SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000] AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS.

ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while [1] Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the Senate in that election. [2] Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath. Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue. In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision. On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation [3] to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c). It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of [4] evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant, this Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000. Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct. First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed late. He contends that a motion for [5] reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c) and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c). The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) [6] has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva, in which this Court held: Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct [7] any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence. On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it. Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was [8] received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only be two days. The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of [9] [10] [11] [12] justice. For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy or prescription or with procedure like verification of pleadings and prejudicial [13] questions have no application to disbarment proceedings. Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where the appealed case is [14] [15] [16] clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even though filed six, four, and three days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious. Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. [17] 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents.

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is [18] [19] required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more [20] convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. [21] This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections. In rejecting this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said: There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of [22] honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election [23] returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the [24] SoVs. Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct. Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads: WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added) Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein. Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties [25] as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a [26] member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood. Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. [27] Tandayag in which this Court said: There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a [28] common reality. . . . It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust. Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the [29] case of Salayon, after a long public service. Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount ofP10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION A. C. No. 7504 November 23, 2007

VIRGINIA VILLAFLORES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS, respondent. RESOLUTION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by complainant Virginia Villaflores against respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, charging the latter with Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty. Complainant Virginia Villaflores is the defendant in Civil Case No. 1218-BG entitled, "Spouses Sanchez represented by Judith Medina vs. Spouses Villaflores," filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33. Receiving an unfavorable judgment, complainant sought the help of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) to appeal her case to the Court of Appeals. The PAO filed for her a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. On 1 September 2004, complainant received a copy of a Notice from the Court of Appeals requiring her to file her appellants brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. Immediately thereafter, complainant approached respondent, who had previously handled her sons case, to file on her behalf the required appellants brief. Since respondent agreed to handle the appeal, complainant handed to respondent on 8 September 2004 the amount of P10,000.00 as partial payment of the latters acceptance fee ofP20,000.00, together with the entire records of the case. The following day, on 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance fee in the amount 3 of P10,000.00. These payments were duly receipted and acknowledged by the respondent. On 21 September 2004, an Employment Contract was executed between complainant and respondent whereby the former formally engaged the latters professional services. Upon the execution of said contract, complainant again paid the respondent the amount 5 of P2,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses. On 14 January 2005, complainant received a copy of a Resolution dated 6 January 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals dismissing her appeal for failure to file her appellants brief within the reglementary period. Thus, on 17 January 2005, complainant went to respondents office but failed to see respondent. After several unsuccessful attempts to talk to the respondent, complainant went to Manila on 18 January 2005 to seek help from another lawyer who agreed to handle the case for her. On 19 January 2005, complainant went back to the respondents office to retrieve the records of her case. Respondent allegedly refused to talk to her. Aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent. In her Answer, respondent admitted her issuance of the acknowledgment receipts for the aggregate amount ofP22,000.00, the execution of the Employment Contract between her and complainant, and the issuance by the Court of Appeals of the Notice to File Appellants Brief and Resolution dated 6 January 2005. She, however, denied all other allegations imputed against her. Respondent argued that the non-filing of the appellants brief could be attributed to the fault of the complainant who failed to inform her of the exact date of receipt of the Notice to File Appellants Brief from which she could reckon the 45-day period to file the same. Complainant allegedly agreed to return to respondent once she had ascertained the actual date of receipt of said Notice, but she never did. Complainant supposedly also agreed that in the event she could not give the exact date of receipt of the Notice, respondent would just wait for a new Order or Resolution from the Court of Appeals before she would file the appropriate pleading. Respondent further contended that she had, in fact, already made preliminary study and initial research of complainants case. Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 17 June 2005.
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On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and Recommendation, finding respondent liable for gross negligence and recommending the imposition upon her of the penalty of one year suspension, to wit: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be declared guilty of gross negligence in failing to file the required appellants brief for which act she should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Also, it is recommended that the respondent be ordered to return the amount ofP22,000.00 that she received from the complainant. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-584 dated 15 December 2006, approving with modification the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents gross negligence in failing to file the required appellants brief, Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with Warning that a repetition of similar conduct will be dealt with more severely and ORDERED TO RETURN the amount of P22,000.00 she received from complainant. The core issue in this administrative case is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case as would warrant disciplinary action. After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and, thus, sustain the same. Respondents conduct in failing to file the appellants brief for complainant before the Court of Appeals falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their clients cause. The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained. To establish the professional relation, it is 11 sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. It must be noted that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent already agreed to take on complainants case, receiving from the latter partial payment of her acceptance fee and the entire records of complainants case. The very next day, 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance fee. Respondent admitted her receipt of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for the legal services she is to render to complainant andP2,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses she is to incur in handling the case, and the subsequent execution of the employment contract between her and complainant. Hence, it can be said that as early as 8 September 2004, respondents rendition of legal services to complainant had commenced, and from then on, she should start protecting the complainants interests. The employment contract between respondent and complainant already existed as of 8 September 2004, although it was only reduced into writing on 21 September 2004. In short, respondents acceptance of the payment for her professional fees and miscellaneous expenses, together with the records of the case, effectively bars her from disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client relationship between her and complainant. No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a 12 client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. As ruled in Rabanal v. Tugade : Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client;
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he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Respondents defense that complainant failed to inform her of the exact date when to reckon the 45 days within which to file the appellants brief does not inspire belief or, at the very least, justify such failure. If anything, it only shows respondents cavalier attitude towards her clients cause. A case in point is Canoy v. Ortiz, where the Court ruled that the lawyers failure to file the position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code. There, the Court ruled that the lawyer could not shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client of the status of cases. Respondent cannot justify her failure to help complainant by stating that "after receipt of part of the acceptance fee, she did not hear anymore from complainant." The persistence displayed by the complainant in prosecuting this complaint belies her lack of enthusiasm in fighting for her rights, as alleged by respondent. This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers 15 lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical. A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a quality of service at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor, and his client 16 may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently. Respondent has obviously failed to measure up to the foregoing standards. It may be true that the complainant shares the responsibility for the lack of communication between her and respondent, her counsel. Respondent, however, should not have depended entirely on the information her client gave or at the time the latter wished to give it. Respondent, being the counsel, more than her client, should appreciate the importance of complying with the reglementary period for the filing of pleadings and know the best means to acquire the information sought. Had she made the necessary inquiries, respondent would have known the reckoning date for the period to file appellants brief with the Court of Appeals. As a lawyer representing the cause of her client, she should have taken more control over her clients case. Respondents dismal failure to comply with her undertaking is likewise evident from the fact that up until 19 January 2005, when complainant retrieved the entire records of her case, and more than four months from the time her services were engaged by complainant, respondent still had not prepared the appellants brief. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by reason of respondents negligence, the complainant suffered actual loss. Complainant faced the risk of losing entirely her right to appeal and had to engage the services of another lawyer to protect such a right. This Court will not countenance respondents failure to observe the reglementary period to file the appellants brief. Counsels are sworn to protect the interests of their clients and in the process, should be knowlegeable about the rules of procedure to avoid prejudicing the interests of their clients or worse, compromising the integrity of the courts. Ignorance of the procedural rules on 17 their part is tantamount to inexcusable negligence. However, the matter before us does not even call for counsels knowledge of procedural rules, but merely her managerial skills in keeping track of deadlines for filing necessary pleadings, having difficulty with which, she could have always opted to timely withdraw from the case in order not to prejudice further her clients interest. The failure of respondent to file the appellants brief for complainant within the reglementary period constitutes gross negligence in 18 violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, this Court held:
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An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515). All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. In People v. Cawili, we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails 20 disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr. characterized a lawyers failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. 21 Court of Appeals, we held that the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the 22 23 24 court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon reiterated Ford v. Daitol and In re: Santiago F. Marcos in holding that an attorneys failure to file a brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence. In cases involving a lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleadings before an appellate court, we did not hesitate to suspend the 25 26 erring member of the Bar from the practice of law for three months, six months, or even disbarment in severely aggravated 27 cases. WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely. Furthermore, respondent is hereby ORDERED to return the amount of Twenty-Two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00), which she received from complainant Virginia Villaflores. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land. SO ORDERED.
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