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Fall 2006
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THE VANGUARD
Volume 11 Number 4 Fall 2006 Publisher COL Larry D. Bruns, USA, Retired Managing Editor SFC Michael C. Taylor, USA, Retired Design Director Mr. Les Siemens Layout Assistant Ms. Robbin Myers Subscription Administrator Ms. Tara Glaus Editorial Office P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020 Fax: (520) 459-5022 Email: vanguard@micorps.org Website: http://www.micorps.org/ vanguard.htm
Purpose: THE VANGUARD is the official journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) for its members and sponsors. The quarterly journal serves as a professional forum for sharing knowledge, preserving history, and honoring civilian and military members of the Military Intelligence Corps. Disclaimer: All rights reserved. The opinions expressed in the THE VANGUARD are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the MICA. The content does not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of the Army or other U.S. Government organizations. Submissions: Submit articles, photographs, and other material to the Editor, THE VANGUARD, at vanguard@micorps.org. Please provide contact information, a description of the material, and a short biography with each submission. THE VANGUARD reserves the right to accept, reject, or edit any submissions at its discretion. Articles, photographs, and other material from THE VANGUARD may be reproduced, if they are not restricted by law or military regulations, provided proper credit is given and the Editor has given specific prior permission for each reproduced item. Change of Address: Please send your new address along with your old address to administrator@micorps.org or by mail to MICA, P Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ .O. 85670-3020. Postmaster: Send address changes to MICA, P Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ .O. 85670-3020.
Presidents Message
THE VANGUARD, under the direction of Michael Taylor, has risen with each issue to a new level of professionalism. The articles in this issue underscore the transformation of THE VANGUARD over the past eighteen months. The word is getting out and writers are submitting well thought out and focused articles on diverse topic of interest to the members of MICA and the MI Corps. These articles serve to expand the dialogue on our profession and cause debate that strengthens our Corps. Sadly, Michael is departing as the editor of THE VANWe are looking for someone to step up and continue the transformation of THE VANGUARD. If anyone has an interest in being the new editor, please contact myself or another member of the MICA National Executive Committee by 1 December 2006.
GUARD.
MICA National Executive Committee President COL Larry D. Bruns, USA, Retired president@micorps.org Vice President 1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retired vicepresident@micorps.org Secretary Mr. Christopher L. Friend secretary@micorps.org Treasurer 1SG Timothy P. Carroll, Jr., USA, Retired treasurer@micorps.org Other MICA National Executive Committee Points of Contact Administrator Ms. Tara Glaus administrator@micorps.org Awards Ms. Tara Glaus knowlton@micorps.org Chapter Coordinator COL Calvin E. Boyles, USA, Retired chapters@micorps.org Corporate Membership Coordinator 1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retired corporate@micorps.org Managing Editor, THE VANGUARD SFC Michael C. Taylor, USA, Retired vanguard@micorps.org Gift Shop Manager 1SG Timothy P. Carroll, Jr., USA, Retired gifts@micorps.org 2 5 5 9 15 18 18 20 20 20 21 22 25 Individual Membership Coordinator 1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retired membership@micorps.org Mentor Program Coordinator COL Robert C. White, Jr. USA, Retired mentor6@micorps.org Scholarship Program Coordinator SGM John L. Corley, USA scholarship@micorps.org Chapter Points of Contact See Chapter News for individual chapter points of contact or visit http:// www.micorps.org/chapters.htm.
The Executive Committee has spent much of the past two-months reviewing and revising the MICA Constitution and By-Laws. The Constitution appears in this issue for the membership to review. We will publish the ByLaws in a subsequent issue of THE VANGUARD. Please continue the use of the on-line Gift Shop. Based on your use, Tim Carroll continues to expand its selection and inventory. The Gift Shop remains a good place to find unique MI Corps related mementos for departures, arrivals, or special Corps functions. Our thoughts remain with all those intelligence professionals going in harms way each and every day. We are proud of what you are doing for Corps and Nation. We pray for and await your safe return. Larry D. Bruns, President
Contents FEATURES Crisis in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria Afghan National Army Intelligence School 76th Infantry Brigade Leverages ASAS-Light The Sources and Patterns of Terrorism in Islamic Law 650th MI Group Pioneers Multinational Counterintelligence in NATO DEPARTMENTS Army Publishes New Intelligence Manual Military Intelligence Hall of Fame Chapter News US Army Field Station Augsburg Reunion 328d Communications Reconnaissance Company Reunion Knowlton and Golden Rose Award Receipients for 3rd Quarter 2006 Constitution of The Military Intelligence Corps Association Submissions Guidelines
FEATURE
analysis of three separate hypotheses, overwhelming evidence points to the Nigerian governments continued use of military force to quell violence and stabilize oil production. Economic benefits will almost certainly stay in the hands of the powerful and politically connected, with a lack of historical action in changing policy or acting on proposed agendas to improve the Niger Delta region. Violence will continue to be the primary tool of the people to voice their dissent. If the Nigerian government continues to fail in stabilizing the Niger Delta, international intervention is almost inevitable. There is also a lack of evidence pointing to the Nigerian government requesting international assistance, which means US and Coalition intervention will be required when the government no longer controls the Niger Delta region.
According to the US National Energy Strategy1, West Africa will produce 25% of the worlds oil by the year 2020, up from its current 10%. With this large increase in oil production, the stability of West Africas largest oil producer, Nigeria, will be critical to the success of this growing energy market. The US currently imports 1.15 million barrels of oil per day from Nigeria, accounting virtually half of Nigerias production, making the country the 5th largest importer to the US. Increased violence in Nigerias oil producing Niger Delta region raises questions as to whether the government can address the needs of its people while increasing its economic viability. So how will the Nigerian government address the continued violence in the Niger Delta? After careful
changing economic policy they simply chose to reap the benefits of the oil industry without compensating the regional population where the oil resources reside. This is an underlying issue with todays violence in the Niger Delta, and hinders other national interests such as education and civil engineering projects to improve the nations infrastructure. Instead, the influence of the foreign oil companies operating in the region dictate much of Nigerias domestic policy. Another key event that contributes to the violence plaguing the Niger Delta is the formation of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1993. MOSOP formed to give the Ogoni people, indigenous to an oil-rich area of the Niger Delta, a platform to protest the perceived abuses by foreign oil companies such as Shell in Ogoni territory. The Ogoni charged Shell with environmental abuses of their land and a lack of oil revenue placed back into Ogoniland. Events escalated when then President Abacha took over the government in November 1993 and dispatched the Nigerian military to Ogoniland to pacify MOSOP initiatives. The military commenced to lootings, burnings, rape, executions and other acts of terror, including the murder of four Ogoni leaders. Many Ogoni suspected an alliance between Shell and the Nigerian government resulting in this retaliation against the Ogoni. In May 1994, MOSOP leader Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders were fraudulently charged with the murder of the four Ogoni leaders and imprisoned. In October 1995, all nine MOSOP leaders were tried and found guilty, causing several international organizations including the United Nations to pressure Abacha to spare their lives. Despite these pressures, Abacha executed the nine men resulting in several nations placing immediate sanctions on Nigeria2. The perceived use of the Nigerian military as an action arm of foreign oil companies when opposition is raised to the government is perhaps the greatest evidence supporting military use to solve instability issues. The lack of attention paid to international pressures shows a lack of evidence for future requests by the Nigerian government for international assistance in domestic issues.
violence, intentionally or otherwise, through a pattern of environmental neglect and financial arrangements with the Nigerian government3. As a result, the people of the region have lost the ability to work due to environmental disasters and loss of land, and have seen little by way of financial compensation from the Nigerian government. This lack of economic benefit to the Niger Delta region has created rampant criminal activity, to include selling siphoned oil to purchase weapons and kidnapping foreigners for ransom. Although this paper discusses the vast ethnic divides in Nigeria and the related violence these divides have caused, it is important to understand much of ethnic violence is a result of the stagnant economy. The lack of money, jobs and governmental attention has pushed the people of the Niger Delta into a state of desperation and anger, resulting in violence directed against rival ethnic groups. Although rivals, Nigerian ethnic groups would have a better chance of living in relative peace if provided with financial incentives and civil engineering projects from the government. On several occasions, Nigerian government representatives have proposed various plans to reinvigorate the economy and the Niger Delta region, the majority of which remain empty promises4. The oil companies also claim to be actively assisting the communities of the Niger Delta, although independent reports show quite the contrary. Many projects sponsored by oil companies in the region are unfinished, or even worse, actually support oil production rather than help the local population5. The Nigerian government must become more assertive over the oil companies and transition to a non-corrupt authority over the oil companies operating in their country. This alone will facilitate an environment where proper measures can be taken to ensure the Niger Deltas populace receives proper compensation and oil companies are regulated in their actions. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support this change, therefore reverting to military action to stabilize oil production.
has increased the use of kidnapping for ransom to fund their resistance. Although many militant groups operate in the Niger Delta, MEND normally facilitates activity and attempts to consolidate resources and efforts for the opposition. Estimates state security-related issues accounted for a 25% reduction in oil production by this year. Although this figure is staggering, no evidence points to the Nigerian government making any changes in policy to improve the Niger Delta situation, instead opting to continue use of the military to quell violence. Other government organizations, such as the Special Security Service (SSS), participate in covert raids on kidnapping rings, which has had isolated success in the past year6. Overall, the results have not changed the overall violent and dangerous environment in the Niger Delta. The upcoming Nigerian national elections, set to begin in early 2007, is yet another key evidence pointing away from any real political or economic change in the next few years. As with the majority of national elections, the transition time between administrations can be long, and for the fledgling Nigerian democracy, it will likely take even longer. The real concern among several international observers is whether voter turnout will be high or will violent incidents intimidate Nigerians from going to the polls7. Recently, a series of politically-motivated assassinations have sparked accusations of police involvement in attempting to curve the elections to meet their political agenda In an already tenuous trust-relationship between Nigerians and their government, these accusations can only hurt the prospects of a successful national election next year.
SFC Brassard currently serves as the NCOIC of the G2, US Army Southern European Task Force (Airborne). Previous assignments include 1-67 Armor Battalion S2, 4th Infantry Division; Combating Terrorism NCOIC for US Army Europe; and Regional Threat Section NCOIC for 66th MI Group. He has deployed to Afghanistan, serving as the CJTF-76 J2 JISE/ Operations NCOIC and the Senior Targeting Analyst.
Endnotes
1. The US National Energy Policy: http:// www.whitehouse.gov/energy/ US Government website providing the official US Energy Policy detailing trends in worldwide energy resources. 2. Motherland Nigeria: http://www.motherlandnigeria.co m/ An independent website providing a history of significant events that shaped present day Nigeria. Created by Nigerian national Mr. Olubunmi Boomi, who has firsthand knowledge of many issues facing the Niger Delta. 3. Conflicts in Africa: http://www.globalissues.org/ Geopolitics/Africa/Nigeria.asp/ Provides great incite into the oil companys involvement in Nigerian politics, specifically recent violence plaguing the Niger Delta. 4. All Africa: http://www.allafrica.com/stories/ 200609038.html/ Daily news resource discussing strictly African issues. Great independent news resource for Africa-specific topics. 5. Essential Action: http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/ report/ Provides an independent report from nine reporters and activists who visited the Niger Delta and documente oil company abuses and environmental neglect. 6. Library of Congress Nigeria Country Report: http: //www.lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf#searcg= %22history%20MEND%20nigeria%22/ US Government website providing the most comprehensive and updated information on Nigeria, including demographics, economy, government and internal/external threats. 7. VOA News: http://www.voanews.com/english/200608-25-voa24.cfm/ Provides daily world information, with this particular article focused on the 2007 Nigerian National Elections.
Conclusion
To conclude, collected and analyzed evidence overwhelmingly points to Nigerias continued use of their military to stabilize oil production and maintain the nations primary source of income. Violence in the Niger Delta has not significantly improved over the last seven years, and there is no reason to believe it will in the future without significant economic and political change. The influence and power that foreign oil companies have within the Nigerian government will continue to drive domestic agenda, and as long as the oil companies can pay for their own protection, the real victims in this crisis are the common populace in the Niger Delta. As in other stabilization operations conducted throughout the world, Nigeria faces international intervention once the central Nigerian government cannot control the oilrich Niger Delta. Without the aforementioned policy changes, Nigeria will face certain failure in realizing their full oil-producing potential.
FEATURE
MAJ Lee Grubbs and CPT Shawnda Johnson present Distinguished Honor Graduates with 10th Mountain Division G2 Coins. will help provide the Afghan National Army personnel with the intelligence skills they require in order to shape their country and make it a strong Afghanistan. The next Intelligence Officer course will take place in November 2006 with guest instructors from the CJTF -76s Joint Intelligence Operations CapabilityAfghanistan.
MAJ Grubb is the Chief, Joint Intelligence Support Element, of CJTF-76. Readers can contact MAJ Grubbs at lee.gurbbs@cjtf76.centcom.mil.
FEATURE
The Workshop
Attendees consisted of members of the Brigade S2 section and the S2 sections of the subordinate battalions, as well as personnel from the 38th Infantry Divisions Analysis and Control Element (ACE) and Joint Forces Headquarters-Indiana. All attendees were greeted by BG Harris, who provided his guidance for the training and took time out of his busy schedule to specifically emphasize the importance of automation to the entire Warfighter community and to continually challenge the 76th Brigade intelligence community to keep raising the bar on ASAS-Light proficiency. The brigades intent and focus was to provide a productive venue for intelligence professionals to receive developmental instruction while transitioning the Brigades focus to future training and operations of a modular infantry brigade combat team. 76th Infantry Brigade had just returned from a deployment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. As the Headquarters for Coalition Joint Task Force Phoenix III, the brigade deployed Army Battlefield Command Systems (ABCS) to include ASAS-Light in Afghanistan. In
Afghanistan, the brigade leveraged successfully its ABCS capabilities to maintain situational awareness and track trends in the tactics of insurgents in the task force area of operations. Lessons from the deployment developed from operating with multinational coalition partners who do not share the same security access or security clearance requirements as does the US Army. These challenges forced adjustments to standard operating procedures (SOP) for information exchange and processing. Throughout these adjustments, the brigade leveraged ASAS-Light capabilities to increase the S2s efficiency in receiving, storing, and disseminating information to produce timely and relevant intelligence. The main goal is to familiarize the whole Brigade with the ASAS-Light, said MAJ Andy Minton, the 76th Infantry Brigade S2. We want them to maintain the basics and see what the system can do for them. 1LT Gregory Hembree, Assistant S2, began the workshop by briefing the soldiers on a Warfighter scenario overview and provided information on operations and terrain graphics. While 1LT Hembree briefed the enemy situation as part of the common operational picture (COP) to the audience, CW2 James Graham dynamically manipulated the ASAS-Light map display. CW2 Graham also executed live queries of data to support the presentation of specific intelligence preparation of the battlefield results. Gone are the days of 3x5 cards and canned slide shows depicting hours-old information. Todays Intelligence Professional must be acutely aware of the battlefield environment so that he or she can convey the most timely and relevant assessment to the battlefield commander. Time is not on our side, and we can now leverage the power of computer databases and information dominance to develop and display it in a graphic that is easy to understand preached 1LT Hembree as he briefed the brigade and battalion staffs.
We live and die by automation, and ASAS is your tool to keep me informed on the enemy situation says BG David Harris with an ASAS depiction in the background. We have already achieved proficiency with ASAS; now we must maintain it.
in the military decision making process. The S2 section at any echelon is responsible for establishing a correlated enemy graphic, an intelligence product, based on the organic reporting and intelligence feeds from higher and adjacent headquarters. As the 76th Infantry Brigade also learned in Afghanistan, battlefield information comes from many other sources outside the normal reporting channels. In a multinational environment, information and all-source intelligence may enter the S2s reporting channels via briefing notes, telephonic Intel Cross-talk, or informal verbal reporting at synchronization meetings. Headquarters may also share intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) via courier, especially in an austere environment where communication is extremely difficult due to terrain limitations. ASAS, as a tool, allows the intelligence analyst to compile massive amounts of information from all these reports, collectors, sources and database as well as catalog this data in order to sort it, retrieve it, digest it and then make valid and relevant assessments. Once shared with other S2 sections, the enemy situation is correlated or synchronized with the assessments of others. This sharing provides a dynamic and computerized version of Intel Cross-talk which institutions like the US Army Intelligence Center has preached for years.
The Technology
Information dominance provides better synchronization, ensures all units and weapon systems participate in the fight, resulting in a faster tempo that overwhelms the enemy. The Army must leverage enabling technologies to meet these requirements. As with battle command, the principles of command and control do not change with the development and fielding of the ABCS. The more a commander knows about his enemy, the better he is able to exercise command and control and make appropriate decisions. A good commander understands the environment of combat, the dynamics of battle, and the enemys uncooperative nature. The ASAS-Light allows the Intelligence Professional to convey intelligence estimates to the commander to assist 6
The Techniques
In order to effectively operate the ASAS, analysts must pay more attention to the technical skills of computer database technology and software applications than ever before. S2s must also pay attention to managing the enemy in a dynamic battlefield. Managing the enemy is not an easy task. The enemy situation displayed on the ASAS is created through the use of size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) and contact reports
Once the analyst has developed and correlated the enemy picture, he can broadcast or synchronize the new or updated situation graphic via ASAS to higher, lower, and adjacent echelons in a matter of minutes. MI leaders will want to establish, as part of their tactical SOP just how often or un, der what circumstances the S2 should send an updated enemy situation graphic. Every time the S2 does this, he should notify the higher, adjacent, or subordinate commands by voice or text message. There are several methods of real-time digital communication organic to the intelligence architecture (embedded Instant Messaging and email), and there are countless other digital messagEntity Editor is the graphic user interface by which analyst input data in order ing applications that the analyst to maintain and query the database. The Unit Summary provides many fields in can load into the ASAS-Light. order to sectionalize information for database searches. This makes the ASAS-Light even more flexible to the analyst or as well as via shared INTSUMs (some adjacent units, esunit because this capability allows the unit to adapt the pecially in a multinational environment, may not have workstation to the organizations tactics, techniques, and access to ASAS workstations to link to the network). procedures. Analysts create the enemy icons based on what they This digital flexibility, while important to maintain ausee or what is reported to them about the enemy. Once tomation connectivity, also adds to the emphasis of intelan analyst creates an enemy icon, he must manage ligence analysts maintaining their technical skills. These (maintain) it to ensure the enemy picture is kept curare new challenges for trainers and leaders in the MI rent and as accurate as possible. The element that first Community as we all attempt to aggressively teach and receives a SALUTE or contact report and generates an maintain valuable skill sets in our analysts with precious enemy icon is responsible for managing that icon until little time in the training plans and schedules. Time is they can no longer observe the enemy unit or it has an issue especially for Army National Guard and other been destroyed. This includes updating the enemy Reserve Component units that train one weekend per position, adjusting the number and types of vehicles if month and two weeks during the summer. This is what necessary, changes in the enemys activity, and delete makes a separate workshop, such as the one conducted the icon when it is no longer a valid representation of the annually by 76th Infantry Brigade, so critical to maintainenemys composition and location. ing the skills of automation and familiarity with ASASWhen the enemy formation or element moves beLight, the weapon system of todays digital analyst. yond the icon managers view he should pass the icon Once our analyst teams compile and digest all of the on to the analyst in the adjacent or higher unit. The use information that hits the S2 shop, they can run queries in of transition named areas of interest or intelligence the ASAS that depict patterns and trends. conveyed 1LT hand-off lines are both good techniques to facilitate the Hembree. This automation doesnt replace the analyst passing of the enemy along with its representative icon to or the analysis that is performed; ASAS as a tool assists the next observer or friendly echelons S2. These, by the in predictive analysis by allowing analysts to spot trends way, are age-old techniques that Intelligence Professionthat they may otherwise have missed without the power als have been using for years and have been preached of a digital database. at the school house in courses like Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course and Captains Career Course. 7
The Training
Following 1LT Hembrees Mission Brief, CW2 Graham gave technical instruction on the functionality of the ASAS-Light and how it helps analysts manage the enemy and share intelligence. Soldiers learned about the digital connectivity that enables ASAS to synchronize at multiple echelons. They also learned about the architectural backbones on which ASAS can operate as well as the functionality of the automated tool sets like ArcGIS (geospatial information service software) and Entity Editor (the database interface) as well as Analyst Notebook, an application used to depict enemy relationships. By the end of CW2 Grahams instruction, soldiers understood how to input battlefield information, insert their own analysis, and rapidly share that intelligence to update the COP at all echelons. This really takes Intel Cross-talk to a new level, said CW2 Graham, who has dedicated several man-hours to enhancing the system while working directly with the Program Director for Intelligence Fusion as well as the system engineers. After the technical instruction, soldiers broke off into groups by battalion S2 sections, a brigade S2 section, and a division ACE in order to replicate functional tactical operations center intelligence operations and to show that digital synchronization can provide an updated COP to all elements, dynamically updated to give accuracy as the situation develops. Novice soldiers who werent familiar with the ASAS-Light were able to work with experienced soldiers who had already deployed with the system and had developed expertise in using it in the field. It was easy talking to a deployed soldier, says SPC Joe Dodson. I was able to ask practical questions like, Did you actually use this method? Which worked best for you? SGT Amanda Brezina was one of the soldiers at the workshop who had deployed with the system. During the practical exercises she was able to refresh her memory on the capabilities of the system as well as assist other soldiers who were experiencing difficulties. I think having people from all different units learning at a company level and not relying on upper level units really helped, Sergeant Brezina said. We accomplished our goal. The computers are talking and the soldiers are able to understand the message process. MAJ Anthony Sanchez, the Product Director of Intelligence Fusion at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, visited the workshop and brought his team to observe the training and evaluate the ASAS-Light in action. Chief Graham is doing things with the system that we havent tried before, remarked MAJ Sanchez. He 8
really dove into the system. Its apparent that the leadership has refined the process of operating the system and is focusing on things to become successful. Part of being successful is figuring out the best way to get your job done and focusing on that. Chief Graham is doing a good job of that. System engineers like Marvin Miller attended the conference to oversee different units operating the ASAS-Light and make note of how they were using the system and what changes need to be made. Mr. Miller has been with the program for over a decade and has been an integral part of the systems evolution. Because different units operate the ASAS-Light in different ways according to SOP as well as their tactics, techniques and procedures, the system engineers are able to incorporate those lessons learned into their training and provide upgrades or tweaks to the ASAS-Light so that it can be as useful as possible on the battlefield. Well still continue to make little refinements, says MAJ Sanchez. Once you stabilize a baseline product, youre able to take what is there and make little refinements. I think the 76th Brigade is most likely to be a large contributor to this process.
Conclusion
This really fit the bill according to 1LT Jacob Weis. It is exactly what we needed! The workshop was a success. With the relevant instructions from 1LT Hembree as well as the assistance of CW2 Graham and the support of system engineers, the soldiers were able to train to standard. All walked away from the training very pleased with the opportunity to apply their intelligence skills, knowledge and abilities in a nonintrusive environment that allowed for mistakes, corrections, and development.
1LT Hembree is the Assistant S2, 76th Infantry Brigade, and SPC Huffman is the Unit Public Affairs Representative, 276th MI Company, Indiana National Guard. Readers can contact 1LT Hembree at gregory.t. hembree@us.army.mil and SPC Huffman at angela.huf fman@us.army.mil
others). The insurgent environment is characterized by a wide variety of groups (Al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, or any number of pop-up organizations), state sponsors (Iran, formerly Afghanistan, and others), as well as homegrown and freelance individuals whose operations range from centralized planning and execution to instances of autonomous, decentralized, self actualization. The analytical challenge is to create a framework that portrays the threat in understandable terms and gives insight to a solution. As depicted in Figure 1, one such framework consists of organizing the analytic picture into the three traditional levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical The tactical level is the insurgent environment, whether it be in a specific country or region, and the primary response force is law enforcement or the military. Operational The operational level (hostile or facilitating groups, nongovernmental organizations and charities, and nation-states) is addressed primarily by the military; diplomacy and economic initiatives having failed in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, and other pop-up organizations. Strategic The strategic level hosts the forces that animate the tactical and operational elements. Those forces are the strategic themes in Islam which consists of: The Example of the Prophet; the Koran; the Haddiths; Islamic Law; the Pillars of Faith; Jihad; World View; and, Just War Traditions. Within each of these themes are drivers that constitute the sources of terrorism in Islam.
There was a nearly incomprehensible misconception about the nature of the military problem. Lacking a criteria for judgment, officials often misunderstood, and therefore often misstated, the issues. -- Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy This paper identifies the sources and patterns of terrorism in Islam and proposes a framework for a response. The United States is confronted with an ideological threat requiring a response using a lever of national power that has no tradition of success in American Foreign Policy. Of the four levers of national power (diplomatic, ideological, military and economic) the United States has traditionally used three (diplomatic, military and economic) to defeat its adversaries. The Ideological lever has largely been neglected. The two primarily ideological wars in American history are the Revolutionary War and the Cold War and in each the United States successfully responded with a combination of diplomatic, military and economic power. An argument can be made that the Revolutionary War and Cold Wars were characterized by Ideological exchanges but in neither case were American ideological tools organized, synchronized and focused against enemy centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities or exploitable seams. Today, the United States, and an increasing number of other governments, are beleaguered by an expanding array of states, groups, and individuals whose goals, actions and norms are animated by Islamic values. This places the defenders in the unenviable position of having to fight, at the strategic level, against an idea.
A FRAMEWORK
Currently, the United States is engaged in two countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) and is experiencing a groundswell of insurgent activity in each. Elsewhere across the globe, an increasing number of Governments are addressing the rising levels of criminal activity animated by Islamic values (Belgium, England, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Russian, Somalia, Sudan, The Netherlands, and
number of key, and closely interwoven, Islamic themes. Each of these themes is central to the core values of Islam and its orthodoxy and adherence to these themes is obligatory for the pious and devout. Mohammads influence is manifested three fold as the author of the Koran, the subject of the Haddiths, and by his personal example. These three elements (Mohammad, the Koran, and the Haddiths) form the basis of Islamic Law.
Mohammad
Mohammad, both in his capacity as a military and religious leader, established a strategic objective of political (as well as religious) imperium and he left behind a rudimentary warfighting doctrine articulated in the Koran, elaborated on in the Haddiths1, codified in Islamic Law and reinforced by cur-
Ibn Umar. Allahs Apostle said, I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is Allahs Apostle, and offer the prayers perfectly and give obligatory charity, so if they perform that, then they save their lives and property from me except for Islamic Laws and then their reckoning (accounts) will be done by Allah. 4 This utterance by Mohammad has neither been countermanded nor abrogated leaving it a mandate into the 21st Century. For Non-Muslims, Mohammads mindset is a source for terrorism.5
Islamic Law
Islamic Law is based on The Example of Mohammad, the Koran, and the Haddiths and is refracted through the lenses of four major Sunni Schools6 and a lesser number of Schools within the Shia Tradition.7 The Jurists, using the rules of war embedded in the Koran, the Haddiths and the Example of Mohammad, give clear guidance on combat, combat support and combat service support obligations to the fighter, and those who can directly and indirectly support him. The Sunni views are contained and discussed, but not limited to, the following legal texts: The Distinguished Jurists Primer,8 The Riyad-us-Saliheen,9 and Reliance of the Traveller.10 Each text discusses Jihad in detail citing a number of Koranic verses as the basis in Law for attacking Non-Muslims. For example, The Distinguished Jurists Primer rests its analysis on the laws justifying Jihad on the following Koranic Suras: 2:190, 2:216, 4:95, 8.1, 8:39, 8:41, 8: 61, 8:67, 9:5, 9:29, 9:122, 17:17, 40:25, 47:4, 48:17, 59:6, and 59:10. Reliance of the Traveller cites Sura 2: 216, 4:89, 4:95, 9:29, 9:36, 9:41, 9:111, and 61:1013. The Riyad-us-Saliheen cites Sura 2:216, 4:95-96, 9: 36, 9:41, 9:111, and 61:10-13. Common to all three of the legal texts are 2:16 and 4:95. Sura 2:216 obliges the fighter and Sura 4:95 motivates the non-fighter. Sura 002.216:11 Yusufali: Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not. Pickthal: Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not. Shakir: Fighting is enjoined on you, and it is an object of dislike to you; and it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it 10
rent interpretations in the modern era. As late as early 2006, the senior Service colleges of the Department of Defense had not incorporated into their curriculum a systematic study of Mohammad as a military or political leader. As a consequence, we still do not have an in-depth understanding of the war fighting doctrine laid down by Mohammad, how it might be applied today by an increasing number of Islamic groups, or how it might be countered.
The Koran
Mohammads Koranic verse commanding Jihad with a view toward a strategic endstate is Sura 8:39.2 Sura 008.039: Yusufali: And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere; but if they cease, verily Allah doth see all that they do. Pickthal: And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allah. But if they cease, then lo! Allah is Seer of what they do. Shakir: And fight with them until there is no more persecution and religion should be only for Allah; but if they desist, then surely Allah sees what they do. Mohammads views are elaborated on in Surah 8, Al-Anfal, of the Koran. Yousuf Ali, the translator for the principle version of the Koran that the US Military uses, comments, In this chapter (Sura 8) we have the lessons of the Battle of Badr enforced in their larger aspects; (1) the question of war booty; (2) the true virtues necessary for fighting the good fight; (3) victory against odds; (4) clemency and consideration for ones own and for others in the hour of victory.3
The Haddiths
Mohammads mindset is further revealed from the Haddith recorded by Sahih Al-Bukhari, and narrated by
may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah knows, while you do not know. Sura 004.095:12 Yusufali: Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of Allah with their goods and their persons. Allah hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in Faith) Hath Allah promised good: But those who strive and fight Hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward. Pickthal: Those of the believers who sit still, other than those who have a (disabling) hurt, are not on an equality with those who strive in the way of Allah with their wealth and lives. Allah hath conferred on those who strive with their wealth and lives a rank above the sedentary. Unto each Allah hath promised good, but He hath bestowed on those who strive a great reward above the sedentary. Shakir: The holders back from among the believers, not having any injury, and those who strive hard in Allahs way with their property and their persons are not equal; Allah has made the strivers with their property and their persons to excel the holders back a (high) degree, and to each (class) Allah has promised good; and Allah shall grant to the strivers above the holders back a mighty reward. The Distinguished Jurists Primer,13 Riyad-us-Salihee,14 and Reliance of the Traveller,15 clearly identify combat, combat support and combat service support roles for the Muslim community when one initiates Jihad. There is unambiguous legal guidance upon whom support to Jihad is obligatory; conditions affecting the obligation; identification of the persons to be fought; the scale of harm that may be inflicted on the enemy; conditions for the declaration of war; the identification of the number from whom retreat is not permissible; permissions for truce; and, the two reasons for waging war (to force the conversion to Islam and to secure the payment of the jizya).
The obligatory disbursements for those whose hearts are to be reconciled constitute a funding mechanism facilitating the establishment of Islamic footholds in non-Muslim areas and the consolidating of those footholds to increase Islamic influence.17
The obligatory disbursements for those fighting for Allah constitute a funding mechanism for combat, combat support and combat service support operations. The precise characteristics of the funding process and the amount of money involved is presently unknown, but the enabling doctrine is in place and ideally suited for supporting autonomous, decentralized, asymmetrical military operations.18 The obligatory disbursements for travelers needing money defrays personal expenses and transportation costs associated with individual movement to and from conflict zones.19
Jihad20
Jihad is considered among an increasing number of Muslims to constitute a Sixth Pillar of Faith and this enjoys considerable theological inertia. Mohammad commanded Jihad (Sura 8:39) proclaiming a divine mandate, personally led 27 attacks and sent his armies out 47 more times against non-Islamic communities averaging about seven operations per year.21 Quoting directly from the Encyclopaedia (sic) of Jihad: The Scholars of Fiqh (jurisprudence) have agreed that jihad in Sharaee terms means to fight in the Path of Allah or anything aiding this course A more detailed understanding of the term Jihad has been explained by the four major schools of Fiqh as follows. Maliki Fiqh: The Muslims are to fight with the Kuffar to advance Allahs religion. Shafiee Fiqh: The meaning of Jihad in Sharaee terms is to make utmost effort in fighting in the Path of Allah. Hanbali Figh: Jihad means to fight against the unbelievers. (Fadhail-e-Jihad). Hanafi Fiqh: Jihad means to be involved in fighting in the Path of Allah by ones life, wealth and speech. It is further explained to call the unbelievers towards the true religion of Islam and to fight against them, if they are unwilling to accept this true religion.22
Pillars of Faith
Of the five Pillars of Faith,16 one directly facilitates warfighting: zakat, or alms giving. There are eight obligatory disbursements for zakat: The Poor, Those Short of Money; Zakat Workers; Those Whose Hearts are to be Reconciled; Those Purchasing their Freedom; Those in Debt; Those Fighting for Allah; and, Travelers Needing Money. Three of these categories support insurgency 11
Developing a policy response is problematic because the analytical community does not have a commonly accepted or understood framework for quantifying the threat. Islam is an idea; an ideology, and it is not readily or easily susceptible to diplomatic, military, or economic leverage. As an idea, however, it is more susceptible to the information or ideological lever of power and this requires insight to where the lever should be applied. Figure 2 portrays the sources of power animating Islam. Islams political trinity consists of its Holy Texts, the Clerics (who interpret the Texts and serve as community leaders and spiritual advisors for fighters and fighting groups), and the People. Each of the three elements is tightly interwoven with Islams strategic themes. Within each element are centers of gravities, critical vulnerabilities and exploitable seams that, when fully identified, become potential themes for a defensive information campaign.
Centers of Gravity These constitute sources of strength that may or may not present themselves as suitable information targets.24 The centers of gravity for Islam itself are
Mohammad, the Koran, and to a lesser degree, the Haddiths. Fracturing a center of gravity is a shorter (but sometimes more difficult) route to success but an indirect method for attacking a center of gravity is approaching it through its critical vulnerabilities. Critical Vulnerabilities These are soft spots that, if exploited, may induce a deteriorating cascade effect upon the target. Critical vulnerabilities of the Koran, for example, are that it was uttered by a mortal; portions were ghostwritten by others; portions were lost or redacted, and it was revised and re-issued by another mortal. Similar vulnerabilities may be found in Mohammads character as a political and military leader, the character of other Clerics in the Modern Era, as well as the topics addressed in the Haddiths. Exploitable Seams Exploitable Seams are elements of Strategic Culture which can be thought of as LoveHate relationships that bind the three elements (Holy Texts, Clerics, and the People) together. For example, within the American experience, there is the love-hate relationship between the People and the Government. Americans love the Constitution but hate big government. Another love-hate relationship, successfully exploited by North Vietnam, was the dichotomy between an anti-military bias and the tradition of the citizen soldier. By exploiting the seams binding the People to the Government and the Military, North Vietnam was able 12
tion is raised about the nature of the Crusades and the answer is that the Crusades were a delayed response to Jihad
to fracture the Political Trinity of the United States. The same process may be applicable in the Global War on Terrorism. The identification of information or ideological centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and exploitable seams produces Information Themes which become the fodder for a yet to be realized Information Lever of National Power. Presently, the adversary has the upper hand in using a global network of information outlets capable of delivering Islamic themes penetrating otherwise inaccessible recesses of the Islamic Community. If the United States, Moderate Muslim governments, and the Non-Muslim world seek to engage ideological adversaries on their own ground, they will have to develop, use and maintain the full range of capabilities in the Ideological component of National Power, and address Islams strategic themes directly.
Endnotes
1. From the Haddith, recorded by Sahih Al-Bukhari, Muhammad is quoted as saying: I am commanded by Allah to go and fight all the people of the world until they confess there is no God but allah, and I am his messenger, and to pray five times a day and to give alms. And if they do that, their blood will be spared from me. This command has not been revoked, abrogated, or modified. See Mark A. Gabriel, Islam and Terrorism: What the Quran Really Teaches About Christianity, Violence, and the Goals of Islamic Jihad, (Charisma House, Lake Mary, FL. 2002); 79. 2. http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/008.qmt.html#008.039, accessed 30 June 2006 3. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Quran (Amana Publications, Baltimore, 2002): 413 4. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http:// www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/ 002.sbt.html#001.002.024, accessed 29 June 2006 5. Will you listen to me, O Quraysh? By Him who holds my life in His hands I bring you a slaughter. Muhammad to his detractors while circumambulating the Kaba on the third circuit. Reported by Amr ibn al-As in Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet (Harper Collins: San Francisco, 1992); 124. 6. The four schools are Hanifi, Maliki, Shafie, and Hanbali. 7. The remainder of this assessment will address the Sunni Law Traditions. 8. Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK:(1994) 9. Yahya, al-Imam Abu Zakariya, Riyad-us-Saliheen, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia:(1998) 10. al-Misri, Ahmed ibn Naqib, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD, 1994. 11. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http://
www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/002.qmt.html#002.216, accessed 29 June 2006. 12. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http:// www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/004.qmt.html#004.095, accessed 29 June 2006 13. Ibn Rushd: 454-487 14. Yahya: 976-1016 15. al-Misri: 599-605 16. The Five Pillars of Faith are: Testimony of Faith (Kalima), Prayer (Salat), Fasting (Sawm), Almsgiving (Zakat), and Pilgrimage (Hajj). 17. Those Whose Hearts Are To Be Reconciled: Must be Muslim. Given to ensure propagation of the faith in initial stages. If recent converts and are alienated from their kin. Those to be reconciled include: Chief personages of a people (with weak or fledgling institutions needing economic support to improve or whose peers may be expected to enter Islam); Heads of a people who collect zakat for Islam from Muslims living near them who refuse to pay it; Heads of a people who fight an enemy for Islam at considerable expense and trouble to themselves. See al-Misri: 270-271. 18. Those Fighting for Allah: Those engaged in Islamic military operations for whom no salary has been allotted in the army roster. Given enough to suffice them for the operation even if affluent of: weapons; mounts; clothing; expenses; and, for the duration of the journey, round trip, and the time they spend there. Current interpretation and practice has been to provide expenses in supporting such persons family during this period. See al-Misri: 272. 19. Travelers Needing Money. One who is passing through a town in Muslim lands where zakat is collected or whose journey was not taken for the purpose of disobeying Allah, if such a person is in need, he is given enough to cover his personal expenses and transportation, even if he possesses money back home. See al-Misri: 272 20. For a more detailed discussion of Jihad, see Stephen P. Lambert, Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2005, and Islam: The Peaceful Religion in Perpetual War, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 2003. 21. Gabriel, 78. 22. R.K. Pruth, editor, Encyclodaedia of Jihad, Anmol Publications PVT, LTD, New Delhi, 2002, Vol 1, page 57-58 23. See first, Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994), 464. The Muslim jurists agreed that the purpose of fighting the People of the Book, excluding the (Qurayshite) People of the Book and the Christian Arabs, is one of two things: it is either for their conversion to Islam or the payment of the jizya. See also: Fred M. Donner, The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War, in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds, Greenwood Press, New York (1991), 51. Against states of the dar al-harb the legitimate ruler of the Islamic empire, in juristic theory, was justified in making war at any time; indeed to wage jihad in an effort to subdue the dar al-harb and to incorporate it into the dar
13
al-islam was seen as a religious duty of the imam/caliph. See also: A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War. Manchester University Press, New York (1997), 46. Legitimate domination has one true foundation Islam - and the recognition of non-Islamic states on anything other than a temporary and pragmatic basis is impermissible. This fundamentalist approach yields a starkly adversarial and conflictual view of the present state of humanity. The use of force to bring about the triumph of Islam is unambiguously and enthusiastically proclaimed. War is not a necessary evil, but a fundamental obligation or neglected duty. Far from war posing a threat to religious observance, religion without war is a crippled religion (Ayatollah Khomeini), and jihad or holy war is the essence of Islam, as the fundamentalists understands it. 24. See, Izzo, Lawrence L. LTC. The Center of Gravity is Not an Achilles Heel. Military Review (January 1988): 76-77. See also Mendel, Wm W., and Lamar Tooke. Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity. Military Review (June 1993): 2-11; Vego, Milan. Enter of Gravity. Military Review (AprilMarch 2000): 23-29
Bibliography
Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim M. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, State University of New York Press, New York: (1995) Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, Oneonta, New York: (2002) al-Haddad, Abdullad ibn Alawi. Knowledge and Wisdom, Starlatch, Lic, UK (2001) al-Mawardi, The Ordinances of Government, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1996) al-Misri, Ahmad ibn Naqib. Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD: (1994) Al-Imam Abu Zakariya Yahya, Riyad-us-Saliheen, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: (1998) al-Juywani, Al-Haramayn. A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (2001) al-Tabari, History of Al-Tabari (39 vol), State University of New York Press, NY: (1958) Alvi, Sajida Sultana (trans), Advise on the Art of Governance of Muhammad Baqir Najm-I Sani, State University of New York Press, NY: (1989) Arjomand, Said Amir. Political Dimensions of Religion, The, State University of New York Press, NY: (1993) Bakhtiar, Laleh. Encyclopedia of Islamic Law: A Compendium of the Major Schools, Kazi Publications, Chicago: (1996) Brown, Nathan J., Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government, State University of New York Press, NY: (2001) Chardin, Sir John, Travels in Persia 1673-1677, Argonaut Press, London: (1927) Coates, A. J. The Ethics of War. Manchester University Press, New York (1997) Dashti, Ali, 23 Years: A Study of the Prohetic Career of Mohammad, Mazda Publications, Costa Mesa, California: (1994) Donner, Fred M. The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,
in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds, Greenwood Press, New York: (1991) Gleave, Robert and Eugenia Kermeli, eds, Islamic Law: Theory and Practice, I.B. Tauris, London:(1997) Goldziher, Ignaz, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, Princeton University Press, Princeton: (1981) Hallaq, Wael B, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnie usul al-fiqh , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: (1997). Hallaq, Wael B., The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: (2005) Ibn Kathir, The Life of the Prophet Muhammad, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994) Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, UK: (2003) Ibn Rushd, The Distinquished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994) Ibn Sallam, The Book of Revenue, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (2003) Islam: The Peaceful Religion in Perpetual War, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2003. (U) Izzo, Lawrence L. LTC. The Center of Gravity is Not An Achilles Heel.Military Review (January 1998). Keller, Nuh Ha Mim. Al-Masqasid: Nawawis Manual of Islam, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD: (1994) Lambert, Stephen P. Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2005 Mendel, Wm., and Lamar Tooke. Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity. Military Review (June 1993) Narden, Terry. Ther Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Pespectives, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996 Ostrogorsky, George History of the Byzantine State, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey: (1969) Pruth, R.K. editor. Encyclopaedia of Jihad, Anmol Publications PVT, LTD, New Delhi, 2002. Sarloff, Robert B. Ed, The Politics of Change in the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado: (1993) Schacht, Joseph . An Introduction to Islamic Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford: (1982) Warraq, Ibn, Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York: (2003) Warraq, Ibn, What the Koran Really Says: Language, Text, & Commentary, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York: (2002) Vego, Milan. Center of Gravity. Military Review (AprilMarch 2000): 23-29. Zacharias, Ravi, Light in the Shadow of Jihad: The Struggle for Truth, Multnomah Publishers, Inc, Orlando, Florida: (2002) Zarabozo, Jamaal al-Din M., How to Approach and Understand the Quran, Al-Basheer Company for Publications and Translations, Boulder, Colorado: (1999)
14
Introduction
Who could imagine, less than two years ago, that a French Counterintelligence (CI) officer would receive his new stripes from an American Colonel, in the presence of 15 nations? This international unit is an opportunity for us to share information, individual experiences, and to reinforce dialogue among our national agencies. More than that, it will protect our countries from terrorist attacks in Europe, the Balkans, and of course Iraq.
With these words, Major Luc Rollet of the French Army accepted promotion to Lieutenant Colonel on 16 December 2005 in the Headquarters of the 650th Military Intelligence (MI) Group at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium. Colonel John Z. Dillon II, 650th Military Intelligence (MI) Group Commander, presided at the ceremony, and placed the new rank on Rollets shoulders. No one in attendance could say for certain, but all suspected that it had been a very long time since an American officer had been invited to promote a French officer. Yet such activities may soon be the norm rather than the exception for the 650th MI Group. Lieutenant Colonel Rollet is one of 17 Allied officers currently assigned to the 650th MI Group, with more on the way. 15
As expected, formal staffing of the proposal was timeconsuming, but the goal was reached in January 2004, when SACEUR General James Jones endorsed the initiative and forwarded it to NATOs North Atlantic Council (NAC) for final approval. The NAC agreed in April 2004, and the first Allied agentfrom SHAPEs host nation Belgiumarrived at the 650th MI Group the following month. Others quickly followed, with representatives from Iceland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Greece, the United Kingdom, France and Italy joining the unit over the following two years. Initially, all Allied personnel were assigned to Region V, 650th MI Group, co-located with the Groups headquarters at SHAPE, Belgium. This allowed the Groups multinational experiment to unfold in a controlled environment, in close proximity to the Group Commander
as well as each participant nations National Military Representative located at SHAPE Headquarters.
and Naples, respectively, while Romania and The Netherlands have deployed personnel to serve with the 650th in Afghanistan. In the near future, we expect to welcome an Allied agent to the Groups Kosovo Detachment as well. Unlike in the U.S. Army, many NATO nations have no enlisted CI agents, and some restrict CI work to field grade officers. Given these structural differences and the importance each nation would certainly place upon ensuring the success of their initial contributions to the multinational unit, the 650th expected from the outset that the structure would be rank heavy. In fact, most nations have assigned Lieutenant Colonels to the 650th, with a few nations providing even more senior personnel. Region Vs plan to deal with the influx of senior personnel was to de-emphasize rank and treat all assigned personnel on a first name basis and work in civilian business attire. The result has been better than we had dared to hope, with every participant thus far firmly committed to the success of the multinational endeavor. While rank has proven to be much less a problem than it might have been, two other issues have required careful attention: experience in the NATO environment and written English language skills. While some of the Allied personnel assigned to the 650th MI Group have lengthy experience in NATO assignments, even those individuals have required training in the 650ths operational procedures. To help us meet that challenge, we designed our internal LAN to be as much a training tool as our operational backbone. We created templates for all our standardized reports, so personnel unfamiliar with the formats do not have to
start from a blank sheet of paper. We created selfpaced training versions of our most commonly used security awareness briefings. With these, unit personnel can sit at their own workstations and not only review the briefings, but also learn the background information that will help them answer questions about the presentations. We also designed the network to maximize use of shared directories so that less experienced personnel can benefit from the work done by more experienced agents. Since almost everything the unit does must ultimately be documented in some form of a written report, the widely differing English writing skills of the Allied personnel created new editing and proofreading requirements for the native English speakers. It was impractical to send someone to an intensive English course for the first several months of his assignment, so we recognized that we must accept gradual and incremental improvements in written English. At the same time, we needed to be careful when editing reports written by non-native English speakers, so that we did not discourage their efforts. No one likes to see a final product that bears no resemblance to their first draft. To meet this challenge, we encouraged our native English speakers to work one-on-one as a desk buddy with a non-native speaker, talking through a report before the Allied agent tackles an initial draft. Even so, timely publication of a clearly-written report must sometimes take precedence over an English language training opportunity.
nations can support such missions with personnel far more readily than with infrastructure. The 650ths ability to provide office space and ADP support removes that major obstacle and has been instrumental in our ability to attract Allied contributions to these missions. As more NATO nations provide personnel to the 650th MI Group, and ideally come to see an assignment with the 650th as an essential element in the career progression of their CI personnel, we hope those nations will also see the value in adopting more common CI policies and procedures. Developing shared standards for the basics, such as report formats, may open the door for greater commonality among NATO nations on more important subjects such as the scope of an individual agents routine investigative authority. The conversion of the 650th MI Group to a multinational unit offers a new model for the CI community. Even though the fundamental principle governing CI in NATO is that it is a national responsibility, the 650th MI Group is creating an environment where sharing CI information and working hand-in-hand with personnel from across the Alliance are simply accepted as routine business. No nation stands alone against the threats we face today, and we are at our most vulnerable when we cannot bring ourselves to trust and work with our Allies. CI personnel are accustomed to asking themselves if the information they gain can be shared with Allied nations. The 650th MI Group wants to ask instead, Why cant we share this information if it will help our collective efforts? The 650th MI Group seeks senior, experienced personnel to be part of its team. The 650ths agents routinely work with national-level CI and security personnel from 26 NATO member nations and have the opportunity to conduct multinational or combined CI operations, investigations, and collection in support of the SACEUR and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.
LTC Chris A. Pilecki is Deputy Chief of the Army HUMINT Operations Center on the Army G2 staff. From July 2005 to June 2006, he was Deputy Commander of the 650th MI Group, following three years as Commander, Region V, 650th MI Group, at SHAPE, Belgium. He holds an MS from the London School of Economics, London, England and a BS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. He can be contacted at chris.pilecki@us.army.mil or (703) 695-3053.
The Future
As the 650th MI Group expands the placement of Allied personnel throughout its three regional headquarters, and ultimately to the smaller detachments as well, a distinctly new picture of CI in NATO is beginning to emerge. While the Allied presence still constitutes only ten percent of the 650ths strength, the additional commitment from the 25 Allied nations will greatly increase the 650ths ability to support NATO personnel, facilities and activities. As NATO becomes more heavily engaged in out-of-area operations, the need for effective CI coverageboth in garrison and deployed locationswill only increase. The 650ths experience suggests that the major obstacles to greater Allied contributions to out-of-area missions are the start-up and overhead costs, particularly for facilities and automated data processing (ADP) support. Over the nearly three years that 650th MI Group personnel have deployed to Afghanistan in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul and the ten years that 650th MI Group personnel have deployed to the Balkans in support of NATO missions in Bosnia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo, we have consistently seen that most 17
Hall of Fame Inductees (left to right): LTG King, MG Halverston, Mr. Dillon, Ms. Jones, Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones, and LTC Chambers.
MG Barbara Fast (center - Commander, USAIC&FH) and other participants in the MICA-sponsored Hall of Fame Golf Tournament.
CSM Jackie Moore (Commandant, MI NCO Academy), CSM Frank Saunders (CSM, USAIC&FH), and an unidentified rider.
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DEPARTMENT
Chapter News
The Chapter News provides information (activities, elections, awards, upcoming events, etc) about the activities of active MICA chapters. We update the News using input from the Chapters and the MICA National Executive Committees Chapter Coordinator. A list of active MICA chapters is available on the MICA website at www.micorps.org.
Academy Officers and Faculty Club on 1 October. The events keynote speaker was Mr. Elliot Jardines, the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source and Class of 00 Alumni. Mr. Jardines entitled his speech, A Day in the Life on the Senior Staff of the Director of National Intelligence. For more information, visit http:// www.jmicfoundation.org/default.asp. Suggested Resources & Directions: INKognito, the chapters newsletter for Summer 2006 discusses Enigma cipher machines of both WWII and present-day, and highlights of the above mentioned activities! To get a copy via email, send an email to drdg@prodigy.net with INKognito in the subject. The DELMARPA Chapter is again accepting nominations for the prestigious Military Intelligence Corps Associations Knowlton Award! Congratulations to Knowlton Award recipients, whoooaaahhh! MI, Always Out Front!
Pennsylvania
Chapter: DELMARPA (Delaware-MarylandPennsylvania) Headquarters: Carlisle, PA Founded: 1 October 2003 Chairman Pro Temp: Dr. R. Don Green Presidents Pro Temp Delaware: Mr. William Johnson Maryland: Last call for nominations PA-East: Mr. John Donaldson, Jr. PA-West: CPT Marcel C. Minutolo Secretary/Treasurer: Last call for nominations Point of Contact: Dr. R. Don Green, drdg@prodigy.net DELMARPA News: The Tri-state Honored Military Intelligence Scholar is Mr. John F. Murphy, Jr., Associate Professor, American Military University. Washington, DC: Representatives of DELMARPA Chapter attended the Joint Military Intelligence Colleges conference, Science + Technology = Intelligence on Target at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling AFB, on 26 September. This conference convened experts from the academe, government and the private sector to discuss the critical partnership between developing scientific and technological solutions to address national security threats. Sessions addressed innovation and application of science and technology(S&T) tools to bioterrorism and hardtargets, developing an effective technology warning system, and strategies for countering terrorism. A panel of intelligence operators, analysts, and technologists discussed integrated S&T solutions to intelligence challenges. The conference closed with a strategic perspective on S&T priorities from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. For more information, visit http://www.fbcinc.com/ jmic/ and http://www.dia.mil/college/index.htm. Annapolis, MD: The President of the Joint Military Intelligence College Alumni Association invited DELMARPA Chapter Pro Temp Dr. Green to the Associations brunch of at the US Naval
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DEPARTMENT
Knowlton and Golden Rose Award Receipients for 3rd Quarter 2006
Knowlton Awards
CW3 Abe Kader MAJ Adam J. Boyd SFC Alphonso S. Phillips SGT Amanda Nicole Pinson CPT (P) Amos R. Bennett CPT Ashley Brian Miller SFC Bernard M. Linhart CW2 Brian Dickenson CW2 Brian A. Stearmer CPT Carmen Lugo-Martinez Chad M. Keuser Charles W. Gill, Jr. CPT Christina M. Girotti SGM David A. Tyler COL David E. Servinsky SFC David F. Nelson SFC David Lee Clubb 1LT David P Price . 1SG David R. Oxford CW3 Dennis L. Lindberg SGT Edward T. Summerell Special Agent Emiliano F. Sedillo SFC Eric R. Dean SFC Eric W. Anderson CPT Galen R. Kane Dr. Jacob W. Kipp SGT Jason R. Thomas CW4 Joel Giefer MAJ John Ganino CW2 Joseph E. Pickerd CPT Joshua Comstock SPC Justin Knight SFC Kenneth Logan Green CW2 Kevin Gallop 1SG Kevin Theismann CW3 Kevin G. Boughton
The Knowlton Award recognizes individuals who have contributed significantly to the promotion of Army Military Intelligence (MI) in ways that stand out in the eyes of the recipients superiors, subordinates, and peers. These individuals must also demonstrate the highest standards of integrity and moral character, display an outstanding degree of professional competence, and serve the MI Corps with distinction.
CPT Kristin M. Arney SSG Laurita A. Vanzant CPT Lonnie L. Moore SSG Lynne Snyder CW2 Mario LaMaestra LTC Mark J. Mabry SSG Markus Morrison CW3 Michael S. Sparks SFC Patrick A. Lahti Mr. Randy McMahon 1SG Robert Hall SPC Robert A. Rosado MSG Ronald Earl Lauscher MAJ Shahram Afshar Takmili Ms. Stephanie Samergedes Stephen C. Wong MAJ Steve Stevens SFC Stuart A. Kreutzer CW3 Timothy Puccetti MAJ Timothy J. Parker MSG Tony W. Dawson SGT Victor M. Conde LTC William Spendley, Jr.
COL Mark Quantock, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, presents the Knowlton to soldiers of Task Force Vanguard during a ceremony at Camp Victory, Iraq, in July 2006.
Commander and staff of the 205th MI Brigade with Task Force Vanguard recipients of the Knowlton at Camp Victory, Iraq, in July 2006.
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Section 2. Purpose
Said Association is a national professional association organized for fraternal purposes to promote Military Intelligence and support the United States Army Military Intelligence Corps, including, for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code.
the minutes of all business meetings of the Association including actions taken by vote or direction of the President. He shall assist with correspondence of the Association. He shall give notice of all Executive Council, Executive Committee and membership meetings as requested by the President. d. Treasurer. The Treasurer shall have charge and custody of all receipts, funds, and securities of the Association, and shall secure them in the name of the Association in such depositories as may be designated by the Executive Council. The Treasurer shall prepare checks and withdrawals for authorization on behalf of the Association. He shall keep accurate and current accounts in books belonging to the Association; collect Association fees as required, and shall render to the Executive Council, as required, an account of all his transactions as bonded in accordance with policy established by the Executive Council. The Association books shall be reviewed annually and audited as directed by the President.
1. Individual Members: Anyone who subscribes to the purpose for which the Association is formed. 2. Corporate Members: Any corporation, business, or limited partnership that subscribes to the purpose for which the Association is formed.
Section 2. Application
Application for membership can be made to the Association Headquarters. The application shall set forth the facts establishing membership, be accompanied by payment of the membership fee, and be submitted to the President for approval. Eligibility being met, the President may grant membership.
Section 3. Termination
Membership in the Association shall remain in force so long as the member does not violate the provisions of section 5 of this Article and has submitted the appropriate membership fee. Membership in this Association may be terminated for cause at any regular or special meeting of the Executive Council upon concurrence of a majority of the members attending said meeting; but only after the member concerned has been advised by written notice of said proposed action at least twenty (20) days prior to such meeting, which written notice shall have been mailed to his address of record retained in the office of the Association, and only after said member has been given opportunity to be heard at said meeting, if member indicated his desire to the President prior to said meeting.
Section 4. Rights
All members of the Association have the privilege of attending meetings and engaging in discussions at meetings and receive the benefits specified in the Bylaws. Only members shall be entitled to hold office and vote. Each member shall have one (1) proxy vote which may be cast either personally or by duly elected proxy.
Section 5. Conduct
When acting on behalf of the Association, members will conduct themselves in a manner that will not in any way prejudice or discredit the United States Army or other agencies of the United States Government. Any member whose conduct is prejudicial or discredits the Association will have action taken as outlined in section 3, this article.
in accordance with general accounting practices (GAP) and in accordance with AR 210-22. c. The officers and employees of the Association may receive reimbursement for expenses incurred while performing Association business as prescribed in the Constitution and Bylaws or approved by the Executive Council.
ARTICLE VI ACTIVITIES
a. The Associations goals and purposes are to: 1. Promote Military Intelligence. 2. Support the United States Army Military Intelligence Corps 3. Honor and recognize individuals for their contribution to Military Intelligence. 4. Support the Association members and their families. 5. Assist in preserving Military Intelligence history. 6. Educate and provide a forum for sharing Military Intelligence knowledge. b. The Association shall also have the following powers: 1. To accept, from present and former Military Intelligence personnel, their estates, from other persons and organizations, gifts of pictures, flags, relics, libraries, personal papers, books, manuscripts, files and personal effects. Any such gifts will be donated to the United States Army Military Intelligence Museum in the public interest for sharing knowledge and increasing esprit de corps and pride in the Military Intelligence Corps. 2. The Association is authorized to do all and everything necessary, suitable, and proper for the accomplishment of any of the goals and purposes or the attainment of any of the objects, or the furtherance of any of the powers hereinbefore set forth, either alone, or in association with other corporations, firms, or individuals, and to do every other act or acts, thing or things, incidental or appurtenant to, or growing out of, or connected with the aforesaid objects or purposes, or any part or parts thereof, provided, the same not be inconsistent with the laws under which this Association is organized. 3. The purpose of this Association being purely fraternal, charitable, benevolent, historical, educational, and not for profit or financial gain, no financial gain shall accrue to any Incorporator or Trustee of the Association in the conduct of same; any receipts of the Corporation on excess of authorized expenses shall be held and disposed of by the Association in the furtherance of the goals and purposes herein stated. Limitations of Powers. No part of the net earnings of the Association shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributed to its members, trustees, officers, or other private 24
persons, except that the corporation shall be authorized and empowered to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of the purposes set forth in Article I, Section 2 thereof. No substantial part of the activities of the Association shall be carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidates for public office. Notwithstanding any other provisions of these articles, the Association shall not carry on any other activities not permitted to be carried on (a) by a corporation exempt from federal income tax under sections 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or (b) by a corporation, contributions to which are deductible under section 170 (c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code.
Section 2. Amendments
This Constitution may be amended or repealed by a vote of the members of the Association present personally or by proxy at a duly called meeting of the Association, provided that the notice of intent to amend or repeal, contains, (as well as) a copy of the proposed amendment or repeal. Following membership vote, changes/ amendments to the Constitution will be submitted in accordance with AR 210-22. Recommendations for amendment or repeal can be presented to the President, in writing, signed by not less than ten (10) members of the Association, at least two (2) months before the date of the meeting at which the proposed amendment or repeal is to be considered. Bylaws may be established, amended, or repealed by a majority vote of the Executive Council.
Submissions Guidelines
When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the MICA membership. The goal is to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate. When writing for THE VANGUARD, please consider the following: Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3000 words, double-spaced pages with normal margins, not counting graphics without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words. Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible. We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take more than a year to publish some articles. Be aware that submissions become property of THE VANand may be released to other government agencies or non-profit organizations for republication upon request. What we need from you:
GUARD
MICA is the national professional fraternal association of the US Army Military Intelligence Corps.
Awards Program
The Knowlton Award recognizes select individuals who have contributed significantly to Military Intelligence The Golden Rose Award recognizes a spouse whose volunteer service contributes to mission accomplishment
Cover Letter A cover letter with your work and home email addresses, work telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published. We accept electronic or hardcopy cover letters. Security Release A security release signed by your local security officer stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, non-sensitive, and releasable in the public domain. Publication Release - A publication release if your organization requires it. Please include that release with your submission. Graphics Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic and enliven the article. We need complete captions (who, what, where, when, why and how), the photographers credits, and the authors name on the photos. Please note where they should appear in the text. Biography The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the authors current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address and phone numbers with the biography. In what format: Text - Your article in Microsoft Word. Do not use special document templates. Graphics - Please do not embed graphics or images within the text, attach them separately. Images should be sent to us in .tif or .jpg formats.
Scholarship Program
MICA provides scholarships for members and their families
Museum Program
MICA supports the Military Intelligence Museum
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THE VANGUARD
Militrary Intelligence Corps Association P Box 13020 .O. Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020