Class and Space: Social Segregation in Japanese Cities Author(s): Anthony J.

Fielding Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp. 64-84 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3804429 . Accessed: 05/07/2011 18:55
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Class

and

space:
cities

social

segregation

in

Japanese

Anthony J Fielding
It has become increasingly common to play down the 'place stratification' of Japanese cities, and to emphasize their lack of social class segregation. Demonstrating that the Japanese city lacks a social geography in this respect conforms to, and serves to advance, the view that Japan has produced a capitalist form of development that avoids many of the inequalities and social ills characteristic of other advanced capitalist societies (e.g. no 'inner city' problems). But do the social geographies of Japanese cities really conform to this picture of Japanese society? This issue is explored with the help of a new analysis of the occupational class geography of the city of Kyoto. key words Japan social class social geography social exclusion Kyoto Edinburgh

Departmentof Geography,School of Social Sciences and CulturalStudies, University of Sussex, BrightonBN1 9SN email:a.j.fielding@sussex.ac.uk revised manuscript received 28 August 2003

Introduction
In general, studies of the historical geography of Japanese cities have emphasized the marked differences, in wealth and income, safety and security, economic role and social prestige, between the different quarters of the city. A famous example of this genre is Edward Seidensticker's Low City, High City: Tokyo from Edo to the Earthquake1867-1923 (Seidensticker 1983). A central theme of this very readable book is the contrast between the low city (shitamachi) and the high city (yamanote). Referring to the effects of the great Kanto earthquake in 1923, in which about 100 000 people died, he writes: The great loss was the Low City, home of the merchant and the artisan, heart of Edo culture. From the beginnings of its existence as the shogun's capital, Edo was divided into two broad regions, the hilly Yamanote or High City, describing a semicircle generally to the west of the shogun's castle, now the emperor's palace, and the flat Low City, the Shitamachi, completing the circle on the east. Plebeian enclaves could be found in the High City, but mostly it was a place of temples and shrines and aristocratic dwellings. The Low City had its aristocratic dwellings and there were a great many temples, but it was very much the plebeian half of the city. (Seidensticker 1983, 8; see also Kurasawa 1986)

How interesting, therefore, that the conventional wisdom of more recent studies of Japanese cities is that they lack a 'social geography' (where this phrase is used to mean that there are no important differences from one area to another in wealth and social status). If this were true, it would be quite remarkable because it would mean 1 that, against all expectations, Japanese capitalist modernization has reduced rather than exacerbated spatial inequalities in the city, and 2 that the familiar Western models of the sociospatial structure of capitalist cities were just that - Western models, and that they do not apply to Japan, or perhaps also to the many other major cities located in East Asia. This paper is in three sections. Reversing the usual sequence, the first section is empirical. Through reference to a case study on Osaka, it presents one strongly expressed view of the nature of social segregation in Japanese cities (that such segregation does not exist), and develops an internal critique of that position. The second section is then theoretical. It asks the question: are there reasons for thinking that Japanese cities should be fundamentally different from European and North American cities in their contemporary social geographies? The final

Trans Inst Br GeogrNS 29 64-84 2004 ISSN 0020-2754 ? Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2004

Social segregation in Japanesecities

65 Fujita and Hill then proceed to justify their position by presenting data on the Osaka city-region. They show that the income difference between the central city (Osaka City) and the wider region (Osaka Prefecture) is extremely small (Osaka City 1.22 million yen per capita, Osaka Prefecture 1.27 million yen). Thus there is no central city/suburbs differentiation to speak of. They conclude that the income of the richest jurisdictionin a large Americanmetropolisusually exceeds the poorestby a factorof ten or more.Per capitaincomeamong(the44) citiesand towns in OsakaPrefecture rangesfroma low of 1.01 millionyen... to a high of 1.72 millionyen... As many Osaka suburbsare below as are above the centralcity's incomelevel, but most hover aroundthe and (Fujita Hill 1997,111) averagefor the Prefecture. They then look inside the Osaka city boundaries to show the degree of differentiation between the city wards. For this, they must turn to the occupational structures of the residential populations. They show that, for 21 of the 24 wards, the differences are minor, the exceptions being two inner wards that have higher than average proportions of professionals and managers, and one inner ward that has a high proportion of construction workers. They conclude that 'the distribution of occupational groups in each ward tends to replicate the social composition of the city as a whole' (1997, 111), and 'geography is not destiny in Japan' (1997, 129). Before turning to the authors' explanations for this lack of a social geography in Japanese cities, we should pause for a moment to question whether or not the data analysis is strong enough to support their argument. Two criticisms might be made of the data. The first is that the study area suffers from underbounding - there are residential zones outside Osaka Prefecture that supply workers for the Osaka labour market. For example, some of Osaka's professional workers commute in from Nara Prefecture, which is located on the other side of the mountain that marks the eastern border of Osaka Prefecture. In addition, there are commuting exchanges between Osaka, Hyogo (Kobe) and Kyoto Prefectures. There might, therefore, be macro-scale social class differences that are being missed by this analysis. My own judgement of this criticism, however, is that, although it is fair, it is not important. The vast majority of the workers in the Osaka labour market are resident in Osaka Prefecture, and the generalizations based on this data would not be significantly altered by a widening of the area covered.

section is again empirical. It goes back to the Japanese city, this time Kyoto, and uses much more sensitive data, organized in an appropriately systematic way, to analyse the degree and nature of social class segregation in that city. As part of this analysis, a comparison is made between Kyoto and Edinburghto see if there are fundamental differences in their social geographies. Two hypotheses are tested: 1 that social segregation is less in Japan than in the UK, and 2 that the form that social segregation takes in Japan is different from that found in the UK.

Social class segregation in the Osaka

city-region Kuniko Fujita and Richard Child Hill are well known for their excellent work on the changing political economy of Japanese cities (Fujita and Hill 1993). In their paper on social segregation in Osaka, however, they change scale to explore the social geography of a single city-region (Fujita and Hill 1997). This is an important text for anyone interested in Japanese urbanism, urban planning or urban social geography (see, for example, Wiltshire 2002). At the beginning of the paper the authors set out their position in a forthright manner. If 'separate unequal'best characterises political and the and socialecologyof US urbanization, then,by contrast 'together and equal' best characterisesurban form in Japan.Controlover territory not a meansof class is in reproduction Japanesecities. Our field researchin Osakaindicatesthat class-organized place stratification is practically non-existent in Japan's second-most and powerfulmetropolis. (Fujita Hill 1997,106) This claim has enormous implications because it means that in Japan, one of the main means by which individuals are socially excluded, not for what they themselves are like, but because they 'belong' to a socially stigmatized group, is missing. 'Placism', along with sexism, racism and ageism, is a powerful mechanism for social exclusion. As Fujita and Hill say, in the US, 'geography is destiny' in the sense that living on the right or wrong 'side of the track', can determine your life chances (for example, ability to obtain credit, attend a decent school, find a marriage partner). Were it to be true that Japan lacks placism, it would imply that Japan is one major step nearer than the US (or the UK) to being a 'just society'.

66 The second criticism of the data is, however, more serious. It is that the spatial scale of differentiation might be smaller than that of the city (used for income data), or city ward (used for occupation data), and therefore would be totally missed by their analysis. In particular, it is surprising to me that Fujita and Hill are satisfied with the use of city wards when they know from their own published data (1997, 113: Table 6.2) that the average employed resident population of a ward is 56 000 - equivalent to the size of a small- to medium-sized town! It is quite conceivable, even likely perhaps, that analysis at a finer spatial scale would have produced a much higher degree of social class differentiation [notice, for example, the very different picture of Osaka presented in the work of Toshio Mizuuchi (see Mizuuchi 2003). Here a distinctive microgeography of urban poverty in Osaka is portrayed]. For the time being we can suspend judgement on this matter and accept that, even with more sophisticated data analysis, the main argument will still stand - that is, that the degree of social class segregation in Japan is a whole order of magnitude less than in Western (e.g. US or UK) cities. How then do Fujitaand Hill explain this difference?They write '(o)ur interviews suggest that Japanese choose their residence according to commuting distance from work, family networks, and stage in the life cycle' (1997, 111). There is, however, an immediate difficulty with this statement. It is widely known that Japanese people will almost always respond to inquiries from strangers by adopting a tatemae mode of speech. The dictionary definition of tatemae is 'outwardly expressed feelings', but a more truthful definition might be 'socially sanctioned deceit'! Since it is deeply embarrassing for most Japanese (including, in my experience, professional geographers!) to talk about class differences, or even to admit to the existence of such differences in Japanese society (where 89% of people claim to be 'middle class'), it is hardly likely that interviewees will introduce this factor in their discussion of residential location decisions. Instead, they are extremely likely to mention certain practical, noncontroversial factors such as commuting distance, family networks (which gains approval for the speaker), and stage in life-cycle. Fujita and Hill then correctly emphasize the complex inter-mixing of land uses and building types in Japanese cities (see Figure 1). They write '(h)ighpriced condominiums, middle-income private family housing, public housing for low- to middle-income

J Anthony Fielding families, and old, wooden low-income housing intermix in the city and metro area' (1997, 111), and they explain this through the weakness of land-use zoning and urban planning, which itself is a product of strong ownership rights and the high price of land. Rather less convincingly, however, they explain the continued presence of small- and mediumsized manufacturing businesses in residential areas as being a result of Osaka City's policy to foster the small business sector. This then reduces the class polarization that results when manufacturing job loss occurs. This argument, however, ignores the fact that these firms are not for the most part high wage-payers like the major corporations, where wages for manual workers are close to national average wages, but mainly subcontractors where wage levels are typically much lower. Similarly problematic is the emphasis on the role of the Osaka City government in maintaining class diversity through its housing policies (see Sorensen 2002, chapter 5, for a discussion of the Japan Housing Corporation financed 'new towns' in Osaka). In general, 'social housing' is far less significant in the urban social ecology of Japanese cities than it is, for example, in European cities. Their next argument seems to claim that the lack of differentiation is due to the high levels of social mobility. They write 'individual mobility across a wide and flexible network of jobs blurs class distinctions in Osaka's industrial district and counteracts class segregation'. But this emphasis on the importance of social mobility within a meritocratic society clashes with sociological evidence (notably Ishida 1993), which shows that social class background has as much effect in shaping educational performance and then occupational careers in Japan as it does in the US and UK, and that in general Japan is a country of low intra-generational social mobility. Indeed, one of the persuasive views of Japan is that it is a 'one-chance society', meaning that success or failure at the point of entry into the world of work tends to determine subsequent promotion prospects, and that job improvement through subsequent inter-company mobility is not to be expected (Ariga et al. 2000). Finally, under the label of 'the developmental state', Fujita and Hill emphasize the space equalizing effects of central government expenditure on social infrastructure and education, housing and welfare services. But even if this standardization is less true of the US, it is normal in Western European countries, and yet has not resulted in an

Social segregation in Japanesecities

67

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Figure 1 Yamashina land use Source: Adapted from a 1:25 000 Land use map for the mid-1980s published by the National Land Agency absence of an urban social geography. Far from it, one of the bases for the stigmatization of low income areas has become the state welfare dependency of the people living there. It follows from what has been discussed so far that two tasks need now to be carried out. The first is theoretical; it is to discover if there are some more convincing reasons why social class segregation might be expected to be much less in Japan than in Western cities. The second is empirical; it is to provide a richer description of the degree and nature of urban social class segregation in Japan, and to highlight the distinctiveness of the social geography of the Japanese city through a carefully comparison between two cities, one in Japan (Kyoto) and one in Britain (Edinburgh). controlled

Are there more persuasive explanations for the lack of a social geography in Japanese cities?
I think perhaps there are. Seven such explanations are discussed below, and in each case the arguments involve both material economic and historical/cultural factors - thus, following Sharon Zukin (1982), we are witnessing once again the 'intersection of culture and capital' in the shaping of the social spaces of the city.

68

Anthony J Fielding

For our first explanation we can turn to the arguments contained in the neoclassical model of urban land use and social segregation developed in the US by Alonso and others (see Fujita and Thisse 2002, section 3.3). In this approach the social group that occupies a particular zone does so because it out-bids others at that location. Each social group is conceived as having a 'bid-rent curve'. These typically peak at the city-centre (due to the attractiveness of high accessibility to city-centre jobs and facilities) and slope away to the outer suburbs. But the shapes of the social class-specific curves reflect the resources, needs and aspirations of the specific groups. Those who are wealthy can trade higher commuting costs for more space and can afford to locate in the low-housing-density outer suburbs. In contrast, those who are poor are constrained by high commuting costs to consume less space in the high-housing-density inner areas. In Japan, however, your commuting costs are typically paid by the employer! This reflects, amongst other things, the paternalistic nature of employer/employee relations in Japan (and the fact that employers can claim tax relief on these payments) (see Hatta and Ohkawara 1994). But the effect is dramatic - relatively poor people can afford to purchase space in the outer suburbs of the Japanese city, and the wealth differentiation between the inner city and the outer suburbs, which is so characteristic of the US or UK city, is lost. This links closely to another difference. In Western cities the outer areas tend to reflect the car-based space-economy of the wealthy and the middle classes, while the inner city reflects the public transport space-economy of the poor and the working classes. But in Japan's major cities public transport is used for the journey to work by people of all classes. Furthermore, a lower concentration of wealth and investment in the outer suburbs of Japanesecities has reduced the tendency (very visible in the US and UK but also increasingly significant in the EU) for the development of 'edge' cities. As Fujita and Hill say '(t)he edge-city phenomenon dynamic economic growth centres on the periphery of metropolitan areas - so much discussed among urban planners in the US, has not taken hold in Japan' (1997, 107). This last point leads us in to the second explanation, which can be called the 'aging of built form' argument. As cities in Western countries age, the land use and built forms of the older inner sections

of the city become increasingly dysfunctional. High income home buyers and businesses prefer the (car-adjusted) spatial forms (new roads, shopping centres and houses) of the outer suburbs. The older housing of the inner areas becomes occupied and then sub-occupied by poorer and poorer households (unless gentrified - see below). Thus the inner city is inhabited by the working classes in old, dysfunctional properties, while the outer suburbs are inhabited by the middle classes in modern, functional properties. But in Japan, standard urban housing lasts only about 40 years on average (Waswo 2002, 89), so there is almost as much modern housing in the inner areas as in the outer! As incomes go up (and for many Japanese men incomes increase steadily with length of service for an employer), so the family will often knock down the old house and build a new one on the same site. Of course, sometimes a household will move to the suburbs when they buy a house for the first time, but this means going from being relatively rich (as a renter, since rent protection often leaves rents below market rates) to being relatively poor (as a purchaser). The third explanation lies in the social and symbolic meaning of housing and neighbourhood. In the Western city, one's house, or rather one's home (typically located in a neighbourhood of extremely similar or even identical houses or homes), is an extremely powerful and accurate expression of one's position in society. 'Tell me someone's zip code and I can predict what they eat, drink, drive, even what they think' (Reich quoted in Fujita and Hill 1997, 106). Following Bourdieu, we can see the house as also an expression of one's lifestyle and consumption choices, resulting in distinctive classspecific spatial patterns of housing consumption. In short, your house reflects not only your wealth
status but also the kind of person/household you are.

In Japan, the social standing of a household (in what remains a fiercely gender-role-segregated society) is based on the man's job (especially the status of the company and his standing within the company), and on the social reputation of the (man's) family. The house/home is the wife's realm and is for social reproduction only. It is a very private space, known only to the inner family circle, and certainly not a place to entertain friends and work colleagues. If a man wants to impress others he does it through his generosity in gift-giving or in paying for expensive wining and dining in A and locations. woman's city-centre otherentertainment

Socialsegregation Japanese in cities reputation is not related to the size, quality or style of the house she lives in (indeed, in this as in other matters, there may well be a reluctance to be seen to be 'sticking out' from the crowd), but to her standing in the community as a good neighbour, loyal wife, and, above all, as a caring, active and ambitious mother. Often where one lives depends on where 'family-owned' land is located, but if one is choosing a house or a neighbourhood, while a 'good' school might make a difference, the (probably very varied) attributes of the houses in the neighbourhood almost certainly would not (for a contrary view see Ozaki 1998). This brings us to the fourth explanation - the land ownership and land development system. Here, my analysis differs only in detail from that of Fujita and Hill's. Some housing in Japan is produced in large speculatively built estates (often misleadingly called 'new towns') as is normal in the US and the UK. But most is produced for a specific customer, on an extremely small scale, using traditional carpentry skills, on absolutely minute parcels of land (see Cybriwski 1998, chapter 4, for interesting accounts of overcrowding in Tokyo). This is due, not only to the high cost of land, but to the historical legacy of fragmented land ownership combined with very strong individual ownership rights (resulting from the post-war US occupation land reform). The outcome is an immensely complex pattern of land use and built form (see Figure 1). Local planning authorities facing these strong ownership rights, and commanding very weak compulsory purchase powers, are able to do little to avoid non-conforming land uses (such as arise with the juxtaposition of factories and homes) or to hold back the piecemeal destruction of valued urban environments [such as the streets of traditional houses (the machiya)in Kyoto (see Mimura et al. 1998, and for the effects of inheritance tax on this process, Kinoshita 2003)]. Figure 1 shows selected land uses in the unexceptional Kyoto suburb of Yamashina (for the location of this area, see Figure 5 below). On a priori grounds one might expect a spatial separation of paddy rice cultivation, factories and workshops, and housing. But in fact these land uses are all jumbled up together in a micro-scale land use pattern of immense complexity. Notice also the minor contribution of high-rise housing to the urban landscape. Until now the only forms of social segregation that have been considered have been the general tendency for a spatial clustering of same-class

69 individuals and households, and the specific tendency for wealthier people to locate in the outer suburbs, leaving the inner city to the poor. But in Western cities another form of social segregation has attracted a great deal of academic attention - gentrification. This is the 'takeover' of former working class districtsand 'old city' quartersin inner city (especially waterfront) locations by high income 'postmodern lifestyle' single professional men and women or professional couples without children. The fifth argument then refers to the lack of gentrification in Japanese cities. For a start, river banks, and waterfronts more generally, were associated traditionally (perhaps because of frequent flooding and the resulting temporary nature of the settlements there) not with high status but with low status people (see below). In fact the construction of flood defences, which involved the clearing of water-edge settlements, was a form of both physical and social engineering, and had the effect of reducing (or rather, reconfiguring) one of the historical forms of segregation in Japanese cities. Furthermore,the likelihood of gentrificationfocusing on 'old city' quarters (though it does occasionally happen, as in the samurai housing quarter in Kanazawa) was much reduced by the effectiveness of the American bombing of Japanese cities in 1945, which destroyed the inner areas of most of Japan's major cities. Thus, although there are individual gentrifiers investing in older properties in Japanese cities, and small-scale redevelopment projects promoted by local authorities, there is little evidence of the large-scale spontaneous neighbourhood transformations of the kind now so common in Western cities (see Waley 2000 for support for this position in his excellent analysis of the restructuring of Tokyo's urban space). The sixth explanation argues that Japanese cities would be expected to differ from Western cities because of their relatively low levels of ethnic diversity (see Kurasama quoted in Alden et al. 1994, 52). One of the mechanisms of out-migration to the suburbs in the US, for those who have the means to do so, is so-called 'white flight'. Wealthy white Americans often migrate to try to escape the (imagined or perceived) threat that minoritydominated or multi-ethnic neighbourhoods represent to them. Undoubtedly, similar processes operate in Western Europe. But Japan has such a small proportion of its population as members of ethnic minorities that this factor is rendered almost irrelevant. In addition, most of the members of ethnic

70

minorities in Japan (including Koreans, Chinese and nikkeijin), are virtually indistinguishable visually from the Japanese themselves, unlike the situations in the US or Western Europe. A more general version of this argument emphasizes the contrast between the riskiness of the inner cities and 'sink estates' of US and UK cities (from which those who can afford to do so, escape through migration to safe areas), and the safety of Japanese cities. Since Japanese inner cities are low crime areas, with zero or minimal risk of violence, very little street crime and low burglary rates, there is no need to escape the inner city to avoid these problems. Of course, there are serious social problems in Japanese cities, but, as with the recently much publicized hikikomoriproblem (young men who shut themselves away in their rooms), these (i) typically do not imply harm to others (in contrast to the need to steal to maintain a drug habit); and (ii) do not occur in particular parts of the city (in contrast to gang violence in inner city or 'sink estate' areas). Finally, this discussion of possible explanations for the lower social segregation in Japanese cities in comparison with Western cities would be incomplete without mention of the overall level of income inequality in society. Other things being equal, one would expect lower spatial separation of social groups in a society that was more equal than in one that was less equal. OECD figures show that Japan has a degree of income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) that, at 0.25, is about 60 per cent of UK and US rates (0.36 and 0.41, respectively) (Martin 2001). Household income inequality has increased slightly since 1970 (after sharp declines in the early post-war period), but half of this is due to the aging of the workforce (due to seniority pay, which means that inequality increases with age) (Ohtake 1999). The effects of relative equality are well known. Japanhas the global record for life expectancies at birth. This almost certainly reflects the better health standards which result from lower levels of poverty and of (often related) self-damaging social behaviours. But levels of social pathology are known to be related, not to absolute levels of income, but to the levels of income inequality. So a less unequal country such as Japan can have higher life expectancies than a wealthier country (on a purchasing power parity basis) such as the US. However, while the effects of income equality/inequality are fairly uncontroversial, the causes are not. Is Japan's relative equality

J Anthony Fielding a product of historical pre-modern 'cultural' influences? Or perhaps it is due to the very completeness of its experience of modernity? Has it been brought about by design (for example, through state policies) or is it a result of chance? My own judgement is that much of the explanation lies in the post-war political economy of Japan, notably its severe labour shortages (which improved the incomes of the lowest paid), and its particularforms of incorporation of labour (which kept down the pay differentials between managers and workers, and reduced many of the differences in conditions and pay between white collar workers and blue collar workers). But whatever the causes, the implications for the social geography of Japanese cities are clear - the lifestyles, living standards and opportunities of people are less prescribed by occupational class differences in Japan than in the US/ UK. It would follow from this that the salience of social class in residential location decisions would be expected to be lower than in Western countries. To summarize, in Japan the poor do not need to escape the inner city and therefore cannot become trapped in it, and many of them can afford to move to the suburbs if they want to. The rich face no risk or threat by remaining in the inner city, and they do not need to express their social status through the house they live in or the neighbourhood of their residence. Gentrification is not a major factor in the social geography of Japanese cities, nor are massive estates of social housing for the poor. Given all this, it would hardly be surprising if the levels of social segregation were lower in Japan than in the US or the UK/EU. There is, however, a weakness with the above analysis. It is all couched in extraordinarily general terms - indeed, almost every one of the generalizations made in this section cries out for qualification. Japanese housing and labour markets and the crucial links between them (for example, commuting) are, in detail, highly complex. Households do not in reality conform to the nuclear family model performing traditional, ie family, roles (see White 2002). There are immigrant ethnic minorities (Douglass and Roberts 2000), and also other socially excluded groups such as the day labourers (Gill 2001) and burakumin (descendants of outcastes) (see below), and these groups are located in specific areas of the city. Indeed, it is now almost fashionable to emphasize (perhaps even to excess) the cultural and social diversity of Japanese society (see Maher and Macdonald 1995; Weiner 1997; Lie

Social segregation in Japanesecities

71

2001). And to be fair to Fujita and Hill, they recognize this diversity - the Osaka city ward with the highest value for manual workers is Nishinari where the famous yoseba(market place for the recruitment of male casual labourers) of Kamagasaki is located, and the second highest is Ikuno where the Korean community is to be found. But, unfortunately, their data are too crude to reveal the spatial patterns of this diversity. Instead of using wards which have resident employed populations of 30 000-50 000, we should be using Census tract data with employed resident populations which are a whole order of magnitude smaller, say about 4000-5000. This is what has been done for the following analysis of the social geography of Kyoto City.

Social class segregation in Kyoto (and

Edinburgh) The previous section provided a number of strong reasons for expecting social class segregation to be weaker in Japan than in the US or the UK. Quite remarkably,no one (to my knowledge) has yet tested this! So the purpose of this empirical section will be to answer these two questions: (i) is there firm evidence that the degree of social segregation is lower in Japan than in the UK? (ii) does the nature of social class segregation differ between the two societies? (for example, are the spatial patterns of the same social class different?, and are the rankings of social classes with respect to degree of segregation different?). In addition, by analysing in some detail the social segregation patterns in Kyoto, the purpose of this section is to re-introduce some of the complex, and even occasionally contradictory, detail that was so obviously omitted in the last section. The data analysis It is necessary to admit at the outset that exact comparability of data between Japan and the UK for measuring the degree of social segregation is impossible to achieve (but I do not share the pessimism about the possibility of comparisons of social segregation between large cities expressed in some quarters; see, for example, Preteceille 2000). The most we can aim for is close comparability with respect to (i) social class categories and (ii) areal unit used. On the first of these, Japanese data for Kyoto residents in employment have been reworked to get as close as possible to the fivefold occupational social class categories used in Savage

et al. 1992 [(small capitalist class plus) three middle classes: professionals; managers; petty bourgeoisie; and two working classes: white collar working class; and blue collar working class]. As a context for this, we can compare the national figures for Japan and the UK (though only England and Wales here because the analyses in Savage et al. were based on the Longitudinal Study dataset, which excludes Scotland and Northern Ireland), drawing upon data provided in Morioka 1989, and including the small capitalist class and the unemployed (Table I). It is, of course, true that the positions of the classes within the overall class structure differ slightly between Japan and the UK. Mention has already been made of the rather higher status of blue collar workers in large organizations in Japan. But the class categories used here are extremely robust; one achieves middle class status by being privileged either through educational qualifications or credentials (i.e. professionals), organizational skills and experience (i.e. managers), or ownership of the means of production (i.e. petty bourgeoisie). One is working class if the job you do does not imply these privileges; working class jobs have, on average, lower status, lower pay and lower job security. This is as true in Japan as in the UK. Table I shows that Japan's capitalist, middle class and working class percentages for 1985 were not very different from those for England and Wales in 1991 (but that unemployment was much lower in Japan at that time). However, the balance between the different parts of the middle classes and the working classes was different. In the case of the working classes, Japan had a rather larger white
Occupational social classes in Japan and England and Wales Table I Japan 1955 Capitalistclass Middle class of which: service class of which:prof/technical of which:managers of which:petty bourgeoisie Workingclass of which:white collar of which:blue collar Unemployed Total 0.2 59.3 6.9 5.0 1.9 52.4 38.7 16.3 22.4 1.9 100.1 Japan 1985 0.1 37.6 16.9 11.1 5.8 20.7 58.9 30.4 28.5 3.4 100.0 and England Wales 1991 0.1 36.1 26.4 15.1 11.3 9.7 54.0 24.5 29.5 9.9 100.1

Sources: Morioka(1989)and ONS LongitudinalStudy

J Anthony Fielding collar population. In the case of the middle classes, are uniquely different, not just from each other, but it had an extremely large petty bourgeoisie com- from other cities in Japan and the UK (and therepared with England and Wales, and correspond- fore do not represent the more general differences ingly smaller managerial and professional middle between those two societies and spaces). My classes (the low figure for managers being espe- response to this objection is to accept, of course, the cially notable). I am fairly certain that definitional fact that they are unique, but to emphasize very problems affect these figures, but I am equally con- strongly the significance of their deep embeddedfident that these figures reflect real differences in ness in their wider societies, and hence the near, the social class configurations of the two societies. no! full, certainty that the political economies, and Small owners in agriculture, manufacturing and the symbolic and daily practical cultures of those the services continue to be a strong feature of wider societies will be reflected in their patterns of Japan's class structure, and insofar as whole sections social segregation. Stated in a different way, uniqueof production are organized around independent ness and generality are co-present in our two cities. economic agents rather than in the branches of The second basis on which close comparability large organizations, we would expect the proportion must be sought is the areal units used in the analysis. of managers to be less. It was discovered that compact areas containing These national differences are found as well about 4500 resident employed people could in the data for the Kyoto and Edinburgh areas. be constructed by combining small area census Edinburgh (1991) has larger percentages of profes- statistics for both Kyoto and Edinburgh. This gave sionals and managers (20.7% and 11.0%, respec- 155 areas for Kyoto (shi area) and 88 areas for the tively) than Kyoto (14% and 4.2%, respectively), Lothian region (centred on Edinburgh). (To check but Kyoto (1995) has a far higher percentage of that Edinburgh was not overbounded, the data for petty bourgeoisie (18.6%compared to Edinburgh's the 52 areas of Edinburgh City were also used. This 6.4%).Similarly, Kyoto's white collar working class made virtually no difference at all to the results). In is larger than Edinburgh's (38.6%to 29.8%) and its only very few cases did the populations of the areas blue collar working class is smaller (24.7%to 32.0%). fall outside the range 3000-6000 resident employed, I should explain at this point why Kyoto and so a fairly homogeneous set of areas was used in Edinburgh were chosen for this analysis, and the analysis. As with the Fujita and Hill study, discuss one possible objection to this choice. Kyoto there are some areas falling outside the areas used was chosen, not only because it is a city well known in this analysis that nevertheless send commuters and fully explored on foot by the author, but to the central city. In the case of Kyoto, these are to because an analysis of its social class segregation be found mostly to the east (especially from Otsu needed to be conducted as a prerequisite for and Kusatsu in Shiga Prefecture), but also from another study that the author was undertaking Kameoka to the north west, and there are, of course, with a Japanese colleague (in fact a study of migra- some commuter exchanges with Osaka and Kobe. In tion histories using the 'triple biography' approach). the Edinburgh case, there are commuting exchanges The task then was to find a UK city that possessed with Glasgow and commuting flows from north of as many of the rather special features of Kyoto as the Forth river. The argument used before, however, possible. Edinburgh, though smaller (its popula- applies in these cases as well. Inclusion of the tion is only about 55% of that of Kyoto), is, like outlying areas would not, in the author's judgement, Kyoto, a historical city with capital city functions, significantly affect the results presented here. contains a prestigious university and a very large student population, is a tourist attraction (e.g. for The results of a comparison between Kyoto and festivals) and a significant centre for the perform- Edinburgh ing arts, is the administrative centre for its region, Using standardized areas means that it is possible and has important manufacturing industries. Like to measure very directly the degree of social Kyoto, it is also part of a larger zone of urbaniza- segregation. Figure 2 shows the standard deviations tion and is located about one hour's travel time of the values of the percentages for each of the away from a larger industrial and commercial city occupational social classes in Kyoto and Edinburgh. (Glasgow and Osaka, respectively). The objection It can be seen that in all cases except the petty to the use of Kyoto (and Edinburgh) for this pur- bourgeoisie, the standard deviations for Edinburgh pose is to be found in the argument that these cities exceed those for Kyoto.

72

Social segregation in Japanesecities

73

Kyoto
E

Edinburgh

0.4

0.2

PRO

MAN

PB

WC

BC

PRO

MAN

PB

WC

BC

Figure 2 Standard deviations of social class percentages across standardized areas in Kyoto (155) and Edinburgh (88)

Figure 3 Ratios of standard deviations to means of social class percentages across standardized areas in Kyoto (155) and Edinburgh (88)

A higher standard deviation implies a higher degree of concentration of that social group in particular areas of the city, a lower standard deviation

implies the opposite. Thus social segregation in Kyoto is less than in Edinburgh. But what about the petty bourgeoisie? The reason for the higher value in Kyoto is because the proportion of the population in this social class is much higher here, so in absolute terms, the standard deviation can be quite large. The answer to this problem lies in standardizing the standard deviations by dividing each by the mean for that class. This has been done in Figure 3. Now the contrast between Kyoto and Edinburgh becomes even clearer. For each social class the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean shows a higher figure for Edinburgh than for Kyoto, and in both cities the values for the white collar working class are lower than for other classes. But whereas the differences for the managers and the petty bourgeoisie are fairly small, those for the professionals and the blue collar working class are very large, especially so the professionals. However, one thing is abundantly clear from Figures 2 and 3. Were it to be the case that Kyoto had no social geography and its occupational social classes were exactly evenly distributed over the

space of the city, then the values of the standard deviations in Figure 2 and those of the ratios in Figure 3 would be zero. Manifestly they are not, and the conclusion one must draw from this is that significant spatial patterns of social class concentration exist in this Japanese city. To demonstrate this point further, and at the same time to show in a different way the higher degree of social segregation in Edinburgh, Lorenz curves for Kyoto and Edinburgh for professionals have been constructed in Figure 4. In this instance the Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentage of the total population of professionals at decile points for the array of areas ranked from the lowest value (% professionals) to the highest. If at each 10 per cent point, another 10 per cent of professionals were added (that is, professionals were equally distributed over the city), then the values would fall along the 45 degree line. Clearly, they do not, and clearly also the degree to which they deviate from the 45 degree line is greater for Edinburgh than for Kyoto. This proves once again that social segregation is lower in the Japanese city than in the UK one. So much for the degree of segregation, what about the nature of that segregation? Professionals in Kyoto are mostly found in the north-eastern

74

Anthony J Fielding

Figure 4 Lorenz curves for spatial distributions of professionals across standardized areas in Kyoto (155) and Edinburgh (88)

suburbs away from the city centre, but in Edinburgh they are located in, around, and on the near south side of the city centre. Managers in Kyoto are concentrated in the northern suburbs, but in Edinburgh form a wedge-shaped sector running in a west and northwest direction from the city centre. Even more different, however, are the petty bourgeoisie. While these are strongly represented in some areas of the inner city of Edinburgh, the highest values are found in the outer eastern suburbs, but in Kyoto the petty bourgeoisie are very much a feature of the inner city. The Kyoto white collar workers are distributed all over the city, but in Edinburgh, the southwest sector has especially high values. Finally, Kyoto's blue collar workers are strongly concentrated in a contiguous zone located on the south, west and southwest side of the city, whereas in Edinburgh there are separate concentrations in the port of Leith, in the southwestern suburbs and in Livingston New Town. In general, while inner city/outer city differences are present in both cases (though involving different social classes), Edinburgh has a stronger sectoral pattern of social class segregation. Social segregation in Kyoto Finally, we return to focus on the Japanese city, this time to record and interpret the actual patterns

of social class segregation in Kyoto. Figure 5 shows the ward boundaries and key locations mentioned in the text, while Figures 6-10 map the individual social class distributions at grouped census tract level. These maps have been made comparable by grouping the areas on the basis of quintiles [so that each shading category has 20% of the (155) areas when these are ranked from the highest value to the lowest]. The decision to map in this way was taken in the light of the fact that the degree of segregation of each social class has already been demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3 (which showed, for example, that white collar employees were less segregated than blue collar ones). Maps were also constructed for each social class (and the unemployed) at the even more detailed enumeration district level. These are not reproduced here (due to their complexity) but reference will be made to them at an appropriate point in the analysis. Figures 6-10 have a special feature - only the builtup areas have been shaded. The white areas on the western, northern and eastern sides are the unpopulated forested slopes of the surrounding mountains (Kyoto lies in a broad, semi-enclosed, south-tilting river basin), while the white areas in the south-central parts of the maps are the river floors and sparsely populated marshy areas which partially separate Kyoto from the northernmost edges of Greater Osaka (hence data for the contiguous cities of Muko and Uji have not been included in this study). We can begin by asking where do the seriously rich and powerful people of Kyoto live? We know from Table I that the capitalist class is very small, and we would not expect their residences to form a major feature of the Kyoto landscape. This is indeed the case, and while there are occasional large and expensive residences scattered around the city, many of the small number of exceptionally fine houses are concentrated in an area located to the east of the Heian Shrine, close up against the eastern mountain (in the south-eastern corner of Sakyou ward). In the light of what was said above, it is perhaps not surprising that, instead of these impressive houses fronting onto wide tree-lined avenues visible to the many, they are tucked away down narrow lanes, are partially hidden by screens and foliage, and are known only to the few (despite their proximity to one of Kyoto's popular tourist routes - the Philosopher's Walk!). It is customary in social class analysis to place professionals and managers together to form a

Social segregation in Japanesecities

75

_-r?"

Kyotowards ">~ Wardboundaries

5 km
I . . . . I

Figure 5

Location map of Kyoto

76

Anthony J Fielding

KYOTO PROFESSIONALS
Source: 1995 Census

I/

_FS
* w

=[,

quintiles

top 31 areas 2nd 31 areas 3rd31 areas 5 km 4th31 areas bottom areas 31 of boundary Kyoto-city

Figure 6

Professionals

Social segregation in Japanesecities

77

KYOTO MANAGERS
Source: 1995 Census

quintiles

top31 areas 2nd 31 areas 3rd31 areas 5 km

I I

D1 4th31 areas

31 bottom areas of boundary Kyoto-city

Figure 7 Managers

78

Anthony J Fielding

KYOTO PETTYBOURGEOISIE
Source: 1995 Census

A-

=r"
?:

quintiles

top 31 areas 2nd 31 areas 3rd31 areas 5 km

4th 31 areas
IlI

|-

bottom areas 31 of boundary Kyoto-city

Figure 8

Petty bourgeoisie

Social segregation in Japanesecities

79

KYOTO WHITE COLLAR

Source: 1995 Census
r '" ~r /ll
, '1

-- -I

_^

r?\

quintiles

top 31 areas 2nd 31 areas 3rd31 areas 5 km

I .I. . . .

114th 31 areas 31 bottom areas of boundary Kyoto-city

Figure 9 White collar employees

80

Anthony J Fielding

KYOTO BLUECOLLAR
Source: 1995 Census

p_
quintiles top 31 areas 2nd 31 areas 3rd31 areas

tj
I

5 km
I I

: 4th31 areas

bottom areas 31 of boundary Kyoto-city

Figure 10

Blue collar employees

Socialsegregation Japanese in cities 'service class' (although he does not use this term, Sugimoto, following the Social Mobility and Stratification Study, does this in the new edition of his basic text, see Sugimoto 2003). However, as can be seen by Figures 6 and 7, the spatial distributions of these two middle-class groups only partially overlap and are, in detail, distinctly different. Both have a strong presence in the northern and western suburbs, and in specific parts of Fushimi and Yamashina wards in the south and east. But professionals dominate the northeast corner of Kyoto (especially around and to the north of Kyoto University) and are not to be found in the city centre (defined roughly as the area lying between Kyoto station and the Imperial Palace, with perhaps the main shopping intersection at Shijou-Kawaramachi as its focal point), while managers are more strongly represented in the central northern and north-western districts (for example, in Kita ward near to Ryouanji, and at Arashiyama) and are very much a feature of the central part of the city. In both cases, but perhaps especially so for professionals, it is manifestly obvious that the spatial distributions are non-random;this Japanese city does have a social geography! Japanese sociologists identify the petty bourgeoisie as the 'old middle class'. This is rather unfortunate because it misrepresents the many young men and women who are setting up small businesses (many of them using new information technologies). Kyoto likes to present itself as a new knowledgebased local economy (see, for example, Nihon Keizai Shinbun 1998), but the vast majority of those who own their own businesses in Kyoto are indeed very much part of an old, and slowly disappearing, segment of the middle class. They work in the retail sector, and in the tourism-related craft industries for which Kyoto is so rightly famous. Not surprisingly, therefore, the spatial distribution of the petty bourgeoisie (see Figure 8) is dominated by the central city and the nearby Higashiyama ward, an area which contains both the Gion district (famous for its festival and its geisha houses), and the most visited of Kyoto's many splendid temples - Kiyomizudera. There is, however, a very distinctive extension of the zone dominated by the petty bourgeoisie into the inner north-western suburbs of the city. This is explained by the strong presence there of the Nishijin silk-weaving craftsmen and women (whose subaltern voices are communicated so poignantly through Hareven's recent study, see Hareven 2002).

81 Given the relatively high status of blue collar workers in the large company sector of the Japanese economy, we might have expected that the spatial distributions of Kyoto's blue collar and white collar working classes would be similar. This is clearly not the case (see Figures 9 and 10). White collar workers are to be found living in both the inner areas and the outer suburbs, in the north and the south of the city, and in no particular association with any other social group. The probable key to this low spatial patterning is the high proportion of women engaged in white collar work. Since literacy rates are high and most female students complete high school, women from working class backgrounds can obtain white collar jobs. At the same time, the poor presence of women in middle class occupations (especially as managers and petty bourgeoisie) means that women from middle class backgrounds also tend to occupy low level white collar jobs. Not surprisingly, therefore, the high female participation rates (many of these jobs being 'part-time' in nature) and the wide involvement of women in white collar work, results in a small range of values over the 155 areas, and hence a low degree of spatial patterning. The situation for blue collar employment is very different. Yes, of course, a part of this workforce is female (Glenda Roberts' female garment workers, for example, are almost certainly included in my data, see Roberts 1994), but most of it is male. The spatial distribution of blue collar workers is highly distinctive; there is a very high concentration in the southern half of the city, and especially in the western and south-western suburbs. Much of the low-lying land in these areas is given over to factories and to the housing of factory workers and their families. Some of this housing is in the form of high rise apartments (danchi), as, for example, in the central southern part of Fushimi ward, where a 'new town' has been built, but most of it is high-density low rise housing mixed in with the factories in a relatively unplanned industrial urban landscape. Figure 10, however, contains a remarkablefeature. Minami ward, located to the south and southwest of Kyoto station, has nine of the 31 top-decile values for blue collar workers, and only one area in the ward falls outside the top decile. Clearly this is Kyoto's working class district par excellence. And living in this ward, especially in the Higashi-Kujou area located just to the east and southeast of Kyoto station, are some of Kyoto's poorest and most

82 socially excluded people. As has been indicated elsewhere in this paper, Japan (for all its 'clubbiness') is a society that is relatively socially inclusive. Income inequalities are less than in other advanced capitalist countries, and class consciousness is, at least at the tatemaelevel, low. And yet, when social exclusion does occur in Japan, it can take (and has taken in the past) a particularly vicious form. It maybe that Kyoto does not today have indigenous ethnic minorities suffering discrimination (though see Mizuuchi 2001 for a discussion of the impact of post-war slum clearance on the Okinawan community in nearby Osaka), but it does have a significant population of Korean ancestry, and a large number of burakudistricts. The Higashi-Kujou area in Minami ward and the adjoining southeast corner of Shimogyou ward contains the main concentration of these socially excluded groups in Kyoto. This is not fully visible at the areal level of analysis used in this paper, but, when unemployment, for example, is mapped at the enumeration district level, the geography of poverty in Kyoto is much clearer. It was while inspecting the highly complex detailed map of unemployment 1995 by enumeration district, that I was shocked to realize (i) that high unemployment rates, instead of characterizing broad areas of working class housing (as would be the case in the UK or US), were extremely concentrated into small districts often surrounded by extended areas of low unemployment, and (ii) that these small areas of high unemployment tended to coincide with the burakudistricts so visible on early modern maps of the city (such as those found in Uemura and Ueno 1999, 128-9). This finding has enormous implications; my interpretation is that, despite the ending of the 'semi-feudal' caste system 135 years ago, people of buraku(outcaste) descent continue to suffer social exclusion for the supposed 'impurity' of their blood. This discrimination, especially through the labour market, results in higher rates of unemployment and lower life chances for those of burakudescent (see Kitaguchi 1999). The spatial continuity in this process is crucial - knowledge of the buraku districts forms part of the fiercely secret mental maps of every long-term Kyoto resident, reproduced and re-enacted generation after generation. Indeed, the 'proof' of outcaste descent for many people (amazingly often still considered important when considering someone as an employee, a client or as a marriage partner) is to trace a person to a family address in a burakudistrict.

J Anthony Fielding So the fascinating paradox is, that while Japanese cities show, in general, much lower levels of social segregation than Western cities, they also retain a form of minority social exclusion that is about as extreme in its 'placism' as is to be found anywhere in the world. Conclusion This research, on the basis of a detailed empirical study of Kyoto (and Edinburgh) has shown: 1 that it is misleading to characterize the Japanese city as 'together and equal' as Fujita and Hill do in their paper. This surely exaggerates the lack of social segregation in Japanese cities, and results in large part from the inappropriate spatial scale of their empirical analysis. In fact, Japanese cities do have a distinctive social geography with clear patterns of social class segregation; 2 that, despite this, good reasons exist for expecting that the degree of social segregation in Japanese cities will be less than in Western cities (in some cases better reasons, perhaps, than those provided by Fujita and Hill); and 3 that, in fact, a comparison of social segregation between a Japanese city (Kyoto) and a UK city (Edinburgh) shows (a) that the degree of social segregation is indeed less in the Japanese city, and (b) that the spatial form of this segregation is also different. The fact that the scale at which social segregation manifests itself is at a level below that of the city ward (ku) has considerable political significance (for a recent discussion of the politics of scale see Brenner 2001). If city wards are too large and too socially composite to form the basis for a classbased urban politics, and neighbourhoods with their street-level organizations (chounaikai)are too small, how then are people who share problems through their common class locations expected to express their interests politically? This question has particular salience in Japan, where national-level politics (despite the continued presence of a communist party) is renowned for its corporatist and 'ideology-free' nature. Finally, this is, I think, the first time that a comparison between a Japanese city and a Western city using common social class categories and common areal units has been carried out. The results of this comparison require us to reconsider (or at the very

Social segregation in Japanesecities least, qualify) our expectations that 'Western' models of urban spatial structure can be generalized to encompass the social geographies of all capitalist cities.

83

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Anthony J Fielding the minorities: illusionof homogeneity WeinerM ed 1997Japan's Routledge, London White M I 2002 PerfectlyJapanese: makingfamilies in an era California University Press, Berkeley of upheaval Wiltshire R 2002 Study guide for 'Urban Japan' course (http://www.btinternet.com/~richard.wiltshire/g307/ guide.htm) Accessed November 2002 Zukin S 1982 Loftliving: cultureand capitalin urbanchange John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore