimed at forging a
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competitive economy in the post-war era. Struck by the economic crises of the 1970s, this model came under pressure both from within, as well as from without, due to international forces (Levy 2000, 2005). On the one hand, state intervention in the industry in the 1970s proved increasingly dysfunctional because it no longer fostered, but impeded economic modernization, maintaining social peace by providing subsidies for uncompetitive sectors. On the other hand, European unification acted as a pressure to dismantle the dirigiste policies from without. When the left came to power in 1981, it had promised to revive the economy and fight unemployment by intensifying state intervention, by nationalizing parts of the industry and pursuing Keynesian demand stimulation. When this strategy failed, provoking a foreign trade deficit and skyrocketing inflation, President Mitterrand performed a U-turn. In 1984, when the Communist ministers left the government, Mitterrand switched to a course of austerity and committed himself to anchoring the franc in the European Monetary System. Commitment to European integration and the achievement of the single market then locked subsequent governments into this line of policy (Hall 2006: 22). While some authors (e.g., Smith 2004) still see France as a case of stalled reform, others have underlined the system-changing impact of the policy changes of the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, they imply a shift from a state-directed to a market-directed economy, resulting in a radical break with the past (Levy 2000, 2005). According to Hall, the efforts made at liberalizing the economy have been the most substantial of any nation in continental Europe (2006: 7). But, even if the reforms greatly enhanced competitiveness, making France one of the most attractive destinations for foreign direct investment in Western Europe throughout the 1990s, the process has not been without losers. The relatively large segments of the workforce disposing of low levels of skills and education were hit especially hard by the de-industrialization triggered by the increased international economic competition. As Levy (2005: 11922) has forcefully argued, French governments reacted to this challenge by redeploying state activism from industrial to social policy-making. Levy calls the latter a social anaesthesia programme, designed to pacify and demobilize the victims and opponents of market-led adjustment (Levy 2005: 119). Early retirement programmes on a massive scale and compensation strategies for the key geographical areas of deindustrialization alleviated some of the social pressure and
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succeeded in demobilizing the unions in the restructuring phase in the 1980s. When social exclusion increasingly became a problem in the 1980s due to the contributory nature of most social benefits in France, targeted minimum benefits were introduced, for example a statefinanced minimum income (see Palier 2005). The results of the French path to economic modernization are therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, the level of inequality, though always exceptionally high within the OECD members, has not risen since the 1970s (Alderson et al. 2005: 422). On the other hand, as in all regimes of coordinated capitalism and continental welfare states, individuals with few or obsolete skills find it increasingly difficult to compete on the labour market (Scharpf 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). One of the major problems in France, in other words, is ensuring employment, especially for the young and even more so for those among them with low levels of education. According to Eurostat, the unemployment rate for the under-25s in France in 2005 was more than twice as high as the overall rate of 9.9%, reported in Chapter 2. Two related dualisms therefore emerge within the French population. On the one hand, there is a divide between those covered by the rather generous Bismarckian social insurance schemes and those 1015% of the population relying only on targeted minimum benefits (Palier 2005: 141). While the benefits may prevent poverty, they do not override the emergence of a labour market insider v. outsider divide. And this antagonism, as Chauvel (2006) shows, is in fact a generational one, producing an insiderization of previous generations and an outsiderization of new ones. In terms of the political potentials resulting from these divides, it is important to note that the basic thrust of economic reforms has been quite similar under the left-wing governments under Mitterrands presidency after 1983 and under the right-wing governments between 1986 and 1993 (Hall 2006; Levy 2005). As a consequence, little difference was visible between the positions of the established parties. With the Communists having participated in governments with the Socialists, the resentment of the social groups hit by economic restructuring and not profiting from the generous early retirement plans went to those parties that could credibly claim to oppose the cartel of the governing parties, namely, the extreme left and the extreme populist right.
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Immigration France has for a long time been a country of immigration, and, due to its colonial past, there is a strong non-Western European component in its immigrant population (see Chapter 2). Because of its civic-territorial model of citizenship, descendants of immigrants automatically obtain French nationality, or at least they can still acquire it easily. At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 2, Frances citizenship model is culturally monist, requiring foreigners to adapt. As a consequence of this combination of features, the republican model of citizenship presents favourable opportunity structures for the ethno-pluralist discourse of the French New Right and the Front National (Koopmans and Kriesi 1997). To make sense of the rise of the immigration issue since the early 1980s, it is important to acknowledge that it is neither linked to a growing number of immigrants, nor related to a surge in xenophobia. According to survey data presented by Martin (2000: 256), the share of citizens who believe that there are too many immigrant workers in France did not rise significantly between 1966 and 1993 they were already a majority in the 1960s. In other words, the political potential linked to immigration has not grown and we have to look at political factors to explain the timing of the rise of the Front National and the subsequent transformation of political space. In fact, France is one of the prime examples that corroborates Ignazis (1992, 2003) influential claim that the established parties of the right pushed a radicalization of political discourse which right-wing populist parties later thrived on. This occurred first in 1977, when the right-wing government announced plans to repatriate immigrants, as a reaction to both the first successes of the left in the wake of their ascendance to power, and the rising levels of unemployment. This provoked a countermobilization of the unions and the non-communist left, as well as by parts of the right, leading the government to abandon the plan (Martin 2000: 256ff.). And the established right played with ideological polarization again after it found itself in opposition after 1981. When the Socialist government under Mitterrand decided to regularize illicit immigrants and abandon the death penalty, the right reacted promptly and radicalized its discourse. Together with the later mobilization of the Front National, this has resulted in a far-reaching realignment. In 1979,
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partisanship was weakly structured by differing attitudes towards foreigners, according to survey evidence, and there was hardly a difference between the voters of the left and the voters of the right regarding these orientations (Martin 2000: 257). In 1988, this had changed drastically, as our own analysis will show. European integration Attitudes concerning European integration have generally been rather positive in France, a founding member of the Community. However, the faith in this permissive consensus typical of the 1960s and 1970s (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) has been shattered by the narrow margin of approval of the Maastricht Treaty in the referendum in 1992 and by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty to gain majority support in 2005. Far from being solely an expression of popular discontent with the government, opposition can in fact be hypothesized to derive from two distinct sources. On the political right, scepticism towards European integration stands in the tradition of a heavy emphasis on national sovereignty going back to Charles de Gaulle, who even boycotted the Council of Ministers between 1965 and 1966. Up to the early 1980s, the centrist UDF was in fact the only party that was clearly pro-European, while Jacques Chirac led a resolutely anti-European list in the first election to the European Parliament in 1979 (Martin 2000: 31314). Before the European elections of 1984, the Gaullist RPR changed its stance radically and rallied behind a list led by Simone Veil, member of the UDF and former president of the European Parliament. With the decline of the Euro-sceptic Communist party and the Socialists adopting a more clearly pro-European line, virtually the entire political spectrum had turned pro-European. In the same 1984 election, the Front National achieved its electoral breakthrough with a list led by Le Pen and entitled Liste Front dopposition nationale pour lEurope des patries, which received 11% of the vote. At the same time, the Front Nationals rise in the 1980s was not intimately linked to opposition to European integration. In 1992, however, the party launched a new electoral programme in which it devoted considerable attention to the issue, taking a staunchly anti-European stance (Perrineau 1997: 75). Consequently, a much more widespread opposition to the integration project emerged in the 1990s. In particular, opposition to the EU resurfaced within the Gaullist movement. A number of dissidents from the RPR, such as Charles Pasqua and
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Philippe Sguin, set up lists of their own in the European election campaigns. The centre-right UDF was also hit by the rise of the integration question, when Philippe de Villiers launched his own list in the 1994 elections for the European Parliament and stood as an independent candidate in the 1995 presidential contest. On the other hand, opposition has arisen from the political left, where the Communist party had always remained sceptical of the European Union. On this end of the spectrum, voters are supposedly concerned less with the loss of identity than with what they see as a neo-liberal thrust in European integration, a hypothesis supported by Evans (2000). The voters of the extreme left and the Communist party rejected the Constitutional Treaty even more decisively than the voters of the Front National (Boy and Chiche 2005). However, there has also been a fissure within the Socialist party, when Jean-Pierre Chevnement set up a left-wing splinter party advocating cultural protectionism. In conclusion, following a first shock for the French party system stemming from the rise of the Front National in the 1980s, the issue of European integration has then fuelled an astonishing fragmentation of the party system in the 1990s. While the four major parties of the Fifth Republic the Socialists, the Communists, the RPR and the UDF scored close to 90% of the votes until 1981, the corresponding figures for the 1990s and 2002 lie under 70%, as Table 4.1 shows. The trend is similar in the presidential elections, where they gained no more than half of the vote in 2002. Table 4.1 also shows that this fragmentation of the party system measured by the effective number of parties is not solely attributable to the proliferation of independent candidacies in the presidential contests. Rather, it is mirrored by roughly similar levels of fragmentation in the parliamentary elections, again testifying to the eroding hold of the old party system. Because the major parties of the left and right seek to play down the issue, European integration has not been a very prominent issue in the presidential elections under study in this chapter. However, as Belot and Cautrs (2004) put it concerning the 2002 election, Europe was invisible, but omnipresent in structuring alignments.
Political context conditions

Institutional structures It is difficult to assess the impact the French electoral system has had on the fortunes of the Front National. The two-round majoritarian
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electoral system used in presidential and parliamentary elections allows voters to cast a sincere or a protest vote in the first round, while then voting strategically in the second. Thus, only the second round is strongly majoritarian. Furthermore, elections using proportional representation take place at various levels, such as the municipalities and the regions, as well as in the elections for the European parliament. In fact, the Front National achieved its electoral breakthrough in a number of second-order elections in the early 1980s, first in a number of municipalities, and then in the 1984 European Parliament elections. When the Socialist government changed the electoral system to proportional representation for the 1986 parliamentary elections so as to divide the right and prevent a victory of the RPRUDF coalition, this is likely to have helped the Front National in a crucial phase of its implantation. For the first time, the party scored 9.7% of the vote in a first-order election. That said, the Front Nationals voter share did not recede in 1988, when the system had been changed back to the majoritarian format. What is probably much more important is that the Front National gained broad access to the media. At the Front Nationals request, the Socialist government intervened to assure the party coverage, and, in 1984, Le Pen was invited to a TV discussion along with the other political leaders (Perrineau 1997: Chapter 1). In the light of the considerable difficulty of right-wing populist parties in other countries in receiving a platform to present their political ideas (see the chapters on Germany and the UK), this appears as an important factor. As van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2005) have found, being perceived and evaluated in the same terms as the established parties is a necessary condition for the electoral breakthrough of the populist right. Organizational capacity and leadership quality The Front Nationals centralized internal organization and its ability to quickly take clear stances regarding the issues of the day have certainly helped its rise. Due to Le Pens leadership qualities, the Front National in 1972 succeeded in integrating the rather diverse streams of the French extreme right and established a powerful organization. The partys structure is extremely centralized and hierarchical, giving Le Pen a lot of leeway in defining the programmatic line over the partys militants (Venner 2002). As other cases of successful mobilization of the populist right show, this is a decisive factor in particular in their
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early mobilization phase (Bornschier 2005). The Front National has used its organizational capacity skilfully to redraw the dimensions of conflict structuring the party system. Le Pen has actively sought to weaken the impact of economic issues by declaring that the socioeconomic cleavage has lost any relevance, and had been replaced by the opposition between the proponents of a cosmopolitan and those of a national identity (Perrineau 1997: 64). The populist rights well-known anti-establishment strategy is an integral part of its redefinition of political conflicts. Le Pen regularly refers to the established parties as the gang of four and denounces the lies of the candidates of the system (interview in Le Monde, 25 April 1995, p. 5). The downside of Le Pens control over the party apparatus and the consequent lack of pluralism has been a series of splits. When Le Pen set up a list of candidates including many defectors of the traditional right in 1986, which probably helped the partys appeal a great deal, many militants in turn left the party. Personal rivalries between Le Pen and Bruno Mgret, himself a renegade from the Gaullist RPR, have persisted, and even provoked the partys split in 1998. Although Mgret, as a representative of the moderate party wing, is much more suited to mobilizing the more bourgeois elements of the Front Nationals electorate, his disappointing performance in direct competition with Le Pen underlined the partys dependence on its icon (see Mayer 2002).1 All this said about strategic flexibility and personal charisma, the role of the Front Nationals strong and far-reaching organization should not be downplayed. The party has a rich array of affiliated organizations. Youth and womens organizations, a number of sector-specific unions both in the public as well as in the private sector, affiliated traditionalist catholic movements and newspapers aim at creating and nourishing a tightly knit nationalist counter-culture, in Perrineaus (1997: 467) words, reminiscent of the Communist party in its early years. Strategies of the mainstream parties For a long time, the parties of the established right have found it difficult to define their strategy towards a political party some of whose voters in
1
While it would be interesting to analyze the two resulting parties of the extreme populist right separately, Mgrets Mouvement National Rpublicains insufficient presence in the media precludes such a treatment. The number of MNR voters in the 2002 survey is also too limited.
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fact represent a radicalized variant of their own electorate (see Mayer 2002; Perrineau 1997), and whose politicians comprise a number of defectors from their own rows. However, it has not only been the strategies of the established right, but also those pursued by the parties of the left in the early 1980s which have contributed to the Front Nationals success. Early on, the Socialists adopted an adversarial strategy, in the terms introduced in Chapter 2. Caught in an ideological void, as Perrineau (1997: 49) writes, the Socialists made anti-racism and the defence of the right to difference their central programmatic theme, rather than advancing their own issues connected to the cultural axis of conflict. This reinforced the Front Nationals ownership of the immigration issue and established a tripartite structure of opposition, where the Socialists represent the counterpart of the established right in economic terms and the antagonists of the populist right in cultural terms. The parties of the established right, the RPR and UDF, found it difficult to respond to this pattern of oppositions. Caught in a bipolar interpretation of political space, and in response to the two-round majoritarian formula, they entered alliances with their new competitor at various levels, thereby granting the Front Nationals political stance legitimacy. However, the strategy did not pay off in electoral terms, since the right lost many districts in which a candidate of the Front National stood alone in the second round. From 1990 on, then, the established right refused any form of accord with the Front National. As a consequence, the populist right in 1993 did not win a single one of the 100 districts where it came into the second round of the parliamentary elections. In terms of their strategy regarding the issues brought up by the challenger, the RPR and UDF, after having been slow to respond (Meguid 2005), switched to an accommodating strategy in the 1988 presidential elections, the first for which we have data from the media campaigns. Both parties adopted an anti-immigrant position, but the RPR did so much more decisively, making this the third-most important issue in its campaign. However, as we will see, this step occurred both half-heartedly, as well as much too late, since the Front National had entrenched itself firmly in the French party system by then.
Analysis of the demand side: voters political potentials

This section will now trace the transformation of the demand side of the French political space since 1978. As described in Chapter 3, the aim of
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the analysis is, first, to determine the dimensionality of voters political preferences. In a second step, party voters and social-structural groups will be positioned in this attitudinal political space. In the next section, these configurations will then be related to the evolution of the parties programmatic offer. Because presidential contests are more important than parliamentary elections in France, the former are chosen for the analysis in all but one case. Due to the lack of an appropriate postelection survey for a presidential election in the 1970s, the analysis starts with the 1978 parliamentary election, and then continues with the presidential elections of 1988, 1995 and 2002. Table 4.2 presents the results of a factor analysis of those of our twelve issue-categories that could be operationalized using the postelection surveys, proceeding as explained in Chapter 3. The first important finding is that, in all four elections, the analysis clearly yields two-dimensional solutions. While this confirms prior results showing that French political space is more than one-dimensional (Chiche et al. 2000), our analysis does not yield three, but only two, dimensions. With the partial exception of 1978, the two factors correspond to a cultural and an economic dimension, respectively. In 1978, the first factor is an economic dimension, while the second represents a mixture of cultural issues cultural liberalism and security and economic liberalism. In the later elections, the analysis produces a first, exclusively cultural dimension and a second, solely economic one. The exception is support for the army in 1988, while the theoretical status of environmental protection is open to debate. From 1988 on, attitudes towards immigration, cultural liberalism and security issues are all associated with the cultural dimension. For those elections where we have found appropriate items, the European integration question is also clearly linked to the cultural dimension. In 2002, a large number of items pertaining to the EU makes possible a separate operationalization of the economic and the cultural aspect of integration, which is shown as variant 2002b in Table 4.2. The economic aspect is captured by the citizens perception that European integration endangers the achievements of the welfare state, while the cultural aspect is measured by respondents fear of losing their identity and of seeing Frances role in the world diminished. As the analysis reveals, evaluations of the economic aspect of integration are embedded into the economic dimension, while the perception of a cultural or identity-related threat is embedded into the cultural dimension of
Table 4.2 Demand side of party competition: results of factor analyses after varimax rotation
1988 Factor 2 (econ.) 0.82 0.64 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.19 0.09 0.67 0.69 0.82 0.78 0.91 0.33 0.38 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.72 0.77 0.84 0.76 0.23 0.76 0.49 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.69 0.06 0.07 0.73 0.70 0.42 0.04 Factor 1 (cult.) Factor 2 (econ.) Factor 1 (cult.) Factor 2 (econ.) Factor 1 (cult.) Factor 2 (econ.) 1995 2002a 2002b
1978
Attitude
Factor 1 (cult.)
Factor 2 (econ.)
Factor 1 (cult.)
0.01 0.11 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.10 0.18
Welfare 0.04 0.77 Econ. lib. 0.46 0.56 Budget 0.00 0.61 Environment Cult. lib. 0.83 0.14 Europe Culture Immigration Security 0.83 0.02 Army Inst. reform Infrastructure EU econ. EU cultural Eigenvalue 1.86 1.03 Var. expl. 0.37 0.21 N 2280 1.57 0.22 1883 2535 2.28 0.46 1.06 0.21 2.48 0.35 3119 1.36 0.19 0.83 0.75 0.31 0.16 0.61 2.31 0.29 3136
2.16 0.31
0.04 0.06 0.60 0.62 0.31 1.51 0.19
Note: Factor loadings over |0.4| are set in bold. Sources: Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1978 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0062), Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1988 (Reference: BDSPCIDSP q0601), Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 2002 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0891), Panel electoral franais 2002, all available from SocioPolitical Data Archive (www.cidsp.com/bdsp/).
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political attitudes. This is strong evidence for our hypothesis postulating that the new integrationdemarcation antagonism is becoming embedded in the established lines of national conflict. The next step is now to examine the positions of the parties electorates and of various social groups in this political space, shown in Figure 4.1. The horizontal axis represents the economic dimension, while the vertical axis corresponds to the cultural factor. Starting with the positions of the party electorates in the earliest election, we can see that, with the exception of the Ecologists, the voters of the left are all situated in the upper left quadrant, indicating a left-libertarian political position in support of cultural liberalism and rejecting law and order stances. The voters of the parties of the right are situated in the lower right quadrant, along with the supporters of the Radicals of the left (MRG). Rather unexpectedly, there is hardly a difference in the position of RPR and UDF voters. Equally striking is the fact that the Front Nationals electorate is extreme neither economically nor culturally. However, the party was extremely small back then and is therefore not included in the shaded area. In 1978, the major parties electorates virtually lie on a single dimension reminiscent of Kitschelts (1994) leftlibertarian v. right-authoritarian line of conflict. In the three more recent elections, this situation has changed profoundly. Following the Front Nationals successful mobilization, the voters political space now reveals a tripartite configuration, conforming both to our theoretical expectations and to Grunberg and Schweisguths (2003) similar claim. The main transformation between 1978 and the three recent elections takes place on the political right, where the voters of the established right and those of the extreme populist right occupy clearly distinct ideological positions. The followers of the Front National are situated at the extreme of the cultural dimension, opposing cultural liberalism and advocating an exclusionist conception of community. Consequently, the mobilization of citizens in favour of cultural demarcation by the Front National has led to a strong expansion of the political space occupied by party electorates, underscored visually by the size of the shaded area. The poles of the cultural dimension are occupied by the supporters of the two parties that are a product of the twofold transformation of political space since the 1970s: the first driven by the New Left in the late 1960s and 1970s, resulting in the emergence of ecologist parties, and the second in the 1980s and 1990s, driven by the rise of the New
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Figure 4.1 Demand side of party competition, 1978, 1988, 1995 and 2002 elections (France)
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Right, symbolized by the Front National. Ecologist voters more or less consistently share the most culturally liberal outlook. The Front Nationals voters, on the other hand, are located at the counter-pole of the cultural divide. From 1988 on, Le Pens formation clearly mobilizes an electoral segment of its own, and this group of voters seems too far away from the rest to be won back easily by the established parties. It is equally important to note that the Front Nationals voters are extreme only as far as their cultural preferences are concerned. Their position is less liberal in economic terms than that of the established right. As early as 1988, then, the position of the Front Nationals electorate clearly rejects Kitschelts (1995) claim that the party is the master-case of a New radical right because its voters combine a promarket and authoritarian outlook. Contrary to Kitschelts findings, what distinguishes supporters of the populist right is not their economic, but their cultural preferences. The rather centrist position of the Front Nationals voters revealed by our analysis is much more compatible with findings that indicate that the party rallies an electoral coalition with rather heterogeneous economic preferences. While some segments are resolutely market-liberal, others are in favour of a strong welfare state and of economic regulation (Perrineau 1997; Mayer 2002; Bornschier 2007). Finally, we can examine the positions of those voters who have contributed to the growing fragmentation of the party system by supporting smaller parties. It is interesting to observe that, with one notable exception, the supporters of these candidates do not stand out for their extreme profile. On the political left, those who voted for the candidates of the extreme left are not ideologically distinct from other left-wing sympathizers. Accordingly, political factors are likely to be most promising in explaining their vote, most prominently disenchantment with the established parties of the left. Jean-Pierre Chevnements candidacy in 2002, on the other hand, is supported by a centrist segment of voters that differs from those of the other left parties both in their economic, as well as in their cultural preferences, which are less liberal. On the political right, those who voted for Philippe de Villiers in 1995 lie halfway between the RPR and Front National voters. There is an important exception to this general picture, however: Madelins Dmocratie Librale mobilizes a decisively pro-market clientele. This can be considered an albeit small segment of winners of
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globalization, attracted by Madelins assertion that All over the world, our own liberal ideas are a rallying point (quoted from Sauger 2004b: 134). In a second step, I now turn to the positions of social groups in the attitudinal political space. The aim here is primarily to highlight changes over time. In 1978, we observe a strong association between religion and cultural preferences. Non-Catholics and frequent churchgoers are situated at opposing poles of the cultural dimension. Regular churchgoers have a position similar to the voters of the parties of the right and share their traditionalist outlook. Non-Catholics, on the other hand, strongly favour cultural liberalism and have a universalistic outlook. In this early election, in other words, the cultural dimension appears strongly structured by the traditional religious cleavage. The parties of the right mobilized an electorate whose cultural preferences make them at least as distinct from that of the left in cultural as in economic terms. Non-regular churchgoers, as in all later elections, are characterized by centrist positions and they are therefore not shown in the figure. Compared to the late 1970s, we observe a weakening of the association between religiosity and cultural preferences in the more recent years. Both non-Catholics, as well as those regularly attending religious services, become comparatively more centrist. This is visible in the declining levels of polarization along religious lines shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 Demand side, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (France)
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Education in 1978 has an impact similar to that of religion. Citizens with low levels of education have a more traditionalist outlook than those with high levels of education. This accords with our hypothesis that education is associated with the cultural divide by virtue of its liberating impact that fosters support for culturally liberal values. Contrary to that of religion, the influence of education remains stable or even increases somewhat, and represents the strongest divide in social structural terms, as Figure 4.2 shows. In other words, positions regarding the cultural divide become more and more a function of education and less of religion in the course of time, indicating a declining impact of the religious cleavage. Citizens with no more than primary school education have relatively culturally protectionist and exclusionist world-views. Due to their proximity to the position of Front National voters, they appear as the social group most susceptible to the mobilization by the populist right. And, indeed, it can be shown that education has a very strong impact on the Front National vote (Mayer 2002; Perrineau 1997; Bornschier 2007). Those with the highest levels of education, on the other hand, on average have cultural preferences close to those of the supporters of the left in cultural terms, although they are generally more right-wing in economic terms. For the analysis of social class, I rely on the schema set out in Chapter 3. The categories used in the 1988 survey do not allow the employment of the full schema, and an additional, somewhat vague category of intermediate professions had to be taken over from the survey. Overall, social classes differ markedly in their average preferences. And, while there is little change in the location of classes over time, we do observe that the segments of the workforce most touched by the process of economic modernization, the unskilled workers as well as the skilled workers and routine non-manual workers, tend to move somewhat closer to the demarcation pole of the cultural divide. In terms of economic preferences, skilled and unskilled workers remain left-wing, while people with routine non-manual occupations as well as technical specialists have actually become more state interventionist after 1978. Managers remain the only social group consistently located in the upper right quadrant, indicating a culturally open and economically liberalist profile. According to expectations, those segments of the middle class whose occupations are characterized by an interpersonal work logic, the social-cultural specialists, share a strongly universalistic outlook.
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Looking at the polarization measures in Figure 4.2, we can see that the antagonism between socio-cultural specialists and unskilled workers increases between 1978 and 1995. It becomes the second strongest determinant of attitudinal polarization, after education. Note that differing cultural outlooks almost exclusively account for this antagonism, while these classes have similar economic preferences. On the other hand, the intensity of the new middle-class divide decreases over time, which is fully compatible with our hypothesis that the new middle class as a whole is on the winners side of the new conflicts emerging in the 1980s and 1990s. The old class divide, represented by skilled workers and self-employed, remains rather stable. Contrary to the new divide, it is a function of differing economic preferences. Overall, the profile of Front National supporters conforms to the potentials identified in this analysis. Until 1995, in keeping with Kitschelts (1995) proposition, working-class and self-employed voters represent the partys core support base, but, in 2002, only skilled workers remain over-represented (Bornschier 2007). While the selfemployed are located similarly to the working class on the cultural dimension, they exhibit much more right-wing economic preferences. To a large degree, then, the Front Nationals success has depended on its ability to bridge considerable gaps in the economic preferences of its support base by virtue of the culturally protectionist and exclusionist stances its electorate shares. There is also evidence supporting the claim that it is most successful in doing so in the segments of society least anchored in the traditional cleavage structure, i.e. among the young (Perrineau 1997: 103; Mayer 2002: 81). As pointed out earlier, young workers with low levels of formal education are indeed the social groups most touched by the difficulties the French economic model has faced in the last two decades. Paradoxically, however, the resulting political potential is not mobilized in economic, but in cultural terms.
Analysis of the supply side: structures of competition in the party system

In all the contests shown in Figure 4.3, we find a two-dimensional configuration in the parties programmatic offer, mirroring the structure found on the demand side. Welfare as opposed to economic liberalism invariably emerges as one dimension of conflict,
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Figure 4.3 Supply side of party competition, 1978, 1988, 1995 and 2002 elections (France)
corresponding to the traditional statemarket cleavage. At the same time, we witness a transformation of the cultural dimension. In 1978, this dimension is formed by cultural liberalism and budgetary rigour, which can be interpreted as a divide between the progressive position of
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the New Left on the one hand, and a neo-conservative position on the other hand (see Habermas 1985; Eatwell 1989). The positions of the parties in this political space are characteristic of the situation after the rise of New Left issues in the 1970s. We observe a differentiation between the Socialist New Left and the Old Left position of the communist PCF. The Socialist party is both strongly in favour of the universalistic values advocated by the New Social Movements of the 1970s, as well as solidly leftist in economic terms. The Communists position regarding the cultural dimension is more ambiguous than that of the PSF. In the later elections, the difference between the two major parties of the left almost vanishes as far as the integrationdemarcation divide is concerned, while the difference on the economic dimension remains (for these interpretations, see also the issue-positions in Appendix B). While the Communists profile as of 1988 more closely resembles the position of its voters as a result of this shift, this has not averted the progressive erosion of their support base. Ten years later, a new demarcation pole has emerged, which combines anti-universalistic and exclusionist anti-immigrant stances. This is in line with our general embedding hypothesis, according to which the issues pertaining to the integrationdemarcation divide are integrated into the already existing cultural divide. In the course of this transformation, the RPRs programmatic profile has evolved from a culturally protectionist and nationalist orientation to an acceptance of cultural liberalism, levelling out the differences between itself and the centrist UDF. As a result of their long-term convergence in programmatic profile, large parts of the remaining UDF in the forefront of the 2002 elections joined together with the RPR to form the UMP, first standing for Union pour une majorit prsidentielle, then rebaptized Union pour un mouvement populaire after the election. As a consequence, the RPR has left unoccupied a political space that provided fertile ground for the right-wing populist challenger, resulting in a reconfiguration of the party system. Opposing the cultural liberalism of the left and advocating an exclusionary conception of community, the populist right occupies a distinct political space. While it is also located near to the law and order stances comprised in the security category, this is not what sets it apart from the moderate right. All in all, and similarly to the findings on the demand side, the political space covered by the parties, visualized by the shaded area in the figures, has expanded.
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Additionally, the question of European integration emerged as a political issue at the end of the 1980s. In fact, what makes the difference in the positions of the PSF and the PCF in the 1988 and 1995 campaigns is their strongly diverging stance regarding European integration (see also the issue-positions in Appendix B). While the left had always been divided between a Europhile PSF and a Eurosceptic PCF, the reorientation of the Front National introduced a similar rift within the right. After the Gaullist RPR had abandoned its nationalist position early on in the 1984 European Parliament elections, opposition against supranational integration thrived in the sovereignist political space from the beginning of the 1990s onward. While the question produced various scissions within the established right, it also led the Front National to revert to its originally integration-friendly position and staunchly oppose the project. Apart from the additional discordance between the Communists and the Socialists concerning the EU, the main components within the moderate left and right blocks differ mainly in their positions regarding the statemarket cleavage. As far as the established right is concerned, Chirac led the Gaullist party into more economically protectionist grounds in the 1995 election. Along with a stronger correlation between the economic and the cultural dimensions, this explains the unusual configuration in that contest. This albeit limited convergence along the economic dimension may well have rendered the cultural antagonism more salient. Regarding the strategies of the mainstream parties, the established right reacted to the Front Nationals rise by attempts to challenge the populist rights ownership of the immigration question, combining cultural liberalism with tough stances regarding immigration, as a close look at the issue-positions shows (see Appendix B). However, this strategy proved ineffective in pre-empting the Front Nationals success, built on the apparently more coherent combination of cultural protectionism and anti-immigrant stances. Between 1995 and 2002, the established right then profoundly changed its position regarding the immigration issue. From an attempt at accommodating the Front Nationals prime concern, both the RPR and the UDF switched to an adversarial strategy, distancing themselves from the exclusionist stances of their challenger. As a consequence, the Front National alone occupied the cultural differentialist political space in the 2002 election. This may well have contributed to Le Pens unprecedented success in that presidential election.
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Conclusion
In the last two decades, French politics have been profoundly altered. An economic and a cultural dimension structure conflicts in the party system as well as voters attitudes in all the elections under study in this chapter, but the nature of the cultural divide has undergone a transformation under the impact of structural changes. While this antagonism was still strongly determined by religion in the 1970s, it has become a conflict most strongly related to education. It now opposes citizens with culturally liberal values to citizens favouring cultural protectionism and an exclusionist conception of community. This is attributable to the long-term trend of secularization and to the waning of the laicistcommunist v. Catholic-traditionalist divide, making possible the manifestation of new political potentials. As a result, parts of the working class along with routine non-manual workers have become more culturally protectionist. Together with those citizens that have low levels of formal education, they constitute a potential at the demarcation pole of the new cultural divide. There is a structural component to this conflict in that these are the segments of society most strongly affected by the economic modernization processes of the past two or three decades. Quite paradoxically, however, and contrary to the expectation set out in Chapter 2, this new structural conflict is mobilized along cultural, instead of economic, lines. Aided by a number of favourable circumstances, the Front National has managed to rally the hard core of the culturally protectionist segment of the electorate and to establish itself durably in the French party system. In fact, the findings lend support to the hypothesis of the emergence of a triangular political space, as suggested by Grunberg and Schweisguth (2003), and rejects Andersen and Evans (2003) claim to the contrary. However, contrary to these authors, we have been able to empirically determine an economic and a cultural dimension of conflict without introducing a priori theoretical assumptions. Furthermore, these dimensions can be shown to structure both the parties programmatic offer, as well as the preferences of voters. In this tripartite political space, the parties of the left advocate an economically leftist and culturally liberal political stance characteristic of the New Left, albeit to somewhat varying degrees. In cultural terms, the Front National advocates a clearly opposing normative ideal, combining anti-universalism and the defence of an allegedly natural
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community. The parties of the established right are caught in between these two poles. More liberal than the left and the Front National in economic terms, they have found it difficult to define their position relative to the new dimension of conflict. In part, this is due to the fact that they are haunted by a ghost they helped to build up. Hence, the Gaullist RPR abandoned the culturally protectionist and Eurosceptic discourse that had helped it to outflank the centrist UDF in the 1970s. Later, finding themselves in opposition, both parties of the established right sought to thrive on a radicalization of their discourse, in particular as far as immigration and law and order are concerned. However, this strategy backfired in that it helped the Front Nationals ideas to gain legitimacy. When the RPR (now the UMP) rallied behind cultural liberalism in the course of the 1980s, it thereby left unoccupied the political space in which the Front National thrived with a radicalized variant of its own discourse. In this sense, the French case thus conforms to Ignazis (1992, 2003) model. Although the question of European integration has seldom played an important role in the presidential contests under study here, it has contributed to a fragmentation of the party system in the 1990s, in particular by introducing a series of fissures within the established right. The Front National, originally favourable to European integration, has capitalized on Eurosceptic sentiments within the populace by radically reversing its stance and denouncing the European project. While the opposition of the voters of the Front National is related to their cultural preferences, those opposing European integration for economic reasons are mobilized by the Communists and the radical left, as prior research has shown (Evans 2000). The analysis presented here shows that both the economic, as well as the cultural-identitarian aspect of European integration have become embedded in the respective national dimensions of conflict. Because Europe divides both the left and the right, it may lead to the institutionalization of a pattern of oppositions comprising four ideological blocks, provided that Europe becomes a prominent issue in the years to come. The distinct political profile of Front National voters makes a vanishing of the populist right in France seem unlikely in the near future, although the question remains how much of the partys success is due to Le Pens personal charisma. At the same time, Le Pens inability to progress between the first and second rounds of the 2002 presidential election indicates severe limits to the growth of the party. In part,
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however, the Front Nationals electoral fortunes also depend on the strategies pursued by the other political actors in the light of their challenger. Early on, the Socialists have fostered the partys success by pursuing a strongly adversarial strategy against it. Similarly, the RPR/ UMP and UDFs shift to an adversarial strategy in 2002 is likely to have contributed to Le Pens electoral success in that election. Finally, in the recent 2007 campaign, not covered by the analysis in this chapter, Nicolas Sarkozys move back to an accommodative strategy seems to have contained the success of the populist right, contributing to its meagre showing. But, while the culturally protectionist potential may of course be mobilized by various actors, the issues related to the new cultural line of conflict have remained vibrant. What is more, the twodimensionality of voter orientations in combination with a multiparty system precludes any stable equilibrium with only two ideological blocks.

MARTIN DOLEZAL
Introduction
Austrian post-war politics until the 1980s was a classic example of stability. For almost forty years after 1945, either the Social Democrats (SP) or the Christian Democrats (VP) governed the country: from 1945 to 1966 together in a grand coalition, the type of government most often associated with Austria.1 From 1966 to 1983, first the VP, then the SP (197083), managed to achieve majorities of their own and built five consecutive single-party governments. Until the early 1980s, voters were extremely loyal to the major parties not least because they were not affected by several social and economic problems experienced in other European countries, such as mass unemployment, strikes and riots, which famously inspired Pope Paul VI to call Austria an Island of the Blessed. Since the 1980s, Austria has experienced far-reaching developments: the breakdown of Austro-Keynesianism and nationalized industries led to important changes in macro-economic policy, because market forces have become accepted as a legitimate instrument for achieving growth (Lauber 1992: 170; Winckler 1988). The end of the communist regimes in neighbouring countries redeemed Austria from its status as a Western border state, but civil wars in the Balkans gave rise to almost forgotten fears for security and led to waves of refugees. EU membership was finally achieved in 1995, but quarrels about neutrality, the sanctions against the government in 2000, and the opening of borders to East European workers gave rise to Euroscepticism. These external developments combined with a declining importance of the once dominant model of consociational democracy have resulted in an ongoing reduction of national idiosyncrasies; a process Pelinka (1995) has called De-Austrification.
1
From 1945 to 1947, the small Communist Party (KP) was included in government to appease the Soviet forces that occupied the eastern part of Austria until it regained independence in 1955.
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Austria, therefore, is a good case to exemplify political change since the 1990s. In particular, the developments in the party system, above all the rise of the right-wing populist FP, have been described as drastic (Mller 2000: 46). It is the purpose of this chapter to analyze these developments with regard to the general political transformations in Europe. Coming back to Pope Paul VI, Austria has certainly lost its character of an island and it is increasingly a part of a globalizing world.
Social-economic and political context conditions

The consequences of globalization have a strong impact on all countries and societies. If happiness is finding a force or event which affects a number of societies at the same time (Gourevitch 1977: 281), we probably have found this force. Even though globalization is the decisive factor for the transformation of societal conflicts in European democracies, this does not mean that national particularities have lost all of their explanatory power. On the contrary, the question if and how the new structural conflict is expressed and incorporated into party competition depends on several factors summarized as context conditions. These conditions determine, first, the existence or strength of new political potentials and, secondly, the possibilities and strategies for their mobilization. Four important factors already introduced in Chapter 2 will be briefly discussed: the relative strength of traditional cleavages, the economic development, the cultural context, and finally several political factors.
Relative strength of traditional cleavages

The strength of traditional cleavages is negatively correlated with the new conflicts potential to mobilize. Assuming a zero-sum hypothesis, we expect the breakthrough of the new conflict to occur only in those countries where old divisions are solved or have lost much of their political salience (see Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995: 510). In Austria, class and religion more precisely, religiousness because of a religiously almost homogeneous society (Jagodzinski 1999: 7781)2 have been
2
According to the latest population census (2001), 78.6% of the Austrians belong to the Roman Catholic Church, and only 4.3% to Protestant churches.
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the two main traditional cleavages. Especially before World War II, these cleavages tended to overlap significantly and resulted in fierce struggles between anti-religious Social Democrats and conservative forces backed by the Catholic Church. Finally, in 1933, this conflict even culminated in the breakdown of democracy and a short civil war in February 1934. For a long time after World War II, the importance of social structure for voting was still higher than in most other West European countries (Haerpfer and Gehmacher 1984; Haerpfer 1985). At least since the 1980s, however, traditional socio-structural factors have lost much of their explanatory power for electoral behaviour, although they have not become irrelevant (Mller 2000; Plasser, Seeber and Ulram 2000; Plasser, Ulram and Seeber 2003). A third traditional cleavage is related to the national question, dividing supporters of an Austrian nation and an independent state from adherents to a Pan-German identity (and state). This conflict was very important in the first half of the twentieth century but lost much of its salience after the experience of National Socialism and World War II. After 1945, the political parties representing the Christian-social and the Socialist Lager (political camp), the VP and the SP (plus the small KP), unambiguously supported the concept of an Austrian nation and independent state. Only the representative of the third Lager, since 1955 the Freedom Party (FP), originally opposed this concept. Starting in the 1960s, when the FP moved towards a more moderate programme, it also began to accept the existence of an Austrian state, but still stressed a strong cultural community with the German people (Horner 1987: 2723). Since the 1980s, the FP has switched to a strong Austrian patriotism (Plasser, Seeber and Ulram 2000: 57). Comparing the six countries covered by this book, the class cleavage above all seems to be pacified, especially when looking at data on strikes (see Chapter 2, Table 2.2), where the numbers have usually been low since the early 1950s. However, concerning the religious cleavage, Austria clearly ranks above the average, and is therefore classified as a country with a comparatively religious society (Chapter 2, Table 2.1). Whereas political consequences should not be overestimated, compared to the other five countries we nevertheless expect a more prominent role for the traditional cultural opposition between libertarian and traditional values, expressed, for example, by the issue-positions of the VP and its voters respectively.
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Traditional lines of conflict lose their significance especially in countries with an advanced and positive economic development, with cultural changes towards post-material or left-libertarian attitudes becoming more salient (Inglehart 1977). Many economic data, for example the gross domestic product per capita or the rate of unemployment, indicate a comparatively favourable economic development in the 1990s/2000s. Austria is also one of those countries with a high share of modernization winners in its population (Hadler 2004: 245). Like other small European states with limited domestic markets, Austria has had a long-standing tradition of economic openness and integration in the world market that was connected with internal strategies of compensation (Katzenstein 1985). The economic performance during the crises of the 1970s in particular was interpreted as successful, for which the governments and social partnerships combined efforts to coordinate macro-economic policy decisions was stressed as the decisive factor (Scharpf 1987: 956). In the 1970s, Austria was blessed with full employment, low inflation, and high growth (Katzenstein 1984: 83).3 As mentioned above, most economic figures still indicate a quite successful development, but several features of the Austrian economy have dramatically changed since the first three decades of the post-war era. When democratic corporatism (Katzenstein) hit its peak in the 1970s, full employment, the most important economic goal, was achieved not least by means of nationalized industries and a growing public sector (Katzenstein 1984: 14); even in manufacturing, about one-fifth of the workforce was employed in state-owned industries (Hemerijck, Unger and Visser 2000: 194). While the public sector increased in size until the mid-1990s, the crisis of uncompetitive nationalized industries in the 1980s led to strong demands for their privatization, first articulated by the VP, then gradually accepted by the SP (Meth-Cohn and Mller 1994; Kittel 2000: 11314). Economic policy issues, for a long time part of consensus politics within the system of corporatism, became increasingly controversial (Gerlich and Mller 1989: 154). In addition, the rising public debt, once dismissed as
3
In a more critical account of the development in the 1970s, Kurzer (1993: 76) refers to, among other things, the low participation of women in the workforce as one reason for low unemployment figures.
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secondary to the main political goal of full employment, became a major problem for the government (Winckler 1988). Due to globalization and a structural change towards an emphasis on market forces, the former strategies of internal compensation are no longer available. With industrial restructuring and global financial interdependences, the economic vulnerability of small states has increased, while policy alternatives have decreased (Kurzer 1993: 15). The room for manoeuvring has become smaller, and relevant parts of the workforce have lost the state as their protector. Although all countries are affected by globalization, Austria is one of the worlds most globalized.4 Being heavily exposed to the world market and having lost compensational strategies, there is a risk of losing in the globalizing competition, especially for those who do not have the resources and skills required by the market. The Austrians seem to recognize this and see clear differences between winners and losers of the open economy: multinational corporations, banks and insurance companies are perceived as winners, whereas workers, the agricultural sector and small and medium-sized firms are seen as the losers of globalization.5

As an economically quite successful country, Austria is attractive for immigrants whose presence might lead to culturally based conflicts. Theories of nativism distinguish at least three approaches that explain attitudes towards foreigners, of which cultural difference and economic self-interest seem to be the strongest ones (Fetzer 2000).6 In general, one might expect a strong opposition to foreigners if there are many immigrants who come from a different cultural background or in difficult economic situations, when they are an actual or perceived threat concerning the allocation of scarce resources like jobs or benefits of the welfare state (Quillian 1995). Since the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, Austria has been an ethnically and culturally homogeneous country, a development
5 6
The A.T. Kearny/Foreign Policy Globalization Index has ranked Austria between seventh and ninth since 2001 (see Table 2.2). See Market News, July 2005 (No. 12), a publication of the polling institute Market. Contact theories, the third dominant approach, are considered to be rather weak (Fetzer 2000).
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accompanied by a comparatively strong ethnocentrism (Plasser and Ulram 1991: 312). However, in the electoral context, these attitudes did not have much salience for a long time.7 The opening of the eastern borders in the late 1980s dramatically changed the situation and led to widespread negative resentments. Attitudes towards foreigners became a major political issue starting with the 1990 election (Plasser and Ulram 1991: 317) and have remained so. The share of the foreign population tripled from 2.8% in the early 1970s to 9.1% at the beginning of the new millennium and is higher than in most other West European countries (see Chapter 2, Table 2.4). Citizens from the former Yugoslavia have traditionally been the largest group of foreigners,8 followed by Turks; the latter group in particular is viewed as culturally different from the majority of the population. The widespread preference for a culturally homogeneous society becomes manifest in the laws regulating access to citizenship. Because of the dominant principle of descent (Waldrauch and Cinar 2003: 261), Austria is an example of the ethnic type of national political communities (see Koopmans and Kriesi 1997). Despite the actual development, governments and the public have traditionally refused to regard Austria as an immigration country, which is reminiscent of the debate in Germany (see Chapter 9). Of particular importance, and combining economic as well as cultural factors, is participation in supra- and transnational political organizations, especially the EU. In the late 1980s, Jacques Delors plan to complete the single market by 1992 caused fears that the export-oriented Austrian economy would suffer from severe discrimination (Schultz 1992: 187). The new grand coalition government (19872000), backed by the social partners, therefore changed its EU policy and requested membership in July 1989 before the fall of the Berlin Wall. For a long time, Austrias neutrality had been interpreted as an obstacle to full membership, but the end of the Cold War brought about a new perception. In addition, EU
7
The only relevant exception is the regional conflict between German-speaking inhabitants of Carinthia, a southern Land (state), and the small Slovenian minority living there. In 1972, this conflict became visible to the national public when bilingual town signs, required by law, were put up by the Land government and immediately destroyed by demonstrators. About 40% of the foreigners living in Austria are citizens of the former Yugoslavia. Source: Statistik Austria.
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membership was regarded as a way to strengthen or enable several internal deregulation and privatization reforms (Kurzer 1993: 238). After a mandatory referendum in 1994, with two-thirds of the voters and all important social groups (except farmers as well as the FPs and the Greens voters) supporting membership (Plasser and Ulram 1994: 979), Austria joined the EU in 1995. Given its position as a net contributor and a small state, Austria has a high potential for Euroscepticism that has become even more salient since the Eastern enlargement of 2004. In 2005, only one-third of the population called EU membership a good thing which put Austria in second to last place in this respect.9 The sanctions against the VPFP coalition in 2000 led to further scepticism, concerning not only interference in national affairs but also the general position of small countries within the Union (Luif 2006: 877). Since the 1980s, some parties have dramatically changed their position with regard to Europe (Fallend 2002; Pelinka 2004). Whereas the VP has always been in favour of European integration, the SP and especially the Greens switched from a Eurosceptic to a pro-European position. Contrarily, the FP moved in the opposite direction and gave up its traditional pro-European stance, which, without a doubt, also has to be seen in terms of [Austrias] relations with Germany (Pulzer 1970: 31617): membership of the community was interpreted as an alternative to the long demanded but now impossible Anschluss. Stressing the political and cultural consequences of European integration, the transformation of statehood and the decline of national sovereignty might especially be perceived as a loss by those who feel strongly attached to their nation-state. The results of the World Values Survey 19992002 show that the Austrians, out of the six countries explored in this book, are the people most attached to their nationality, leaving in decreasing order the UK, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany behind. In a long-term perspective, this finding confirms the acceptance of Austria as a nation by its citizens, which had not been the case before World War II. At the same time, these figures indicate that cosmopolitan attitudes are not widespread, a fact that can be interpreted as a strong potential for demarcation in cultural terms.
See Eurobarometer, No. 63.
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Dealignment For a very long time Austrian voting behaviour could be described with just one word: stability. In the election of 1975, the first campaign covered in the subsequent sections, not a single seat changed between the three parties represented in parliament. Since the 1980s, however, electoral behaviour has lost much of this long-term stability, and volatility from one election to another has dramatically increased. In 2002, the Pedersen Index reached an all-time high. The effective number of parties has risen as well (see Table 5.1). Since more voters than ever are accessible to the parties, party competition is much stronger than it used to be. After a period of social democratic hegemony lasting for about thirty years, both major parties now compete for dominance. The declining salience of traditional cleavages, especially their organizational manifestations, is the main reason for the increasingly volatile electorate. The parties have lost about one-third of their members since the 1980s (Mair and van Biezen 2001: 12). The unions and the Catholic Church have met with a similar fate.
Institutional structures: the end of consensus democracy? Post-war Austria has been an example of consensus politics. The electoral system is especially important in this context because it is the main factor determining institutional access. Austrias system of proportional representation is relatively strong with just a 4% threshold and no substantial differences between the shares of votes and seats. The two main parties benefit only slightly from the rules most recent adaptation in 1992 (Mller 2006b: 288). New challengers, therefore, have quite good chances to pass the threshold of representation, particularly in a comparative perspective. One further element of a consensus democracy is federalism (Lijphart 1999). Despite its comparatively weak Lnder (Lane and Ersson 1994: 224; Lijphart 1999: 189), Austria still belongs to the group of federal countries in Europe. Federalism provides new political challengers with at least three advantages: they more often have the chance to express their positions in electoral campaigns; such contests are interpreted as second-order elections by the voters, which enhances the challengers chances to win seats; and federal states provide room for experiments
Table 5.1 Election results and party system features

1971 1.4 50.0 43.1 5.5 0.0 100 93.1 6.9 4.2 2.2 93.3 7.5 0.0 2.2 92.9 9.1 1.6 2.2 90.8 4.4 2.7 2.3 84.4 1.8 7.7 2.6 74.9 10.7 9.3 3.0 62.6 7.2 12.6 3.7 66.4 9.8 3.8 3.5 60.1 6.3 9.3 3.4 1.2 50.4 42.9 5.4 0.1 100 1.0 51.0 41.9 6.1 0.0 100 0.7 3.4 47.6 43.2 5.0 0.0 100 0.7 4.8 43.1 41.3 9.7 0.4 100 0.6 4.8 42.8 32.1 16.6 3.1 100 0.3 7.3 34.9 6.0 27.7 22.5 1.3 100 0.3 4.8 38.1 5.5 28.3 21.9 1.1 100 0.5 7.4 33.2 3.7 26.9 26.9 1.4 100 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 0.6 9.5 36.5 1.0 42.3 10.0 0.1 100 78.8 5.8 18.6 2.9
Election 3.5 43.5 45.5 7.8 0.7 100 89.0 2.0 4.4 2.3
194570
Election results (votes)
KP Greena SP LIF VP FPb Others Total
TPVc Asymmetryd Volatilitye ENPf
Abbreviations: KP (Communist Party of Austria), SP (Social Democratic Party of Austria), LIF (Liberal Forum), VP (Austrian Peoples Party), FP (Freedom Party of Austria). a 1983 combined votes AL (Alternative List of Austria) and VG (United Greens of Austria). b 194953 League of Independents (VdU). c Two-party Vote: SP and VP. d Asymmetry: SPVP. e Net volatility (Pedersen 1979) based on seat percentages of all parties represented in parliament. f Effective Number of Parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) based on seat percentages of all parties represented in parliament.
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where new challengers are integrated into coalition governments at the regional level first as a kind of preparation for the federal level. If we interpret the FP as a new challenger party after its transformation in the mid-1980s, when, after a rather liberal phase, it changed to a right-wing populist profile (Plasser and Ulram 1995), one might argue that the party successfully used regional elections for mobilization. The Lnder, however, cannot provide room for coalition experiments such as in Germany. As a special feature of Austrian consociationalism, most of the regional cabinets are based on proportional representation and include all parties. In fact, the FPs strategy to simultaneously play the part of government and opposition was a major factor in the criticism of this type of government and the partial introduction of majority-based systems (Fallend 1997: 389). In general, consensus democracies, with their prevailing model of collusion between the main parties, provide a perfect environment for right-wing challengers. Austria in particular has long been considered as an example of an elite-based consensual political system. Consequently, grand coalitions and social partnership were the important points of attack for the FP especially in the late 1980s. The new right-wing populist challenge The rise of the FP, beginning in 1986 when Jrg Haider took over its leadership, stimulated public interest and concern not only in Austria but throughout Europe. The Freedom Party and its leader were seen as probably the most successful example of contemporary right-wing populism (Riedlsperger 1998: 27; Wodak and Pelinka 2002). Austrias main parties interpreted the rise of the FP as an increasingly severe threat but responded differently. Referring to the two strategies of stigmatization and cooperation (see Chapter 2), the SP has always tried to build a kind of cordon sanitaire against the FP. First, the Social Democrats ended their coalition with the FP which was formed after they lost their majority in 1983. Then, starting with the 1986 election, the SP ruled out any coalition with the FP at the federal level and instead committed itself to a new grand coalition with the VP as red-green has never had a majority. By contrast, with the exception of the 1994 election under party chairman Erhard Busek, the Christian Democrats did not rule out governing with Haiders party and, in the end, formed a coalition
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with the FP in February 2000, despite severe national and international protests. The rapid decline of the FP after its entry into government, followed by a heavy defeat in the subsequent election of 2002, was interpreted as a major success for this strategy of cooperation (Luther 2003). Heinisch (2003), among others, argued that the FP was unable to combine its former populist strategy with the duties of a governing party. After the partys split in 2005, most of the prominent politicians, especially the office-holders at the federal level, left the FP and created a new party led again by Haider (Bndnis Zukunft sterreich, BZ). Thus, the question how to react to a right-wing populist party now not only the BZ but also the recently much more successful old FP must be addressed again. Mainstream parties not only have to reconsider their coalition strategy but also have to react to the issues right-wing populists introduce into electoral competition. The SP and the VP clearly failed in a strategy of preemption and were unable or unwilling to close this niche in the electoral market. For a long time, both parties seemed to ignore the issues raised by Haider except for changes in asylum-law. Neither of the major parties adopted a strategy of direct confrontation with the FP, which opened a niche for left-libertarian forces, above all for the Greens and the Liberal Forum (LIF).10 Many, but not all, of the context factors support the hypothesis that the new conflict, initiated by globalization, has a relatively high potential in Austria. This conflict can be mobilized in different ways. In this book we concentrate on party politics, which is the obvious strategy especially for Austria. From this point of view, one can differentiate between two developments: the rise of new and the change of old parties. New parties in the period under study are, above all, the Greens and for a short period in the 1990s the LIF. Because of its reorientation since the mid-1980s, the FP can also be seen as a new party, although, as will be shown in the following paragraphs, elements of continuity should not be underestimated. In the 1980s and 1990s, both major parties the SP and the VP lost many voters and had to adapt their strategies.
10
The latter was a breakaway from the FP after Haider had launched the popular initiative (Volksbegehren) Austria first (sterreich zuerst) in 1993.
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Analysis of the demand side: voters attitudes and issue-priorities

Several context factors indicate that there is a strong potential for the mobilization of the new conflict and that new challengers are in a favourable position. In this section, we explore the changing attitudes of the Austrian voters, summarized as the demand side of political competition. These structures of attitudes build the potentials upon which the parties operate and adapt their strategies. Starting with the election of 1975, which serves as a point of reference for subsequent developments, the analysis will then consider three recent elections, in 1994,11 1999 and 2002. Since in Austria there are no national election studies organized by and available to the scientific community, a situation more or less unique in Western Europe, access to data concerning political attitudes and voting preferences is extremely difficult. Almost nothing has changed since Plassers (1987: 6) similar statement twenty years ago and Jagodzinskis (1999: 73) more recently. The following analyses, therefore, are based on different kinds of national and international surveys that vary considerably concerning the amount of information on voters issue-preferences and membership in demographic groups. Not all of the twelve issue-categories we defined for our exploration were part of these surveys. This can be seen in Table 5.2, which presents the results of the factor analysis of the available issue-categories for each one of the four elections. In each election, the structure of attitudes turns out to be twodimensional, which contradicts previous interpretations in terms of three basic factors (Plasser, Seeber and Ulram 2000: 689). However, the nature or thematic content of the two dimensions does not always correspond to our main hypotheses and to the results of the supplyside analyses that will be discussed in the following section. It is difficult to determine to what extent these results are influenced by shortcomings in the available survey data. Since the results closely conform to our theory in 2002, when the data are most reliable, we tend to believe that our main hypotheses still work for the demand side in the Austrian case.
11
We do not analyze the election of 1995 because it was exceptionally concentrated on the two major parties.
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1975 1994 1999 2002
Factor Cultural Factor Factor Factor Factor Economic Cultural 1 dimension 1 2 (env.) 1 2 (env.) dimension dimension welfare 0.66 0.38 budget economic liberalism cultural liberalism 0.07 0.72 Europe culture 0.48 0.32 immigration 0.06 0.75 security 0.72 0.10 environment 0.68 0.09 infrastructure 0.67 0.06 Eigenvalue 2.09 1.36 % variance 29.82 19.36 (n) (1429) 0.54 0.54 0.19 0.27 0.50 0.55 0.15 0.66 0.26 0.72 0.55 0.00 0.79 0.23 0.69 0.14 0.11 0.94 0.77 0.38 0.30 0.74 0.22 0.02 0.17 0.90 0.29 0.24
0.06 0.30 0.54 0.71 0.49 0.50
1.70 1.05 1.72 1.09 1.43 1.43 33.91 21.08 34.47 21.79 20.45 20.45 (1349) (1215) (1349)
Note: factor loadings >0.4 are in bold.
In 1975, the earliest election covered by this study, the first factor is not an economic leftright factor, but one combining a mix of different policies that the respondents emphasized as being important. Nevertheless, the second factor, which clearly reflects a cultural opposition, corresponds well to our main hypotheses. The juxtaposition of attitudes against immigration and support for cultural liberalism dominate this dimension, indicating that a corresponding mobilization potential has existed in Austria as early as the 1970s. In 1994 and 1999, when the available data are again problematic because, just as in 1975, we have to rely on indicators measuring issue-priorities instead of issue-positions, the second factor refers to environmental attitudes only, whereas the first factor is once more difficult to interpret. Thus, the data indicate that environmental issues are strongly polarizing on the demand side of party competition. This can partly be explained by the available item that refers to the question how the government should
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act against nuclear power stations in neighbouring countries, especially in East Central Europe. Since the Austrians rejected nuclear power plants in a referendum in 1978, nuclear energy has not been a polarizing issue concerning the national energy policy,12 but there have been major differences with regard to foreign plants. In 2002, finally, the structure of attitudes closely corresponds to our main hypotheses: the first extracted factor is primarily an economic one, where attitudes in favour of welfare (and cultural liberalism) oppose economic liberalism. The second factor mainly consists of cultural issues; tough attitudes on immigration as well as law-and-order policies on the one side and support for Europe on the other define the overall structure. Figure 5.1 shows the average positions of party voters,13 nonvoters,14 and demographic groups defined by occupation, level of education,15 and religiousness.16 For 1975 and 2002, we have precise information on the respondents employment since the surveys use the ISCO codes; in 1994 and 1999, the information is less detailed. The figure shows the positioning of these groups, how close the party voters and certain demographic groups are to each other, and how their positions and relative distances have changed since the 1970s. Considering the importance of old and new cleavages, we will focus in particular on the differences between religious Catholics and nonreligious Catholics, voters with low and high education, as well as the distances between, respectively, skilled workers and the self-employed, and socio-cultural specialists and managers. Comparing the four spaces, one can see first that, in general, the relative distances between the groups have clearly increased. In the 1970s, the last decade of consensus in Austrian politics, the different parts of the electorate were located much closer to each other than in the
12
13
14 15
16
Only 5% of the Austrians supported nuclear energy in 2005 (see Special Eurobarometer 247, Attitudes towards Energy). In 1994 and 1999, we do not have information about voting preferences, but on party identification. In 1994 and 1999, these are respondents without a party identification. Throughout the book we distinguish three levels of education. In Austria, the three groups comprise Volksschule and Hauptschule (low), respondents with vocational training (Lehre) up to Matura (medium), and all respondents with university degrees (high). Here we compare Catholics who go to church (almost) every week with Catholics who never go to church plus respondents without a religious affiliation. Members of the small Protestant minority are not included in this analysis.
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Figure 5.1 Demand side of party competition, 1975, 1994, 1999 and 2002 elections (Austria)
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1990s and 2000s. In 1975, the two major parties voters are positioned in the centre of the space, with the FP voters at some distance, because of different attitudes on the cultural dimension. On the first dimension, the one that is difficult to interpret, the differences between the three voter groups are minimal. The SPs traditional core groups skilled and unskilled workers and voters with lower education (Pelinka 1974: 36) are quite close to the SP voters in general. Interestingly, this is not the case for the VP and farmers, one of the Christian Democrats traditional core groups. The latters issue-attitudes position them at quite some distance from the average VP voter, a difference we find in all elections analyzed. One social group, the social-cultural specialists, takes a position relatively far apart from the others on the cultural dimension and is in rather strong opposition to the attitudes of the selfemployed. Coming back to the position of the FP voters, we find a clear difference to the centrist position they attributed to themselves in the opinion polls of the 1970s.17 But these polls only referred to a left right dimension, which primarily reflects socio-economic attitudes. As we observe now, with regard to cultural issues, the FP voters of the 1970s are not situated between the two major parties but express attitudes clearly in favour of demarcation. In the elections of 1994 and 1999, several important things have changed since the 1970s. First, a new group of party-voters, the Greens, is now represented in the space at a rather extreme position in the upper left-hand corner, far apart from the other parties. With Greens voters and FP voters occupying opposite corners of the space, the overall structure is much less compressed than in the 1970s, which corresponds to the interpretation as an end-of-consensus in Austrian politics (Plasser and Ulram 2002). Secondly, all groups of voters and social classes are positioned on a diagonal line which is reminiscent of Kitschelts (1994: 32) theoretical interpretation of the political space in Western Europe. But for these two elections, as mentioned before, the extracted factors are not easy to interpret. Third, whereas social democratic core groups were close to the mean SP-voter in the 1970s, this has changed as well: especially in 1999, voters with lower education and manual workers are situated near the mean FP-voter which reflects the changing social structure of this party resulting from the blue collar realignment of the 1990s (Plasser and Ulram 2000: 182). The voters of
17
See, for example, the Political Action survey.
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the right-wing populist DU (Die Unabhngigen or The Independents), a flash party led by the entrepreneur and society star Richard Lugner, are situated close to the FP voters, too. In general, social groups who might suffer disadvantages from globalization have moved to the positions of right-wing party voters and have partly given up the culturally moderate positions they had expressed in the 1970s. Finally, in 2002, the structure of attitudes conforms to our basic hypotheses: it constitutes a two-dimensional configuration with the social-economic leftright opposition on the horizontal and the cultural conflict on the vertical dimension. Again, voters of the Greens and the FP (plus farmers) constitute the opposite poles, but also supporters of the SP and the VP are now clearly separated albeit only on the socio-economic, not on the cultural dimension. Several former core groups of the SP are situated between the average SP and FP voters. They support concepts of cultural demarcation, while they take a centrist position on the socio-economic line of conflict. Summarizing the findings of the demand analyses, we observe that the relative distances between party voters and between several social groups have increased since the 1970s. The Greens and FPs supporters are now the most polarizing party voters. Their attitudes concerning the new cleavage are diametrically opposed. The Greens support integration in the cultural dimension, but demarcation in the economic dimension, while FP voters support demarcation in the cultural conflict but integration in the economic one. The latter is a little surprising and might be explained by the FPs heavy losses in 2002, especially among workers. Additionally, in 2002, opposition to cultural liberalism correlates highly with support for economic liberalism, which moves the FP voters position more to the right. In general, this pattern of attitudes indicates that there is no big demand for a mix of liberal positions in economic and cultural affairs in Austria. With regard to the distances between the relevant social-demographic groups, somewhat unexpectedly, the differences resulting from the religious cleavage have increased since the 1970s (Figure 5.2). In 1975, religious Catholics and non-religious Catholics (plus nonmembers of any confession) were located rather close together; as were all social groups. For 1994 and 1999, we are lacking data, but, in 2002, the overall Euclidian distance between the groups increased. Interestingly, this difference results from both dimensions with the religious Catholics having a stronger preference for market solutions
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(a)
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(b)
Figure 5.2 Demand side of party competition in Austria, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (Austria)
and cultural demarcation respectively. Regarding the level of education, we find the expected increase in the contrast between voters with low and high levels of education. In this respect, it is in particular ones position on the cultural division that explains the increasing difference. Comparing the differences between selected social classes, the results are mixed. We focus first on the classic opposition between skilled workers and the self-employed, for which we have information in all four elections. Their overall distance does not show a clear development, since it declined somewhat in the 1990s and finally increased in 2002. As with the religious opposition, attitudes on both dimensions are responsible for the difference. The opposition within the new middleclass, expressed by the differences between socio-cultural specialists and
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managers, can be explored only for 1975 and 2002. Here, the overall difference slightly increased. In the 1970s, the divisions in the cultural dimension were stronger; in 2002 the groups differ more with respect to the economic dimension.
Analysis of the supply side: the parties programmatic offer

With regard to the supply side of the Austrian case, our theoretical starting point is clearly opposed to previous studies on the spatial structure of the party system: issue-attitudes of the members of parliament indicate that socio-economic and cultural positions strongly correlate (Mller, Philipp and Jenny 2001: 214), and authors who used the data of the comparative manifestos project most often constructed a simple leftright ordering of the parties (Horner 1987, 1997; Mller, Philipp and Jenny 1995; Jenny 2006). However, even for authors working in this tradition, the situation is not that clear when referring, for example, to the economic and the cultural position of the LIF, which was in the 1990s the party most on the right concerning the economy and together with the Greens the most liberal in cultural affairs (see Jenny 2006: 317). Thus, Horner (1987: 2912) already stressed the significance of two dimensions and produced an a priori constructed space with a leftright and a cultural dimension based on data from the manifestos project. Corresponding to our demand-side analyses, our exploration of the parties issue-positions resulted in two-dimensional configurations for all four elections. In the 1970s and 1990s/2000s, we find a leftright conflict opposing support for welfare to economic liberalism. In the 1970s, the cultural dimension did not have such a clear structure, because support for culture and cultural liberalism was opposed by support for a lean budget. Starting with the election of 1994, immigration, the new important issue that will stand in sharp contrast to cultural liberalism, is visible in the configuration. In 1999 and 2002, this issue clearly structures the space on the conservative end of the cultural division. As stated above, in the 1970s one would expect a rather close relative distance between the parties, at least between the two big parties, since this decade was part of the consensus era in Austrian politics. In the election of 1975, this is partly the case, and, more interestingly, there is almost no difference between the SP and the
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VP concerning the socio-economic cleavage. Actually, the Christian Democrats are closer to welfare than the Social Democrats, which cannot be explained only by their status as an opposition party. In general, the VP did not offer real alternatives to the SPs economic policy of Austro-Keynesianism but merely claimed that it would do better when in power (Mller 1988: 1067). The FP is quite far apart from the major parties and near to issues that stress its efforts to become a more modern and accepted party. Institutional reform and budget, the latter summarizing criticisms of deficit-spending and demands for lower taxes, are the issues most often associated with the FP of the 1970s but also environmental protection, which, however, was not yet a major issue. Nevertheless, the first diagram in Figure 5.3 also shows how far the FP was apart from cultural liberalism, which does not change in the subsequent configurations and corresponds to its voters attitudes. Since the 1990s, the supply-side space has become more explicitly structured. The two-dimensional configuration corresponds well to our main hypothesis of a socio-economic leftright and a cultural opposition, the latter, since 1999, being structured by attitudes to cultural liberalism and immigration the new issue in European politics since the 1980s. Reducing the Austrian party space to a single leftright dimension is not only difficult, as Luther (1999: 12830) argued, but utterly impossible. From a theoretical perspective, we expect a transformation of the socio-economic and cultural conflict dimension, as new issues are being embedded in the existing structure and change their meaning. In the socio-economic dimension, one would assume issues like free trade, but such policies were not part of the observed election campaigns. What did change, however, were the explanations for some policies that cannot be included in such a quantitative exploration. In the socio-economic domain, for example, supporters of economic liberalism increasingly explain or justify their positions with the growing importance of the countrys competitiveness. The second dimension as mentioned above traditionally referred to statechurch relations, but this conflict had already lost much of its power by the 1960s and 1970s and was replaced by moral issues in general, for example abortion or homosexuality (Mller 1997: 11213). Now, tough attitudes on immigration stand in sharp contrast to libertarian issue-positions, thus confirming our expectations.
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Figure 5.3 Supply side of party competition, 1975, 1994, 1999 and 2002 elections (Austria)
As we observed when we referred to the strength of traditional cleavages, Austria is the most religious country covered by this book. We therefore expect above all the VP to articulate traditional views with regard to moral questions. Indeed, according to our
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data, in particular in the election of 1994, the parties discussed abortion.18 While the SP and the LIF articulated libertarian positions, the VP took a strictly conservative stance. Opposition to homosexuality is another issue, which clearly shows the internally sometimes disputed conservative orientation of the VP (Mller 2006a: 359), whereas the SP and the Greens articulated some support for equal rights in the elections of 1999 and 2002. However, both issues played only a minor part in the observed campaigns. In the 1994 configuration, we see two new parties: the Greens, who have been represented in parliament since 1986, and the LIF, a breakaway from the FP. Both parties expressed a libertarian profile concerning cultural issues, but the LIF combined this position with strong support for economic liberalism. At least in Austria, this combination is quite exceptional and was expressed for the first time in Austrias electoral history. The three traditional parties are positioned in a triangle with the SP now clearly the economically most left party and the VP the most right, whereas the FP takes the middle position. Despite their collaboration in the new grand coalition since 1987, the two major parties are relatively far apart from each other; both parties are closer to the FP. Interestingly, the SP and the right-wing populist FP are almost in equidistance from the immigration issue. The explanation for this rather astonishing finding is the former minster of the interior, Franz Lschnak. He was an important figure during the 1994 campaign and had controversially within the party given the SP a rather tough stance on questions of immigration as well as security. The VP is now much closer not only to economic liberalism but even more so to demands for a tight budget. This development became manifest one year after the 1994 election when the new VP chairman, Wolfgang Schssel, provoked a snap election after ongoing controversies in the grand coalition over budget issues. Starting with the election of 1999, the space is explicitly structured by the leftright antagonism and a cultural conflict between support for cultural liberalism and tough attitudes to immigration. After months of
18
Since 1974, abortion has been permissible if it takes place within the first three months of a pregnancy. In 1994, the introduction of RU 486, a pill terminating pregnancy, was discussed.
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coalition poker, the VP and the FP agreed to cooperate. This infuriated unknown numbers of demonstrators in Austria and brought the EU to impose diplomatic sanctions on the government of one of its member states. It is interesting to note that this coalition can be derived from the parties positions in the supply space. They are closer to each other than they were in 1994, when the then VP leader Busek ruled out such a coalition. Both parties are in a centre position with regard to the socio-economic line of conflict but especially close to conservative policies concerning security as well as immigration. Not only are the conservative and right-wing populist forces closer to each other than before, the SP and the Greens also take almost identical positions, indicating a bipolar configuration (Mller and Fallend 2004). The Liberals, finally, who failed to achieve the required 4%, have to a certain extent given up the former programme of an undivided liberalism, a slogan of their leader, Heide Schmidt, and positioned themselves close to economic liberalism. In 2002, the structure of the space remained almost the same. Nevertheless, both the opposition and the governing parties increased their relative distances from each other. The LIF has disappeared from the political scene, so the space on the economic right is empty. Its undivided liberalism should have appealed especially to the winners of globalization, but this combination of positions found no demand in the electorate. The SP in particular has regained its earlier profile of left-libertarianism and is still much closer to the Greens than to the VP, its long-time coalition partner. After its flirtation with a centrist position in the socio-economic domain what critics described as the enforcement of neoliberal policies (Ucakar 2006: 336) the Social Democrats have returned to a more left-leaning image. This probably reflects its new status as opposition party as well as the change in the party leadership from the technocrats Franz Vranitzky and Viktor Klima to the presumably more ideological Alfred Gusenbauer. Summarizing the movements of the FP from 1975 to 2002, one can see that its transformation from a national-liberal to a right-wing populist party was accompanied by a relatively stable position in the political space. In all four elections, the FP supported a centrist position in the socio-economic dimension. Kitschelts (1995) winning formula, a combination of neoliberal and culturally conservative positions, has never been the FPs strategy. With regard to the cultural opposition,
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the FP was always the most conservative party and supported concepts of demarcation. Once more, this demonstrates the weaknesses of one-dimensional approaches for understanding the structure of the Austrian political space.
Conclusion
Globalization, so our main argument goes, leads to new oppositions within national communities, separating the winners and losers of this far-reaching development. Starting with a discussion of some contextual factors, we expected a rather strong potential for such mobilization in the Austrian case. Subsequent analyses showed how the political space, both the demand side and the supply side, has changed from the 1970s to the 1990s/2000s. Voter groups have moved further apart, the parties relative distances to each other have increased, and, in general, one can see that the systems polarization has risen. A renewed importance of the socio-economic conflict has recently produced more difference between the two main parties as well as their voters, but, in general, it is the small parties positions that structure the space. The Greens and their voters support cultural globalization, but do not want to weaken the states power in the socio-economic field. Right-wing populists are situated on the other side of the configuration and explicitly disapprove of cultural integration, whereas in the economic domain their position is less clear-cut. Austria, therefore, is an example where both an increased polarization between the major parties and a transformation of an established party are the developments driving forces. Compared to the stable period until the 1970s, Austrian politics has entered a period of massive change, but, if we look at the party systems indicators in comparative perspective and the rather stable position of the parties within the supply space, we see that there is no real indication of a complete transformation. Trends that indicated a development towards a structural change in the system, not only the rise of the FP but also increasing fragmentation and volatility, are perhaps only a temporary phenomenon. The disappearance of the LIF, the decline of and subsequent split in the FP, and the recent reinvigoration of the main parties, especially of the VP, indicate that the traditional political forces have been able to adapt to a changing environment. The SP has regained a left profile, which might be
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attractive for the losers of globalization, especially with regard to its economic dimension. The VP seems to have found a position that increasingly appeals to moderate voters as well as to some of the populists potential. Nevertheless, despite its recent electoral setback in 2002, right-wing populism has remained a relevant political force in Austrian politics and still defines a major part of the political agenda. Criticism of the EU, for example, once a domain of the left rather than of the populist right (Pelinka 2004), is now shared by politicians of all parties. Perhaps, the FP and the BZ will remain taboo-breaking forces articulating latent attitudes of the electorate. Consensus democracy, once a dominant feature of Austrian politics, has certainly come to an end in the arena of party competition.
Switzerland: another case of transformation driven by an established party

ROMAIN LACHAT
Introduction
The Swiss political system is often viewed as an example of stability. The consensual style of politics, the unusual longevity of the grand coalition which forms the federal government, the high level of cooperation between social partners and the state, are all factors that explain or have contributed to this image. Further, such a perception is not only the point of view of outside observers. Kerr (1975), for example, emphasized in the 1970s that Switzerland had not faced any major political change since the late nineteenth century. This image is even reinforced by data from opinion surveys in this period, showing that Swiss citizens, in comparison with citizens of other European countries, are among the most satisfied with the state of their economy and political system (Sidjanski 1975). Yet, over the last decades, Swiss politics have been marked by important developments. The transformations may seem to be less impressive, less dramatic than in neighbouring countries. But, at least by Swiss standards, they are significant and indicate deep changes in the social and economic basis of political cleavages. The single most important development is certainly the rise of the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP). A traditionally rural and Protestant party, it gradually changed its political orientation in the 1980s and early 1990s and has now become one of the most potent examples of the success of the populist right (Kriesi et al. 2005). One of the direct consequences of its success was a change in the composition of the federal government in 2003. The SVP gained a second seat, at the expense of the Christian-democratic party (CVP). This change is emblematic as it meant the end of the magic formula, that is, the way in which the seven seats of the Federal Council had been distributed among the four governmental parties since 1959. A corollary of these events is the polarization of the Swiss political landscape. Parties of the moderate right, the CVP and the Radical party (FDP), have been
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Switzerland: transformation driven by an established party
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among the losers of recent elections. This benefited parties which are further apart from the political centre: on the left the Social-Democratic Party (SP) and the Greens, on the right the SVP. These developments have thus had important consequences and they have altered the balance of power among the major parties. The SVP played a key role in the articulation of the new cleavage. Through its political transformation, however, it has also attenuated the partisan consequences of this process of change. Given an institutional setting which is favourable to the emergence of new parties, one may have expected to observe increased fragmentation. Yet, while the Swiss party system has become more polarized, it has become less fragmented. The SVP attracted voters not only from established right-wing parties, but also from smaller competitors of the new radical right. The latter, which were especially successful in the early 1990s, have since then largely disappeared from the political scene. In this chapter, we analyze these transformations in more detail and show how they relate to a changing political, economic and cultural environment. To better explain what the specificities of the cleavage between integration and demarcation are in the case of Switzerland, we shall first consider the socio-economic and cultural context. As introduced in Chapter 2, several factors contribute to the formation of an important potential of losers in the process of globalization. Most important among these are the Swiss conception of citizenship, its large foreign population, and its tradition of economic openness. In the next section, we turn to the role of political factors and emphasize how the electoral system and consensual political arrangements have facilitated the electoral gains of the SVP. Finally, we present the results of our empirical analyses. We consider first the demand side of electoral competition, by exploring the structure of voters attitudes and the evolution of the differences between social groups. Then, we show how these changes are reflected in the supply side and how parties have adapted their programmatic position in order to better articulate the interests of specific social groups. We conclude this chapter by a summary of our main results and by an evaluation of our general hypothesis in light of the Swiss findings.
Traditional cleavages
The class and religious cleavages have traditionally been the most important ones in Switzerland (Kriesi 1998b; Hug and Trechsel 2002). They do
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not coincide, and contribute to the fragmentation of the Swiss political landscape. Their salience, though, varies across cantons (Klti 1998; Kriesi 1998a). The class cleavage is mainly reflected by the opposition between the SP on the left, and the right-wing or centre-right parties like the CVP, the FDP and the SVP. Such a division can be observed in all cantons, but it was more salient in recent decades in the French-speaking cantons. The exact nature of the religious opposition, by contrast, is not the same in all cantons, depending on the religious composition of their population (Klti 1998; Kriesi 1998a). In Catholic cantons, the religious divide opposed Catholics to non-religious voters. In religiously mixed cantons, by contrast, this cleavage was basically an opposition between Protestants and Catholics. The interests of the latter group are articulated at the political level by the Christian-Democratic Party. Among governmental parties, the SVP is the one which is most clearly dominated by Protestants (Kriesi 1995). But this party is not centred exclusively on the religious cleavage, and the role of religion in explaining support for this party has strongly declined in recent elections (Selb and Lachat 2004; Lachat and Selb 2005b). While the class and religious cleavages were dominant at least until the 1970s, their importance has declined over the last decades, especially in the case of the religious division (Hug and Trechsel 2002; Lachat 2004). There is also evidence that the class cleavage has weakened, following a trend similar to that which can be observed in many Western democracies (Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999). The latter findings, however, are more sensitive to changes in the definition of social classes or in the measurement of cleavage strength (Kriesi 1998c; Lachat 2004). This may indicate that the class cleavage is transforming rather than weakening. In other words, we may face a phenomenon of realignment rather than simple dealignment. Realignment leads to divisions within social groups that were more or less homogeneous on the traditional class cleavage. For instance, one of the most salient differences in party preferences or issue positions can be observed by considering the division within the new middle class between managers and social-cultural specialists (Oesch 2006). Beyond these two main cleavages, several authors have emphasized other potential divisions in the Swiss electorate. Most important among these is a ruralurban or centreperiphery cleavage (e.g., Sciarini 2002). The SVP is a former agrarian party, which has traditionally defended the interests of rural regions against the more urban Social-Democratic
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Party and Radical Party. But, in recent elections, the contribution of such divisions to the explanation of party preferences is rather limited (Hug and Trechsel 2002), even when focusing specifically on electoral utilities for the SVP (Kriesi et al. 2005). Another possibility is a linguistic cleavage. It has been presented as one of the central cleavages in the 1970s (Lijphart 1979), and even as the most important one in the early 1990s (Trechsel 1995). Yet, while voters political preferences certainly vary across linguistic regions, this opposition does not qualify as a cleavage, as it is not articulated at the political level. There are no parties who specifically defend the interests of the French-speaking minority, for example. The only exception is the Lega, a party which is only present in the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino and which defends the interests of this community against the political centre. But this party is marginal at the federal level. Thus, despite the existence of regional differences in political preferences, and even if several parties compete only in one of the linguistic regions (Kriesi 1998b), citizens are not mobilized by linguistic parties. Potential linguistic divisions do not prevent the emergence of new divisions and the formation of new cleavages. The international comparison presented in Chapter 2 shows that the two central cleavages are moderate or weak in Switzerland (Table 2.1). The traditional cleavages are pacified to a large extent, which leaves room for the political articulation of the consequences of globalization. Several authors have emphasized the growing importance of this division (Kriesi 1998b; Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Wernli 2004). Yet, beyond a general trend, some regional differences subsist. The religious cleavage remains stronger in Catholic cantons than elsewhere, and the class cleavage is still more pronounced in the French-speaking part of the country than in other cantons. Such differences are often emphasized in the literature on Swiss elections and are one of the reasons for the weak degree of nationalization of the party system (Caramani 2004).1 But this does not call into question our hypothesis about the emergence of a new cleavage between integration and demarcation. It simply means that the breakthrough of the new cleavage may be
1
At the individual-level, by contrast, the determinants of voting choice seem to be largely nationalized (Lachat and Selb 2005a). Voters in different cantons base their voting choice on similar factors. Regional differences in the explanation of voting choices have largely disappeared. What still differ to some extent, however, are the stimuli with which voters are confronted.
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delayed in some regions. This interpretation is supported indirectly by the regional pattern in the rise of the SVP, which first had success in religiously mixed and German-speaking cantons, and was successful only later in Catholic or French-speaking cantons (Kriesi 2005b).

Like the Netherlands or Austria, Switzerland belongs to the small European countries with open economies identified by Katzenstein (1985). These states have traditionally used measures at the domestic level to compensate for the negative consequences of their economic integration. In the case of Switzerland, these measures included heavy subsidies for agriculture, soft anti-cartel legislation, an immigration policy that provided cheap labor for domestic producers, and an occupational welfare state for the core workforce (Bonoli and Mach 2000: 143). As we saw in Chapter 2, it is one of the countries with the highest level of economic openness and of economic development (Table 2.2). The consequences of globalization may thus be particularly negative for some segments of the population. A reassessment or a weakening of the traditional compensatory measures would have a direct and negative impact on important sectors of the economy. Economic deregulation, the weakening of protectionist measures, and the increase in domestic competition should contribute to the formation of a large potential of losers and to the emergence of a new cleavage. The low level of unemployment, one would think, could attenuate the creation of this potential. However, while low in international comparison, the Swiss level of unemployment of the 1990s and early 2000s still represents an important deterioration in the economic situation. In the post-war period, until the late 1980s, there was virtually no unemployment at all in Switzerland. The 1990s represent an important period of change. There was a general perception in the country, promoted by the media and by various political and economic elites, that radical change was needed if the country was to maintain the high levels of prosperity it knew in the past (Bonoli and Mach 2000: 145). The increase in unemployment, changes in the international environment, in particular the closer ties between Switzerland and the European Community and the negotiations on the GATT, as well as pressure from some sectors of the economy towards more efficiency, are among the most important factors that have
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put the Swiss economic model under growing pressure (Bonoli and Mach 2000: 138; Mach et al. 2003: 301f.). A turning point was the popular vote in December 1992 on the adhesion of Switzerland to the European Economic Area (EEA). This treaty was rejected by a small majority of voters, after what was probably the most intense referendum campaign ever in Switzerland (Kriesi 2005a). As a consequence of this rejection, the federal government launched a programme of economic revitalization, and several reforms were initiated, especially in the field of economic regulation (Mach et al. 2003). Key reforms were implemented to improve the competitiveness of Switzerland, such as the liberalization of the telecommunications sector and the increase in domestic competition through a revision of the law on cartels. These reforms have reinforced the market logic and have adjusted the economic framework to bring it closer to the rules of the European Community. Most important for our argument, these reforms of the 1990s have exposed the traditionally sheltered sectors of the economy to a more intense competition. They have also weakened the position of trade unions and of the professional organizations representing economic sectors oriented towards the domestic market (Kriesi 1998b). The debate on economic liberalization and on the relationships between Switzerland and the EU has been salient throughout the 1990s. Divisions within the left-wing and right-wing blocks have intensified and this period is crucial for the formation of new political alignments. The EEA treaty was supported by all major centre-right parties and economic associations, which emphasized the economic opportunities linked with a full participation in the European market. The SVP, radical-right parties, and some economic sectors (e.g., the agricultural sector), by contrast, opposed this treaty. They feared higher levels of unemployment, a decrease in wages and a massive influx of workers from other European countries. The left, too, was divided. The SP supported the treaty though there were divisions within the party, in particular because many were dissatisfied with the purely economic character of the EEA while the Greens and some radical-left parties opposed it. They disagreed with the economic and social policy of the European Community, and regarded the EEA as one of the worst options for integration, as it strongly limited the possibility of influencing EU level decisions. However, the Greens changed their position in later years. Since 1998, they have officially supported the immediate opening of EU membership negotiations.
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In later campaigns on the economic consequences of the Switzerland EU relationships, the configuration of party positions was similar to those of the 1992 EEA vote. This is typical, for instance, of the debate on the bilateral agreements. These are a series of treaties between Switzerland and the EU which were negotiated after the rejection of the EEA. Two rounds of such agreements have been negotiated so far, which were accepted in popular votes in 2000 and 2005. They pertain to domains such as the mobility of persons, land and air transport, and immigration and asylum policies. On the right of the political spectrum, there is a strong division between Christian-democratic and liberal parties, on the one hand, and right-wing populist parties, such as the SVP, on the other. The left is also divided, but for different reasons. The SP, the Greens and many smaller parties fully support Swiss membership of the EU. But parts of the Greens and of the SP were opposed to specific bilateral agreements for fear of their negative social and economic consequences.

The previous section emphasized the divisions linked with the consequences of the economic integration of Switzerland. But the fears are probably even more pronounced as regards a possible political integration, within the EU or within other supranational instances. A core aspect of the problem is the definition of national identity. Switzerland is often presented as a nation based on political will, a Willensnation (Kriesi 1998b). The various linguistic and religious communities do not share a common cultural heritage. Following this interpretation, what these communities share, the force that unites them, is their political identity, their identification with the central political institutions of Switzerland: direct democracy, federalism and neutrality. Such an idealized definition of Swiss identity, however, is not shared by all citizens. The fundamental importance of these three institutions for the way in which citizens perceive their own political identity is rather linked to some form of Swiss mythology (Kriesi 1998b). Furthermore, these central political institutions have been criticized, especially in more recent times. The conservative impact of direct democracy has been criticized (Brunetti and Straubhaar 1991; Borner and Rentsch 1997). Several proposals have been made to reform the federalist structure of the state (e.g., Blchliger 2005). And, while neutrality has never been called into question, there are
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different opinions on the exact meaning and consequences of this policy (Gabriel and Hedinger 1999). Controversies on the importance of these institutions are particularly salient in the debate on European integration. Many who oppose Swiss membership of the EU argue that this would mean abandoning direct democracy and weakening the role of federalism, as many decisions would be taken in Brussels. Switzerland would lose its sovereignty, and Swiss national identity would be weakened. Similarly, one of the reasons why Swiss membership of the UN was rejected for such a long time was the fear that UN membership would threaten neutrality (Hirter and Linder 2002). Supporters of Swiss membership of the UN, by contrast, wanted to avoid the isolation of the country on the international political scene. This type of conflict is typical for popular votes related to foreign policy or to institutional reforms (Christin et al. 2002). The political form of competition linked to globalization thus leads to strong divisions between groups of voters who differ by their attachment to this traditional conception of national identity. Such divisions have been particularly important in the 1990s and early 2000s, given the salience of the debate on European integration. The third form of competition linked to globalization, the ethnic or cultural competition, also has important consequences in Switzerland. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Swiss conception of citizenship combines cultural monism and a civic-territorial tradition. This is likely to intensify the fears and tensions linked to immigration. Furthermore, such problems are also likely to be salient because of the size of the foreign population. With a share of over 20%, it is the third largest in Europe, after Luxembourg and Liechtenstein (BfS 2004: 49). Of course, the size of the foreign population is not entirely independent of the ethnic conception of citizenship, as the criteria for acquiring Swiss citizenship are quite restrictive. Another central aspect of ethnic or cultural competition is that political mobilization against immigration is not a new phenomenon. Following the significant increase in the number of foreign workers in the 1960s, parties and movements of the radical right set up fierce antiimmigration campaigns in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Several popular initiatives were launched, which aimed to introduce much more restrictive immigration rules. Between 1970 and 1977, Swiss citizens voted on four such popular initiatives. None of these was accepted, but they enjoyed the support of a strong minority, of up to 46%, of the voters. A strong potential for a new cleavage centred on ethnic and cultural
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competition was thus already present in the 1970s. However, parties of the radical right, the National Action and the Republicans, had only limited success in the electoral arena. They succeeded only temporarily in the direct-democratic arena using popular initiatives (Linder 1998: 105). The question of immigration lost in intensity in the 1980s though the former initiatives had a lasting impact on the governments immigration policy (Kobach 1993: 112). Since the 1990s, this question has again received more attention. However, the debate has increasingly shifted from immigration to asylum policy, especially at the end of the decade, following the rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers after the war in Kosovo (see Figure 2.1). This coincided with the early phase of the 1999 electoral campaign. The SVP attached much importance to this topic in the 1999 and 2003 campaigns.2 In the domain of asylum, like in the questions related to immigration or to the more cultural aspects of European integration, the major line of conflict is between the SVP and parties of the left. The SP, the Greens and other smaller left-wing parties have systematically opposed the restrictive immigration policy advocated by the SVP, and they strongly support Swiss membership of the EU. The centre-right parties, by contrast, have taken less clear-cut positions. While they support the federal governments strategic objective of EU membership, they have been less enthusiastic than the left in putting this issue in the forefront. Similarly, on immigration and asylum policy, they often defend more pragmatic solutions, between the two extreme positions of the SVP and of the left.
The political context

While the previous sections have emphasized several developments that may lead to strong oppositions with respect to the consequences of globalization, we have also argued in Chapter 2 that the expected electoral consequences of these transformations should be influenced by institutional or political factors. These can moderate the electoral success of challenger parties trying to mobilize voters by articulating new cleavages. In this volume, we have emphasized repeatedly the zero-sum game
2
In the 1995 election, by contrast, the SVP focused more strongly on the opposition to Europe and on the defence of national sovereignty. This change of focus is clearly illustrated by the SVPs electoral advertisements reproduced in Kriesi et al. (2005).
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between old and new structural oppositions. A party focusing on the integrationdemarcation cleavage is only likely to succeed if other divisions are not very salient. This condition can be examined by looking at patterns of voting behaviour across social groups, as we did in a previous section. It can, however, also be based on the analysis of the symptoms of electoral dealignment, that is, of the weakening of voters traditional partisan loyalties. Such a phase of dealignment is a precondition for a realignment of voters and parties (Martin 2000). One of the most important indicators, in this respect, is the strength of party identification (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). As long as voters are strongly attached to one of the established parties, any lasting change in the structure of the party system is difficult. In Switzerland, as in many other countries, the number of party identifiers has declined since the 1970s (Nabholz 1998; Lachat 2004). This means that a growing proportion of voters should be uncertain about their voting choice, resulting in increasing electoral volatility and split-ticket voting, as well as in an increasing number of voters who make their voting decision late during the campaign (Dalton et al. 2000). There is some evidence in Switzerland for such developments: the proportions of volatile voters and of late decision-makers have increased over the last decades (Lachat 2004).3 These changes in voters characteristics leave room for a process of realignment and for the emergence of new divisions. Yet, the consequences at the level of parties have been far less dramatic than in other countries. Table 6.1 presents the development of the strength of the main parties since 1971, as well as some summary statistics on the characteristics of the party system. Beginning with the latter, we note that the degree of fractionalization, as indicated by the effective number of political parties, has decreased in recent elections. Similarly, the total share of votes of the four governmental parties has increased in the 1990s. By contrast, a temporary phase of instability can be noted in the 1980s. The share of the vote of governmental parties decreased from 81% in 1979 to 69% in 1991. At the same time, the effective number of parties increased markedly, from 5.5 to 7.4. This is due to central changes on both sides of the political
3
Split-ticket voting, that is, the proportion of voters supporting different parties in the election of the lower and of the upper houses of the Federal Parliament, has also increased. But this change has little to do with electoral dealignment (Lachat 2006).
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Table 6.1 Election results and characteristics of the party system, Switzerland, 19712003
1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 Radical left PdA Sol. PSA POCH FGA Greens GPS 2.6 0.3 0.1 2.4 0.3 1.0 2.1 0.4 1.7 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.5 2.2 1.0 1.9 0.8 0.6 1.3 2.4 4.9 0.8 0.6 0.2 1.3 6.1 1.2 0.3 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.5
1.5 5.0
0.3 5.0
0.5 7.4
0.1
Social-democrats SP 22.9 24.9 24.4 22.8 18.4 18.5 21.8 22.5 23.3 Christian-democrats and centre parties CVP 20.3 21.1 21.3 20.2 19.6 18.0 16.8 15.9 14.4 LdU 7.6 6.1 4.1 4.0 4.2 2.8 1.8 0.7 EVP 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.3 CSP 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 Liberals FDP LPS Populist right SVP Radical right Rep. SD EDU FPS Lega Others 21.8 22.2 24.0 23.3 22.9 21.0 20.2 19.9 17.3 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 11.1 4.3 3.2 9.9 11.6 11.1 11.0 11.9 14.9 22.5 26.7 3.0 2.5 0.3 0.6 1.3 0.3 0.5 2.9 0.4 0.3 2.5 0.9 2.6 2.6
1.2
1.7
2.3
2.8
3.4 1.0 5.1 1.4 2.7
3.1 1.3 4.0 0.9 2.4
1.8 1.3 0.9 0.9 2.4
1.0 1.3 0.2 0.4 1.6
Party system features Four-party votea 76.1 78.1 81.3 77.5 72.0 69.4 73.7 80.8 81.7 ENPPb 6.1 5.8 5.5 6.0 6.9 7.4 6.8 5.9 5.5
a
Share of the vote of the four governmental parties (SP, CVP, FDP, CVP). Effective number of political parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) based on shares of the vote.
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spectrum. On the left, the most important change is the emergence of the Greens, which increased their share of the vote from 0.6% in 1979 to 6.1% twelve years later. The share of the vote of the SP has decreased by the same amount though these electoral losses were only temporary. The Greens have further consolidated their share of the vote in the 1990s, at the expense of radical-left parties, who have continuously weakened since the late 1980s. Among right-wing parties, similar changes can be observed. First, in the 1980s, radical-right parties have become stronger, at the expense of centre-right parties, mainly the CVP and FDP. Strong radical-right parties were not an entirely new phenomenon, as we saw above. But they reached an unprecedented level of support in 1991, with a total share of the vote of almost 11%. This trend towards a higher fragmentation of the party system was reversed in the 1990s. Radical right parties have considerably weakened over the last fifteen years. Most interestingly, however, the decline among centre and liberal parties, initiated in the 1980s, has continued. Among right-wing parties, the SVP is the only one which managed to increase its shares of the vote in the 1990s. And it did so with astonishing success. Its share of the votes has more than doubled since the early 1990s and it is now the strongest party in the lower house of the Federal Assembly. While the SVP does not, so far, show any sign of weakening, it will probably not progress again so strongly in the near future. The SVP seems to have almost exhausted its electoral potential (Kriesi et al. 2005). These pronounced changes in the Swiss party system have certainly been facilitated by specific institutional and political factors. First of all, the SVP radically changed its political profile, to move away from the centre, towards an economically moderate but culturally conservative position. The larger its distance from its centre-right opponents, the stronger was its success (Lachat and Selb 2005a: 246f.). Furthermore, as it is on the cultural dimension and not on the economic one that the SVP strongly differs from the FDP and the CVP, the success of the SVP was stronger in cantons where the issues of immigration and European integration were particularly salient (Lachat and Selb 2005a: 250f.). Thus, the success of the SVP is also due to the strategic decisions of liberal and Christian-democratic parties on these issues. Centre-right parties are rather favourable to European integration though they are internally divided. As we have seen above, the SVP is the only major party that has systematically opposed Swiss membership of the EU (or
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to the EEA). The FDP has probably moved closer to the position of the SVP in recent years, in particular by becoming more supportive of a restrictive immigration and asylum policy. But the gap between the SVP and its competitors remains wide, even in cantons where this party long maintained a traditional, centrist position (e.g., Kuhn et al. 2005).4 The consensual political arrangements are another political factor that contributed to the rise of the populist right. Switzerland is often presented as one of the best examples of a consensual democracy (Lijphart 1999). Factors such as a federalist structure, strict bicameralism, PR elections, a multiparty system and a grand coalition contribute to the sharing of power between institutions and between political actors. These institutional arrangements may favour the political articulation of the new cleavage in three ways. First, proportional elections have lower electoral thresholds than majoritarian ones, which makes the entry of new parties easier (Lijphart 1994). Secondly, the tradition of cooperation between elites in the federal government or between parties and social partners has been one of the targets of the SVP. Its critique of the classe politique and of collusive arrangements among elites is typical of parties of the populist right (Canovan 1999). The federalist structure, finally, implies that parties can mobilize new segments of the electorate or experiment with new issues at the regional level, before applying their new strategy at the federal level. This is central for understanding the rise of the SVP. Its transformation from a traditional agrarian party to a right-wing populist one was initiated in the canton of Zurich in the late 1970s (Hofer et al. 2005). The ensuing electoral gains and the growing influence in the party of the more radical Zurich wing led other cantonal sections of the party in the late 1980s and 1990s to follow a similar strategy. To sum up, we have seen so far that several factors should contribute to a strong cleavage in the Swiss electorate. The liberal economic reforms of the 1990s have increased the pressure on the economic sectors that were traditionally protected from international competition. The development of closer ties with the EU and the debate on the immigration and asylum policy have also led to a conflict between citizens who want to avoid the isolation of Switzerland on the international political scene and others
4
While positions on a leftright scale are less appropriate, as they confound the economic and the cultural dimensions, a movement of the SVP towards the right can also be noted here, both from the point of view of party elites (Ladner and Brndle 2001: 276f.) or by analyzing party programmes (Brndle 1999).
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who defend traditional values and a certain conception of Swiss national identity. Furthermore, the relative weakness of the traditional class and religious cleavages and the consensual character of the democracy represent favourable conditions for the articulation of such a new cleavage. In the following sections, we present the results of our empirical analyses on the emergence and articulation of this expected new cleavage.
Analysis of the demand side: the electoral potential for a new cleavage
We start our empirical analysis by focusing on the demand side of electoral competition. In order to compare the structure of voters attitudes over time, we have performed a two-step factor analysis of issuequestions, as explained in Chapter 3. Contrary to the other countries, we can consider here only three elections. The 1991 election study did not contain enough issue-questions for us to perform a fair test of the dimensionality and structure of the political space. For the other three elections, we can analyze from seven to nine issue-categories. The results of the factor analyses are presented in Table 6.2. The political space is two-dimensional in each election, as expected. Furthermore, it is possible in each case to distinguish between a cultural and an economic dimension though the distinction between these two groups of issues is less clear-cut in 1975. In that election, the first factor, which is labelled mixed dimension in Table 6.2, integrates attitudes towards the welfare state, cultural liberalism, culture, immigration and environment. It is thus more than a purely economic dimension, and it structures attitudes towards old issues (welfare, culture) as well as attitudes linked with new divisions, such as environmental protection and immigration. The second dimension, by contrast, is limited to cultural items and is easier to interpret. It corresponds to the expected cultural dimension after the integration of issues linked with the mobilization of new social movements. It structures attitudes towards national defence and towards traditional values. The latter category is part of cultural liberalism, but corresponds to a more limited group of items on deviant behaviours (lack of respect for national symbols, taking drugs, etc.) which here form a separate dimension.5 It is important to emphasize that attitudes towards Europe or immigration are only weakly related to
5
The construction of the issue-categories is presented in more detail in Appendix A.
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Table 6.2 Structure of the Swiss political space: analysis of the demand side, 19751999: factor loadings after a varimax rotation
1975 Mixed Cultural Cultural 1995 Economic Cultural dimension 0.02 0.69 0.60 0.01 0.19 0.62 0.52 0.03 0.55 2.12 0.24 819 0.20 0.32 0.77 0.37 0.07 0.39 0.76 0.49 0.07 1.79 0.20 0.67 0.59 0.56 0.05 2.57 0.37 1850 0.10 0.48 0.30 0.79 1.12 0.16 0.70 0.66 0.61 0.18 2.77 0.35 1603 0.07 0.23 0.19 0.67 1.16 0.15 0.74 0.08 0.71 0.06 0.06 0.75 0.71 0.11 0.20 0.78 1999 Economic dimension 0.71 0.62 0.14
dimension dimension dimension dimension Economic liberalism Welfare Cultural liberalism Traditional values Europe Culture Antiimmigration Army Environment Eigenvalue Variance explained N
Law and order 0.46
Note: factor loadings > .5 are shown in bold.
this cultural axis. The two categories that are central for the transformation of the cultural dimension have here no clear position in the political structure: attitudes on these issues are weakly or moderately correlated with both main dimensions. In the 1990s, the structure of the political space is much easier to describe. There is a clear separation between an economic (and ecological) dimension and a cultural one, in both elections. The issues that load most strongly on the cultural dimension are Europe and immigration, as well as attitudes towards cultural liberalism. Contrary to the 1975 election, all cultural issue-categories load on the same dimension and those linked with the consequences of globalization take a central position. The cultural dimension is dominated by the opposition between integration
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and demarcation. As far as the economic dimension is concerned, it is important to note that it integrates the issue of environmental protection. This confirms previous analyses showing that the Swiss political space is two-dimensional (Klti 1998; Kriesi 1998b). The structure of the political space still represents only one side of the expected transformation. To show that a potential for a new opposition is present, we have to consider further the configuration of social groups in this space. For each election, we present in Figure 6.1 the
Figure 6.1 Demand side of party competition, 1975, 1995 and 1999 elections (Switzerland)
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location of several groups of voters in the political space, as defined by the dimensions we have just introduced. We are interested here in three kinds of social groups: social classes, religious groups, and voters with different educational levels. As the structure of the political space changes and as new political divisions are formed, the distances between these groups should vary. Social groups that were opposed along traditional cleavages may come closer together, while new oppositions may form at the same time. In addition, Figure 6.1 also shows the average location of the voters of each of the main parties or party groups. Starting with social classes, we note a trend towards a higher degree of polarization. In 1975, most social classes take a similar, centrist position. The only groups that stand out are farmers and two segments of the new middle class, the technical and social-cultural specialists. The traditional class cleavage does not appear as salient, if one judges by the proximity of the working class (both unskilled and skilled workers) and of the self-employed. The weakness of this cleavage is confirmed by the results of more recent elections. Distances between the working class and the old middle class are always relatively moderate. This confirms the impression we had by focusing on macro-level indicators on the strength of traditional cleavages. Differences between the expected winners and losers of globalization, by contrast, grow larger over time. The three segments of the new middle class belong to the winners of globalization. They are more favourable to cultural and political integration than other social classes, and this division has become stronger since the 1970s. In 1975, managers and administrative specialists were not much different from skilled workers. But the gap is now quite large. There are also increasing divergences within the new middle class. The distance on the economic axis between managers and socialcultural specialists is larger in recent elections than in the 1970s. The most important of these differences are summarized in Figure 6.2, which presents the evolution of the key distances of Figure 6.1, corresponding to old and new cleavages. We observe in particular a clear reinforcement of the differences between social-cultural specialists and unskilled workers (class divide 1990s). At the level of social classes, this conflict best represents the new opposition between the winners and losers of globalization. The second traditional cleavage, religion, was also already weak in the 1970s. Protestant and Catholic voters take virtually identical positions.

(a) religion and education
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(b) class
Figure 6.2 Distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (Switzerland)
They are, however, very distant from the non-religious individuals, who are culturally more liberal. This may point to a transformation of this conflict, from a cleavage based on religion to one based on religiosity (Wolf 1996; Geissbhler 1999). At the same time, however, religion still has an independent impact on voting choices (Lachat 2004). Differences between educational groups have not changed much either. They are large in every election and represent one of the strongest oppositions, as shown in Figure 6.2. Voters with a high level of education are culturally more liberal or more integrationist than voters with a low level of education. This is quite similar to the contrast between the new middle class, on the one hand, and the working class or the old middle class, on the other. Again, it fits with the expected opposition between winners and losers of globalization. It is important to note, however, that
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educational groups are quite similar to one another regarding their position on the economic axis. By considering the average positions of the electorate of the various parties, finally, we get some important information on the electoral impact of the new potential. In the 1970s, governmental parties were aligned on the diagonal formed by the left-liberal SP and the rightconservative SVP. Radical parties on the left are somewhat off this axis, but party positions are clearly structured by a single dimension. Compared to this, the configuration in the 1990s is more polarized and has become tripolar. Social-democratic, Green and radical-left voters favour cultural integration and are opposed to economic liberalism. Supporters of liberal parties (FDP and LPS) are in strong opposition to the former group on the economic dimension and they take a moderate position on questions of European or cultural integration. SVP and radical-right voters, finally, are economically more moderate, but they strongly favour demarcation on the cultural dimension.
Analysis of the supply side: the articulation of the integrationdemarcation cleavage

Turning now to the supply side of electoral competition, we want to see whether changes in the configuration of party positions reflect similar transformations. The positions of political actors during electoral campaigns, which we derive from a content analysis of newspaper articles, were coded with the same issue-categories that we use throughout this book. We can typically measure the positions of parties on a larger number of issue-categories than for voters, as the range of topics addressed in the press during electoral campaigns is larger than what can be considered in electoral surveys. As regards parties, by contrast, the Greens and the small parties of the radical left or radical right cannot always be considered, as we have fewer relevant observations. The configurations resulting from the MDS analyses are presented in Figure 6.3. We emphasize again that the axes that have been drawn in each of the four panels are not a product of the analyses themselves, but are simply designed to facilitate the interpretation of the results. The same applies to the triangles that join in each election the main three political parties. In each election, the political space is best represented by a two-dimensional solution although the fit of the model is relatively low, as indicated by the stress statistics. Similarly to the results of the
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Figure 6.3 Supply side of party competition, 1975, 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections (Switzerland)
demand side, we find that no additional dimension of conflict has appeared. Starting with the 1975 election, we note a strong opposition between welfare and economic liberalism. They form one of the most distant pairs of issues in this election. Another important conflict is the one between support for the army and for law and order, on the one hand, and cultural liberalism, on the other. These two main oppositions are similar to the ones which structure voters attitudes. We also find here
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a cultural and an economic dimension, and there are some signs of integration: the liberal pole of the cultural dimension is closer to the economic left than to the right. In the same vein, the analysis of the demand side showed that some aspects of cultural liberalism were correlated with attitudes towards the welfare state. Finally, it is important to emphasize that the questions of immigration and the relationship to Europe were not salient in the 1975 campaign. We had some observations for each of them, but not enough to have any reliable measure of parties positions on these matters. The configurations of the 1990s differ in several important respects from the 1975 election. First of all, while the opposition between economic liberalism and support for the welfare state remains salient in every election, the other main conflict has changed radically. The issues of immigration and of European integration have become more salient. They now represent one of the strongest oppositions. Another important difference is a change, during the 1990s, in the degree of integration of the economic and cultural dimensions. In 1991 and 1995, there is some affinity between left-wing positions in economic matters and culturally liberal positions: the issue-categories of economic liberalism and budgetary rigour, for instance, are closer to a restrictive immigration policy than to the defence of European integration or of cultural liberalism. But the political space is still clearly two-dimensional. In 1999, the integration of the main dimensions is even more pronounced. The defence of economic liberalism and the support for cultural demarcation now represent virtually identical positions. We observe a compact cluster of economic and cultural issues, especially on the right. Law and order, budgetary rigour, economic liberalism, support for national defence, and a restrictive immigration policy, are closely related to one another. They form one pole in the political space, in opposition to a left-wing, integrative position, characterized by favourable positions towards cultural liberalism, the welfare state, culture, European integration and environmental protection. This shows the strong integrative capacity of the existing dimensions of conflict. In the early 1990s, the new issues of Europe and immigration have become more salient and were structuring the cultural dimension of the political space. There was, however, important divisions on these matters within groups of parties. On the left, we see in 1991 and 1995 that the social-democrats are more supportive of European integration than the Greens. While the latter are generally pro-European and in favour of Swiss membership of the EU, they have
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among others campaigned against the ratification of the EEA treaty. Similarly, on the right of the political spectrum, important divergences can be observed in the 1990s between liberal parties and the SVP. Both support economic liberalism, but liberal parties were rather supportive of European integration and did not advocate a restrictive immigration policy as strongly as the SVP did. In 1999, however, these divergences are less intense. As a consequence, the positions of parties are closer than before to a one-dimensional configuration. These results may seem surprising, as they strongly differ from those based on the demand side. In 1995 and 1999, we found that voters attitudes were structured by two dimensions, and that the locations of the three main parties supporters formed a triangular configuration. In 1995, the configurations of parties and the configuration of voters are still quite similar to one another. The only important difference is in the location of the Greens: their voters are more left-wing and more liberal than supporters of the SP, while the party itself takes positions that are culturally more moderate, especially on European integration. As we discussed before, however, the apparently more conservative position of the Greens on Europe is not due to a rejection of EU membership, but to their opposition to specific bilateral agreements. In 1999, by contrast, the differences between voters and parties are more important. The CVP and the SP are much closer to one another than are their voters. The same can be said of the liberal parties and the SVP. The raw party positions (see the detailed statistical results in the appendix) show that the CVP has moved towards the SP on several key issues. In 1999, it was very close to the SP regarding the welfare state, economic liberalism, cultural liberalism and Europe. Similarly, the SVP and liberal parties are now closer to one another. This shows that parties not only adapt their positions to new demands or priorities among their voters. Their issuepositions and their priorities also depend on strategic incentives. Parties react to the decisions of their competitors. The rise of the SVP has had a strong impact on the positions of the CVP and of the FDP. For instance, they have adopted a low profile on the question of European integration. While these parties do not oppose Swiss membership of the EU, in the present situation this option is no longer seen as realistic. Established right-wing parties have also tried to compensate their electoral losses by moving closer to the SVP, especially on the issue of immigration. This is reflected in the particular configuration of 1999, where electoral competition appears to be almost one-dimensional.
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However, if these developments do not allow moderate right-wing parties to be successful again at the polls, they may again change their strategy and try to distance themselves more clearly from the SVP.
Conclusion
The Swiss political system has faced important challenges in the 1990s. Although the country had a longer tradition of integration into world markets and although it had been confronted with heavy immigration for decades, the intensification of globalization has led to important tensions. Following the pressure for economic deregulation in the early 1990s, the government has initiated a programme of economic revitalization leading to stronger competition on the domestic market. The development of closer ties between Switzerland and the EU has also led to new oppositions between different conceptions of national identity or of the international role of Switzerland. Finally, the large share of the foreign population and the wave of asylum seekers at the end of the decade have intensified the political debate on immigration policy. Switzerland has thus been confronted with crucial challenges for each one of the three new forms of competition that we identified in Chapter 1. These consequences of globalization have had a strong impact on the structure of the political space, both among voters and among parties. As expected, the nature of the main dimensions of the political space has changed, but no additional dimension has emerged. In each one of the four elections we have analyzed, we could distinguish between a cultural and an economic dimension. The main differences over time concern the nature of the cultural dimension and the degree of integration between these two axes. While it reflected the traditional cleavages in the 1970s, the cultural dimension was dominated in the 1990s by the opposition between cultural liberalism and support for European integration, on the one hand, and a restrictive immigration policy, on the other. As far as the relationship between these two dimensions is concerned, we found in the analysis of the supply side signs of a converging trend of cultural and economic positions. In the 1999 election, the left-wing economic position and the liberal cultural one were very close to one another as were the opposite ends of each dimension. It is, however, not possible, on the basis of the evidence presented here, to say how this relationship is going to evolve. Given the electoral losses of the two centre-right parties in recent elections, they may try to differentiate their position from that of their
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competitors a development which would lead again to larger distances between economic and cultural issues. The positions taken by the main social categories in the space also fit with our theoretical hypotheses. We have found large distances between the winners and the losers of globalization. The gap between citizens with a low or a high level of education, as well as the distance between the new middle class and skilled workers, are important, especially on the transformed cultural dimension. Social categories who have low skills and who are more directly confronted with the competition of immigrants on the job market are more favourable to a strategy of cultural demarcation. Finally, we have also observed clear differences among the positions of the governmental parties. The SVP is the only major party which clearly articulates the interests of the losers of globalization. In particular, it is strongly opposed to cultural integration a position that matches our expectation on the profile of parties of the populist right. The transformation of an established party is one of the key features of the developments in Switzerland. The SVP took the role of the new challenger, thus making it difficult for new parties on the right to be successful with a demarcation strategy. The smaller radical right parties have lost most of their voters to the SVP in recent elections. This explains why the party system has actually become less fragmented. Such a transformation of an established party has been possible, in part at least, because of the federalist structure. The SVP of the canton of Zurich was the first to move away from the traditional, agrarian profile of the party. The other regional sections gradually followed. As we are going to see in the next chapter, this pattern of change stands in stark contrast to the more sudden transformation of the structure of electoral competition that characterises the Netherlands.

Introduction
In their introduction to Dutch politics, Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 19) put the accent on the Netherlands as a country of minorities, without any doubt, as they maintain, the single most important characteristic of Dutch politics. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, although a numerical minority, the Liberals had dominated Dutch politics thanks to franchise restrictions. As the franchise was enlarged, however, they were gradually crowded out of political power and became a minority among others. Those other minorities have been structured by religion and class. Andeweg and Irwin argue that a socioeconomic leftright dimension and a religioussecular dimension have always been and still are of crucial importance for the structuration of Dutch politics. As far as religion is concerned, the Catholics, who corresponded to about one-third of the population in the late nineteenth century, did not constitute the only minority, since the Protestants were divided into a more orthodox and a more mainstream current. The religious groups all created their own parties: in addition to the Catholic party (KVP), the religious differences gave rise to two major Protestant parties the more orthodox Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and the more mainstream Christian Historical Union (CHU) next to a host of additional small parties. The class based minority the working class1 entered the political arena relatively late due to the late industrialization of the country. When the mobilization of the working class by the SocialDemocratic Party (PvdA) got underway, its appeal had to compete
1
The authors would like to thank Philip van Praag for his very helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter. The working class constituted a minority everywhere in Western Europe (Przeworski and Sprague 1986), but in the Netherlands it has always been relatively small, given the early importance of the service sector.
154
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with the mobilization of the denominational parties which crossed the newly developing class divide. The Social Democrats were left with only the secular manual workers to organize a category that fell far short of a majority. Subsequently, a small Communist Party (CPN) and a host of small parties of the radical left added to the further political fragmentation of the working class. The Dutch minorities did not just structure party politics, but also constituted tightly organized groups or subcultures that organized every aspect of social life in the Netherlands. As is well known, Dutch society was segmented into so-called pillars (zuilen) and the members of these pillars lived their entire lives within the confines of these subcultural communities. This segmented society was held together by elitecooperation, as described by Lijpharts (1975) model of consociational democracy: segmentation or pillarization at the mass level, cooperation at the elite level, this was the characteristic combination of the Dutch model of democracy. Elite cooperation may have benefited from the surviving Republican culture of compromise. More decisively, however, it may have resulted from the rational behavior on the part of the political elites who had to accept the fact that, in a society of multiple minorities, no single community could impose itself on all the others (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 35f.). For our purposes, it is crucial that the pillarized structure of Dutch society has started to come apart since the mid-1960s. The popularization of technical innovations such as television, new methods of contraception and private cars along with a general rise in the standard of living contributed to an increasing individual social and geographic mobility and to an increasing communication between the pillars. Depillarization, i.e. the specific Dutch form of the weakening and gradual disappearance of traditional social and cultural patterns, probably had a more profound impact than in the other Western European countries.
Social and economic context conditions The relative strength of traditional cleavages
The most spectacular illustration of the process of depillarization is provided by the far-reaching secularization of the Netherlands. This process has already started at the turn of the twentieth century, as can be
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seen from the development of religious non-affiliation (Sasaki and Suzuki 1987). On the eve of World War II, almost one-sixth of the Dutch population older than 19 was unaffiliated; and, by the late 1960s, this fraction had risen to about one-quarter. Then, the process accelerated and the Netherlands experienced a profound value-change in the domain of private, moral aspects of life, a change so profound that we can speak of a cultural revolution (Kriesi 1993: 54f.). Since then, the Netherlands has been one of the most secularized countries in Europe (see Table 2.1, Part(a)). At the political level, this process of cultural change manifested itself above all in the electoral decline of the denominational parties. By 1972 the election that constitutes our point of departure in the subsequent analysis the Catholic party (KVP), the one most seriously affected, was left with 17.7% of the vote (see Table 7.1) and only half of its original number of seats. The class divide has also lost much of its acuity (Table 2.1, Part (b)). With respect to this cleavage, depillarization manifested itself in a decline of the Social Democratic party (PvdA), which suffered a heavy defeat in the elections of 1967, and in the fragmentation of the left. This fragmentation had already set in with the foundation of the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) in 1959. It was accentuated by the foundation of a radical-liberal party in 1966, the Democrats 66 (D66); by the secession of radical members of the KVP, who founded the Radical Party (PPR); and by the secession of moderate members from the PvdA, who founded the Democratic Socialists 70 (DS70). The PvdA was temporarily weakened and the socialist vote decreased considerably throughout the 1960s.

Together with Austria and Switzerland, the Netherlands belongs to the small open economies of Western Europe which have become known for their successful integration into the world markets (see Table 2.2). As one of the six founding members of the EU, the Dutch economy is particularly well integrated into the European common market: almost 80% of Dutch exports go to partners in the EU. In the period under study, the Dutch economy went from an exemplary basket case to an exemplary success story. It seriously deteriorated during the early 1980s. The level of unemployment which had attained around 5% in the late 1970s rose to unprecedented heights at the

Elections 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003
194563
1967
24.6 5.3 6.8 3.9 1.4 1.8 2.5 21.8 8.6 6.3 2.3 1.6 0.4 2.2 1.8 0.9 31.9 2.1 1.0 0.4 30.8 2.0 2.0 29.4 1.9 2.3 17.7 8.8 4.8 34.6 1.8 1.9 35.3 1.9 2.2 22.2 1.7 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.8 1.5 4.7 5.4 1.7 0.9 1.7 11.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 0.5 4.3 1.8 2.3 1.6 0.4 6.1 0.4 7.9 1.3 15.5
27.3 4.1
33.8 0.7
28.3
30.4
33.3
31.9
24.0
29.0 3.5 9.1
15.1 5.9 5.1
27.3 6.3 4.1
Election results (% of the valid votes) Left PvdA 29.0 23.6 DS70 SP D66 4.5 CPN 5.7 3.6 PSP (2.4) 2.9 PPR GLa 3.5 7.3
7.0
5.1
Christian democrats and religious parties KVP 31.0 26.5 ARP 10.9 9.9 CHU 8.5 8.1 CDA SGP 2.3 2.0 (0.7) 0.9 CUb Orthodox Catholic (1.3)
18.4 1.8 3.3
27.9 1.7 2.5
28.6 1.7 2.1
Table 7.1 (cont.)

Elections 1971 10.3 1.1 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.9 2.5 3.6 2.6 82.7 5.8 0.6 14.4 1.9 17.9 0.8 17.3 23.1 17.4 14.6 20.0 24.7 15.4 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 17.9
194563
1967
Right VVDc BP Centre Party AOV/union55+ LPF Others 3.8 86.1 7.2 85.5 6.9 74.9 4.0 78.2 4.6 76.5 4.3 73.5 3.8 74.4 3.9 0.9 1.7 2.2 1.6 1.6 0.8 2.3 80.6 5.2
9.1 (1.4)
10.7 4.8
2.5
17.0 2.4 83.5 6.1
5.7 1.2 80.0 5.0
Party system features Rae ENPP 4.4
84.0 6.2
Abbreviations: PvdA (Labour Party), DS70 (Democratic Socialist 70), SP (Socialist Party), D66 (Democrat 66), PSP (Pacifist Socialist Party), CPN (Communist Party), GL (Green Left), KVP (Catholic Peoples Party), ARP (Anti Revolutionary Party), CHU (Christian Historical Union), CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal), SGP (Radical Political Party), CU (Christian Union), VVD (Liberal Party), BP (Farmers Party), CD (Centre Democrats), AOV (United Old Persons League), LPF (List Pim Fortuyn) a The election result of the GL in 1986 is the combined result of CPN, PSP, PPR and EV votes (van der Brug and Pellikaan 2003, 2). b The election result of the CU from 1986 to 1998 is the combined result of GPV and RPF votes (van der Brug and Pellikaan 2003, 2). c 1946: PvdV (Party of Freedom).
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beginning of the 1980s. Underlying the rapid rise of Dutch unemployment were both the decline in employment caused by the international economic crisis and the above-average growth of the labour force caused by demographic factors, as well as the long-delayed rise in the rate of employment of women (Visser 1987). The Dutch welfare state had been late in developing. When the number of beneficiaries of the various programmes grew more rapidly than anticipated, it became almost impossible to finance all the expenditure. Fortunately, natural gas was discovered in the north of the country, which provided substantial income to the government who used it to cover welfare benefits a practice which became known as the Dutch disease. However, not even the income from natural gas was sufficient to finance all the welfare programmes, which meant that the size of the budget deficit grew steadily. To cure the Dutch disease, several bitter pills had to be administered by successive governments, the most important of which arguably was the reduction of wage costs by a revival of the traditional tripartite cooperation between the social partners and the government to improve the international competitiveness of the Dutch economy.2 This policy of wage moderation has become known as the Polder model. Visser and Hemerijck (1997: 180), however, caution against calling it a model: wage moderation was not the result of a grand design, but rather the net outcome of various small steps and reactions to new circumstances. Thus, the famous Wassenaar Accord of 1982, the symbolic event that marks the change of strategy on the part of the unions from earlier polarization to cooperation was only recognized as the harbinger of new patterns of policy-making with the benefit of hindsight. The upshot of these measures was a Dutch miracle, a decisive improvement of the economy, especially in the course of the 1990s. The most impressive aspect of the miracle consisted in the creation of a large number of new jobs 18.5% in the 1990s, an increase surpassed only by Luxemburg and Ireland.3 After 2000, the Dutch miracle came to an end and the economy went into a decline. Becker (2005) attributes this decline to the bursting of the house price bubble. Economic growth fell more sharply than in
2
See Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 196201); Visser und Hemerijck (1997), Rhodes (2001: 1814). Some observers suspect that the Dutch miracle did not have anything to do with cooperation: see Becker (2005).
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other European countries, where the bubble did not burst. In 2003, the economy actually shrank. The unemployment rate, which had fallen to 3.3% in 2001, rose again to 6.2% in 2005. The budget deficit grew again, too. Starting in 2002, cuts in public spending were decided and implemented by the new Balkenende government. The Polder model fell apart.

Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 3941) maintain that there is no new cleavage to replace the declining importance of the traditional pillars. But they take note of the changing composition of Dutch society as a result of immigration (see Table 2.4). The three main sources of immigration to the Netherlands are guestworkers recruited in the 1960s who became permanent residents by 2003 an estimated 340,000 persons of Turkish and 295,000 of Moroccan origin live in the Netherlands; people from the (former) Dutch colonies, with the largest group coming from Surinam (320,000) and the Netherlands Antilles (120,000); and asylum-seekers, their number fluctuating but declining from 44,000 in 2000 to 13,000 in 2003. There are other groups of immigrants, but the Dutch debate about a multicultural society focuses on the non-Western immigrant groups. Perhaps most importantly, these groups account for the growth of Islam, which, with 920,000 Muslims in 2003, corresponds to almost 6% of the population. Faced with this immigration, the Netherlands adopted multicultural policies in the early 1980s, which attributed multicultural rights to the new minorities. These policies were based on an elite consensus and consisted of four elements: stability of residence after five years, enlarged participation including easier naturalization and voting rights for foreigners in local elections, special programmes for underprivileged minorities, including special assistance for them to organize and represent the various groups, and the fight against racist discrimination (Thrnhardt 2000: 170). On the whole, an attitude of pragmatic compromise became prevalent, with rising optimism about the possibility of solving existing problems, and a sense of pride about the Netherlands as an open and tolerant country (p. 171). The leaders of the main political parties made a gentlemens agreement to abstain from using immigration as an issue in electoral campaigns, and not win votes at the cost of immigrants (p. 173).
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However, all was not well with Dutch multicultural policies. Before the issue exploded onto the political scene, there was already considerable factual evidence for their failure.4 The Dutch model of pillarization could not simply be extended to the integration of immigrants. Offering new ethnic and religious groups a formal and symbolic form of equality, which in practice reinforced ethnic cleavages and reproduced segregation on a distinctly unequal basis, this model proved to be inadequate for that purpose. The elite consensus held for almost ten years, until Frits Bolkestein, the parliamentary leader of the Liberals (VVD), broke it in the autumn of 1991, when he warned publicly against giving in too much to the cultural peculiarities of immigrants, and argued that they should be expected to integrate much more into the Dutch way of life. In this period, policy shifted from an emphasis on special treatment of migrant groups to policies for individual migrants within Dutch society (Enzinger 2003).

The Dutch party system has gone through troubled times since the late 1960s. This period of transformation was essentially a result of the process of depillarization and the rise of the New Left. Structurally, it was linked to secularization and the growth of the opposition between managers and socio-cultural professionals in the new middle class (Kriesi 1993). Under the impact of the New Left, the traditional pragmatic style of the PvdA was replaced by a strategy of polarization, which was electorally successful, but proved to be a dismal failure in terms of political power (van Praag 1991). By the end of the 1980s, after the main denominational parties had merged and successfully consolidated, and after the PvdA had definitely given up its polarizing strategy, it seemed as if the system had stabilized (see Tromp 1989: 97; Lijphart 1989). This is illustrated by the decline in the effective number of parties from an extremely high level of 7.2 in the late 1960s to a low of 3.8/3.9 in the mid-to-late 1980s (see Table 7.1). But, by the end of the 1980s, the system had only reached a temporary equilibrium. A new period of trouble was about to set in, this time driven by the new opposition between winners and losers of the opening up of the national borders.
4
Documented in a report of the WRR (the Scientific Council for Government Policy) (Koopmans et al. 2005: 245).
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New challengers appeared, the number of effective parties increased again to 5.8 in 1994 and up to 6.1 in 2002 and electoral volatility reached unprecedented heights. Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 44) call the polarizing style in Dutch politics a temporary aberration. In the early 1990s, Dutch politics returned to elite cooperation, to compromise and even to consensus. Most importantly, the PvdA got rid of its ideological feathers, as Kok famously called the de-ideologization of the party. The purple coalition, which came to power after the 1994 elections, bridged the classic socialeconomic divide. Moreover, since the key cultural questions related to immigration were more or less consciously kept out of politics, the impression of convergence was reinforced. Under the purple coalition, the consensual atmosphere differed, however, from the days of pillarization it was due rather to converging visions on many political issues than the result of negotiations among opposing elites (Koole and Daalder 2002: 50). There was no longer an opposition. To the extent that there was one, it came out of the coalition itself in the person of the parliamentary leader of the VVD Bolkestein. When he left for Europe in 1998, this last element of critique disappeared as well. Dutch politics became unidimensional (de Rooy 2005: 191). In spite of the continuity in the realm of policy, the first purple coalition still had the allure of opening up rather than closing the political cartel, which is so typical for consensus democracies. The second purple coalition, however, had no such redeeming features and thus contributed to the rise of a new challenger. If getting rid of ideological feathers was a liberating event, there was not much to replace them (de Rooy 2005: 223). Moreover, if the purple coalition had contributed to the modernization of the Netherlands, to the completion of the transformation of a pillarized industrial state into an individualized service society (de Rooy 2005: 221), it had not contributed to the solution of the problems of the multicultural society. There was a latent potential for an anti-immigration party: Adriaansen et al. (2005: 235) show that, already in 1994, voters were waiting for such a party which did not have the stigma of being undemocratic or right-extremist. In late 1993, with the increasing arrival of new asylum-seekers (see Figure 2.1), they became the most prominent issue in the media (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1995: 66). In the electoral campaign of 1994, Bolkestein had, for the first time, broken with the politically correct silence on immigration by presenting, one and a half
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months before the elections, a six-point plan to keep non-European immigrants out of the Netherlands. Although the party manifesto of the VVD did not even mention asylum-seekers as a political problem, Bolkestein succeeded in winning attention for the VVD with this issue (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1995: 35). In other words, Pim Fortuyn was not the first to break the taboo of the immigration issue, but his party was the first to make this issue a central element of its programme and to succeed in taking a radical stance on it without being considered undemocratic or extremist.
The new right-wing populist challenge

The new right-wing populist challenge came late to the Netherlands. But, when it came in the 2002 election, it caused an earthquake in the Dutch party system. With respect to electoral volatility, this election ranks fourth among all West European general elections in the period 19002002 (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2002). Only the Italian elections of 1994, the German elections of 1919 and the French elections of 1945 proved more unstable than the Dutch 2002 elections. However, in contrast to these other three electoral earthquakes, the Dutch 2002 election is the only one that is not associated with an institutional break in the democratic system. In 2002, the incumbent parties of the purple coalition lost forty-three of their ninety-seven seats, while the new right-wing populist Lijst Pim Fortuyn won twenty-six seats and became the second largest party behind the CDA, who won another fourteen. Fortuyn had entered the campaign on 25 November 2001, when Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) chose him as its leading candidate. When Fortuyn famously declared Islam to be a backward culture in February 2002, Liveable Netherlands immediately dropped him as its leader. In order to still be able to participate in the election, he hastily put together a list of candidates under his own name (The Lijst Pim Fortuyn, or LPF), created a new phenomenon for the Netherlands a candidate-party (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 72) and succeeded in inheriting most of the supporters of Liveable Netherlands. Fortuyn benefited from two sets of special circumstances. First, there was a leadership crisis in each of the three major parties. After the formation of the cabinet in 1998, Bolkestein had been made a member of the European Commission and was replaced by Hans Dijkstal,
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Deputy Prime Minister in the first purple coalition, who proved to be a much weaker leader than his predecessor. In the autumn of 2001, after an internal crisis, the CDA elected a new leader, too, the young and fairly inexperienced Member of Parliament Jan Peter Balkenende. Finally, in August 2001, Kok decided that he no longer wanted to be Prime Minister. As Kok withdrew, much of the PvdAs political capital was destroyed (de Rooy 2005: 215). His successor, Ad Melkert, was rather unpopular and the PvdAs strategy of focusing on Melkert as the next Prime Minister proved to be a major strategic mistake. Secondly, Fortuyn benefited from the change in the economic and political climate, from the end of the roaring 1990s, which came with the bursting of the Dutch house price bubble in 2001 and with the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001. But Fortuyns success cannot be explained only by favorable circumstances: his success can mainly be attributed to his capacity to determine the key issues of the campaign in 2002 and to put all the mainstream parties on the defensive on these issues. Fortuyn not only attacked the policies of the purple coalition, but consensual Dutch politics as symbolized by this coalition. He wanted to free the people from paternalistic governance structures and elite cartels. In his book, The Mess of Eight Years Purple (De Puinhopen van acht jaar Paars), which he presented to the public at the height of the campaign on 14 March 2002, he criticizes the paternalistic culture of the Dutch elite the regentencultuur in a way that reminds us of the New Lefts attacks on the pillarized society in the 1960s. He argues that the Dutch are a very democratic people, but that their political and administrative elites do not care for democracy at all. He denounces the closed world of the elites with its autistic elements, with its very special world view, and even with a jargon of its own that is hardly comprehensible for outsiders (Fortuyn 2002: 12). Fortuyn also fundamentally changed the Dutch campaigning style (van Praag 2005). Traditionally, Dutch election campaigns were factual, boring and amateurish. The private lives of politicians were kept out of politics, and journalists respected the private sphere. Moreover, campaigning was inexpensive and little professionalized. In 2002, campaigning became much more personalized, and Fortuyn introduced negative campaigning into Dutch electoral contests. There were heavy personal and emotional attacks by Fortuyn and on Fortuyn, the campaigns became more expensive and more professional. Extraordinary
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circumstances characterized the end of the campaign: a cabinet crisis in the final weeks and the premature end of the campaign after the murder of Fortuyn by an animal-rights activist shortly before election day. True to the expected impact of the consensual tradition on the mainstream parties strategies (accommodate and coopt), after its great success, the LPF was invited to join a centre-right coalition with Christian Democrats and Liberals led by the Christian Democrat leader Balkenende, who had never excluded the possibility of a coalition with the LPF during the campaign (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 43). However, without prior experience in government, without a coherent programme and without its leader, the LPF proved unable to function as a governing party. Conflicts with the LPF party executive paralyzed the government, and, after only eighty-seven days in office, the parliamentary party leaders of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals pulled the plug on the coalition. New elections were held in January 2003. The LPF lost two-thirds of its vote, while the PvdA, which recouped most of the losses it had suffered the year before, was the big winner.
Analysis of the demand side: the voters political potentials

As we have argued in Chapter 1, the voters political potentials define the opportunities and constraints for the mobilization of the new cleavage by the political parties. We follow the two-step procedures described in Chapter 3 for our analysis of the political potentials. Table 7.2 presents the factor analyses to determine the configuration of the Dutch space for all five Dutch elections included in this study. They all yield two-dimensional solutions. Moreover, with the exception of the 1972 election, the two dimensions closely correspond to the economic and cultural axes that we expected to find. Finally, again with the exception of 1972, the first and most important factor clearly refers to the cultural dimension, indicating that voters attitudes are more polarized with respect to cultural matters than with respect to the economy. Contrary to what we find from the 1990s onwards, in 1972, the dimensional structure of the political potentials is somewhat blurred, because the cultural and economic aspects are not clearly separated. To some extent, the blurring of the pattern for this election may be an artefact, since we do not have any measurements for the voters
1994 1998 2002 2003
1972
Attitude 0.71 0.12 0.25 0.27 0.74 0.54 0.50 0.78 0.59 0.41 2.64 0.29 1435 0.34 1.20 0.13 2.00 0.33 0.51 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.56 0.72 0.77 0.16 0.64 0.30 0.27 0.01 0.21 1.10 0.18 1444 0.41 0.11 0.72 0.78 0.62 0.74 0.78 2.23 0.45 1217 0.76 0.12 0.20 0.47 0.07 0.04 0.26 1.29 0.16 0.61 0.71 0.09 0.73 0.13 0.90 0.18 0.37 0.06 0.24 0.99 0.20
Factor Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 1 2 (cultural) (economic) (cultural) (economic) (cultural) (economic) (cultural) (economic)
0.16
0.12
0.79 0.60
0.39 0.70 0.81
Welfare state Economic 0.37 0.57 liberalism Budget 0.42 0.46 Environment Institutional 0.51 0.39 reform Multiculturalism Cultural 0.11 0.69 liberalism Minorities Europe 0.76 0.12 Security Immigration 0.15 0.57 Polit. rights foreigners Defence 0.65 0.33 Eigenvalue 1.93 1.27 Variance 0.28 0.18 explained N 1318
0.38 2.61 0.33
1160
Note: factor loadings > .5 are in bold.
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attitudes to the welfare state.5 The first dimension in 1972 was mainly defined by the attitudes to institutional reform (support of further democratization of Dutch political institutions) and support of the EU, on the one hand, and the defence of Dutch NATO membership, on the other. The second dimension was associated with the contrast between cultural liberalism and immigration, but also with economic liberalism. For the elections of the 1990s and the years 2000, the dimensional structure closely conforms to our expectations. We always find the strong contrast between cultural liberalism (and multiculturalism) and a tough immigration policy (as well as a refusal to grant political rights to foreigners) on the cultural dimension, while the economic dimension is always defined by the contrast between economic liberalism and the welfare state (or environmental protection). It is interesting to note, moreover, that, for Dutch voters, attitudes to the EU become rather closely associated with both dimensions. This corresponds to the idea presented in Chapter 1 that the new integration/demarcation cleavage has both an economic an a cultural aspect. Figure 7.1 indicates how the average party voters are positioned in the two-dimensional space. To save space, this figure does not include the 2003 election. In fact, the pattern for 2003 is virtually identical to the one for 2002. For each election, we find a triangular configuration of the three major parties. The PvdAs voters constitute the upper lefthand corner of the triangle, while the voters of the CDA and the VVD are always located in the opposite quadrant in the lower right-hand side of the graph. The CDAs voters are generally as culturally conservative as the VVDs voters, but they are typically somewhat less economically liberal than the latter. In the course of the 1990s, the voters of the two parties tend to move further apart on the economic dimension, as the CDAs voters become somewhat less and the VVD voters somewhat more economically liberal. This leads to triangles of a less compressed shape. We also note that the PvdA and D66 voters, who had originally been positioned very close to each other, tend to move apart, as the D66 voters become more economically and (temporarily, in 1998) more culturally liberal.
We have such a measure only for the elections of 1998, but, for 1994 and 2002, environmental protection may serve as a proxy for the welfare state category.
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Figure 7.1 Demand side of party competition, 1972, 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections (The Netherlands)
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The overall impression is, however, one of great stability in the configuration of the voters mobilized political potentials in the transformed space throughout the 1990s. This confirms the results by van Holsteyn et al. (2003), who found little change with respect to the average placement of the voters during the 1990s (19942002). Given the stability of the voters attitudes during this period, these authors conclude that the electoral change in 2002 was not due to a shift to the right among the voters, but to the addition of a new product in the electoral marketplace (pp. 81f.). The addition of the LPF, indeed, adds a fourth point to the diagram for the 2002 election, which is quite far removed from the traditional triangle. Note that the position of the LPFs voters closely resembles that of the former radical-right voters (RR). The only difference is that this position now corresponds to a much larger group of voters. With the rise of the LPF, the radical-right voters have changed from a marginal sect into a key component of the Dutch electorate. As a consequence of the shift of conservative voters to the LPF, the configuration of the voters of the mainstream parties polarizes to a considerable extent, i.e. the size of the traditional triangle defined by the major parties increases. The main reason is that the by now much smaller group of the remaining PvdA voters positions itself decidedly more to the left-liberal end of the political space. In fact, the voters mobilized by the PvdA close the gap to Groen Links voters. The increasing distance between CDA and VVD voters also contributes to a widening of the triangle, but this phenomenon has already set in before 2002, as we have observed above. Considering the positioning of the social groups, we turn to Figure 7.2, which presents the trends with respect to the distance between the average positions of some selected socio-demographic categories in the two-dimensional space. The corresponding groups can also be located in Figure 7.1. Let us start with religion. The first thing to note is that the three religious groups Catholics, Dutch reformed and Calvinists are always positioned close to each other and close to the CDA. To the extent that there is a remaining religious cleavage in the electorate, it opposes the secularized (non-religious) group to the joint group of practising Christians (represented by the Catholics in Figure 7.1). The positioning of these two contrasting groups is virtually indistinguishable on the economic dimension and differs only with regard to the cultural axis. But, even in cultural terms, the distance between the two has become relatively small compared to the differences we find for
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(b) class
Figure 7.2 Demand side, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (The Netherlands)
education, which corresponds to our hypothesis that the cultural dimension tends to loose its traditional, religious connotations. This finding does not preclude that on specific cultural issues such as euthanasia or abortion religion is still the crucial discriminating factor. It means that, overall, positioning on cultural issues is less and less determined by religion.6 In a similar vein, we observe that the voters
6
Van Holsteyn and Irwin (2002: 4753) and Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 1015) insist on the importance of religion for Dutch voters. They do so by reducing the economic issues to the reduction of income disparities and the cultural issues to euthanasia, and by analyzing the voting behaviour of the electorate that is located in the heartlands of each party. They show that, in 2002/3, more than threequarters of the voters in the Christian-Democratic heartland voted either for the
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of the small, orthodox Protestant parties (indicated by OC in Figure 7.1), who have been as far removed from the mainstream parties in 1972 as the voters of the radical right in the 1990s, tend to lose some of their extreme cultural conservatism and move towards the mainstream of CDA voters. In fact, by the early 1990s, education has taken over the traditional role of religion when it comes to defining the voters positions on the cultural dimension: while education was more closely associated with the economic dimension in the 1970s, it has come to be the most distinguishing feature with regard to the cultural dimension: the highly educated are most culturally liberal, the least educated most culturally conservative, with the medium group taking an intermediary position. Contrary to expectations, however, the structuring impact of education on the cultural dimension has decreased since the late 1970s. On the one hand, the least educated have become somewhat more liberal in cultural terms. On the other hand, the cultural liberalism of the most educated has declined quite considerably. It is the latter effect which is unexpected. It probably reflects the impact of the breakdown of the Dutch elites consensus on multicultural policies and the general hardening of the Dutch attitude to immigration. With respect to class, our measures for the Netherlands, unfortunately, are quite unsatisfactory. Reliable data for class exist only for 1972 and 1998, which is why we concentrate our discussion on these two elections. We note several, albeit limited, shifts in the expected direction.7 First, the average skilled and unskilled workers have shifted from the upper left-hand (left-liberal) quadrant to the lower right-hand (liberal-conservative) quadrant. By contrast, the routine non-manual employees have moved more to the left. In spite of these shifts, all three groups still stay close to the centre of the space in 1998. By 2002,
CDA (44% and 45% respectively) or for the orthodox Christian parties (33% in both elections). These are very important percentages. But they concern only 14% (2002) and 10% (2003) of the voters. For the hard-core Christian electorate, moral issues such as abortion or euthanasia remain crucial, but in order to evaluate overall trends we should not concentrate on shrinking, increasingly extreme groups within the electorate. Moreover, one should not use euthanasia alone for the operationalization of the cultural dimension, since this issue has very little to do with the key contrast between cultural openness and closure. For an analysis of the class-based political behaviour of the Dutch electorate at the end of the 1980s, see Kriesi (1993).
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however, under the impact of the mobilization by the LPF, the unskilled workers have moved further in the culturally conservative direction and form by that time clearly the most conservative group in class terms. Accordingly, the contrast between winners and losers, operationalized by the average distance between socio-cultural professionals and unskilled workers, increased somewhat during the 1990s. In the new middle class, the positioning of the social-cultural professionals and the technical specialists/managers contrasts quite sharply, but only on the cultural axis in 1972, with the social-cultural professionals constituting the culturally most liberal group. By 1998, the social-cultural specialists have moved further to the left, now becoming clearly the most left-liberal component of the electorate. At the same time, the technical specialists/managers have shifted to a culturally more liberal position while staying economically liberal. As a result, by the late 1990s, the two key components of the new middle class are primarily distinguished with regard to the economic axis. As far as the old middle class is concerned, the self-employed stay put in the economically liberal corner, remaining quite neutral in cultural terms. Compared to the contrast within the new middle class, the traditional class conflict indicated by the distance between skilled workers and selfemployed is, as expected, of declining importance.
Analysis of the supply side: the partys programmatic offer

In line with their difficulties of finding a new cleavage in Dutch politics, Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 62) believe that it is increasingly difficult to identify the dimensions along which Dutch political parties can be distinguished. In our analysis of the parties programmatic offer on the supply side, however, we have no difficulty in identifying the same two dimensions that we already found on the demand side. In fact, we find considerable confirmation for our general contention that (a) the political space in the Netherlands just as in other Western European countries has been (in the 1970s) and still is (in the 1990s) twodimensional, and that (b) the articulation of the new issues of the 1990s has been embedded in this two-dimensional structure, while transforming its meaning. The cultural dimension in particular was transformed and no longer primarily refers to a religioussecular contrast, but to a contrast between a libertarian-cosmopolitan-multicultural world view, and an authoritarian-nationalist-monocultural view. For
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the Dutch case, the transformation of the political space which we find for the 1990s confirms the analysis by Pellikaan et al. (2003) based on party manifestos. But note that, contrary to their analysis, our study does not make any a priori assumptions about the two-dimensionality or the contents of the two dimensions. Our results provide an empirical test of the two-dimensionality and its interpretation in terms of the new structural conflicts. They clearly contradict claims that the supply side of Dutch politics has become one-dimensional by 2002 and indicate that both the supply and the demand sides are two-dimensional. The election of 1972, which we have chosen as our standard of comparison in the Dutch case, falls into the period of the PvdAs polarizing strategy. It had become necessary after the precipitated fall of the previous coalition government headed by the leader of the ARP. Based on a common programme entitled Turning Point 1972 (Keerpunt 1972), the PvdA formed a pre-electoral reform coalition with the PPR and D66. However, compared to later elections, the 1972 election did not lead to any major changes in the party configurations. The KVP lost once more (4.1%), as did D66, while the PvdA (+2.7%), the PPR (+3%) and the VVD (+4%) won some seats. The PvdA became the largest party, but the reform coalition fell far short of the hoped-for majority. It was not able to form a government without accepting the KVP and ARP as coalition partners (van Praag 1991: 140). Indeed, from the vantage point of our comparative analysis, Dutch politics in the 1970s do not turn out to have been very polarized (see the first graph in Figure 7.3). There was very little polarization with regard to cultural issues, which, taken together, were already as salient as economic issues at the time: all major parties supported cultural liberalism and there was also little conflict with regard to other issues related to the cultural dimension, except for questions dealing with the Dutch participation in NATO and cuts in defence spending proposed by the progressive parties, and except for the discussion on abortion (Outshoorn 1986), which did not, however, play a significant role in the campaign of 1972. Immigration did not constitute an issue yet: the cultural debate was still dominated by depillarization and the cultural dimension was still defined by the opposition between cultural liberalism and the defence of traditional institutions (illustrated by the debate about defence). We observe some degree of polarization with regard to the socio-economic dimension: the three progressive parties are grouped together at the welfare-cum-cultural liberalism pole, the Christian parties (grouped together under their future label
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Figure 7.3 Supply side of party competition, 1972, 1994 and 1998 elections (The Netherlands)
CDA) endorse the welfare state almost as much as the progressive parties, while the VVD marks the opposite position. The expansion of the welfare state constitutes the most salient set of issues for all the major parties. By contrast, economic liberalism is hardly a salient issue at all and even the Liberals do not wholeheartedly embrace it. Finally, in 1972, we can already identify a feature of the Dutch political space that we shall encounter in all subsequent elections as well: the cultural and the economic dimension of the political space are somewhat correlated, which leads to a rather compressed triangular configuration of the three major parties.
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Throughout the 1990s, the role of the welfare state continues to be a very salient issue for all major parties, while economic liberalism remains of little importance for all of them. In 1994, support for the welfare state has, however, considerably weakened among its former partisan promoters. The PvdA, and even more so the CDA, have taken their distance from the welfare state, and have made some steps in the direction of economic liberalism.8 Contrary to the results of Pennings and Keman (2003), which are based on manifesto data, we do not find a convergence between the major parties on the socio-economic dimension, however (see the graph for 1994 in Figure 7.3). Rather, all the parties shift towards economic liberalism, but to varying degrees: while the PvdA and the CDA make some gestures in this direction, the VVD now wholeheartedly embraces the new creed. By 1994, cultural issues were, on the whole, considerably more salient in the electoral campaign than issues related to the socio-economic dimension. As Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 106) point out, it is not always the economy that is decisive for elections, and it is unwise to presume that it is. Moreover, the cultural dimension is now more polarizing than in the 1970s, and its contents have changed in line with our hypotheses: the dimension is now defined by the opposition between cultural liberalism and immigration. Compared to the 1970s, all major parties except the CDA now adopt a more conservative position, with the VVD becoming the most explicitly conservative party.9 Except for the CDA, cultural liberalism loses support and, temporarily, some of its salience. Immigration becomes a very salient issue for the VVD (Bolkestein), but not for the other parties. Finally, in 1994 as well as in the subsequent elections, security comes to the fore as another key issue, a valence issue of considerable salience for all major parties, but most important for the VVD. Summarizing the emerging configuration of the 1990s, the overall configuration in 1994 does not turn out to be much different from that of the 1970s, except for the fact that it has moved to the right on both dimensions. Moreover, the CDA and the VVD have changed places
8
As we have seen above, the PvdA had been part of the Lubbers III cabinet that had continued the no-nonsense economic reforms of the previous cabinets headed by Lubbers. These reforms involved substantial cuts in the welfare state especially in the disability insurance which had gotten out of hand. Since the PvdA participated in the reform of the welfare state, it lost its social image for part of its former electorate (van Ingen Schenau and Benschop 1995: 46). The joint movement towards greater cultural conservatism is confirmed by the analysis of party manifestos by Pennings and Keman (2003), according to whom the turning point in this respect had occurred during the previous campaign in 1989.
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with regard to cultural conservatism, and the overall structure is more polarized than it had been in the past. There is quite a clear opposition between the PvdA and the VVD in the political space, with the CDA being positioned in the middle (see the graph for 1994 in Figure 7.1). Nevertheless, together with D66, the two polar parties were finally forming the new purple coalition a coalition which corresponded, at the time, to the widespread desire for change in the Dutch public. As our analysis reveals, however, this new coalition did not have a solid grounding in the configuration of the political space. As Kok, who became the new premier, said in a later interview, this kind of coalition did not come naturally to him at all in fact, as he said, he had, an above average need to get used to it (de Rooy and te Velde 2005: 67). The 1998 election campaign a typical re-election campaign confirms the transformation of the cultural dimension and the overall configuration of the major parties does not change very much. To the extent that there is a change, it is back to the original situation of the 1970s: the PvdA, with its campaign slogan Strong and social, returns to its original position on the welfare state, and the CDA returns to its traditionally more conservative position on the cultural axis. Europe becomes an object of the campaign because of the conditions under which Wim Duisenbergs nomination as the first President of the European Central Bank took place: Bolkestein, the leader of the Liberals parliamentary group, heavily criticized the deal with France and talked about the disregard for Dutch national interests.10 In this campaign, immigration had not been a salient issue. The VVD had tried to raise the issue, but did so only belatedly (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1998: 74). In the final weeks of the campaign, Bolkestein was almost alone in calling for a tougher immigration policy (Lindhout and van Praag 2000: 102f.). In 2002, Fortuyn moved the political agenda of the campaign from the economic to the cultural domain more than ever before. Immigration, security and the restructuring of the public sector were his key issues. With regard to immigration, Fortuyn said publicly what many voters apparently had been thinking, or saying in private. We should note, however, that Fortuyns position with respect to immigration was not quite comparable to that of the other radical challengers of the populist right: he was
10
According to the official deal, the Frenchman Claude Trichet was to replace the Dutchman Duisenberg in the middle of his mandate as president of the European Central Bank.
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opposed to any kind of cultural relativism, but not to immigration per se. An exception among the populist parties of the new radical right, he attacked Islam in the name of the universalist principles of modernity (human rights, gender equality, separation of church and state), and asked for immigrants to adapt to these principles, if they wanted to stay in the Netherlands (Fortuyn 2002: 15367). By contrast, the other parties of the populist right tend to oppose universalism and human rights and hold that divergent cultures cannot reach shared understandings or be judged by common standards (Antonio 2000: 63). The new populist rights concept of ethnopluralism insists on the incompatibility of cultures and ethnicities and advocates the right of Europeans to be different and to resist cultural mixing (Minkenberg 2000: 180). Fortuyns ideology was a striking combination of universalist adherence to Western values, libertarian thinking, a belief in market forces and a strong aversion to bureaucracy and state interference (van Praag 2003: 9). Surprisingly, however, the importance of immigration for the 2002 elections does not show up in our data for the 2002 campaign, nor does the LPF appear to be the party most opposed to immigration. According to our data, it is the VVD which takes by far the toughest position in this respect. To be sure, Fortuyn had taken a very tough stance on immigration early on in 2002. In an early stage of the campaign, Balkenende, the new leader of the CDA, had already raised the failure of the purple parties to deal with immigration issues, albeit in more moderate terms than Fortuyn. The members of the purple coalition, by contrast, had originally agreed to ignore Fortuyn and to focus on issues of which they had been traditional owners: the PvdA had opted for centring its campaign on socio-economic themes, the VVD for presenting itself as the party that had set the states finances in order and that advocated a vigorous approach to criminality (van Praag 2003: 13). However, the campaign ran a completely different course. The governing parties were compelled to react to the agenda set by Fortuyn. While the CDA as an opposition party was essentially spared by the new challenger,11 the VVD and the PvdA took the brunt of his attacks, became nervous and adopted ever harsher viewpoints on immigration. In other words, all
11
Van Praag (2003: 12) observes: Although Balkenende and Fortuyn met each other on several occasions in November 2001 and the two men could get on with each other, the leader of the CDA denied afterwards that there had been an agreement not to clash so that the two parties could fight together against the purple coalition.
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major parties, but especially the VVD, adopted an accommodating strategy with respect to immigration. Then, during the last weeks of the campaign, Fortuyn caught his competitors by surprise again and put the VVD in particular in an awkward position, since he now announced that illegal immigrants who had already been in the Netherlands for a long time would be granted a general pardon, thereby positioning himself to the left of both the VVD and the PvdA on the issue of asylum seekers. VVD campaigners were completely embarrassed, and were uncertain how to deal with this announcement. From a campaigning point of view, it turned out to be a brilliant move, since people whom he had already won over with his earlier tough talk did not turn away from him, while the change to more moderate pronouncements probably succeeded in rallying more cautious voters to the LPF (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 434, 578). According to our data, security was the most important issue for the LPF, followed by the (restructuring of the) welfare state and cultural liberalism (i.e. the critique of multicultural society). The CDA and the VVD followed an accommodating strategy in both respects. By contrast, the parties of the centre-left D66 and the PvdA tended to avoid the issues raised by Fortuyn and focused their campaigns on a defence issue: the Joint Strike Fighter (the expected successor for the F-1612)! To the extent that they did address the issues raised by Fortuyn, they also adopted accommodating positions positions critical of cultural liberalism (PvdA) and strongly supportive of law and order (D66). Moreover, their traditional support for the welfare state weakened considerably. Together with the lack of popular appeal of their new party leaders, these strategic choices may go a long way towards explaining their dramatic losses at the polls. The appearance of Fortuyn and the difficulties of the mainstream parties in adapting their strategies to this new challenger disturbed the traditional configuration of the Dutch political space, which is reflected in the bizarre result that the usual endpoints of the cultural dimension cultural liberalism and opposition to immigration are located very closely together in the political space for the 2002 elections (see Figure 7.4). Accordingly, the emerging configuration is difficult to interpret, but
12
The data presented by Heijting and de Haan (2005: 53f.) confirm the crucial importance of defense issues (the joint strike fighter and the report over the Dutch responsibility for the disaster of Srebrenica) for this campaign.
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Figure 7.4 Supply side of party competition, 2002 and 2003 elections (The Netherlands)
one of its key aspects is quite clear: under the impact of Fortuyns challenge, all parties except the VVD have moved even further away from cultural liberalism than they did previously. Strangely enough, the VVD appears to be the party closest to both cultural liberalism and a tough immigration policy a result which is linked to a particular twist of the campaign: the VVD minister of justice of the purple cabinet was attacked by the partys opponents during the campaign for his seemingly liberal anti-drugs policy (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 56). As a result of another particular twist Fortuyns change of position on immigration late in the 2002 campaign, the LPF appears to be comparatively lenient on immigration, since our data cover only the later stages of the campaign. With the emergence of the LPF, the Dutch triangle transforms into a trapezoid, with the LPF occupying a rather strange position one equally removed from cultural liberalism, opposition to immigration and the welfare state. The disturbance of the dimensionality of the Dutch political space by Fortuyn proved to be of a temporary nature, however. In the 2003 election, the contrast between cultural liberalism and opposition to immigration on
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the cultural dimension is restored and this dimension can again be interpreted in line with our hypotheses. But Fortuyns challenge has left a legacy which follows the pattern of accommodate-and-coopt that we proposed for consensus democracies: all parties took note of their own failure to address the various problems surrounding immigration and took more vociferous and harder stands. This helped to blow out what was left of the light among the followers of Fortuyn (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 234).13 While tougher security and immigration policies became with the possible exception of D6614 generally accepted, all major parties had by now abandoned their traditional cultural liberalism and their support for environmental protection. The shift in the configuration of the CDA and the PvdA away from their traditional support of the welfare state and of all three parties away from their traditional support of cultural liberalism, which had already become visible in the 1994 elections, has been accentuated. The LPF, although severely beaten, did not simply disappear. But it occupies an unexpected position: its staunch support of budget cuts puts it in the economic liberalism hook, although it hardly distinguishes itself from the other parties with regard to cultural issues. Given the proximity of the CDA and the PvdA, the Dutch party trapezoid changes back to a triangle with the VVD in the conservative pole and the LPF in the liberal conservative one! Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 234) suggest that Fortuyn had a lasting impact by speeding up the process of normalization of politics in the Netherlands, in the sense of drawing Dutch politics closer to the dominant pattern in Europe. From our vantage point, this is certainly true with respect to the transformation of the cultural axis. Although not visible in our graph for the 2002 elections due to the special circumstances of this election, Fortuyns challenge accentuated the transformation of the cultural axis in line with our main hypotheses. With respect to the party configuration, however, normalization has not yet been reached. It would imply the emergence of a triangular structure with either the LPF, another possible challenger from the new radical right, or the VVD occupying the national-conservative pole, and with either the CDA or the VVD shifting to a more liberal conservative or
13
14
For more details, see Heijting and de Haan (2005: 56). However, although immigration was a salient issue, especially for the right, it was not the key issue; driven by CDA, VVD and LPF, the most salient issue proved to be public finances and the need to make economies. Due to insufficient data, D66 is not in the graph for the 2003 elections.
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conservative liberal position. After the premature death of its natural leader Fortuyn, the future shape of the Dutch new radical right has not yet been settled. It is an open question whether there will be new challengers to replace Fortuyn outside of the established parties. In the final analysis, however, the eventual outcome of the transformation of the Dutch electoral space will very much depend on the strategies of the mainstream parties with respect to this new challenge.
Conclusion
Our analysis of both the supply side and the demand side confirm our overall hypotheses about the transformation of the national political space under the impact of this new cleavage. For all elections, we found two-dimensional solutions in both of our analyses. On the supply side as well as on the demand side, these solutions always showed the combination of an economic and a cultural dimension, with the cultural dimension transforming from a traditional, partly religion-based contrast into a new integrationdemarcation contrast. The potential of globalization losers was there already in the early 1990s, but the new challenge from the populist right was slow to get organized. First, in 1994 and 1998, it was the VVD who succeeded in mobilizing part of this potential. With the emergence of the LPF, however, the latent potential of globalization losers found a more adequate supply. When it finally broke through, the new challenger caused an earthquake and the party triangle was temporarily transformed into a trapezoid. Its direct competitors reacted with a combination of accommodation and cooptation, as we predicted for mainstream parties in consensus democracies. Their strategy was facilitated by the fact that the new challenger was decapitated and disoriented after the murder of its charismatic leader. Very rapidly, the mainstream parties succeeded in undermining its stabilization, but they paid a heavy price for it: the whole configuration of the Dutch party system shifted in a culturally conservative direction. As a result of the mobilization by the new challenger, the configuration on the demand side polarized, but the configuration on the supply side did not, because of the indicated shift by all the mainstream parties. As the mainstream parties lost their more culturally conservative supporters to the new challenger, the remaining supporters voting for each of them became more homogeneous internally and, therefore, more distinct from the supporters of the other parties. Under the impact of
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the mobilization by the new challenger, all the parties moved to the right even the parties on the left in order not to lose voters. As a result, there is no corresponding polarization on the supply side, but an increasing discrepancy between demand and supply. The discrepancy we have in mind came to the fore on 1 June 2005, when some 61.6% of the Dutch voters said no to the EU Constitution in a referendum (with a turnout of 62.8%), even though all major parties, the trade unions and most newspapers were backing a yes. The rejection of the EU Constitution by the Netherlands, one of the founding members of the EU, came as another shock right after the French rejection. Opposition was mobilized mainly by the radical left (from the Socialist Party, SP), but also by the new radical right (Geert Wilders). The no campaign highlighted the lack of democracy inside the EU, developments towards a common EU defence, and the neoliberal character of the EU. Opposition against the EU clearly was not only or not even primarily motivated by cultural issues. In spite of the importance of the left and of socio-economic issues in this campaign, this event confirms the notion that the opening up of the national borders constitutes a crucial challenge for national politics. We expect this challenge to further transform the basic configuration of Dutch politics, even if the future motor of transformation may not exclusively come from the national-conservative right, but also from a national-conservative left mobilizing above all on economic grounds to defend the achievements of the national welfare state. In the 2006 elections, which were not part of our analysis, the dramatic rise of the SP confirms that the challenge of the mainstream parties in the Netherlands is no longer coming only from the radical right but also from a transformed classic left. Under its charismatic and very popular leader Jan Marijnissen, the SP became the third largest party with 16.6% of the vote (up from 6.3%), behind the CDA (26.5%) and the PvdA (21.2%), but in front of the VVD (14.7%), who all lost part of their electoral support. At the same time, the former challenger from the new populist right, the LPF, virtually disappeared. The new populist right was not entirely replaced by a new populist left, however: the group of Geert Wilders, who had split away from the VVD after the 2003 elections, obtained 5.9% of the vote, inheriting part of the former LPF support. These more recent developments indicate that the Dutch party system has not stabilized (yet). Moreover, they suggest that our focus on the new populist right may have to be extended to include a new populist left as well.
The United Kingdom: moving parties in a stable configuration

Introduction
The UK constitutes the paradigmatic case of a majoritarian democracy. As we have argued in Chapter 2, such a system discourages the rise of new challengers in the party system. This implies a greater stability of partisan configurations, but it does not mean that party systems are not subject to change. Under conditions of majoritarian democracies, the transformation of the party system is, however, more likely to involve the transformation of mainstream parties. As we have argued in Chapter 2, in majoritarian systems, the number of mainstream parties is more limited and, as a consequence, their internal composition is likely to be more heterogeneous than in proportional systems. New structural cleavages are likely to cut across the mainstream parties and to put them under great tension. The strain is expected to be particularly strong in the mainstream party that finds itself in the opposition. Such a party is likely to expand the scope of conflict on issues linked to the new cleavage, i.e. to adopt a more radical stance with regard to such issues. Therefore, in a majoritarian system such as the UK, shifts of power within mainstream parties are not only more likely to occur than in PR systems, but they also take on a much greater significance. In the period covered by our project, two decisive shifts have occurred in each one of the major parties the Conservative Party and the Labour Party with far-reaching implications for the restructuration of the party system as a whole. As a reaction to the economic crisis of the 1970s and the failure of the cabinet of Edward Heath to solve it, the Conservatives elected Margaret Thatcher to the party leadership in 1975. With the victory in the general elections of 1979 (see Table 8.1), the strict adherents of the neoliberal doctrine (the dries) within the Conservative Party opposed the defenders of the social-democratic compromise (the wets). At first seen as a laboratory experiment in neo-liberalism, the British Conservatives, thanks to their success, became a paradigm for other European parties on
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Table 8.1 Election results, House of Commons: shares of votes and numbers of seats
194559 37.9 (297) 37.1 (301) 19.3 (14) 35.8 (277) 39.2 (319) 18.3 (13) 6.7 (26) 100.0 (635) 5.4 (16) 100.0 (635) 4.6 (21) 100.0 (650) 4.3 (24) 100.0 (650) 5.8 (24) 100.0 (651) 8.2 (30) 100.0 (659) 31.5 (165) 43.3 (418) 17.0 (46) 5.7 (23) 100.0 (635) 43.9 (339) 36.9 (269) 13.8 (11) 42.4 (397) 27.6 (209) 25.4 (23) 42.3 (375) 30.8 (229) 22.6 (22) 41.9 (336) 34.4 (271) 17.8 (20) 31.7 (166) 40.7 (412) 18.3 (52) 9.3 (29) 100.0 (659)
1964
1966
1970
1974 (Feb) 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001
1974 (Oct)
2005 32.4 (197) 35.3 (355) 22.1 (62) 10.2 (19) 100.0 (643)
Election results (% of the valid votes, seats in parenthesis) Conservatives 46.1 43.4 41.9 46.4 (304) (253) (330) Labour 46.6 44.1 47.9 43.0 (317) (363) (287) 5.8 11.2 8.5 7.5 Liberals/Liberal (9) (12) (6) Democratic Party Others 1.4 1.3 1.7 3.1 (0) (2) (7) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 (630) (630) (630)
United Kingdom: moving parties in a stable configuration
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the right (Girvin 1988: 4). By contrast, its defeat in 1979 incited Labour to radicalize in the opposite direction, as its defeat was interpreted as a result of excessive moderation by the Wilson and Callaghan governments. The internal tensions created by Labours turn to the left then split the party: its social-democratic wing under the leadership of David Owen, former foreign minister, Roy Jenkins, former minister of finance, Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers, left the party and created the new Social Democratic Party (SDP), who became the natural ally of the Liberal Party. The two parties formed the Alliance for the 1983 general elections and eventually merged to form the Liberal Democratic party (LDP) in 1988. After its debacle in the 1983 elections, Labour started to transform itself again. But it took two more Conservative victories for Labour to overcome its multiple disadvantages in electoral terms. Eventually it moved to the centre-ground on the economic dimension, took its distance from the unions and became pro-European. Under the leadership of Tony Blair, who was elected party leader in 1994, New Labour adopted a pragmatic, largely non-ideological approach (sometimes referred to as the Third Way) and won an unprecedented series of three consecutive general elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The success of New Labour threw the Conservatives into disarray, since Labour now occupied positions on the economic dimension which were very close to those which they had adopted under the leadership of the neo-liberals. In order to win elections, they had to distinguish themselves from Labour on the cultural dimension. Accordingly, the Conservatives in the opposition increasingly moved to the right on the cultural dimension and increasingly took up the positions of a national-conservative party with respect to the two key issues characterizing the new cleavage European integration and immigration. As a result of the double programmatic shift of the two major parties, the character of the main protagonists in the British party system has profoundly changed, even if they are still the same in name. At the same time, the structure of the British political space has been transformed in line with our basic hypothesis about the emergence of an integrationdemarcation cleavage.
Social and economic context conditions The relative strength of traditional cleavages
Since the end of World War I, the British party system has primarily been structured by the class cleavage. Religious and territorial questions,
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which had been of prime importance for the structuration of politics before the Great War, only played a subsidiary role afterwards (Moran 1999). With the rise of the Labour Party and the decline of the Liberals, the class conflict became the key issue dividing the two major parties the Conservatives defending the interests of the business community and the Labour Party those of the working class. Class voting remained high in the UK until the early 1970s, when, according to some indicators (Clarke et al. 2004: 43), it declined precipitously in the February 1974 general election the election that constitutes the starting point for our own analysis. The problem with the decline of the class hypothesis in Britain is that it rests on a too simple dichotomous measure of social class, which actually only captures the decline of the traditional class cleavage, but does not account for new cleavages within the new middle class and between the new middle class and the working class. Using a more detailed indicator of class, Heath et al. (1991: Chapter 6) provide evidence that new cleavages have indeed grown in importance and that the new middle class has since the 1980s become more divided than it used to be. We shall show that, indeed, class remains important in British politics, if we take into account the new cleavages. The strike statistics provide additional evidence for the decline of the traditional class cleavage. As is shown in Figure 8.1, there has been a resurgence of strikes at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, at the end of the 1970s (winter of discontent) and in the mid-1980s (the showdown between Arthur Scargills miners and the Thatcher government). The British election of February 1974 was, as King (1974: 3) observed, the most extraordinary since the Second World War It was fought at a time of acute national crisis, with Britains 269,000 miners on strike and industry working a three-day week. The timing of the election was determined not, as is normal in Britain, by strict calculations of electoral advantage but by the circumstances of the strike. While the miners strikes of the early 1970s became the symbol for the failure of the Conservative government led by Edward Heath in 1974, the winter of discontent brought down the Labour government of James Callaghan in 1979. These events, in turn, constituted the catalyst for the ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher to the leadership of the Conservative party and its adoption of a neoliberal programme. The Thatcher government took up the challenge of the miners, decisively defeated them in 1984/5, and profoundly renewed the British system of industrial relations (King and Wood 1999; Wood 2001; Rhodes 2000: 45f.). As a result, strikes declined rapidly
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Figure 8.1 Level of industrial conflict, days not worked (in million) (United Kingdom) Source: 19712004: ILO statistics, 196470: King (1974: 9)
after 1985. Finally, the defeat of the unions contributed to the modernization of the Labour Party, to its distancing from the unions under Tony Blair and to the general decline of the traditional class conflict in British politics.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the two major British parties had converged to a social-democratic consensus characterized by the acceptance of the welfare state and a mixed economy consisting of both private enterprises and of nationalized industries, an acceptance of the main interest groups, a Keynesian macro-economic policy, a managed withdrawal from colonies and overseas territories and support for NATO in the Cold War with the Soviet Union (Budge et al. 1998: 373). Conservative and Labour governments engaged in pragmatic crisis management. In todays terms, both the inflation and unemployment rates were low in the 1950s and 1960s, but, crucially, they were higher than those of comparable countries and Britain was increasingly outstripped by its competitors, most notably by Germany and France. As Britains competitive position deteriorated, the balance-of-payments deficits were increasing.
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Sterling was overvalued, mainly because of the need to maintain the stability of the pound as an international reserve currency. Labours six years in office (196470) were characterized by continual economic crisis, and the Labour government fell because the economy had failed to grow, prices had risen and unemployment had reached its highest level since the war. Nothing did more to win the Conservatives the 1970 election than their promise to fight inflation; nothing did more to cost them the election in 1974 than their failure to win that fight (King 1974: 13). The Conservative government under Edward Heath was intent on adopting major reforms but famously ended by continuing the pragmatic policies of the previous government. It successfully negotiated British entry into the European Community in 1972, but it did not succeed in bringing about a solution to the economic problems of the country. Nor did the subsequent Labour governments. The combination of low industrial productivity, accelerating rates of inflation and wages, and a high level of public expenditure could not go on. In 1976, under a Labour government, Britain experienced a humiliating financial rescue operation by the IMF and a revolutionary change in its economic policy from Keynesianism to monetarism (Moran 1999: 192). As a reaction to the decline of the British economy, the Conservatives, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, definitely broke with the social-democratic consensus of the earlier post-war years, and Thatcher substituted a neo-liberal consensus of her own which put promotion and expansion of the free market at the centre of policy (Peele 1988). They were the first in Europe to accomplish a fusion of economic liberalism with cultural conservatism (Girvin 1988). At first, however, it was the economic aspects of this fusion which loomed large. The Conservatives not only implemented a radical reform of industrial relations and a far-reaching policy of privatization, but they also introduced a strict policy of fiscal restraint. Fiscal restraint was nothing new, since the previous Labour government had already had to accept massive budgetary cuts in exchange for loans from the IMF. What was new, however, was that the government abandoned the goal of full employment, and low inflation rates became the primary goal of economic policy. Aided by luck and the results of privatization, the Conservatives, indeed, created a fiscal miracle (King and Wood 1999: 383). It was lucky that tax revenues from North-Sea oil increased after the second oil shock in 1982. In addition, the privatization of public utilities and the formerly nationalized industries as well as the sale of council houses
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contributed extra-income. The privatization policy presupposed a strong central government and the absence of institutional constraints which is characteristic of the British system of government (Rhodes 2000: 55; Hall 1986: 126). The Thatcher cabinet abandoned the traditional restraint of British governments and used the enormous power of the British executive without hesitation to reduce the role of the state in society and to inflict a defeat on the unions. Together with the entry of the UK into the European Union, the radical reforms which were introduced by the Conservative governments under Thatcher and Major and continued by the Labour governments under Blair have profoundly transformed British politics. As Budge et al. (1998: 658) observe, a significant indicator of this change is the decline of decline: whereas political commentators in the 1980s were still obsessed by the question of the general decline of the UK, especially by the question of the relative economic decline, the theme of decline had virtually disappeared from public debate in the UK by the mid-1990s. By that time, the spectre of the pound crisis that had haunted the UK from the 1949 devaluation until Black Wednesday in 1992 had disappeared. After 1992, as a consequence of the reforms, the economic situation of the UK significantly improved. From 1995 to 2004, the UK grew more rapidly than the other G7 countries and the UKs GDP per capita surpassed that of France.

During the period from 1948 to 1962, Britain developed into a multicultural society thanks to an immigration policy which left the door wide open for migrants from the Commonwealth. Commonwealth migrants were attracted to the UK by the countrys economic prosperity in the 1950s. As Hansen (2000: 17) explains, the liberality of British immigration policy until 1962 resulted from the intersection of a bipartisan ideological commitment to a previous centurys colonies (the Old Commonwealth of Canada, New Zealand and Australia) and the distribution of power within the Conservative Party. In 1948, under a Labour government, the UK created, for reasons that had nothing to do with migration, a definition of citizenship including Britons and colonial subjects under the same nationality. To reinforce attachment to the Old Commonwealth, they were citizens of both the UK and the colonies with full citizenship rights in the UK. This was done before large-scale
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migration was considered possible. When New Commonwealth migration picked up in the 1950s, Conservative governments sensitive to the political risks associated with a lax migration policy considered restricting it, but domestic policy concerns were at first secondary to a larger foreign policy aim maintaining close relations with the Old Commonwealth. Under the impact of ever increasing immigration and rising antiimmigration politics, the door was finally closed by the Conservative government in 1962. The closure was quick and complete. Subsequently, Britain operated one of the strictest migration policies in the Western world. The new firm but fair migration policy that crystallized in the 1960s justified strict immigration policy by reference to the need to integrate migrants into British society. Hansen (2000) explains the rapidity and decisiveness of the policy change once again by the absence of institutional constraints. A strong executive, a weak legislature, the absence of judicial review and the marginalization of the Colonial Office, the main pro-migration client within the Cabinet allowed governments to respond to public demands with a singleminded success unknown in the rest of Europe or North America (p. 244). By the 1970s, British cultural liberalism no longer expressed itself in favour of open borders, but became invested in anti-discrimination legislation. By the late 1960s, both parties accepted that good race relations depended on strict migration control. Compared to our other countries (see Chapter 2), Britain has a relatively limited foreign population, and it accepted relatively few refugees in the wave of asylum-driven migration of the 1990s. Its conception of citizenship is close to the multiculturalists position. This combination of cultural context conditions is rather unfavorable for xenophobic mobilization from the radical right. As is observed by Koopmans et al. (2005: 244), however, multicultural policies in the strict sense were in many countries, such as Britain, less of a reality and more of a normative rhetoric designed to present a cozy image of mutual tolerance.1 Moreover, even this normative policy concept of multiculturalism is in decline, as is underlined by recent shifts towards
1
In Europe, Koopmans et al. (2005: 244) continue to explain, official multicultural policies never went close to granting group rights in the same way as those in countries like Canada partly because their objectives were directed at migrants and not the population as a whole.
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thicker civic citizenship requirements for migrants in Britain. The race riots in Bradford, Burnley, Oldham and Leeds in the summer of 2001 were a shock for British minority politics, as was the 7/7 attack, the Islamic terrorist attack on the London Underground in 2005. Add to these issues a sharp rise in immigration in recent years, the measures of devolution in Scotland and Wales that the Labour government has introduced since 1997, as well as European integration, and one understands that questions of national identity have moved up the political agenda since the late 1990s. As Colley (1992: 374) has observed, many key components of Britishness have faded: Protestantism, that once vital cement, has now only a limited influence on British culture. Recurrent wars no longer unite the British. And, crucially, both commercial supremacy and imperial hegemony have gone. The resulting doubt and disarray, illustrated by the stir created by David Goodharts essay on cultural diversity in 2004, are likely to contribute to the cleavage which, according to our point of view, constitutes the key structuring factor of Western European politics today. The potential for a radical populist party on the right certainly exists. Eatwell (1998: 153) cites a 1995 poll on race-related issues showing that a party supporting repatriation and a whites first policy would be on course to become Britains third political force.
Political context conditions Dealignment and realignment

With the declining significance of (traditional) class conflict and the corresponding decline in party identifications, the party system has increasingly fragmented. In the British context, dealignment refers to changes in the intensity of partisan attachments and in the strength of the relationship between these attachments and social class (Clarke et al. 2004: 177f.). The erosion of partisan attachments in Britain is generalized identifications with the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberals and their predecessors all decreased in strength between 1964 and 2001. And, with the exception of a relatively sharp drop in the intensity of Conservative and Liberal identifications between 1970 and 1974, these long-term decreases are approximately linear (p. 179). Clarke et al. (2004: 213) summarize the evidence: Party identification is not now and, at least since the 1960s, has not been an unmoved mover.
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Its movements are explicable in term of a simple information-updating model [V]oters use current information about the performance of parties and their leaders as sensible, albeit rough and ready, guides to political action, and they reduce deliberation costs by storing that information in updated partisan attachments. This ongoing process leads some voters to stay where they are, but prompts others to move on. According to Dunleavy (1999: 222), the period 19724 constitutes a decisive break in this respect. In the February 1974 elections, the starting point of our study, both major parties were repudiated. The Conservative result was the worst since 1945; Labours was its lowest since 1931. Not since the 1920s had the two main parties together won the support of so few electors. The Liberals, by contrast, more than doubled their vote between 1970 and 1974. In addition, regional parties increasingly gained electoral support (we are not treating them any further in this chapter). The shift towards minor parties and the fragmentation of the party system proved to be permanent: since 1974, the two major parties never recovered the shares of the vote they previously polled in the post-war period. Norris (1997: 17) distinguishes between the era of two-party dominance (194570) and the era of two-party decline (197092). She characterizes the British configuration of the second period as a moderate multi-party system (p. 60). However, because of the majoritarian electoral system, the British version of electoral fragmentation did not have the profound consequences we found in the other countries. If the two-party system declined at the electoral level, it continued at the level of government. In 1974, the Liberals barely won more seats and, although they got fewer votes, the major parties continued to be able to form one-party governments. Thus, as Denver (1998: 199) points out, the dealignment thesis was apparently contradicted by the British experience: from 1979 to 1992 a volatile and unpredictable electorate produced stable election outcomes. The Conservatives won all four elections of the period and their share of the vote varied only slightly. This contradiction cannot be satisfactorily explained by reference to issue voting. To explain the series of Conservative victories, election analysts have referred to three other factors which are at least partly compatible with the dealignment thesis: first, the Conservatives were judged to be the party which was more competent at handling the economy; secondly, the Conservatives had more popular party leaders; and, thirdly, they enjoyed the overwhelming support of the British national press. After 1992, the
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Conservatives lost all three of these advantages. Largely as a consequence of the ERM (the European Exchange Rate Mechanism) fiasco, the Conservatives lost not only their reputation for economic competence (Clarke et al. 2004: 63), but also the support of a significant section of the national press.2 Finally, as soon as Blair became Labour leader in 1994, he established a commanding lead over his rivals as the party leader thought likely to make the best prime minister. In the 1997 elections, the dealignment thesis was vindicated after all: the electorate displayed high levels of volatility, the second highest since 1945. Moreover, the electorate made its decision on the basis of judgments about party policies, the record of the government in office and the capabilities of the party leaders, rather than falling back upon traditional loyalties (Denver 1998: 212). However, economic voting proved to be of little relevance in this vote: as Labour had accepted most of the Conservative economic programme, the Conservatives were voted out of office in spite of a remarkable economic performance.
Difficulties for new challengers

New challengers have a great handicap in the British first-past-the-post electoral system. In addition, the challengers from the radical right faced several other unfavorable conditions related to the nature of the extremist parties themselves and to the strategies of their competitors (Ignazi 2003: 1846; Eatwell 2004). First, their proto-Nazi mould, however much hidden, has raised an insurmountable barrier for many right-wing Conservatives. Secondly, their leaders lack of ability and their destructive and ceaseless factionalism proved to be a major disadvantage. Thirdly, the radical right has always been met by the mobilization of vigorous anti-racist movements, and it is also discouraged by Britains multiculturalist conception of citizenship (Koopmans et al. 2005).
2
Britain had joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System in 1990 on the grounds that the countrys long-term economic stability was best served by the alignment of the UKs currency with those of its EU partners (Clarke et al. 2004: 60). Unfortunately, the exchange rate when Britain acceeded to the ERM was too high. British exporters found it increasingly difficult to compete in European markets. By September 1992, the foreign exchange markets had lost confidence in the governments ability to sustain the external value of sterling at the rate required by membership in the ERM. On Black Wednesday, a run on sterling provoked the government into formally withdrawing from the ERM and allowing sterling to float.
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Finally, and from our point of view most importantly, the strategy of the Conservative Party when faced with a potential competitor from the radical right has played an important role. At the end of the 1960s, Conservative policy, to a certain extent, opened a niche for a radicalright party: the marginalization of Enoch Powell (member of the Conservative shadow cabinet) after his famous 1968 speech on the rivers of blood, and the liberal immigration politics of the Conservative government under Heath, especially in light of 50,000 Asian refugees expelled by Uganda in 1972, provided good opportunities for the antiimmigration propaganda of the radical right. Later on, however, Margaret Thatcher radically modified Conservative immigration policy. More generally, the main parties, by introducing restrictive immigration controls in 1961 and subsequently operating a relatively bipartisan restrictive attitude to further immigration, have defused the extremists (Eatwell 1998: 151). Koopmans et al. (2005: 191) make a similar point: the political space for the extreme right proved to be relatively narrow in Britain, given the position of the Conservative Party on immigration. Because of these handicaps, it is no surprise that the radical right has remained particularly weak in Britain, in terms of its partisan mobilization and in terms of its extra-parliamentary mobilization (Koopmans et al. 2005: 194f.).
Transformation of major parties

This brings us to the transformation of the major parties. As Labour moved to the centre on economic issues, it reduced the electoral significance of those issues. Some observers suggest that the most effective way of competing on the valence issue of economic management has become to appear competent relative to the other major party rather than adopt ideologically distinctive economic policies (Clarke et al. 2004). Another option has been to shift the electoral competition to cultural issues. We are mainly interested here in this second alternative and, in particular, in the development of the differences between the major parties on two issues: immigration and the British relationship to the EU. The British Conservatives, like several other European conservative parties, have always had a nationalistic tendency. They have always emphasized the unity of the British nation against peripheral nationalism, disestablished churches and, during the 20th century, class conflict analyses (Hooghe et al. 2002: 981). It is, therefore, no surprise that they
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have been strongly tempted to mobilize opposition to immigration and European integration for electoral purposes. As far as immigration is concerned, Studlar (1978) showed that this issue had no significant impact on electoral behaviour in the 1964 and 1966 elections. In 1970, however, the Conservatives benefited from the widespread perception that they were the party more likely to keep immigrants out. By the 1980s, however, these earlier controversies over immigration had been relegated to the margins of electoral competition (Saggar 1997: 185): Through the campaigns of the 1980s and early 1990s, the true significance of racial politics appeared to be twofold: its constrained and often volatile impact in a small handful of constituencies, and its general failure to shape electoral politics at large. The Conservatives tried to revive the issue in late 1995, but, during the 1997 general election, immigration again played a minor role. Saggar (1997: 193) and Eatwell (1998: 151) call attention to the leadership factor and tactical consideration to account for this dog which did not bark in the night: John Major seems to have discouraged the use of the race card a reflection both of his own opposition to such politics and a wider realization in the party that such a campaign could weaken the party in the centre. In addition, it is important that Labour also clearly intended to neutralize the issue in 1997.3 By the time of the 2001 general election, however, the Conservatives no longer felt the same restraint: new measures to curb the influx of what they called bogus asylum seekers featured strongly in their campaign (Berrington 2001: 208). On the issue of the British relationship to the European Union, the two major parties shifted in opposite directions (Evans 1998). Labour changed from advocating withdrawal from the European Community (EC) without a referendum in 1983 to ardent support by 1989. The Labour Partys more overtly positive approach to European integration developed as a part of the policy review undertaken by the party following its third successive election defeat in 1987. It owes much to domestic political considerations (Daniels 1998: 79): In general terms, the Europeanization of the party may be seen as a response to its long exclusion from national office and as a key element of a broader
3
Saggars (1997: 194) suggestion that the reservoir of potential votes to be gained from exploiting anti-immigrant sentiments tended to become shallower in the 1980s and 1990s, compared to the two previous decades, does not preclude that this potential remains quite important.
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electoral strategy designed to convey the image of a party which is modern, credible and fit to govern. In becoming more pro-European Labour shifted away from the views of its traditional support base in the working class and towards the target group of the educated middle classes that provided the core of new party members and a basis for the partys electoral success in the 1990s (Evans 2002). The pro-European shift served to highlight a weakening of the classic left in the partys internal balance of power. Following the Labour Party, the British unions also shifted to a more positive attitude to Europe in the course of the 1990s (Strange 2002). The deepening commitment of the British union movement to the European project is perhaps most visible in the disarticulation of the left Eurosceptics as a coherent union grouping. The Conservatives, in contrast, although pro-European in the 1970s, became openly less so and experienced very public splits over the issue. For many Conservatives, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was (as Margaret Thatcher put it) a treaty too far. In fact, the issue of European Union has exposed a major fault line within the Conservative Party, which at times posed a severe threat to the Major government (Berrington and Hague 1998). Unsurprisingly, the Conservatives have become more distinctively Eurosceptic since 1997 and emphasized their scepticism with respect to the adoption of the euro in the 2001 campaign. The Conservative position on European integration, and particularly that on the adoption of the euro, represents a distinctive choice that is consistent with the views of the generally Eurosceptic, or at least EMU-sceptic, electorate. In 1997, however, because of their internal division over European integration, the Conservatives were not able to take advantage of their proximity to the Eurosceptic public opinion (Evans 1998). Moreover, in 1997, the Eurosceptic vote was split by the presence of the Referendum Party, which polled 3% of the vote in those constituencies where it stood. By 2001, the Conservatives were seen to be less divided on Europe, the Eurosceptic vote was not split by the presence of the Referendum Party and the highly politicized question of the EMU had become more central to the integration agenda. Given these conditions, the stage was set for European integration to become a key issue for the elections. Evans (2002) confirms both that the traditional leftright divide has become less important in these elections, and that European monetary integration provides a significant basis of realignment in British electoral politics.
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Analysis of the demand side: the voters political potentials

The configuration of the British political space on the demand side is again determined by a factor analysis of the voters attitudes with respect to the campaign issues. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8.2. For all four British elections included in our study, we find a twodimensional solution with an economic and a cultural axis corresponding to our expectations. The two dimensions are quite clearly separated from each other. Note that, in the 1970s, the second axis is actually an EU axis, since we have only items referring to the EU for operationalizing the second dimension of the political space. At the time of the British adherence to the Common Market, this question loomed large in addition to the economic questions of inflation and the restoration of peace to industrial relations. In the British case, the economic axis dominates in the 1970s (February 1974) and it is still more important than the cultural axis in the first election of the 1990s (1992). However, as Labour decisively moved to the centre in economic terms, the cultural axis has become the key dimension for the structuration of the publics attitudes in the last two elections of our study (1997 and 2001). The details of the dimensional structure also conform to our expectations. On the economic dimension, we always find the strong contrast between economic liberalism and support for the welfare state. On the cultural dimension, cultural liberalism (measured for 1992, 2001), support for European integration (for all three elections) and for environmental protection (for 1997, 2001) are opposed to support for traditional values (1992, 1997), law and order (security, for all three elections) and for a tougher stance with regard to immigration (for 1997, 2001). It is important to note that, among British voters, support for European integration has quite clearly been associated with the cultural dimension throughout the 1990s. As Diez Medrano (2003: 249) has observed, the European citizens image of the EU and of the European integration process is filtered by national or sub-national cultures. Their attitudes and opinions with respect to the EU are shaped by cultural repertoires which, in turn, are rooted in their national histories and their collective experience. For the British voters, EU membership is at best a necessary evil (Haller 1999), they fear for their national sovereignty in an ever closer union. Just as the Swiss, the British are afraid to lose their national identity in the process of European integration (Kriesi, 2007).
1992 Factor 2 (cultural) 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.67 0.57 0.76 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.40 1.83 0.17 1564 0.76 0.75 2.47 0.35 1570 0.68 0.65 0.21 1.50 0.15 1427 0.61 0.75 0.23 3.19 0.29 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.40 0.51 0.73 0.87 0.75 0.69 0.13 0.44 0.33 0.19 0.00 0.36 0.52 0.84 0.68 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.13 1.24 0.18 Factor 1 (cultural) Factor 2 (economic) Factor 1 (cultural) Factor 2 (economic) 1997 2001
1974
Attitude 0.83 0.80 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.41 2.98 0.30
Factor 1 (economic)
Factor 2 Factor 1 (EU) (economic)
0.77 0.72 0.56
0.03 0.16 0.21
0.06 0.06 0.09
0.85 0.87 0.80
Welfare Economic liberalism Wage control Budget Environment Institutional reform Cultural liberalism Traditional values International cooperation Europe Common Market Referendum on Common Market Immigration Security Army Eigenvalue Var. expl. n
2.36 0.39
1.26 0.21
1532
Note: factor loadings > .5 are in bold.
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Figure 8.2 Demand side of party competition, 1974, 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections (United Kingdom)
Figure 8.2 presents the positioning of the average party voters in the two-dimensional space. The configuration of the 1974 election is quite special, since it shows the voters of the three major parties all positioned on a single line, linking the left, Eurosceptic Labour voters to the right, pro-European voters of the Conservative Party, with the Liberal voters
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taking an intermediate position. This very special configuration depends, of course, on the fact that we only have items referring to the European integration process as indicators for the second dimension and it reflects the stances of the respective parties at the time. In the 1990s, we find the familiar tripolar patterns we have already encountered in the other countries. In Britain, the Labour voters constitute the left-hand corner, the Conservative voters the right-hand corner and the Liberal voters are always close to the Labour voters, but more culturally liberal. As far as the minor parties are concerned, the voters of the Scottish Nationalists also position themselves close to the Labour voters. The Green voters, by contrast, have moved from a culturally very open to a middle-of-the-road position, while maintaining at the same time a decidedly leftist profile in economic terms. Comparing the three triangles of the 1990s (including 2001), it is quite striking to observe that, contrary to the other countries, the political potentials of the two largest parties are not stable over time. In fact, we observe a gradual, but decisive, double shift: the distance between Labour and Conservative voters on the economic dimension becomes smaller, while the corresponding distance on the cultural dimension gets bigger. In 1992, the average voters of the two parties were quite distinct with regard to economic issues, but hardly differed at all in cultural terms. By 2001, average Labour voters had moved much closer to average Conservative voters on the economic dimension, and, at the same time, Conservative voters had become culturally much more conservative. This double shift corresponds to the programmatic shifts of the two major parties which we have discussed previously. It provides a strong indication for a fundamental realignment in the British party system. Considering the positioning of the social groups, we turn to Figure 8.3 which presents the trends with respect to the distance between the average positions of some selected socio-demographic categories in the two-dimensional space. The corresponding groups can also be located in Figure 8.2. The main remaining religious contrast is that between the non-religious group and the Protestants. As we can see from Figure 8.3, the average distance between these two groups has remained fairly constant in the course of the 1990s. While the Protestants are positioned at a roughly equal distance from all three major parties, the nonreligious group is situated closely to the average Liberal voters. As in the other countries, compared to the discrepancy between the highly

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(b) class
Figure 8.3 Demand side, distances between selected socio-demographic categories (in standard deviations) (United Kingdom)
and the least educated voters, the remaining religious contrast is rather weak, and, just as in the other countries, the educational contrast mainly manifests itself with regard to the cultural dimension. The discrepancy between the two educational groups provides us with an additional indicator for a realignment: in the 1970s, the highly educated voters used to be more closely associated with the position of the Liberal and Conservative voters, while the least educated positioned themselves closer to Labour. By 2001, the educational groups had not moved much in the two-dimensional space, but, as a consequence of the programmatic shifts of the parties, their alignment with the parties has become substantially modified: now the highly educated position themselves close to Liberal voters, with Labour voters positioned at only a slightly greater distance, while the least educated are now located closer to the
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Conservatives. The national-conservative turn of the Conservative Party has increased its distance from the educational elite, while it has drawn them nearer to the popular mass. A related realignment becomes apparent, if we look at the partisan proximities of the voters from different classes: just as with the educational groups, the classes have not moved much in space. The differences between the classes on the economic dimension were already rather small in the 1970s and, if anything, they have become smaller since. By contrast, already in the 1970s, the classes positioned themselves quite widely with regard to the cultural dimension and they still do so. The working classes are economically only slightly to the left, but culturally quite conservative. The old middle class (the self-employed) is culturally equally conservative, but economically slightly to the right. The different components of the new middle class differ above all in cultural terms, with the social-cultural specialists and technical specialists taking a more liberal position and the managers a more conservative one. Compared to the contrast within the new middle class, the traditional class conflict indicated by the distance between skilled workers and self-employed is again, as expected, of only limited importance. Since the 1970s, however, the most important contrast in class terms has been the one between social-cultural professionals and skilled or unskilled workers, i.e. the contrast we associate with the new conflict between integration and demarcation.

In analyzing the British parties programmatic offer, we find the same two dimensions that we have already identified in our analysis of the demand side. Just as in the other countries, the British party space has been and still is two-dimensional. What has changed in Britain is again in line with the experience of the other countries the meaning of the cultural dimension in particular. As the parties have repositioned themselves with regard to the new conflict, the cultural axis has been reinterpreted. What is peculiar about the British case is the way the cultural axis has been reinterpreted as a result of the programmatic shifts of the major parties. The February 1974 election was dominated by economic issues, which is confirmed by our analysis of the supply side. The two issues most voters were concerned with were the rising cost of living, especially the rise in food prices, and the problem of industrial unrest. The
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Figure 8.4 Supply side of party competition, 1974, 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections (United Kingdom)
question was: which party would be more likely to bring inflation under control and restore peace to industry (King 1974: 26). All parties had similar recipes for solving these problems, which is why they are located closely together in the space in the first graph of Figure 8.4. Both major
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parties lost votes, because the voters seem to have been pessimistic about their capability to solve these problems. The Liberals improved their position, because, if they, as King (1974: 26) dryly observed, could not be praised for anything, at least [they] could not be blamed for anything. Compared to the economic issue, all other issues were much less salient. Even European integration preoccupied only the Eurosceptic Labour Party, which is why this issue appears so far removed in the lower right-hand corner of the graph. Just as in the Netherlands, the transformation of the cultural dimension in Britain was slow in coming. In the 1992 elections, the cultural dimension was still essentially determined by the opposition between cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and law and order issues (security) on the other. In 1997, we observe a partial transformation of this dimension, since European integration has come to replace cultural liberalism at its cosmopolitan end point. It is, however, only in the 2001 elections that the double programmatic shift of the two major parties ended up giving the same new meaning to the cultural dimension, as it did in the other countries. By 2001, this dimension had become characterized by the opposition between European integration and a tougher approach on immigration, as we predicted on the basis of the integrationdemarcation conflict. This reinterpretation of the cultural dimension went hand in hand with the repositioning of the parties in the reconfigured space. Compared to February 1974, the polarization between the three major parties was considerably greater in 1992. Labour and the Conservatives had moved further apart on the economic dimension, in line with the greater distance between their average voters (see Figure 8.2). On the cultural dimension, the two main contenders did not differ very much, but the Liberal Democrats position on this dimension was distinctly more liberal. Unfortunately, we do not have any comparable data for the 1980s, but it is conceivable that the tripolar configuration would have been even more polarized for the elections won by Margaret Thatchers Conservatives. By 1992, under Neil Kinnock, Labour had abandoned its support for unilateral nuclear disarmament, it had become proEuropean, and it jettisoned its plans for further nationalization in favour of an economic policy putting more emphasis on the market. However, as our graph shows, the advance in the direction of the Conservatives in economic terms still left a considerable gap between the two parties. The voters still did not trust Labour and once again voted for the
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Conservatives under their new leader, John Major. The Conservatives won at the bottom of a recession and in the face of an intense unpopularity achieved in the final triumphalist phase of Mrs Thatchers long reign. As one commentator (Jenkins 1992: 16) observed at the time, all this came as an immense shock to the adherents of the left: For they had convinced themselves for the most part that since the two debacles of 1983 and 1987 the Labour Party had reformed and modernized itself sufficiently to resume its role as the alternative party of government. Apparently, the move to the centre had not been decisive enough. After the 1992 elections, many commentators predicted a long continuation of the Conservative reign. The question was in the air, whether Britain was moving towards Japanese conditions, i.e. towards a situation where one party holds a quasi-monopoly of power.4 However, as we have already pointed out, the fortunes of the two major parties changed drastically soon thereafter, in the autumn of 1992, as a result of the ERM crisis. As Clarke et al. (2004: 601) point out, the impact of this crisis on elite discourse and public opinion was significant for at least three reasons: first, it was the first time since 1945 that a Conservative government was associated with a serious currency crisis. Secondly, the government had to change discourse overnight: British interests were said to be best served by ERM membership before September 1992 and by nonmembership thereafter. Voters were not forgiving of this change of discourse. Thirdly, voters had given the Conservatives the benefit of the doubt in spring, in spite of the recession that transpired in 19901. The governments mishandling of the ERM crisis was precisely the sort of event that could prompt people to downgrade their image of the competence of the Conservative Party and its leader. However, the Conservatives lost reputation was not a sufficient condition for the rejuvenation of Labour, although it was a necessary one. As Clarke et al. (2004: 61) also stress, the Labour leadership had to convince the voters that the party had broken decisively with its taxand-spend past and that it was now concerned as much with wealth creation as it was with income distribution. Labour had to move further to the centre on the economic dimension in order to re-establish contact with the moderate voters (Gould 1998). As our graphs show, this is precisely what New Labour under Tony Blair did in 1997. The distance between Labour and the Conservatives on the economic dimension was
4
The Economist, 3 May 1997, p. 36.
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substantially reduced. In 1997, just as did their predecessors in 1974, the Liberal Democrats positioned themselves slightly to the left of Labour in economic terms. Accordingly, the size of the triangle joining the positions of the three major parties shrank considerably to the order it had back in 1974. In 1992, economic issues still dominated the electoral campaign in Britain. For both Labour and the Conservatives, economic issues were most salient in this election. By 1997, however, cultural issues had become more important than economic ones. European integration now figured most prominently among the issues addressed by the Conservatives. As is indicated by Table B10 in Appendix B, no less than 18.4% of their core sentences addressed this issue. Although less important for Labour, Europe still constituted its third most frequently addressed issue-category. Security had become equally prominent for both parties, and cultural liberalism was also high on both of their agendas. Immigration, however, was still a non-issue in 1997. Only in 2001 did the Conservatives take up immigration, combined with an increased emphasis on Euroscepticism. In the 2001 election, Europe, with a share of 25.8% of their core sentences, constituted by far the most salient issue for the Conservatives, followed by welfare with 11.9% and immigration with 11.3%. Because of their Euroscepticism and their increasingly tough stance on immigration, the Conservatives had now moved to the national-conservative end of the cultural dimension. This is indicated by the fourth graph in Figure 8.4 and confirms our previous discussion of the double programmatic shift of the two major parties5.
Conclusion
Their long period in opposition has led the Conservatives to adopt a position in the British party space which is comparable to that of the Swiss Peoples Party, the Dutch or Austrian Liberals or the Front National in France. By the time of the 2001 general elections, the Conservative Party has become a national-conservative party, the functional equivalent of the radical populist right. The programmatic shift of
5
For 2001, we have collected only a few statements by the Liberal Democrats, which makes their positioning somewhat uncertain. This may also be the reason why cultural liberalism is somewhat unexpectedly located in the corresponding graph.
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the Conservatives was preceded by a corresponding shift of the Labour Party in the opposite direction with regard to Europe, which opened a niche for a Eurosceptic position for the Conservatives, and by Labours shift to the centre of the economic dimension, which reduced the salience of economic questions for electoral competition in Britain. The transformation of the two most important parties of the British system has reconfigured the political space in line with our expectations. While the economic dimension has diminished in importance, the importance of the cultural dimension has increased and its meaning has been transformed: from a contrast between cultural liberalism and traditional values exemplified by support for law and order, it has become a contrast between a cosmopolitan, pro-European and pro-immigration view and an isolationist, Eurosceptic and anti-immigration view. In the transformation process, the British party system became more electorally fragmented as did the systems of the other countries, but without corresponding consequences at the level of government formation. The electoral system still allowed creating minimal winning, oneparty governments. The 2005 election continued the trend we have observed here. It marked a further decline in Britains traditional twoparty system and led to the unenthusiastic re-election of a Labour government, led by a widely distrusted prime minister, on the lowest winning plurality of the popular vote on record (Quinn 2006: 169). All three major parties were disappointed with the outcome of the vote.6 On the surface, the Liberal Democrats made impressive gains. Yet there was a sense that the party had missed an enormous opportunity at a time when both the government and its main opposition party were unpopular. From the available information, we cannot tell how the political space developed. All we know is that cultural issues remained important for the voters, with immigration and security now taking second and third place behind health (Quinn 2006: 170). Improving public services such as education and health were major themes of Labours second term in office. European integration had, however, lost some of its salience, since it was cited much less frequently, as was the Iraq War. From our point of view, it appears that a majoritarian electoral system is increasingly incompatible with the tripolar partisan configuration which is bound to develop in a party space with two dimensions.
The Economist, 14 May 2005, pp. 356.

MARTIN DOLEZAL
Introduction
All countries explored in this book face similar challenges due to globalization processes. Different reactions to these developments are the result of several contextual factors as well as of the strategies of political parties. But Germany has to deal with one additional major challenge that sets this country somewhat apart from the others: the ongoing struggle to complete reunification. Despite or maybe because of the astonishing and unexpectedly rapid development that ended with political reunification on 3 October 1990, the social and economic differences between the western and the eastern part of the country have remained a major problem. The East Germans have had to adapt themselves not only to liberal democracy and the market but also to an economy that became increasingly globalized in the 1990s. For the traditional parties, reunification and the integration of a 15 million strong post-communist electorate was a unique challenge (Jeffery 1999: 112). But the election of 1990, the first in the reunited Germany, resulted in a triumph for West Germanys core parties, proving their organizational strength (Betz 1999: 32). As a consequence of the electoral colonization (Jeffery 1999: 97) of the Eastern Lnder (states), the party system of the reunified Germany is in general the party system of the old Federal Republic (Pappi 1994: 221). Therefore, after some early forecasts of a return to Weimar conditions, with extreme ideological polarization and a high degree of fragmentation, at least since the mid-1990s the development of German party politics has been interpreted as undramatic (Niedermayer 1998; Mielke 2001; Stss 2000). Far-reaching changes in the societal and economic realm were accompanied by political stability, not only in the sphere of party politics but also with regard to the overall institutional structure. For that reason and also as a consequence of the genuine comparative approach followed by this book Germany will be treated as one case and no detailed differentiation between the old and new Lnder will be
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discussed. Political change in this country can be explained by the ongoing processes of denationalization; in this perspective, Germany does not constitute a Sonderweg.
Social-economic and cultural context conditions Relative strength of traditional cleavages

Class and religion have been the two traditional cleavages in post-war Germany (Urwin 1974; Wessels 2000). From a comparative perspective, this country therefore exemplifies a standard case: the different measures discussed in Chapter 2 put Germany in a middle position and show that the militancy of the two cleavages is comparatively low. Contrary to some Latin countries and Austria, where the two basic cleavages historically have tended to overlap, the two divisions have cross-cut each other quite strongly, which has facilitated consensus across party and class lines after World War II (Linz 1967). A plurality of Catholic workers, for example, has traditionally supported the CDU (Urwin 1974: 148) and have continued to do so in the most recent elections as well.1 The contemporary relevance of class-based voting has been the object of intense debate in the literature. Beck (1984) and Dalton (1984) in particular refuse to attribute any significance to group-based political behaviour at least to the behaviour of groups defined in traditional terms. Klingemann (1985) and Schnell and Kohler (1998), among others, take a middle position in this debate and accept a declining predictive power of demographic variables for voting choices. By contrast, Mller (1998, 1999) still stresses the continuing importance of class-based voting behaviour in Germany (see also Pappi 1984; Betz 1999; Wessels 2000; Saalfeld 2004). One obvious development during recent decades that is recognized by most authors is the continuing, but increasingly less relevant, alliance between the parties and their traditional electorates. Their declining relevance is due to the fact that these groups religious Catholics for the Union parties, and unionized workers for the SPD have become much smaller (Klingemann 1999: 121).
1
In 2005, 41% of Catholic workers voted for the Union parties, 34% for the SPD (source: Postelection Study Bundestagswahl 2005 German CSES Study; own calculations).
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With regard to the religious cleavage, there have been discussions about whether the conflict between religious and non-religious voters has replaced the traditional confessional cleavage between Catholics and Protestants (Wolf 1996; Wessels 1997: 207). Such a development is likely to have accelerated since 1990 because, contrary to some earlier forecasts, reunification has not led to the reinforcement of Protestant Germany but to an increasingly secularized population. However, the parties strategies initiated the transformation of the religious cleavage as early as the 1950s when the Union parties managed to integrate religious Catholics as well as religious Protestants in their voter coalition (Pappi 1984: 1721).2 Whether these two traditional cleavages have been replaced or supplemented by new conflicts is another issue of ongoing discussion in the literature. Concerning the New Politics debate, authors like Wessels (1997) or Dalton (1984) argue that a new cleavage exists, at least with regard to the attitudinal dimension of this concept. But Pappi (1984: 22) was able to show that the ecological conflict dimension is not orthogonal to the traditional political cleavages. Especially in Germany, ecological attitudes have been strongly connected to traditional positions of the left since the early 1980s. A final dispute concerns the abovementioned consequences of German reunification that have possibly led to a regional EastWest cleavage as a kind of new centreperiphery conflict (Wessels 1997: 21520). Indeed, in the early 1990s, voting behaviour in the new Lnder differed markedly from Western patterns because, among other things, workers tended to support the CDU (Saalfeld 2004: 181). Dalton and Brklin (1995: 94), therefore, stressed the distinctiveness of the two electorates. But, at least since the mid1990s, voting behaviour has become increasingly similar in the two parts of the country (Schmitt 2001: 1045; Jung and Roth 1998: 1618; but see Arzheimer and Falter 1998, 2002) and the differences in citizens attitudes are declining (Juhsz 2000). Referring to the strength of the post-communist PDS in the East, it is important to note that regional differences in party strengths are not sufficient to indicate a nonuniform party competition (Pappi 1994: 225). After all, a significant NorthSouth divide in the Western part of the country exists as well (Roth and Jung 2002: 9; Roberts 2003: 65). If there ever was an
2
According to Jagodzinski and Quandt (2000: 179), however, only religious Catholics strongly support the Union parties (see also Jagodzinski 1999: 834).
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EastWest cleavage mobilized by the PDS, this partys recent transformation to become The Left, and which has by now quite a successful German-wide appeal, has further weakened this divide. Summarizing the discussions on social cleavages, the results remain inconsistent. Traditional alignments of certain social groups with parties are still present, but because they have lost their strength we observe an electorate that might be receptive to new efforts of mobilization.

Once the powerful engine of the post-war European economy, Germany has experienced severe economic problems for many years now. Declining growth rates and mass unemployment are the main challenges, especially in the eastern part of the country, where one-fifth of the potential workforce is unemployed. The question whether structural problems such as the lack of job growth in private services and rising contributions to social security constitute the main cause for this development (e.g. Manow and Seils 2000) or whether it is rather the financial costs of reunification which are at its origin (e.g. Czada 1998) has been the subject of ongoing debate. In any case, the financial consequences of reunification and the ensuing problems for the welfare state together with mass unemployment have led to a renaissance of the social question (Mielke 2001: 90). The problems of the economy and social security were critical political issues (Kitschelt 2000: 200) in all elections of the 1990s; contrary to all other countries explored in this book (except France), they were more important than cultural issues (see Chapter 11). Despite the severe economic challenges, political reactions have not so far been very important. Germanys political economy still follows a middle way between the Scandinavian model of welfare capitalism and the Anglo-American model of market capitalism (Schmidt 1987, 2001). As the power of the state is considered to be comparatively weak, what Katzenstein (1987) famously called semi-sovereign, largescale policy changes are difficult to implement, given the power of veto players (Scharpf 2006), and therefore incremental change prevails.3 In addition, contrary to developments in other countries, for example the Netherlands, many relevant political actors have denied the need for
3
According to Katzenstein (2005: 283), this interpretation is still suitable because he estimates the impact of reunification as rather moderate.
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reform for quite a long time (Cox 2001: 464). A strong welfare bias (Padgett 2004) in the party system arising directly out of voters preferences is a major obstacle to policy change. And this social protectionist majority (Kitschelt 2003) exists not only in the population but also in the political elites.

In Chapter 2, we argued that adherents of an ethnic interpretation of nationhood and citizenship in particular feel threatened by cultural aspects of globalization. With regard to its model of citizenship, Germany has served as an almost perfect example for ethnic nationalism, which is most prominently reflected in the laws concerning the political rights of the Aussiedler: even though their ancestors left Germany hundreds of years ago, they are still regarded as members of the national community (Koopmanns and Statham 1999: 2307). In particular, between 1987 and 1992, when the communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed, more than four million ethnic Germans were accommodated in the Federal Republic (Heinen 2000). After the integration of about twelve million displaced persons from eastern parts of the former German Reich in the aftermath of World War II, the first real wave of immigration started in 1955: up to 1973, when the programmes were stopped because of declining growth rates and rising unemployment, about fourteen million guest workers from several Southern European countries came to Germany, eleven million of those returned home after several years of employment (Koopmans 1999: 166). Contrary to ethnic Germans, these immigrants have always been considered as temporary residents, which is reflected in the term guestworker. But this perception proved to be an illusion (Katzenstein 1987: 209). Those who stayed, and in particular their children, have faced serious integration problems; until the 1990s the rates of naturalization were extremely low, equalling those of Switzerland (Koopmans 1999, 177). In the second half of the 1980s, a new group of foreigners appeared on the scene: asylum seekers. In particular in the early 1990s, Germany was confronted with very high numbers of refugees (see Figure 2.1) and so the question of how to deal with them has shaped party politics ever since (Herbert 2001: 9). Contrary to the guestworkers, who, at least for the mainstream parties, did not constitute an important electoral issue and were not controversial (Katzenstein 1987: 213), the treatment of
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asylum seekers became a conservative partisan issue for the first time in 1987. But, despite a presumably serious challenge from the new radical right (the Republikaner), the Union parties were internally divided on whether it is useful or even appropriate to exploit such an issue for electoral purposes (Herbert 2001: 2712). In the 1990s, rising numbers of foreign residents led to debates about the adaptation of the naturalization law. After having come to power in 1998, the red-green coalition tried to change the basic model of citizenship to a more territorial and civic conception. Plans for a more relaxed handling of dual citizenships especially for Turks, the biggest group of former guestworkers provoked protests by the Union parties, who initiated a petition campaign to stop it. This led the government to reduce considerably the extent of its reform (Holmes Cooper 2002; Herbert 2001: 32933; Hansen and Koehler 2005: 63841). For the first time the government also tried to define Germany as an immigration country, which corresponds to reality more closely than earlier approaches. But, despite these efforts, the questions of how to deal with foreigners and what defines a German have remained hot political issues and have also become the subject of election campaigns. In the late 1990s, as a reaction against the agenda of the left, the Union parties launched a debate on German cultural identity (Leitkultur), which was also designed to define a role model for naturalized foreigners, but which had much less success than its petition campaign (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2002: 1819). Economic and cultural challenges of globalization have therefore led to conflicts, but political denationalization has not. In spite of the primarily ethnic conceptualization of the national political community, the Germans have traditionally viewed European integration quite favourably and have not been afraid of losing their sovereignty (Diez Medrano 2003). All parties represented in the Bundestag, except for the PDS, have been pro-European and have supported the integration process and the treaties throughout the 1990s (Busch and Knelangen 2004: 88).4 In the early decades after World War II, voters attitudes towards European integration were very positive, too. A kind of Europe-euphoria (Schmitt 1996: 139) reached its climax in 1979 when the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held. Since the 1980s, however, euphoria has
The Greens abstained from voting on the Amsterdam Treaty because they interpreted it as not far-reaching enough (Busch and Knelangen 2004: 88).
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been replaced by scepticism, although the overall attitude has remained pro-European especially within the countrys elite.
Political context conditions Dealignment

In the Federal Republic, as a result of the Allies licence policy (Urwin 1974: 127; Pappi 1984: 7) and especially of the Union parties efforts to integrate different groups with a catch-all strategy (Kirchheimer 1965), the complex party system of the Weimar era was reduced to a much simpler structure (Linz 1967: 284). In the 1960s and 1970s in particular, the system was characterized by a low number of effective parties only the Union parties, the SPD and the FDP were represented in the Bundestag and the absence of relevant extreme political forces. The two-and-a-half-party system (Blondel 1968: 185) therefore served as a classic example of moderate pluralism (Sartori 1976) and of the disappearance of explicit programmatic opposition (Kirchheimer 1969). In 1976, the combined vote of the three main parties reached its all-time high with 99.1 percent of the votes (see Table 9.1). Starting in the 1980s, the party system lost its ultra-stable character and has undergone a development towards a greater degree of fragmentation. After the establishment of the Greens, German reunification led to the advent of the former communist PDS. But, because no party of the populist or radical right has been able to win seats in the Bundestag, and because the ideological differences between the main parties have declined, the character of moderate pluralism is still present, reflecting a high degree of continuity (Klingemann 1999: 115). Nevertheless, the increasing fragmentation has been accompanied by weaker attachments of the voters to their parties and also by declining membership rates, but the dealignment has not been as far-reaching as in other countries covered by our study. One obvious consequence of reunification has been the declining dominance of the Union parties; they now compete heavily with the SPD for first place. The parties of the left seem to have even gained a kind of new structural majority: starting in 1998, they have won a combined majority in three consecutive federal elections. But, after the most recent contest of 2005, this majority depends on the inclusion of the PDS, whom the SPD officially still rules out as a coalition partner at the federal level.

1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005
Election
194969
Election results (votes)
PDSa Greens SPD FDP Union Others TPVb Asymmetryc Volatilityd ENPe 45.8 8.4 44.9 0.9 91.7 0.9 3.4 2.3 2.4 5.0 33.5 11.0 43.8 4.3 84.3 10.3 8.6 2.6 4.4 7.3 36.4 6.9 41.5 3.5 81.3 5.1 9.4 2.9 5.1 6.7 40.9 6.2 35.1 6.0 81.2 5.8 8.0 2.9 4.0 8.6 38.5 7.4 38.5 3.0 82.8 0.0 8.0 2.8 42.6 7.9 48.6 0.9 92.1 6.0 3.6 2.3 1.5 42.9 10.6 44.5 0.5 89.3 1.6 3.5 2.4 5.6 38.2 7.0 48.8 0.4 87.8 10.6 8.9 2.5 8.3 37.0 9.1 44.3 1.3 82.3 7.3 5.5 2.8
34.7 9.5 44.3 11.6 84.5 9.6 7.6 2.7
8.7 8.1 34.2 9.8 35.2 4.0 72.9 1.0 10.6 3.4
Abbreviations: PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), FDP (Free Democratic Party), Union (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union).
Notes: a 2005: Die Linke (The Left). b Two-party vote: SPD and Union. c Asymmetry: difference UnionSPD. d Net volatility (Pedersen 1979) based on seat percentages of all parties represented in the parliament. e Effective Number of Parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) based on seat percentages of all parties represented in the parliament.
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Institutional structure
Germanys political system is strongly influenced by the consensual model of democracy, which means that, among other things, institutional access for new challengers is comparatively easy to achieve. The personalized system of proportional representation has been interpreted with certain pride (Urwin 1974: 141) as successful, and has become a role model for several new democracies in the 1990s. To avoid the extreme fragmentation that was a characteristic of the Weimar Republic, considered as one reason for the breakdown of democracy, a 5% clause was introduced, but new challengers have been able to overcome this threshold. Two peculiarities of the electoral system balance advantages and disadvantages for major parties and new challengers: the surplus seats (berhangmandate) serve the interests of the two major parties, the SPD and the CDU/CSU, but the possibility of ticket-splitting between the constituency and the party vote is advantageous to smaller forces (Jeffery 1999: 100). Federalism, a central feature of consensus politics (Lijphart 1999), is comparatively strong in Germany. It provides ample space for regional elections as a basis for electoral mobilization and for the formation of new government coalitions. The new radical-right parties in particular have been able to mobilize successfully at the regional level, because these elections are interpreted as second-order by the voters. The Greens used regional experiences as governing party for their entry into the federal government (Niedermayer 1999, 31); this might also be a model for the PDS. Small parties have an additional advantage due to federalism: if they temporarily lose representation at the federal level they can survive in Land parliaments where the 5% threshold is easier to overcome if the party has regional strongholds. This is especially the case for the PDS, but also for the Greens. A final consequence of federalism for German politics is a continual election campaign because, with sixteen Lnder there is nearly always an election campaign going on somewhere. Potential losses in those elections, therefore, are always a threat to the governing parties at the federal level, which does not give them much incentive to carry out tough reforms. The electoral system, the federal structure of the country, and the primarily consensus style of politics should provide a favourable opportunity structure for new challengers. But there is a kind of Damocles sword hanging above them: the danger of being outlawed if the party is
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considered as working against the free and democratic order.5 After banning the KPD and the extreme-right SRP (Sozialistische Reichspartei) in the 1950s, state authorities have closely watched right-wing parties: in 2001, the government tried to ban the NPD but failed (Flemming 2003). Even the PDS has been under official observation in spite of its status as governing party in two eastern Lnder. But, contrary to radical-right parties, the ex-Communists have never actually been in danger of being banned (Niedermayer 2003: 27). Perhaps even more important than these legal measures is Germanys restricted ideological space (Smith 1976: 402). Smith explained the long absence of ideological extremes as a consequence of the main parties integrative capacity. Additionally, the radical right has always had the problem of demarcating itself from National Socialism, whereas the radical left at least in the 1970s was equated with GDR and terrorism (Smith 1976: 4024). As a consequence of the historical legacy, rightwing challengers face enormous difficulties in getting access to media coverage apart from continuous negative reporting.6 Furthermore, a vast majority of the German elite has been opposed to right-wing thinking, which serves as a kind of vital barrier (Winkler and Schumann 1998: 100) against right-extremism. Finally, because of the unique heritage of the Holocaust, Germany has always been under close international observation contrary in particular to Italy and, until the 1980s, Austria (Kitschelt 1995: 204). This further reduces the chances for new radical right-wing parties of becoming accepted as regular participants in party competition.
Organizational capacity and leadership quality of the new challengers

Since the 1970s, Germanys traditional post-war party system has been confronted by three important new challengers: the Greens as outgrowth of the new social movements, various right-wing parties, and the ex-communist PDS. We consider right-wing populist parties as the driving force of the transformation process in several European countries; in
5 6
Article 21(2) of the Constitution (Grundgesetz). This is the reason why we could not measure the right-wing parties issue-positions with the content analysis. There is virtually no coverage of their political programme, in our terminology actor-theme sentences (see Chapter 3).
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particular in Austria, Switzerland and France, they have become the main challengers to traditional party politics. In Germany too, challengers from the radical right have been successful in several regional elections, but so far they have failed at the federal level. This failure is explained not only by several institutional factors (see above), but also by internal splits and the lack of charismatic leaders. The Republikaner (REP), the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) are the three most important of the more than forty right-wing extremist parties after 1945 (Winkler and Schumann 1998: 95). Most of the time, these parties have competed independently. But recently the DVU and the NPD have decided to coordinate their electoral efforts. Whether personal struggles between their leaders or substantive programmatic differences are the main reason for the internal divisions of the radical right has been extensively discussed in the literature. Jesse (2003: 160) explains the fragmentation of the radical right as a result of programmatic disparities, whereas Jaschke (1999: 153) denies real differences. Kailitz (2005), finally, distinguishes the pro-capitalist Republikaner from the anti-capitalist NPD and DVU. All three parties, though perhaps the Republikaner to a lesser degree, share the same problems of separating themselves from political extremism and Nazinostalgia. From a comparative perspective, they are part of the (new) radical right and do not belong to the populist right. Only the shortlived Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive, a flash party led by the former judge Ronald Schill (Faas and Wst 2002), was seen as a more modern and moderate variant of the right and part of the Verfassungsbogen, the constitutional arch (Jesse 2003: 160). One additional reason for the rights problems is their low level of competence in most policy fields, which makes them dependent on the relative salience of their preferred issues immigration and security (Jaschke 1999: 1424). But, despite all the quarrels about the integration of foreigners, socio-economic questions dominate in German party politics.
Strategies of mainstream parties

Germanys mainstream parties have responded differently to the new challengers. The Greens were accepted quite early, despite some initial discussions about their constitutionality (Stss 1984) and their selfperception as an anti-party party. At the regional level, the SPD began to cooperate with the ecologists in the mid-1980s. Building a
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red-green coalition at the federal level became a strategy in the early 1990s, and was finally implemented in 1998. Moreover, the FDP joined so-called traffic light coalitions (Ampelkoalitionen) with the SPD and the Greens at the regional level. Although the Union parties have, (except in local government) kept their distance from the Greens, they have at the same time accepted them as a normal competitor. A similar development has already begun with regard to the PDS. Challengers from the radical right, however, have been confronted with a strategy of stigmatization and the building of a cordon sanitaire: All other parties have always ruled out cooperating with them (Winkler and Schumann 1998: 106).7 Moreover, any suspicion of right-wing connections endangers a politicians career. Unlike in other countries, such as Italy or Austria, the radical right remains completely marginalized (Koopmanns and Statham 1999: 226). Nevertheless, the mainstream parties responded to several political issues introduced by new right-wing challengers and repositioned themselves in this respect. In the 1970s, the positions of the radical right had become increasingly stigmatized (Winkler and Schumann 1998: 99), but, when rising numbers of asylum-seekers paved the way for several right-wing successes at the Land level, the UnionFDP coalition, supported by the SPD, changed the (originally very liberal) asylum law in July 1993 (Backer 2000: 109). One could argue that the Union in particular has responded to the new right challengers by adopting an oligopolistic strategy that restates the latters policies in a more acceptable way and thus leaves no room for them (Jaschke 1999: 1412). But, in a comparative perspective, this strategy is more an example of adaptation: it has clearly not been far-reaching enough to consider the Union parties as transformed conservative parties the functional equivalents of the new radical right. More radical elements of this adaptation strategy especially the rhetoric have always been delegated to the Bavarian CSU (see Koopmans et al. 2005: 1912),8 whereas the CDU, the dominant force within the Union, continued to take more moderate positions. Not only in the Union parties, but also within their long-time coalition partner, the FDP, some actors were tempted to benefit from right-wing populism
7
The only exception was a short-lived coalition of the CDU and Schills party in the Land Hamburg (20013). In this study, the CSUs stance on immigration is estimated as being tougher than the position of the Swiss SVP.
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and argued for following the example of the former Austrian sister-party, the FP. But, all those efforts and others by the national-liberal Alexander von Stahl in the mid-1990s or, more recently, by the more populist Jrgen W. Mllemann met with strong internal opposition (Dittberner 2005: 904, 11421, 268; Soe 2000: 66). Despite its lost libertarian profile (see below), the FDP remained immune to the radical rights agenda.
Analysis of the demand side: voters attitudes and issue priorities

According to the development of the context conditions, we assume socio-economic issues to remain important from the 1970s up to the most recent elections, and we expect immigration issues in particular to transform the cultural line of conflict in the 1990s. These expectations are supported by the analyses of voters issue-specific attitudes (Table 9.2). In all four elections, the structure of attitudes turns out to be two-dimensional,9 which rules out any additional conflict dimension, based for example on attitudes towards the environment. In 1976, the cultural dimension combines positive attitudes to an opening up of Germany to Europe, including the communist East, with support for culture. The second factor merges economic and cultural attitudes, but the positions regarding the socio-economic leftright conflict (welfare and economic liberalism) prevail. Whereas positive attitudes to cultural liberalism are connected to left-wing positions in the economic realm, support for security is part of the (economic) right. Since the 1990s, opinions about foreigners have been measured in all election studies and these positions strongly influence the structure of attitudes. In the three elections of 1994, 1998 and 2002, the conflict between libertarian positions and opposition to immigration always dominates the first extracted factor, indicating that the failure of right-wing forces at the federal level cannot be explained by a lack of demand. Attitudes to environmental policies most prominently about the use of nuclear energy were rather independent of the socio-economic line of conflict in 1976 but, by the 1990s, they have been integrated into the socioeconomic dimension of the space. Support for European integration
9
A three-dimensional solution would have been possible only in 1976, but because the third factors Eigenvalue is just 1.04 this solution was ruled out.
Table 9.2 Results of factor analyses after varimax rotation

1994 Cultural dimension 0.13 0.08 0.71 0.08 0.79 0.52 0.29 1.41 28.30 0.06 0.66 0.63 1.52 30.33 (1349) 0.45 0.73 0.24 0.60 0.39 1.83 22.85 (1579) 0.34 0.09 0.39 0.54 0.58 1.79 22.34 0.10 0.82 0.74 0.59 0.83 0.34 1.71 34.18 (1243) 0.75 0.56 0.07 0.65 0.12 Economic dimension Cultural dimension Economic dimension Cultural dimension 1998 2002 Economic dimension 0.65 0.20 0.46 0.02 0.70 1.17 23.48
1976
Cultural dimension
Economic dimension
0.08 0.13
0.68 0.72
0.38
0.53
welfare budget economic liberalism cultural liberalism Europe culture immigration army security environment Eigenvalue %Variance (n)
0.80 0.77 0.39 0.24 1.61 23.01
0.05 0.04 0.58 0.01 1.60 22.83
(973)
Notes: factor loadings > 0.4 are in bold.
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was part of the cultural dimension in the 1970s. By the 1990s, however, contrary to other countries, attitudes towards Europe do not clearly belong to the cultural line of conflict. In both 1998 and 2002, support for Europe is connected to economic liberalism; only in 2002 is it also part of a libertarian profile.10 The results of the factor analyses are illustrated in Figure 9.1. Based on the mean values of the factor scores, these figures present the positions of party voters, non-voters, members of social classes, of three groups defined by the level of education, and of groups concerning the religious cleavage. Comparing the demand space of the four elections, one result attracts special attention: the positions of the different groups are much more polarized in the 1990s/2000s than they were back in 1976, when only the non-voters and the farmers were clearly positioned away from the centre. Starting with the election of 1994, voters of the three new challengers Greens, PDS and Republikaner are positioned quite far away from the structures core, indicating a growing polarization within the electorate. Regarding the positions of voter groups, we expect especially those who are able to compete in the (international) market (Kitschelt 2003: 1278) and who are not attached to traditional and parochial values to be in favour of cultural and economic integration. Voters with comparatively higher educational levels and those who work as professionals/ socio-cultural specialists are the potential winners of globalization and should support the opening up of borders, especially with regard to cultural issues. As already mentioned, in 1976 all groups of voters expressed attitudes that put them in a central position of the demand space. Only the non-voters were situated at a peripheral location and expressed a combination of socio-economic support for the left and opposition to cultural integration.11 A (relevant) party providing this kind of policy mix has never been available on the market; the anticapitalist parts of the radical right the DVU and the NPD come closest to this position in the 1990s/2000s. As regards the mainstream voters positions, in the 1970s not only was the social-liberal coalition based on programmatic similarities of the two parties, especially in cultural affairs (see below), but the
10
11
In 1994, unfortunately, we have no measurement because of missing variables in the survey. Because just two voters of the NPD are included in the survey, it was not possible to position the radical right in the figure.
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Figure 9.1 Demand side of party competition, 1976, 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections (Germany)
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attitudes of the SPD and the FDP voters were quite similar as well. Both groups positioned themselves on the economic left, which is quite interesting regarding the liberal voters, and culturally close to the median voter. The Union voters were situated on the economic right, close to the self-employed and religious voters, while culturally they were also quite close to the median. Compared to the attitudinal space of 1976, the 1994 configuration has dramatically changed. Four groups of party voters the FDP, the PDS, the Greens and the Republikaner as well as the socio-cultural specialists take distinctive positions off the centre. The voters of the two main parties, by contrast, are now closer to the spaces centre than in the 1970s; relevant differences in their attitudes are limited to the cultural line of conflict, where the Union voters now support more conservative positions. Compared to the 1970s, the FDP voters have clearly moved to the economic right. They are now more or less alone in supporting market liberal preferences in an electorate that in general, as argued before, shares a strong bias towards welfare (Padgett 2004: 380). Their economic liberalism, however, does not go together with cultural liberalism. The supporters of the two new parties, the PDS and the Greens, are positioned on the left and support cultural integration, especially the Greens. Culturally progressive attitudes are also shared by the sociocultural specialists. The Republikaners position demonstrates how extreme these voters are concerning the cultural line of conflict, where they strongly support concepts of demarcation. Regarding the socioeconomic dimension, however, they position themselves close to the centre. Kitschelts (1995) winning formula, the combination of culturally conservative and economically liberal positions, does not fit the attitudes of the radical rights adherents in the German electorate. The configurations of 1998 and 2002 are quite similar to that of 1994. Unfortunately, for these two elections we do not have a variable measuring attitudes to the welfare state which somewhat distorts the space. One consequence of this missing variable might be the slight move of the Green voters to the right in 1998, because on the horizontal dimension positive attitudes to Europe, which are shared by an increasing part of the Green electorate, load highly. Again, the right-wing Republikaner12 are positioned at the extreme opposite of the Greens
12
Because of too few respondents in the election survey, the voters of the REP, the Schill party, and the NPD are merged in the 2002 space.
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Figure 9.2 Demand side of party competition, distances between selected sociodemographic categories (in standard deviations) (Germany)
and take a distinctive attitude of cultural demarcation. But these voters are also far away from economic liberalism, which once more shows how important it is to conceive the attitudinal structure as two-dimensional. Contrary to other countries, the core groups of the Social Democrats, skilled and unskilled workers, have not distinctly moved towards cultural demarcation, even though they have become a stronghold of right-wing parties (Jung and Roth 1998: 16). But both groups of workers are culturally clearly more conservative than the median SPD voter. Comparing the spatial positions with regard to old and new cleavages (Figure 9.2), the attitudinal differences based on the confessional cleavage are very small; differences between religious and non-religious
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parts of the electorate have always been bigger but both divisions also decreased somewhat. The traditional class conflict between skilled workers and the self-employed has remained important and actually increased in the late 1990s, while the conflict within the middle class between managers and socio-cultural specialists is more stable. But one conflict has become much more important since the 1970s: voters with low and high levels of education now clearly differ from each other. Whereas those with low levels of education tend towards demarcation in both dimensions, those with high levels of education prefer concepts of integration.

The structure of Germanys party political space, the supply side in our terminology, has been a subject for discussions in the literature. Klingemann and Volkens (1992: 189, 197) and Klingemann (1999) among others interpret the parties positions relative to each other simply in terms of a leftright divide. Interestingly, they acknowledge having difficulties when finding an economically left position of old right-wing parties13 based on their electoral manifestos, which clearly suggests that one-dimensional solutions are not appropriate. Pappi (1994: 233) has criticized such an interpretation of the German political space. He argued in favour of giving up the simple, one-dimensional left right framework and suggested interpreting the relationship of the three main parties as a triangle (Pappi 1984: 12). This is an improvement compared to the leftright solution, but the suggested solution leaves no room for the two new relevant parties who have entered the party competition since the 1980s, the Greens and the PDS, not to mention the radical right. Despite some differences between the elections that will be discussed below, the structure of the German supply side resulting from the MDS analyses of issue-positions is two-dimensional and corresponds well to the overall structure of the demand side. The parties differ both on the socio-economic line of conflict and on the cultural one. As can be seen in Figure 9.3, the thematic content of the cultural conflict has changed in the period covered according to our theoretical expectation, given that immigration has become the most polarizing issue. Compared to the 1972 election, which was dominated by fierce struggles over the relationship with communist Eastern Europe and especially
13
Deutsche Rechtspartei and Wirtschaftliche Aufbauvereinigung.
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Figure 9.3 Supply side of party competition, 1976, 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections (Germany)
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the GDR (the famous Ostpolitik) as well as abortion, there was no key issue in 1976 (Conradt 1978: 378). Freedom instead of socialism, the Union parties main slogan, was somewhat misplaced, given the reality under the moderate SPD leader and chancellor, Helmut Schmidt (Kaltefleiter 1978: 131). The 1976 campaign and the resulting configuration can be considered as representative of the social-liberal era in German politics, the phase of an ultra-stable two-and-a-half party pattern (Jeffery 1999: 104). The corresponding space shown in Figure 9.3 is structured by two dimensions: a socio-economic one and a cultural one. The former is dominated by welfare and economic liberalism, reflecting the different approaches to government intervention in the economy. The cultural line of conflict is structured by the support for cultural liberalism on the one side and support for the army on the other. Immigration, which marks off the conservative end of the cultural conflict in the elections of the 1990s, is absent from the campaign in the 1970s. As discussed above, the treatment of guestworkers was not a relevant electoral issue for the mainstream parties; only the rise of refugees and asylum-seekers in the 1980s made foreigners a salient as well as a polarizing issue. The positions of the three main parties constitute the relevant triangle in each of the elections. For 1976, the configuration shows the socialliberal position of the FDP, combining positions of cultural and economic liberalism in the 1970s. The governing parties, the SPD and the FDP, shared quite common positions in the cultural domain their distance to cultural liberalism was almost identical but they were in conflict over economic and social policies (Kaack 1978) where the FDP saw itself as a kind of intragovernmental opposition against the unrealistic or radical plans of the SPD (Conradt 1978: 45). Compared to the position of its voters, the FDPs position was much closer to economic liberalism. The Union was positioned quite far away from the governing parties in cultural terms, expressing a much more conservative stance, while taking an intermediate position on the socio-economic dimension. The configuration of the 1994 election is exceptional, because support for welfare and cultural liberalism are located extremely close to each other. This transforms the spatial structure and reminds us of the French configuration (Chapter 4). By the 1990s, immigration has become the most important new issue in the configuration, which results in a new meaning of cultural demarcation. Starting in the summer of 1991, when attacks against asylum-seekers and other immigrants (mostly in the eastern part of the country) shocked the public, immigrants became the most
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important issue for two years (Jung and Roth 1994: 45). When the mainstream parties including the oppositional SPD agreed on a tougher asylum law, the publics concern with foreigners lost its leading position which made it difficult for the radical right to mobilize in this election: the Republikaner received just 1.9% of the votes and clearly failed to gain parliamentary representation (Jung and Roth 1994: 15). Not only immigration, which clearly belongs to the issues most often linked to globalization, entered the political space, but also European integration; in the 1970s, this issue was of interest only for the elite and was not articulated in electoral campaigns. In the 1994 space, Europe is close to conservative issue-positions because support for integration has traditionally been the position of the Union parties. Since the 1980s, there were some internal disputes because, in particular, the smaller Bavarian sister party, the CSU, changed to a more Eurosceptical stance (Paterson 1996), but in the 1994 election criticism of integration especially of the monetary union and the stability pact was expressed primarily by the SPD. Compared to the configuration of the 1970s, the relative distances of the traditional parties have changed by the 1990s. The FDP, since 1982 in coalition with the Union parties, is now closer to them than to the SPD, its former ally. The Liberals, who once combined economic liberalism with a libertarian profile, have abandoned their cultural liberalism, which opened a niche in the electoral market for the Greens, who, together with the PDS, have now become the party closest to cultural liberalism. The SPDs position in the 1994 space is quite peripheral, which corresponds to internal struggles during the first half of the 1990s. After several lost federal elections, important groups within the party, led by Gerhard Schrder, wanted to move the SPD towards a more centrist position, a strategy that was opposed by the then party leader, Rudolf Scharping (Conradt 2000: 4). The 1998 Bundestag election deserves special attention because for the first time an election led to a complete change of governing parties, which was interpreted as a historical landmark (Conradt 2000: 1).14 Because the SPD and the Greens obtained an unexpectedly large share of the seats, they were able to build a red-green coalition to replace both the Union parties and the FDP. Compared to 1994, the structure of the space has changed quite considerably again; the economic and cultural lines of conflict are now clearly separated and build a configuration that is also
14
Niedermayer (1999), however, stresses some long-term developments leading to the 1998 election result and therefore denies its sensational character.
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present in 2002. Comparing the locations of the parties, the SPD in particular has dramatically changed its position. Potential losses to the Greens had preoccupied the party since the 1980s but were no longer a central strategic aspect (Conradt 2000: 5). Under its new chancellor candidate Schrder, the SPD gave up ecopacifist-postmaterialist positions (Walter 2002: 24950) and moved towards the political centre. Leaving in particular environmental protection aside, the party rediscovered issues like employment, growth and internal security (Conradt 2000: 5). The shift towards economic liberalism in particular caused debates because the SPD seemed to have given up some of its fundamental social democratic positions and perhaps even adopted the programmatic orientation of a Christian-democratic party (Seeleib-Kaiser 2002).15 The major parties were now operating in a centripetal competition with presumably only marginally differentiated economic policy positions (Kitschelt 2003: 126). But the policy of the Neue Mitte, the German variant of the Third Way, was different from neo-liberal policies, because the SPD did not want to give up a national economic policy and stressed the retention of political influence through Europe (Meyer 2001: 812). By contrast, apart from a slight shift towards cultural demarcation, the Union parties position remained almost the same. As we have already observed, the FDP, the long-time ally of the Union parties in the federal government, had given up its libertarian position by the mid-1990s and became a genuine party of economic liberalism (Vorlnder 1999: 1056). The youngest challenger to the German party system, the PDS, combined economically left positions with a progressive stance in cultural affairs, and succeeded in establishing itself as a permanent fixture in the German party space, despite earlier expectations to the contrary (Kleinfeld 2000: 99). Once again, the radical right, who split their votes between three competing parties plus two anti-EU groups, played no relevant role, either during the campaign or in the final result. But together they polled no less than 4.4%, and in the eastern part of the country they even obtained 7.2% of the votes (Feist and Hoffmann 1999: 235). After the unexpected victory of the red-green coalition in 1998, the 2002 election ended with a standoff between the major parties, the closest result in post-war German electoral history (Pulzer 2003). The SPD and the Union parties each polled 38.5% of the votes, and the coalition
15
Frenzel (2003) criticizes this interpretation.
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managed to remain in power only due to Green gains. A strong commitment against the Iraq War, the governments successful handling of a major flood catastrophe and the Union parties candidate for chancellor being viewed as too conservative were important reasons why the coalition retained power (Maier and Rattinger 2004; Roth and Jung 2002: 1213). The structure of the political space remained almost the same as in 1998. The SPD moved away from the centrist position it had occupied in 1998 towards a more left-libertarian stance. It fiercely opposed the war against Iraq and successfully positioned itself as a leading force of the German peace movement. This move away from the centre was directed against the PDS as well, which even lost parliamentary representation altogether (Hilmer 2003: 202, 210). The extreme left was not only challenged by the oligopolistic strategy of the SPD but it also ran into difficulties because, as a governing party at the Land level, it had to defend financially restrictive policies (Pulzer 2003). The FDP presented itself as a party of lower taxes and welfare reform (Vorlnder 2003: 115) and is therefore close to budget and economic liberalism but far away from welfare. The Greens, since 1998 the SPDs coalition partner, once more were close to ecological concerns but also moved slightly away from welfare closer to economic liberalism. Their leftright position since the mid-1990s has led to some debate in the literature (see Dolezal 2005); Kitschelt (2000: 215), for example, denied an economically liberal attitude of the Greens. Summarizing the changes of the political space and the movements of parties, one can see that the Union is the most stable force in German politics. The SPD, like many other social-democratic parties in Europe, moved towards more centrist positions with regard to social-economic issues but still remains a left force especially in the context of electoral campaigns where it has to compete with the post-communist PDS primarily in the eastern part of the country. The FDP remained an economically liberal force but gave up most of its libertarian profile and lost this niche in the electoral market to the Greens. Since no rightwing party has yet succeeded at the federal level, there is no party political actor who is close to (anti-)immigration positions. Since the 1990s, this issue-category builds the conservative end point of the cultural line of conflict, but most of the time it is barely populated. The predominance of socio-economic issues over cultural ones, which differentiates Germany from most other European countries, is cause as well as consequence of this missing actor.
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Conclusion
From a comparative perspective, political change in Germany since the 1990s has been rather moderate; even reunification has not led to dramatic shifts in party politics. Contrary to other countries explored in this book, neither has a new challenger party from the populist right managed to gain representation at the federal level, nor has there been a major transformation of a mainstream conservative (Union) or liberal (FDP) party. More happened on the left: the Greens became an integral part of party competition in the Berlin Republic and the relatively successful PDS exemplifies the only new force of the traditional left in the six countries studied here. The emergence of the PDS is without a doubt the direct consequence of reunification, but the partys surprising stabilization also reflects the continuing importance of the socio-economic conflict. In most European countries, cultural conflicts, especially immigration and increasingly European integration, have become dominant in recent elections; in Germany, however, issues related to the traditional left right divide still prevail and losers of globalization are mobilized primarily by social and economic issues. Severe economic problems, especially in the new Lnder of the East, not only bring socio-economic issues to the forefront of electoral campaigns and keep the traditional class cleavage alive; they also leave less room for experiments in the eyes of the electorate. The radical right is seen as lacking the competence to handle important issues such as the fight against unemployment. Its electoral success, therefore, is restricted to second-order elections at the Land level, where the voters sometimes express dissatisfaction with the established parties and perhaps articulate aggressive stances against cultural integration. But these voters abandon the right at elections which really count. Contrary to other results and interpretations in the literature, we were able to show that the structure of the German political space, both on the demand side and on the supply side, is two-dimensional. Such a configuration was visible in the 1970s and remains so in the 1990s/2000s. Since the 1990s, issues connected to globalization have had a big impact on the thematic base of this structure and changed the nature in particular of the cultural line of conflict. But, as in all the other countries, these issues are embedded in the two-dimensional configuration. The analyses of the voters attitudes and the parties positions showed great similarities. Voters of the FDP at least in the aggregate have followed their party
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in its move towards greater economic liberalism and abandoned libertarian attitudes that are now most prominently expressed by the Greens. Contrary to the SPD, who changed its profile and moved towards the centre of the political space, the Union parties remained the most stable forces. Because no right-wing party has been able to successfully enter the (federal) electoral market, the space near the demarcation end of the cultural dimension has remained rather empty. As could be seen in the analysis of the demand, cultural issues do polarize the electorate but no social group has decisively moved towards this position. But, without a doubt, there is a strong demand for cultural demarcation in the German electorate. It is due to the strategic failure of the radical right, to institutional constraints as well as to the political culture that this demand has been marginalized at the federal level. In addition, competition between the major parties has always been stronger than in other countries with a primarily consensus style of politics. In contrast in particular to Austria, grand coalitions are rare and the mainstream conservative party, the CDU/CSU, has always integrated not only economically but also culturally conservative positions, leaving much less room for the radical right than perhaps its Austrian sister-party. In the late 1960s, the first grand coalition in Germany was accompanied by a rise of the NPD. Whether the second grand coalition, in power since November 2005, will again give the radical right such an opportunity is an open question.
PART III
Comparative analyses
10
Demand side: dealignment and realignment of the structural political potentials

ROMAIN LACHAT AND MARTIN DOLEZAL
Introduction
The country chapters have shown how the structure of electoral competition has been affected by globalization in the recent period. In each of the six countries, we found strong evidence for a transformation of the main dimensions of the political space and for patterns of realignment. In the present chapter, we focus on the demand side of electoral competition, analyzing in more detail the formation of a potential for the new integration v. demarcation cleavage. We take here a comparative perspective and consider similarities and differences among countries in the nature of these developments. It must be emphasized that the nature of our data imposes some limitations on the extent to which voters attitudes can be compared across elections. To be able to perform similar analyses and to rely on comparable categories of issues across space and time, it was necessary to standardize all scales measuring issue-orientations. This implies that differences among groups of voters are always expressed in a relative way. Absolute positions or absolute distances in the political space cannot be compared directly. This is certainly annoying, but it is unavoidable given the lack of survey questions and designs that are directly comparable across several countries and elections. While this problem limits the type of comparisons that can be performed, it leaves enough room to analyze several of the central implications of our theoretical argument. The following analyses are divided into five parts. In the first section, we summarize the overall structure of voters attitudes in the six countries, drawing on results presented in the country chapters of this volume. The results of the factor analyses of voters issue-orientations show the development of a similar configuration in all countries, corresponding to the expected two-dimensional political space. Then, we analyze more in depth the relationship between economic and cultural
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issues. This is important from the point of view of the possible partisan consequences, as the articulation of the new divide will be easier, the larger the degree of independence between economic and cultural issues. Thirdly, we go beyond the general structure of the political space to focus on divides between winners and losers of globalization, i.e. those social groups that may perceive the process of denationalization as a chance or as a threat, respectively. To this end, we trace changes in the degree of polarization of the old and new divides. After this, we emphasize the partisan consequences of these developments, showing how the increasing polarization on cultural issues is reflected in the distances between partisan groups, i.e. the supporters of the various political parties. In the final part of our analyses, we turn to regression models, analyzing the joint impact of the various structural characteristics that correspond to the traditional economic and cultural cleavages, as well as to the new opposition between winners and losers of globalization.
The structure of voters attitudes

We start by analyzing the general structure of voters attitudes. As we have argued in the introductory chapters, it is central to consider how the political space was structured before the transformation process linked with globalization, a period that accelerated in the late 1980s (Figure 3.1). In most Western European countries, both an economic and a cultural cleavage have structured electoral competition in the post-war period. While these dimensions were linked with the traditional class and religious cleavages, identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the cultural dimension has been characterized by a first transformation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Issues emphasized by the new social movements, such as gender equality or peace, have been integrated into the cultural dimension while at the same time the structuring potential of traditional moral and religious issues has weakened. We expect a similar transformation process to have occurred during the 1990s as a direct response to globalization. At the level of voters, we should observe a change in the structure of attitudes. The exact result of these developments, of course, will depend on the starting configuration. We shall therefore focus first on the structure of attitudes in the 1970s, the time period we use as a point of reference for our exploration. As explained in Chapter 3 and as shown in the country chapters, we examined the configuration of voters attitudes with the help of
Demand side: dealignment and realignment
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two-stage factor analyses. In the first stage, we operationalized the issuecategories that are common to all our analyses. Then, we performed factor analyses of these variables. In all six countries, we have found that voters issue-positions in the 1970s were structured by two dimensions. This is in line with our description of the structure of electoral competition in Western Europe. However, the nature of these dimensions was not as clear-cut as expected. It was not always possible to distinguish between a purely cultural and a purely economic dimension. Attitudes towards economic liberalism, welfare, and budgetary rigour were often correlated with preferences on cultural matters. The main dimensions of the political space, therefore, were structured by both types of issues. Nor could we, in the 1970s, identify typical or regular patterns of association between cultural and economic issues. The cultural issue-categories that correlate with attitudes towards economic matters vary from country to country. While the distinction between an economic and a cultural dimension appears quite clearly at the level of parties, as we are going to see in the following chapter, the structure of voters attitudes is rather less explicit or appears to be in a phase of transition. It shows that the mobilization of new social movements and the emergence of new issues, like environmental protection, have initiated a phase of realignment. From this point of view, it is important to notice that France and the UK stand out as exceptions because one of the dimensions structuring voters attitudes is still dominated by economic issues (as we saw in Table 4.2 and Table 8.2). These are also countries where the mobilization of the new social movements was particularly weak (Kriesi et al. 1995; Koopmans 1996) and where the traditional class cleavage remained strong, as noted in Chapter 2. In this early period, there were thus quite important differences among the six countries in the structure of voters attitudes. In more recent elections, by contrast, the similarities among them are striking. For the 1990s, we found again a two-dimensional solution in each election, which confirms our hypothesis that the new globalization issues do not lead to the formation of an additional political opposition. Furthermore, the results of our analyses also offer strong support for our hypotheses about the nature of these dimensions. In the Netherlands, in Switzerland, in France and in the UK, the distinction between an economic and a cultural dimension is very clear-cut. The two broad categories of issues each form a homogeneous factor. One factor structures attitudes towards economic liberalism, the welfare state, and budgetary rigour (as well as
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environmental protection in most cases). The other factor is strongly correlated with preferences towards cultural liberalism, immigration, European integration and other cultural issues. There are almost no deviations from this pattern. At most, one can notice that attitudes towards European integration relate equally to both dimensions in the Dutch elections of the 1990s. But this issue has, indeed, both economic and cultural aspects, as we have repeatedly emphasized. This can be seen in the results of the French 2002 election, too, where both types of consequences of European integration are measured separately and where each of them loads on a separate dimension (Table 4.2).1 In general, the results are somewhat more mixed in German and Austrian elections. In these countries, the distinction between economic and cultural issues is less clear-cut than in the other four. In Germany, the economic dimension also includes attitudes towards Europe or law and order. While Europe, as just discussed, also has an economic aspect, the association of law and order with the economic issue dimension is more difficult to interpret. In the case of Austria, finally, the distinction between economic and cultural issues seems to be totally blurred in the 1990s. In 1994 and 1999, a mix of economic and cultural issues builds the first dimension, while the second one is structured only by attitudes towards the environment. These surprising results, however, may primarily reflect poor data quality. In the 2002 election, for which our data come from a more reliable source than in the previous polls, the Austrian results fit quite well into the pattern observed in the other countries. This also means that we should be cautious when comparing further results from Austria in the 1990s with those of other countries. Summarizing our findings, the similarities between the countries have without a doubt increased since the late 1980s. All Western European societies face similar challenges from globalization processes, and voters in all six countries respond in a comparable way.
The relationship between economic and cultural issues

While the separation between economic and cultural issues was relatively clear in the results of our factor analyses, this method is
1
Another apparent deviation comes from the fact that attitudes towards the army load on the economic dimension in the 1988 French election. However, these attitudes were measured by a question on military spending and deal therefore also with the question of budgetary rigour.
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not the most appropriate one to analyze in detail how these two categories of issues relate to one another. One of the main objectives in our analyses of voters attitudes was to determine the number of dimensions structuring their issue-orientations. This is one of the central reasons why we performed such factor analyses. As discussed above, they have resulted in two-dimensional solutions structured primarily by economic and cultural issues, respectively. Beyond this general conclusion, however, the strength of the relationship between cultural and economic attitudes is likely to vary across elections and countries. The weaker the relationship between these two types of attitudes, the greater is the potential for divisions or tensions within groups of voters. These might be used by political entrepreneurs as a basis for new mobilization efforts. We can think for example of a country where the economic axis is the most important one for explaining voting choices and the structure of party positions. In such a case, a weak relationship between economic and cultural attitudes would mean that groups of voters, on both sides of the economic divide, are likely to be heterogeneous in their cultural orientation. There may be tensions regarding cultural questions among both (economic) left-wing and right-wing voters. New challengers may attempt to benefit from these divisions by mobilizing voters on such cultural issues. The potential for changes in the structure of electoral competition is likely to be larger if the twodimensional character of the political space is pronounced. Of course, other aspects play an important role here as well, in addition to the structure of voters attitudes. Thus, the chances that such mobilization efforts are successful also depend on the salience of cultural issues. But examining the relationship between cultural and economic attitudes already offers some important insights into the strength of the potential for a new cleavage. To analyze the strength of this relationship, we have first operationalized these two dimensions separately. For each election, we have performed separate factor analyses of economic and of cultural issue categories.2 Table 10.1 presents the correlation coefficients between
2
The categories of environmental protection, institutional reform and infrastructural projects were not used for these analyses. In most cases, we find that economic and cultural items each form a single factor. In the few cases of two-dimensional solutions, we used the first factor only for the present analysis.
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Table 10.1 Strength of the association between economic and cultural attitudes
France Austria Switzerland Netherlands UK 1970s 1990s 1st election 2nd election 3rd election 4th election 1990s (average) 0.30 0.47 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.25 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.20 0.12 Germany 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.08
0.20 0.12
Note: p < 0.01 for all correlations. Entries are correlation coefficients, measuring the association between the cultural and the economic dimension, operationalized by separate factor analyses.
these two factors for each election. In most cases, we find a negative correlation. This corresponds to what we found in previous analyses. In the graphical representations of voters positions, the main line of conflict usually ran from the upper left quadrant, favouring cultural integration but opposing economic liberalism, to the inverse position in the lower right quadrant. There are also a few cases of positive correlations, which do not fit with this pattern. Most relevant among these is the 1974 British case, where the positions of social-democratic and conservative voters on European integration were diametrically opposed to what they are now. The other positive correlations are substantially less important: they are either low, as in France or Germany, or they correspond to less reliable data sources, as in Austria in the 1990s. Altogether, the correlations in Table 10.1 are quite modest, most of them being smaller than 0.30 in absolute value. The only rather strong relationship is found in the 1975 Austrian election, with a correlation of 0.47. Thus, while there is some relationship between these two categories of issues, the two really form independent dimensions. Furthermore, we can better see here how this relationship has changed over time. There is some evidence for a decline during the 1990s in the strength of this association. This change is not very pronounced, but, apart from Switzerland, the correlations are always weaker in the early 2000s than in the 1970s or 1990s. In France, it is even positive in 2002 though the coefficient is small.
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The weakness of the correlations between economic and cultural attitudes further supports the idea that the political space is twodimensional and that using a single leftright dimension to express voters attitudes is an inadequate simplification. The tendency of a further weakening of the association between these two categories of issue-positions in the recent period may also be a sign that a realignment process is underway. As Kitschelt (1994: 23f.) has emphasized, there is no logical or normative compatibility between preferences on the economic and on the cultural dimensions. Such associations are primarily formed empirically, depending on the preferences and interests of specific social groups, but also as a consequence of dominant ideologies. As social groups face new challenges, like those linked with the process of globalization, the structure of political preferences in the public may change. We may observe a phase of instability, leading to the formation of new alignments. To explore in more detail this expected realignment process, we now turn to the level of social groups.
Winners and losers of globalization

In Chapter 1, we presented the characteristics of the winners and losers of globalization. The cultural, economic and political forms of competition resulting from globalization each lead to new disparities between social groups. In the previous chapters, we have shown for each election how the preferences of social groups varied, focusing on social classes, education levels and religious groups. Here, we consider the positions of these social categories from a comparative perspective. The country chapters discussed five divides among social groups. Two of these correspond to traditional cleavages: the old class conflict and the religious cleavage.3 The other three contrasts capture oppositions resulting from new forms of competition associated with
The old class divide is the opposition between skilled workers and the selfemployed. The nature of the religious divide varies across countries. It opposes Catholics and Protestants in Switzerland and Germany, Catholics who attend church service frequently and non-Catholics in France, Protestants and nonreligious voters in the UK, and, in Austria, religious Catholics and Catholics who do not attend services at all, as well as citizens who are not members of any church. In the Netherlands, several religious divides were identified in Chapter 7. We present here the opposition between Catholics and non-religious voters, which was the strongest one in all elections.
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Figure 10.1 Strength of traditional and new divides among social groups
globalization: the divide between the well educated and the less well educated, the opposition between social-cultural specialists and managers (middle class divide), and the conflict between unskilled workers and social-cultural specialists (class divide 1990s). Our results on the evolution of these oppositions are presented in Figure 10.1. These findings have already been discussed country by country in previous chapters. We simply show them here again separately for each divide in order to emphasize the similarities and differences among countries.4 As can be seen in the line diagrams, few of the divisions presented are characterized by an unequivocal trend, such as a decline or a rise in all countries. Yet, there are important differences between the old and the new divisions. Starting with the religious cleavage, the traditional cultural opposition in European societies, we see that this division has weakened impressively in France over the last decades, while it remained more or less stable in the other countries. Furthermore,
4
As emphasized earlier in this chapter, all distances between social groups are measured in relative terms. They are expressed in standard deviations and show how much the average positions of groups differ from one another relative to the overall distribution of attitudes in the corresponding sample.
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apart from the French exception, this line of division is always among the weakest ones. Even back in the 1970s, the issue-positions of voters did not vary strongly across religious groups. This division was already largely pacified even in a country like Switzerland, which was traditionally characterized by a strong confessional division (Lijphart 1979). The only instance of a reinforcement of the religious cleavage is Austria. In this country, with a strong confessional homogeneity, the attitudinal differences between the two core groups religious Catholics, on the one hand, non-religious Catholics and non-members, on the other have increased markedly.5 They represent one of the strongest divisions among religious groups in the recent period. A likely explanation for this development, we believe, is a kind of radicalization of the core group of religious Catholics, who are increasingly different from the secular voters as they become fewer, which is the case even in religious Austria (for a discussion of similar developments in other contexts, see Knutsen 2004; Lachat 2004). The other traditional division, the class antagonism between skilled workers and the self-employed, is also stable and rather weak. It has eroded a little bit in recent Dutch elections, it has fluctuated more strongly in the UK and Germany, but, altogether, the strength of this cleavage in recent elections is comparable to the situation in the 1970s. The average distance in the political space, measured in standard deviations, was 0.45 in the 1970s, against 0.48 for the elections of the 1990s and 2000s. This is similar to the corresponding results for the religious cleavage (0.50 in the 1970s, 0.45 after 1990). The latter values, however, are strongly influenced by the French case, where religious divisions were particularly salient in the 1970s. Omitting this country, the average distances between the two poles of the religious cleavage for the two electoral periods are 0.26 and 0.33, respectively. While the strength of the traditional class and religious cleavages has not changed much, the other divisions have become more salient. The average distances between the corresponding social groups are larger in the 1990s and 2000s than in the 1970s. This development is particularly pronounced for the educational divide as well as for the new class divide between unskilled workers and social-cultural specialists. Still
5
Note, however, that we are only able to measure two time-points (1975 and 2002), because the surveys available for the 1990s did not include any questions on religious affiliation or religiousness.
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comparing the 1970s and the 1990s/2000s, the average distance has increased from 0.66 to 1.06 for the first division, and from 0.56 to 0.96 for the second one. These are the two contrasts which most directly reflect the new oppositions linked with globalization. As we have emphasized, differences in education level are central to understanding how voters may react to immigration and to the cultural form of competition. Citizens with a higher level of education not only display more liberal and tolerant values on average, they are also less directly confronted with the competition of migrants on the labour market. As regards the economic aspects of globalization, those with higher education might also be less afraid of the opening processes, as they perceive it more as an opportunity than a threat to their individual welfare, given their resources to compete successfully even in an international context. But the new class divide not only reflects differences in education levels, it is also associated with sectoral differences and with the degree to which workers or employees may be exposed to the world economy. Social-cultural specialists are mainly employed by the state or work in sectors that are less strongly confronted with international competition. These results clearly show that the new divides among classes or between education levels have become larger than those rooted in traditional cleavages. Yet, this reveals only partially the importance of the transformations linked with globalization. As we have emphasized, globalization leads to the formation of a potential for a new cleavage. We see this in the increasing attitudinal distances between specific social groups, as shown in Figure 10.1. As this potential cleavage is articulated by parties, it will transform the structure of the political space. The consequences of this realignment process will be all the more important as the new divides cross-cut traditional oppositions. To account for this, we can look again at distances between social groups, while separating economic and cultural issues. Figure 10.2 presents such data for the economic dimension, Figure 10.3 for the cultural one. Contrary to the previous results, distances between groups are not computed here in a two-dimensional space, but on a single dimension. These are the product of separate factor analyses of economic issue-categories and of cultural issues, respectively.6
These are the same factors that were used to compute the correlation coefficients presented in Table 10.1.
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Figure 10.2 Distances between social groups on economic issue-categories
Figure 10.3 Distances between social groups on cultural issue-categories
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The contrast between the two groups of issues is striking. As far as the traditional cleavages are concerned, we clearly see that the religious divide was a cultural opposition and the class divide an economic one. Only in France are economic oppositions as strong among religious groups as they are between the self-employed and skilled workers. More interesting from our perspective, however, are the other three divides. The education and new class divides were relatively weak in the 1970s, on both dimensions. They have markedly intensified since then, but only on the cultural dimension with the exception of Germany, where the new class divide is characterized by a polarization on both dimensions. As a consequence, it is now the cultural dimension which is characterized by the most salient oppositions. Our results clearly show the importance and salience of the new potential. As economic oppositions become less relevant, at least in a relative way, a realignment of voters and parties on the cultural dimension is more likely. These developments not only lead to a change in the relative importance of the cultural and economic dimensions of the political space. The globalization process also leads to a more homogeneous positioning of social groups across countries and elections. To better compare the location of social groups across elections, such as that of socialcultural specialists or of voters with a low level of education, we can rely on their average position on the separate economic and cultural factors resulting from distinct analyses of the corresponding groups of issues, which we used for instance to compute the distances reported in Figures 10.2 and 10.3 As these factors are based only on economic issue-categories or cultural issue-categories, respectively, they can be more easily compared across elections.7 Using these dimensions, we show in Figure 10.4 the average locations of the three education levels. Figure 10.5 does the same for three social classes: unskilled workers,
The factors resulting from the analyses of the country chapters, by contrast, may vary in their nature or meaning, as they are based on both economic and cultural issue-categories. The horizontal axis in a given election is therefore never a purely economic axis, but may be affected by voters preferences on some cultural issues as well, even if this impact is much smaller than that of economic issue-positions. The solution we rely on here avoids such comparison problems. However, it is still the case that the locations of social groups are expressed in relative terms, i.e. on standardized scales.
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Figure 10.4 Average location of education levels on the economic and cultural dimensions
Figure 10.5 Average location of social classes on the economic and cultural dimensions
social-cultural specialists, and the self-employed. Each of these figures is composed of two panels, one for the 1970s, the other for the more recent elections. Each symbol indicates the average location of a social group in one election.
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Education groups, both in the 1970s and in the 1990s/2000s, differ from one another primarily by their position on the vertical axis, representing the cultural dimension. In the first electoral period, however, the distinction between the three groups is not always clear-cut. While the more liberal positions are represented by voters with a high level of education and the more conservative ones by voters with a low level, as expected, most categories are located in a heterogeneous cluster at the centre of the political space. Clearly, the association between education level and issue-positions on cultural matters is weak at best. There is also virtually no connection between this social characteristic and voters preferences on the horizontal or economic dimension. In more recent elections, by contrast, we observe that the voters preferences are more clearly structured by their education level, especially on the cultural dimension. Three distinct clusters can be identified, each composed of voters with a similar level of education. We observe here the emergence of a similar potential for a new cleavage across different contexts. In all six countries, voters with a lower level of education express economic and especially cultural attitudes of demarcation, while those with a high level of education share attitudes in favour of integration, especially in the cultural domain. A similar conclusion can be drawn by looking at the average locations of social classes (Figure 10.5). The three groups presented there correspond to two of the divides discussed before: the new class divide, characteristic of the 1990s, between unskilled workers and social-cultural specialists, and the traditional class divide, between workers and the self-employed.8 In the 1970s, the positions in each of the three groups are relatively homogeneous on the economic dimension, but much less so on the cultural axis. Most take a rather centrist position on the latter dimension. On the right-hand panel, by contrast, the situation is reversed. The three groups form compact clusters, which vary somewhat in their economic orientation but are more homogeneous in their cultural preferences. This is particularly true of unskilled workers and of social-cultural specialists. There is also a large gap between social-cultural specialists, who are culturally liberal, and the
8
We specified the latter divide as an opposition between skilled workers and the self-employed. Yet, the two groups of workers, skilled and unskilled, take a very similar position in the political space. Only one of them is presented here, to keep the figure easier to read.
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other two categories, whose orientation is more conservative. The expected new divide between unskilled workers and social-cultural specialists is strong. Here again, the potential for the formation of a new cleavage is similar across different contexts.
The configuration of partisan groups

The articulation of the new cleavage by political parties should lead to a realignment of their electorates. For example, while the traditional opposition between social-democratic voters and the supporters of conservative parties was mainly an economic one, these two groups should now be more strongly opposed on cultural matters. The location of partisan groups in the political space should therefore change. If our arguments about the transformation of the structure of the political space at the national level are correct, we should observe several important changes in the configurations of partisan groups. First, the main axis on which these groups are aligned should change from an economic opposition to a cultural one. This is similar to the rotation of the main dimension of the distribution of voters preferences postulated by Kitschelt (1994: 32). There are several possibilities to determine what the main axis is or how to represent it. Here, we have chosen to focus on the degree of polarization of the positions of partisan groups on the cultural dimension and on the economic one. If the most important differences among groups of voters were their positions on the economic axis, and if their average positions on the cultural dimension were quite similar to one another, we would find a high variance or degree of polarization on the horizontal axis and a weak one on the vertical axis. Expressing the orientation of the main axis of the distribution of partisan groups through two quantities, rather than a single regression coefficient or other parameter, may seem to be an unnecessary complication. However, in this way we can follow changes not only in the relative degree of polarization on the economic and cultural dimensions, but also on their absolute level. The degree of polarization of the average positions of groups of voters can be computed as a weighted average of their standard deviations, using the index of Taylor and Hermann (1971), which is introduced in the technical appendix (Appendix A below). As is shown in Table 10.2, in the 1970s, the level of polarization was usually stronger on the economic dimension than on the cultural one.
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Table 10.2 Polarization of partisan groups on the economic and cultural dimensions
France Austria Switzerland Netherlands UK Germany Economic dimension 1970s 0.24 1990s 1st election 0.29 2nd election 0.24 3rd election 0.13 4th election 1990s 0.22 (average) Cultural dimension 1970s 1990s 1st election 2nd election 3rd election 4th election 1990s (average) 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.26 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.25 0.38 0.26 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.11
0.24 0.08
0.00 0.11 0.14 0.23 0.16
0.06 0.38 0.44 0.41
0.22 0.19 0.16 0.26 0.21 0.21
0.18 0.05 0.08 0.14
0.02 0.20 0.17 0.14
0.09 0.17
Note: entries are values of the Taylor and Herman index of polarization, which represents a weighted variance. See Appendix A for a presentation of this index.
Despite the rising attitudinal differences in the cultural domain, partisan groups still differ with respect to the economic dimension in more recent elections. In three of the six countries, the degree of polarization remained rather stable. It declined in the UK and France, but from a high level, meaning that economic polarization is still noticeable. At the same time, however, the degree of cultural polarization has become more intense. In Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland, polarization on the cultural axis is much stronger now than in the 1970s. And, in every country, the differences among partisan groups in the last elections are larger on the cultural dimension than on the economic one. There are, however, differences in the timing of this development. The economic dimension remained the most important one until the late 1990s in France, the UK and the Netherlands. By contrast, the cultural dimension was already more important in Switzerland in 1995, while it was dominant in Austria throughout the 1990s. Switzerland and Austria, finally, are the two countries where the level of polarization
Demand side: dealignment and realignment Table 10.3 Degree of tripolarity of the party configuration
France Austria Switzerland Netherlands UK 1970s 1990s 1st election 2nd election 3rd election 4th election 1990s (average) 0.10 0.64 0.45 0.23 0.44 0.11 0.09 0.51 0.44 0.35 0.00 0.33 0.22 0.28 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.52 0.40 0.28 0.00 0.21 0.22 0.10
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Germany 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.05
0.18 0.24
Note: the groups of voters considered in the Netherlands are those of the PvdA, VVD and CDA (197298) or LPF (2002, 3); SP, Liberals and SVP in Switzerland; SP, VP and FP in Austria; SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP in Germany; PSF, RPR and FN in France; Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats in the UK.
of party voters has increased on both dimensions. These two countries share two major developments. First, both small countries have had to deal with a decline of their once peculiar position in a divided Europe. European integration has become a major and polarizing issue. Secondly, and certainly connected with the former, both countries have been strongholds of right-wing populism since the late 1980s. Contrary to other countries, especially the UK and Germany, the populist right represents one corner of the party triangle leading to stronger polarization, especially on the cultural divide. With regard to economic attitudes, voters in both countries have been confronted with strong efforts towards deregulation and liberalization, which were especially in Austria a requirement for becoming an EU member. The second expected change in the configuration of partisan groups regards its shape. The mobilization of parties of the new radical right should lead to a realignment of partisan groups. The greater salience of cultural issues, and the divides among right-wing parties on such issues, should be reflected at the level of voters. As moderate right-wing (and left-wing) parties lose part of their voters to the populist right, the ideological make-up of the groups of voters should change. As long as the economic conflict was dominant, the main parties were aligned on a single leftright dimension. With the tripolarization of the party system, however, it is not possible any longer to rely on a single ideological continuum. This would represent an oversimplification of the configuration of parties as well as of their voters. In Table 10.3, we examine
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the degree of tripolarity of the configuration of the three main parties supporters. What we need to measure is the degree to which the triangle formed by these three partisan groups in the two-dimensional political space differs from a one-dimensional solution. At one extreme, the three average positions may form a line, while at the other extreme they may form an equilateral triangle, i.e. a configuration in which the distances between any pair of parties are equal. The measure used here captures this characteristic of the configuration. As explained in detail in Appendix A, it is derived from an MDS analysis and is based on the Stress-1 statistic. If three groups of voters are perfectly aligned, this index of tripolarity takes a value of 0, while its maximal value, corresponding to the most tripolar situation, is 1. The values presented in Table 10.3 show indeed that the configurations of party supporters in the political space are closer to a onedimensional solution in the 1970s than in the recent period the only exception is, again, Germany. The values of the index are close to 0 in the first electoral period, especially in the UK, Switzerland and the Netherlands. This is even the case for countries such as France, where the Front National was already competing, or Switzerland, with the traditional agrarian SVP. In the 1990s and early 2000s, by contrast, we observe a clear triangular configuration in most cases. Even if values range just between 0.20 and 0.30, which is far from the maximum possible value of the index, the configurations clearly do not correspond to one-dimensional solutions. The 1999 Swiss configuration, for instance, with a value of 0.22, appears in Figure 6.1 as a clear tripolar system. These results show again the importance of relying on a twodimensional representation of positions of voters and parties. In all countries considered here, the configuration of partisan groups has a tripolar character in all or most of the recent elections. Furthermore, these countries also present similar characteristics as far as the relative positions of party families are concerned. In the introductory chapter of this volume, we summarized our hypotheses on the expected location of party families in the political space (Figure 1.1). Following the argument we have presented, parties should change their location in the political space to better represent the interests of specific electoral segments. We have shown above how the configuration of social groups has changed and how differences on the cultural dimension have become increasingly important. This is a first set of results
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Figure 10.6 Average location of partisan groups in the political space, 1970s
supporting the expected realignment process. We go one step further here by looking at changes in the political preferences of partisan groups, i.e. of the supporters of the various parties. In Figures 10.6 and 10.7, we present their average location in the political space, separately for the 1970s and for the 1990s. The horizontal axis is the economic dimension, and the vertical axis corresponds to attitudes towards cultural issues. Both are measured by relying on distinct factor analyses, of economic and cultural issue-categories, respectively. In the 1970s, the main axis of the distribution runs from a left-wing, culturally liberal position (upper left quadrant), to an economically liberal but culturally conservative position (lower-right quadrant). Supporters of social-democratic parties take the former position, as radical-left voters do. On the right of the political spectrum, the positions are less homogeneous. The relative issue-positions of liberal
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Figure 10.7 Average location of partisan groups in the political space, 1990s
voters, in particular, differ strongly across countries. Supporters of the German liberals, for instance, are quite close to social-democratic voters in that country and are located at the centre of the overall distribution of attitudes. At the other extreme, the profile of French UDF and Dutch VVD voters is similar to those of their conservative counterparts and forms a pro-market and culturally conservative pole. The particular positions of the supporters of the major British parties must also be emphasized. Labour voters were then clearly more conservative on the cultural dimension than supporters of the Conservative party. As discussed in Chapter 8, this reflects the positions of the parties on the European question at that time. By comparison with the 1970s, the configuration in more recent elections reveals several important developments. First, the relative distances between party families have
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increased, showing now a higher level of polarization of partisan groups. Secondly, the left-liberal v. right-conservative axis, which we emphasized in Figure 10.6, is now less dominant. There are important cultural differences among supporters of economic right-wing parties, as well as economic differences among culturally liberal parties. The tripolar character of party systems appears here very clearly. Supporters of right-wing populist parties stand out by their conservative position on the cultural dimension. On the economic one, however, they are similar to Christian-democratic or liberal voters. The only exception are supporters of radical-right parties in Germany, who take a left-wing position on economic matters reflecting the economic positions of their unreformed parties as well as the countrys economic problems (see Chapter 9). Among left-wing parties, the correspondence with the expected positions is less pronounced. Supporters of Third Way parties, in particular of the British Labour Party, are culturally rather moderate, while we expected them to be among the most liberal. The economic position of Green voters in Germany and Austria, finally, is quite centrist. This indicates some potential tension between voters and a traditionally left-wing-oriented party elite.
The structural basis of the new divide

We conclude our analyses by considering in more detail the structural basis of the new divide between integration and demarcation. We have found strong evidence that the character of the cultural dimension structuring voters attitudes has changed in the 1990s. The traditional moral or religious issues, as well as the values advocated by new social movements, have become less important than the new globalization issues, i.e. European integration and immigration. We have also shown that attitudes towards such issues are linked with social-structural characteristics such as ones level of education or social class. In this section, we analyze more directly the strength of this structural basis, with the help of regression models. As with previous analyses, measures of voters attitudes are standardized, which imposes some limitations on the type of comparisons that can be performed. It is not possible, for example, to say whether social-cultural specialists are more or less favourable to economic liberalism in the UK than in France. Drawing such conclusions would require identical measures of voters issuepositions in all surveys, which is not possible in our case. However,
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the standardized measures of issue-positions allow us to compare relative differences between groups. For instance, we can show whether the impact of the level of education on economic orientations differs across time or space. We have estimated a series of regression models, where voters attitudes are regressed on their level of education, social class membership, and religion. We focus on four dependent variables: attitudes towards European integration, immigration, cultural liberalism, and economic issues.9 All models were estimated separately for each country and for each electoral period.10 Education is coded as a three-point scale, ranging from 0, for a low level of education, to +1 for a high level of education. Social class and religion are coded as a set of dummy variables. There is some variation across countries in the distinctions made among social classes. Distinctions within the service class, in particular, are not always the same. When we have enough information on respondents occupations, we contrast three segments: managers, socialcultural specialists, and technical specialists, following the work of Kriesi (1989, 1998) and Mller (1998, 1999). In five elections (France 1988, Netherlands 1994 and 2002, Austria 1994 and 1999), however, we can only distinguish between higher grade and lower grade service class members; and, in Germany, technical experts and social-cultural specialists had to be grouped in a single category. In all models, the reference category is the group of manual workers. For the purpose of this analysis, we do not distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers, as their issue-orientations are virtually identical. As far as religious groups are concerned, we distinguish between Catholics, Catholics with a high level of church attendance, Protestants, and a category including
10
Contrary to the first three variables, the last one is not based on a single issuecategory, but summarizes preferences towards all economic issues. The reason is that many election studies include questions on only one of the two main economic categories, economic liberalism or welfare, but not on both. Choosing either of these variables would reduce the number of elections that can be considered. However, the results presented here are similar to those obtained with either of these two issue-categories. We chose this solution, rather than a pooled analysis, mainly for ease of presentation. A joint analysis would require the inclusion of many interaction terms, between social-structural characteristics, electoral periods, and countries (or contextual variables). While the latter specification would be statistically more efficient, our results are pretty much the same with the chosen specifications.
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respondents of other confessions and those without religious affiliation. This last-mentioned group forms the reference category. We first turn to the impact of social-structural variables on attitudes towards immigration policy. The corresponding coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table 10.4. Among the various divides we have identified, that of education and the new class divide of the 1990s are particularly salient. In the 1970s, voters education level already had a significant impact in Switzerland and the Netherlands but not in Austria. In the 1990s, by contrast, it has a strong impact on attitudes in all countries. And, in the cases where a comparison with the first electoral period is possible, that impact has increased. This shows again the importance of accounting for voters levels of education to explain preferences on the cultural dimension of conflict. Class differences, between manual workers and social-cultural specialists, are also strong in all recent elections. They have also reinforced since the 1970s, as we can see in Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The old class divide, by contrast, which has traditionally structured economic oppositions, is not relevant here at all. The pattern of results is quite similar to that observed with attitudes towards European integration (Table 10.5). Here, again, there are significant differences among educational levels and between the two groups opposed on the new class divide. Citizens with a high educational level and the social-cultural specialists support the process of European integration more strongly than voters with a low educational level or manual workers, respectively. These differences, however, are weaker than those for the issue of immigration. This can also be seen by comparing the values of the R2 statistic, which are always lower than for immigration. As far as the old class divide is concerned, it is interesting to note that it has some impact in France and in Germany. These are the two countries in our sample that have the highest rates of unemployment (Table 2.2), and presumably the severest economic problems. In both countries, economic issues have also been relatively salient in the 1990s (see Figure 11.2 in the next chapter) and European issues may well have been framed in this perspective. The third cultural issue category we have analyzed, cultural liberalism, presents again a similar pattern of results,11 with
11
This table and the one pertaining to economic attitudes are not presented here for reasons of space. They can be found on the website of the project (www.ipz.uzh. ch/npw/).
Table 10.4 Impact of social-structural characteristics on voters attitudes towards a restrictive immigration policy: coefficients and robust standard errors estimated with OLS regressions
Austria 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s UK 1990s Switzerland Netherlands Germany 1990s
France 1990s
Educational level
Farmer
Self-employed
Routine non-manual worker
Manager
0.75c (0.05) 0.11 (0.15) 0.17a (0.07) 0.15b (0.05) 0.23c (0.05)
Technical specialist
Social-cultural specialist
0.75c (0.03) 0.09a (0.04) 0.02 (0.03) 0.09b (0.03) 0.10b (0.03) 0.15a (0.06) 0.30c (0.04) 0.17 (0.10) 0.18a (0.09) 0.33 (0.19) 0.03 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) 0.15 (0.16) 0.30b (0.12)
0.68c (0.09) 0.05 (0.19) 0.06 (0.17) 0.20a (0.09) 0.19a (0.09) 0.39c (0.11) 0.52c (0.10)
0.30b (0.10) 0.15 (0.12) 0.15 (0.11) 0.00 (0.11) 0.18a (0.09) 0.22a (0.10) 0.28a (0.12)
0.49c (0.05) 0.09 (0.10) 0.05 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07) 0.10a (0.05) 0.29c (0.05) 0.44c (0.05)
0.37c (0.05) 0.46c (0.07) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) 0.17a (0.08) 0.10 (0.08)
0.88c (0.07) 0.17 (0.18) 0.03 (0.12) 0.14a (0.07) 0.20a (0.09) 0.14 (0.11) 0.35b (0.11)
0.53c (0.05) 0.10 (0.22) 0.00 (0.08) 0.12b (0.05) 0.22c (0.05) 0.16 (0.09) 0.48c (0.07)
Technical/social-cultural 0.02 (0.07)
0.44c (0.10)
Lower service class
0.34c (0.04)
Upper service class
Non-labour force part.
Catholic
0.06 (0.11) 0.15 (0.15)
0.07 (0.06) 0.24c (0.05)
0.24b (0.08) 0.13b (0.05) 0.10 (0.08) 0.06 (0.06)
0.02 (0.11) 0.05 (0.06) 0.28c (0.04) 0.19c (0.05) 0.03 (0.04)
Catholic, high att.
0.32c (0.05) 0.20c (0.05) 0.37c (0.02) 0.07 (0.03)
Protestant
Constant
R2 N
0.18c (0.03) 0.15 10685
0.34c (0.10) 0.17 (0.10) 0.01 (0.06) 0.29 (0.15) 0.19 (0.10) 0.03 1504 0.21 (0.15) 0.01 (0.16) 0.03 1204 0.07 (0.05) 0.40c (0.06) 0.11 2624 0.22c (0.05) 0.19b (0.06) 0.08 3911 0.26c (0.05) 0.00 (0.04) 0.06 2755 0.26c (0.04) 0.26c (0.04) 0.11 4857
0.30b (0.10) 0.27c (0.06) 0.07 (0.07) 0.27 (0.14) 0.33c (0.08) 0.13 1554
0.02 (0.04) 0.37c (0.04) 0.10 4785
p < 0.05 p < 0.01 c p < 0.001
Table 10.5 Impact of social-structural characteristics on voters attitudes towards European integration: coefficients and robust standard errors estimated with OLS regressions
Switzerland 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s 1990s 1970s Netherlands UK Germany 1990s
France 1990s
Austria 1990s
Educational level
Farmer
Self-employed
Routine non-manual worker
Manager
0.38b (0.14) 0.62b (0.22) 0.00 (0.13) 0.01 (0.09) 0.13 (0.08)
0.48c (0.07) 0.13 (0.18) 0.25a (0.10) 0.01 (0.06) 0.22c (0.06)
Technical specialist
Social-cultural specialist
0.64c (0.04) 0.06 (0.06) 0.13b (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.31c (0.03) 0.26c (0.06) 0.41c (0.04) 0.17 (0.09) 0.04 (0.18) 0.25 (0.15) 0.38c (0.08) 0.23b (0.08) 0.26a (0.11) 0.36c (0.09)
0.34b (0.11) 0.19 (0.12) 0.10 (0.12) 0.06 (0.13) 0.07 (0.10) 0.22a (0.11) 0.25 (0.13)
0.32c (0.05) 0.44c (0.09) 0.06 (0.07) 0.16a (0.06) 0.29c (0.05) 0.28c (0.05) 0.48c (0.05)
0.31c (0.06) 0.01 (0.09) 0.04 (0.08) 0.15a (0.07) 0.07 (0.07) 0.04 (0.09) 0.05 (0.08)
0.38c (0.09) 0.14 (0.18) 0.14 (0.13) 0.06 (0.07) 0.22a (0.10) 0.09 (0.12) 0.12 (0.11)
0.45c (0.06) 1.21c (0.18) 0.30 (0.16) 0.21c (0.05) 0.81c (0.07) 0.68c (0.12) 0.45c (0.11)
0.40c (0.04) 0.26 (0.16) 0.01 (0.07) 0.02 (0.04) 0.16c (0.04) 0.31c (0.07) 0.15b (0.05)
Technical/social-cultural 0.13 (0.08)
0.43a (0.19)
0.17 (0.14)
Lower service class
Upper service class 0.40c (0.10) 0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) 0.20 (0.17) 0.17 (0.09)
Non-labour force part. 0.12 (0.07) 0.02 (0.05) 0.00 (0.12) 0.16b (0.05)
Catholic
0.11 (0.16) 0.20 (0.21)
0.33b (0.11) 0.04 (0.07) 0.04 (0.05) 0.23a (0.11) 0.23c (0.05)
Catholic, high att.
0.28c (0.06) 0.14c (0.03) 0.09a (0.04)
Protestant
Constant
R2 N
0.39c (0.03) 0.12 7454
0.24a (0.10) 0.08 (0.06) 0.12 (0.08) 0.09 (0.13) 0.28c (0.07) 0.03 1906 0.24 (0.21) 0.02 (0.21) 0.04 921 0.10 (0.06) 0.20b (0.07) 0.04 2275 0.39c (0.03) 0.15 1778 0.06 (0.05) 0.34c (0.06) 0.06 3893 0.11a (0.05) 0.27b (0.05) 0.02 2232 0.22c (0.03) 0.15c (0.03) 0.06 7583 0.02 (0.09) 0.07 (0.10) 0.04 1487
0.17b (0.05) 0.34c (0.05) 0.06 2950
p < 0.05 p < 0.01 c p < 0.001
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strong educational and new class divides. In addition, however, these attitudes are also affected by the religious cleavage. Non-religious voters are more favourable to cultural liberalism than Protestants and Catholics. This is a central difference between the core globalization issues of immigration and European integration, on the one hand, and cultural liberalism. It is still structured in part by differences of religion and of religiosity. Attitudes towards economic issues, finally, present an entirely different picture. These attitudes are mainly structured by the old class cleavage, as well as by the divide within the new middle class, between managers and social-cultural specialists. Managers, the self-employed, and in most cases farmers, are more supportive of economic liberalism than the other classes. They differ especially from manual workers and from social-cultural specialists. The educational divide, by contrast, is much weaker than for cultural issue-categories. Its impact here is weak or irrelevant in recent elections. Similarly, the new class divide of the 1990s, that is, the opposition between social-cultural specialists and manual workers, plays only a minor role.
Conclusion
This comparative analysis of the demand side of electoral competition has shown how voters in Western Europe reacted to globalization processes. We first considered the structure of citizens attitudes. This structure was two-dimensional both in the 1970s and in the 1990s, in all six countries. Whereas the content or nature of the main dimensions in the 1970s varied somewhat among the countries we have explored, such differences were much smaller in the 1990s/2000s. In the most recent period, the dimensions structuring voters attitudes were virtually identical in all elections, reflecting similar reactions to the challenges of globalization. The common two-dimensional structure, based on an economic and a cultural dimension, offers strong evidence in favour of our embedding hypothesis. As we expected, denationalization has not led to the emergence of an additional dimension of conflict or to a more complex configuration. On the contrary, the political issues related to the process of globalization have been integrated into the existing configuration. In particular, this has led to a transformation of the cultural dimension and to a decrease in the salience of traditional cultural issues. Furthermore, the
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degree of independence of the economic and cultural dimensions is more pronounced in the 1990s/2000s. While the correlations between these two groups of attitudes were already weak in the 1970s, the separation between them is now even more clear-cut. In order to emphasize the importance of the divides between the winners and losers of globalization, we compared the evolution of five types of oppositions between groups of voters, defined on the basis of social-structural characteristics. Our analyses showed that traditional divisions, linked to religion and to the old class divide, are still present but that they have lost in intensity. It is the new divisions that are now more salient, especially those based on differences in educational level and on the contrast between workers and social-cultural specialists. These two divisions are those that best capture the divergences and tensions linked with the consequences of globalization. Differences in attitudes associated with this educational and new class divides are especially strong with respect to cultural issues. This is one of the reasons explaining why this dimension is now more salient than the economic one. Furthermore, with the process of globalization, the relative positions of social groups in the political space have become more homogeneous across elections and countries. We also observed similar developments across the six countries by considering the configurations of partisan groups. In the 1970s, the groups of supporters of the main parties were above all polarized on the economic dimension. During the 1990s and 2000s, however, the degree of polarization on the cultural dimension increased markedly. As a consequence, the configurations of partisan groups are increasingly tripolar. There are important oppositions among these groups on both the economic and cultural dimensions. Furthermore, the overall degree of polarization has increased since the 1970s an end of ideology has to be postponed once again. We concluded our analyses by taking a closer look at the structural basis of voters attitudes. We explored the relevance of socio-demographic factors for explaining attitudes towards four issue-categories: immigration, European integration, cultural liberalism, and economic issues. The results confirmed the importance of educational differences and of the new class divide, between workers and the social-cultural specialists, for explaining attitudes towards the first two issues-categories. They are those most closely related to the integrationdemarcation
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cleavage. The importance of the traditional divides in recent elections, by contrast, is limited to cultural liberalism and to economic issueorientations. Attitudes towards cultural liberalism are related to the religious divide (as well as to the educational and new class divides), while the traditional class divide still matters for explaining economic preferences.
11
Supply side: the positioning of the political parties in a restructuring space

ROMAIN LACHAT AND HANSPETER KRIESI
Introduction
As we have observed in Chapter 1, the political mobilization of the latent structural potentials constituted by the challenge of globalization gives rise to two interdependent dynamics the transformation of both the basic structure of the national political space and the parties positioning within the transforming space. On the one hand, parties react to the political conflicts and the associated preferences developing in the electorate and articulate them in the political arena. In this way, they restructure the political space. On the other hand, the individual parties position themselves strategically within the emerging spatial configuration of their competitors in the transformed space. According to our basic hypothesis, the parties who appeal to the preferences of the losers of globalization constitute the driving force of the current transformation of the Western European party systems. We propose that the initial electoral success of these parties set in motion the transformation of the dimensional structure and the repositioning of the established parties within the transforming structure, which, in turn, contributes to the ongoing transformation of the dimensions of the political space. As outlined in Chapter 2, there are a number of processes which contribute to the functional dealignment in Western European party systems, i.e. to a greater detachment of the voters from the parties in general. Thus, we agree with Kitschelt (2000: 164) and other authors that parties are, much more than they used to be, confronted with political preferences which result from exogenously determined, spontaneous developments in the electorate or from activities of independent media and political entrepreneurs who operate outside of the parliamentary arena. In the new form of representative government which is taking shape in the audience democracy, as an astute observer (Manin 1995) has called it public support becomes volatile and unpredictable, but at the same time crucial for political success. This tendency is reinforced by
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Romain Lachat and Hanspeter Kriesi
the increasing sophistication and collective action capabilities of intense minorities in the electorate who can reward and punish their representatives by strategic vote switching, by intra-party activism, where fewer individuals make a greater difference in an age of reduced party membership, and by collective mobilization in interest groups and social movements (Kitschelt 2000: 175). However, although we acknowledge the increased short-term volatility linked to these procedural transformations of representative government, in the present study we insist on the long-term processes of the structural transformation of politically relevant social conflicts, i.e. on processes of structural de- and realignment. Following up on Kitschelts (1994, 1995) analysis of political cleavages and their implications for the strategies and success of social-democratic and radical-right parties in Western Europe, we are concerned with the long-term transformations which are expected to give rise to a fundamental reconfiguration of the political space in all Western European countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, we expect the impact of these long-term trends to vary from one country to another, depending on the country-specific social, economic and cultural context, the original structure of the national party systems and on the strategic considerations of the various parties embedded in this structure. The country chapters offered a detailed analysis of the transformation of the political space in the six countries. The issue-positions of parties during campaigns and the changing party configurations were analyzed election by election. In the present chapter, the comparative analysis of the supply side of the electoral competition focuses on the basic long-term transformations common to all six countries, and on the variations of the common theme that can be attributed to key contextual differences. First, we consider the general structure of the national political space, by looking at the transformation of the main cultural and economic divides and by discussing the degree to which they overlap. Secondly, we compare the general configuration of parties across countries. We focus on three aspects: whether parties belonging to the same ideological families react in similar ways to the challenges of globalization, to what extent the main parties in each country form tripolar configurations and how the corresponding tripolar national patterns are situated in the common space. Finally, turning to the level of parties rather than focusing on general configurations we estimate the relative importance of contextual and party characteristics in determining parties issue positions.
Supply side: positioning political parties
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The structure of the political space The transformation of the basic dimensions of the space
We start by evaluating our key hypotheses regarding the structure of the national political space and its transformation. To this end, we focus for the moment only on the configuration of issue-positions, not on those of parties. We have argued that the political space should be two-dimensional in each country. The developments linked with globalization should not give rise to the disappearance of the traditional economic and cultural axes, nor should they lead to the emergence of an additional line of conflict. Instead, as suggested by our embedding hypothesis, the existing dimensions should transform, as new issues gain in salience and are integrated into the programme of established political parties. This hypothesis is strongly supported by our results. Indeed, in each case, we found a two-dimensional solution to be appropriate. The goodnessof-fit of these solutions, that is, the degree of closeness between the original distances and those of the final configuration, was sometimes low, compared to the standards of MDS analyses (e.g., Borg 1997: 36ff.). However, it is important to emphasize that increasing the number of dimensions to three would have only marginally improved the quality of these representations. In each case, the evidence strongly suggests that a two-dimensional solution is most appropriate. The high values of the Stress-1 statistic found in some cases are not due to the limited number of dimensions, but rather are a consequence of the nature of our data, i.e. of the often incoherent issue-positions taken by parties during electoral campaigns. Even if the main dimensions which structure the space are common to all parties, there is considerable variance with regard to the coherence of the positions within the common space from one party to the other. Our embedding hypothesis and our arguments about the expected transformation of the central cleavages are also supported by the nature of the two dimensions observed in the various elections. In most cases, we can clearly identify an economic and a cultural dimension. Furthermore, the character of the latter has changed in line with our expectations. In the 1970s, in economic terms most countries were characterized by a sharp opposition between support for the welfare state and support for economic liberalism. The distance between the two corresponding points was typically among the largest ones, which
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indicates that the traditional economic conflict was very salient. This is particularly clear for the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and France. In the UK, economic issues were also central in the February 1974 election although these issues proved to be less polarizing than in the other countries. The reason is that, as discussed in Chapter 8, Labour and the Conservatives advocated similar solutions to the predicament of the UK economy of that time. The distance between welfare and economic liberalism is also moderate in the case of the 1976 German election. In this case, all three parties moderately supported the expansion of the welfare state. They differed from one another only on issues of economic liberalism. In cultural terms, the main political conflicts in each country were characterized by a combination of issues related to the traditional cultural or religious cleavage with issues related to the goals of the contemporary new social movements. Thus, in addition to the struggle about the welfare state, Dutch politics were dominated by the opposition between the categories of culture and cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and support for national defence, on the other. Similarly, the opposition between defence and cultural liberalism is central to the structure of the German and Swiss political spaces. In France, Austria and the UK, defence was not an important issue, but cultural liberalism and culture constituted polarizing categories and formed one of the poles of the second dimension structuring the political space. In more recent elections, we notice that the traditional cultural line of conflict has been transformed. It is now structured by the issues of European integration, cultural liberalism and immigration. The main differences between the six countries concern the degree of integration of the cultural and economic dimensions as well as the relative importance of European integration and of immigration. The degree of integration will be taken up in the next section. As far as the relevance of European integration and immigration is concerned, both issues have been central in one or several of the elections of the last two decades in France and in Switzerland. Immigration has played a more important role than Europe in structuring the Austrian and Dutch party systems. In Germany, immigration also became a key polarizing issue, while the European question has been of little salience and did not polarize in recent contests. In the UK, by contrast, the issue of European integration was both salient and polarizing in the two most recent elections, whereas the immigration policy proved to be of only marginal
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Figure 11.1 Issue-positions and values of the integration indices in Austria, 1999, and France, 1978
importance until very recently. In spite of such differences across countries and elections, one or both of these issues appear in each recent election as one of the poles of the cultural line of conflict. This is strong evidence for the hypothesized change in the restructuring of the political space. The more traditional cultural issues, in particular the categories of culture and defence, have lost their central role in most cases. One of the most noticeable exceptions, as discussed in Chapter 7, is the emphasis put by the PvdA and D66 on the issue of fighter planes in 2002. This strategy misfired, however, and the issue of national defence was virtually absent from the following electoral campaign, which is another way of stating that this exception confirms the general rule.
The degree of integration of the two dimensions

As discussed in the country chapters, we also observe variations in the degree of integration of the cultural and economic dimensions. This may be illustrated by comparing the Austrian elections of 1999 with the French elections of 1978. As the reader can see from Figure 11.1, the issue-categories of cultural liberalism and immigration are virtually equidistant from the categories of welfare and economic liberalism in the Austrian case. In the French example, by contrast, support for the welfare state and for cultural liberalism are located much closer to each other, and the defence of budgetary discipline (the traditional pole of the cultural dimension in this case) is located slightly closer to the
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defence of economic liberalism than to the support for the welfare state. In other words, the cultural and economic dimensions seem to be quite strongly integrated in the French example, but largely independent from each other in the Austrian case. Although the notion of integration of spatial dimensions appears to be intuitively quite straightforward in such examples, it is not easy to design a measure that can be compared across elections. As explained in Appendix A, we measure the degree of integration as a ratio of the distances between the respective poles of the economic and cultural dimensions. This measure of integration is computed separately for the left-integration and the right-demarcation poles. It takes a value of 0 when the two dimensions are independent from each other. The higher its value, the stronger is the integration between economic leftwing positions and cultural integration, or between cultural demarcation and economic liberalism. There are also some cases of negative values, which correspond to integration between issues in the wrong direction (when the integration pole is closer to the economic right than to the left, for instance). The corresponding values for the twenty-five elections are presented in Table 11.1. For an intuitive grasp of how these indices vary, consider once again the examples presented in Figure 11.1. For the Austrian example (1990s, second election in Table 11.1), both indices are close to 0, indicating virtual independence of the two dimensions. For the French example (1970s election in Table 11.1), the index value for the left-integration pole lies above 1, which indicates quite a closely integrated situation. The French example also illustrates that the degree of integration at the two poles is not necessarily symmetrical. Thus, the index value for the right-integration pole amounts to only half of the value for the opposite pole, which corresponds to the lower degree of integration on the right-hand side of the political space. Three results stand out in Table 11.1. First, there is no trend with regard to the integration of the two dimensions. We cannot conclude that the two dimensions increasingly tend to converge, i.e. we cannot say that the space of national party competition tends to become one-dimensional. Nor can we conclude that the two dimensions are increasingly diverging. The degree of integration appears to be mainly a result of the partisan strategies, which may vary from one election to the next. This can be illustrated by the Swiss case. In the 1995 elections, the index value for the rightdemarcation pole is a modest .46, whereas the corresponding value is
Supply side: positioning political parties Table 11.1 Degree of integration of the left-integration and rightdemarcation poles
France Austria Switzerland Netherlands UK Left-integration pole 1970s 1990s, 1st election 1990s, 2nd election 1990s, 3rd election 1990s, 4th election 1.17 2.04 1.41 0.98 1.03 0.13 0.34 0.15 1.29 0.32 0.03 1.41 0.90 0.07 2.14 1.36 0.34 1.40 0.12 0.17 0.59 0.12 0.12 0.28
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Germany 0.23 3.21 0.04 0.36
Right-demarcation pole 1970s 0.58 1990s, 1st election 0.59 1990s, 2nd election 0.46 1990s, 3rd election 0.58 1990s, 4th election
0.25 0.74 0.06 0.14
0.39 1.00 0.46 1.33
0.77 0.18 0.42 0.70
0.10 0.41 0.05 0.51
Note: the integration issue chosen for computing the distances was European integration (1991 and 1995 in Switzerland, 2001 in the UK) or cultural liberalism (all other cases). The demarcation issue was army (Netherlands 1972, Switzerland 1975, Germany 1976), budgetary rigour (Austria 1975, France 1978), law and order (UK 1974 to 1997), or immigration (all other cases).
almost four times as large for the 1999 elections. Figure 6.2 in the Swiss country chapter shows what happened: the moderate parties of the right repositioned themselves in the 1999 elections with respect to the challenge of the Swiss Peoples Party on the cultural dimension and the Swiss Peoples Party repositioned itself on the economic dimension. The Liberals and the Peoples Party adopted an accommodative strategy on the respective dimensions: the Liberals toughened their approach on the cultural dimension, in order to win back some of their former voters who had defected to the Peoples Party in 1995. The Swiss Peoples Party, in turn, moved closer to the economically liberal position of the Liberals. Having established its reputation on the demarcation end of the cultural dimension, the Swiss Peoples Party began to challenge the Liberals position as the natural choice for the Swiss business community. The other established party of the moderate right the Christian-Democrats tried an adversarial strategy and moved closer to the position of the Left. The combined effect of these strategic moves was a convergence of the two spatial dimensions in the 1999 elections.
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The second result concerns the frequency of integration on the left and on the right: overall, the economic and cultural issues are more frequently integrated on the left than on the right. In ten out of the twenty-five elections, we find a substantial degree of integration on the left (i.e. value of the index greater than 1), compared to only three cases on the right. This is a first hint at the existence of a triangular configuration of the party systems to be discussed in more detail below: while the positioning of the various components on the left is often rather homogeneous with regard to both dimensions, the right is typically split into a culturally more liberal and a culturally more conservative component. It is this split on the right which implies a triangular configuration of the national party system. The third result concerns the country-specific differences: the degree of integration on the left is greatest in the case of France, where the two dimensions are substantially integrated on the left in all four elections. The next case in line is the Netherlands, with three out of four elections characterized by a high degree of integration on the left, followed by Switzerland with two out of four elections, and Austria and Germany with one in four. The UK is the only country in our sample where none of our elections led to an integration of the two dimensions on the left. On the right, the two dimensions have only been integrated in two Swiss elections and one election in the Netherlands. As the degree of integration of the two dimensions can most likely be attributed to partisan strategies, these country-specific differences point to the different strategic reactions of the established parties to the new challengers as we have described them in the various country chapters.
The configuration of party positions Tripolarity

Figure 1.1 summarized our hypotheses concerning the positioning of the parties in the transformed space. This figure can usefully be compared to Kitschelts (1994: 32; 1995: 15) conception of the competitive space for political parties in Western Europe. Kitschelt also presented a two-dimensional political space with a horizontal socialist-capitalist (economic) dimension and a vertical libertarianauthoritarian (cultural) dimension. In Kitschelts (1994: 30f.) view, as a result of social change in the 1970s and 1980s, the main axis of the voters preference
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distribution and, accordingly, the main axis of party competition have shifted from a simple alternative between socialist (left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing left-libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives. In his view, the new main axis of party competition of the 1970s and 1980s corresponded to the diagonal running from the upper left-hand corner to the lower right-hand corner of the two-dimensional space and intersecting the socialist-capitalist axis to the right of its original midpoint. Later on, as a result of social change in the 1990s, Kitschelt (1996, 2001) diagnosed a further rotation of the main axis of party competition in such a way that it essentially came to coincide with the vertical (cultural) axis of the political space. Kitschelts conception of the transformation of party competition from an essentially economically to an increasingly culturally determined confrontation is certainly in line with our own point of view. As Figure 1.1 suggests, our expectations are not entirely incompatible with his view that the parties are more or less unidimensionally aligned along the main axis of conflict, running from left-liberal parties across liberal, socialdemocratic and Christian-democratic competitors to the populist right: we expected most parties to be aligned along a more or less steep diagonal running from the upper left-liberal corner to the lower populist right corner of the space. Where we do deviate from Kitschelts perspective, however, is that we do not expect all parties to be aligned on such a diagonal. Indeed, we expect a third pole to be occupied by culturally and economically liberal parties in the upper right-hand corner of the space. Schematically speaking, we expect the left to be concentrated in the upper left-liberal quadrant of the space, but we expect the (economic) right to be divided between a culturally open (cosmopolitan) and a culturally closed (nationalistic) position. In other words, we expect essentially tripolar (or even multipolar) partisan configurations instead of the bipolar configurations implied by Kitschelts conceptual scheme. As we have argued throughout this volume, the question of the shape of the party configuration is, of course, closely related to the question of the structure (dimensionality) of the space of electoral competition. In other words, the question of the party configuration is similar to the one concerning the degree of integration of the cultural and economic divides that we have discussed in the previous section. If all major parties are more or less aligned along the same axis in the political space, it means that the choices faced by voters are one-dimensional. In the final analysis, Kitschelts idea that the parties are essentially aligned along a single axis
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of competition is incompatible with his two-dimensional conception of the political space. However, the question of the number of dimensions and the number of poles is not an all-or-nothing affair. As we have shown, we always need two dimensions to adequately characterize the political space of the six Western European countries, but, as we have just discussed, the two dimensions can, indeed, be more or less integrated (i.e. correlated with each other). Similarly, the party configurations can be more or less tripolar. We can measure this degree of tripolarity indirectly by considering how strongly the actual distances would be distorted if the configuration were reduced to a one-dimensional solution, following a scaling procedure. If parties are almost aligned on a single dimension, the actual distances will be virtually unaffected and the degree of distortion will be low. For such a measure, we focus on the configuration formed by three parties: depending on the country, we include the three main established parties (including the functional equivalent of a new challenger), or the two main parties (one each from the left and the right) plus the main challenger from the new populist right. The strongest possible degree of tripolarity will be observed if these parties form an equilateral triangle, that is, if the distances between any pair of parties are of equal length. The degree of distortion imposed on the original distances by a onedimensional solution is measured by the Stress-1 statistic we used in MDS analyses. Its value is 0 for a perfect one-dimensional configuration and about 0.58 for a configuration forming an equilateral triangle. To have a more convenient statistic, we multiply the stress value so that our index values range from 0 to 1.1 The corresponding values of this index for each election are presented in Table 11.2. This index has to be interpreted with caution in case the degree of polarization in the party system is low. In such a case, the index is strongly influenced by small changes in party positions. In the 1974 UK election, for instance, the index takes a relatively high value. Yet, parties were located very close to each other (Figure 8.4). For this reason, the value of the index is printed in parentheses in Table 11.2, when the degree of polarization is particularly low (average distance between parties
This index is equal to the Stress-1 measure, multiplied by the square root of 3. We rely for this on the original dissimilarities, not on transformed dissimilarities as is frequently done in such analyses.
Supply side: positioning political parties Table 11.2 Degree of tripolarity of the party configuration
France Austria Switzerland Netherlands UK 1970s 1990s, 1st election 1990s, 2nd election 1990s, 3rd election 1990s, 4th election Average 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.39 0.15 0.29 0.22 0.67 (0.31) 0.05 0.51 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.33 0.22 0.17 0.59 0.37
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Germany
(0.55) 0.48 0.98 0.23 0.17 0.44 0.65 0.34
Note: the parties considered in the Netherlands are PvdA, VVD and CDA (197298) or LPF (2002, 2003); SP, Liberals and SVP in Switzerland; SP, VP and FP in Austria; SPD, CDU and FDP in Germany; PSF, RPR and UDF (1978) or FN (19882002) in France; Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats in the UK.
smaller than 0.50). Values in bold are those of clearly tripolar configurations (index greater than 0.30) that are sufficiently polarized. Just as with the degree of integration, there is no general trend towards an increasing tripolarity in our six countries. In fact, the degree of tripolarity varies in line with the degree of integration of the two spatial dimensions. This can again be illustrated by the Swiss case: here we find two elections with very low tripolarity the elections of 1991 and 1999 (1990s, first and third election). Both are also characterized by a strong integration of the right-demarcation poles of the partisan space. The Swiss election of 1995 (second election), by contrast, is not only characterized by the highest degree of tripolarity, but also by the lowest average degree of integration of the corresponding two poles. More generally, the average order of magnitude of the degree of tripolarity varies in the same way across countries as the degree of integration of the two dimensions: on average, the tripolarity is lowest in France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and highest in the UK, with Austria and Germany taking an intermediate position. Two elections (Switzerland 1975, the UK 1974) present a tripolar configuration, but are only weakly polarized. This leaves us with only eight out of our twenty-five elections which gave rise to a more or less polarized, clear-cut tripolar
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configuration: three of the German, two of the UK, and one each of the French, Austrian and Swiss elections. Overall, this is not very strong evidence in support of the hypothesis of emerging tripolarity of party systems, although the spatial structure is always clearly two-dimensional. The party systems tend to be characterized by an intermediate configuration that is neither clearly bipolar, nor clearly tripolar.
Party families
Our Figure 1.1 describes the expected positions of the major party families in recent elections. We now turn to the empirical description of their overall positions. For this purpose, we can no longer analyze the party configurations separately for each country, but we have to analyze the location of the parties from all six countries in a joint Western European space. For this purpose, we again rely on multidimensional scaling, but with some important differences from the previous analyses in the country chapters. Here, we are only interested in the relative positions of party families in the political space. Therefore, we focus on the location of parties disregarding the location of issues. For each pair of parties, the MDS procedure used here uses a measure of dissimilarity, which is based on the parties respective positions in the twelvedimensional issue space. The measure of dissimilarity is weighted for the relative salience of the different dimensions, as explained in more detail in Appendix A. We have computed such distances for all pairs of parties, separately for the 1970s and for the 1990s/2000s. The resulting matrices of distances were then analyzed with metric MDS. The resulting configurations of party positions are presented in Figure 11.2. The first part of Figure 11.2 presents the configuration for the 1970s. In that period, party configurations are expected to have still been strongly shaped by the traditional class and religious conflicts. This is, indeed, what we find in the first part of Figure 11.2, although the emerging pattern is not as clear-cut as we might have expected on the basis of the two traditional cleavages alone. We can clearly distinguish the three families of the social-democrats, the Christian-democrats and the conservatives, each of whom forms a more or less coherent cluster. The Liberals, however, are spread all over the place and do not constitute a coherent cluster at all. The wide spread of the Christiandemocrats along the vertical (cultural) axis, the clear separation of the conservatives into a liberal-conservative and a national-conservative

(a) 1970s
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(b) 1990s2000s
Figure 11.2 Positions of party families in the political space
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subgroup, and the extreme dispersal of the Liberals over the entire space complicate the emerging pattern to a considerable extent. The social-democratic family turns out to be most coherent. It is clearly situated on the left, ranging from the Dutch PvdA and the British Labour Party at the very left-hand end of the horizontal axis to the Swiss SPS, located close to the centre of the space. The socialdemocratic cluster also includes the Dutch and French radical Liberals (D66 and the MRG) as well as some minor parties from the Left of these two countries, all of whom closely cooperated with the socialdemocrats at the time. The two components of the conservatives constitute the opposites of the left on each one of the two axes. On the economically liberal end of the horizontal dimension, directly opposite to the social-democrats, we find two liberal-conservative parties, the Dutch VVD and the Austrian FP, as well as the Swiss Peoples Party and the French Front National.2 By contrast, more culturally traditional conservative parties the British Conservatives, the French RPR and the Swiss radical right (National Action and Republicans at the time) constitute the direct opponents of the cultural liberals (most clearly represented by the German FDP at the time). Together with the German CDU, they are located at the centre of the economic axis, but at the traditional (nationalist and religious) end of the cultural axis. The Christian-democrats, finally, who, in the 1970s, contributed to the expansion of the welfare state and promoted a social market economy, are all situated on the left-hand side of the economic divide. But they are widely spread along the cultural divide ranging from the left-liberal Swiss CVP and Dutch CDA, across the economically rather socialist and culturally rather moderate VP to the economically centrist and culturally very conservative CDU. The French UDF, who included an important Christian-democratic component at the time, takes a moderate position on both dimensions and we also attribute it to the Christian-democratic cluster. The Swiss Liberals, who occupy a very similar position in the centre of the space, are also included in this cluster. In the 1970s, the populist right had not yet carved out a clearly delimited niche for itself and the New Left and the Greens had not yet systematically occupied their terrain either.
2
For the French Front National, just as for the other radical parties on the right and the left, we have only a few cases here, which means that their location should be taken with a grain of salt.
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By the 1990s/2000s, the predominant pattern has evolved in the direction of the expectations laid out in Figure 1.1. We now find five quite clearly delimited party families: the social-democrats; a fragmented family including the New Left, the Greens and the classical Left; the Christiandemocrats; the liberals and the populist right/conservatives. Among the social-democratic parties, the Dutch PvdA, the British Labour Party, the German SPD and the Austrian SP have most clearly adopted principles of the Third Way and are now more on the right in economic terms than the Swiss SPS and the French PSF. At the same time, however, the PvdA, Labour and the SPD are the culturally least liberal party in this group. The very parties who have most clearly adopted the neo-liberal principles of the Third Way have least embraced its culturally cosmopolitan principles, and vice versa. In other words, we do not find the champions of the Third Way, where we expected them. Instead, the Swiss SPS, together with the British Liberal Democrats and the Dutch D66, most clearly correspond to the position of the ideal-typical Third Way. Moving towards the centre of the space, the social-democrats opened a niche for the fragmented smaller parties of the left all of whom we find at the left end of the economic axis, but widely spread along the cultural axis. Not all of these parties are liberal in cultural terms, however. Some of them (e.g. the Swiss Greens, the Dutch or the French classical left) are opposed to European integration and, therefore, not located in the upper left-hand quadrant of the space. Not only the social-democrats, but also the Christian-democrats have moved to the right in economic terms. Moreover, by the end of the 1990s, the Christian-democratic family has become much more coherent in cultural terms. Note that the conservative RPR is located close to these parties, while the UDF is positioned between the Christiandemocratic and the liberal parties. The liberals are now situated where we have expected them. The Swiss and the German liberals most clearly represent the liberal conservative position, while the British Liberal Democrats and the Dutch D66 constitute, as we have already pointed out, the most typical representatives of the Third Way. Finally, and most clearly in line with our expectations, there is now a conservative/populist right cluster in the lower right hand quadrant of the political space. In this cluster we find the Dutch LPF and the VVD, the Swiss Peoples Party and the Swiss new radical right, the French Front National, the British Conservatives and the Austrian FP. In other words, we find in this family not only the new challengers from
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the populist right, but also the established conservative or liberalconservative parties who have transformed their positions under the impact of the new challengers and the political potentials they stand for. The only country that is not represented in this family is Germany. As we have pointed out in the German country chapter, there are a number of reasons which have prevented the success of a new challenger from the populist right in Germany or the transformation of the CDU into a functional equivalent of such a challenger. Surprisingly, the FP does not turn out to be the most typical representative of the populist right. Indeed, it appears to be culturally more moderate than the other parties in this cluster. In comparative terms, it is rather the Swiss SVP, the smaller parties of the Swiss new radical right and the French Front National who most clearly represent Kitschelts winning formula of the combination of a culturally conservative and an economically liberal position. The Dutch LPF, by contrast, seems to have chosen an economically more centrist position. The British Conservatives and the Dutch VVD, finally, are not as culturally conservative as the true populist challengers from the right, but they are still located in the proximity of these parties and constitute functional equivalents for them in their respective countries.
Comparing national party configurations

We can look at Figure 11.2 in yet a different way. Instead of focusing on the party families, we can compare the national party configurations. In each country, we again focus on the tripartite configurations, which we have already analyzed in the previous section on tripolarity.3 Figure 11.3 takes this alternative perspective and highlights the national tripolar configurations for both, the 1970s and the 1990s/2000s. In the 1970s, we note a strong contrast between the configurations of the Dutch, Austrian and French party systems, on the one hand, and the UK and German party systems on the other, with the Swiss system falling in between the two extremes. The first group of party systems is clearly structured along the economic contrast between left and right, while the second group of party systems is dominated by the contrast between cultural liberalism and tradition. In the UK case, all parties are pro-welfare state. In 1974,
3
In the Swiss case, we include all four major parties; in the Dutch case, we also include the LPF for the 1990s.

(a) 1970s
283
(b) 1990s2000s
Figure 11.3 Positions of parties in the political space
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even the British Conservatives took a position which was situated to the left of the SPS or the SPD in economic terms. However, in cultural terms, the contrast between Labour and Conservatives was substantial, with the Liberals taking an intermediate position. In Germany, the party system of the 1970s was generally much more liberal economically than the British one, but, just as in the British case, there were few economic differences between the parties, while the cultural differences between the socialliberal coalition (SPD and FDP), on the one hand, and the opposition of the CDU, on the other, were enormous. In the UK, Germany and, we should add, Switzerland, the mobilization by the New Left and the new social movements in the 1970s did not incite the major parties to renew the class conflict, but rather encouraged the major liberal and social-democratic parties to take up their cultural themes. By contrast, in the Dutch, Austrian and French party systems, the differences were mainly of an economic nature in the 1970s, whereas the parties took rather similar positions on the cultural axis. Under the impact of the mobilization of the New Left, the 1970s saw in these three countries a confrontation between established parties of Left and Right in terms of a renewed class conflict. By the 1990s/2000s, the configurations have undergone two crucial changes. First, most major parties appear to have moved to the economic right. Secondly, the cultural axis has become the main line of conflict in all countries except Germany. The British configuration is still dominated by the contrast on the cultural axis. In Austria, the Netherlands and France, and in Switzerland, too, the cultural axis has become clearly more important than the economic one for the shape of the configuration. Only the German case deviates from the other countries, in that its configuration is not predominantly shaped by the cultural contrast between a social-liberal and a conservative position. As described in the German country chapter, under the impact of reunification, economic conflicts have become the key structuring factors in Germany in the 1990s. As the analysis of the demand side has shown, cultural issues do polarize the German electorate just as they polarize the electorates in the other countries. But, for various reasons which have been analyzed in the German country chapter, this demand has so far been marginalized. The CDU/CSU has always succeeded in integrating not only economically, but also culturally conservative positions and the moderation of the CDU/CSU has considerably reduced the scope for the articulation of cultural conflicts in Germany.
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The determinants of parties issue-positions

In the last step of our comparative analysis of the supply side, we now turn to the individual parties in order to identify the determinants of their average issue-positions. To this end, we focus on six issuecategories, which we consider to be the most important ones for our hypotheses: the two key economic categories welfare and economic liberalism and four key cultural categories European integration, immigration, cultural liberalism, and law and order. The first pair of cultural categories refers to the integrationdemarcation cleavage, the second pair to Kitschelts libertarianauthoritarian contrast. For the 1990s/2000s, we calculated summary measures which we compare with the 1970s. In addition to the global social change (indicated by the time period), the issue-specific mobilization of the parties depends on characteristics of their own as well as on the national contexts characteristics. Our independent determinants, therefore, include a dummy for the 1990s as well as dummies for the various party families and a dummy identifying oppostion parties. Depending on the issue at stake, we distinguish between the radical left, the left-libertarians (the radical left, the greens and the radical liberals), the social-democrats, the Christian-democrats, the liberal conservatives and the new populist right/national conservatives. For the composition of the families, we use the results presented for the 1990s/2000s in Figure 11.2. Thus, the last family, which is crucial for our analysis, not only includes the new challengers of the populist right (Front National, Swiss radical right and LPF), but also the transformed established liberal conservative/conservative parties (the British Conservatives, the Dutch VVD, the Austrian FP and the Swiss SVP). For the sake of brevity, we shall refer to this family subsequently as the new populist right. Together with the Swiss, German and Austrian Liberals we include the French UDF and RPR among the liberal conservatives, while the radical liberal family includes the British Liberal Democrats, the Dutch D66 and the French MRG.4 The remaining family compositions are straightforward. For the analysis, we only
The Austrian Liberals (LIF) are usually considered as radical liberal. However, because of their proximity to the liberal conservatives, we include them among the latter family.
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include parties with at least five issue-specific statements, which excludes the Swiss Greens.5 Three variables specify the context characteristics of the countries, which have been defined in Chapter 2 a dummy variable each for countries with deep-seated national anxieties about losing their national sovereignty (Switzerland and the UK), for culturally monist (Austria, Germany, Switzerland and France) and for multicultural countries. In addition to these indicators, we also use dummies for individual countries in order to account for some exceptional aspects of the data. Although we are aware of Przeworski and Teunes (1970) injunction that the comparativists ought to replace the countries names by variables, we also know that it is sometimes difficult to translate the specificity of one country into a general concept applicable to all. Finally, we shall use interaction terms, if we expect the effect of party or country characteristics to change over time and/or if we expect the effect of party characteristics to vary from one country to another. Our analysis starts from the findings of the country chapters and will have an exploratory character. Since we know from the country chapters that the relevant determinants vary both from one issue and one aspect to another, we shall not work with a standard set of determinants, but be highly selective with regard to the set of determinants introduced in a specific analysis.
Economic issues
Table 11.3 presents the results for the two economic issue-categories welfare state and economic liberalism. The positions of the parties on these issues are mainly determined by the traditional opposition between left and right. Parties on the left lend significantly stronger support to the welfare state than the liberal conservatives and the parties from the family we have labelled the new populist right, and vice versa for economic liberalism. Two observations are of particular relevance. First, as we have noted in the previous section, a highly significant shift in the direction of increasing economic liberalism has occurred across all parties, although not in all the countries: Germany and France have not
5
This lack of issue-specific statements may explain the unexpected location of the Swiss Greens in Figure 11.4.
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Table 11.3 Impact of party-level and country-level factors on average issue-positions: welfare and economic liberalism: coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) of OLS regressions
Welfare Constant 1990s/2000s Radical left Christian-democrats Christian-democrats, 1990s Liberal-conservatives New populist right France UK UK, 1990s Germany France/Germany, 1990s Adjusted R2 N
a
Economic liberalism 0.68d (0.09) 0.59d (0.11) 0.39c (0.13) 0.77d (0.13) 0.51d (0.11) 0.17 (0.15) 0.51c (0.17) 0.53c (0.18) 0.63 59
0.58d (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) 0.22a (0.12) 0.09 (0.16) 0.47b (0.21) 0.51d (0.10) 0.84d (0.10) 0.64d (0.16) 0.60b (0.24) 0.65 62
p<0.10 p<0.05 c p<0.01 d p<0.001

b
followed the general trend. These two countries have been characterized by particularly severe economic problems in the 1990s (see Chapter 2), which may be one reason why they have resisted the common trend. One should keep in mind, however, that they started out from quite different levels of economic liberalism in the 1970s: at
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that time, the German parties were very significantly more economically liberal than the parties in the other countries, while the French parties already took rather less economically liberal positions. By the 1970s, all German parties had more or less adopted the concept of the social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), which had proved to be so successful in the post-war period of reconstruction, while all the French parties have been marked by the French statist tradition, which had proved to be equally successful during that period (Hall 1986). By the 1990s/2000s, the parties of the other countries have caught up with the Germans, while it is the French who now clearly lag behind all the others. No comparable shift with regard to the support of the welfare state has occurred. Most parties in all the countries still support or oppose the welfare state to the same extent as they did in the 1970s. There are two kinds of exceptions, however. On the one hand, the Christian-democrats have become significantly more critical of the welfare state. On the other hand, the British parties, who have all been exceptionally supportive of the welfare state back in the 1970s (as is reflected in the first part of Figure 11.3) have fallen in line with the parties in the other countries. The second observation concerns the new populist right, who turns out to be the least supportive of the welfare state and to be almost as economically liberal as the liberal conservatives. In other words, we provide support for Kitschelts idea of the winning formula, which maintains that the new populist right has been so successful at the polls because it combined its cultural demarcation strategy with a critique of the welfare state and an appeal to the economic liberalism of the old middle class. This does not mean that all the parties of this family have opted for this winning formula. Thus, as we have seen in Chapter 5, the Austrian FP has never followed such a strategy. But it shows that, overall, the new challengers of the populist right and their functional equivalents among the established parties of the conservative right have followed a course that is quite close to Kitschelts suggestion.
European integration and immigration

On the cultural axis, we shall first consider the two issues, which are most closely related to the integrationdemarcation theme and which have been most clearly associated with the rise of the new populist right European integration and immigration. Our analyses, presented
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Table 11.4 Impact of party-level and country-level factors on average issue-positions: European integration and immigration: coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) of OLS regressions
Europe Constant 1990s/2000s Opposition Left-libertarians Christian-democrats New populist right UK, Switzerland Monism Adjusted R2 N
a
Immigration 0.55b (0.20) 0.13 (0.15) 0.61d (0.17) 0.57c (0.21) 0.89d (0.21) 0.33b (0.16) 0.57 47
0.50d (0.16) 0.20 (0.19) 0.39a (0.24) 0.88d (0.23) 0.34a (0.20) 0.36 44
p<0.10 p<0.05 c p<0.01 d p<0.001

b
in Table 11.4, do not reveal any time trend. Among the parties in our six countries, neither the permissive consensus, nor Euroscepticism, seems to have increased, nor has their stance concerning immigration policy changed significantly. Mair (2001) has argued that European integration has generally had very little impact on either the format or the mechanics of national party systems thus far. He maintains that Eurosceptical parties such as the Austrian FP, the French FN, the Italian AN or the Swedish Left party cannot be reduced to their anti-European appeal, and that their anti-European positions are merely part and parcel of their general oppositional stance. As Taggart (1998) and Sitter (2001) have already shown, Euroscepticism is characteristic of parties outside the mainstream, both on the extreme left and the extreme right. Drawing
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on these studies, Mair doubts whether European integration has had any direct effect on how national party systems operate. According to this reasoning, we would expect the parties positions with respect to Europe to be determined above all by whether or not they are part of the governing coalitions. As the corresponding analysis in Table 11.4 shows, this expectation is not entirely unfounded. Parties in opposition are significantly more anti-European than parties in government. However, as this table also shows, Euroscepticism is not simply part of the politics of opposition. In fact, compared to the effect of being in the opposition, the effect of the new populist right on the positioning with regard to European integration is considerably more substantial. As we have argued throughout this study, the question of Europe is part and parcel of the new structural conflict over integration (into the European or global community) versus demarcation (of the national community). With regard to immigration, we cannot find any opposition effect at all. Immigration is much rather a question that opposes the new populist right to the left-libertarians, independently of whether the parties involved are in government or not. But one should not reduce the new populist right to its anti-immigration stance: as we have just seen, the new populist right is not only the most significant promoter of a tough anti-immigration policy, but also the most clearly anti-European force. These parties consistently defend a cultural demarcation strategy, as predicted by our new cleavage hypothesis. On the immigration issue, we also find the Christian-democrats on the side of the new populist right. Although not as radical as the latter, the Christian-democrats prove to be very significantly more opposed to immigration than the social-democrats or the liberal conservatives who serve here as the base category. The German Christian-democrats may serve as an illustration of this point. As argued in the German country chapter, they have used the immigration question to mobilize against the red-green government in the late 1990s (Hansen and Koehler 2005).
Cultural liberalism and law and order

In addition to the two cultural issue-categories most clearly linked to our own new cleavage hypothesis, we look at two cultural issues, which are most clearly associated with Kitschelts (1995) interpretation of the new populist right. In his perspective, the New Right constitutes the mirror image and opposite political pole of the New Left that began to
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mobilize in the 1960s (p. 2). According to his interpretation, the New Right not only advocates free market economics, but also authoritarian hierarchical arrangements in politics, together with a limitation of diversity and individual autonomy in cultural expressions. Our two categories of cultural liberalism and law and order quite nicely capture the opposition between libertarians and authoritarians. With the exception of environmental protection, the category of cultural liberalism includes all the themes that were raised by the so-called new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s peace, solidarity with the Third World, gender equality and human rights. These are issues which have been traditionally defended by the Left and which have gained enormously in importance during the cultural revolution of the late 1960s and the emergence of the New Left and the new social movements in the early 1970s. Law and order, by contrast, is a traditional issue-category, that has mainly preoccupied the parties from the right. The debate on cultural liberalism opposes the Left social-democrats and left-libertarians to the new populist right (Table 11.5). The debate on law and order mainly confronts the left-libertarians, on the one hand, and the new populist right together with the Christian-democrats, on the other. In this respect, the social-democrats do not take a particularly distinguished position. As far as law and order is concerned, the tone of the debate has become tougher in the multicultural countries, but not elsewhere. These countries were much more tolerant back in the 1970s more culturally liberal and more critical of a rigorous position on law and order. By the 1990s, however, they have lost much of their former tolerance on both counts. By this time, the Dutch parties have become the least culturally liberal of all the countries compared, and the cultural liberalism of British parties is now close to the average. All this is to suggest that the opening up of the borders is putting a strain even on multicultural societies. Just as the culturally monist countries, these countries are now also confronted with the problems created by the immigration of culturally very diverse populations. As we have argued in more detail in the Dutch chapter, they can no longer meet the new challenges with their traditional recipes either. The upshot of this detailed discussion of the cultural issues is that they generally oppose the left to the new populist right, but that the details of the configuration heavily depend on the country context, the impact of which varies from one issue-category to the other. To summarize this discussion, we have constructed two weighted positional contrasts for
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Table 11.5 Impact of party-level and country-level factors on average issue-positions: cultural liberalism and law and order: coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) of OLS regressions
Cultural liberalism Constant 1990s/2000s Social-democrats Left-libertarians Christian-democrats New populist right Multicultural (NL, UK) Multicultural (NL, UK), 1990s France Adjusted R2 N
a
Law and order 0.39c (0.15) 0.03 (0.15) 0.35b (0.16) 0.44b (0.19) 0.47c (0.16) 0.70c (0.21) 0.56b (0.27) 0.45c (0.16) 0.43 57
0.23b (0.11) 0.12 (0.12) 0.31c (0.19) 0.22a (0.13) 0.63d (0.14) 0.36a (0.19) 0.70c (0.22) 0.49 60
p<0.10 p<0.05 c p<0.01 d p<0.001

b
each party the contrast between a partys position on Europe and its position on immigration, and the contrast between its position on cultural liberalism and that on law and order. The weights are provided by the corresponding saliences. The first contrast most clearly refers to the integrationdemarcation cleavage, whereas the second one most clearly addresses Kitschelts distinction between libertarians and authoritarians. The two weighted contrasts correlate moderately with each other (r=.42; n=52). Dividing each contrast into two categories (cutting each at its mid-point (0)) and combining the two, we arrive at a four-fold typology ranging from libertarian/open to authoritarian/
Supply side: positioning political parties Table 11.6 Party family and period: percentages
Party family Type and period 1970s Libertarian-opena Authoritarian-open Authoritarian-closed All 1990s/2000s Libertarian-opena Authoritarian-open Authoritarian-closed All
a
293
Left 88.9 11.1 100% 70.6 23.5 5.9 100%
Moderate right 42.9 42.9 14.3 100% 33.3 44.4 22.2 100%
New populist right 100.0 100% 14.3 85.7 100%
Total 57.9 21.1 21.1 100% 45.5 27.3 27.3 100%
Including a few libertarian-closed exceptions.
closed positions. It turns out that libertarian parties are generally also rather open, i.e. one of the two mixed types is quite rare. The other one is more frequent: although many authoritarian parties tend to take rather more closed positions, some of them do not. Table 11.6 presents the distribution of the party families on these combinations for the 1970s and the 1990s/2000s. For this summary presentation, we only distinguish between the three relevant combinations and the party families have also been reduced to only three groups the left (including the radical liberals), the moderate right (including Christian-democrats and liberal conservatives), and the new populist right. As we can see from this table, the left is typically libertarian and open, while the new populist right tends to be both authoritarian and closed. It is the mainstream parties of the moderate right, for whom the two cultural contrasts do not necessarily coincide. The mixed category is actually the most frequent one for the moderate right, who is open, but still rather authoritarian in terms of Kitschelts contrast. The table also indicates that the alignment of the two cultural contrast has decreased: by the 1990s/2000s, some parties on the left have become more authoritarian, while remaining (or becoming more) open. In addition to the British Labour Party and the Austrian social-democrats, three of these parties, who have become more authoritarian, are from the Netherlands (the Dutch social-democrats, Groen Links and the radical left). On the other
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hand, there is one new populist-right party which does not quite fit the fold of a combination of authoritarianism with closure the Dutch LPF. As we have seen in the Dutch country chapter, the LPF constitutes an exception among the parties of the new populist right, since its flamboyant leader did not insist on the incompatibility of cultures and ethnicities, as the authoritarian parties of this family usually do, but attacked Islam in the name of the universalist principles of modernity. If we focus on the contrast between the left and the new populist right, as Kitschelt has done, we tend to overlook the emerging new integration demarcation cleavage, since the positions of these two types of parties on the new cleavage are closely aligned with their respective positions on the libertarianauthoritarian cleavage identified by Kitschelt. If we take into account the moderate parties of the established right as well, and if we also consider the more recent transformations in the party systems of multicultural countries in particular, we become aware of a differentiation with respect to the cultural issue-categories, which is in our view a consequence of a new dynamic in Western European politics. This new dynamic is at the heart of the emerging differentiation within the right and the corresponding tripolar party configuration, which we have already discussed in detail.
Conclusion
We have compared the transformation of the structure of the national political space of party competition, the emerging new configurations of the party systems within the transformed space as well as the determinants of these dynamics in our six countries. Our expectations have been more or less confirmed. In all the countries, the transformed space of party competition is still two-dimensional, and the new conflicts have been embedded in the inherited two-dimensional structure. Moreover, the two dimensions can still be interpreted in terms of economic and cultural issues. By the 1990s/2000s, however, cultural issues have typically acquired a greater structuring capacity than economic ones. Assuming independence of the two dimensions, we have predicted tripolar configurations for the major parties, the three poles being constituted by the left, the moderate right and the new populist right (including its functional equivalents of transformed conservative or liberal conservative parties). The tripolarity we have found was less pronounced than expected, however. Depending on the mobilizing
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strategies of the established parties, we have found the two dimensions to be more or less integrated and, correspondingly, the main configurations to be neither clearly tripolar, nor clearly bipolar: to the extent that the moderate parties of the established right adopt accommodating strategies with regard to the new challengers or align themselves with the adversarial strategies of the left, the two dimensions become more integrated and the configurations of the main parties more bipolar. Conversely, to the extent that the moderate parties of the established right differentiate themselves from both the left and the new challengers of the populist right, by adopting a dismissive or an adversarial strategy with regard to the cultural challenge of the new populist right, and by continuing the adversarial strategy with regard to the economic challenge of the left, the two dimensions are more independent of each other and the emerging configuration becomes more tripolar. We have found that, by the 1990s/2000s, both the cultural issues most associated with Kitschelts libertarianauthoritarian cleavage and those most associated with our integrationdemarcation cleavage clearly oppose the left and the new populist right. The two types of issues differ, however, with regard to the positioning of the moderate right, which often remains authoritarian, but sides with the left on the integrationdemarcation cleavage. Accordingly, to the extent that the integrationdemarcation question becomes the key cultural issue, we expect the party configuration to become more pronouncedly tripolar than it has become so far. With respect to the economic dimension, the new populist right is clearly siding with the moderate right, confirming Kitschelts original idea of the winning formula. In economic terms, we have found a substantial shift in the direction of economic liberalism in the smaller countries and in the UK. Finally, we have shown that the general theme varies from one country to the other, depending not only on the strategies of the established parties, but also to some extent on cultural context characteristics. These characteristics, however, affect mainly the average tone of the debate on specific issues, rather than the size or nature of party differences. The cultural context conditions seem to be particularly relevant in this respect: parties in multicultural countries have usually been more tolerant on issues of law and order, cultural liberalism or immigration. But, on the first two of these issues, such differences were much smaller in the recent period than in the 1970s, pointing to a convergence across countries in the positions of the main party families.
12
The electoral consequences of the integrationdemarcation cleavage

ROMAIN LACHAT
Introduction
We conclude our analyses in this chapter by considering the links between parties and voters. After having presented separate analyses of the demand side and of the supply side of electoral competition, in this chapter we seek to relate both levels. Our main argument in this volume has been that globalization leads to the formation of a potential for a new line of conflict, and that the corresponding issues and interests are articulated by political parties. We have presented much evidence for the emergence of such a new division and for the polarizing capacity of the issues associated with globalization. At the level of parties, we have observed substantial changes in the configuration of the main actors. Cultural issues have become more important for explaining the structure of party positions. Furthermore, among these issues, those linked with the process of globalization, such as the questions of immigration and European integration, have become more salient. This is a consequence of the transformation of the character of the cultural line of conflict. Following these developments, electoral competition cannot be summarized by a single line of conflict. Both economic and cultural differences are now equally relevant. In addition, important transformations could be observed among voters. The structure of political attitudes has changed following a similar pattern. Analyses presented in previous chapters made the implicit hypothesis that the transformations at both levels of voters and of parties are strongly related to one another. Parties, for instance, should respond strategically to changes in voters preferences. Similarly, the new integrationdemarcation conflict should be important not only for explaining the structure of voters attitudes, but also for determining their voting choices. It is the last part of this argument that we are going to test in this chapter. If our arguments are correct, we should observe variations across time and between parties in the determinants of voters
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The electoral consequences of integrationdemarcation
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choices. First, the relative importance of economic issues, as compared with cultural issues, should decrease over time. Secondly, we expect a similar development among cultural issues: those linked with the concerns of the new social movements are expected to become less important for explaining voting choices, while the relevance of the issues most directly associated with globalization should increase. Thirdly, we expect to find increasing differences among parties. While the overall importance of specific issues should vary, they are unlikely to affect preferences towards all parties to the same extent. The likelihood of supporting some parties will depend mainly on the economic preferences of voters, while the probability of supporting other parties will be more strongly affected by attitudes towards cultural issues. While such differences are not necessarily a new phenomenon, they will be all the more important, as the structure of party positions (and of voters preferences) is clearly two-dimensional. The next section presents these hypotheses in more detail. It also emphasizes some important differences between the perspective adopted in this chapter and the research questions on which analyses of issue voting are often based. Then, we discuss the specification of the models and the choice of statistical methods used for testing our hypotheses. The following sections present our results country by country.
The issue basis of voting choices

The main focus of this chapter is on the impact of issue-orientations on voting choices and on how this impact varies across elections and among parties. Following the theoretical arguments presented in earlier chapters and our distinctions between party families and issuecategories, we can specify three sets of hypotheses. The first one concerns the relative importance of both economic and cultural issuecategories. Both should be important for explaining voting choices, but the relative weight of cultural determinants should have increased. As we have seen in Chapter 10, the degree of polarization among social groups on the cultural dimension was higher in recent elections than in the 1970s. Cultural differences among groups of voters are now more important than economic ones. While the economic leftright divide has often been considered as the most important one for explaining party preferences and voting choices, there is reason to expect that cultural preferences have become at least as important. This hypothesis is also
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justified by the changes we observed at the level of parties in the previous chapter (Figure 11.3). We found that the main axis of competition was now a cultural one in each country except Germany. The second set of hypotheses concerns two different categories of cultural issues: those linked with the mobilization of the new social movements and those associated with the consequences of the globalization process. As we have argued before, one of the main characteristics of the transformation process analyzed in this volume is a change in the nature of the cultural line of division. This change should also be reflected in the determinants of voting choices. The impact of the traditional cultural issue-categories, mainly cultural liberalism and national defence, should decrease, while the role played by preferences towards European integration and immigration policy should become more important. This is similar to the transformation we have emphasized regarding the structure of political attitudes and the configuration of party positions. Thirdly, we expect the impact of issue-categories to vary from one party to the other, and we expect that these variations have become larger over time. In other words, we expect the influence of a given issuecategory on voting probabilities to vary from one party to the other. As far as left-wing parties are concerned, support for social-democratic parties should depend on both economic and cultural issue-preferences. They have traditionally been the most important actors on the left of the economic divide, and we expect them to continue defending the role of the state for social protection and for market regulation. As far as cultural issues are concerned, these parties strongly support cultural integration. As we have seen in Chapter 11, they are generally in favour of the process of European integration and they defend liberal immigration policies. Corresponding cultural preferences should also be apparent among their supporters. Among right-wing parties, we have emphasized several times the important distinction between the moderate right and right-wing populist parties. The supporters of these two groups of parties should also differ from one another. Support for rightwing populist parties should be driven mainly by cultural preferences, while the likelihood of voting in favour of a mainstream right-wing party should depend more heavily on economic preferences than on cultural ones. This expectation is derived from the strategies of the respective parties, as described in previous chapters. The greater importance of economic preferences should be especially pronounced among
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supporters of liberal parties. The contrast between right-wing populist and conservative parties is likely to be less sharp, as the latter are usually less supportive of cultural integration. Cultural issues may also be more important for Christian-democratic parties, at least in countries like Switzerland or the Netherlands where the Christian-democrats take a moderate position towards economic liberalism and remain mainly rooted in the traditional religious cleavage. This third set of hypotheses is different from the first two, insofar as it focuses on variations among parties. But there are no contradictions between the two. The overall relevance of a given issue-category may increase or decrease while being important for some parties only. It means, however, that we must be cautious when testing for these hypotheses. It is also important to emphasize the specificity of our approach, which is distinct from other analyses of issue voting. Much has been written about the role of issue-orientations in explaining voting choices. Thus, research on electoral dealignment has focused on the contrast between issue voting and other types of determinants (such as party identification or social-structural factors) of voting choices. This literature argues that a decline in the strength of cleavages together with a process of cognitive mobilization leads voters to make more sophisticated voting decisions (Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Following this line of argument, the impact of issues or ideological orientations on voting choices should have increased over the past several decades (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005; van der Eijk et al. 2005), while traditional factors, such as membership in social groups or party identification should have become less relevant. In contrast to this literature, the total impact of issues is not central to our analyses. Rather, our arguments refer to the relative impact of different issuecategories. From this point of view, it is interesting to compare the type of analyses presented here with the debate on the emergence of a new politics dimension. As discussed in previous chapters, this debate deals with the first transformation of the cultural dimension, following the mobilization of the new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s. These mobilization efforts, together with a generational change in the voters value priorities (Inglehart 1977), have led to the emergence of new issues in the political debate (Franklin et al. 1992). Analyses of the electoral consequences of this transformation process have typically focused on the opposition between new issues and traditional ones.
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Such comparisons are useful in our case, too, but they have some limitations, for two reasons. First, they assume a clear distinction between old and new issues. While some issue-categories, such as European integration and immigration, can be directly linked to the process of globalization, establishing a clear distinction is more difficult for other issues. Preferences related to economic liberalism or the welfare state, for instance, should be influenced both by the deregulation processes linked to globalization and by more traditional orientations towards economic redistribution. Similarly, some cultural issue-categories, such as cultural liberalism, may merge old and new concerns. Indeed, old and new issues are only partially separate. Therefore, the distinction between globalization issues and more traditional cultural ones, on which our second hypothesis focuses, is only able to capture part of the changes associated with the globalization process. Secondly, the usefulness of a distinction between old and new issues is limited for yet another reason. As we have emphasized, the impact of issue-orientations should not only vary from one issue to the other, but also between parties. The crucial test of our argument is not simply to show that issues linked with globalization have become more relevant in general. Rather, it is to show that they matter more strongly for specific groups of parties and voters. The impact of issue-preferences on voting choices cannot be separated from changes at the level of parties, and from party-specific variations with respect to their issue-positions and issue-salience.
Strategy of analysis
In order to test our hypotheses about the variations in the determinants of voting choices, we estimate a series of regression models. In each case, party choice is regressed on voters issue-orientations. In order to specify these models, we need to decide how voting choice is coded and which issue-categories are considered. This is especially important as we want to compare our results across time and space (i.e. among countries). We face a trade-off between the depth of the analyses for single elections and the ease with which our results can be compared. In the ideal case, we would have measures for all relevant issue categories in all elections, applied to an identical set of parties. This would allow us to estimate exactly the same model in each election and to compare our results directly. As we have seen, however, the number of issue-categories
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that we are able to operationalize varies from one election to the other, as does the configuration of parties. As far as the latter are concerned, we shall consider all main parties and ignore only those with too few voters in a given sample. With respect to issues, we shall limit the problems of comparability by focusing on six categories only: economic liberalism, the welfare state, cultural liberalism, the army, European integration, and immigration. These are the most important categories as far as the hypotheses discussed in this chapter are concerned. As there are more than two parties in each election, all models will be estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. To test our hypotheses, we shall focus on two types of results. The overall impact of specific issue-categories will be estimated with the help of likelihood ratio tests (Long 1997). These tests allow one to estimate the contribution of a variable (or of a group of variables) to the goodness-of-fit of a model. We rely on such tests for the first two of our hypotheses. Variations among parties in the impact of issues, by contrast, will be estimated by looking at first differences, that is, changes in the predicted probability to support one of the choice alternatives for a given change in the values of the independent variables. Our results will be presented country by country, following the order used in previous chapters.1
France
In the case of France, we distinguish between six parties or groups: the radical left, including the Communist party and smaller Trotskyist parties, the moderate left (PSF and MRG), the Greens, the RPR, the UDF and the FN.2 As far as issue-categories are concerned, attitudes towards cultural and economic liberalism can be included in all four elections. The category welfare can be considered for only the first two
For reasons of space, we present only the results of the likelihood ratio tests and the values of the first differences. The full results of the estimated regression models are available on the website of our research project (www.ipz.uzh.ch/npw/). In 2002, the PCF is coded under moderate left, as the party was then much less radical and far closer to the Socialist party. The FN is not considered in the 1978 election, as we have too few supporters of this party in the sample. The UDF is not included in the analysis of the 1995 election, as there was no candidate from this party.
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Table 12.1 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, France
1978 Economic liberalism Welfare Cultural liberalism Army Europe Anti-immigration Degrees of freedom
a
1988 131.3c 229.2c 59.4c 80.0c 227.4 5

c
1995 432.2c 31.5c 91.9c 136.4c 4
2002 283.1c 31.2c 79.1c 245.1c 5
672.0c 13.4a 198.0c
p<0.05 p<0.01 c p<0.001

b
elections, army only in 1988, and immigration and European integration since 1988 and 1995, respectively. The results of the likelihood ratio tests for these six categories of issues are presented in Table 12.1. In 1978, attitudes towards economic liberalism have the strongest impact on voting choices. The traditional cultural cleavage, represented by issues of cultural liberalism, plays only a secondary role. Unfortunately, a direct comparison with the impact of immigration and of Europe is not possible, as such items were only included in later election studies. In the more recent period, however, we find a strong impact of attitudes towards immigration on voting choices. Its impact is almost as strong as the one of economic preferences, in 1988 and 2002. Thus, we observe a relative decrease in the role of the economy, as well as a clear decrease in the impact of the traditional cultural cleavage. At the same time, the emergence of a new line of division centred on questions of immigration is unmistakable. As far as the question of European integration is concerned, it plays only a secondary role in explaining voting choices at least when controlling for attitudes towards immigration. While this issue is central for explaining the reconfiguration and fragmentation of the party system, as discussed in Chapter 4, it is less central among voters motives. First differences for all issues and parties are presented in Table 12.2. As explained above, these results show how the probability of supporting a given party varies with a change in the corresponding issue
The electoral consequences of integrationdemarcation Table 12.2 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, France
Economic Cultural Year liberalism Welfare liberalism Army 1978 0.13b 0.04b 0.07b 0.07b 0.18b 0.11b 0.16b 0.12b 0.00 0.00 0.02b 0.01b 0.16b 0.10b 0.07b 0.15b 0.05b 0.23b 0.11b 0.01 0.02a 0.02a 0.00 0.06b 0.06b 0.04b 0.03a 0.03b 0.05b 0.03 0.04b 0.00 0.04b 0.02a 0.01 0.02b 0.07b 0.02 0.00 0.09b 0.07b 0.08b 0.05b 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03b 0.03b 0.04b 0.04b
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Party Radical left
AntiEurope immigration
1988 1995 2002 Moderate 1978 left 1988 1995 2002 Greens 1978 1988 1995 2002 UDF 1978 1988 2002 RPR 1978 1988 1995 2002 FN 1988 1995 2002
a
0.04b 0.15b
0.03 0.02b
0.07b
0.09 0.05b 0.02b 0.00 0.01a 0.03b 0.01 0.05b 0.02 0.01 0.04b 0.04b
0.17b 0.08b 0.11b 0.02b 0.01b 0.04b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06b 0.22b 0.16b 0.13b
0.00 0.00
0.01 0.09b 0.03b 0.09b
-0.03b
0.04b
p<0.05 p<0.01 Note: Entries are the value of the first difference in the probability of supporting the corresponding party for an increase of one standard deviation in the corresponding issue-category (the other independent variables being set at their average value).
position. These first differences were computed by setting all variables to their average value and by changing the position on a single issuecategory by one standard deviation. Changes are in the direction of positions more favourable to economic liberalism, the welfare state, cultural liberalism, national defence, European integration, and a restrictive immigration policy, respectively.
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First, we notice that all significant first differences are in the expected direction. Thus, changes towards left-wing economic positions increase the probability of supporting the radical left, the moderate left, or the Greens, while they decrease the level of support for all three right-wing parties. An analogous pattern emerges for positions in favour of cultural liberalism and European integration, or opposition to the army and to a restrictive immigration policy. The only deviation from this general pattern is the impact of European preferences on support for the radical left. These parties enjoy a higher level of support among Eurosceptics than among citizens favourable to further European integration. We comment on this result in more detail below. As far as our third group of hypotheses is concerned, we first notice a strong contrast between the moderate right and the Front National. Support for the UDF and for the RPR is strongly influenced by attitudes towards economic and cultural liberalism, while it is not related to the issues of European integration and of immigration except for the RPR in 2002. Support for the right-wing populist party, on the other hand, bears only a weak relationship with economic issue-orientations, while it strongly depends on preferences on the immigration question and, to a lesser extent, on preferences regarding European integration. This pattern can be observed in all elections and corresponds to our expectations. It shows that the tripolarization of the party system is also reflected in the determinants of voting choices. Moderate and populist right-wing parties do not differ from one another simply by their relative location, that is, the FN is not just situated more to the right than the RPR. As we saw in earlier chapters, these parties also represent very distinct issue profiles, and this difference is clearly reflected in the determinants of voting choices. Yet, the results also point to a possible weakening of this difference. First, the overall impact of issue orientations on support for the UDF decreases. Secondly, and probably more interesting, we observe signs of a possible convergence between the RPR and the FN, as far as the determinants of individual voting decisions are concerned. The impact of attitudes towards immigration has decreased for the FN, but becomes significant in 2002 for the RPR. As far as economic issues are concerned, we also notice a weak but significant impact on support for the FN since 1995. So far, these developments indicate only rather weak tendencies and, accordingly, should not be overinterpreted.
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On the left, the distinction between moderate and radical parties is less pronounced. Support for these two groups of parties is mainly influenced by orientations towards economic liberalism and towards the welfare state. Together with the Greens, they also attract voters who support cultural liberalism or are opposed to the army. As noted above, however, the supporters of moderate and of radical-left parties differ from one another with respect to the question of European integration but not with regard to immigration.3 This is not surprising given the results presented in Chapter 4. These results point to a possible divergence between the economic and cultural goals of European integration. The European project is often perceived as neo-liberal, among others by voters from the Communist and radical left. When attitudes towards the economic and cultural aspects of Europe can be separated, as was the case in the 2002 French electoral survey, they correspond to different dimensions of the political space (Table 4.2). Similarly, if the two groups of European attitudes are separated in the present model, we find that the probability to support a radical left party is significantly affected by economic attitudes towards the EU, but not by attitudes towards the cultural aspects of European integration. The opposite is the case for support of the Front National. These results show that the economic aspects of European integration are dominant among supporters of radical-left parties.
Austria
In Austria, we consider four parties: the SP, the VP, the FP and the Greens the latter only since the 1994 election. We have indicators for fewer issue-categories than in the other countries. While attitudes towards the welfare state and immigration are measured in all election surveys, cultural liberalism can be considered only in 1975 and 2002, and the categories of economic liberalism and of European integration only in 2002. The results of the likelihood ratio tests, summarizing the impact of these issue-categories on voting choices, are presented in Table 12.3.
The values of the first differences may give the impression that the impact of immigration is weaker for the radical left than for the moderate right. The relative change in the odds of supporting either of these parties, however, is not significant.
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Table 12.3 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, Austria
1975 Economic liberalism Welfare Cultural liberalism Europe Anti-immigration Degrees of freedom
a
1994 50.2
c
1999 26.1
c
2002 116.9c 1.9 49.4c 3.2 158.9c 3
5.9 2.7 0.2 2
164.2c 3
162.9c 3
p<0.05 p<0.01 c p<0.001

b
The results for the 1975 election may be surprising, as none of the three issue-categories has a significant impact on voting choices. The only significant effect we find is for the contrast between the SP and the FP, which is weakly related to preferences towards the welfare state. Altogether, however, voting choices cannot be explained on the basis of issue-orientations in that election, and nothing can be said on the relative importance of different categories of issues except that none of them seems to matter. This is probably a direct consequence of the strong economic and social consensus that was prevailing in Austrian politics in that period (see Chapter 5). In more recent elections, the conclusions we can draw are constrained by the small number of available issue-categories. We find that immigration has a strong impact in all three recent elections and that its influence on voting decisions is stronger than that of economic issues. Yet, this result must be interpreted with some caution, as the operationalization of the issue-categories is far from optimal in 1994 and 1999. If we judge by the results of 2002, our hypothesis about the transformation of the cultural dimension is supported, as attitudes towards immigration have a much larger impact than those related to cultural liberalism. Without a more reliable basis of comparison, however, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about our first two hypotheses. Turning to differences among parties (Table 12.4), comparisons over time are again difficult to make. First, there are no significant changes in predicted probabilities in the 1975 election, for any of the
The electoral consequences of integrationdemarcation Table 12.4 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, Austria
Economic Year liberalism Cultural Welfare liberalism 0.03 0.09b 0.08b 0.02 0.01a 0.02b 0.01 0.02 0.04b 0.04b 0.01 0.01 0.04b 0.02a 0.00 0.02
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Party SP
AntiEurope immigration 0.00 0.11b 0.10b 0.01 0.02b 0.06b 0.06b 0.00 0.01 0.04b 0.01 0.00 0.14b 0.20b 0.06b
1975 1994 1999 2002 0.18b Greens 1994 1999 2002 0.02b VP 1975 1994 1999 2002 0.20b FP 1975 1994 1999 2002 0.00
a
0.02
0.02
0.10b 0.01
0.00
0.11b 0.01
0.03
0.01a
0.01
issue-categories. Secondly, comparisons of the 2002 election with those of 1994 and 1999 should only be made with some caution, as the available indicators are more problematic in the 1990s. However, we do find some interesting contrasts between the four parties. The impact of economic attitudes is characterized by a leftright divide. Voters who defend the welfare state and who are opposed to economic liberalism are more likely to vote for the Social-Democrats and for the Greens, but less likely to support the Christian-Democrats or (except in 2002) the FP. With respect to cultural issues, we again find a difference among right-wing parties. In 2002, support for the Christian-Democrats is influenced by attitudes towards cultural liberalism, while this issuecategory is not relevant for explaining the level of support of the FP. Attitudes towards immigration, by contrast, are much more relevant for
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the latter party than for the VP. Again, however, there are differences between the elections of the 1990s and that of 2002, which are difficult to interpret. Thus, the impact of attitudes about immigration is much lower in 2002 than in 1994 or 1999. As it is for economic attitudes, this may reflect changes in the available indicators as much as real changes in the motives of voters. Thus, while we find some evidence supporting our hypothesis about differences between moderate left, moderate right, and right-wing populist parties, our conclusions in the case of Austria can only be tentative.
Switzerland
In the Swiss case, we do not have such operationalization problems. There, we encounter less variation in the number of available categories (all can be included in 1999, and only economic liberalism is missing in 1975 or 1995), and the issue-questions we could rely on to construct summary measures of voters attitudes closely corresponded to the type of questions we needed. We distinguish between four parties: the Social Democrats (SPS), the Christian Democrats (CVP), the Liberals,4 and the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP). The latter is not included in our analysis of the 1975 election, since it counted too few supporters in the sample. In 1975, voting choices were significantly affected by two variables only: attitudes about the welfare state and about national defence (Table 12.5). Similarly to the Austrian election in the same year, voters issue-positions had only a weak impact on voting choices. As far as we can judge from this evidence, however, the traditional economic and cultural cleavages were the most important ones, as expected. Preferences regarding immigration and European integration were already included in this election study, but they did not influence the voters electoral preferences. The pattern of results for the 1990s turns out to be quite different. Not only is the overall impact of issue-positions larger, but the single most important group of attitudes is now constituted by those concerning European integration. Preferences with regard to cultural liberalism and the army still have an impact on voting choices in the 1990s, but they are clearly less important than the issue of
4
This includes both the Radical Party (FDP), which is a member of the governmental coalition, and the smaller Swiss Liberal Party (LPS), which has a similar programmatic orientation.
The electoral consequences of integrationdemarcation Table 12.5 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, Switzerland
a
309
1995 99.8 2.2 80.5c 136.3c 12.1b 3

c
1999 12.0b 109.9c 36.4c 30.6c 134.9c 9.2a 3
31.8 2.8 7.3a 2.4 3.3 2
p<0.05 p<0.01 c p<0.001

b
European integration. The transformation of the cultural line of conflict has thus also affected the determinants of electoral choice. In line with our first hypothesis, we also find that the relative importance of cultural versus economic attitudes has increased. It must, however, also be emphasized that, among the two categories of issues most strongly related to the consequences of globalization, only European integration seems to matter. Attitudes about immigration policy play only a minor role in Switzerland. Considering now the variations between parties with regard to the determinants of voting choices (Table 12.6), we first observe a clear leftright economic divide. The more favourable voters are to the welfare state, the less likely they are to support a right-wing party. This effect is particularly strong for the Liberals. This is the first sign of a divergence among right-wing parties. Except in 1999, the probability to support the SVP or the CVP also decreases with an increasing support of the welfare state, but less strongly than in the case of the Liberals. The difference is even clearer for economic liberalism, which affects only the probabilities to vote for the Social Democrats or for the Liberals not those of supporting the Christian-Democratic party or the right-wing populists. As far as cultural issues are concerned, we also observe differences in the motivation of voting choice between supporters of right-wing parties. At the same time, there are also some important differences between the 1995 and 1999 elections, which can be difficult
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Table 12.6 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, Switzerland

Economic Party Year liberalism SPS 1975 1995 1999 0.04a CVP 1975 1995 1999 0.03 LIB 1975 1995 1999 0.06b SVP 1995 1999 0.01
a
Cultural Welfare liberalism Army 0.14b 0.24b 0.21b 0.06b 0.07b 0.01 0.08b 0.13b 0.14b 0.04b 0.08b 0.04 0.02 0.10b 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08b 0.06a 0.16b 0.08b 0.01 0.02 0.09b 0.05 0.11b 0.02 0.08b 0.03
AntiEurope immigration 0.01 0.06a 0.09b 0.02 0.07b 0.01 0.03 0.07b 0.04 0.07b 0.12b 0.02 0.07b 0.05b 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06b 0.01 0.01 0.03
p < 0.05 p < 0.01 Note: Entries are the value of the first difference in the probability of supporting the corresponding party for an increase of one standard deviation in the corresponding issue-category (the other independent variables being set at their average value).
to interpret. It must be emphasized that, contrary to Austria, these variations cannot be explained by changes in the operationalization of our issue-categories.5 As far as the traditional cultural cleavage is concerned, we observe again a leftright divide. The SPS enjoys a higher level of support among voters who defend cultural liberalism and oppose the army. On the right of the political spectrum, the SVP is supported more strongly by voters with opposite views in both elections. A similar effect can be noted for the two moderate right-wing parties but only in one election each (the Liberals in 1995, the Christian-Democrats in 1999) and
5
Besides the inclusion of a new item on economic liberalism, only the construction of the index of cultural liberalism differs slightly between the two surveys, without changing the meaning of this variable. Attitudes towards cultural liberalism in 1995 are measured by a single scale, measuring preferences towards the defence of traditions. In 1999, two additional items were included, asking respondents whether they are proud to be Swiss, and whether they think the critiques of the behaviour of Switzerland during World War II were justified or not. All three indicators are strongly correlated with one another and they clearly load on the same dimension (more information on the operationalization of the issue categories can be found in Appendix A).
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only with respect to the question of national defence. The chances of supporting either of these parties are not influenced by voters attitudes towards cultural liberalism. Similar to the issue of cultural liberalism, preferences regarding the question of European integration mainly affect the opposition between the SVP and the Social Democrats. The latter are more strongly supported by pro-Europeans. In 1995, but not in 1999, the probabilities to vote in favour of the Liberals or of the Christian Democrats are also influenced by the European question. The electoral chances of the Liberals are higher among those who support Swiss membership of the EU, while the Christian Democrats are more strongly supported by Eurosceptics.
The Netherlands
Changes in the relative impact of the six issue categories in the Netherlands also support our corresponding hypotheses, as they did in the other countries. From Table 12.7, we see that the impact of economic preferences has decreased in relative terms during the 1990s at least until 2002. Voters attitudes about economic liberalism are still important, and they have a strong impact on their choices at the polls. But preferences on cultural issues have become more important. Among the latter, those linked with the army were the most important ones in
Table 12.7 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, the Netherlands
a
1994 201.5c 114.4c 8.5 23.2c 62.1c 4
1998 123.6c 61.6c 181.3c 6.6 7.0 30.3c 4
2002 115.0c 94.0c 17.7b 219.9c 5
2003 146.7c 37.2c 9.6 57.1c 5
134.7c 45.3c 104.8c 11.1a 36.7c 4
p<0.05 p<0.01 c p<0.001

b
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1972, reflecting the salience of the traditional cultural cleavage. The question of cultural liberalism was important in the 1990s, too. In the 2002 election, however, with the rise of the LPF, the question of immigration played a central role. It was clearly the most important issue for explaining party choice. The results of the likelihood ratio tests also show that the 2003 election differs markedly from that of 2002. In 2003, attitudes towards immigration are still most important culturally, but economic preferences turn out to be dominant again. The results for the Netherlands not only show trends in the relative impact of the different issue-categories, but also reveal clear patterns in the parties or groups of parties that are opposed on cultural and economic issues (see Table 12.8). Starting again with economic issues, we find a strong and consistent opposition between the Social Democrats and the Greens, on the one hand, and the VVD, on the other. The probabilities to support each of these parties vary strongly between voters defending economic liberalism and those opposed to it. The impact of attitudes towards the welfare state is similar, though such attitudes can only be included in the analysis of the 1998 election. The traditional cultural cleavage, especially with regard to cultural liberalism, is strong in all elections as well. But it opposes different parties. On the left, it plays some role for explaining support for the Social Democrats, but is stronger and more consistent with respect to the Greens. Support for D66 is also driven by the defence of cultural liberalism though this effect weakened during the 1990s and was no longer significant by 2003. On this issue, supporters of D66 are opposed by Christian-Democratic voters. By contrast, support for the other two right-wing parties, the VVD and the LPF, is not influenced by citizens preferences for cultural liberalism. Finally, we observe yet another pattern for the impact of immigration on voting choices. The main contrast here is that between the Social Democrats and the Greens, on the one hand, and the VVD and LPF, on the other. Supporters of the latter two parties defend a restrictive immigration policy. The alignments on this question also depart from the general leftright opposition that we found for other issues. Christian-Democratic voters are also rather in favour of a liberal immigration policy though less so than voters of left-wing parties. Consistent with the results of the likelihood ratio tests, we also note that attitudes towards European integration have virtually no impact on voting probabilities. Altogether, our hypotheses about the divisions
The electoral consequences of integrationdemarcation Table 12.8 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, the Netherlands
Economic Party Year liberalism PvdA 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 GL 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 D66 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 CDA 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 VVD 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 LPF 2002 2003
a
313
Cultural Welfare liberalism Army 0.05b 0.01 0.03 0.04a 0.08b 0.05b 0.02b 0.06b 0.07b 0.02b 0.01 0.10b 0.09b 0.03a 0.02 0.09b 0.12b 0.12b 0.15b 0.10b 0.02a 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01a 0.12b 0.03 0.00
AntiEurope immigration 0.04a 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02a 0.01b 0.02a 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03b 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02b 0.01a 0.03a 0.06b 0.04a 0.10b 0.09b 0.04b 0.01b 0.01 0.05b 0.03b 0.00 0.00 0.02a 0.02b 0.00 0.06b 0.04a 0.02 0.06b 0.00 0.01 0.11b 0.10b 0.04b 0.07b 0.19b 0.05b
0.12b 0.15b 0.13b 0.07b 0.14b 0.04b 0.01b 0.04b 0.04b 0.03b 0.05b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04a 0.01 0.00 0.03a 0.02 0.13b 0.20b 0.16b 0.14b 0.15b 0.01 0.01
0.09b
0.02
0.04b 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.00
0.01 0.02 0.01
0.02
0.10b 0.01 0.03a
0.09b
0.07b 0.04b 0.02
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among right-wing parties seem to be confirmed. The CDA, VVD and LPF each represent the pole on one of the main lines of divisions we have identified: the Christian Democrats on the traditional cultural cleavage, the Liberals on the economic one, and the LPF on the issue of immigration, which is emblematic of the new cultural line of conflict resulting from the globalization process.
United Kingdom
The results of our analyses for the UK differ quite strongly from those of the other countries. The summary statistics on the importance of the various issue-categories show a clear dominance of economic attitudes, especially in the 1990s (Table 12.9). In each election, the single most important issue-category for explaining voting choices is economic liberalism. Attitudes towards the welfare state also have a strong impact in 1992 and 1997. The cultural issue-categories, by contrast, have only a weak or moderate impact except in 1974. Here, we see that the question of European integration was almost as important as the economic dimension. We have already discussed this point in previous analyses, especially in Chapter 8. The debate on Europe was central to the election of February 1974. Compared with this, the impact of European integration on voting choices in the 1990s appears to be particularly weak. Yet, at the same time, this issue has again become more influential during the 1990s and early 2000s. We continue to
Table 12.9 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, the UK
a
1992 273.2c 111.8c 6.4a 29.7c 6.4a 2
1997 99.9c 138.9c 10.0b 47.9c 3.7 2
2001 129.8c 7.8a 27.7c 34.7c 8.2a 2
206.3c 34.2c
192.0 2
p<0.05 p<0.01 c p<0.001

b
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Table 12.10 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, the UK

Economic Cultural Year liberalism Welfare liberalism Army 0.20b 0.20b 0.15b 0.18b 0.04a 0.11b 0.02 0.01 0.23b 0.30b 0.18b 0.18b 0.08b 0.21b 0.14b 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04b 0.09b 0.22b 0.13b 0.01 0.03 0.04a 0.03 0.03a 0.00 0.04 0.04a
b
Party Labour
AntiEurope immigration 0.19b 0.01 0.07b 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03a 0.02 0.02 0.05b 0.04b 0.20b 0.04a 0.08b 0.02 0.08b 0.03
1974 1992 1997 2001 Libdem 1974 1992 1997 2001 Conservative 1974 1992 1997 2001
a
0.06b 0.01
0.09b 0.04b 0.08b
observe, during the more recent period, an increase in the importance of the new cultural issues, which parallels a decline in the impact of preferences towards the army and towards cultural liberalism. Given the small size of the British party system, the divides among groups of voters are much easier to summarize than in other countries. For most issues, we find a clear opposition between supporters of the Labour Party and supporters of the Conservatives (see Table 12.10). Attitudes in favour of the welfare state, of cultural liberalism, of European integration, as well as opposition to economic liberalism or to the army, all contribute to higher probabilities of voting for the Labour Party. This pattern is more consistent for economic issues than for cultural ones. The 1974 election also represents an exception as far as the role of attitudes towards European integration is concerned, as mentioned above. This is linked with the radical change in the position of the two major parties on this issue, which was discussed in detail in Chapter 8. Support for the third party, the Liberal Democrats, is usually characterized by a pattern similar to that of
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Labour. But the effects of the various issue-categories vary here more strongly from one election to the next.
Germany
In the last of our six countries, again we find strong support for our first two hypotheses, as shown by the results in Table 12.11. In the 1970s, voting choices were structured by the traditional economic and cultural line of conflicts, with attitudes towards economic liberalism having the largest impact. While voters preferences on the question of European integration were already measured in that election study, they did not significantly contribute to the explanation of party preferences. These results differ strongly from those of the 1990s and early 2000s. In the more recent elections, voting choices were mainly influenced by preferences on cultural issues, especially by the question of immigration. This pattern fits with the hypotheses we have formulated and corresponds to the results observed in the other countries with the possible exception of the UK. As there is no party of the populist right, there are fewer reasons to expect strong variations among parties in the determinants of voting choices. But we do observe an interesting contrast between the SPD and the Greens. On economic issues, the opposition runs between socialdemocratic voters, who are opposed to economic liberalism, and those of the Liberal and Christian-democratic parties. On the question of
Table 12.11 Likelihood ratio tests of the impact of issue-categories on voting choice, Germany
a
1994 10.0a 9.5a 21.3c 9.4a 98.1 3

c
1998 49.9c 56.8c 9.8a 47.6c 3
2002 19.6c 28.1c 9.6a 57.6c 3
136.3c 2.0 78.8c 0.6 2
p<0.05 p<0.01 c p<0.001

b
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Table 12.12 Impact of issue-positions on voting probabilities, Germany

Economic Cultural Year liberalism Welfare liberalism Army 0.18b 0.02 0.10b 0.07b 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02b 0.04b 0.00 0.18b 0.01 0.07b 0.08b 0.02 0.03 0.10b 0.02 0.05b 0.05a 0.03b 0.04b 0.04b 0.05b 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15b 0.06b 0.10b 0.07b 0.04a AntiEurope immigration 0.01 0.04 0.04a 0.01 0.01 0.03b 0.00 0.01
a
Party SPD
1976 1994 1998 2002 Greens 1994 1998 2002 FDP 1976 1994 1998 2002 CDU/ 1976 CSU 1994 1998 2002
a
0.01
0.10b 0.06b 0.09b 0.03b 0.02b 0.03b
0.01 0.01a
0.02 0.03
0.01 0.02a 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11b 0.09b 0.13b
0.04a 0.02 0.00
cultural liberalism, a leftright cleavage also emerges, but it is most salient between supporters of the Greens and Christian-democratic voters. This situation bears some resemblance to the French case, in which support for the Greens is only weakly related to economic preferences. Attitudes towards cultural liberalism also influence the odds of the SPD, but this impact is weaker than that of economic liberalism. Finally, a leftright contrast is also characteristic of the category of immigration, where both the SPD and the Greens enjoy a higher level of support among citizens who oppose a restrictive immigration policy.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to analyze the determinants of voting choices and thus to relate both aspects of electoral competition, that
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is, the supply side and the demand side. Following the developments emphasized in previous chapters, regarding the line of conflicts that structure party positions and voters preferences, we formulated three sets of hypotheses. First, the influence of cultural issues on voting choices should have become greater. Secondly, we expected an increase in the relative impact of preferences towards European integration and immigration, as compared with the impact of attitudes towards cultural liberalism and national defence. Thirdly, we expected variations among party families in the relevance of different issue-categories. Most importantly, we suggested a strong contrast among right-wing parties, with the likelihood of supporting right-wing populist parties being influenced mainly by cultural preferences and the odds of voting in favour of a moderate dependent more on economic orientation. These hypotheses were quite strongly supported by our analyses. As expected, the overall impact of economic issue preferences has decreased in recent elections. While voting choices were mainly explained by attitudes towards economic liberalism or the welfare state in the 1970s, preferences towards cultural issues are now dominant. The traditional economic leftright opposition, associated with the class cleavage, is no longer the most important one. Voters are more strongly influenced by their position on the cultural dimension. The only exception to this pattern is the UK, for which the economic dimension is still the most important one. But, even in this case, we observe a reinforcement of the impact of the European question during the 1990s. In this volume, we have emphasized several times that it was important not to reduce the space of electoral competition to a single leftright dimension, especially if the latter is interpreted mainly in economic terms. The results of this chapter offer further evidence in favour of this conclusion. Our second hypothesis, regarding the balance between old and new cultural issues, has also been strongly supported. Our analyses have confirmed the expected weakening of the traditional cultural cleavage and the emergence of a new line of division. The opposition between integration and demarcation is clearly reflected in the determinants of voting choices and this opposition has grown stronger during the 1990s and early 2000s. These changes parallel those observed in the separate analyses of both the demand side and the supply side of electoral competition. In line with our embedding hypothesis, we have shown in previous chapters how the articulation of the
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consequences of globalization has led to a transformation of the nature of the cultural cleavage. The same development can now be observed in the influence of issue-positions on voting choices. While this hypothesis was tested by contrasting old and new issues, that is, cultural liberalism and national defence on the one hand, and European integration and immigration on the other, this contrast must be interpreted with some caution. As we have emphasized, such a distinction can only be imperfect. It is not possible to isolate a group of issues that are direct consequences of globalization and that are entirely different from political issues associated with traditional divides. What we sometimes referred to as globalization issues captures only part of the consequences of this phenomenon. But still, the changes we observed in the relative importance of these two groups of issues provide strong evidence in favour of our argument. Finally, we also expected the impact of issues to vary across parties. Most important from this point of view was the expected contrast between parties of the moderate right and those of the populist right. This contrast, of course, is only relevant in four countries, as there are no significant right-wing populist parties in the UK or in Germany. This hypothesis was also generally confirmed, though the results are here less clear-cut. Support for conservative or liberal parties depends mainly on economic preferences, while cultural preferences are central to explaining votes for right-wing populist parties. This pattern appeared clearly in the Netherlands and in France. In the latter country, however, it was stronger in the 1990s than in the 2002 election. In Austria, too, this contrast can be observed when comparing votes for the FP and for the VP in 2002 but not in the elections of the 1990s. In the Swiss case, the distinction between two types of variables for explaining voting choices was less systematic and there was more variation across elections. Altogether, our results are more mixed for this hypothesis than for the previous two. Yet this may point towards a more general characteristic of this third hypothesis. Contrary to the other two, it depends as much on the strategy of single parties as on more general developments affecting all voters and parties. It shows again that the way in which parties articulate these new issues and challenges is central to understanding the electoral consequences of globalization.
13
Globalizing West European politics: the change of cleavage structures, parties and party systems in comparative perspective
EDGAR GRANDE
Globalizing West European politics: dimensions of comparative analysis

Has globalization resulted in a fundamental change of West European politics, its cleavage structures, parties and party systems? Although globalization has been one of the most important topics in social science research over the past decade, this question has thus far been widely neglected.1 In political science, most attention has been paid to the empirical analysis of the consequences of economic globalization on national state capacities and policies (e.g. Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, 2000b; Weiss 2003) and to efforts at establishing new transnational institutions and organizations able to regulate effectively a rapidly globalizing capitalism (Zrn 1998; Held et al. 1999; Held 2004; Slaughter 2004; Grande and Pauly 2005). The impact of globalization on politics has received hardly any attention. This holds true in particular for political parties. While there are some studies on the reactions of interest groups to globalization (Zrn and Walter 2005; Streeck et al. 2006) and on the transnational organization of social movements (della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999; Smith and Johnston 2002; Tarrow 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005), a systematic comparative analysis of the consequences of globalization on political cleavage structures, political parties and party systems is missing. Conventional wisdom still holds that political parties, their ideological profiles, their organizational capacities and their strategic interactions are all determined by domestic factors. It is the aim of this book to revise substantially this picture. In our research design, politics was treated as the dependent variable, while we
1
For a recent overview of the state of the art in this field, see Schirm (2007).
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Comparative perspective
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considered globalization to be the most important independent variable. Basically, we were interested in whether and how globalization has been causing changes in the ideological profile and the organization of politics in Western democracies. The focus of our empirical analysis was cast deliberately on national parties and party systems. Despite the establishment of new transnational institutional architectures of political decision-making, the organization of politics remains firmly rooted within the national political systems and it is political parties that remain the most important actors in transforming citizens preferences into political programmes. In this context, we assume that globalization has the capacity to produce a new structural cleavage in modern societies which offers new opportunities for the transformation of national party politics and party systems. Our analysis of change in West European politics was based in particular on three theoretical concepts: first, and most importantly, Stein Rokkans cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1999; Kriesi 1998); secondly, the sociological theory of reflexive modernization (Beck et al. 1994; Beck 1999; Beck and Bon 2001; Beck and Grande 2007; Beck and Lau 2004, 2005; Giddens 1990; 1994), and, thirdly, different strands of neo-institutionalist theories, in particular concepts of historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism (March and Olsen 1989; Steinmo et al. 1992; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997; Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999). Stein Rokkans cleavage theory served as a starting point for our analysis. This theory attributes the formation of political parties and party families in West European countries to fundamental societal conflicts and assumes a close relationship between the structure of these social cleavages and their manifestation within the respective national party systems. We have employed this concept in particular for analyzing the structure of political spaces, their development and their transformation. The theory of reflexive modernization focuses on structural transformation processes in West European societies since the 1960s, caused by processes of individualization and globalization. It allows for the formulation of hypotheses on the origins of new structural cleavages in West European societies, in particular on the conflict between the winners and losers of globalization, which plays a central role in our analysis. Finally, neo-institutionalist theories have proven to be a fruitful tool for analyzing processes of institutional change in West European societies. They emphasize factors such as national election systems and party laws, constitutional norms and state structures
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and, as we have seen, these factors play an important role for the success and failure of political parties. Moreover, they offer conceptual tools for analyzing the strategic interactions of political parties in their efforts at adapting to changing competitive circumstances. Taken together, these concepts allow us to analyze the effects of globalization on West European party politics as a process of institutionally embedded, strategic interaction between political parties and their electorates in the course of which new political cleavages have emerged, the existing political spaces have been restructured, and national party systems have been reconfigured. We expected the scope of this transformation process to be empirically contingent and to vary across different countries, depending not only on a large number of contextual factors but also on the strategies employed by political elites. In the following, the results of our empirical analysis shall be summarized and interpreted in a comparative perspective. Our main conclusion is that globalization has not only been (at least partly) the result of political decisions and is the object of an increasing amount of political decision-making, but is at the same time also transforming the very basis of politics in Western Europe. As we will show in the following, these transformations of politics can be observed at three different levels:
first, the level of societal conflicts, their structure and the political
spaces constituted by these conflicts; secondly, the level of political parties and party families organized on the basis of these societal cleavages; and thirdly, the level of party systems, emphasizing their structural properties and competitive dynamics.
The transformation of cleavage structures and political spaces

Apparently, our analysis of the impact of globalization on national politics goes far beyond the conventional analysis on party politics and party systems, although, as we will go on to show, it does contribute substantially to this body of literature. Nevertheless, in this book, our research interest has been in the political sociology of globalization in a more comprehensive sense. Such a political sociology of globalization emphasizes the impact of globalization on the structure of political conflicts and the resulting political spaces. Our main hypothesis in this context is that globalization in West European countries has been
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generating a new demarcation-integration cleavage, a new conflict between winners and losers of denationalization, and that this new cleavage has far-reaching repercussions for the structure of political spaces in West European countries. In our empirical analysis of these national political spaces we distinguished between the supply side of political parties on the one hand, and the demand side of voters on the other. This distinction offers the possibility to investigate whether the new demarcation-integration cleavage has caused processes of structural alignment and realignment between parties and voters. Our empirical analysis covered both the ideological positioning of political parties (supply side), i.e. the effectively relevant space of political competition and its changes; and the ideological structure of national electorates (demand side), i.e. the structuring of the space of political identification and its changes. The quantitative analysis of these political spaces was based mainly on three indicators:
the number of dimensions of the political space; the ideological meaning of the individual dimensions; and the positioning of political parties and social groups within these
political spaces. Regarding our first indicator, the dimensionality of the political space, the empirical results confirm our initial expectations to a remarkable extent. The data clearly show a two-dimensional structure of the political spaces in all six countries over the entire period. This holds for both the supply side as well as for the demand side of political competition. Hence, there is a noticeable isomorphism between the ideological structuring of party competition and the preference structure of the electorate (isomorphism hypothesis). This finding is not self-evident, but not completely surprising either, because the electorates political spaces are not entirely independent from parties and their activities. Rather, we are dealing with political spaces that are pre-structured and mobilized by party politics. Moreover, in none of the countries and at no time did we find a onedimensional structure, even if the distances between the two dimensions are very small in some cases (e.g. Austria in the mid-1970s). Nevertheless, on the basis of our empirical analysis, we can clearly refute the presumption that the political space in West European countries shows a onedimensional structure and is defined by the socio-economic leftright
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division only, as was occasionally held to be the case in some of the countries we examined (France and the UK in particular, but also the Netherlands in the most recent elections). The same, however, holds for hypotheses which claim that a pluralization of conflict structures and the formation of multidimensional political spaces has occurred in Western Europe. Neither one-dimensional nor multidimensional political spaces can be observed in our cases. Hence, regarding the basic structure of the political spaces, we have found a high degree of continuity, both between the 1970s and the early 1990s and in the period from the early 1990s until 2003, the year in which the last election we have examined took place (continuity hypothesis). This is not to conclude, however, that national political spaces have remained stable over the past three decades. Although the number of conflict dimensions has not changed, their meaning has. This applies in particular to the cultural dimension which has changed its meaning repeatedly in individual countries. On the one hand, new culturally defined conflicts about the integration of West European societies, unleashed by increasing numbers of immigrants and asylum-seekers, have replaced old religious conflicts; on the other hand, attitudes towards political globalization (most significantly European integration) have been of increasing importance for the formation of political identities (compared to older, liberal values). Therefore, it might certainly be true that religious factors have lost most of their relevance for political competition and voting behaviour in West European countries;2 however, this does not imply that the cultural cleavage has become insignificant for voters and for party competition. On the contrary, the comparisons of the relative importance of the two dimensions in Chapters 10 and 11 clearly show that the cultural cleavage has gained in importance in most of the countries and this holds both for parties and for voters! In four of the six countries that we have examined, it has even become the dominant cleavage; and it is particularly pronounced in the UK and the Netherlands. The two countries in which the socio-economic cleavage remains dominant are France and (in the 2002 election) Germany. These are also the countries with the highest
As the results of our analyses of the demand side (see Chapter 9) indicate, religious factors have not become completely meaningless for voting behaviour in West European countries.
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unemployment levels and the greatest difficulties in reforming their labour markets and their social security systems.3 These empirical findings clearly confirm the embedding hypothesis, formulated in the introductory chapter of this book, according to which the new demarcation-integration conflict generated by globalization will not transform the political spaces completely; rather, it will be embedded in the existing two-dimensional structure by altering the meaning of the existing cultural dimension. This redefinition of the cultural dimension can be observed in all countries, widely independent of the former meaning of the cultural dimension. Moreover, the distances between the two dimensions of the political space have become more pronounced and the similarities between countries in particular regarding voters attitudes have become stronger. This is clear evidence of the power of globalization to penetrate West European societies and to shape their social conflicts and political identities. This finding can be boiled down to yet another hypothesis, a convergence hypothesis, which suggests that globalization generated a strong convergence of national political spaces and conflict structures at least in Western Europe. The third indicator which may be employed for analyzing political spaces is the positioning of parties and voters within these spaces. Concerning parties, we will go on to examine this in greater detail in a comparative analysis of party families and party systems. At this point, however, it may suffice to mention four empirical findings which deserve closer attention. First, it is noticeable that the space of competition among the major parties has been shifting significantly towards the right pole of the ideological continuum. Our analysis of the political supply side in Chapter 11 (see Figures 11.4 and 11.5) provided strong evidence of such a repositioning of political parties. This holds in particular for social democratic parties, which have been moving closer towards the political centre in most of the countries. Consequently, the left side of the political space was occupied only by parties of the radical left and some of the green parties during the 1990s. Secondly, we found that the political space in individual countries is occupied quite differently. In the Netherlands, for instance, all relevant parties have shifted towards the right-authoritarian pole, while in Germany the established parties have shown a tendency towards the
3
In the case of Germany, the importance of socio-economic issues has become even more marked in the election of 2005.
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cultural dimension
Edgar Grande
socio-economic dimension demarcation integration (pro-state) (pro-market ) social democratic and left- radical liberalism green profiles extreme right and fascist winning formula of rightpositions wing populist parties in the 1990s
integration (strong libertarianism) demarcation (strong authoritarianism)
Figure 13.1 Typology of ideological profiles of political parties
centre, and British, French and Swiss parties are distributed across the entire space. We shall return to these findings in our comparative analysis of party families and party systems, but it is striking that individual sectors of the political space are differently populated in the six countries. Thirdly, when we look at the distribution of political parties in the twodimensional space, we can also see that the political space is very incompletely occupied in all countries. If we use our demarcation-integration distinction and subdivide the political space into four quadrants, we can identify four different types of ideological profiles (see Figure 13.1). The majority of the parties settles in two of these quadrants, with conservative and right-wing populist parties occupying the bottom right quadrant and social-democratic parties, though moderating their ideological profile still settling in the top left quadrant. In contrast, two quadrants are occupied only weakly, if at all. This applies on the one side to the space in the top right quadrant, in which neo-liberal economic positions are combined with culturally integrative positions. In the countries covered by our analysis, there are only very few examples which represent this ideological profile, and none of the parties represents it exactly. This holds even for the 1970s, when smaller liberal parties such as the German FDP represented an economically moderate variety of this profile. At present, the Dutch D66 comes closest to this position among the parties in our sample.4 It is equally striking that no new party representing this ideological profile has been established over the last three decades. The most remarkable attempt was the launch of the Liberal Forum in Austria, a faction of the right-wing populist FP, which unsuccessfully tried to occupy a relevant position within the party system
The D66 has been the most liberal party in the Netherlands regarding issues such as minority rights and it has been right of the two major parties on socioeconomic issues, although it remains located in the centre on this dimension.
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in the 1990s. The opposite quadrant, in which protectionist positions on social and economic policy issues are combined with authoritarian and nationalist positions in the cultural dimension, also remains unoccupied. Hypothetically, we would expect fascist and extreme right parties in this quadrant.5 At its edges, close to the centre, we occasionally find socialdemocratic and Christian-democratic parties combining defence of the welfare state with moderately neo-nationalistic positions. The centre of this quadrant, however, is occupied in none of the countries under analysis by a relevant party. It is noticeable, however, that over the course of the past years some parties of the radical right have departed from the winning formula of the 1990s, while moving in the direction of this quadrant. This applies particularly to the French FN, but also to the Austrian FP. The fourth remarkable finding is that supply and demand are not fully congruent. Although we must be careful about drawing conclusions in this respect given the methodological difficulties involved, it is nevertheless striking that we can observe a remarkable mismatch between the positioning of political parties and of voter groups in the two-dimensional space. As our analysis of the demand side in Chapter 10 reveals, this mismatch is partly due to the fact that the bottom right quadrant is actually populated by two sizeable (and in reality overlapping) groups of voters: unskilled workers and the less well educated. Hence, while none of the relevant political parties are positioned in the bottom right quadrant of the political space, not even the parties of the new populist right, some important groups constituted by losers of globalization actually are. This incongruence of supply and demand seems to be particularly striking in France and Switzerland; however, there are some indications of it in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK as well. Since this incongruence has occurred within the same twodimensional political space, it might indicate a latent and still unexploited potential for polarization within the party systems of these countries. Moreover, the fact that the political space has not been completely occupied by the established parties yet indicates that we should not only expect new ideological profiles to emerge, it also
5
An authoritarian state and an integrative economic system can be considered key elements of any fascist ideology. For a typology of fascist ideology, distinguishing it from both the radical right and a conservative-authoritarian right, see Payne (1995).
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suggests that the window of opportunity for the establishment of new parties remains open.
The rise of new parties and party families in Western Europe

The second dimension of change relates directly to political parties and party families. We assumed that the new cleavage constituted by the conflict between the winners and losers of globalization is not ideologically predefined, but politically contingent. It creates political potential which has to be translated into political programmes, strategies and votes. Hence, based on our analysis of cleavage structures, we asked how the political potential generated by globalization has been utilized by political parties and how the redefined political spaces have been occupied by them. In general, the emergence of new cleavages and the restructuring of political spaces can have different effects on parties and party families:
First, it may result in an ideological repositioning of established par
ties. Existing parties may adapt to the altered conflict structures and absorb the new conflicts (adaptation and absorption hypothesis). Secondly, however, it might result in the formation of new parties, in particular of new radical parties, addressing directly the concerns of groups which are hardest hit by the consequences of globalization, resulting in a fragmentation and polarization of national party systems (fragmentation and polarization hypothesis).
Political science literature is ambiguous in this respect. While research on right-wing populist and radical-right parties predominantly supports the fragmentation and polarization hypothesis (e.g. Kitschelt 1995; Betz 2002; Ignazi 2003; Decker 2006), the adaptation and absorption hypothesis dominates the literature on party systems (see Mair 1997: 9ff.; Lane and Ersson 1999). Lane and Ersson (1999:106), for example, pretend that it is difficult not to be impressed by the capacity of the political parties in Western Europe to maintain themselves in such an uncertain world as that of politics. In our introductory chapter, we found arguments in support of both positions; however, we expected the parties of the populist and extreme right, i.e. the new populist right, to be the most forceful agents of change in West European politics because they articulate most successfully the preferences of those deprived by globalization.
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Our empirical results mostly confirm this expectation, although with some important qualifications. First of all, in comparing our six countries, we find rather different profiles of change. France is the country which has best met our expectations, although the socio-economic cleavage has remained strong over the past three decades. Here, it was a new party of the radical right, the Front National, which benefited most from the new social conflicts generated by globalization. This party managed to become a major force in French politics, not least by significantly influencing the national political agenda. The Netherlands is the second country which confirms our fragmentation hypothesis. Here, the List Pim Fortuyn, a latecomer among the right-wing populist parties in Europe, achieved spectacular success in the early 2000s by addressing problems with the integration of immigrants. Although this success was highly short-lived, the LPF not only forced established parties to adapt to its agenda but also contributed to a second wave of fragmentation in the Dutch party system. In addition, the conservative-liberal VVD has adopted ideological positions which make it a member of the family of new populist right-wing parties. Meanwhile, Austria and Switzerland are cases in which the emergence of a new political cleavage was also accompanied by the establishment of a successful right-wing populist party. However, in both countries change occurred not by founding a new party but by transforming an existing one. In Austria, it was the transformation of the conservative-liberal FP, and in Switzerland it was the ideological reorientation of the conservative SVP, which contributed to the rise of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. While the profiles of change in these four countries by and large confirm our assumptions, although with considerable variation in timing and in its exact organizational manifestations, there are two countries which deviate remarkably from this picture. Germany stands out in two respects. On the one hand, right-wing populist or extreme right parties have thus far failed to enter the national parliament, although they have had some successes at the level of federal states. On the other hand, Germany was the first West European country in which a (partly new) left-wing populist party was successfully launched. As a consequence, there has been some fragmentation in the German party system too, but this fragmentation developed in a different way than in the other countries. Finally, the UK is the only case in which no new radical party, either on the left or on the right, has achieved electoral success in the last three decades. Party competition and government formation has been dominated by the two
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major parties throughout the entire period. It would be wrong to infer, however, that there have been no changes in British party politics. Most importantly, the Conservative Partys programmatic change towards a neo-conservative ideological profile anticipated important elements of right-wing populism both in style and in substance (see Kitschelt 1995: Chapter 7). The subsequent polarization between the two major parties closed the window of opportunity for the establishment of new parties at the right and at the left poles of the ideological spectrum but did allow the formation of a new moderate party in the centre. Our analysis has shown that the ideological profile of the British Conservatives has meanwhile strongly approximated the winning formula with which rightwing populist parties were successful at the beginning of the 1990s. Hence, we can consider the British Conservative Party with its in-built populism as being a functional equivalent of a right-wing populist party. In a comparative perspective, it is striking that the political potential generated by globalization has been exploited in very different ways. The parties and party systems have changed in all countries, but not with the same scope and intensity. In fact, we can distinguish three groups of countries. First, a group including France and the Netherlands, in which the transformation of politics was caused mainly by new parties (transformation from outside); second, countries like Austria and Switzerland in which transformative changes took place within established parties (transformation from within); and, thirdly, a group of countries including Germany and the UK, in which established parties managed to adapt and absorb the new political potential to a large extent without radically changing their ideological profiles (absorptive change). How can we explain these cross-national differences? As we have shown in Chapter 2, the political potential for change is substantial and rather similar in each of these countries. Hence, the differences in the change of politics cannot be attributed to the different strength of the independent variable, i.e. globalization; rather, we would expect that they are caused by the political and institutional context variables discussed earlier in this book. In a comparative perspective, three factors turned out to be of particular importance: electoral systems, party organizations and party strategies. The importance of electoral systems has once again become apparent in our comparative study, although its effects are not as direct and straightforward as sometimes suggested (cf. Lijphart 1994; Powell 2000). The British majoritarian first-past-the-post electoral system clearly discourages the formation of new parties that do not have a
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regional stronghold. Hence, the profile of change of the British party system, with its absence of new radical parties on both the right and the left and the strengthening of regionalist parties, can be explained to a significant extent with reference to electoral rules. The Netherlands represents the opposite case of a proportional representation system without any legal restrictive clause and with a very low effective barrier. With its high fragmentation, and the establishment of new radical parties on both the left and the right, the Dutch case again meets our expectations. The other four countries are more difficult to assess. In France, we have a majoritarian system in the case of national elections which for most of the time prevented the entry of the radical Front National into the national parliament. PR systems at the regional and European level as well as the introduction of a PR system at the national level in the late 1980s, however, created favorable political conditions for the party not only to survive but also to expand its political base. In countries like Germany and Austria, we have a proportional representation system with rather high thresholds of 5% and 4% respectively. These thresholds have produced major obstacles for new parties and have clearly restricted the fragmentation of party systems. The failure of the Liberal Forum in Austria, and of radical-right parties at the national level in Germany, are examples of the restrictive effects of the respective electoral systems. However, the Green parties in both countries have demonstrated that these obstacles are not insurmountable; hence, the importance of electoral systems should not be overstated either in these cases. Finally, in Switzerland we see a PR system without a restrictive clause but with a restrictive effect which varies from canton to canton. The large number of small parties in the national parliament indicates that the Swiss electoral system does not prevent the establishment of new parties. Party organization is the second factor that explains some of the observed cross-national variation. The organizational structures and capacities of parties matter in several respects. First, the success of new radical parties has been dependent on the absorptive capacity of existing parties, particularly the major parties of the left and right. Where this capacity is high, the scope for establishing new parties is correspondingly limited. The absorptive capacity of parties depends on a number of factors, among them their ideological profile and coherence, their organizational structure and their leadership. As our analysis of party families in Chapter 11 has revealed, there is a strong
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correlation between a partys ideological cohesion and the extremity of its position. Radical parties, regardless of their size, tend to be more cohesive. Thus, we may assume that it is programmatically open und organizationally flexible catch-all-parties (Kirchheimer 1965) in particular which have a high capacity for integrating new issues and new societal groups. Among the parties in our sample this characterization holds best for the Christian-democratic parties in Germany (CDU, CSU) (see Schmid 1990), and this might explain at least to some extent why new right-wing parties have thus far failed to gain a hold at the national level. Secondly, party organization may provide more or less favorable opportunity structures for the transformation of existing parties. Here, we may assume that it is decentralized party organizations, in which local and regional subdivisions enjoy a high degree of autonomy, which offer the most favorable opportunity structures for transformative change of an established party (cf. Chapter 2). The Swiss SVP and the Austrian FP with the regional strongholds of their populist leaders Blocher and Haider at Zurich and Carinthia respectively are the best illustration for such a possibility. Finally, party organization has also turned out to be important for the success of new radical parties. As the case of the French FN has demonstrated, it is not only charismatic leadership but also the existence of a strong, hierarchically structured party organization which is a prerequisite for the successful establishment of a new party of the radical right and for its ideological flexibility. The short-lived success of the Dutch LPF and the failure of the radical right in Germany may at least partly be attributed to the lack of adequate party organization too. The third factor which contributes to an explanation of cross-national differences is party strategy. In Chapter 2, we identified several strategic options for established parties to respond to new issues and new competitors. As we have seen in detail in the various country chapters, the knowledge of these strategies is indispensable for understanding the structuring of national political spaces and the parties movement within these spaces. For the purposes of our comparative analysis, it is parties strategies towards new competitors, in particular of the radical right, which is of particular importance. In the six countries under examination, we have identified two different approaches that are largely consistent with our initial expectation: cooperative and stigmatizing strategies. The different strategic responses have become particularly relevant in two situations: the formation of electoral alliances and the formation
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of government coalitions. France and Germany are clear cases of a stigmatizing strategy. In France, established parties of the centre and of the right have refused to form electoral alliances with the Front National in the elections to the national parliament. In Germany, the stigmatization of the parties of the radical right became most apparent in the refusal of the established parties to enter coalitions with them in those federal states in which they gained seats in the regional parliament.6 In both countries, stigmatization of the parties of the radical right clearly reduced their electoral chances. In the consensus democracies of Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the established parties followed a different strategy. In each of these countries, right-wing populist parties massively attacked the existing cartel of parties and interest groups and in each of these countries they came to be coopted into this cartel, albeit for different reasons. It is important to note, however, that the cooptation of rightwing populist parties occurred as a consequence of their electoral success, rather than as a precondition for it. The results of our comparative analysis of political and institutional opportunity structures for radical right-wing parties in Western Europe are summarized in Table 13.1. Although the three sets of variables included in this analysis cannot provide a straightforward causal explanation of the variation across countries, they contribute considerably to our understanding of their successes and failures in the past two decades. In conclusion, we should emphasize three aspects. First, it is obvious that the potential for new parties has been considerably constrained by institutional and organizational factors in most of the countries under examination. Secondly, radical right-wing parties have been successful even under unfavorable political and institutional conditions. High electoral barriers and a strong cartel of established parties might have restricted them, but neither has been strong enough to prevent their success. Thirdly, as the case of France indicates, electoral success in the national parliamentary arena is not a necessary precondition for the radical right becoming a lasting factor in national politics. Taken together, these are clear indications of both the large size and the forcefulness of the new political potential generated by globalization.
The only exception thus far was a short-lived coalition of the Christian-democratic CDU with the right-wing populist Schill Party in the state of Hamburg.
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Table 13.1 Political and institutional opportunity structures for radical-right parties
Party strategy towards new competitor co-optation
Country Austria
Electoral system medium-high barrier
Party organization favourable opportunity structure: medium-high adaptive capacity of established parties; strong organizational capacities of new right-wing populist party favourable opportunity structure: low adaptive capacity of established parties; strong organizational capacities of new extreme right party unfavourable opportunity structure: high adaptive capacity of established parties; weak organizational capacities of new parties unfavourable opportunity structure: high adaptive capacity of established parties; weak organizational capacities of new right-wing populist party favourable opportunity structure: medium-high adaptive capacity of established parties; strong organizational capacities of right-wing populist party unfavourable opportunity structure: high adaptive capacity of established parties; weak organizational capacities of new parties
France
very high barrier
stigmatization
Germany
medium-high barrier
stigmatization
Netherlands
low barrier
cooptation
Switzerland
medium-high barrier
cooptation
United Kingdom
very high barrier
dismissal
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The fragmentation and polarization of party systems in Western Europe

The third dimension of change is at the level of party systems. How did the emergence of new cleavages, new parties and new party families affect national party systems in Western Europe? Has globalization resulted in a fundamental change of West European party systems? While there is broad consensus in the literature that West European party systems are caught up in a process of change (Mair and Smith 1990: 1; see also Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984), the scope and the consequences of these changes are still unclear. On the one hand, by reporting earthquakes, ruptures and fundamental crisis, studies on individual countries, elections and parties tend to emphasize discontinuities in the development of national party systems. Comparative analyses, on the other hand, predominantly argue that West European party systems on the whole have remained remarkably stable (see Mair and Smith 1990; Mair 1997; Broughton and Donovan 1999; Lane and Ersson 1999). According to Peter Mair, who has been the most forceful in defending this stability hypothesis, a melting of West European party systems is certainly not in evidence. On the contrary, he states that the freezing hypothesis remains largely valid, at least up to now, with the evidence of long-term continuities in party systems far outweighing the ostensibly more striking and more immediate evidence of change. In other words, and some three decades later, the long-standing party alternatives which had been instanced by Lipset and Rokkan are now even older still (Mair 1997:3). Mair even takes it further and maintains that it is precisely the numerous small changes identified by other authors that have increased the flexibility of party systems and which eventually contributed to their stability. Our own empirical findings clearly contradict this hypothesis. While they show that changes should not be overrated, they provide strong evidence that the formation of new parties and party families has destabilized party systems in Western Europe. We can substantiate this argument with the use of Giovanni Sartoris typology of party systems (Sartori 1976) which combines two dimensions: a quantitative dimension defined by the number of relevant parties; and a qualitative dimension defined by ideological distances between these parties. Transformative changes in a party system would be particularly strong
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Table 13.2 Effective number of parties (based on votes at national parliamentary elections)a
Country Austria Franceb 19749 2.4 (1975) 5.0 (1973) 19805 2.4 4.1 2.6 (1983) 4.3 (1982) 6.0 3.5 19869 2.71 19905 3.9 (1994) 19969 20003
3.8 (1999) 3.0 7.3 3.3 5.2 3.2 5.3 3.3 6.1 (2002) 3.3
4.6 (1988) 7.2 2.9 3.1 (1994) 3.8 (1986) 5.8 6.9 3.3 7.4 3.0
Germany 2.4 Netherlands 6.9 (1972) Switzerland 5.8 (1975) UK 3.1 (Feb. 1974)
a
6.8 (1995) 5.5
Based on Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Based on Taagepera and Shugart (1989), calculated from vote shares of all candidates at national parliamentary elections.
if both dimensions were affected. In the following, we will examine each of these dimensions in more detail.
Fragmentation
First of all, the quantitative indicators commonly used in comparative analysis (effective number of parties; fractionalization) show that both the fragmentation and the number of relevant parties in most countries with the notable exception of Switzerland has increased during the past three decades (see Table 13.2). This holds in particular for France and the Netherlands. In these countries, the party systems went through a phase of consolidation in the 1980s, and in both countries fragmentation has been increasing significantly in recent elections.7 In Austria and Germany, we can also observe a moderate increase in fragmentation. In both countries, the dominant position of the two major parties has been weakened considerably, while new parties of the left and the right have become relevant. In the UK, quantitative indicators show no significant changes in the last two decades; but comparisons with the 1950s and 1960s do reveal that the two major parties have lost some of their monopoly position. The most notable exception is Switzerland, where
7
In France, however, the results of the two national elections in 2002, the presidential election and the election to the national parliament, point in opposite directions.
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fragmentation significantly increased between the 1975 and 1991 elections (from 5.8 to 7.4); in the following elections, however, it decreased continuously and in the elections of 2003, it declined below the initial figure. This indicates on the one hand, that the cartel of the four major parties has hitherto been able to secure its position. On the other hand, we must take into account that the fragmentation of the Swiss party system was already rather high as early as the 1970s. The increasing fragmentation of West European party systems since the 1970s has several causes and cannot be attributed solely to new rightwing parties. First, in the 1980s, it was a consequence of the emergence of Green parties which are with the exception of the UK represented in the national parliaments of each country under examination. It was mostly in the past twenty years that the fragmentation of party systems has been caused by the formation and establishment of new radical rightwing parties. However, the contribution of radical right-wing parties to the fragmentation of West European party systems should not be overrated. In Germany, right-wing populist and right extremist parties have hitherto only been successful in some federal states; in Switzerland, newly formed radical right-wing parties after some electoral successes of the FPS in the second half of the 1980s have not gotten beyond the status of splinter parties. Finally, new parties have emerged as a result of the restructuring of existing parties. This has been particularly noticeable in France where separations, new formations and mergers of parties have decisively shaped the development of the party system in the Fifth Republic (Knapp 2004). For an overall assessment of this development it is important to consider that there were only very few counter-movements to this fragmentation process, i.e. endeavours to concentrate national party systems by merging existing parties or even by the disappearance of some of them. Such a concentration occurred in the past, for instance in Germany in the 1950s, and in the Netherlands in the 1970s. In the last twenty years, however, we can find only very few examples of such counter-movements. The most important and noteworthy case was the recent merger of the bourgeois parties in France to form the UMP. Further examples might be the mergers between the Liberals and the Social Democrats in the UK, and between the post-communist PDS and the new left-wing populist WASG in Germany. Although changes in the quantitative dimension of West European party systems are significant, the scope of change should not be
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overrated. First, the total number of relevant parties in the countries examined is still quite low. Even in the countries with the highest degree of fragmentation (the Netherlands, France, Switzerland), the number of relevant parties still ranges from five to seven. Secondly, the established major parties have been able to maintain their dominant positions despite substantial losses in votes in some cases. Thirdly, the number of relevant new parties and their political influence has hitherto been limited. However, there have been a number of spectacular exceptions to this rule in the course of the last decade: in 1999, the Austrian FP succeeded in breaking down the long-lasting supremacy of the two major parties and managed to become the second-strongest party ahead of the VP (though very narrowly); in the 2002 French presidential election, the candidate of the right-wing extremist Front National, Le Pen, came second in the first ballot, ahead of the Socialist candidate; in the Netherlands, the right-wing populist List Pim Fortuyn succeeded in becoming the second-strongest party in the 2002 parliamentary elections, even outplacing the social democratic PvdA. The examples of the FP (which has since split up) and the LPF (meanwhile insignificant) show, however, that it is very difficult to consolidate and repeat such spectacular successes.
Polarization
How did the changes in conflict structures and the rise of new parties and party families affect ideological profiles and ideological distances within the party systems? Before we summarize our empirical findings on this issue, we should emphasize that the ideological profiles of rightwing populist and extreme right parties are much more ambiguous than large sections of the literature might suggest. Their ideological profiles have not always been as radical and as far to the right as has been repeatedly maintained. This vagueness is most obvious in their positioning on the socio-economic leftright dimension. While parties of the radical right are clearly distinct from conservative, liberal and socialdemocratic parties on the cultural dimension, their profile on economic and social policy issues has been rather diffuse and in permanent flux.8
8
In the case of the Dutch LPF, the ideological ambiguity applied to the cultural dimension as well. Nevertheless, the LPF was perceived to be farthest to the right by the voters (cf. Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 59).
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Our quantitative analysis in Chapter 11 confirms their positioning close to the right-authoritarian pole supporting both pro-capitalist and antilibertarian ideological positions in the 1990s. As our country chapters show, however, we can observe some movement to the centre with regard to economic and social policy issues in recent years. This is particularly true for two of the most successful parties of the new right, the FN and the FP, which meanwhile keep some distance from neo-liberal positions (if they have ever taken such a position at all). Nevertheless, our findings can be summarized in three conclusions. First, the polarization within the West European party systems has clearly been increasing since the 1970s. As we have shown in Chapters 10 and 11, this holds for both relations between parties and for the ideological distance between major groups of voters. In these comparative chapters we have traced the polarization between parties and voter groups with the aid of sophisticated regression analyses. Another indicator for this polarization trend are the cumulated voting shares of communist, socialist, right-wing populist and extreme right parties. This share has strongly increased in Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands. In France, where we also witness strong polarization, the total share of votes for extremist parties has remained unchanged, but the weights of the two extreme poles have shifted to the right. This leads to our second conclusion: the polarization of West European party systems has not taken place at both extreme poles simultaneously and to the same extent; rather, the right pole of the ideological spectrum has been strengthened significantly. In Western Europe, the increasing polarization of party systems has mainly been a consequence of a strengthening of a new family of right-wing populist parties in the last two decades. In the UK, where radical parties have been insignificant, we can find a modification of this general trend but not an exception. In the UK, polarization occurred from within the existing party system and it resulted from several waves of ideological radicalization (and subsequent moderation) of the two major parties. Thirdly, as a result of these trends, a tripolar structure of political competition has been emerging. This tripolar structure is constituted by social-democratic and Green parties at the left pole, Christian-democratic and conservative-liberal parties at the moderate right pole and various types of right-wing-populist and extreme right parties forming a new radical-right pole. In the UK, it is the Conservative Party which represents the radical right pole while the Liberal democrats occupy the moderate pole. In our view, this tripolar structure must be interpreted as a product
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of the new cleavage between winners and losers of globalization and it is this new tripolar structure which has been shaping the dynamics of party competition in most West European countries over the past decade. In the most recent elections in Germany (2005) and the Netherlands (2005), which have not been covered by the quantitative analyses of our country chapters, we find another deviation from the general trend which deserves attention in future research. In both countries, we can observe the remarkable success of new left-wing populist parties. In Germany, a new left-wing populist party, the Linkspartei (Left Party), was founded in 2005. In this party, the post-communist PDS and a new protest movement against labour market reforms, WASG (Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit Die Wahlalternative), joined forces. With a share of 8.7% of the votes in the 2005 national election, the new party achieved spectacular success, while the right pole of the ideological continuum remained vacant on the national level. In the Netherlands, we can also observe the rise of a left-wing populist party, the SP (Socialistische Partij) at the last national election in November 2006. By gaining 16.6% of the votes and twenty-five seats, the SP became the third-largest party in the second chamber of the Dutch parliament. We should be careful not to give too much weight to these cases, but they might indicate that the new political potential generated by globalization can be exploited not only by parties of the (radical) right but also by (new) parties of the left. Their success seems to indicate a problem shift within West European societies. In the 1990s, denationalization was mostly perceived as creating new problems of identity in the arena of party politics. More precisely, radical right-wing parties managed to define the problem in public discourse in such a way that the negative consequences of economic globalization could be linked to problems of cultural identity.9 This allowed them to respond to these problems successfully with an aggressive politics of identity (Betz 2002) against foreigners, migrants, asylum-seekers and European integration. Meanwhile, it is the security problems created by globalization, in particular the problems of economic and social security, which have gained wider attention in public debates in Western Europe; and it is the threat of a neo-liberal globalization, to which left-wing populist parties
9
Hence, it is quite plausible that the distinction between economic and cultural issues is blurred in some of the elections, in which right-wing populist parties were strong, as we have in Austria in the 1990s (see Chapter 11).
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respond with interventionist and protectionist programmes. Since the necessary adjustments of the welfare states are far from completed in West European countries, there are good reasons to expect that the politics of security advocated by left-wing populist parties might gain in attractiveness in the coming years.
Still the age of moderate pluralism?

How do these two trends fragmentation and polarization affect the structure of party systems? Does globalization have the power to produce a new type of party system in Western Europe? It is striking that the overall picture resulting from our comparative analysis of the two dimensions of party systems is rather diffuse. Most of the party systems have become more pluralistic, and in some of them we can observe an increasing ideological polarization as well. But it is still unclear whether these party systems have really been transformed from moderate pluralism into polarized pluralism, to employ the terminology of Sartoris typology. This is partly due to the fact that West European party systems are still in flux. As the example of left-wing populist parties indicates, the window of opportunity for the formation of new parties remains open, while the spectacular successes of some of the radical right parties have turned out to be only very short-lived. Hence there is still a great deal of instability and uncertainty in West European party systems and at present it would appear that this is one of their most striking features. The difficulty of reaching a conclusive assessment of the state and prospects of West European party systems has yet another explanation, however, which relates to the conceptual ambiguities and weaknesses of Sartoris typology. Most of our problems in classifying party systems result from the fact that it only allows a choice between two types of pluralist party systems, i.e. moderate pluralism and polarized pluralism. Meanwhile, none of these two types satisfactorily fits the reality of the party systems in the countries under examination any longer. This is due not least to the fact that the two dimensions combined by Sartori in his typology fragmentation and polarization have developed quite differently in some countries. Hence, if we want to arrive at a more precise and adequate assessment of recent developments in Western Europe it is necessary to modify and extend Sartoris typology by adding a third type of pluralist party system which Sartori had in fact envisaged for his typology but which he did not include, namely, segmented
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weak polarization weak fragmentation strong fragmentation moderate pluralism fragmented pluralism
strong polarization polarized pluralism extreme pluralism
Figure 13.2 Typology of pluralist party systems
multipartism. This term applies to strongly fragmented party systems (i.e. systems with more than five relevant parties) and a low degree of polarization. Given that the term segmentation has since become common in party research with a different meaning, we instead refer to this type as fragmented pluralism. This extended typology of pluralist party systems is presented in Figure 13.2. What are the results of this conceptual clarification? Our empirical analysis shows that most of the countries still retain basic features of a moderate pluralism, but most of them also show marked tendencies towards a fragmented or even a polarized pluralism. Apart from the UK, whose party system is clearly moving in the direction of a moderate pluralism, the German party system is most commensurate with the type of moderate pluralism at present. The two extreme poles are only weakly occupied and the number of relevant parties (five at most) is still within the range of a moderately pluralist system. A look at the subnational level, however, reveals that even the German party system has latent potential for further fragmentation and polarization (see Grande 2003; Grande and Dolezal 2005). The party systems of Austria and Switzerland still possess important properties of a moderate pluralism too. In both countries the number of relevant parties corresponds to the format of moderate pluralism, despite some increase in fragmentation in Austria. Polarization has increased strongly, however, with right-wing populist parties gaining more than 20% of the votes at the peak of their success. Because of its large number of relevant parties, the Netherlands must be classified as fragmented pluralism with a strong propensity towards an extreme pluralism due to the strength of two left parties, the Socialist Party and the GreenLeft, on the one side, and the successes of right-wing populist parties, the LPF and the VVD, on the other side of the ideological continuum. At present, the French party system resembles most clearly the type of polarized pluralism. The party systems fragmentation has increased, with both poles being occupied, even if the
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Table 13.3 Party systems and party system change in Western Europe
Country UK Germany Austria Switzerland Netherlands France Type of system and direction of change two-party system with a strong trend towards moderate pluralism moderate pluralism with a trend towards fragmented pluralism moderate pluralism with a trend toward fragmented pluralism moderate pluralism with a trend towards polarized pluralism fragmented pluralism with a trend towards extreme pluralism polarized pluralism
left pole (the Communist Party in particular) has diminished in importance. Table 13.3 summarizes the development of party systems in West European countries. This comparative overview leaves no doubt that the stability hypothesis in party systems research at the very least requires substantial qualifications, if it should not be rejected entirely. The new demarcation-integration cleavage generated by globalization and the new political parties and party families, established as a response to these new social conflicts have not only infused a great deal of instability and change in West European party systems, it seems as if these changes have sparked off far-reaching structural transformations in these systems. This transformative change is most apparent in France and the Netherlands, in both of which party systems have shifted from moderate to fragmented or polarized pluralism respectively. It also applies to those countries in which we still find some basic features of a moderate pluralism. In Austria, Germany and Switzerland, we can observe considerable pressure for change towards a fragmented (in Germany) or polarized (in Austria and Switzerland) pluralism. Even in the UK, we might witness the end of the two-party system and its transition to a moderate pluralism.
Conclusion
Our empirical findings have clearly confirmed the hypothesis that globalization has generated a new structural cleavage in West European politics; at the same time, our results indicate that the political potential created by this new cleavage has been processed within the existing twodimensional political spaces by transforming the meaning of the existing cultural dimension of the political space. This new potential has
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been utilized by political parties in quite different ways and to remarkably different extents. The potential for structural changes in politics has partly been slowed down by institutional and organizational factors; partly it has been absorbed by established parties (some of which as a result have radically changed their ideological profile), and in a few cases (most notably in France and the Netherlands), new parties have been established, strongly altering the structure of the existing party systems. In sum, we have identified far more changes in West European politics than existing research on party systems would have suggested. In none of the countries covered by our analysis has politics remained unaffected by these transformative changes. In all cases, with the partial exception of the UK, party systems have been destabilized and are becoming more fragmented and polarized. The type of moderate pluralism which characterized the party systems of continental Europe for most of the period since World War II has come under intense pressure. In some countries it has already been mutating into new types of fragmented or polarized pluralism. In the light of these developments, the claim that the West European party systems remain frozen can hardly be maintained. Over the past forty years, West European party systems have indeed been melting. Finally, the results of our comparative study indicate that this process of change has not yet come to its end neither has the process of globalization. West European politics are still in flux, and there is no reason to assume that this process will come to a halt in the near future, nor that it might be possible to reverse its consequences. On the contrary, our findings suggest that the transformative potential of globalization has yet to be fully exploited by political parties and that the window of opportunity for the formation of new parties has not yet been closed.
Appendix A
Technical appendix
ROMAIN LACHAT
Introduction
This appendix presents supplementary information on the data collection process, on the operationalization of the variables and on the statistical methods used in this volume. This information is divided into five sections. In the first section, we explain how the data on the positions of parties during electoral campaigns were collected, and we present the criteria used to sample newspaper articles. The second section gives the detailed references of the individual-level datasets. The next two sections present the procedures used to operationalize individual-level variables, first in the case of social-structural variables (class, education, religion), then with respect to citizens issue-positions. Part of the information on these operationalizations cannot be presented here for reasons of space. This concerns the tables indicating the recoding procedures for socialstructural variables, as well as the detailed discussion of the measures of voters attitudes. This information is, however, available from the website of the project (www.ipz.uzh.ch/npw/). In the fifth section of this appendix, finally, we turn to the statistical methods used in this volume and give more detailed information on multidimensional scaling and on the various indices and summary measures used in the comparative chapters.
Analysis of the supply side of electoral competition: data collection

All analyses of the supply side of electoral competition are based on an original dataset collected for this project on the content of mass media during electoral campaigns. We selected in each country a quality newspaper and a tabloid (or equivalent if there were no true tabloids). For each of these two types of newspapers, we selected the one with the largest readership that was available in all elections studied here. The list of the selected newspapers was presented in Table 3.5. For each of
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Appendix A
these, we coded articles pertaining to the campaign during the two months preceding the election. As explained in detail in Chapter 3, our units of analysis are single relationships among political actors or between political actors and issue topics, rather than entire newspaper articles, as is maybe more common. This method allows for more detailed analyses of the configurations of parties positions during the campaign, but it is also more time-consuming. As our resources were limited, we could not possibly code every article and every sentence. The selection was made at different levels, by considering only some days of the week, only some sections of newspapers, only some articles within these sections, and only some parts of these articles. As regards first the number of days selected, we first sampled a few weeks in each campaign to estimate the number of relevant articles. This varied quite strongly across newspapers and years. Depending on the number of articles in this sample, we decided to code either all days of the week, or only two or three days a week. Further, the days of the week coded were either fixed or rotating.1 The selection plan for the days of the week is presented in Table A.1, newspaper by newspaper. For these selected issues, we considered only articles in the sections on international news, national news, and the economy (but not sections devoted specifically to finance and markets). Further, in the case of Switzerland, we added articles from the regional section. The reason is that the campaign in this country is rather weak at the federal level, but more intense at the regional one. In each of these newspaper sections, we selected all articles that were directly or indirectly related to the electoral campaign. This includes not only articles in which the title or the lead specifically refers to the campaign or the forthcoming election, but also those where any politician, party or candidate is named. The last selection criterion regards single articles. In most cases, we coded only sentences in the title and lead of articles (or, in the first paragraph, if there was no lead). For some tabloids, however, we coded the articles entirely, as they include only few sentences that are relevant according to our coding scheme. Articles were coded entirely in the Blick, the Kronenzeitung the Bild and in The Sun. A last important point regarding content analyses is the inclusion of political advertisements in newspapers. In Switzerland, such
1
We rotated the days when only two days a week were coded, while we selected fixed days when three a week were coded.
Technical appendix
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Table A.1 Days selected for the content analysis, by year and newspaper
Country France Newspaper Le Mondea Year 1978, 1988, 2002 Days coded
Le Parisien
Two days a week, rotating with a three-week cycle: TuesdayFriday, WednesdaySaturday, SundayThursday 1995 Three days a week, fixed (Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday) 1978, 1988 Three days a week, rotating with a two-week cycle: MondayWednesday Friday, TuesdayThursday Saturday 1995b Two days a week, Monday always coded, second day rotating: MondayTuesday, MondayWednesday, MondayThursday, etc. 2002 Two days a week, rotating with a three-week cycle: MondayThursday, TuesdayFriday, WednesdaySaturday 1975 All days 19942002 Three days a week, fixed (Monday, Wednesday, Saturday) 19752002 All days 19751999 All days 19751999 All days
Austria
Die Presse
Kronenzeitung Switzerland Neue Zrcher Zeitung Blick
Netherlands NRC Handelsblad 19722003 All days Algemeen 19722003 All days Dagblad
348 Table A.1 (cont.)

Country UK Newspaper The Times Year Days coded
Appendix A
Germany
The Sun Sddeutsche Zeitung Bild
19742001 Three days a week, fixed (Monday, Wednesday, Saturday) 19742001 All days 19762002 Three days a week, fixed (Monday, Wednesday, Saturday) 19762002 All days
Le Monde is an evening newspaper and the issue bears the name of the following day. The Tuesday issue, for instance, is published on Monday afternoon. b Mondays were always coded, as this issue included every week a long interview with one of the presidential candidates.
advertisements are a central part of the campaign. All parties and a large number of individual candidates publish paid advertisements in local or regional newspapers. Dozens of these are printed every day in each newspaper. As these are as central to the campaign, and as the number of articles devoted to the campaign is, in international comparison, quite low, we decided to include such advertisements in our analysis, coding them following the same schema as for articles. In the four Swiss campaigns, advertisements were selected in the same two newspapers, considering all days of the week (and all sections of the newspapers).
Analysis of the demand side: list of datasets used

The individual-level analyses were based on national electoral studies and, in one case, on data from the European Social Survey. Below, we indicate the title of the surveys used, as well as the data archive where they can be obtained and the corresponding reference number or code. France. Data available at the Socio-Political Data Archive (http://cdsp. sciences-po.fr): Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1978 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0062); Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1988 (BDSPCIDSP q0601); Enqute post-lectorale franaise, 1995 (BDSP-CIDSP q0891); Panel lectoral franais 2002 (PEF 2002). Austria. 1975 data available at the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (www.gesis.org/ZA/): Political Action: An Eight
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Nation Study, 19731976 (ZA study number: 0765). 1994 and 1999 data available at the Wiener Institut fr Sozialwissenschaftliche Dokumentation und Methodik (www.wisdom.at) (1994: SWS9409, 1999: SWS9908). 2002 data available through the website of the ESS project (www.europeansocialsurvey.org): European Social Survey 20022003. Switzerland. Data available at the Swiss information and data archive service for the social sciences (www.sidos.ch): Attitudes politiques 1975 (Reference number: 20); Swiss electoral study 1995 (1815); Swiss electoral study 1999 (6646). Netherlands. Data available at the Steinmetz Archive (www.steinmetzarchief.nl): The Dutch voter 19721973 (Reference: P0353); Dutch parliamentary election study, 1994 (P1208), Dutch parliamentary election study, 1998 (P1415); Dutch parliamentary election study, 2002 2003 (P1628). UK. Data available at the UK data archive (www.data-archive.ac.uk): British Election Study, February 1974 (UKDA study number 359); British General Election Study, 1992 (UKDA study number 2981); British General Election Study, 1997 (UKDA study number 3887); British Election Panel Study, 2001 (UKDA study number 4620). Germany. Data available at the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (www.gesis.org/ZA/): Wahlstudie 1976 (Panel) (ZA study number: 0823); Nachwahlstudie zur Bundestagswahl 1994 (ZA study number: 2601); Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Whlerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998 (ZA study number: 3066); Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Whlerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 2002 (ZA study number: 3861).
Operationalization of social-structural variables Social class

There was strong variation across surveys in the level of detail with which occupations were coded. This made the construction of an identical class schema in all elections a difficult task. As a consequence, we had to allow for some country or election specific deviations. The aim was to operationalize the following nine-class schema, based on the work of Kriesi (1989, 1998) and Mller (1998, 1999):
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1. Self-employed farmers (IVc) 2. Other self-employed in non-professional occupations (IVab) 3. Semi-skilled and unskilled workers, including agricultural workers (VIIab) 4. Skilled workers and foremen (V/VI) 5. Routine non-manual workers in white-collar occupations (IIIab) 6. Managers and other professionals in social-administrative occupations (I/II) 7. Professionals with technical expertise (I/II) 8. Social-cultural specialists (I/II) 9. Non-labour-force participants The schema above represents a modified version of the class schema of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). The codes indicated in parentheses correspond to those of their categories. The main difference between the two schemas is the treatment of the service class. Erikson and Goldthorpe make a vertical distinction, by separating higher grade and lower grade service class members. Kriesi and Mller, by contrast, choose a horizontal distinction and consider three segments of the new middle class, characterized by the type of tasks linked with their occupation, by the relation to their customers (or patients, students, ), by their relation to their professional community, as well as by their relation to the management of the organization or company they are working for. Making such a distinction, however, requires having detailed enough information on citizens occupations, such as those provided by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) or by national classifications of occupations. Furthermore, in the ideal case, one should also have information on individuals employment status (employee or selfemployed), eventual supervising functions, and the number of their employees or supervised persons. Such detailed information was available only in part of the surveys. In the other cases, we have tried to come as close as possible to the above classification with the available information. Below, we explain country by country which information was available and which difficulties we encountered in the operationalization of the class schema. The detailed coding procedures are not presented here, for reasons of space, but are available from the projects website. In France, occupations were coded with a series of relatively detailed categories, distinguishing between different types of tasks or skill levels. This information, combined with the distinction between employees and
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self-employed respondents, was usually precise enough to construct the nine-class schema. In some cases, we have also drawn on additional information pertaining to the sector of activity and to the number of employees in order to refine our classification. Only in 1988 did we have to deviate from the target class schema. In that election study, service class members could only be classified as either managers and professionals or intermediary occupations. The desired horizontal distinctions among service class members could thus be only very partially captured. In the 1975 Austrian election study, occupations were coded at a detailed level, following the 1968 ISCO (with 3-digit categories). Further, the data allow distinguishing between self-employed, employees, and employees with supervising functions. We could on this basis operationalize the nine-class schema. In the 1994 and 1999 surveys, the only information we can use is a seven-class schema, which distinguishes between farmers, self-employed, unskilled workers (Hilfsarbeiter), skilled workers (Facharbeiter), as well as three types of employees: employees (Angestellte), civil servants (Beamte), and senior employees or civil servants (leitende Angestellte und Beamte). While the first four categories can be translated directly into our classification, distinctions among non-manual workers are less than optimal. We coded the employees and civil servants as routine non-manual workers, and the senior employees or civil servants as higher grade service class members. In 2002, finally, data from the European Social Survey offers detailed information about occupations, which are coded with 4-digit 1988 ISCO codes. We could thus follow a recoding procedure similar to that of the 1975 election. The coding of occupations in the 1975 Swiss election study was identical to that in Austria in the same year (both were part of the Political Action Study project). We thus followed an identical recoding procedure. In 1995 and 1999, we have similar information, but occupations are coded with 1988 ISCO codes (with 4-digit categories). This is the same situation as in the 2002 Austrian election study and the nineclass schema was operationalized in exactly the same way. In the Netherlands, the level of detail of the available information varied quite strongly from one election to the next. In 1972, occupations were coded with a detailed schema, very similar, but not identical with, the 4-digit 1968 ISCO. We coded social class membership on the basis of these occupational categories and by making a distinction between employees and self-employed respondents. The distinction between the
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three segments of the new middle class was not possible in 1994. The only information available in the dataset is a 10-category version of the EGP schema. We used this by collapsing two groups of self-employed (with and without employees) into one and by grouping manual supervisors and skilled manual workers into a single category. We also maintained the distinction between higher and lower service class. We had some more information in the 1998 Dutch election, as 4-digit 1988 ISCO codes were available, along with the 10-category EGP schema. We started from the latter classification, but divided the lower and upper service class into the three segments, on the basis of respondents occupation, as indicated by their ISCO classification. In 2002, finally, no detailed classification of occupations was available. We constructed a class schema combining information on voters employment status, sector of activity, supervising function and skill level. In the UK, occupations were coded following a classification of the Office for National Statistics (or its forerunner, the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys). These classifications are usually available both in a detailed classification of occupations, with 200 or more categories, and in class schemas that combine occupation, managerial/supervision functions, as well as employment status. In all four elections, we started from the class schema with fewer categories, but used more detailed classifications to make further distinctions within the service class. In 1974, 1992 and 1997, our starting point were the socio-economic groups, a class schema of about 20 categories, which we combined with more detailed information from the occupational unit groups (in 1974) or from the standard classification of occupations 1990 (in 1992 and 1997). In 2001, by contrast, we started from the 10-category EGP class schema, which is available in the dataset. Similarly to what we did in the 1998 Dutch election, we used the EGP classification, except for service class members. These were divided into the three segments, on the basis of their position in the standard classification of occupations 2000.2 In Germany, finally, social class in all four surveys was coded using about 20 categories. This system offers quite detailed information, but the distinctions made are not always useful for our purpose and are not
2
The reason we started from the EGP schema, contrary to the 1992 and 1997 elections, is that the socio-economic groups were not available in 2001. They were replaced by a new scheme, the socio-economic classification, which is less appropriate for distinguishing the categories of our class schema.
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always sufficient to construct our class schema. There are detailed hierarchical distinctions among civil servants and employees, but only little information allowing one to separate correctly between the three segments of the new middle class. Most employees and civil servants are coded as routine non-manual workers or as managers and administrative specialists, depending on their skill level. Further, we had to construct a category including both technical and social-cultural specialists, as it was not possible to distinguish among them.
Education
The second social-structural variable used was education. We made a simple distinction between three educational levels. As explained in Chapter 3, the lowest category includes those who did not go beyond compulsory school, while the highest one corresponds to the tertiary level of education. The correspondence between the original education levels used in the various surveys and our own classification can be found on the projects website.
Religion and religiosity

The coding of religion is unproblematic. The distinctions we made among confessions and degrees of religiosity were introduced in the corresponding country chapters, and are based on the distinctions made in the electoral studies used.
Measuring voters issue-positions

The measurement of voters orientation was briefly presented in Chapter 3. We have tried to operationalize each of the twelve categories on the basis of issue questions available in the various electoral studies. It is not possible for reasons of space to present here all relevant information on this. However, detailed information on the procedures we followed is available on the projects website. We discuss there in more detail the selection and classification of issue questions, the results of our factor analyses, the problems we encountered, and the alternative solutions we have tested when the construction of the issue dimensions was not straightforward. Here, we shall simply explain the main guidelines we have followed and illustrate these with the case of the 1994 Dutch election study.
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For each of the twelve issue categories, we have tried to find corresponding indicators in the different election surveys. When several issue questions related to the same category, we combined them using factor analyses. In this way, we could also check whether the indicators really measure a single underlying dimension. Constructing these issue variables is obviously a critical point of the analysis. There is no standard way of selecting the relevant indicators, combining them, or determining the correct dimensionality. In several cases, the decision which indicators to include or how to categorize them was not straightforward. As alternative operationalizations of the issue-categories may potentially have a strong impact on our results, we have attached much importance to testing their robustness. When the indicators for a given issue-category are weakly correlated, when a survey item could fit into several issue-categories, or when the dimensionality of an issue-category was not straightforward, we have compared results from different solutions. To this end, we compared the impact of such variations on results regarding the structure of the political space. It must be emphasized that the differences between the preferred solutions used in this volume and the alternative operationalizations we have tested are only marginal and do not lead to different interpretations. The rules and methods we have used for operationalizing the issue-categories can be summarized as follow. First, issue questions that did not correspond to any of our twelve categories were not considered, as well as questions which were too general to be attributed to a specific category or which were linked with political aims that may be attained by different means.3 When a single variable was available for a given category, we used it as our measure of voters attitudes towards this issue group. When several variables were available, we performed a principal-components factor analysis. In most cases, we found in this way a single dimension. When the factor analyses showed that the underlying structure was twodimensional, we formed two separate variables for this issue-category. To give a concrete example of how we proceeded, we consider here the 1994 Dutch election study. This is a panel study and we rely on data from the first (pre-electoral) and second (post-electoral) waves. Table A.2 and Table A.3 present the available indicators. These issue
3
Issue questions deemed too general are for example questions regarding solidarity or equality, as they may be interpreted in different ways. Similarly, valence issues such as fighting unemployment were not considered if the corresponding question did not specify the concrete measures by which these aims had to be reached.
Technical appendix Table A.2 List of available indicators (Netherlands 1994, first wave)
Category Economic liberalism Cultural liberalism Var var071 var061 var081 var145 var140 var141 var142 var143 var144 var146 var147 var148 Law and order Environment var066 var076 Description Preference on income differences Preference on euthanasia Preference on ethnic minorities Other cultures enrich Dutch society Opinion on asylum seekers Opinion on asylum seekers from within EU Opinion on asylum-seekers from outside EU Foreigners should be welcome Too many asylum seekers Deny access to asylum-seekers only in exceptional cases Willing to pay for asylumseekers Opinion on allowing political refugees Preference on crime Preference on nuclear plants Notes
355
7-point scale 7-point scale 7-point scale 5-point scale 3-point scale 3-point scale 3-point scale 5-point scale 5-point scale 5-point scale 5-point scale 10-point scale 7-point scale 7-point scale
Anti-immigration
Table A.3 List of available indicators (Netherlands 1994, second wave)

Category Var Description Notes 5-point scale 5-point scale 5-point scale 5-point scale 7-point scale 5-point scale 5-point scale
Cultural liberalism var471 Attitude towards foreigners var504 Preserving traditional morals and values var505 Respect for authorities var512 Stimulating patriotism Europe var331 Preference on European unification Army var508 Providing for strong defence forces Law and order var510 Limiting room for dissenters
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questions are sorted according to our issue-categories. In addition to the name of the variables in the original dataset, we give a short description of the variable content, and indicate on which type of scale the answers were measured. Most of these items can be classified into one of the twelve issuecategories without any problem. There are only two variables that could be interpreted in different ways. One of these is var471 (attitude towards positive action for foreigners). For the preferred solution, we use it as an indicator of cultural liberalism. It may, however, also be included in the category anti-immigration. We show below how this affects the structure of the political space. The second problematic item is var510 (limiting room for dissenters). It may be classified into the category law and order (preferred solution) or into cultural liberalism. Here again, we show below how this decision may affect our results regarding the structure of the political space. In this election, we have indicators for seven of our twelve issuecategories. Four of these (economic liberalism, environmental protection, European integration, and army) are represented by a single indicator. We used these as our measure of voters attitudes towards the corresponding issue. Among the remaining categories, we have two indicators for law and order. Combining them into a single measure may, however, be problematic, as the correlation between them is relatively low (0.15). While we rely on the combined index (obtained through a factor analysis) in our preferred solution, we will also show how much the final results change when a single indicator is used instead. Turning to cultural liberalism, a factor analysis of the seven corresponding variables produces two factors not a single one as we would have expected. All variables load on one of the two dimensions only, with one group of items corresponding to attitudes towards ethnic minorities or foreigners (var081, var145, var471), and the second one to other aspects of cultural liberalism. It is clear that the seven items classified into this category cannot be subsumed to a single dimension. Accordingly, we have performed separate factor analyses for these two groups, which result each in a one-dimensional solution (Table A.4). The factor based on the first group of variables is labelled minorities, the other one cultural liberalism. These results are virtually unchanged in the alternative solutions, when var471 is excluded from the first factor or when var510 is also used as an indicator for the second one.
Technical appendix Table A.4 Factor loadings for the category cultural liberalism
Minorities var081 var145 var471 Eigenvalue Proportion variance N
a
357
Cultural liberalism var061a var504a var505a var512a Eigenvalue Proportion variance N 0.41 0.78 0.75 0.79 1.97 0.49 1445
0.81 0.82 0.68 1.78 0.59 1478
The direction of the original variable was inverted.
Table A.5 Factor loadings for the category antiimmigration

Factor 1 Var140 Var141 Var142 Var143 Var144a Var146 Var147 Var148a Eigenvalue Proportion variance N
a
0.75 0.61 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.44 0.75 0.69 3.78 0.47 1443
The direction of the original variable was inverted.
As far as attitudes towards immigration are concerned, finally, the eight variables of the preferred solution form a single factor. The corresponding loadings are presented in table A.5. When the variable var471 is used as an indicator of this category rather than of cultural liberalism, as discussed above, the solution is also one-dimensional, and the loadings are virtually unchanged. The operationalization of the issue-categories having been discussed, we turn to the structure of the political space determined on this basis. A factor analysis of the eight variables produces three factors with an
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Figure A.1 Screeplot of a factor analysis of the issue-categories, Netherlands, 1994
eigenvalue greater than one. The screeplot, however, shows that two factors are sufficient (Figure A.1). The final solution we relied on for analyzing the structure of the political space in that election (as in Chapters 7 or 10) was thus obtained by constraining the number of factors to be equal to two. Last of all, we check the robustness of this solution by considering how much the factor loadings vary when relying on alternative operationalisations of the issue categories anti-immigration, cultural liberalism, and law and order. To this end, we rely on a graphical representation of the factor loadings. These can be considered as the coordinates of a variable in a space, where each of the dimensions correspond to one of the factors. Figure A.2 compares the loadings of the preferred solution with those of two alternatives:
Alternative 1: var471 used as an indicator of the category anti Alternative 2: var510 included in the category cultural liberalism
rather than law and order. It appears clearly that the differences among these three solutions are marginal. The variations in the operationalization of the issuecategories do not lead to substantial differences. The only noticeable immigration rather than cultural liberalism.
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Figure A.2 Factor loadings for the preferred solution and for two alternative solutions, Netherlands, 1994
change is the correlation between the category law and order and the cultural (or vertical) dimension. When var066 is the only indicator for this category, the factor loading is a little bit smaller than when two indicators are used (0.56 vs. 0.70).
Statistical methods Multidimensional scaling

The general principles of our MDS analyses were introduced in Chapter 3. As explained there, the aim of MDS is to obtain a graphical representation of the relative locations of a set of objects in a low-dimensional space. Starting from information on the proximities between pairs of objects, MDS finds the optimal space in which these objects can be located while
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distorting as little as possible the original proximities. In our case, we consider the distances between parties and issues, which were determined with the help of content analyses, and use MDS to construct a representation of the locations of these parties and issues in a (two-dimensional) space. It is not our purpose here to explain all the details of MDS. Overviews of this statistical method can be found in Borg and Groenen (1997), Cox and Cox (2001) or Kruskal and Wish (1978). Rabinowitz (1975) also presents a good and simple introduction to the topic, but limited to the case of non-metric MDS. Rather, we simply want here to emphasize some of the peculiarities of the analyses we have performed, which differ from a standard MDS. Most important among these are the unfolding technique and the use of weights. Also, we need to explain how the MDS solutions we obtained were transformed for ease of presentation through a rescaling procedure and through rotation. Unfolding models are special cases of MDS where information is available on the proximities between objects of two different sets, but not on the proximities between objects within each of the two sets. In our analyses, we used information on the distances between parties and issues. But we had no comparable measures of the distances between pairs of parties or between pairs of issues. Such data can be analyzed with standard MDS techniques, but it means that at least half of the cells in the proximity matrix have missing values. When such data are analyzed with non-metric MDS (which implies a transformation of the original proximities into rank orders, for instance), the solutions are subject to many potential degeneracies (Borg and Groenen, 1997: 231). Metric MDS, however, is more robust and avoids the problems linked with non-metric MDS in the case of unfolding (Borg and Groenen, 1997: 245ff.).4 The second particularity of our MDS analyses is the use of weights. As explained above, MDS locates the objects in a space while keeping the distances between them as close as possible to the original proximities. However, as the aim is to obtain a representation of the objects in a low dimensional space, some distortion of the original distances is unavoidable. The degree of distortion is measured by a Stress statistic, which is based on the sum of the squared distances between the original proximities and the proximities obtained in the solution. The higher the value of the Stress statistic, the worse is the fit between the solution and the data.
4
Neither are our results affected by the possible inverse representation of proximities discussed by Borg and Groenen (1997: 248).
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The aim is thus to find the solution that minimizes the value of Stress. In our case, we want to obtain a configuration of parties and issues where the distances between them are as close as possible to those in our original data. By using weights, we allow for the possibility that some distortions of original distances have a larger impact on the value of Stress than others. In other words, we attach much importance to representing some distances faithfully and less importance to the degree of distortion affecting other distances.5 The rationale for this is that not all relations between parties and issues have the same importance. In a campaign, parties address some issues very frequently while other issues play a minor role in their statements. Similarly, not all parties are central actors in a campaign. We account for such variations by computing weights that reflect the salience of a given party issue relationship. These weights are computed as the number of core sentences corresponding to a given party relationship, expressed as a proportion of the total number of relationships between parties and issues.6 All our analyses of the configuration of party positions were computed with such weighted metric multidimensional scaling. However, two transformations were made to the raw MDS solutions, to make them easier to compare across elections. The configurations were rescaled and rotated two changes that do not alter the substantial conclusions that can be drawn from these solutions. By rescaling, we mean changing the scales on which the distances in the final solution are expressed. This is necessary, because Proxscal, the algorithm we use to compute the MDS solutions, involves a linear transformation of the original distances.7 We rescaled the distances in the final solution by setting their weighted average equal to the weighted average of the distances in the original data. Finally, as explained in Chapter 3, all configurations were rotated (and eventually inverted) in order always to have the same orientation, with the issue-category of welfare on the left and those corresponding to cultural integration on the top.
5
This also means that, if a perfect solution could be found, where all original distances could be represented without distortion, a weighted MDS would lead to exactly the same solution as an unweighted MDS. As we have no information on the relationships among issues or among parties, these are given a weight of 0. Proxscal transforms the original proximities so that the weighted sum of the squared proximities is equal to n(n1)/2, where n is equal to the number of objects in the proximity matrix.
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Measuring the degree of integration of two axes in an MDS configuration

In the comparative analysis of the supply side of electoral competition, we want to estimate the degree of integration of the cultural and economic dimensions in configurations resulting from MDS analyses. It is important to remember that there are no real axes in such a configuration. Contrary to factor analyses, for instance, MDS does not summarize the data by transforming the existing variables into a smaller number of dimensions. In the configurations presented in the country chapters, however, we have drawn additional axes, based on our interpretation of the main dimensions structuring these configurations. The economic dimension was always presented as the axis linking the issue-categories of welfare and economic liberalism. The two issues forming the cultural dimension could change from one case to the other. In recent elections, it was a conflict between immigration, on the one hand, and European integration or cultural liberalism, on the other. In the 1970s, there was more variation across countries, but the dimension was most often characterized as an opposition between culture or cultural liberalism and national defence. It is the degree of integration of these two axes that we want to measure. We do this separately for the two poles. The reason is that the economic leftwing and culturally integrative positions may be located close to one another, while there is a more important distance between the rightwing economic position and the defence of cultural demarcation (or vice versa). If we were to average these different situations by computing a single measure, important information would be lost. Furthermore, there are also theoretical reasons to expect the integration to be more pronounced on the left than on the right. The division among economic left-wing parties on cultural issues is less pronounced, as this group is dominated by parties that have a rather favourable attitude towards globalization. On the right, by contrast, there is more division, especially in countries where right-wing populist parties have been successful. The measure we use for each pole is based on a ratio of three distances. It is best illustrated by focusing on Figure A.3, which represents a hypothetical space with the location of the four relevant issue-categories. We see here, for instance, that the distance between the pro-integration issue and welfare is much smaller than the distances between welfare and the demarcation issue or between the prointegration issue and economic liberalism. This indicates a relatively
Technical appendix
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Figure A.3 Schematic representation of the distances on which the integration index is based
strong degree of integration. The integration of the left-integration pole would be most pronounced if the two corresponding issues were located at exactly the same position. By contrast, the two dimensions would be least integrated if all four distances depicted in Figure A.3 were equal. On this basis, we can define our two measures as follows: d2 d4 d2 d4 Ili ln and Ird ln : 2d1 2d3 Ili is the degree of integration of the left-integration pole and Ird is the measure of integration of the right-demarcation pole. The shorter the distance d1 or d3, compared to the distances d2 and d4, the more pronounced is the degree of integration and thus the value of the index. We take the natural logarithm of the ratios, as the value of the index would otherwise increase exponentially as d1 or d3 gets smaller. These indices can take positive or negative values. A value of 0 corresponds to a situation of perfect independence between the two axes. If the value is positive, it indicates that there is some integration in the expected direction. In the case of the left-integration pole, for instance, this would mean that the left-wing and pro-integration issues are closer to one another than to economic liberalism or demarcation. These indices sometimes take a negative value, showing integration in the opposite direction, that is, some affinity between integration and economic liberalism or between demarcation and defence of the welfare state.
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Polarization measure
In Chapter 10, we measured the polarization of voters position on the economic and cultural dimensions, using the index of Taylor and Herman (1971). This index indicates how strongly party positions differ from one another on a given set of issues. It was designed to measure the degree of polarization of a party system on the leftright scale and is defined as: V
K X k1
! k x k x 2
where Bk is the vote share of party k (or, more generally, the size of group k), xk is the position of party k on the leftright scale (or of another social group on a given scale), and x is the weighted average position on this scale, that is: x
K X k
!k xk
The range of values taken by this index depends on the scale of the issuecategories. As party positions are measured on scales ranging from 1 to +1, the distance to the average can range between 0 and 1.
Weighted Euclidian distance between parties in a multidimensional issue space

The MDS analyses of party families presented in Chapter 11 are based on the dissimilarities between pairs of parties, rather than on the dissimilarities between parties and issues, as in the country chapters. Our measure of the dissimilarity between two parties is based on a weighted Euclidian distance in a multidimensional issue space. We know the position of each party on up to twelve issue-categories. We can thus locate parties in this issue space and compute the Euclidian distance between pairs of parties. In this framework, a simple Euclidian distance between parties a and b in an k-dimensional space is defined as v u K uX da;b t xak xbk 2
k1
Technical appendix
365
where xak and xbk are the positions of parties a and b, respectively, on dimension k. In our case, however, we need to depart from a simple Euclidian distance for two reasons. First, we want to account for the fact that parties do not give the same importance to all issuecategories or issue-dimensions. Secondly, the number of issue-categories for which we can compute a distance varies across pairs of parties. As far as the first problem is concerned, we rely on a weighted Euclidian distance, giving each issue-category an importance which is proportional to its salience. The salience of an issue-category can be computed for each party as the number of issue statements pertaining to this issuecategory, as a proportion of its total number of issue statements. For a pair of party, the weighting factor used is the average of the two salience measures of the corresponding parties. The second problem implies that the dimensionality of the issue space in which a distance between two parties is computed can vary across pairs of parties. As the range of possible distances depends on the number of dimensions, this makes it difficult to compare such Euclidian distances. To address this problem, we express the weighted Euclidian distances as a proportion of the maximal possible distance in the corresponding k-dimensional space. Accounting for these two problems, we use the following measure of dissimilarity for a given pair of parties: v u K 1 uX da;b p t !k Xak Xbk 2 2 2 k1 where Xak and Xbk are the positions of parties a and b, respectively, on the kth issue-category, and where Bk is a weighting factor, defined as: n n !k K ak K bk P P nak nbk
k1 k1
with nak and nbk being equal to the number of issue-positions of parties a and b, respectively, on the kth issue category.8 This measure of dissimilarity can vary between 0 (identical position on all issues) and 1 (i.e. 100% of the maximum possible distance in the corresponding issue space.
8
To avoid relying on average issue-positions that are computed on a very small number of observations, we included only issues for which nak and nbk are both greater than 4.
Appendix B
Detailed statistical results
Tables B.1 to B.12 present the data used for the MDS analyses, that is, the positions of parties on the twelve issue categories, as well as the salience with which they addressed these issues. The average issue positions are measured on a scale ranging from 1 to +1, with positive values indicating support for the corresponding aim, as expressed by the name of the issue category (for economic liberalism, for the welfare state, etc.). The salience of an issue for a given party is the percentage of issue statements of this party regarding this issue. Thus, the saliencies presented in this table sum to 100% for each party in each election. We present saliencies in this way as they make it easier to compare the profile of different parties. For the MDS analyses, however, these saliencies were further multiplied by the percentage of issue statements of the corresponding party in a given election (which are indicated on the right hand side of the tables). In this way, the saliencies sum to 1 for each election and indicate the relative importance of a party issue combination in the overall campaign.
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Table B.1 Issue positions of French parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve issue categories
Economic Cultural AntiEnviInstitutional InfraWelfare Budget liberalism liberalism Europe Culture immigration Army Security ronment reform structure 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33
Radical left 1988 1.00 2002 1.00
1.00 0.25
0.85 1.00
1.00
PCF 1978 1988 1995 2002 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.80 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.94 0.91 0.75 1.00
0.44 0.75 1.00 0.33
0.94 1.00 0.94 0.87
0.46 1.00 0.83 0.60
0.82 0.92 0.57 1.00
PSF 1978 1988 1995 2002 1.00 0.95 0.46 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.46 0.44 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58
0.71 0.72 0.78 0.63
0.35 0.21 0.10 0.34
0.86 0.48 0.86 0.67
0.76 0.98 0.75 0.46
0.80 0.29 0.71 0.92 0.14 1.00
0.58 0.49 0.46 0.65 0.27 0.67 0.94 1.00
Greens 2002
0.88
0.25
1.00
0.43
MRG 1978 1995
0.77 0.56
0.17 0.00
0.58 1.00
0.20 1.00
Table B.1 (cont.)
Economic Cultural AntiEnviInstitutional InfraWelfare Budget liberalism liberalism Europe Culture immigration Army Security ronment reform structure 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.33 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.61
UDF 1978 1988 1995 2002 1.00 0.56 0.92 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.84 0.75 0.71
0.23 0.16 0.33 0.22
0.84 0.87 1.00 0.64
0.37 0.30 0.71 0.28
0.07 0.82 1.00 0.40
RPR 1978 1988 1995 2002 0.91 0.59 0.55 1.00 0.85 0.90 1.00 0.56 0.76 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.96 1.00
0.05 0.20 0.24 0.05
0.85 1.00 0.60 0.94
0.04 0.32 0.47 0.21
0.72 0.12 0.26 0.43
0.04 0.09 0.45 0.00 1.00
De Villiers 1995 0.14
1.00
0.33
1.00
FN 1988 1995 2002 1.00 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.68 0.83
0.05 0.29 0.13
0.88 0.75 1.00
0.71 0.00 0.41
0.79 0.69 0.71
0.79
1.00 1.00 0.77
0.73 0.64 0.80
Table B.2 Issue salience for French parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election)
% of election
Economic Welfare Budget liberalism
Cultural AntiInstitutional Infraliberalism Europe Culture immigration Army Security Environment reform structure N
Radical left 1988 52.1 2002 36.1 0.0 4.2 0.0 2.1 1.6 2.1 4.9 4.2 9.8
2.1 13.1
27.1 34.4
6.3 0.0
48 61
2.4 5.9
0.4
PCF 1978 1988 1995 2002 4.2 3.7 5.6 4.7 7.9 7.4 6.8 12.1 3.7 8.1 0.9 3.0 2.8 4.1
27.7 38.2 22.2 43.2
11.1 4.8 1.9 8.1
28.5 17.0 28.7 20.3
17.4 9.1 11.1 6.8
9.4 3.6 13.0 2.7
235 16.6 165 8.3 108 6.0 74 7.2
0.9
PSF 1978 1988 1995 2002 8.7 6.1 3.0 4.3 15.4 5.2 7.8 6.3 5.0 4.5 3.1 3.8 5.3 15.0
34.5 23.4 27.7 31.1
10.2 4.2 3.3 13.2
24.8 19.2 22.3 12.6
10.6 12.5 6.6 10.8
11.5 6.6 15.5 5.1
322 745 638 334
22.7 37.7 35.5 32.3
Greens 2002 9.5 3.6
20.2
7.1
16.7
8.3
21.4
13.1
84
8.1
MRG 1978 1995 7.7 6.3 0.0
26.3 23.1
4.7 10.3
34.2 20.5
7.9 15.4
3.2 15.4 2.6
1.1 0.0
16.3 5.1
190 13.4 39 2.2
Table B.2 (cont.)

% of election
Cultural AntiInstitutional Infraliberalism Europe Culture immigration Army Security Environment reform structure N
10.1
UDF 1978 1988 1995 2002 8.0 22.9 0.0 5.5 18.5 0.0 4.6 2.5 2.9 8.0 5.7 9.9 2.9 16.1 12.9 7.7 22.9 8.0
20.0 19.1 8.6 20.7
5.5 9.4 8.6 12.6
23.0 18.8 20.0 18.4
17.3 6.1 11.4 11.5
456 32.2 362 18.3 35 1.9 87 8.4
1.4
RPR 1978 1988 1995 2002 4.6 9.8 3.9 4.7 8.2 6.3 4.0 13.3 2.1 4.7 6.0 11.8 4.4 17.9
29.3 21.1 20.8 20.1
9.3 3.4 10.9 11.7
21.4 19.4 20.1 18.2
17.2 11.2 7.0 7.7
10.7 7.2 14.7 15.7
215 475 816 274
15.2 24.0 45.4 26.5
De Villiers 1995 15.2 17.4 2.2 8.7 6.5 13.0
6.5
13.0
6.5
10.9
46
2.6
FN 1988 1995 2002 2.7 8.8 3.8 1.8 5.9 33.9 21.9 20.2 6.1
10.4 12.3 13.4
7.1 7.0 4.2
3.8 11.4 14.3
11.5 15.8 11.8
14.8 5.3 21.8
12.0 9.6 8.4
183 9.3 114 6.3 119 11.5
Table B.3 Issue positions of Austrian parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve issue categories
Welfare
Budget
Economic Cultural liberalism liberalism Europe Culture Security
Antiimmigration Army
EnviInstitutional ronment reform
Infrastructure
Greens 1994 1998 2002 1.00 0.56 0.00 0.81 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.11 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.20
0.00 0.23 0.53
0.60 1.00 0.00
1.00 0.25 0.13
1.00 0.47 0.53
SP 1975 1994 1998 2002 0.80 1.00 0.29 0.76 0.89 0.69 0.75 0.71 0.64 0.66 0.25 1.00 0.32 0.74 0.93 0.81 0.87 0.50 0.00
0.59 0.86 0.57 0.69
0.40 0.46 0.89 0.67
0.30 0.15 0.26 0.58
0.91 0.65 0.44 0.48
0.29 0.29 0.74 0.74
0.90 1.00 0.82
LIF 1994 1998 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.57 1.00 1.00
1.00 0.09
1.00
0.86 0.83
0.83 0.60
1.00 1.00
0.45 0.40 0.80 1.00
VP 1975 1994 1998 2002 0.94 0.61 0.50 0.38 0.14 0.26 0.73 0.68 0.14
0.89 0.34 0.15 0.14
0.50 0.88 1.00 0.83
0.37 0.43 0.04 0.14
0.50 0.21 0.51 0.34
0.14 0.28 0.30
1.00 0.65 1.00
0.47 0.73
0.37 0.34 0.70 0.18
0.00
FP 1975 1994 1998 2002 0.00 0.13 0.20 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00
0.71 0.20 0.23 0.38
0.73 0.50 0.56 1.00
0.17 0.13 0.05 0.50
1.00 0.25 0.55 0.83
0.67 0.60 1.00
0.00 0.38 0.29
1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00
0.82 0.54 0.70 0.35
1.00
0.54
Table B.4 Issue salience for Austrian parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election)
AntiEurope Culture immigration EnviArmy Security ronment Institutional reform Infrastructure
Cultural liberalism
% of election
Greens 1994 4.9 1998 15.9 2002 11.0 2.4 0.0 5.8 14.6 27.1 17.1 7.3 8.4 22.0 6.1 4.5 0.0 17.1 7.3 6.1 11.6 17.1 2.4 10.3
12.2 2.4 1.3
2.4 14.6 2.6
4.9 23.2 11.0
0.0 6.5
41 5.2 82 7.6 155 15.8
SP 1975 1994 1998 2002 4.1 9.4 14.1 6.0 1.1 2.6 15.2 7.2 6.6 10.4 5.7 1.1 1.5 6.1 4.2 15.9 10.0 8.9 10.0
12.8 10.5 14.7 25.9
8.7 7.8 5.0 8.9
12.5 12.3 17.2 7.0
6.4 17.7 11.4 8.5
9.9 5.7 14.7 7.0
24.2 6.9 4.1
343 333 361 270
53.6 42.0 33.6 27.6
LIF 1994 1998 4.4 3.1 2.2 12.5 4.4 0.0 2.2 7.3
2.2 24.0
0.0 9.4
31.1 24.0
26.7 5.2
2.2 1.0
24.4 3.1
0.0 10.4
45 96
5.7 8.9
VP 1975 1994 5.6 20.2 6.2 2.3
17.5 17.4
11.4 5.6
22.4 17.7
4.4 12.5
1.8 6.9 12.1
0.4
15.4 11.5
6.6 2.3
228 35.6 305 38.5
1998 2002 0.5
21.8 20.7
5.8 10.6
6.9 8.5
19.6 7.5
5.0 10.9
11.0 7.2
0.0 10.9
16.0 7.2
2.8
4.1 11.6
6.9 4.4
362 33.7 387 39.5
FP 1975 1994 1998 2002 13.0 1.7 12.6 1.4 2.3 13.8 7.2 2.9 5.8 0.6 8.7 12.2 4.2 7.8 7.2 2.9 10.1 9.3 6.4 12.6 15.9 39.1 15.7 6.0 5.8 0.0
10.1 14.5 17.4 23.4
21.7 5.8 5.2 3.6
17.4 11.6 12.2 8.4
1.4 2.9 11.6 7.2
69 10.8 69 8.7 172 16.0 167 17.1
Table B.5 Issue positions of Swiss parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve issue categories
Welfare
Budget
Economic liberalism
Cultural liberalism
AntiEnviInstitutional Europe Culture immigration Army Security ronment reform
Infrastructure
Greens 1991 1995 0.63 0.00 0.81 0.50 0.85 0.65 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.50 1.00
0.83
1.00
0.33 0.33
0.84 1.00
SP 1975 1991 1995 1999 0.71 0.69 0.52 1.00 0.76 0.56 1.00 0.73 0.41 0.00 0.78 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.15 0.83 0.81 0.95 0.58
0.77 0.74 0.89 0.83
1.00 0.09 0.20
0.71 0.20 0.14 0.25
0.32 0.11 0.55 0.33
0.20 0.08 0.83
CVP 1975 1991 1995 1999 1.00 0.55 0.33 1.00 0.94 0.14 0.33 0.64 0.25 0.40 0.50 1.00
0.88 0.67 0.33 1.00
1.00 0.14 1.00 0.56
0.22 0.20 0.53 0.22
0.78 0.11 0.25 0.84
0.25 1.00 0.60
1.00 0.62 0.70 0.57
0.41 0.58 0.46 1.00
0.67 0.24 1.00
Liberals 1975 1991 1995 1999 0.47 0.37 0.09 0.80 0.43 0.44 1.00 0.39 0.64
0.26 0.47 0.56 0.25
0.78 0.55 0.93 0.96
0.00 0.87 0.93 0.85
0.67 0.14 0.56
0.50 0.76 0.75 0.00
0.88 0.92 1.00
0.11 0.74 0.50 0.00
0.22 0.59 0.21 0.60
0.60 1.00 0.91
SVP 1975 1991 1995 1999 1.00 0.71 0.83 0.69 1.00 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.60 0.10 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.10 0.92 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.46 0.83
0.25 0.32 0.19 0.80
1.00 0.71 0.94 1.00
0.40 0.23 0.71 0.79
0.41 0.18 0.87 0.26
Radical right 1975 0.27 1991 0.50 1995 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.91 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60
1.00 0.75 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00
0.03 0.58 0.25
0.33 0.67
Table B.6 Issue salience for Swiss parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election)
% of election
Cultural AntiEnviInstitutional Infraliberalism Europe Culture immigration Army Security ronment reform structure N
Greens 1991 1995 30.7 10.3 2.8 2.6 6.3 2.6 1.1 18.8 43.6 3.4 5.1 21.6 7.7
3.4 0.0
1.1 0.0
1.7 7.7
9.1 20.5
176 12.9 39 4.0
SP 1975 1991 1995 1999 3.5 9.4 4.9 3.0 22.7 0.0 7.0 1.1 13.6 9.6 9.0 7.1 0.0 2.6 0.4 5.2 13.1 12.0 9.1 14.8 3.7 12.0 9.1
19.1 13.5 20.2 13.6
7.8 13.1 2.7 0.0
12.2 8.2 15.3 9.1
25.2 18.4 18.0 10.6
4.1 6.6 9.1
115 244 183 66
18.9 17.8 18.8 8.7
CVP 1975 1991 1995 1999 5.4 15.3 1.9 2.8 17.9 8.2 3.9 4.8 3.6 3.9 1.3 2.8 3.4 7.2 2.7
14.4 10.6 9.7 7.6
9.0 2.7 18.2 11.0
8.1 3.9 12.3 12.4
28.8 19.6 10.4 17.2
3.6 23.1 21.4 10.3
19.8 5.1 8.4 2.1
4.7 12.3 7.6
111 255 154 145
18.3 18.7 15.8 19.0
Liberals 1975 1991 1995 1999 4.9 10.9 11.7 2.4 16.6 6.1 6.1 12.6
18.6 10.4 7.8 6.5
8.0 8.8 9.1 18.6
25.2 12.0 26.0 20.6
8.4 13.1 13.9 4.0
7.1 4.5 3.5 0.8
7.5 6.7 3.6
4.0 14.1 1.7 3.2
16.4 10.7 12.6 2.0
2.7 7.8 8.9
226 375 231 247
37.2 27.4 23.7 32.4
SVP 1975 1991 1995 1999 4.4 11.1 46.0 7.2 7.9 3.6 20.6 4.2 28.0 2.5 1.7 3.3 8.9 5.0 5.9 7.2 12.2 1.5 8.9 12.6 2.1 2.0 12.2 2.5 8.3 3.0 90 199 289 304 14.8 14.6 29.6 39.9
8.9 12.6 6.2 3.3
8.9 3.5 12.5 22.0
11.1 11.1 2.4 6.3
24.4 17.1 10.7 6.3
Radical right 1975 16.7 1991 1.7 1995 6.3 6.1 9.3 10.1 22.9 27.8 7.6 6.8 6.3 3.0 3.4 3.0 18.6 3.8 9.1 5.1 12.7 5.1 7.6
1.5 6.8 10.1
4.5 4.2 5.1
48.5 16.1 10.1
66 10.9 118 8.6 79 8.1
Table B.7 Issue positions of Dutch parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve issue categories
Economic Welfare Budget liberalism Europe
Cultural liberalism
AntiEnviInstitutional Culture immigration Army Security ronment reform
Infrastructure
GroenLinks 1972 1994 2002 2003 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.61 0.56 1.00 0.43
0.00
1.00 0.50
0.14
0.50
1.00 0.25 0.50 1.00
1.00 1.00 0.56 0.26
PvdA 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 0.78 0.23 1.00 0.39 0.89 0.14 0.16 0.50 0.19 0.10 0.59 0.45 0.04 0.50 0.53 0.36 0.60 0.19
0.79 0.33 0.74 0.23 0.30
0.15 0.10 0.38
1.00
0.33
1.00 0.14 0.50 0.41 0.60
0.81 0.33 0.43 0.31 0.33
1.00 0.75 1.00 0.24 0.42
0.00 0.05
0.33 0.33 0.80 0.74
D66 1972 1994 1998 2002 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.11 0.00 0.96 0.00
0.69 0.32 0.63 0.23
1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00
0.63 0.00 0.68 0.32
1.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.04 0.93 1.00
0.20 1.00 0.75 1.00
1.00
0.00 0.25 1.00 0.50
0.07 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.21 1.00 0.10 0.57 0.17 0.20 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.59 0.67 1.00 0.63
CDA 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 0.80 0.36 0.78 1.00 0.41 0.98 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.65 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.40
0.59 0.10 0.67 0.00 0.24
0.04
0.52 0.55 0.33 1.00 0.40
0.50 0.58 0.19 0.00 0.17
VVD 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 0.06 0.58 0.50 0.06 0.50 0.57 1.00 0.17 0.17 0.38 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.64 0.90 0.05 0.14 0.40 0.17 1.00 0.08 0.72 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.38
0.64 0.43 0.66
0.39 0.43 0.33 0.33 0.17
0.13
0.43 1.00 0.12 0.35 0.27
0.40 0.56 0.30 0.24 0.31
1.00 1.00 0.07 0.60 0.33
LPF 2002 2003 0.17 0.28 0.17
0.33 0.00
0.33
0.57
0.40 0.22
0.08 0.13 0.06
1.00 0.60
0.47 0.38
0.65
Table B.8 Issue salience for Dutch parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election)
% of election
Economic Cultural AntiEnviInstitutional InfraWelfare Budget liberalism liberalism Europe Culture immigration Army Security ronment reform structure N
4.5 0.0 0.0 3.3 13.3 6.3 10.3 3.3 10.4
GroenLinks 1972 31.8 1994 20.5 2002 26.7 2003 14.6 18.2 5.1 10.0 18.2 6.8 4.5 5.1 0.0 8.3 6.8 28.2 3.3 2.1 4.5 10.3 26.7 39.6
14.6
2.3 10.3 0.0 2.1
2.3 10.3 13.3 2.1
44 39 30 48
5.6 5.9 4.0 6.1
PvdA 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 15.7 5.7 44.2 4.2 7.9 12.7 20.9 10.0 2.6 11.6 5.7 7.7 5.6 10.8 16.7 14.3 5.5 8.9 2.9 10.2 5.7 7.7 6.7
25.5 20.0 13.6 7.3 27.8
12.7 4.7 11.4
5.9
10.0
2.9 3.3 8.6 5.8 5.6
7.8 7.0 10.0 8.8 3.3
2.2 32.2
2.9 1.4 7.1 8.4 0.0
102 215 140 274 90
13.1 32.3 29.3 36.5 11.4
D66 1972 1994 1998 2002 10.2 9.8 9.2 2.4 2.1 26.8 0.0 2.8 12.2 4.9 11.3 11.0
36.7 26.8 17.0 18.3
4.1 2.4 0.7
2.0 2.4 5.0 0.0
8.2 9.8 25.5 23.2
2.0 19.5 19.9 2.4
10.2 9.8 5.7 1.2
10.2
14.6
4.1 14.6 0.7 0.0
49 41 141 82
6.3 6.2 29.5 10.9
CDA 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 4.5 5.4 18.9 8.1 4.0 11.7 7.4 13.5 10.4 2.1 2.7 10.8 6.0 2.7 2.7 4.7 6.6 18.7 24.3 10.8 22.9 6.6 7.4 2.7 2.7 11.5 5.3 2.8 2.7 2.7 4.0 376 283 37 37 253
26.9 29.3 16.2 16.2 22.9
7.2 7.8 0.0
9.9
8.8 7.8 8.1 2.7 4.0
12.0 10.6 21.6 24.3 16.2
48.1 42.5 7.7 4.9 32.1
VVD 1972 1994 1998 2002 2003 15.2 3.1 14.8 2.8 18.0 9.0 9.1 21.3 5.7 4.5 1.3 2.8 34.1 8.8 4.2 5.5 9.5 12.5 6.3 33.1 18.9 2.9 6.8 5.6 5.6 5.5
25.2 8.0 13.1 10.6 21.2
11.9 8.0 10.0
8.8
6.7 5.7 10.6 9.2 6.9
11.4 10.2 6.3 13.4 12.4
2.4 1.1 13.8 3.5 2.8
210 88 160 142 217
26.9 13.2 33.5 18.9 27.5
LPF 2002 2003 3.2 7.0 10.8 6.7 17.3 18.3
22.7 2.2
7.8
4.9 0.0
22.7 10.0
1.1 5.6
10.3 9.4
0.0 40.0
185 180
24.7 22.8
Table B.9 Issue positions of UK parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve issue categories
Cultural AntiEnviInstitutional Infraliberalism Europe Culture immigration Army Security ronment reform structure
1.00 0.50 0.37 0.09 1.00 0.56 0.68 0.55 1.00 0.07 0.21 0.70
0.82 0.70
Labour 1974 1992 1997 2001 0.67 0.33 0.86 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.48
0.92 0.48 0.41 0.60
0.23 0.53 0.29 0.03 1.00 0.89 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00
0.28 0.88 0.10 0.01
1.00 0.35 0.10 0.67
1.00 0.78
Libdem 1974 1992 1997 2001
1.00 1.00 0.03 1.00
1.00 0.80 1.00
0.27 0.60 0.73 0.60
1.00 0.80 1.00 0.50
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
1.00 0.79 0.54 1.00
0.86 0.42
Conservatives 1974 1992 1997 2001 0.79 0.79 0.64 0.05 0.61 0.43 0.00
0.90 0.60 0.11 0.30
0.33 0.48 0.25 0.46
0.09 0.35 0.48 0.23
0.16 0.22 0.21 0.23
0.38 1.00 0.93 1.00
0.77 0.47 1.00 0.71
0.60 0.75 0.24 0.20
Table B.10 Issue salience for UK parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election)
% of election
11.6 12.0 13.8 2.6
6.4 3.7
Labour 1974 1992 1997 2001 3.5 18.6 10.3 7.2 3.5 1.4 15.7 13.6 2.3 1.4 4.8 7.2 8.7 12.2 7.4 13.1
15.0 29.4 10.5 13.3
7.5 7.2 5.7 3.5
38.7 22.2 18.8 20.8
2.9 7.7 11.1 4.9
173 221 542 428
32.3 38.2 44.4 66.7
2.7 5.5 0.0 0.0
2.7 9.8
Libdem 1974 1992 1997 2001 0.0 10.2 6.1 25.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 5.0 2.7 4.1 20.7 5.0
24.3 8.2 12.2 30.0
13.5 20.4 3.0 0.0
29.7 10.2 9.1 25.0
0.0 12.2 16.5 5.0
24.3 34.7 7.9 5.0
37 6.9 49 8.5 164 13.4 20 3.1
3.7 18.4 25.8 11.3
13.5 7.0
Conservatives 1974 8.0 1992 14.9 1997 15.5 2001 11.9 5.8 14.9 7.8 10.3
2.8 15.6 2.3 7.2
33.4 16.9 11.2 6.7
11.7 12.0 11.0 6.7
8.9 10.4 15.9 8.8
9.2 4.9 5.2 3.6
3.1 10.4 5.6 7.7
326 308 516 194
60.8 53.3 42.2 30.2
Table B.11 Issue positions of German parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues
AntiEnviEurope Culture immigration Army Security ronment Institutional Infrareform structure
Cultural liberalism
PDS 1994 1998 2002 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
0.85 1.00
0.50
0.00
0.06 0.96 1.00 0.29 1.00 0.04 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.98 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.80 1.00
Greens 1994 1998 2002
0.86 0.58 0.33
1.00 1.00 0.60
0.70 0.56 0.11
0.71 0.67 0.72
0.50 0.13 0.00
SPD 1976 1994 1998 2002 0.21 0.80 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.44 0.90 0.33 0.17
0.27 0.34 0.32 0.59
0.63 0.87 0.40 0.29 0.56 0.00 0.63 0.60 0.75
0.29 0.93 0.00 0.22
0.66 0.45 0.42 0.40
0.21 0.64 0.83 0.63
1.00 0.50 0.86 0.65
1.00 0.27 0.43
0.63 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.60 0.43
FDP 1976 1994 0.09
0.07 0.06
0.78 0.33
0.46 0.68
0.79 0.36
1998 2002
0.52 0.13 0.60 0.07 0.69 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.88 0.71 0.67
0.92 1.00
0.96 0.57
0.87 0.54
0.56 0.33
CDU/CSU 1976 1994 1998 2002 0.63 0.33 0.60 1.00 0.85 0.94 0.64 0.76 0.05 0.03 0.72 0.40 0.85 0.45 0.88 1.00 0.87 0.64 0.97 0.91 0.56 0.58 0.29 0.25
0.30 0.20 0.09 0.43
0.40 0.73 0.59 0.58
0.56 0.54 0.61 0.22
0.24 0.17 0.08 0.15
Table B.12 Issue salience for German parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election)
% of election
PDS 1994 1998 2002 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 9.1 66.7 4.5 0.0 4.8 9.1 5.3 23.8 6.1 10.5
0.0 19.7 5.3
0.0 0.0 10.5
0.0 27.3 63.2
0.0 15.2 5.3
0.0 6.1 0.0
21 66 19
2.2 5.8 1.7
Greens 1994 1998 2002 0.0 1.9 4.3 3.8 7.9 0.9 7.7 7.3 0.0 9.8 6.5 23.1 17.1 43.0
13.5 18.9 11.2
3.8 1.8 4.7
9.6 4.9 8.4
13.5 18.3 16.8
15.4 0.0 6.5
7.7 9.8 1.9
52 5.4 164 14.5 107 9.7
SPD 1976 1994 1998 2002 6.3 4.3 5.4 4.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 4.3 6.7 2.1 10.3 6.3 16.0 9.1
17.5 18.3 30.6 18.0
3.4 6.7 3.5 8.9
13.2 10.3 9.7 18.8
30.3 17.9 13.5 29.3
0.4 9.4 11.1 6.7
4.0 3.8 2.8
16.2 7.6 4.2 4.6
234 224 288 505
38.4 23.1 25.5 45.9
FDP 1976 1994 8.0 9.6 7.3 5.8
15.7 13.1
5.1 8.8
27.0 18.2
15.7 20.4
2.2 3.6
6.2 5.8
10.7 3.6
5.1
7.9 0.0
178 29.2 137 14.1
1998 2002
18.2 15.2
6.8 34.3
14.2 20.0
25.6 12.4
2.8
10.2 2.9
4.0
7.4 3.8
2.8 1.0
4.0 7.6
4.0 2.9
176 15.6 105 9.5
CDU/CSU 1976 1994 1998 2002 9.5 1.5 1.9 3.9 2.4 8.3 9.9 5.4 3.4 3.6 5.6 4.5 1.8 7.6 10.7 15.4 12.4 0.0 10.5 6.7 9.6 4.5 4.9 4.4 2.2
16.7 16.1 17.9 22.3
12.6 7.5 11.5 11.5
19.7 12.5 5.1 13.5
31.8 14.2 21.6 15.1
198 535 435 364
32.5 55.2 38.5 33.1
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Index
absorptive change, 330 accomodate and coopt strategy, 49 alignment, partisan, 2534 Ampelkoalitionen (Germany), 219 analysis, theoretical base of, 321 anti-establishment strategy, 89 ARP (Netherlands), 154, 173 audience democracy, 267 Balkenende, Jan Peter, 160, 164 bilateral agreements (Switzerland), 136 Black Wednesday (UK), 189 Blair, Tony, 185, 187 Bolkestein, Frits, 161 Britishness, 191 Busek, Erhard, 114, 127 BZ (Austria), 115 Catholics, radicalization of, 245 CDA (Netherlands), 167, 173, 280, 314 CDU (Germany), 209, 214, 22830, 280, 316, 332 Chevnement, Jean-Pierre, 87, 95 Chirac, Jacques, 78, 79, 86 CHU (Netherlands), 154 citizenship civic-territorial model of, 85 conceptions of, 33 German model, 212 class Austria, 1223 France, 97 Germany, 226 Netherlands, 154, 1712 Switzerland, 146 UK, 202 class conditions, 10 class consciousness, 10
cleavage class, 257, 79, 106, 132, 185, 20911, 238, 239, 2435, 2501, 259 cultural, 60, 238, 270, 280, 318 East/West, 210 economic, 60, 238, 26970 integrationdemarcation dimensions of, 1114 integrationdemarcation, 10, 27, 34, 36, 241, 246, 257, 290, 323 France, 80, 93 Netherlands, 167 Switzerland, 133, 139 UK, 185, 2046 integrationdemarcation, formation of, 237 linguistic, 133 national question, 107 religious, 25, 79, 106, 132, 20911, 238, 2435 ruralurban, 132 sectoral, 6 cleavage theory, 321 cleavages, classic, 11 coding procedure, 68 Communists (France), 79, 86, 87, 1001 competition, cultural, 7 consensua era (Austria), 123 consensus democracies, 43, 112 Conservative Party (UK), 17, 45, 183, 1913, 1946, 2046, 256, 270, 280, 315, 330 consociational democracy, 155 content analysis, method of, 68 countries included, 545 CPN (Netherlands), 155 CSU (Germany), 219, 229
424
Index
cultural diversity, increasing, 6 cultural heritage, 31 Cultural Revolution 1960s, 291 CVP (Switzerland), 130, 136, 141, 151, 273, 280, 311 D66 (Netherlands), 17, 156, 167, 173, 271, 280, 281, 312, 326 data set, production of, 67 De Gaulle, Charles, 86 De Villiers, Philippe, 87, 95 dealignment, functional, 38, 267 dealignment, structural, 38 de-Austrification, 105 Delors, Jacques, 110 demand side, 4, 53, 323 democratic corporatism (Austria), 108 Deutsche Volksunion (DVU ) (Germany), 218 Dijkstal, Hans, 163 dimension, new politics, 299 dismiss and stigmatize strategy, 49 DS70 (Netherlands), 156 DU (Austria), 121 Duisenberg, Wim, 176 Dutch Disease, 159 Dutch Miracle, 15960 economic and cultural issues, relationship between, 237 economic competition, increase in, 5 economic liberalism, increasing, 286 economic openness, tradition of, 289 education, 7, 2446, 250, 259 Austria, 122 France, 97 Germany, 226 Netherlands, 171 Switzerland, 147 UK, 201 elections included, 557 electoral system importance of, 330 majoritarian, 41, 445, 88, 183 proportional, 41, 43, 112 ERM fiasco (UK), 193 European Constitutional Treaty, 78, 86, 87
425
European Economic Area (EEA), 1356 European integration, 3, 28, 312, 33, 240, 257, 270 Austria, 11011 France, 83, 91 Germany, 213, 220 Switzerland, 1346, 150 UK, 188, 191, 1946 Euroscepticism, 18 factor analyses, 61, 91, 116, 143, 165, 222, 237, 239, 240 farmers (Austria), 111, 1201 FDP (Germany), 214, 21920, 22831, 256, 280, 316, 326 FDP (Switzerland), 130, 136, 1412, 1512, 273, 280, 311 federalism Germany, 216 Switzerland, 142 Fortuyn, Pim, 163, 17681 FP (Austria), 17, 20, 48, 106, 111, 11415, 1201, 124, 1268, 280, 306, 319, 327 Front National (France), 47, 778, 85, 86, 889, 101, 280, 304, 327 supporters profile, 98 Gaulliste, see RPR German cultural identity, see Leitkultur (Germany) Giscard dEstaing, Valry, 79 globalization divide between winners and loosers, 238 France, 80, 82 losers of, 45, 89, 1920, 267 political paradox of, 9 winners of, 4, 5, 89 Goodhart, David, 191 Greens (Austria), 111, 115, 1201, 123, 126, 307 Greens (UK), 200 Greens (Germany), 214, 216, 217, 218, 22631, 316 Greens (Switzerland), 131, 135, 141, 1501 Gusenbauer, Alfred, 127
426
Haider, Jrg, 11415 Heath, Edward, 183, 186, 188 hypotheses adaption hypothesis, 14, 328 continuity hypothesis, 324 convergence hypothesis, 45, 325 embedding hypothesis, 13, 269, 318, 325 fragmentation or polarization hypothesis, 18, 328 isomorphism hypothesis, 323 winners programme hypothesis, 16 ideological distance, 41 immigration, 6, 28, 346, 240, 257, 270, 290 Austria, 10910 Germany, 21213, 220 Netherlands, 1601 Switzerland, 1378, 150 UK, 18991 inflation (UK), 188 integration of cultural and economic dimensions, degree of, 271 issue-categories liberalism/law and order, 290 economic, 286 impact of, 301 variations among parties, 301 integration/immigration, 288 issue ownership theory, 46 issues old/new, 300 salience of, 71 Jenkins, Roy, 185 Keynesian policy, 83, 105, 124, 187 Kinnock, Neil, 204 Kleinnijenhuis method, see content analysis, method of Klima, Viktor, 127 Kok, Wim, 164 KPD (Germany), 217 KP, 107 KVP (Netherlands), 154, 156, 173 Labour Party (UK), 16, 183, 1913, 1946, 2046, 256, 257, 270, 280, 315
Index
New Labour, 185, 205 Lnder Austria, 114 new (Germany), 210 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 77, 78, 86, 889, Leefbaar Nederland, 163 Left, radical, 18 Lega (Switzerland), 133 Leitkultur (Germany), 213 Liberal Forum (LIF) (Austria), 71, 115, 123, 126, 326 Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP)(UK), 185, 1912, 204, 281 Liberalism, European, 17 Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) (Netherland), 71, 1635, 169, 17781, 294, 312, 329 Liveable Netherlands, see Leefbaar Nederland Lschnak, Franz, 126 LPS (Switzerland), 148 Lugner, Richard, 121 Madelin, Alain, 95 Magic Formula (Switzerland), 130 Major, John, 195, 205 Mgret, Bruno, 89 Melkert, Ad, 164 Mitterrand, Franois, 79, 85 mobility, 5 Mllemann, Jrgen W., 220 MRG (France), 93 multicultural policies (Netherlands), 160 multidimensional scaling (MDS), method of, 71 national community, identification with, 78 national party configuration 1970s, comparison of, 282 1990s/2000s, comparison of, 284 comparison of, 282 NATO membership (Netherlands), 167 naturalization rate, 34 neo-institutionalist theory, 321 neo-liberal economic elements, 19 Neue Mitte (Germany), 230 new class approach, 12
Index
New Labour, 17 NPD (Germany), 43, 217, 218 operationalization of levels of education, 64 of religion, 64 of social classes, 64 VP (Austria), 105, 108, 111, 11415, 1201, 123, 1257, 280, 319 Owen, David, 185 Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive, 218 parties Green, 13 issue-positions, 58 new left, 13 niche, 46 number of relevant, 39 party electorate, position of (France), 936 party family Christian-democratic, 280, 299 Conservative, 298 Green, 280 New Left, 280 radical right, 280, 298 social-democratic, 280, 298 party membership, 39 party organization, 331 party position analysis of, 65 empirical description, 278 1970s, 278 1990s/2000s, 281 party strategy, 332 accommodative, 46 adversarial, 47 cooperation, 47 dismissive, 46 oligopolistic, see strategy, accommodative 46 stigmatization, 47 party system, tripolarization of the, 253, 257, 276, 282 Pasqua, Charles, 86 PDS (Germany), 210, 213, 214, 217, 219, 22631 pillars, 155 polarization, 39, 456, 238, 2513, 327, 339
427
France, 98 Switzerland, 131 Polder Model, 159 political fragmentation, 18, 336 political potentials, 8 political sociology, 322 political space, restructuring of, 271 Powell, Enoch, 194 PPR (Netherlands), 156, 173 privatization (UK), 188 protected property rights, erosion of, 56 purple coalition, 162 PvdA (Netherlands), 154, 156, 161, 167, 173, 271, 280, 312 radical right (UK), 1934 refugees, 36 Regententencultuur, 164 regional differences (Switzerland), 133 religion, 264 Austria, 1212 France, 96 Germany, 225 Netherlands, 154, 169 Switzerland, 146 UK, 200 reunification (Germany), 208 right cultural split of, 274 populist, 18, 434, 71 Rodger, Bill, 185 RPR (France), 78, 79, 80, 86, 90, 1001, 280, 304, 337 Scargill, Arthur, 186 Scharping, Rudolf, 229 Schill, Roland, 218 Schmidt, Heide, 127 Schrder, Gerhard, 229, 230 Schssel, Wolfgang, 126 Scottish Nationalists, 200 secularization (Netherlands), 155 Sguin, Philippe, 86 shocks, 58 Social Democratic Party (SDP)(UK), 185 social groups Austria, 118 new disparities between, 243
428
social market economy, see soziale Marktwirtschaft (Germany) social movements, new, 12 Socialist Party (France), 79, 80, 86, 90, 1001 Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Germany), 288 Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) (Germany), 217 SP (Switzerland), 131, 1356, 141, 148, 1501, 280, 311 SPD (Germany), 209, 214, 21819, 22831, 316 SP (Austria), 105, 108, 111, 11415, 1201, 123, 1267, 306 strategic flexibility of the radical right, 43 supply side, 4, 53, 323 surplus seats (Germany), see berhangsmandate (Germany) SVP (Switzerland), 20, 44, 130, 132, 1356, 1412, 148, 1512, 273, 280, 311, 332 Switzerland, identity, 136 Thatcher, Margaret, 42, 183, 186, 1889 The Left (Germany), 211, 340 The Republikaner (REP)(Germany), 213, 218, 229 thematic basis of political conflicts, 53 theory of reflexive modernization, 321 Third Way, 16 Germany, see Neue Mitte (Germany) traffic-light coalitions (Germany), see Ampelkoalitionen (Germany) transformation from outside, 330 from within, 330
Index
berhangsmandate (Germany), 216 UDF (France), 79, 80, 86, 87, 90, 1001, 256, 280, 300 UMP, see RPR Undivided Liberalism (Austria), 127 unemployment, 28, 84, 134, 156, 187, 211, 259 unions, defeat of (UK), 187, 189 United Nations membership (Switzerland), 137 Veil, Simone, 86 volatility France, 79 Netherlands, 163 Von Stahl, Alexander, 220 voter and party transformation, connection of, 296 voters attitudes, structural basis of, 265 issue attitudes, 58 correlations, 243 number of dimensions, 241 reaction to globalization processes, 264 Vranitzky, Franz, 127 VVD (Netherlands), 17, 167, 173, 256, 280, 312, 329 Wassenaar Accord, see Dutch Miracle welfare state, 2931 Willensnation, 136 Williams, Shirley, 185 Winter of Discontent (UK), 186 Zuilen, see pillars

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West European Politics in the Age of Globalization

is a researcher in the Institute of Political Science at the

West European Politics in the Age of Globalization

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

ISBN-13 978-0-511-42926-2 ISBN-13 ISBN-13 978-0-521-89557-6 978-0-521-71990-2

eBook (EBL) hardback paperback

page xi xiii xvii 1

Contexts of party mobilization

The design of the study: the distinguishing characteristics of our approach

France: the model case of party system transformation

Austria: transformation driven by an established party

Switzerland: another case of transformation driven by an established party

Introduction Traditional cleavages

The Netherlands: a challenge that was slow in coming

The United Kingdom: moving parties in a stable configuration

Germany: the dog that didnt bark

Demand side: dealignment and realignment of the structural political potentials

Supply side: the positioning of the political parties in a restructuring space

The electoral consequences of the integrationdemarcation cleavage

362 364 364

Appendix B References Index

Detailed statistical results

366 388 424

Preface and acknowledgments

Preface and acknowledgments

Preface and acknowledgments

Theory and methods

Globalization and its impact on national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

A new structural conflict between winners and losers of globalization

First, we consider that the consequences of globalization are not

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Bartolini (2000) refers to it as a conflict between integration and independence.

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

The positioning of the parties within the transformed space

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

An overview of the volume

Globalization and national spaces of competition

Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, Frey

Contexts of party mobilization

Contexts of party mobilization

(b) Class cleavage

Contexts of party mobilization Notes to Table 2.1 (cont.)

Economic context conditions

Contexts of party mobilization

Table 2.2 Social and economic indicators

Switzerland Austria Netherlands France United Kingdom Germany Overall average

7.3 8.1 15.9 58.9 59.5 82.8