1. Manalili v. CA [GR 113447, 9 October 1997] Facts: At about 2:10 p.m.

of 11 April 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y Dizon. On 11 April 1988, Manalili was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425. Upon his arraignment on 21 April 1988, Manalili pleaded not guilty to the charge. With the agreement of the public prosecutor, Manalili was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond. After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on 19 May 1989 a decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. Manalili remained on provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May 1989. On 19 April 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court. The appellate court denied reconsideration via its Resolution dated 20 January 1994. Manalili filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Search and seizure, when unreasonable? Held: In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. What justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that in these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. To require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to

simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop Manalili to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in his possession. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. 2. JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, RTC-BRANCH 10, APARRI, CAGAYAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ADOLFO B. MOLINA, MCTC, GONZAGA-STA. TERESITA, CAGAYAN, respondent. [A.M. No. MTJ-94-979. October 25, 1995.] Facts: The instant case was brought to this Court in connection with the order of complainant Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili charging Judge Adolfo B. Molina with grave ignorance of the law in relation to Criminal Case No. 10-435, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rolando Anama," for homicide. Complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the preliminary investigation of the above-mentioned criminal case, failed to exercise utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando Anama, based as it was, merely on the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the commission of the offense charged. Complainant judge averred, was a clear violation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which requires that before a warrant of arrest is issued, "the judge must personally determine the existence of probable cause from an examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses." Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause exists, stated complainant judge. There must be something more concrete. Respondent admitted that he was the inquest judge in the preliminary investigation of the above entitled case and finding the existence of probable cause, he ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused and as the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, it was forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent explained that since the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, which has the final say and disposition on the existence of probable cause on cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, should carry the brunt of the responsibility for "erroneous" finding of probable cause. Respondent judge argued that the findings of complainant judge in his opinion-argument and contended that "the proper remedy for a seemingly weak probable cause finding is a reinvestigation." Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only when the "municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." This is in conformity with the constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Issue: Definition of probable cause Held: PROBABLE CAUSE; DEFINED. In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. WHO SHALL DETERMINE. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge and is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination. Liberty, in any part of the civilized world is a basic human right, the curtailment of which must be in strict conformity with the procedure laid down by law. WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to comply with the pertinent rules on the issuance of a warrant of arrest, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be entered in his record.

3. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY; AND AIDEN LANUZA, respondents. [G.R. No. 124461. September 25, 1998.] Facts: On June 27, 1995, Judge Estrella T. Estrada issued Search Warrant No. 958 (95) against Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) in relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394 (Consumer Act) drug, device by any person without the license from the Department required in this Act;. On the following day, the search warrant was implemented and as reported by the search and seizure team, it was conducted on the stated address, witnessed by three members of Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City and resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons of assorted medicines from the possessions and control of Aiden Lanuza. [ARTICLE 40. Prohibited Acts - The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited: k) manufacture, importation, exportation, sale, offering for sale, distribution, or transfer of any] Aiden Lanuza moved for the quashal of the said Search Warrant for being illegal and null and void and for the declaration of seized articles inadmissible in any proceeding and to return them to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export and Import Company. The motion was granted, the search warrant was quashed and ordered returned to their owner. The place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different person. The search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Issue: Probable cause definition Held: The respondent Judge cannot be faulted for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs. In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The presumption of regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.I THE APPLICANT MUST PROVE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE. We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE; EXPLAINED. The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in

the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued in a resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED. 4. STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550) June 19, 1967 Facts: Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law. In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity. The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations. Issues: 1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers. 2.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its seizure. Held: 1)Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 2)The Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.