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Chapter 7 State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law Killing & man is murder unless you do itt the sound of smumpets: v Abstract This chapter examines the intemational and US domestic law governing assassinations conducted or sponsored by States. The issue frst came to widespread, contemporary attention during the first Gulf War of 1990-1991 when US forces allegedly targeted Iragi President Saddam Hussein. Since then allegations of “decapitation” strikes against regime leadership have surfaced in such conflicts as the 1999 campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 2001 strikes against the Taliban, the 2003 war with Iraq and, most recently, the 2011 UN sane~ tioned operations in Libya, However, the law of assassination has a long lineage, stretching back to antiquity. The chapter clarifies much of the definitional confusion regarding the term by exploring both its historical basis and the extant prescriptive norms resident in both international and US law. It concludes with a survey of the practical factors likely to affect decisions about such targeting, an evaluation of current bans, and brief recommendations for future prohibitions. Contents 7 tntrodution 264 72. Historical Understandings 2x7 73. Contemporary Prohibitions of Assassination During Peactime. 21 73.1 Major Treas. aot 732. Inferenes from Other Legal Nonns 203 733. Extradition Treaties 204 TA. State Practice 296, 735. Conclusions 300 74. Contemporary Prohibitions under the Law of Armed Confit 30 74.1 From General Onder 100 tothe Oxford Manual 30 742 Hague IV and the Protocols Additional 1 the Geneva Conventions. 303 743. Domestic Manuals onthe Law of War 304 Previously published in 17 Vale Jounal of Inemational Law (1997) 1 MN. Schmit, Essays on Law and War at the Fault Lines, 23 DOE: 10.1007/978-90-6704-740-1_7, ‘atc. ASSER miss, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the author 2012 264 7. Sute-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law 744. Some Conclusions: A Definition of Wartime Assassination. 305 75. Applying the Proper Corpus of Law 315 7511 When the Law of Armed Conflict Gover. 315 752s 3i8 753s 319 754 in Non-Defensive 333 16 Domestic Potibitions 325 7.611 The Church Comittee Investigations 326 7.62. Executive and Congressional Initiatives in the AMtermath ofthe Church Report aM 7.63. The Ban on Assassination Interpreted in Light of US Practice 335 77 Conclusions 348 27.1 Prstcal Constraints 348 172. The Prohibitions Evalu 350 773. Final Thoughts, 356 References 358 7A Introdu n Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 rekindled a smoldering debate over the legality of state-sponsored assassination. Many thought that the casualties inevi table in a massive land assault on Iragi forces could easily be avoided by simply killing Saddam Hussein. Indeed, air strikes targeting’ Saddam's command centers ‘were ofien characterized as an effort to eliminate the Iraqi leader. However, when the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Dugan, suggested that the death of ‘Saddam Hussein might be a coalition objective, he was quickly dismissed.” Surely few would argue that state-sponsored assassination is, or should be, legal. Yet at the same time the use of force in international relations, often taking the form of intentionally killing one’s enemies, has been justified throughout history.’ What is it, then, that distinguishes assassination from lawful combat, or even from unlawful murder not amounting to assassination? If assassination is, as will be discussed below, a violation of US and interna- tional law, and one for which both states and individuals may be held responsible, "Tn mitarypavtance.a “tage” isa specific object of atack and “targeting” involves dieting operations tovard the aluck of a tage. This ehapler sch these tems in the cote of Sehait 19903, t AL * Unilateral resort to force was not considered violation of customary inkrmationa aw tl after World War I. For 4 discussion of the fet of the UN Charter on eastomary noes oveming the use offers, sce Reisman 1984 7 nteoduetion 2s, the term must be defined as clearly as possible to secure compliance. The impo- sition of responsibility in the absence of notice, even constructive notice, violates ‘one of the most basic principle of law—nullum erimen sine lege. ‘Although none of the domestic or international instruments proscribing assas- sination actually defines the prohibited conduct, scholars and practitioners have struggled to craft a working definition to serve as a guide to states in fashioning their behavior, and also as a prescriptive norm against which other states could {judge and possibly sanction that behavior.’ Some scholars focus on the killing of intemationally protected persons or high-level political figures.” Others ignore the vvictim’s status and instead focus on the purpose of the act and the presence of any political motivations.” Still others tend to analogize assassination to the classic |aw-of-war prohibition on treacherously killing one’s enemy.” The problem arses in par from the fact hat the US probiiion is contin in an executive ner, ste ina notes 189, 232, 230-252, rater than in legislation The onder des ot ince 4 Section on deintions ordinary found in sates. For a general discussion on asasinaton and the problems celating to is definition, se Havens ctl, 1975, pp. 1-20. A sampling of working

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