LabRel Batch 4 Compiled

LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS BATCH 4 ARTICLES 247-249 (1) G.R. No.
178647 February 13, 2009
to labor-only contracting. It found that JLBP was an independent contractor and that the decision to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUES: Whether JLBP is an independent contractor, whether CCBPIs contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to unfair labor practice, and whether such action was a valid exercise of management prerogative. HELD: No. The issues call for a re-examination of evidence, which is not within the ambit of this Courts jurisdiction. The CA squarely addressed the issue of job contracting in its assailed Decision and Resolution. The CA itself examined the facts and evidence of the parties and found that, based on the evidence, CCBPI did not engage in labor-only contracting and, therefore, was not guilty of unfair labor practice. The NLRC found and the same was sustained by the CA that the companys action to contract-out the services and functions performed by Union members did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not directed at the members right to self-organization. Article 248 of the Labor Code provides: ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE OF EMPLOYERS. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: xxx (c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; xxx Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to selforganization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices.
GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNIONTUPAS vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION NACHURA, J.: FACTS: Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. (CCBPI) experienced a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis, thus to curb the negative effects on the company, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement Program. An inter-office memorandum was also issued mandating to put on hold all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions in [the] Head Office and in the Plants. Faced with the freeze hiring directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation (JLBP), a manning agency. Petitioner then filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI Gen San for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members. In a Resolution, the NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out jobs to JLBP. The NLRC held that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the system was meant to curtail the right to self-organization of petitioners members. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA uphold the NLRCs finding that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice. It held that the contract between CCBPI and JLBP did not amount
AQUINO BRAMPIO VILLANUEVA
LABOR RELATIONS 2012-2013
Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practice. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge. (2) G.R. No. 180892 April 7, 2009 UST FACULTY UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, REV. FR. ROLANDO DE LA ROSA, REV. FR. RODELIO ALIGAN, DOMINGO LEGASPI, and MERCEDES HINAYON VELASCO, JR., J.: FACTS: The UST Faculty Union (USTFU) informed its members of a General Assembly. One of its agenda is the election of officers. The Secretary General of UST issued a Memorandum allowing the request of Faculty Clubs to hold a convocation which the members of the faculty including members of USTFU attended without the participation of UST administration. Also, an election of USTFU was conducted by a group called Reformist Alliance. Learning that the convocation was intended for election, some members walked out but the election was conducted among those present (Gamilla Group). Thus, two (2) groups claim to be USTFU namely; (1) Marino Group; and (2) Gamilla Group. Marino group filed a compliant for ULP against UST with the Arbitration Branch. It also filed a complaint before Med-Arbiter praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group. A CBA was entered between Gamilla Group and UST superseding the existing CBA of UST and USTFU. The MedArbiter declared the election of Gamilla Group as null and void. On appeal, the BLR affirmed the decision of Med-Arbiter. On appeal before this Court, the Court upheld the ruling of BLR. With the decision of this Court, the case before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit. USTFU appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. When the case is elevated to CA, the Court affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not UST is guilty of unfair labor practice. HELD: No. The concept of ULP is contained in Article 247 of the Labor Code which states: Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure
for prosecution thereof.Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to selforganization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. (Emphasis supplied.) Notably, petitioner claims that respondents violated paragraphs (a) and (d) of Art. 248 of the Code which provide: Article 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: (a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; xxxx (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters. The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. While there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the burden of proving such ULP. While in the more recent and more apt case of Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (NUBE) v. Confesor, this Court enunciated: In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Emphasis supplied.) In other words, whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party committed ULP, it is the burden of the alleging party to prove such allegation with substantial evidence. Such principle finds justification in the fact that ULP is punishable with both civil and/or criminal sanctions.
Petitioner makes several allegations that UST committed ULP. The onus probandi falls on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar, petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief. (3) [G.R. No. 127374. January 31, 2002] PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC., MARILES C. ROMULO and FRANCISCO DAKILA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER EMERSON TUMANON, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) SEPTEMBER (now UNIFIED PAFLU) and SERAFIN AYROSO BELLOSILLO, J.: FACTS: In November 1993, the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) September (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted among the rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union, Philippine Skylanders EmployeesAssociation-WATU (PSEA-WATU) immediately protested the result of the election before the Secretary of Labor. Several months later, pending settlement of the controversy, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation citing as reason PAFLU's supposed deliberate and habitual dereliction of duty toward its members. PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with National Congress of Workers (NCW) and to maintain continuity within the organization, allowed the former officers of PSEAPAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected officers in the newlyforged PSEA-NCW. On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining agreement with PSI. Agitated by PSI's recognition of PSEA-NCW, PAFLU through Serafin Ayroso filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against PSI. ISSUE: May PSEA, which is an independent and separate local union, validly disaffiliate from PAFLU pending the settlement of an election protest
questioning its status as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of PSI's rank and file employees? HELD: Jurisdiction At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-union conflict the jurisdiction of which properly lies with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter. Nonetheless, with due recognition of this fact, we deem it proper to settle the controversy at this instance since to remand the case to the BLR would only mean intolerable delay for the parties. Right to disaffiliate In the landmark case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., the Court upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members. There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. Effect of pendency of election protest As such, the pendency of an election protest involving both the mother federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation. Neither was it disputed by PAFLU that 92.5%of the total union membership supported the claim of disaffiliation and had in fact disauthorized PAFLU from instituting any complaint in their behalf. It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a CBA with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly severed itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from subsequently affiliating with NCW. Legal personality It stands unchallenged that PAFLU instituted the complaint for unfair labor practice against the wishes of workers whose interests it was supposedly protecting. The mere act of disaffiliation did not divest PSEA of its own
personality; neither did it give PAFLU the license to act independently of the local union. PAFLU might have forgotten that as an agent it could only act in representation of and in accordance with the interests of the local union. The complaint then for unfair labor practice lodged by PAFLU against PSI, PSEA and their respective officers, having been filed by a party which has no legal personality to institute the complaint, should have been dismissed at the first instance for failure to state a cause of action. Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the claims of a local union as against those of national federation, those of the former must be preferred. (4) G.R. No. L-43495-99 January 20, 1990 TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES' UNION-CGW, et. al. vs. TROPICAL HUT FOOD MARKET, INC., et. al. MEDIALDEA, J.: FACTS: The Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU), a local union of the rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market Incorporated affiliated with the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). Following such affiliation, a registration certificate was issued by the Department of Labor in the name of the THEU-NATU. It appears, however, that NATU itself as a labor federation was not registered with the Department of Labor. After several negotiations were conducted between THEU-NATU and Tropical Hut Food Market, Incorporated a Collective Bargaining Agreement was concluded between the parties. Said agreement' contained these clear and unequivocal terms: Article I Coverage and Effectivity Sec. 1. The COMPANY recognizes the UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all matters concerning wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment. xxx xxx xxx Article III
Union Membership and Union Check-off Sec. 1 . . . Employees who are already members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this Agreement or who become so thereafter shall be required to maintain their membership therein as a condition of continued employment. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 3Any employee who is expelled from the UNION for joining another federation or forming another union, or who fails or refuses to maintain his membership therein as required, . . . shall, upon written request of the UNION be discharged by the COMPANY. And attached to the Agreement is a check-off Authorization Form. Respondent company and THEU-NATU entered into a new Collective Bargaining Agreement, which incorporated the previous union-shop security clause and the attached check-off authorization form. Arturo Dilag, incumbent President of THEU-NATU, was appointed by the respondent company as Assistant Unit Manager. For reason of his present position, he resigned as President of the THEU-NATU. As a consequence thereof, his Vice-President, Jose Encinas, assumed and discharged the duties of the presidency of the THEU-NATU. THEU disaffiliated from the NATU federation and affiliated with the Confederation of General Workers (CGW). The general membership of the so-called THEU-CGW held its annual election of officers, with Jose Encinas elected as President. Pacifico Rosal, President of the Confederation of General Workers (CGW), in behalf of THEU-CGW demanded the remittance of the union dues collected by the Tropical Hut Food Mart, Incorporated to the THEU-CGW, but this was refused by the respondent company. The NATU informed Encinas concerning the request made by the NATU federation to the respondent company to dismiss him in view of his violation of Section 3 of Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Encinas was also advised that NATU was returning the letter of disaffiliation on the ground that:
1. Under the restructuring program NOT of the Bureau of Labor but of the Philippine National Trade Union Center in conjunction with the NATU and other established national labor centers, retail clerks and employees such as our members in the Tropical Hut pertain to Industry II which by consensus, has been assigned already to the jurisdiction of the NATU; 2. The right to disaffiliate belongs to the union membership who on the basis of verified reports received by have not even been consulted by you regarding the matter; 3. Assuming that the disaffiliation decision was properly reached; your letter nevertheless is unacceptable in view of Article V, Section 1, of the NATU Constitution which provides that "withdrawal from the organization shall he valid provided three (3) months notice of intention to withdraw is served upon the National Executive Council." In view of NATU's request, the respondent company, suspended Encinas pending the application for clearance with the Department of Labor to dismiss him. Members of the THEU-CGW protested the suspension of Encinas and reiterated their ratification and approval of their union's disaffiliation from NATU and their affiliation with the Confederation of General Workers (CGW). It was Encinas' suspension that caused the filing of NLRC Case against private respondents herein, charging them of unfair labor practice. Thereafter, respondent company suspended the other officers and members of THEU-CGW. Another NLRC Case was filed by THEU-CGW and individual complainants against private respondents for unfair labor practices. The remaining THEU-NATU held a special election of officers in which Arturo Dilag was elected THEU-NATU President together with the other union officers. Petitioner THEU-CGW requested assistance from Juan Ponce Enrile, Secretary of National Defense, complaining of the unfair labor practices committed by respondent company against its members. The secretary of THEU-NATU, notified the entire rank and file employees of the company that they will be given forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of the notice within which to answer and affirm their membership with THEU-
NATU. When the petitioner employees failed to reply, Arturo Dilag advised that the THEU-NATU shall enforce the union security clause set forth in the CBA, and that he had requested respondent company to dismiss them. Respondent company, thereafter, demanded the latter's comment on Dilag's charges before action was taken thereon. However, no comment or reply was received from petitioners. In view of this, the respondent company, upon Dilag's request, suspended 63 workers pending approval by the Secretary of Labor of the application for their dismissal. As a consequence thereof, NLRC Case Nos. LR-2971, LR-3015 and an unnumbered case were filed by petitioners against Tropical Hut Food Market, Incorporated. It is significant to note that the joint letter petition signed by sixty-seven (67) employees was filed with the Secretary of Labor, the NLRC Chairman and Director of Labor Relations to cancel the words NATU after the name of Tropical Hut Employee Union under Registration Certificate No. 5544 IP. Another letter signed by one hundred forty-six (146) members of THEUCGW was sent to the President of the Philippines informing him of the unfair labor practices committed by private respondents against THEU-CGW members. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they immediately elevated the case to this Court without an appeal having been made to the Office of the President; (2) Whether or not the disaffiliation of the local union from the national federation was valid; and (3) Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner employees resulting from their unions disaffiliation from the mother federation was illegal and constituted unfair labor practice on the part of respondent company and federation. HELD: (1) No. The applicable law then is the Labor Code, PD 442, as amended by PD 643 on January 21, 1975, which states: Art. 222. Appeal . . .
xxx xxx xxx Decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the President of the Philippines subject to such conditions or limitations as the President may direct. (Emphasis ours) The remedy of appeal from the Secretary of Labor to the Office of the President is not a mandatory requirement before resort to courts can be had, but an optional relief provided by law to parties seeking expeditious disposition of their labor disputes. Failure to avail of such relief shall not in any way served as an impediment to judicial intervention. And where the issue is lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise thereof, decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be questioned in a certiorari proceeding without prior appeal to the President (Arrastre Security Association TUPAS v. Ople, No. L-45344, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 580). Since the instant petition raises the same issue of grave abuse of discretion of the Secretary of Labor amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in deciding the controversy, this Court can properly take cognizance of and resolve the issues raised herein. (2) Yes. When the local union withdrew from the old federation to join a new federation, it was merely exercising its primary right to labor organization for the effective enhancement and protection of common interests. In the absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union a local may sever its relationship with its parent (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) v. People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation, No. 37687, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 440). There is nothing in the constitution of the NATU or in the constitution of the THEU-NATU that the THEU was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation (pp. 62, 281, Rollo), The alleged non-compliance of the local union with the provision in the NATU Constitution requiring the service of three months notice of intention to withdraw did not produce the effect of nullifying the disaffiliation for the following grounds: firstly, NATU was not even a legitimate labor organization, it appearing that it was not registered at that time with the Department of Labor, and therefore did not possess and acquire, in the first place, the legal personality to enforce its constitution and
laws, much less the right and privilege under the Labor Code to organize and affiliate chapters or locals within its group, and secondly, the act of noncompliance with the procedure on withdrawal is premised on purely technical grounds which cannot rise above the fundamental right of selforganization. (3) Yes. With regard to the process by which the workers were suspended or dismissed, this Court finds that it was hastily and summarily done without the necessary due process. The respondent company sent a letter to petitioners herein, advising them of NATU/Dilag's recommendation of their dismissal and at the same time giving them forty-eight (48) hours within which to comment (p. 637, Rollo). When petitioners failed to do so, respondent company immediately suspended them and thereafter effected their dismissal. This is certainly not in fulfillment of the mandate of due process, which is to afford the employee to be dismissed an opportunity to be heard. The prerogative of the employer to dismiss or lay-off an employee should be done without abuse of discretion or arbitrainess, for what is at stake is not only the employee's name or position but also his means of livelihood. Thus, the discharge of an employee from his employment is null and void where the employee was not formally investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings made by the company (De Leon v. NLRC, L-52056, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 691). Likewise, an employer can be adjudged guilty of unfair labor practice for having dismissed its employees in line with a closed shop provision if they were not given a proper hearing (BinalbaganIsabela Sugar Co., Inc.,(BISCOM) v. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) et al., L-18782, August 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 700). (5) G.R. No. 150896 August 28, 2008
PUREFOODS CORPORATION vs. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS RANK-AND-FILE, ST. THOMAS FREE WORKERS UNION, PUREFOODS GRANDPARENT FARM WORKERS UNION and PUREFOODS UNIFIED LABOR ORGANIZATION NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: Three labor organizations and a federation are respondents in this caseNagkakaisang Samahang Manggagawa Ng Purefoods Rank-AndFile (NAGSAMA-Purefoods), the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-andfile workers of Purefoods meat division throughout Luzon; St. Thomas Free Workers Union (STFWU), of those in the farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and Purefoods Grandparent Farm Workers Union (PGFWU), of those in the poultry farm in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. These organizations were affiliates of the respondent federation, Purefoods Unified Labor Organization (PULO). NAGSAMA-Purefoods manifested to petitioner corporation its desire to renegotiate the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then due to expire. The organization submitted to the company its General Membership Resolution approving and supporting the unions affiliation with PULO, adopting the draft CBA proposals of the federation, and authorizing a negotiating panel which included among others a PULO representative. While Purefoods formally acknowledged receipt of the unions proposals, it refused to recognize PULO and its participation, even as a mere observer, in the negotiation. Consequently, notwithstanding the PULO representatives noninvolvement, the negotiation of the terms of the CBA still resulted in a deadlock. A notice of strike was then filed by NAGSAMA-Purefoods. In the subsequent conciliation conference, the deadlock issues were settled except the matter of the companys recognition of the unions affiliation with PULO. In the meantime, STFWU and PGFWU also submitted their respective proposals for CBA renewal, and their general membership resolutions which, among others, affirmed the two organizations affiliation with PULO. Consistent with its stance, Purefoods refused to negotiate with the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel. The parties then agreed to postpone the negotiations indefinitely. Thereafter, the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in Malvar, Batangas. Five days thereafter, four company employees facilitated the transfer of around 23,000 chickens from the poultry farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas (where STFWU was the exclusive bargaining agent) to that in Malvar. The following day, the regular rank-andfile workers in the Sto. Tomas farm were refused entry in the company premises; and 22 STFWU members were terminated from employment. The farm manager, supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Tomas farm,
who were members of another union, were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ. Aggrieved by these developments, the four respondent labor organizations jointly instituted a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal lockout/dismissal and damages with the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The LA dismissed the complaint, and declared that the company neither committed ULP nor illegally dismissed the employees. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA, ordered the payment of moral and exemplary damages and the reinstatement with full backwages of the STFWU members. In its Decision, the labor commission ruled that the petitioner companys refusal to recognize the labor organizations affiliation with PULO was unjustified considering that the latter had been granted the status of a federation by the Bureau of Labor Relations; and that this refusal constituted undue interference in, and restraint on the exercise of the employees right to self-organization and free collective bargaining. The NLRC said that the real motive of the company in the sudden closure of the Sto. Tomas farm and the mass dismissal of the STFWU members was union busting, as only the union members were locked out, and the company subsequently resumed operations of the closed farm under a new contract with the landowner. Because the requisites of a valid lockout were absent, the NLRC concluded that the company committed ULP. The CA dismissed outright the companys petition for certiorari on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective. ISSUE: Whether or not the sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP. HELD: Yes. The sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP because it was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. Thus, the petitioner company is liable for the payment of moral and exemplary damages. Notable, though, is that this award, while stated in the body of the NLRC decision, was omitted in the dispositive portion of the said ruling. To prevent any further confusion in the implementation of the said decision, we correct the dispositive portion
of the ruling to include the payment of moral and exemplary damages to the illegally dismissed STFWU members. As to the order of reinstatement, the Court modifies the same in that if it is no longer feasible considering the length of time that the employees have been out of petitioners employ, the company is ordered to pay the illegally dismissed STFWU members separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay, or one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The releases and quitclaims, as well as the affidavits of desistance, signed by the concerned employees, who were then necessitous men at the time of execution of the documents, are declared invalid and ineffective. They will not bar the workers from claiming the full measure of benefits flowing from their legal rights. (6) G.R. No. 177283 April 7, 2009
This prompted Aliazas group to file a Motion for Intervention with the BLR. Pending proceedings, the Aliazas group requested the University "to please put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel until such time that an election of union officials has been scheduled and subsequent elections has been held." As response to the request, DLSU established a savings account for the Union where all collected union dues and agency fees will be deposited and held in trust; and discontinued normal relations with any group within the Union including the incumbent set of officers. In the letter, it added that the University does not want itself to be unnecessarily involved in their intraunion dispute. And that the actions mentioned above are the only way that the University can maintain neutrality on this matter of grave concern. This move drew the union to file a complaint against DLSU for Unfair Labor Practice claiming that the university has unduly interfered with its internal affairs and discriminated against its members. The union also prayed for exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorneys fees.1 ISSUES: (1) Is the act of DLSU considered ULP? (2) WoN DLSU is liable for damages? HELD: (1) NO. It reversed CAs decision that DLSU is not guilty of unfair labor practice, considering that the temporary measures implemented by the university were undertaken in good faith and only to maintain its neutrality amid the intra-union dispute. Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute, unions officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs. There is no void in the unions leadership. As duly-elected officers of the DLSUEA, their leadership is not deemed terminated by the expiration of their terms of office, for they shall continue their functions and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to their respective positions in a hold-over capacity, until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. It bears noting that at the time petitioners questioned moves were adopted, a valid and existing CBA had
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY and DR. CARMELITA I. QUEBENGCO, Petitioners, vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), Respondent. CARPIO MORALES, J.: FACTS: In 2001, a splinter group of respondent led by one Belen Aliazas filed a petition for conduct of elections with the DOLE-NCR alleging that the then incumbent officers of the union had failed to call for a regular election since 1985. Disputing Aliazas groups allegation, the union claimed that an election was conducted in 1987 but by virtue of the enactment of Republic Act 6715 which amended the Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to five years or until 1992 during which a general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective bargaining negotiations; and that a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was executed only on March 30, 2000. DOLE-NCR then held that by virtue of the execution of the CBA the holdover authority of unions incumbent set of officers had been extinguished. It ordered the union to conduct elections to be placed under the control and supervision of its Labor Relations Division. Notwithstanding the DOLEs decision, union conducted a regular election without notice to Labor Relations Division.
been entered between the parties. It thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization and an employer becomes the law between the parties, compliance with which is mandated by express policy of the law. (2) As for exemplary damages, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the union must show proof of entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the Court may consider awarding exemplary damages. No such damages were prayed for, however, hence, the Court finds no basis to grant the prayer for exemplary damages. Nonetheless, the grant of nominal damages and attorneys fees to the union under Article 2221and Article 2208 (8) of the Civil Code, respectively, is in order. (7) [G.R. No. 113907. February 28, 2000] MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP) vs HON. CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, M. GREENFIELD (B), INC., SAUL TAWIL, CARLOS T. JAVELOSA, RENATO C. PUANGCO, WINCEL LIGOT, MARCIANO HALOG, GODOFREDO PACENO, SR., GERVACIO CASILLANO, LORENZO ITAOC, ATTY. GODOFREDO PACENO, JR., MARGARITO CABRERA, GAUDENCIO RACHO, SANTIAGO IBANEZ, AND RODRIGO AGUILING PURISIMA, J.: FACTS: Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc., (B) (MSMG) or "local union", is an affiliate of the private respondent, United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), referred to as the "federation". The CBA between the union and M. Greenfield, Inc (company) has union security clause which states that an employee who fails to maintain his membership in the UNION for non-payment of UNION dues, for resignation and for violation of UNIONs Constitution and By-Laws may be dismissed from employment by the company upon written recommendation of the federation. And that the federation shall hold the COMPANY free and
blameless from any and all liabilities that may arise should the dismissed employee question. Thereafter, a rift ensued between the federation and union which started (1) when the SecGen of the federation disapproved the resolution of the local union imposing the P50.00 fine to employees who failed to attend meetings regularly and (2) federation refused to remit the local unions share in the education funds. Because of this, the union passed a resolution declaring its autonomy from the federation. The federation took this as acts of disloyalty and advised the company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause in their collective bargaining agreement. The expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily brought out of the company premises by the companys security guards. Likewise, those assigned to the second shift were not allowed to report for work. Complaint for unfair labor practice was filed by the union and the expelled employees against the company on the grounds of: union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence, and oppression. Local union members contend that their dismissal from work was effected in an arbitrary, hasty, capricious and illegal manner because it was undertaken by the respondent company without any prior administrative investigation. Federation, on the other hand, maintain that the termination of thirty dismissed employees was validly made upon the demand of the federation pursuant to the union security clause of the CBA. ISSUES: (1) WoN the dismissal of employees constitute ULP (2) whether or not respondent company was justified in dismissing local union employees merely upon the federations demand for the enforcement of the union security clause embodied in their CBA HELD: (1) NO. Union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements, if freely and voluntarily entered into, are valid and binding. Corrolarily, dismissals
pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. (2) NO. However, the dismissal is invalid because of respondent companys failure to accord petitioners with due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to their termination. Also, said dismissal was invalidated because the reason relied upon by respondent Federation was not valid. Nonetheless, the dismissal still does not constitute unfair labor practice. Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the local union members without conducting a separate and independent investigation. The company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same. While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by the federation, this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. Even on the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers, due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company. (8) G.R. No. 170287 February 14, 2008 ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES UNION, CHRISTOPHER PIZARRO, MICHAEL BRAZA, and NOLASCO CASTUERAS VELASCO, JR., J.: FACTS: Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Club) is a domestic non-profit corporation while Alabang Country Club Independent Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the Clubs rank-and-file employees. Private respondents Christopher Pizarro, Michael Braza, and
Nolasco Castueras were elected Union President, Vice-President, and Treasurer, respectively. The Club and the Union entered into a CBA which provided for a Union shop and maintenance of membership shop. It states, among others, that upon written demand of the UNION and after observing due process, the Club shall dismiss a regular rank-and-file employee on the 8 enumerated grounds. One of which is malversation of union funds. An election of union officers was held. The new set of officers conducted an audit of the Union funds. They discovered some irregularly recorded entries, unaccounted expenses and disbursements, and uncollected loans from the Union funds. The Union notified respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras of the audit results and asked them to explain the discrepancies in writing. All of them denied any wrongdoing. With regard to his unpaid loans, Braza claimed he had been paying through monthly salary deductions and said the Union could continue to deduct from his salary until full payment of his loans, provided he would be reimbursed should the result of the initial audit be proven wrong by a licensed auditor. Castueras also denied any wrongdoing and claimed that the irregular entries in the records were unintentional and were due to inadvertence because of his voluminous work load. He offered that his unpaid personal loan also be deducted from his salary until the loans were fully paid. Pizarro, for his part, blamed Castueras for his unpaid and uncollected loan and cash advances. He claimed his salaries were regularly deducted to pay his loan and he did not know why these remained unpaid in the records. The Union, invoking the Security Clause of the CBA, demanded that the Club dismiss respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras in view of their expulsion from the Union. The Clubs general manager called Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras for an informal conference inquiring about the charges against them. The general manager then announced he would conduct a formal investigation. Nonetheless, after weighing the verbal and written explanations of the three, the Club concluded that they failed to refute the validity of their expulsion from the Union. They were terminated. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the termination is justified
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(2) Were respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras accorded due process before their employments were terminated? HELD: (1) YES. One of the causes for termination under the Labor Code is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. Termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the unions decision to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the CBAs union security provision. The language of Art. II of the CBA that the Union members must maintain their membership in good standing as a condition sine qua non for their continued employment with the Club is unequivocal. It is also clear that upon demand by the Union and after due process, the Club shall terminate the employment of a regular rank-and-file employee who may be found liable for a number of offenses, one of which is malversation of Union funds. (2) YES. While the company, under a maintenance of membership provision of the CBA, is bound to dismiss any employee expelled by the union for disloyalty upon its written request, this undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily. The company acts in bad faith in dismissing a worker without giving him the benefit of a hearing. Reference to Malayang Samahan is erroneous. In Malayang Samahan, the union members were expelled from the union and were immediately dismissed from the company without any semblance of due process. Both the union and the company did not conduct administrative hearings to give the employees a chance to explain themselves. In the present case, the Club has substantially complied with due process. The three respondents were notified that their dismissal was being requested by the Union, and their explanations were heard. Then, the Club, through its President, conferred with said respondents. The three respondents were dismissed only after the Club reviewed and considered the documents submitted by the Union vis--vis the written explanations
submitted by said respondents. Under these circumstances, we find that the Club had afforded the three respondents a reasonable opportunity to be heard and defend themselves. NB: There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. (9) [G.R. No. 114974. June 16, 2004] STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE), petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, respondents. CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union). The Bank and the Union signed a fiveyear collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the third year. Prior to the expiration of the third year, the Union initiated the negotiations. Before the commencement of the negotiation, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested to the Banks Human Resource Manager and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof. Since both parties failed to agree on the non-economic provisions of the CBA, the parties agree to place deadlocked on such specific provisions. The negotiation for economic provisions commenced. Towards the end of the Banks presentation, Umali requested the Bank to validate the Unions
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guestimates, especially the figures for the rank and file staff to which the Bank did not provide. Submission of proposals and counter-proposals ensued but no agreement was reached. Due to desperation, union filed a ULP case against the Bank. The Union contended that the Bank merely went through the motions of collective bargaining without the intent to reach an agreement, and made bad faith proposals when it announced that the parties should begin from a clean slate. It argued that the Bank opened the political provisions up for grabs, which had the effect of diminishing or obliterating the gains that the Union had made. The Union also accused the Bank of refusing to disclose material and necessary data, even after a request was made by the Union to validate its guestimates. ISSUES: WoN the alleged (1) interference with the unions choice of negotiator under Article 248 (a) (2) duty to bargain under Article 248(g) and surface bargaining (3) making bad faith non-economic proposals; and (4) refusal to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data are ULP HELD: (1) NO. Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim.
The suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is not an anti-union conduct. The Bank did not consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel. The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees rights. (2) NO. The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain; hence, committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining. Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves a question of the intent of the party. It involves the question of whether an employers conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining. The minutes of the meetings show that both the Bank and the Union exchanged economic and non-economic proposals and counterproposals. The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. The duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. Hence, the parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain. (3) NO. In view of the finding of lack of ULP based on Article 248(g), the accusation that the Bank made bad faith provisions has no leg to stand on. The records show that the Banks counter-proposals on the noneconomic provisions or political provisions did not put up for grabs the entire work of the Union and its predecessors. As can be gleaned from the Banks counter-proposal, there were many provisions which it proposed to be retained. The revisions on the other provisions were made after the parties had come to an agreement. Far from buttressing the Unions claim that the Bank made bad-faith proposals on the non-economic provisions, all these, on the contrary, disprove such allegations.
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(4) NO. While the refusal to furnish requested information is in itself an unfair labor practice, and also supports the inference of surface bargaining, in the case at bar, Umali requested the Bank to validate its guestimates on the data of the rank and file. However, Umali failed to put his request in writing as provided for in Article 242(c) of the Labor Code. (10) [G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004] GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The CBA was effective for three years. A day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counterproposal be submitted by GMC. However, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal. GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers stating that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter to GMC disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union. Not heeded, Union filed a complaint before the LA. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right to selforganization; and (3) discrimination. On appeal, NLRC found that union remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC not to enter into negotiation with the union. NLRC likewise held that the individual letters of withdrawal from the union submitted by 13 of its members confirmed the pressure exerted by GMC on its employees to resign from the union. Thus, the NLRC also found GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not GMC failed on its duty to bargain collectively, hence liable for ULP
(2) Did GMC interfere with the employees right to self-organization? HELD: YES. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice. Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase duty to bargain collectively as the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.... The effect of an employers or a unions actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. (2) YES. CA found that the letters by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. We agree with the CAs conclusion that the illtimed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization. (11) HACIENDA FATIMA and/or PATRICIO VILLEGAS, ALFONSO VILLEGAS and CRISTINE SEGURA vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE G.R. No. 149440 PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter that complainants [herein respondents] refused to work and/or were choosy in the kind of jobs they wanted to perform, the records is replete with complainants' persistence and dogged determination in going back to work. Indeed, it would appear that respondents did not look with favor workers' having organized themselves into a union. Thus, when complainant union January 28, 2003
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was certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification elections, respondents under the pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein were not given work for more than one month. Respondents reneged on its commitment to sit down and bargain collectively. Instead, respondent employed all means including the use of private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises. Moreover, starting September 1991, respondents did not any more give work assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a strike on January 2, 1992. But due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the complainants and respondents. Whereas the union staged a strike against management on January 2, 1992 grounded on the dismissal of the union officials and members. ISSUE: WON private respondents were illegally dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor practice HELD: YES. The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows: "Indeed, from respondents' refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their haciendaa clear interference in the right of the workers to self-organization." We uphold the CA's affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme Court. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis."
The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral and exemplary damages. (12) ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC., vs.ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the St. Johns Academy (later renamed St. John Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a secondary course only. The high school then employed about 80 teaching and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union). The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in workers benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10, 1997. In order to end the strike, on November 27, 1997, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), agreed to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction After which, the strike ended and classes resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order dated January 19, 1998 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code. The parties were required to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of said Order. Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high school because of the irreconcilable differences between the school management and the Academys Union particularly the safety of our students and the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, which was approved by the stockholders on even date. Thereafter, SJCI informed the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), parents,
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students and the Union of the impending closure of the high school which took effect on March 31, 1998. Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high school agreed to the closure. On April 2, 1998, SJCI informed the DOLE that as of March 31, 1998, 51 employees had received their separation compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the same. On May 4, 1998, the aforementioned 25 employees conducted a protest action within the perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB only on May 7, 1998. ISSUES: (1) Whether it is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal when it closed down the high school on March 31, 1998 and (2) Whether the Union is liable for illegal strike due to the protest actions which its 25 members undertook within the high schools perimeter on May 4, 1998. HELD: (1) Whether or not the closure of the high school was done in good faith is a question of fact and is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari save for exceptional circumstances. In fine, the finding of the NLRC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that SJCI closed the high school in bad faith is supported by substantial evidence and is, thus, binding on this Court. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal. The determination of whether SJCI acted in bad faith depends on the particular facts as established by the evidence on record. Bad faith is, after all, an inference which must be drawn from the peculiar circumstances of a case. The two decisive factors in determining whether SJCI acted in bad faith are (1) the timing of, and reasons for the closure of the high school, and (2) the timing of, and the reasons for the subsequent opening of a college and elementary department, and, ultimately, the reopening of the high school department by SJCI after only one year from its closure. Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to discern that the closure was done to defeat the parties agreement to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE; to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock; to render nugatory any decision of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Unions right to collective bargaining and its members right to security of tenure. By admitting that the closure was due to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management,
specifically, the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with the demands of the Union. This is precisely what the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat the Unions right to collective bargaining. With respect to SJCIs claim that during the 1997 CBA negotiations the Union made illegal demands because they exceeded the 70% limitation set by R.A. No. 6728, it is important to note that the alleged illegality or excessiveness of the Unions demands were the issues to be resolved by the SOLE after the parties agreed to refer the said labor dispute to the latter for assumption of jurisdiction. As previously mentioned, the SOLE certified the case to the NLRC, which on June 28, 2002, rendered a decision finding that there was insufficient evidence to determine the reasonableness of the Unions proposals. The NLRC found that SJCI failed to establish that the Unions demands were illegal or excessive. A review of the records clearly shows that the Union submitted a position paper detailing its demands in actual monetary terms. However, SJCI failed to establish how and why these demands were in excess of the limitation set by R.A. 6728. Up to this point in the proceedings, it has merely relied on its self-serving statements that the Unions demands were illegal and excessive. There is no basis, therefore, to hold that the Union ever made illegal or excessive demands. At any rate, even assuming that the Unions demands were illegal or excessive, the important and crucial point is that these alleged illegal or excessive demands did not justify the closure of the high school and do not, in any way, establish SJCIs good faith. The employer cannot unilaterally close its establishment on the pretext that the demands of its employees are excessive. As already discussed, neither party is obliged to give-in to the others excessive or unreasonable demands during collective bargaining, and the remedy in such case is to refer the dispute to the proper tribunal for resolution. This was what SJCI and the Union did when they referred the 1997 CBA bargaining deadlock to the SOLE; however, SJCI pre-empted the resolution of the dispute by closing the high school. SJCI disregarded the whole dispute resolution mechanism and undermined the Unions right to collective bargaining when it closed down the high school while the dispute was still pending with the SOLE. The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to close down the establishment on the ground of illegal or excessive demands of the Union. Instead, aside from the remedy of submitting the dispute for voluntary or compulsory arbitration, the employer may file a
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complaint for ULP against the Union for bargaining in bad faith. If found guilty, this gives rise to civil and criminal liabilities and allows the employer to implement a lock out, but not the closure of the establishment resulting to the permanent loss of employment of the whole workforce. (2) No. The protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998. (13) CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL [CABEU-NFL], represented by its President, PABLITO SAGURAN vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. [CAB], represented by its President, ANTONIO STEVEN L. CHAN G.R. No. 186605 MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: On January 19, 2004, CABEU-NFL sent CAB a proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)6 seeking increases in the daily wage and vacation and sick leave benefits of the monthly employees and the grant of leave benefits and 13th month pay to seasonal workers. On March 27, 2004, CAB responded with a counter-proposal7 to the effect that the production bonus incentive and special production bonus and incentives be maintained. In addition, respondent CAB agreed to execute a pro-rated increase of wages every time the government would mandate an increase in the minimum wage. CAB, however, did not agree to grant additional and separate Christmas bonuses. On May 21, 2004, CAB received an Amended Union Proposal8 sent by CABEU-NFL reducing its previous demand regarding wages and bonuses. CAB, however, maintained its position on the matter. Thus, the collective bargaining negotiations resulted in a deadlock. On account of the impasse, "CABEU-NFL filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB then assumed conciliatory-mediation jurisdiction and summoned the parties to conciliation conferences."9 November 17, 2010
In its June 2, 2005 Letter sent to CAB10 (letter-request), CABEU-NFL requested copies of CABs annual financial statements from 2001 to 2004 and asked for the resumption of conciliation meetings. CAB replied through its June 14, 2005 Letter11 (letter-response) to NCMB Regional Director of Dumaguete City Isidro Cepeda, which reads: At the outset, it observed that the letter signed by Mr. Pablito Saguran who is no longer an employee of the Central for he was one of those lawfully terminated due to an authorized cause x x x. More importantly, the declared purpose of the requested conciliation meeting has already been rendered moot and academic because: (1) the Union which Mr. Saguran purportedly represents has already lost its majority status by reason of the disauthorization and withdrawal of support thereto by more than 90% of the rank and file employees in the bargaining unit of Central sometime in January, 2005, and (2) the workers themselves, acting as principal, after disauthorizing the previous agent CABEU-NFL have organized themselves into a new Union known as Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Labor Association (CABELA) and after obtaining their registration certificate and making due representation that it is a duly organized union representing almost all the rank and file workers in the Central, had concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the Central on April 21, 2005 in Dumaguete City. The aforesaid CBA had been duly ratified by the rank and file workers constituting 91% of the collective bargaining unit x x x. Clearly, therefore, the request for further conciliation conference will serve no lawful and practical purpose. In view of the foregoing, and for the sake of continued industrial peace prevailing in the Central, we beseech the Honorable Office to disregard the aforesaid request. It appears that the NCMB failed to act on the letter-response of CAB. Neither did it convene CAB and CABEU-NFL to continue the negotiations between them. CAB counters that in view of the disassociation of more than 90% of rankand-file workers from CABEU-NFL, it was constrained to negotiate and conclude in good faith a new CBA with CABELA, the newly established union by workers who disassociated from CABEU-NFL. CAB emphasizes that it declined further negotiations with CABEU-NFL in good faith because to continue with it would serve no practical purpose. Considering that the NCMB has yet to resolve CABs query in its letter-response, CAB was left
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without any choice but accede to the demands of CABELA. In concluding a CBA with CABELA, CAB claims that it acted in the best interest of the rankand-file workers which belied bad faith. ISSUE: Whether respondents act of concluding a CBA with CABELA is warranted under the circumstances. HELD: The Labor Code, likewise, enumerates the acts constituting unfair labor practices of the employer, thus: Article 248. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers.It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, as correctly determined by the LA, the filing of the complaint for unfair labor practice was premature inasmuch as the issue of collective bargaining is still pending before the NCMB. (14) UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFEDFA-KMU) vs. NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED G.R. Nos. 158930-31 March 3, 2008
x------------------------------------------x NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED vs. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU) G.R. Nos. 158944-45 March 3, 2008
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that CAB was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted x x x" in suspending negotiations with CABEU-NFL. Notably, CAB believed that CABEU-NFL was no longer the representative of the workers.34 It just wanted to foster industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its rank and file workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with CABELA."35 Such actions of CAB are nowhere tantamount to antiunionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases of unfair labor practices. Furthermore, basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith to the actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor practice.36 Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to the circumstances mentioned in the letter-response, namely, the execution of the supposed CBA between CAB and CABELA and the request to suspend the negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CABs actions. The Court is of the view that CABEU-NFL, in simply relying on the said letter-response, failed to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice to rebut the presumption of good faith.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS: Nestl is accused of violating its duty to bargain collectively when it purportedly imposed a pre-condition to its agreement to discuss and engage in collective bargaining negotiations with UFE-DFA-KMU. In a letter, Nestl reiterated its stance that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom." UFE-DFA-KMU argues therein that Nestls "refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice."23 It explains that Nestl set as a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations the non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan. In its words, "respondent Nestl Phils., Inc. insisted that the Union should first agree that the retirement plan is not a bargaining issue before respondent Nestl would agree to discuss other issues in the CBA." 24 It then concluded that "the Court of Appeals committed a legal error in not ruling that respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice. It also committed a legal error in failing to award damages to the petitioner for the ULP committed by the respondent."
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ISSUE: Whether Nestl is guilty of unfair labor practice. HELD: For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x"27 in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. Herein, the union merely bases its claim of refusal to bargain on a letter28 dated 29 May 2001 written by Nestl where the latter laid down its position that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants, companyinitiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom." But as we have stated in this Courts Decision, said letter is not tantamount to refusal to bargain. In thinking to exclude the issue of Retirement Plan from the CBA negotiations, Nestl, cannot be faulted for considering the same benefit as unilaterally granted, considering that eight out of nine bargaining units have allegedly agreed to treat the Retirement Plan as a unilaterally granted benefit. This is not a case where the employer exhibited an indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining, because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of the bargaining representative. Nestls desire to settle the dispute and proceed with the negotiation being evident in its cry for compulsory arbitration is proof enough of its exertion of reasonable effort at good-faith bargaining. In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employers steadfast insistence to exclude a particular substantive provision is no different from a bargaining representatives perseverance to include one that they deem of absolute necessity. Indeed, an adamant insistence on a bargaining position to the point where the negotiations reach an impasse does not establish bad faith.[fn24 p.10] It is but natural that at negotiations, management and labor adopt positions or make
demands and offer proposals and counter-proposals. On account of the importance of the economic issue proposed by UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestle could have refused to bargain with the former but it did not. And the managements firm stand against the issue of the Retirement Plan did not mean that it was bargaining in bad faith. It had a right to insist on its position to the point of stalemate. A meticulous review of the record and pleadings of the cases at bar shows that, of the two notices of strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU before the NCMB, it was only on the second that the ground of unfair labor practice was alleged. Worse, the 7 November 2001 Notice of Strike merely contained a general allegation that Nestl committed unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith for supposedly "setting pre-condition in the ground rules (Retirement issue)." (Notice of Strike of 7 November 2001; Annex "C" of UFE-DFA-KMU Position Paper; DOLE original records, p. 146.) In contrast, Nestl, in its Position Paper, did not confine itself to the issue of the non-inclusion of the Retirement Plan but extensively discussed its stance on other economic matters pertaining to the CBA. It is UFE-DFA-KMU, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor practice. A perusal of the allegations and arguments raised by UFE-DFA-KMU In the case at bar, except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU, neither the second Notice of Strike nor the records of these cases substantiate a finding of unfair labor practice. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. (Tiu v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123276, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 681, 688.) Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify bad faith on the part of Nestl apart from mere allegation. Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted letter of 29 May 2001 laid down a pre-condition to its agreement to bargain with UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestls inclusion in its Position Paper of its proposals affecting other matters covered by the CBA negates the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith. Accordingly, since UFE-DFAKMU failed to proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption of good faith on the part of Nestl, the award of moral and exemplary damages is unavailing. (15) EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER PHILS., FFW and JUANITO S. FACUNDO, in his capacity as President vs. BAYER
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PHILIPPINES, INC., DIETER J. LONISHEN (President), ASUNCION AMISTOSO (HRD Manager), AVELINA REMIGIO AND ANASTACIA VILLAREAL G.R. No. 162943 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Facts: Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (EUBP) is the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Bayer Philippines (Bayer), and is an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW). In 1997, EUBP, headed by its president Juanito S. Facundo, negotiated with Bayer for the signing of a CBA. During the negotiations, EUBP rejected Bayers 9.9% wage-increase proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock. Subsequently, EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. Pending the resolution of the dispute, Avelina Remigio and 27 other union members, without any authority from their union leaders, accepted Bayers wage-increase proposal. EUBPs grievance committee questioned Remigios action and reprimanded Remigio and her allies. The DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA retroactive to January 1, 1997 and to be made effective until December 31, 2001. The said CBA was registered on July 8, 1998 with the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE-NCR. Meanwhile, the rift between Facundos leadership and Remigios group broadened. Barely six months from the signing of the new CBA, during a company-sponsored seminar, Remigio solicited signatures from union members in support of a resolution containing the decision of the signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt a new constitution and bylaws for the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and elect a new set of interim officers, and (5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer. The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local union members. A subsequent resolution was also issued affirming the first resolution. A tug-of-war then ensued between the two rival groups, with both seeking recognition from Bayer and demanding remittance of the union dues collected from its rank-and-file members. Remigios splinter group wrote Facundo, FFW and Bayer informing them of the decision of the majority of the union members to disaffiliate from FFW. December 6, 2010
This was followed by another letter informing Facundo, FFW and Bayer that an interim set of REUBP executive officers and board of directors had been appointed, and demanding the remittance of all union dues to REUBP. Remigio also asked Bayer to desist from further transacting with EUBP. Facundo, meanwhile, sent similar requests to Bayer requesting for the remittance of union dues in favor of EUBP and accusing the company of interfering with purely union matters. Bayer responded by deciding not to deal with either of the two groups, and by placing the union dues collected in a trust account until the conflict between the two groups is resolved. EUBP filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (first ULP case) against Bayer for non-remittance of union dues. While the first ULP case was still pending and despite EUBPs repeated request for a grievance conference, Bayer decided to turn over the collected union dues to respondent Anastacia Villareal, Treasurer of REUBP. Aggrieved by the said development, EUBP lodged a complaint against Remigios group before the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE praying for their expulsion from EUBP for commission of "acts that threaten the life of the union." Thereafter, petitioners filed a second ULP complaint against herein respondents charging the respondents with unfair labor practice committed by organizing a company union, gross violation of the CBA and violation of their duty to bargain. Petitioners complained that Bayer refused to remit the collected union dues to EUBP despite several demands sent to the management. They also alleged that notwithstanding the requests sent to Bayer for a renegotiation of the last two years of the 1997-2001 CBA between EUBP and Bayer, the latter opted to negotiate instead with Remigios group. Labor Arbiter dismissed EUBPs first and second ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the case involves intra-union disputes. Issue Whether the act of the management of Bayer in dealing and negotiating with Remigios splinter group despite its validly existing CBA with EUBP can be considered unfair labor practice. Held: (1) Petitioners ULP complaint cannot prosper as against respondents Remigio and Villareal because the issue, as against them, essentially involves an intra-union dispute based on Section 1 (n) of DOLE Department Order No. 40-03. To rule on the validity or illegality of their acts, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC will necessarily touch on the issues respecting the propriety of their disaffiliation and the legality of the establishment of REUBP issues
19
that are outside the scope of their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the dismissal of the complaint was validly made, but only with respect to these two respondents. But are Bayer, Lonishen and Amistoso liable for unfair labor practice? On this score, we find that the evidence supports an answer in the affirmative. It must be remembered that a CBA is entered into in order to foster stability and mutual cooperation between labor and capital. An employer should not be allowed to rescind unilaterally its CBA with the duly certified bargaining agent it had previously contracted with, and decide to bargain anew with a different group if there is no legitimate reason for doing so and without first following the proper procedure. If such behavior would be tolerated, bargaining and negotiations between the employer and the union will never be truthful and meaningful, and no CBA forged after arduous negotiations will ever be honored or be relied upon. Indeed, in Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission, we explained the correlations of Article 248 (1) and Article 261 of the Labor Code to mean that for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and for the NLRC to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereon, the allegations in the complaint must show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. This pronouncement in Silva, however, should not be construed to apply to violations of the CBA which can be considered as gross violations per se, such as utter disregard of the very existence of the CBA itself, similar to what happened in this case. When an employer proceeds to negotiate with a splinter union despite the existence of its valid CBA with the duly certified and exclusive bargaining agent, the former indubitably abandons its recognition of the latter and terminates the entire CBA. Respondents cannot claim good faith to justify their acts. They knew that Facundos group represented the duly-elected officers of EUBP. Moreover, they were cognizant of the fact that even the DOLE Secretary himself had recognized the legitimacy of EUBPs mandate by rendering an arbitral award ordering the signing of the 1997-2001 CBA between Bayer and EUBP. Respondents were likewise well-aware of the pendency of the intra-union dispute case, yet they still proceeded to turn over the collected union dues to REUBP and to effusively deal with Remigio. The totality of respondents conduct, therefore, reeks with anti-EUBP animus.
(2) Bayer, Lonishen and Amistoso argue that the case is already moot and academic following the lapse of the 1997-2001 CBA and their renegotiation with EUBP for the 2006-2007 CBA. They also reason that the act of the company in negotiating with EUBP for the 2006-2007 CBA is an obvious recognition on their part that EUBP is now the certified collective bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees. We do not agree. First, a legitimate labor organization cannot be construed to have abandoned its pending claim against the management/employer by returning to the negotiating table to fulfill its duty to represent the interest of its members, except when the pending claim has been expressly waived or compromised in its subsequent negotiations with the management. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to subjecting industrial peace to the precondition that previous claims that labor may have against capital must first be waived or abandoned before negotiations between them may resume. Undoubtedly, this would be against public policy of affording protection to labor and will encourage scheming employers to commit unlawful acts without fear of being sanctioned in the future.1avvphi1 Second, that the management of Bayer decided to recognize EUBP as the certified collective bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees for purposes of its 2006-2007 CBA negotiations is of no moment. It did not obliterate the fact that the management of Bayer had withdrawn its recognition of EUBP and supported REUBP during the tumultuous implementation of the 1997-2001 CBA. Such act of interference which is violative of the existing CBA with EUBP led to the filing of the subject complaint.
20

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LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS BATCH 4 ARTICLES 247-249 (1) G.R. No.

178647 February 13, 2009

AQUINO BRAMPIO VILLANUEVA

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