Mind Association

Bernard Williams on Practical Necessity Author(s): Robert J. Gay Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 392 (Oct., 1989), pp. 551-569 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255040 Accessed: 29/11/2010 21:58
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Necessity Williams Practical on Bernard

ROBERT J. GAY Bernard Williams has things which This paperis notjustaboutcertain of is, said, but about practicalnecessity-that about the experience type of Williamshas pointedout a recognizable practical necessity. is it that experience, he maintains thisexperience quitegeneral: is not and of the viewof whatmorality which is, merely consequence a particular its whoheldthevieworhadinherited wouldbe experienced bythose only of of thinking human but feature thedeliberative after-images, a general and up or whospeak language havebeenbrought a beings, at leastofthose to sharein a society itsculture.' and it and I wishtoclaimthat experience irreducible, that is properly this is and thinking we shouldlive,the how afresh basic-if we werestarting to were presented us in merefactthatcertain specific considerations necessary, mightgive us a reason to retain this way, as practically and theseconsiderations give thema special place in the outlookwe adopted. A claimthata typeof experience irreducible in itself and provides is It reasons actionmaywell seemimplausible. does feelobscurantist for of has and,somehow, But 'metaphysical'. at leastthetype experience been who does not have an unusualaxe to grindpickedout by someone owninclinations in thequiteopposite, are plausible-seeming, Williams's in and of the be just direction having ethical understood terms ofdesires as and desiresin turnbe understood othersuch mentalstates, simply aboutwhatit is liketo letting anything tendencies towards goals,without of in desire doingwork theexplanation an action. be And, havea specific out in sections 3, and 4, I will be setting and examining three ways 2, in has that for of ofaccounting thistype experience I find whatWilliams of and if to a reductively the written; onehastried explain type experience thenit all one explanations attempts turnout to be liableto objections, And is shouldbecomemoreplausiblethatthe experience irreducible.
1 According Williams, is notthat ideaofnecessity supplied a system morality by (or of by is an it to but is of and an idea aboutthewillofGod, or whatever) thenthere an experience necessity, thatthe idea of necessity of take comesfirst, thesystems morality their and of necessity experience practical I985 London,Collins/Fontana, of Ethics theLimits Philosophy, and from (Cf. B. A. 0. Williams, it. with of a and necessity, theexperience reaching conclusion 'Ethics&') p. i88: 'Practical (henceforth, the (this obligation mayhelptoexplain that force, one element has goneintotheideaofmoral is that familiar).' is peoplehave,thatmoralobligation at oncequitespecialand very so sense,which many whichmoralthinking to can says,thisexperience occurin relation a consideration And,Williams consideration (Ethics&, pp. 179, I88-9). aesthetic or wouldlabelas supererogatory,as a merely

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Robert Gay ].

finally, section I willsaysomething in an abouthowwhat experience is 5, likemight giveus a reasonto act.

i.

The experience practicalnecessity of

of Sometimes conclusion a thatone must+ is the result a processof thought whichhas takena particular goal forgranted mustleave ('I now-thatis,ifI amtogettothemovie'). there alsoconclusions But to are what may overalldeliberations: we call in all deliberations which considerations admitted. are I to Hereitis not'Giventhat am to i, I ought 4', or 'If I am to *, I must?', butiftheconclusion expressed 'must'then is by thethought ofa mustwhich is 'goesall thewaydown'(Ethics &, p. i88). Andwhenan overall is conclusion expressed 'must'itseemspeculiarly by well whoconcludes I forceful. can perfectly understand We someone 'So, his his ought 4' and,without to changing mindand revoking judgement, doessomething weknow onecanconclude oneought have else: that that to and take a course lunch, yet at someofthesweet. find less it only single We do and then, easy to understand someonewho says he must a thing, without revoking judgement, notdo thething the does (that ifit is not is, that somefurther consideration occurred himandhe says'No, I see has to now I don'thave to do that'but thathe simply failsto act). Whenan overall conclusion expressed 'must',there is by certainly not enough is space forcheerful, easy-going, acrasia.2 In somecases,this'practical' of'must'willbe simply expression use an for conclusion overall the of deliberation where there a lotto be saidon is onesideandvery little theother. on Whenweholdup thescales, they and incline one way,we say we oughtto 4; whenthe scalesdo notmerely incline waybuttipright one over, saywe must4. Andin these we cases we might force theconclusion remarking if explain peculiar the of by that
2 In 'Practical in Necessity', Moral Luck,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,I98I (henceforth, 'PN') Williams takes very the if strong that one thinks must do a thing, line one not then, unless one is mistaken the thought in thatone must not,one simply will not do thatthing intentionally (p. 129). He remarks about'You haveto' and 'You haveno alternative', is an impressive that 'It fact their in thepasttenseindeedimplies use thattheagentdid do theact in question' 128). (p. But (thinking ofcasesof prudence, ofthemoststraightforward ofa person's only and notion own interests, nothing do withanyspecialexperience anymoral with to or necessity) might 'I one say simply to telephone father askhimto sendsomemoney once,but I did notrealize had my and at in time thatI had to do that,' even'I sawthatI had to telephone father... I wastired, I and but my and wasafraid what wouldsay,and I failed do it whileI could.'And(returning thecase of of he to from simpleprudence) someone thesituation Joseph in of Conrad's Jim- whohad joinedtherestof its officers desertingshipwith passengers in a 8oo when they weresureitwasabouttosink- someone in that position couldsay'I saw whatI had to do, butI did notdo it,and... I found thatI had jumped' (cf.Lord of Middx,Penguin, printing i969, end ofch. 9, p. 88). jim, Harmondsworth However, space'must'and 'haveto' leavefor the simply to failing act does seemvery narrow: we seemdriven supposesomething whatwe picture to like whenwe imagine creature a charmed a by snake, with creature the 'I thinking must so andso', butfinding itis fixed thespotandcannot do that to escape.

Bernard Williamson Practical Necessity 553

nothing are all theseriousconsiderations on one side and thereis virtually too to be said on the other,it will matter much thatone do the rightthing in thiscase forthe losses of doing the wrongthingto be canceiled out by It of theoverallbenefits a littlemorespontaneity. is no good if one is very laid-back,and dead. pleasantly But there are cases where 'must' has the same peculiarly forceful relationto action,whichare not of thatkind. To get an example of these special cases, let us imaginea schematizedLuther. We leave out all the contextand all the theologicalviews,and just picturea person historical saying'Here I stand; I can no other'.We surelydo not envisagesomeone as to otherthanloyalty the truth who simplydoes not care about anything on weighed up considerations he sees it, nor someone who has carefully both sides, and has decided that on balance loyaltyto the truthmatters most to him. Rather, although there are in the situationbefore him a a and affect which mightengage his attention numberof considerations sort,hereand now truthfulof deliberation the 'balance of considerations' in ness and whatit requiresof himis presented a special way. He maywell but thiswould processof thought; have gone in fora long and painstaking whenhe had examinedthesituation have been a processofseeingwhether, exactlywhat was appearingto matter and had triedto articulate carefully still struckhim in the same way, and whetherany so, this consideration was also markedout in this way. We mightcall that otherconsideration witha view in process'deliberation' a generalsense forwhichany thinking to decidingwhat to do is 'deliberation';but it would not be 'deliberation' in the more technicalsense forwhich deliberationis a process naturally expressedby the metaphorsof weighingup and balancing. He may say most' will not be mostto him; but this'mattering thatthisis whatmatters the result of any weighingup of considerations,but of the way this consideration been singledout in his thinking. has to whichoccursin relation a particular Our topic,then,is an experience and within deliberative thinking, whichcan explaina person consideration whichis markedout in this way. actingon the consideration of But thatis not just a description the experienceof a strongemotion? an emotionan emotionis thatit moves one. In an emotion,a What makes in an thought triggers alteration one's mood, thatis, in one's biochemistry and bodilystateand in whatRyle called 'the day's weather'of one's mind.3 to When one is grippedby a strongemotion,one's mind keeps returning else, and in and one is hardlyable to attendto anything one set of thoughts is this way everyotherconsideration excluded fromone's deliberations. This phenomenonis merelyan aspect of what a mood is: as Ryle said, 'moods monopolize'. betweenwhatare thereseems to us to be a distinction However,I think
3 G.Ryle,The Concept MindHarmondsworth, Penguin, I963, ch. IV sect.(4), pp.95-6. of

554 Robert Gay j.

which wouldproperly we and merely strong emotions, states express 'I by must'.We havea sensethat are emotions disturbances, tend which strong to distort perception whatis thecase. Even whenan emotion our of is triggered a true belief,it may prevent fromseeingand fully by us the I appreciating wholeofwhatis so: whenI am angry, mayhaveseen one which clearly particular another has thing person done,butmyanger me and mayprevent from seeingthewholeof thesituation appreciating howthings likely haveappeared that are to to we person. contrast, may By the we havea sensethat states shouldproperly express 'I must'would by be fully with the compatible seeing clearly wholeofwhatis thecase,and thaton a clearviewof thewhole,thisimpulseto act and the thoughts which to in belong itwouldbe singled as a guideto follow action. out We to we in between power the maytry saythat candistinguish ourexperience which strong a emotion of which possesses, theappearance authority and leadsus to say 'I must'.Andwe maytry echoButler's to words: They observed two these perceptions different,indegree, inkind: totally not but andthe of reflecting each them, they stood their upon as thus in nature, a wrought full intuitive that was to belonged oneofthese conviction, more dueandofright inward perceptions, tothe than other; itdemanded allcases govern that in to such a creature man.4 as we Possibly aredeeply in mistaken howwewoulddescribe experience. our But at all events, is howit seemsto be. this
2. Practicalnecessity impossibility as

I willlookfirst thelineofexplanation find Williams's at we in 'Practical Necessity'. thispaperWilliams In wishes speaknotso muchaboutan to but about a necessity, experience, whichwe would be awareof in this this experience5; necessity notto be constituted ourexperience, is by and thewayit makes do thisor prevents doingthat us us willnotinvolve the character ourexperience. of a Suppose,for who instance, politician is convinced hisopponent's that policies wouldruintheir country, blighting many livesandcausing good a few preventable deaths. The politician's causeis just,buttheopinion polls are against him,he has no cardsleftto play,and election day is close. However,if he set his mind to it, he would be able to organize an assassination getawaywith As observers, might and it. we comment from outside thathe has thiswayof escape;but we might also comment that we although can see this, cannot. character suchthat idea of he His is the ordering assassination the cannot occur him.6 to Williams remark may that
4 Butler, Fifteen Sermons, I6 preface, paragraph (counting as paragraphs in theedition J. H. of Bernard (London,i900)). S 'PN' (op. cit.n. 2), pp. 127-8. 6 Cf. PN', pp. I28-9.

Necessity555 on Bernard Williams Practical genuinelyis an impossibility.

which of an impossibilitydoing action here leastwehavea psychological at

Williamsinvites to thinkabout the view frominsideupon this us cannot simply Now, whena thought sortof psychological impossibility. to awareness represent at is occurto one,there nothing all in thesubject's thereis not that fact,and when it cannotbe seen as a possibility, in a much.We mayhave to relaxthe degreeof the impossibilitylittle, to appearance the will a to which present substantial order getsomething can the inner view.But we maysupposea case where suggestion engage how it wouldbe good if such and one's interest one can beginto think a thing weredone,butone is awarethatin theend one willnotbe able to do it. do one that awarethat must something, Williams suggests one becomes all awarethat thealternatives concerns as one becomes us, in thewaythat off whichmight have attracted are blocked by such impossibilities. one are the Andwe maywellfeelthat there couldbe a sensethat alternatives thought into this all, notopenafter and that sensecouldenter deliberative it. and foreclose someone such Ie recognizing an impossibility, wouldbe recognizing A from different culture, a politician, was thing which personal. different and justified ordertheopponent's death-and if he had a serious might and theopponent's wouldbe disastrous, wasgenuinely policies belief that death,one ruinand premature actuated a wish to save lives from by not think whathe did morally But one cannotorderan wrong. might of and It assassination oneself. is a matter one'sowncharacter, one'sown culture. be But one's thinking aboutwhatto do wouldnot itself constituting would be recognizing this impossibility necessity. and One's thinking of whichexistedindependently it. This is to be an aspect something for aboutwhat ofone's character, which the is framework one's thinking to do.
7 If we doubt the existence this sense of whatis not a real option,we may supposethe of visitor from politician's situation beingdiscussedby a groupfromhis partyand a sympathetic here, another country witha different culture. trying feelhis wayintothe situation to Hesitantly, in be the visitor starts askingabout the difficulties thiscountry: riskthatthe assassinmight the vote blackmail caught, danger the thatone's agents might one,thechanceof a sympathy forone's opponents their and is speaking if leaderwerekilled.And he finds thathe has lost his audience, and another country, do intoa blanksilence:his hostswantnotto be discourteous a guestfrom to on intowhathe is talking notstart expressions beingappalled, they of but cannot pretend enter to about.

' possibility.

we this were suggest wayouttohim, to that someone Andifwesuppose of which means character that mayimagine thesameaspect thepolitician's thatthe idea cannotoccurto him will also mean thatthe suggestion thiswayoutwouldnotbe presented himas a genuine to unreal: appears

556 Robertj. Gay

of The chief objection thisexplanation to do withtherelation the to has subject-that is, the consciousthinking about what to do-to the tendencies impossibilities and which is to be recognizing. it In general, when recognize we psychological tendencies impossibiliand ties,we as subjects nothaveto acquiescein them.If we recognize do a one to tendency drift way,we maydeliberately to leantheother try way.8 of If we recognize genuine a psychological impossibility doingsomething, we maytakestepsto getroundthisblockage.9 Suppose(to makewhatis we be rather thansomething recognized something positive, negative) see if that we go on reflecting willin theenddecideto 4. This might we lead of to more us to save thebother thinking further deciding 4 without by in the of direction ado. But it might foreclose process thinking theother it one is boundto 4; so one ifone goeson thinking -one seesthat about how determines escapebydeciding do not-?, to to now.(Thatis exactly we if we suspectour thinking beingtakenover by a strong is may react emotion.) is The rootofthisobjection that when person a recognizes ofthese one it aboutwhatto do psychological tendencies, willappearin his thinking of noton thesideofhisdesires, oneofthesprings hisactions, on the but as But side of thefacts which affect he can work his purposes. an how out of wouldhaveto appearon theside ofthe experience practical necessity But thereis a responseto this objection.Surelyit will affect the relationbetweenthe agent who is decidingwhat to do and these tendencies impossibilities, thesource thesetendencies to be of is and that within the agent'scharacter? Character not so muchthe framework is of whichone's deliberative is thinking carried as the collection the on, of of and springs one's actions, so thesource one's deliberative thinking. Whenone is recognizing suchand sucha desireis aboutto prevail that in one'sreflections, willnotbe detached, one this which viewing as a fact but affects how one shouldworkout one's purposes, identified. One's is discoveries about some character one's self:one will not be making to whichis trying interfere whatone decidesto do, but about in thing
oneself:
8 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (EN) II .9.4-6, i io9bi -I 2. if For example, I am a miser becauseI needto feelsecure and I cannot standthethought letting of is me go ofmymoney, I am offeredcourse action and a of which otherwise desirable involves in but putting a lot of money, insecurity fearmayset to workand slantmy deliberations, up my and of exaggerating sense of the risksof the courseof actionand diminishing liveliness my my the appreciation theways is desirable. when recognize waythat deliberations tending of it But I the my are in a particular direction,maystand I backfrom exaggerated oftherisks try see clearly this idea and to whatis really be said on each side. to 9 Where wasatschool, thestudents topassa swimming which I all off had test entailed jumping the deependofa pool.I knew someone whosefear madeitimpossible himto jump.Butwhat could for he do wastostand theright in position theedgeandhavesomeone himon thebackandimpel on tap him in; and so he was able to pass thetest.

springsof action.

Necessity557 Williams Practical on Bernard This much of thatresponseis true,thatwe should not be considering have to set motiveswhich are not reallypartsof one's self and therefore thought.But even round the back of one's deliberative to workcovertly, when one accepts a specific motive as one of the sources of one's thinking and one's actions, therewill still be more to one's deliberative thinking a whole than what belongs to this single motive. as deliberative And so one mightwish to upset the tendencywithinoneselfby which what one would decide to do, this singlemotivewas going to determine and then try to see clearly whetherthe action that this single motive was promptingreally was the thing that, overall, one most wanted to bringabout. (We do tryexactlythis when we feelthat,if we do not stop it, the forceof an emotionis going to determinewhat we will decide to do.) about acceptingthe result Of course,therewould not be any difficulty that the workingswithinoneself were servingup to one, if this result it simplypresented,withoutthe conscious processesof working out, the have made aftera fairand same decision that one would independently But is thatwhat we would be having?In balanced deliberation. properly was going to end in his makinga our example of Luther, his thinking stand for the truth; but the thinkingwas going to settle upon that, was singledout by the experienceof practical because this consideration have been necessity.We may wonder whetherthat would independently the resultof deliberation.'0 Thus, the issue remains, Why should one be identifiedwith those withinoneselfwhichare servingup thisresultto one? It would workings have to be that,in a way, therewas notany more to the agent's practical as thinking a whole than what belonged to one single motive.The agent withthis one motivein a peculiarway which would have to be identified meant thathe could not be detached fromit at all. cannot be enough to So, psychologicaltendenciesand impossibilities We need explainwhatis goingon in the experienceof practicalnecessity. to ask why a person's conscious thinkingshould not be trying to facts.It provesthatwe have to speak of a circumvent these psychological with one motivein a special way which himselfidentified person finding not become detachedfromit at all. But surelyit is this means thathe will withone specificmotivewhichis our experienceof peculiaridentification and thisexplanationhas not even begun to tacklethat. practicalnecessity,
'o Indeed,I am not sure thatwe could even set about answering question. Our ideas of that a evenly out will experience; fair, that someconsiderations be singled bythis may deliberation assume special in which when are is appropriate there notconsiderations matter that weighing-uponly balanced which of prudence, we aboutwhether can conceive a neutral doubts David Wiggins's way.(Compare judgefrom while of of to settle what do inthelight a number considerations prescinding allmoral would Oxford, Truth, Values, in Truth', Needs, Impartiality, 'Universalizability, aboutthem: ments Blackwell, have to would our loyalty thetruth weight Luther's to If we tried askwhat (i).) 1987, p. 86,n. 26, point not might be anyanswer. to up weighing ofwhatwasimportant him,there in an even-handed

558 Robert].Gay

as 3. Practicalnecessity hypothetical necessity The second line of explanation beginsfroma passage in Williams's 'The Makropulos Case'." Here Williams concerned is with whatmight answerthe questionwhether carryon withone's life.He makesa to firm distinction betweenthe bare animalnisusto carryon, whichis there but cannot answer that question when it is asked, and the desires' which giveus 'reflective to can reasons' carry and 'categorical on, of so can answer question the ('MC', at thefoot p. 86). The animalnisus willnaturally forthecontinuation thisliving be of biological organism. For Williams, lifeof thisphysical the bodyis whatconstitutes personal to as identity, so thebareanimalnisuswillrelate bareidentity, such. and to is But at theother level,of 'reflective reasons', future of interest the me onlyin so faras it offers someprospect whichengagesmypresent desires. willnotfind And we mayeasilyhavethethought mydesires that any to to life a who special reason wishthere be a continuing for future person is identical with hereand now,simply such,butonlyfora person me as whois notmerely with butalso closeenough character me in to identical thatthereis thiscontinuity of whatI now am, and onlyto- extent the
character.

Williams certainly think does something that.For he says: like

Whatwe can sayis thatsinceI am propelled forward.. bycategorical . desires, what promised is must holdoutsomehopesfor those desires. The limiting of case thismightbe thatthe promised held out some hope just to thatdesire life of mentioned before, future that desires mine. .. be born satisfied; ifthat and but weretheonlycategorical desirethatcarried forward. . , at leastthisseems me . desiresshould make it demanded,that any image I have of those future to comprehensible me howin terms mycharacter couldbe mydesires. of they ('MC', pp. 9 I -2, myemphasis)'2
" B. A. 0. Williams, Case', in Problems theSelf,Cambridge, of Cambridge 'The Makropulos University Press,1973 (henceforth, 'MC'). 12 How might Williams havearrived thisthought? callsthebasiccategorical at which He desires givea person reasonto carry 'ground on projects' (Williams, 'Persons, Character Morality', and in MoralLuck,p. 12). And thenuances theword'project' of it associate with commitments ideals. and Despitewhat Williams aboutthere says no to of being needfor person be conscious what ground a his projects ('MC', p. 86; 'Persons, are Character Morality', 12), theword'project' and to p. suggests me aimswhich relate thewaythings primarily to in shouldgo in theworld (likeGeorge, theCritique of Utilitarianism J.J. C. Smart (in and B. A. 0. Williams, For Utilitarianism: andAgainst, Cambridge, to Cambridge University Press,1973),being against And CBW), and only derivatively one'sownlife. when they cometoapplytoone'sownlifein particular, derivation which the do by they so is (in what is saidaboutGeorge, least)theideathat at one'slife shouldbe,as it were, sculptured a representation ofone'scommitments. we as idea (Possibly shouldcompare Bradley's ofmorality self-realization-cf, F. e.g, R. Wollheim, H. Bradley, Harmondsworth, Penguin,1959,pp. 237-9.) Now, whenI ask I whether there anyspecialreason is on why shouldcarry living, question addressed theself this to is of A composed projects. future onlyappealto that ifit offers prospect forwarding will of self a these projects, it willonlyappealin thespecialwaywhich to do withitsbeing'myownlife'ifit and has offers prospect myself of the acting of theseprojects. out

Bernard Williamson Practical Necessity 559

Let us consider the case Aristotle mentions, of someone who is and livingon in a confronted witha choice betweendyingforhis country comfortable enough way. Aristotle'sown view seems to be thatone may preferto be killed rather than run away because in being killed one experiencesa surpassing pleasure,as against the moderatepleasure of an ordinarycomfortable life.13While there is somethingto be said for 'A shortlife,but a happy one', this applicationof it is obviouslycrazy. But now it could be suggestedthat if one turnedand ran away, one would be making oneself into a different sort of person. The self of reflective reasonsis onlyparticularly engaged by the continuedlifeof this human being so long as the human being continueswithmuch the same character.It, here and now, would not be speciallyengaged by one's life sort of person. So, for this self of afterone had become this different reflective reasons,the alternatives are, on one side, death in battleand a veryshortlife,and, on the otherside, no lifeat all, as the selfaccordingto this notionwould be broughtto an end by the change in character. to the is According thisline of thought, experienceofpracticalnecessity to presenting me what is necessaryif the self of my presentdesires and else would not fitin with this presentcharacteris to continue:anything character. character would onlybe makingthisconducthypothetically My whichdid not fitin, I necessary-it would onlybe thatif I did something would no longerhave this character.But if we take seriouslythe idea of twonotionsof one's self,one a biologicalnotionof thishumananimal,and the other a notion of the desires which make up my presentcharacter, between whichexistsonlyas long as thereis enough likenessof character me could necessity thefuture and mypresentself'4, thenthishypothetical give an explanationof theforce of the experienceof practicalnecessity. we thatsurely But whenwe considerthis'likenessof character', maythink should be determined the interest present'self' will take in my future my betweenmyself now by a discountrate based on the changesof character and the future that is envisaged. And that could hardly justifythe the of preference dutyabove lengthof days whatever discountforhaving played the coward, a whole life subject to that discount should still be worthmore than the fiveminutesleftto me if I stayput. that The line of thought requiresnot a relationof closenessin character would be just the sum of a great number of separate connections,and as would diminishin proportion theseseparaterelationswere snapped off more all-or-nothing. or withered This will need an away, but something idea of a person's characteras an organized whole. And, when we had out thrashed theissues,it might provethatour idea ofwhatis essentialto a of is person'scharacter not independent the experiencein whicha specific
13 14

Aristotle, IX.8.9, I I69a22-6. EN EthicsC5,p. I89 and p. 223 n. I6.

J. 56o Robert Gay

consideration pickedout as theone on whichwe must 1 (It mightbe is act. that the possibility organizingone's wishes into a whole witha shape of depends on the availability this typeof experience.) of Besides, theargument thatline ofthought for maybe undermined when we recallthattheordinary ofconsciousexperience-the exerciseof the life senses, eatingand drinking and so forth is itselfa good whichone may look forwardto. Some at least of the categoricaldesires which give us reasonto go forwards be desiresforsuch experiences. will And our desires fortheseexperiences essentially are mediatedby imagining experiences the as about to happen to us. Now, thisfirst-person of imagination something as about to happen to oneself surely involves only the bare notion of 16 personalidentity, without any idea about relatedness character. Thus, of some at least of the desires which can give us reflective reason to keep ourselvesalive will not involveany connectionsof character.17
15 This ideawillhavetobe onethat be applied from can But the outside, an observer. ingeneral, by ideasweapply interpreting another's in on of one minds livesdepend theknowledge mental and states and howthevwork we which havefrom owncase. our 16 Williams himself inclined say(cf.'MC', p. 92 with Io) thattheavoidance future is to of n. pain involves thebareideaofpersonal only identity is,for (that the Williams, ideaofbodily But continuity). ourmovement avoidfuture is essentially to to pain related ourimagining these sensations disagreeable as happening ourselves. this to So will as to to imagining about happen oneself involve onlythebareidea ofpersonal identity. now,itwouldappearthat desires future But our for and pleasures enjoyments are related justthesamewayto justthesametypeof imagination. in 17 Williams nowside withthispoint. might the for (He wouldthusbe abandoning argument the overall of if contention 'MC': thatlifecan onlybe enjoyable one is involved it in sucha waythat in one'scharacter be affected, an everlasting couldonly interesting will and be life ifone'scharacter were to altercompletely; one's lifeafter but had one's character altered completely couldnotpositively engage oneself hereand nowso as to giveone reasonto choosethiseverlasting future.) At thebeginning Ethits& he considers question forward Socrates theRepublic, of in the put by How one shouldlive?and suggests about whatI shoulddo hereand now, that,unlikequestions Socrates' will us our 'motivational and lead us to reflect, question tendto detach from specific set' on the basis of our interests as individual just humanbeings,about whatwould be a good set of for deliberative considerations us to have.(Ethits pp. I, 4-5 ('reflection one'slifeas a whole,... on &, all thewaydown'),and pp. 19-20; and compare waythediscussion the in continues ch.2 (where we find we areexpected needa reassurance from point viewofthis that to that of the desire happiness, for ourdeliberative is thebestfor andch.3 (where 'set' us) Williams a considers project which would give us thatreassurance).) We mayobserve thatnow there notto be thatfirm is dividebetween 'reflective reasons' and the tendencies thehuman of animal: nisus carry living to the on also impels awayfrom painand one felt towards pleasure and felt satisfaction, thisgeneral and desireforsomething happiness like which is in appearing 'Socratic'reflection surely a manifestation thatnisus conscious, will be of in reflective, And is thought. nowtheselfof'reflective reasons' notidentified with desires the and 'ground solely which projects' make one'spresent up character: seems first it at that self this may, reflection, in glance become detached from one'scharacter identified with and that for only general desire a fulfilling life; and evenifthatis nottheright is interpretationwhatWilliams saying, is clearthatthisselfhas of it nowexpanded embrace general to a desire 'a goodlife'which notrestricted thelimits one's for is by of present character whatmight and comprehensibly that. developfrom aboutwhatWilliams wouldnowthink also arrived by taking viewshe (This conjecture was at the in expressed hisHartLecture Acts in 'Voluntary and Responsible in Agents', given Oxford 1987,and a drawing parallel between ideasoftheidentity a person a time(in thedifferent of at things may we meanby 'He did it') and ideasof theidentity a person of overtime.But it wouldnotbe proper to discussviewswhich Williams notyetpublished.) has

Necessity56I Bernard Williams Practical on So, the choice put to one's desires would not be between some fulfilment, one stands one's ground, and no life at all, if one runs if away. The argumentthat one mightpreferto be killed ratherthan run away will only be shored up again, if we are able to add that one may in be identified withwhatis centralto one's presentcharacter such a way about what to do all those desires as to shut out fromone's thinking for one's own futureenjoymentwhich are not limitedby one's present character.

4. Practicalnecessity illusory as
For the thirdline of explanation,we should begin fromJohn Mackie's claim that ordinarymoral talk and thoughthave involved an idea of which would exist indepenobjective values values and requirements and the mere perceptionor thoughtof dentlyof us and our experiences, engaging anydesireofours and that whichcould move us to act, without the illusion(as he said it was) of such objectivevalues and requirements Mackie spoke of the may be explained by 'patternsof objectification'. of of objectification feelings, desires,and of demands.'8 But if we do not include the experience of practical necessityamong the feelingsto be of objectified,the objectification desires and feelings can yield only to objectified considerations, be taken into account in deliberationalong or withour own wishes.The idea of objectiverequirements prescriptions of would have to be produced by the objectification demands.'9 of Williamsechoes this explanationby the 'objectification demands' in Ethics&, and in his 'Ethics and the Fabric of theWorld'.20But he would argue that it does not explain the whole of the experienceof practical of would whichwe do have. This specific pattern objectification necessity begin fromdemands for particularactions on particularoccasions, and theywould have givenrise to the 'sense of obligation',whichis a feeling that relates only to actions that one can performhere and now. But, Williamssuggests, sense of havingto act in a certainway whichwe do the to thatare not primarily do withparticular have extendsto considerations times. For instance,it extendsto actions which one can do at particular
18 J. L. Mackie,Ethics: 1977, pp. 42-4. Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, Penguin, Inventing 19 This explanation notpeculiar Mackie'swaysof thinking. her'Morality a System as of is to In

Foot contended in and Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, Philippa Hypothetical Imperatives', Virtues Vices, ends.Any as one thatwe shouldviewmorality telling whatone has reasonto do ifone has certain way still act these ends, onemust ina certain (pp. i6o-i) is a thought whether notoneembraces that or as by matter a feeling one has to act so; and thisis to be explained a feeling, thewayin which of that 'Rules,Rights, also (pp. morality taught us as children I62-4). (Compare G. E. M. Anscombe, was to 'At the and modals' begin: thebeginning, 'stopping modals' 'forcing andPromises', theplacewhere on say Philosophical doingwhatthey he can'tdo' (in Collected adultswillphysically thechildfrom stop I98I, vol.III, p. Ioi ).) Papers, Oxford, Blackwell, and 20 B. A. 0. Williams, 'Ethicsand theFabricof theWorld',in T.Honderich (ed.) Morality & at A to London,Routledge KeganPaul, I985, especially p. 213. Objectivity: Tribute 7. L. Mackie,

]. 562 Robert Gay of which have to do withbeing,or becoming,a considerations gratitude, certainsort of person.2' I would try to work out this argumentby makingan appeal to the the motivations phenomenology, appearanceswhich our different present in our consciousness. There are two recognizable kinds of motivation which may express themselvesby saying 'I mustdo so and so'. One is a special motivation do with effort, to and it may perhaps be explained as the resultof the pressureof others' demands upon us. The otheris a state of motivation which does not involve any specific motivation distinctfromour 'natural' desires,and this may resistbeing explainedin thatway. is The special motivationto do with effort what appears in Kant's examples of the 'good will'22,and it is what Mill is recognizing when he from acceptsthatthe will as an 'active phenomenon'is distinct desire,as a 'state of passive sensibility'. This special motivation distinctfromthe is 'natural' desireswhichordinarily motivateus: theyhave the phenomenology whichMill misdescribes sayingthatto desire a thingand to find by the idea of it pleasantare one and the same thing,while,as he recognizes, this special motivation does not have a phenomenology like that.23And thisspecial motivation seems to existin orderto fillup the deficiencies of the ordinary desires: in happy circumstances, one acts withlove towards one's spouse and childrenwithout any effort will,but when one is tired of and depressed(as in Kant's examplesoftruevirtue), one mayhave to exert oneself to do the rightthing. This motivationdoes relate primarily to acts thatare in one's power here and now, and possiblyit and particular the way it presentsitselfto us could be explained as the result of the pressureof otherpeople's demands upon us. Because thismotivation a distinct has if phenomenology, it is presentin one's awareness,one's thoughtscannot be completelyoccupied by any 'natural' desire.Even a sense thatthismotivation in the offing, is thereto be called upon if needed, would have to be something distinct.And this motivation will not be presentunless some 'natural'motivation lacking. is There will not even be the idea thatit is in the offing, the edge of one's on experience,unless there is some idea of a possibilitythat one's present 'natural' motivation mightflag. But suppose thatsomeone,seeinganotherpersondying, a sense that has
21 Ethics&, p. 179, I88-9; and compare thedifficulties philosophers that in of thinking terms obligations havehad in speaking aboutthissortof consideration, reported M. Midgley, as by 'The Objection Systematic to in Humbug', HeartandMind,London,Methuen, 1983, pp. 76, 83-4, 97-9. 22 Kant,Groundwork oftheMetaphysic Morals, 397-9; trans. J. Paton(The MoralLaw), of pp. H. London,Hutchinson, I948, pp. 63-5. 23 Mill, Utilitarianism IV; Everyman ch. edn.(I972 version) 36-8. Mill's acknowledgement pp. of this difference especially is valuabletestimony, because the difference makesa difficulty his for argument theonlything that which good(i.e, is (rationally) is pursued itsownsake)is pleasure for (including avoidance pain). the of

Necessity563 on Williams Practical Bernard be humanlifemust respected,and triesto give voice to thisby sayingthat a humanlifeis sacred. We surelyshould not suppose thathe is expressing of 'sense of duty',readyto summonup efforts will. Rather, conscientious echoingof occupied by his imaginative the person'smind may be entirely at to the person'sfearand his struggles live,and by his own regret whatis possessed by these,therewill be no gap happening.And, if he is entirely to for the motivationof effort fill,nor even the idea of a gap for the of to motivation effort be 'in the offing'. of, thatthe enjoyment say, a We may be remindedof Ryle's argument game of tennis cannot be the experiencingof sensationsof pleasure, because the more one is enjoyingthe game, the more completelyone's is attention occupied by it, and sensationsof pleasurewould have to enter one's awarenessand distractone fromthe game. In the same way, this be sense thathumanlifemust respectedcannotinvolvethe 'sense of duty', because this sense of the sacredness of life involves being entirely and possessedby certainthoughts, ifone's mindis filledby thosethoughts there is no room for the 'sense of duty', which only occurs to supply If deficiencies. we may picturethe 'sense of duty' as black,and the other and thoughts say, red, thenwe should colour the whole of the as, feelings any black patchesor even subject'sconsciousnessat thattimered,without a black nimbus around the edges of the red. The 'must' of practical but rather(if I may will have to be expressing nothingdistinct, necessity of one step beyondmyexplanation it) the compelling pursuethemetaphor of brightness this red. of But now, it seems to me thatthe precipitate otherpeople's demands as would have to be a distinct upon one, a sense of something demanded, feeling.It would have to be, so to put it, black in comparisonwith the colours of the 'natural' motivations,or to edge their colours with a compellingblack borderof pressure.It does not seem thatthe pressureof otherpeople's demandsforone to act could, so to put it, make the colours of some naturalmotivations bright.And so we are leftwith compellingly 'I must. . .', which we may thinkof as the genuine one type of cases of cases of practicalnecessity. to cases in a Yet Williams himself mightoffer explain these remaining of like that'objectification demands'.24We are not to beginwith way very and the reactionof blame demandsthatpeople are to do particular things, of withpeople's attitudes likingand whentheydo not,but moregenerally And we are not to proceedby distastetowardsotherpeople's characters.25
24 One hint is offer lineof explanation givenat Ethics&, p. 223 n. I5; this thatWilliams might Shameand book to is Lear sayswhenreferring a forthcoming by Williams, another whatJonathan and in 'Moral Objectivity', S. C. Brown(ed.) Objectivity Cultural Divergence, Necessity-J.Lear, Press,I984, p. 135. University Cambridge Cambridge, reaction and in attitudes general thespecific reactive between 2 5 For the distinguishes wayWilliams in p. and &, ofblame, Ethics pp. 37-8, 192-3, andalso'Ought MoralObligation', MoralLuck, 121. cf.

J. 564 Robert Gay

way of guilt and the sense of obligation,but by way of shame and the desireto be a certainsortof person.Williamswould be proposingthatas of the 'sense of obligation'is theprecipitate one's responseto the demands other people make upon one's actions, so the genuine experience of practicalnecessitywill be the result of one's exposure to other people's likes and dislikesforthe character one displays. which our motivaHere we mightagain appeal to the phenomenology whichhad resulted tionspresentin our experience.I urged thatanything fromthe pressureof others' demands upon us would have a distinctive and that we could recognizethat some states which we phenomenology, Equally, expressby 'I must' did not have thisdistinctive phenomenology. shame and what has resultedfromit may have a recognizablecharacter: one mightsuggestthatit should always involvean idea of otherpeople's eyes upon us. we But perhaps,in orderto give the proposala fairhearing, should not whichwould make concentrate shame,or any othersubstantial on feeling therebe one thought manyto fitthe experienceof practicalnecessity. too Instead, we may simplythinkof otherpeople around one havingreactive attitudes-feelings of liking and dislike for people's characters and Then one's actions-and of oneselfcomingalso to have thesame attitudes. own reactionsto one's own motiveswould shut certainconsiderations out of the space of one's thoughts. Certainly,thereare processes by which people come to have reactive attitudesfor themselves, and towardstheirown actions as well as other to people's. And theremustbe some close relationbetweenone's reactions For example, one's own motivesand the experienceof practicalnecessity. ifone viewsa motiveas contemptible,is not as ifthisreactiononlyserved it to to focusone's attention inwardson one's inclinations act, and whenone saw thatone mustnotact on this motive,thatperceptionwere something attitudes are, so to quite separate.But yetit need not be thatthesereactive put it, free-standing, and, being formedand standingup independently of the experience of practical necessity, will account for it without remainder. We may ask about the processesby whichpeople come to form reactive attitudes of their own. With certain reactive attitudes the ones with which we are concerned it mightbe thatthis is able to happen because in therealreadyis implicitly sense ofprecisely a thosedifferences character betweenone impulseto act and anotherthatwill constitute experience the of practicalnecessity. it seems thatthe processcould be simplyone of (If the withshameto keep one in line untilthis absorptionfrom environment, osmosis is completed,we should reflect thatthe reactiveattitudes current aroundabout are, of course,ones whichhave been able to takehold of one or anotherbit of the psychology human beings,and so are able to be of formedwithinthis person also.)

on Necessity565 Bernard Williams Practical We may also wonder how these reactiveattitudesare able to have the simply forcetheydo. In particular, it is proposedthatreactiveattitudes, if as such, can explain what is going on, we may put the question how our reactiveattitudeswould be able to display such unity.We do not sort of person that in fact have a single image and a single determinate we wish to be. Rather,all sortsof likes and dislikesand ideas of what is admirable and contemptibleare circulatingaround us, and have taken hold of different of our psychologies. bits Surelywe should have expected that there would be a swarm of littleadmirationsand dislikes buzzing offin all directions,and so the reactive attitudeswe did have would be dissipated.We should enquirewhatmakesit possible forthesereactive attitudesto singleout one thought and presentit as the one on which we mustact. We should not be contentwith an explanationof the experienceof in practicalnecessity termsof impactsfromoutside ourselveswhichmay in fact only be triggers underlying for dispositionswithinus. (Such an explanationmightnot so much explain whywe have this experience,as presuppose that in certaincircumstances human beings will have experiences of this sort.)

as basic 5. Practicalnecessity irreducible properly and

I cannot see any way of arguingthat what we have in the experienceof practicalnecessityis somethingindependentand irreducible,except by But I need also to takingon attemptsto account for it reductively.26 explain how it can be 'properlybasic'. and irreducible I do not mean thatthistypeof experiencehas a distinct that thereare objectiverequirerepresentational content,and represents mentssuch as Mackie spokeof-requirementswhichwould existindepenconfront in our us dentlyof us and our experiences,and would directly experience.Rather,it seems to be simplybecausewe have thisexperience
26 Whyare these wouldmakethecharacteristic all accounts? experience three reductive The first this to and whatit is like do no workat all in explaining necessity act. The secondwouldhave of sortof reasonforone to act-and in general awareness a certain the experience an implicit be of exceptby wayof one's awareness them.But then reasons act willnot lead to actualactions to but thereasonthatmakesit truethatone has no alternative to act in thisway,wouldbe explained The thirdaccountwouldmake about the character one's experience. of without saying anything But typeofexperience. by a thenecessity feelthatwe are underbe imposed our having certain we to content the experience-bywhatwe are taking of it is to be imposedby the representational of as content to be explained is reductively, thejointproduct be thecase. And thisrepresentational of to and simply theexperience a pressure) ofan impulse as of having things demanded one(conceived 'objectify'. to the and the position thesecond, third, on tothe of alongfrom first Thereis a progression thought And I hope thatthe in cannotbe explained reductively. idea thatwhatmatters the experience may seemmoreplausible. which us arguments propel in thisdirection maketheterminus

566 Robert].Gay

of in It that mustactin sucha way.27 seemsthat thistype experience we which our property-a quality and sensational there a distinct irreducible is in from their ownright, distinct as havein themselves, their experiences in which figure that andthat content theproperties and representational to involves idea that the we find ourselves responding thisin a waywhich we mustso respond. property But we wouldhaveto takecareovertheidea ofa 'sensational the between representational We the ofexperience'. do require distinction this is content an experience whatelse there to having experience and of as sense, things being.In a stricter beyondthe way thatit represents and the properties like the taste of coffee, are however, sensational by Peacocke's'red"28)whichis produced a red property (Christopher of character in an circumstances, having independent objectin normal to their own.Andwhatwe are responding does nothavean independent in in weresucha solid,definite, property character itsownright. there (If to we and responding it,then of necessity, wewere theexperience practical to a awaywhat couldhavetaken muchshorter with way attempts explain we have in theseexperiences: would onlyhave neededto remind we no could of and be ourselves thisproperty, wemight surethat explanation it breakin between and ourresponse.) there be aspectsof whatit is liketo havean experience can However, of For properties experiences. free-standing, thatare not independent, is awareness something-one in fact of one instance, when hasan inchoate does but this registering factbeyond experience, theexperience not some is declareon its facewhatit is answering and yetwhena suggestion to; experience, may one by is being discriminated this madeaboutwhat infact couldfit. we 'from inside'that suggestion the (For example, the recognize our were out might havewhatturned to be a senseforwhether reactions it on wouldbe like,imagining depending a fullgraspofwhata situation or merely what of on Newman from points viewofall thoseinvolved, the wouldcall a notional assent.)Whatit is liketo have such an inchoate
27 aboutthe and in or I Of course, maygo wrong myperceptions myreasoning, so be mistaken I impulses to happens when havecertain which me. ordinary ofthecasebefore Andan experience facts of it mark to becauseofthekind impulse actwhich is,might impulses act,andsingles oneofthese out on mistake the which fact resting a mistaken ofthecase. Andagain,I might in is idea outan impulse necessity. for experience practical of emotion thegenuine pressure a strong of onlythatI have avoidedsuch act wayseemsto require But thissense thatI must in a certain metaphysical in it anything which couldbe upsetby a general mistakes: particular, willnotrequire werea matter an of hand, this if from queerness'. theother On argument as Mackie's'argument such was to whatourexperience representing then we content, while accepted irreducible representational that valuesandrequirements we weresupposing be so, we wouldofcourse guided theobjective be by that cannot suchindependently-existing be to exist. But ifwe becameconvinced arguments there by with comeintocontact of beings and howthey are whatwe know whathuman requirements, that or then for awareofanysuchrequirements, even leavesno room us to become things outside themselves let in we of ifwe continued haveexperience terms suchrequirements, couldnotreasonably such to affect whatwe do. discredited content representational 28 C. A. B. Peacocke, Oxford, Clarendon Senseand Content, Press,I983, pp. 20-I.

Necessity567 Williams Practical on Bernard awareness cannot be fully captured: we can only reach after it with characterizadeterminate The onlyway to producea decently metaphors. tionis to go beyondthe experienceand workout whatwe may have been registering. Also, we would have to take care to say how the responses we were makingwould involvethe idea that we had to respond thus. about how we come to act has it thatactionsspring One wayof thinking would of fromdesires.29A desireis thought as a statewhich,primitively, simplyand directlyissue in behaviour directed towards a goal.30 One cannot decide at a time what desires one will feel here and now. If one oneself a subjectofawarenessand ofchoices,thesedesireswill as considers thathappento of phenomenology be stateswithsomething a characteristic one. about how we come to act, for But there is anotherway of thinking to whichall thathappens the subjectis the awarenessof a fact(an observer or from outsidewill say,the contentof the subject's perception belief,but thisto be so) and one respondsto thatby an of coursethe subjectis taking active movementof one's will. Thomas Nagel, presentingthis picture, says: after to It is as though billiard balls decidedwhere roll,and at whatvelocity, and inferring the uponthem, the and operating noting forces frictions carefully from lawsofmechanics.31 the direction appropriate This active response is to involve the idea of a consistencyin one's patternof responding.As Nagel goes on to say: or themselves, acknowledging (Theywouldalso haveto be capableofcorrecting if madea mistake.) of theaccuracy a correction, they to And thisresponsecan involvethe idea thatit is appropriate the factto which one is responding it is not that one simplyhas to keep to the of as of pattern one's past responses, ifone had to observethepattern some one whichdance-pattern but it did not matter dance in one's movements to followed. Nagel would suggestthattheresponsecan be presented one as thatp and thatif p then q, to calledforin the same waythatifone thinks
29 This wayof thinking to impulses act whichdependon the does notdeal onlyin short-lived of Given the resources episodeof imagining. thingor on a particular of perception a particular of in dependon a representationlanguage whatthey to can there be inclinations act which language, in themselves onlymanifest they even of states inclination, though are and which persisting are for, called are these states notnaturally Perhaps occasions. or on thought in behaviour particular conscious can states leadto these because use but reasonably thesameterm, in English, wemay 'desires' ordinary to aboutwhat do and deliberation thinking this in action thesamebasicway.And,for wayofthinking, to goalscontinue towards in the as processes which samebasictendencies areto be conceived further do inclinations have these general persisting goals.Moreover, towards their directed issueinbehaviour have. impulses that of something thephenomenology theshort-lived 30 Aristotle, EN VII.3.I0, 1147b34-5. 31 T.Nagel, ThePossibility Altruism, Press,I970, p. 22. Clarendon Oxford, of

J. 568 Robert Gay

to accept that willbe presented oneas themovethat should q one make.32 One can refuseto make such a response, but one will be refusing to something which presented one as calledfor; is and we mayspeakofa sensethatone has to act in thisway.33 Whenwe readNagel,or JohnMcDowell's 'Are MoralRequirements Hypothetical we Imperatives?'34, seemto understand idea thatsomethe one'saction in might explained sucha way.Andthevery that be fact we canwrapourminds round ideawillindicate itis notimpossible this that a priori thatsomeactions happenin thisway.It does not showthatany in actions happen sucha way.Butitdoesshowthat issue do particular the cannotbe settledexceptby askingthe questionof our experience of particular the of actions, whether picture actionsas spilling out from or desires thissecondpicture thewaywe think feelwhenwe act. fits and Yet thequestion notsimply is what bestsuits things areinclined the we to say whenwe are,so to put it,pulledintoacting morally. The second picture's response involves idea of consistency appropriateness. an and will The samefact haveto call forth sameresponse onlyfrom the not one on but person different different occasions, from persons. Now,McDowell would urge thatwe respondin this way,directly, the factswhich to characteristically a virtuous move personto act. But theneveryone who graspsthe same factsshouldhave the same actionspresented called as for.35 But whenwe imagine psychopath, may findit natural a we to supposethathe might thesame facts grasp whichengageour attention whenwe act,and that whatis neededbefore willsee anyreason act he to morally thathe be somehow is to brought feelcertain emotions: then, whatever arguments also be neededcan getstarted. may if However, thereis something is liketo have experiences, it besides
Nagel,op. cit.n. 3I, p. 20. Butis this to enough giveus thenotion necessity we areseeking? saw(n. 2 above)that of that We whenone saysone must a thing, do thisdoes not leave space fora simpleself-assertive refusal to comply, onlyforsomething beingundera spell('I found but like thatI had jumped'). However,we may observethatin 'PN' Williamsseems to prefer be appealingto public to phenomena language of rather thanto thecharacter an experience. thatmaynotbe thebest of And waytodirect attention. might that our It when brute be a refusal inprospect would usethe was one not words 'must'or 'haveto', butthatstilltheexperience thesameas thatforwhich woulduse was we 'haveto' on other occasions. 34 J. H. McDowell, 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1978. 35 McDowell(op. cit.n. 34, p. I6, and p. 22) tries escapethis to consequence proposing a by that whois notaffected this in person waydoesnotreally the grasp sameproperty. this tobe a proposal If is interms 'realassent' against of as 'notional we assent', couldunderstand Butitat least it. that appears a can person fully the fact a imagine very which moves virtuous and not person, yet havethesameaction presented required. as Andifthere to be no explanation thisideaofa different is of property, except thatit is neededto save McDowell'swayof applying picture motivation, does notseem this of that enough justifydifferent ofindividuating to a way properties. usualwayofthinking a property (Our has be whatis grasped a person by who is able to 'carry witha term, on' applying correctly fresh it to examples, so itwillsaythat peoplewhoareabletoapply sameterm and two the have correctly grasped thesameproperty.)
33
32

Necessity569 on Williams Practical Bernard is), and if the second content(and therecertainly theirrepresentational so picture'sidea of a responsewhichwould involvethe idea thatone must (and it seemsnotto be), thenit shouldalso respondis notruledout a priori be in order to combine the two ideas. We may put the question to our in thatwe are responding McDowell's the whether suggestion experience, in way to something whatit is liketo have one and anotherdesireseems to fitthe way we come to act on particularoccasions. And this suggestionwould respect what we say when we imagine a psychopath.For it would mean that therecan be a special reason to act morally,but also that this reason could not be seen except by one who alreadyhas certaindesires (only thencan a person know,and be affected to by, whatit is like to have such and such inclinations act). possible and does seem to fitthe It maystillbe feltthatall thisis formally describeour experience,but yet it is metaphysiway we mightnaturally cally implausible,and cannot be correct.I hope that I would be able to out otherthingsthatwe by of overcomethisfeeling implausibility setting a should be preparedto accept, and so furnishing contextin which this suggestionwill be seen to fitin. In particular,what we have proposed requires an idea of the self which is not the 'empirical self', simply constituted our desires,and yet entersinto the explanationof action; by but I would wish to contendthat the explanationof action does require somethingmore than the firstpicture's conceptionof desires as simple tendenciesto act, and that this will not be a Kantian noumenon,which could onlybe supposed to existoutsidetheworldthatwe know,but can be located withinour experienceof our own lives. But thatmustbe a taskfor anotheroccasion.36 of Department Philosophy Lehigh University PA Bethlehem, i80I5 U.S.A
ROBERT J. GAY

36 I am indebted MichaelSmith Case', and toJohn about'The Makropulos a for conversation to of on Hare forcomments thelasttwodrafts thispaper.