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Macro Report
Economic Indicators - US economy - January 2013
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2 The past: Oil & Fed ........................................................................................................................................ 3 The Lighthouse Recession Probability Indicator (LRPI) ................................................................................. 4 LRPI: Recession probability (long-term)........................................................................................................ 5 LRPI: Recession probability (short-term) ...................................................................................................... 6 Interpretation of latest LRPI.......................................................................................................................... 7 Fed Funds Rate.............................................................................................................................................. 8 Crude Oil ....................................................................................................................................................... 9 Building permits .......................................................................................................................................... 10 Non-Farm Payrolls....................................................................................................................................... 11 Monthly job changes (new, for visualization only) ..................................................................................... 12 Consumer Sentiment: University of Michigan survey ................................................................................ 13 Consumer Confidence: Conference Board survey ...................................................................................... 14 Total Credit Outstanding............................................................................................................................. 15 Electricity Usage .......................................................................................................................................... 16 Retail sales .................................................................................................................................................. 17 Manufacturing: Hours Worked ................................................................................................................... 18 Manufacturing: Orders ............................................................................................................................... 19 Miles Traveled ............................................................................................................................................. 20 Orders: Capital Goods ................................................................................................................................. 21 Electric and Gas Output .............................................................................................................................. 22 Manufacturing: Supplier Deliveries ............................................................................................................ 23 Gasoline ...................................................................................................................................................... 24
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Unfortunately, this does not have to be the case going forward. Due to impotence of monetary policy at the lower zero bound and rapidly increasing government debt the Fed might not be able to raise rates in the foreseeable future. A recession might hence happen without prior tightening by the Fed.
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Rules for each indicator define levels indicating a recession call. No two recessions are the same. Trigger levels can be too strict (missing some recessions) or too lose (giving too many false positives). We therefore created a range. The lower ("strict") boundary is the level necessary to avoid false positives; the upper ("lenient") boundary is the level necessary to catch all recessions. A high-quality indicator will have a narrow range, and recessions will be called with high confidence. An indicator at the upper boundary will be awarded a 50% probability, increasing towards 100% at the lower boundary. The overall "Lighthouse Recession Probability Indicator" (LRPI) is a weighted mean of individual indicators. High confidence and timeliness of signal have been awarded higher weights (maximum: 3) then those with low confidence or tardiness (minimum: 1). We have added "non-farm payrolls" to our list of recession indicators. On the following page you see the LRPI since 1971, predicting every recession (assumed once 40%-50% probability is exceeded).
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The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis publishes a recession probability indicator by Chauvet / Piger (black line). It is based on four inputs (non-farm payrolls, industrial production, real personal income and real manufacturing and trade sales). However, the most recent data point for Chauvet/Piger is usually three months old, while LRPI is constantly updated (1 months old data). You can see that LRPI (both the weighted and non-weighted version) begin to show first warnings signs much earlier than Chauvet/Piger. In a recent response to a blog post, Chauvet clarified their indicator calls for a recession only "after exceeding 80% for a couple of months". Additionally, their indicator is "smoothed" as the raw data can reach 70% (2003/4) without being followed by a recession. Incidentally, the weighted LRPI (bold red line) does not deviate significantly from the non-weighted (dotted red line), speaking for the quality of inputs. On the next page we zoom in on a shorter time frame. Macro Report - US economic indicators - January 2013 Page 5
The recession probability by Chauvet/Piger for August has been revised downwards quite a bit from 20% to 4%. Last data point is September (3%). The latest data point by LPRI (December) is 15% (non-weighted) and 11% (weighted). Due to revision of economic data, probabilities for November have been revised slightly downwards to 15% (from 20%) for the non-weighted and remained at 11% for the weighted LPRI. For January, data available so far are the final reading of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment (73.8, up from 72.9 in December) and the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index (58.6 down from 66.7). The January non-farm payroll report showed big upwards revisions for previous months, supporting the view of subdued recession risk. The ISM manufacturing survey came in at 53.1 versus a consensus of 50.7. This seems to contradict a series of lower-than expected economic data seen over the last few weeks. Weaker data had fueled fears of investors following an 'economic surprise index' (not that it had any impact on a surging stock market).
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An investor using the LRPI as a trading tool would have suffered only one loss of 7% (August 1980) while avoiding the dot-com crash (2001) and the 'great recession' (2008-2009). The system creates no unnecessary churn. While the control group ('buy-and-hold') would have created a higher return (with higher volatility) this might be due to the test period coinciding with one of the longest bull markets in history (1982-2000). Annex: LRPI Components Despite the large effort that went into building LRPI we are completely transparent regarding inputs and calculation. Please find charts for all contributors to the LRPI on the following pages.
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The US central bank ("Fed") increased interest rates ahead of each of the last 9 recessions. The black line shows the absolute level of the Fed Funds rate; the blue line the increase from the prior post-recession low. An increase between 2 and 4.5 percentage points from the previous low preceded every recession since 1954. Recessions are shaded in gray. Yellow dots indicate the beginning of a recession; green dots the end. The absolute level (black line) is usually on the right-hand scale, while percentage changes (blue line) are on the left-hand scale. Negative absolute numbers should be ignored as they are merely needed for better formatting.
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An increase in the price of crude oil of 75% to 100% preceded five out of the last six recessions. Close call in March 2011 and February 2012. Currently not a red flag.
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Want to build a house? Need a permit! Any decline in permits of 25%+ from prior peak and you can bet on a recession. Missed the one in 2001 though. 2011 was a close call. Absolute level still below 1990/91 recession lows (despite US population growth from 250m then to 315m in 2012). Due to housing overhang unlikely to give boost to economy. Due to low level unlikely to do much damage to GDP either (should permits decline again).
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The number of people on "payroll", or employed, is a good proxy for the health of the economy. You can see the long "valleys" of lost payrolls after recent recessions compared to earlier ones. A decline of more than 1% from previous peak payroll level indicates a recession. There have been no misses and no false positives; even the "tricky" back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1982 have been called correctly by this indicator. However, not all jobs are equal; only 47% of all working-age Americans have full-time jobs. Since 2007, six million full-time jobs have been lost, but 2.5 million part-time jobs gained. Part-time jobs often come without "benefits" such as health insurance. From peak employment (Q1 2008) to Q1 2010 1.2 million "higher-" wage jobs (median hourly wage $21-54) have been lost; in the subsequent 2 years only 0.8 million have been recreated. While almost 4 million mid-wage jobs ($14-21) have been lost, only 0.9m have reappeared. Among lower wage jobs ($7-$14), 1.3 million have been lost, but 2 million gained. The current monthly payroll growth of 168,000 (12 months average) indicates zero probability of recession. Macro Report - US economic indicators - January 2013 Page 11
Zoomed-in view:
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One false positive (2005), one miss (1981). 1980-1981 were back-to-back recessions, so let's not be too harsh about that. Decline of 25%+ from peak indicates recession. 2011 was a close call. The final January reading (73.8) came in higher than the preliminary number (71.3). We are using 3month smoothed numbers as the series is quite volatile. We cannot detect any warnings signs currently.
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The CB's Consumer Confidence is similar to the UoM Sentiment. Two false positives (1992, 2003), but it did catch all recessions including the ones in 1981/2 and 2001 (difficult for a lot of other indicators). 2011 was a "close call". This indicator's initial January reading showed a distinct deterioration (58.6 down from 66.7), however not enough to raise a red flag.
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Most recessions have been accompanied by a reduction in the growth of debt. But, for the first time in 60 years, debt has actually shrunk in 2009. A meager 2% reduction caused a massive recession. The classic question of chicken and egg comes to mind: did the recession cause debt to shrink or did shrinking debt induce a recession? I have included the 1987 stock market crash (red triangle). A dramatic revelation dawns: the economy is so dependent on credit (debt) it cannot grow without additional debt. Unfortunately, data becomes available only once every quarter, with the latest data often many months old. To ensure timeliness for our LRPI we had to exclude this measure, however present it here for informational purposes. In Q3, TCMDO was growing at a $2.3 trillion rate over the last 8 quarters (unchanged from Q2). TCMDOto-GDP has declined slightly to 350% (Q2: 353%).
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If you run a business you need electricity. Sure, weather has an impact (electricity use in the US peaks in summer due to air conditioning), but this thing seems to work. If electricity usage drops by 1% or more, it's a recession. Limited historic data, but no misses and no false positives. Close call towards the end of 2011. Currently no red flag.
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US retail sales (excluding food services) have declined for three consecutive months (April, May, June 2012), visible as a small drop in the black line above. As Gary Shilling ("Insight") points out, these circumstances usually meant the economy was already in recession or entered one within three months. However, both August and September were strong. On top of that, July ($0.4bn) and August ($1.6bn) have been revised upwards. You would expect the opposite (downward revisions) to happen during a recession. Initial downward revisions for October (-$0.7bn) have been reversed, and November revised higher by $0.9bn. While the annual growth rate (blue line) continues to slow down, this indicator currently gives 0% probability of recession.
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Before firing employees companies prefer to reduce their working hours. A drop in average weekly working hours in the manufacturing sector of 2% or more indicates a recession. Except for 1996. According to this indicator, the US economy is still sailing smoothly. However, it wouldn't take much to tip it into the red zone should the recent decline continue.
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The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) regularly asks company executives about orders, sales, inventories etc. A level of 50 indicates "unchanged" (economy stagnates). One false positive (1989). While December data was revised downwards (49.7 from 50.3), January came in better (53.3). The current decline from prior peak is not yet large enough to raise recession alarm. A continuation of recent declining trend, however, is worth watching.
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The US population increases approximately 1% per annum, so traffic increases constantly. If total miles driven grow less than 0.1% versus its own trend, you are likely to be in a recession (the unemployed drive less). The 2001 recession was missed. This indicator says we had a recession in 2011 (which is theoretically possible - we might not know it yet). The prolonged decline in miles traveled since 2007 is puzzling; the decline being deeper than the back-to-back recession 1980/81. Online shopping might have contributed to this trend. Unfortunately, the data is made available only with a time lag of three months. This, combined with lower confidence, made us exclude this indicator from the LRPI.
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Defense and aircraft orders are lumpy and distort trends, so we exclude them here. We have "medium" confidence in this indicator due to limited historic data. The "red zone" has been set at -4% to -2%. November data has been revised slightly upwards (+0.3%, and November data has been the strongest since April 2012. The 3-month moving average currently (November data) stands at -3% (up from -4.5%), giving a 84% (down from 100%) probability of recession.
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Electricity production should be linked to economic growth. This indicator, unfortunately, had many false positives (1983, 1992, 1997, 2006), so confidence is "medium". Setting the trigger lower than -0.5% would eliminate false positives, but make you also miss some recessions. Recent data has seen quite some revisions of up to 2.5% magnitude. Regardless, electricity production suggests we are in a recession.
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ISM manufacturing supplier deliveries: The current reading suggests a mild contraction. Multiple false positives (1985, 1989, 1995, 1998, 2005) muddy the water. Therefore, this indicator has been slapped with "low" confidence and a corresponding weighting. Recent surveys hovered around the 50-point mark. The indicator is very close to indicating a 50% likelihood of recession, but not yet.
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Cars need gas, and gas needs to be delivered to gas stations. Inventory effects are unlikely because of high turnover. "Low" confidence because of false positive (1996) and limited historic data. The harsh decline in 2012 is puzzling, but seems to recover since March 2012. This indicator is related to "miles driven", confirming trends on one hand, but being redundant on the other. It has therefore been excluded from LRPI.
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