HISTORY 334 WORLD ECONOMIC ORDERS Professor Quinn Slobodian

The Socioeconomic Transformation of Iran

Reform and Revolution 1973-1985
Mary Elizabeth Kenefake 12/22/2012

MERIP Reports, Oil Refineries in South Iran in The Economic Contradictions, Middle East Research and Information Project 69(1978), p. 12.

The Socioeconomic Transformation of Iran: Reform and Revolution 1973-1985 1973-1985 was a turbulent time period of Iran, both economically and politically. Under the Shah, Irans economy was a form of social democracy, rooted in capitalism. Its biggest trading partners were West Germany and the United States, and foreign investment in Iran flourished. However in 1979 the countrys people decidedly turned towards a socialist model, where the state controlled industry, insurance, and banks. Throughout all of these changes, the countrys main source of wealth has been oil. Both regimes have faced the same economic problems of inflation, agricultural shortages, and a trade deficit. Although after 1979 there was not a domestic structure of free trade within Iran, they still remained part of the world economy. However the effects of an eight year war with Iraq immediately after Revolution, international economic sanctions from its former trading partners, and repayment of foreign debt have decreased the standard of living for many Iranians. However, socialism still remains the dominant model of economics in Iran. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi regained power in 1953, after an American and British intelligence-backed coup. 2 He had fled to Rome after nationalist activists threatened his life. Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq was elected Prime Minister in 1951, and his first immediate action was to nationalize the oil industry. He also limited the powers of the Shah, which of course angered the monarchy. Since oils discovery in Iran in 1913, its refining process and export had been controlled by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which was later renamed British Petroleum). While the oil was the property of the Iranian government, Britain was making the majority of the profit. That changed in 1951. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was created and has

Ervand Abrahamian, The Pahlavi Monarchy in The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 37. 2

since been a powerful part of Irans government. 3 The actions of Mossadeq severely limited the foreign interests of Britain and the United States, this spurring the actions of the CIA and MI6 coups. 4 When the Shah returned to power in 1953 the NIOC did not disappear, although it granted concessions to a consortium of international companies. According to Akbar Karbassian, 60 percent of those companies were American, 20 percent were British, and 20 percent French.
5

This agreement gave Iran 50% profits at all times, whereas it had been making only a fraction of that revenue beforehand.
6

Iran also joined OPEC, or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries, which determined the price of oil on their own terms rather than by the control of foreign interests. 7 The states primary source of income became oil, financing up to $50 billion dollars between 1964 and 1977.
8

This money made up an average of 60 percent of the

governments revenues and 70 percent of its foreign exchange between 1954 and 1979. 9 Beginning in 1961, the Shah instituted a series of reforms, known as the White Revolution. The goal was to create a Great civilization of Persians, and to modernize and industrialize Iran. According to journalist Robin Wright, the White Revolution sought to modernize Irans economy and social infrastructure, including land reform and womens
3

Jane Perry Clark Carey, Iran and Control of its Oil Resources, Political Science Quarterly 89 (1974), p. 149-150 4 Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution (New York: Knopf, 2000), p. 290.
5

Akbar Karbassian, Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy, Social Research 67(2000), p. 9. 6 Ervand Abrahamian, Muhammad Reza Shahs White Revolution in A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 123. 7 Karbassian, Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy, p. 9. 8 Ervand Abrahamian, The Politics of Underdevelopment in Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 427. 9 Ervand Abrahamian, Muhammad Reza Shahs White Revolution in A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 124. 3

rights.10 During the 1960s and 70s, 45% of Irans population were rural peasants. 32% of Iranians were urban dwellers, working in industry, small workshops, bazaars, or as domestic servants. The Upper Class was 0.01% of the population, and included the Pahlavi family, entrepreneurs, and high up military and government officials.
11

Although the majority of the

population was located in the countryside, the Shahs development plans were biased towards the urban populations. These plans, of which there were five, focused on the expansion of education, promotion of jobs, and the building of hospitals. The Fifth plan is what this paper will focus on, as it occurred from 1973-1979.
12

Scholar Ervand Abrahamian characterized the Shahs fifth

reform as catering to modern classes. The process of urbanization and industrialization, the expansion of the educational and communication systems, and the creation of a centralized bureaucratic state all served to swell the ranks of the modern classes, especially the intelligentsia and the industrial proletariat, and to reduce the relative size of the traditional classes, notably the bazaar petit bourgeoisie and its clerical allies.13 These policies marked a major shift for the population distribution in Iran. There was a mass exodus of people from the countryside to urban areas. The development plan worked to transform Iran from an agricultural based economy into a modernized one. There was a free market system, although the government subsidized the private sector where needed. They also controlled imports of industrially produced items, encouraging domestic production instead.14 Whereas industrial imports were controlled, food was not. The agricultural sector was described as sluggish by journalist M.G. Weinbaum in 1977. The industry received low priority from the

10 11

Wright, The Last Great Revolution, p. 290. Ervand Abrahamian, The Pahlavi Monarchy, p. 16. 12 Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 427. 13 Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p.530.
14

Jahangir Amuzegar, The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution, Middle East Journal 46(1992), p. 414. 4

Shah because only 8% of Irans total land masses were arable.

15

Before the oil industry became

Irans main source of wealth, Iran sustained major foreign exchange from agriculture. These crops included cotton, tobacco, rhubarb, and rice.
16

Beginning in the 1970s, the value of these

agricultural products began to plummet. In response, the country began to import its food rather than export it. In 1970-71, the government sponsored a bill that imported $400 billion dollars. The amount of food imported grew more than three and a half times over the next five years until 1976. 17 Beginning in 1973, oil revenues quadrupled due to the international oil crisis. This was instigated by OPEC, of which Iran was a member. The revenues from oil were channeled into importing food, communications, mining, construction, and education. Businesses were managed by private entrepreneurs, and the only state-controlled industry was oil, although mining was heavily subsidized.
18

Urban areas saw the majority of these development initiatives. Modern

style housing was built, consumer goods were introduced to the markets, and state-sponsored social plans provided for health care and unemployment. 19 Although the modern urban classes saw an improvement in quality of life, the working class and countryside dwellers did not reap the benefits of oil wealth. In Tehran, where four million people lived in 1975, had no proper sewage system, no subway system, and no proper public transport system.
20

The air became polluted, roads were deteriorating, and shanty towns

15

M.G. Weinbaum, Agricultural Policy and Development Politics in Iran, Middle East Journal 31(1977), p. 432.
16 17

Weinbaum, Agricultural Policy and Development Politics in Iran, p. 445. ibid 18 Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 427. 19 Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 447. 20 ibid 5

began to proliferate around Tehran and Isfahan. People migrating from the countryside to the cities to find work built temporary housing that became unclean and dangerous.
21

The people

affected by these problems were day laborers: factory employees in the industrial and construction fields that were not given the benefits of social welfare programs.
22

Abrahamian

stated that the Shahs new reforms did not improve the quality of life for many Iranians. He stated that the oil boom did not end poverty; it nearly modernized it.23 As a result of the 1973 Oil Crisis, the Iranians had millions of petrodollars available to them. They decided to invest in a West German steel and munitions company, Krupp. Krupp was near bankruptcy in the late 1960s, and had relinquished traditional family control to international buyers. In 1974 the Iranian government bought $100 million of Krupps shares, which amounted to approximately 25 percent of the company.
24

West Germany had been a traditional trading

partner of Iran since before WWII. Iran exported oil, and imported cars, machinery, and weapons from West Germany. However in the 1970s European banks were facing a crisis. It was called a liquidity squeeze and they desperately needed the infusion of Middle Eastern oil dollars.
25

It

was a mutually beneficial relationship. Iran needed West Germanys industrial technologies, and West Germany needed the petrodollars. Iran and West Germany created a $9 billion dollar bank in Switzerland that would finance international investment projects between the two countries. 26

21 22

Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 447. Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 448. 23 Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 448. 24 Buying into Krupp, Time Magazine 104(1974).
25 26

ibid ibid 6

Although oil revenues began to climb, inflation began to effect domestic Iranian prices for goods and services. In 1976, The Economist magazine stated that rents in residential parts of Tehran had risen 300 percent in five years and that a middle class family could be spending on housing as much as 50 percent of its annual income.
27

Food shortages began to fuel unrest in

urban areas, and the government struggled to respond adequately. The Shah responded by infusing more subsidized products into Iranian markets. These included basics such as sugar, poultry, and dairy products.
28

The government also attempted to stabilize food prices and curb

prices, although it proved unsuccessful. The laborers in crucial Iranian industries such as oil and construction began to strike in late 1977 and continued until February 1979, when the Revolution was finally successful. Striking workers in these two lucrative industries impacted the domestic economy significantly.29 In 1978 oil revenue accounted for 60 percent of GDP. Strikes by oil workers caused a loss of $1billion in revenue. 30 On top of that loss, the government was struggling with striking workers settlements. In 1978 there was a $1.5 billion dollar settlement with striking workers for wage increases in order to cover the costs of inflation. The workers demanded higher wages in order to be able to pay for housing and food. 31 Offshore oil production in the Persian Gulf came to a halt in December of 1978. This caused inflation to spike up to 50 percent. In addition to raising

27 28

Abrahamian, The Pahlavi Monarchy, p. 28. Weinbaum, Agricultural Policy and Development Politics in Iran, p. 437. 29 William Claiborne, Ending of Oil Strike Viewed as Pivotal in Iranian Crisis, The Washington Post (1978).
30 31

Claiborne, Tehrans Bustling Daily Life Muffles Crumbling of Economy. ibid 7

inflation, foreign investors began to leave the Iranian oil market, and no new foreign investors came into Iranian industry between 1977 and 1978. 32 In addition to the failing agricultural sector, the striking workers, and the impossible inflation rate, Irans government was hampered by extreme corruption and funneling off of oil revenues. According to Abrahamian, the royal family of the Shah kept a tight control on private industry through their Pahlavi Foundation. He stated that the foundation was It was a source of funds for the royal family, a means of exerting influence on key sectors of the economy; and as a conduit for rewards to supporters of the regime. This foundation had a subsidy of over $40 million, functioned as a tax haven for some of the Pahlavi holdings, and thereby, penetrated almost every corner of the nations economy. By 1977, the foundation had shares in 207 companies, including 8 mining firms, 10 cement firms, 17 banks and insurance companies, and 45 construction companies.33 In addition to the percolation of the royal familys influence on private industry, there was also widespread corruption of money elsewhere. Substantial sums were squandered on palaces, royal extravagances, bureaucratic consumption, outright corruption, nuclear installations, and ultrasophisticated weapons too expensive even for many NATO countries according to Abrahamian.34 The combination of inflation, increasing poverty, food shortages, and corruption caused the Shahs government to fall in February 1979. The people of Iran thought a turn towards socialist practices, in combination with theocracy, could rebuild their nation. Agriculture, the backbone of Iran for thousands of years, had taken a backseat to oil and industrial sectors. The new regime hoped to move away from these greedy capitalist policies and focus on the poor.

32 33 34

Barry Shlacter, December 23, 1978 BC Cycle, the Associated Press (1978). Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 438. Abrahamian, Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 427. 8

In February 1979 the Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini was successful. The new government instituted a theocratic socialist government, and soon took control of banks, insurance, and private industry. For many Iranians, the new policies struck the right chord among those eager for fundamental socio-economic changes.35 The population of Iran had ballooned to 34 million by 1979, and Tehran had a population of 6 million, up 2 million from just 4 years earlier due to a massive exodus from the countryside.
36

Economic historian Fairoz

Ghadar from the Harvard International Review characterized Irans economy as troubled immediately after revolution. There was a recession immediately after revolution, but a strong revival between 1981 and 1986.
37

The economic difficulties were in part due to the same

economic conditions that had caused the downfall of the Shah in the first place, including inflation, falling international oil prices, and a disappearance of foreign direct investment. 38 Alarming bankers worldwide, the new regime nationalized all banks. The main idea behind nationalization of banks was to create liquidity to galvanize industry according to Washington Post journalist William Branigin.39They also made the decision to abolish interest banking, declared un-Islamic by the Mullahs. 40Even more shocking than bank nationalization was the declaration that Iran had no obligation to repay the debts accrued by the Shahs regime. In 1979, the Shahs government held about $15 billion dollars in foreign debt. Finance Minister
35

Ervand Abrahamian, Social Bases in The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989): 230. 36 Wright, The Last Great Revolution, p. xxiii. 37 Fariborz Ghadar, Its the Economy, Stupid. Trials and Tribulations of the Iranian Economy, Harvard International Review (2011), p. 25. 38 William Branigin, Despite Oil, Irans Economy Founders; Iran Economy Plagued by Incompetence, Greed, The Washington Post (1979).
39 40

ibid Sajid Rizvi, Analysis: Irans economy on unsure footing, United Press International (1981). 9

Abol Hassan Bani-sadr later clarified that it would repay debts, but not the nongovernmental, private debts incurred by the Shah. 41 Even so, this sent lawyers and bankers across Europe and the United States into a panic. One journalist called this grab for Iranian assets a suing spree and a free-for-all after Iranian booty. 42 The international community balked at the sheer unpredictability of the new regime, although it did make a $1.2 million payment on a $50 million loan held by Japan's Sumitomo Bank Ltd within the regimes first few months of power.
43

Beni-Sadir made the following statements about foreign investments and companies in a rare

statement to the press in late 1979: Foreign companies operating here have been told thousands of times that this is an illegal regime the Iranian governments they have dealt with and that the money you are taking is theft, he said. The old regime's debts were made by a corrupt regime, and they foreign interests knew it was a corrupt regime which did nothing for the people."44 Out of the $15 million in debt, the regime eventually repaid $8.4 million of it back, freeing itself from creditors in the West. The regime saw this as a way to freely conduct its orders without influence from the West, as the Shah had fallen victim to. 45 To address the immediate concerns of the people, mostly the poor, the regime poured oil wealth to reach the rural populations in areas that were desperately needed. The areas they addressed as quickly as April 1979 were electricity, water, roads, health clinics, and schools in the rural areas. However, with the onset of the Iraqi invasion in 1981 billions of dollars from the

41

Bankers Grab the Booty: A rush for Iranian assets sends lawyers into courts on two continents, Time Magazine 114 (1979).
42 43 44 45

ibid ibid Thomas Kent, February 4, 1979 AM Cycle, The Associated Press (1979). Robin Wright, Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes, Foreign Policy 103 (1996), p. 162. 10

financial efforts in these areas began to be diverted towards arms production. 46 On average the total budget of the Islamic republic from 1980-1985 included 25% towards subsidies to the poor. They received direct subsidies for rice, bread, sugar, cheese, fuel, cooking oil, as well as indirect subsidies for electricity, sanitation, and piped water47 More people were able to read, get adequate health care, and have safe water in the countryside. Farmers also began to receive the majority of attention rather than the urban masses. 48 $142 million dollars was sent to rural areas for agricultural purposes alone. 49 From 1978-1990, farm output increased an average of 4 percent a year. Agricultural economic historian Jahangir Amuzegar described the farming situation as a complicated one. On the one hand, output was increasing. However, Iran imported more food than it ever had in the past. The share of farming in GDP thus rose from 12.4 percent in 1977/78 to more than 18 percent by the decade's end. Nevertheless, some 17 percent of the country's total annual imports on the average consisted of foodstuff. Foreign purchases of sugar, red meat, and edible oil were also much larger than before. 50

Because rice, grain, and meat could no longer be produced in Iran, and therefore subsidized, those items were imported from Eastern Soviet bloc countries. Food and agricultural products had previously been a major Iranian export. Instead, aside from oil, caviar and carpets became

46 47 48

Wright, Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes, p. 161.

Abrahamian, The Islamic Republic, p. 180. Ervand Abrahamian, The Islamic Republic in A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 180.
49

Branigin, Despite Oil, Irans Economy Founders; Iran Economy Plagued by Incompetence, Greed.
50

Jahangir Amuzegar, The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution, Middle East Journal 46(1992), p. 419. 11

the next biggest products. 51Cash grants were given to the poor in place of subsidies to make up for food shortages. 52 In addition to nationalizing banks and insurance, the overtaking of private property was the next largest reform. The government now had the task of managing 3,000 businesses that had previously been privately owned. 53 According to journalist Sajid Rizvi, A special body was named to run such industries, many of whose owners and managers had fled. But the ambitious project was paralyzed by inefficiency, a purge of suspected counter-revolutionary experts and the absence of a central decision-making authority. 54 These state managers incorporated these companies into clerically controlled foundations, similar to the Shahs own Pahlavi Foundation. They were called bonyads and among them, composed 11 percent of Iranian GDP in 1989. 55 While the public sector grew larger and larger, the private enterprise allowed to continue was stunted. Those allowed continuing included small farms, mining businesses, construction businesses, and small businesses that provided goods and services in small towns. 56 The government was able to take control of the private sector because many entrepreneurs fled the country. This phenomenon was known as human flight. Those who left were often times foreign, or feared what the dissolution of capitalism into socialism would do for their livelihoods. For example, before the Revolution, there were 45,000 Americans in Iran. After 1979 that number decreased to 500. Similar numbers are reflective of European and

51

Konrad Ege, West German Ties with Iran and Iraq, Middle East Research and Information Project 125(1984): 48.
52 53 54 55 56

Sajid Rizvi, Analysis: Irans economy on unsure footing, United Press International (1981). Karbassian, Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy, p. 1. Sajid Rizvi, Analysis: Irans economy on unsure footing, United Press International (1981). Karbassian, Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy, p. 1. Karbassian, Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy, p. 5. 12

Japanese populations. 57 The regime argued that foreign workers would be taking Iranian jobs. However, this created an even larger unemployment problem due to the disassembling of businesses that foreigners managed. 58Upon leaving, many people sued in international court for damages from the Islamic Republic. It took 19 years for these debts to be repaid, but they were ordered by the International Court of Justice at The Hague to do so. 59 Immediately before the revolution, $40 billion in liquid capital left Iran, creating the phenomenon of capital flight. 60 Although many business people did leave Iran, the majority of Irans workforce retained the same makeup as before the Revolution. An estimated 10 million people were employed in industry such as technology, oil, and construction. 61 Construction alone employed 1.2 million. Unable to pay the salary increases instituted by the Shah prior to his ousting, many of these people were laid off or were working without salary. The Shah had increased wages by 50 percent in some fields, to deal with an inflation rate of more than 30 percent. 62In response, many factories and construction sites were empty and unused throughout the 1980s. 63 The oil industry, the lifeblood of Irans economy, was also in trouble. In 1980 there was a global surplus of oil. Exports decreased from 5 million barrels per day under the Shah to 1.5

57

Economic Report: Uncertainty, not chaos, hampers Iran with change main economic theme, The Globe and Mail (1979).
58

Branigin, Despite Oil, Irans Economy Founders; Iran Economy Plagued by Incompetence, Greed.
59 60

Karbassian, Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy, p. 3. ibid 61 Sajid Rizvi, Analysis: Irans economy on unsure footing, United Press International (1981).
62

Branigin, Despite Oil, Irans Economy Founders; Iran Economy Plagued by Incompetence, Greed.
63

Economic Report: Uncertainty, not chaos, hampers Iran with change main economic theme. 13

million barrels per day in 1980. 64 In addition, the Khomeini regime began demanding higher prices. The price of oil plummeted from $43 per barrel to $35 per barrel for long-term supply contracts with countries such as Japan and West Germany. While these prices were low, they were still higher than other countries were offering. 65 In 1980 the majority of Irans oil went to Japan (39%), West Germany (21%), the UK (5%), other European countries (13%), and other Asian countries (8%). 66 The United States did not buy Iranian oil after the 1979 Hostage Situation at the U.S. Embassy, although they had not been a major importer of Iranian oil in the past. In addition to the international surplus of oil, the war with Iraq further decreased oil production. Refineries were bombed as were other facilities. 67 The percentage of GDP that oil contributed to fell from 60 percent in the 1970s to 17 percent from 1980-89. 68 Despite this fall, Oil income continued to account for about 90 percent of total foreign exchange receipts each year from 1981-1988. 69 Iran continued to do business with the West, with the exception of the United States. By 1983 Iran had repaid its foreign debt to West Germany. It continued to do business with Krupp and Deutsche Babcock, an industrial firm. It primarily imported industrial technology from the West. These included vehicles, chemicals, machinery, and electronics. Other goods included cigarettes and food. 70 According to World Bank statistics, In 1983 West German exports into

64 65 66 67 68

No-Pinch Cutoff Iran loses its oil clout Time Magazine 118 (1980). ibid ibid

Amuzegar, The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution, p. 419. ibid 69 ibid 70 Konrad Ege, West German Ties with Iran and Iraq, Middle East Research and Information Project 125(1984): 48. 14

Iran reached an all time high of DM 7.72 billion. The pre-revolutionary high had been at DM 6.77 billion in 1978, only to drop to DM 2.34 billion in 1979. 71 Although international trade had regained speed by the mid 1980s, there was still a large trade deficit. The Iranians were importing more than they ever had before, and their oil exports were falling. 72 They were in the midst of an expensive war, financially and in human lives. However, the regime managed to repay debts ordered by the Hague and did not borrow more foreign funds. 73 The regime still faced problems with unemployment and stagnation in business, which was a concern even before the fall of the Shah. While the regime had attempted to infuse capital into rural sectors, poverty increased by 43 percent from 1979-1985. According to the head of the governments Plan and Budget Organization, among as many as 65-75 percent of the population in 1988 was living in quote absolute poverty. 74 Although the government shifted from a capitalist economy to a socialist one, its primary concerns remained the same. Its sources of wealth did not change, and the concerns of its people did not change. Irans participation in the international economic community did not change, with the exception of sanctions and war. However, certain policies have shown to decrease the quality of life in Iran and have increased poverty. While theocratic socialism is still in power, it can be argued that many Iranians were better off prior to 1979. 75 (WC: 4,250)

71 72 73 74

ibid Ege, West German Ties with Iran and Iraq, p. 48.

Amuzegar, The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution, p. 422. Amuzegar, The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution, p. 421. 75 Amuzegar, The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution, p. 417. 15

Works Cited Ervand Abrahamian, The Islamic Republic in A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 155-195. Ervand Abrahamian, Muhammad Reza Shahs White Revolution in A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 123-154. Ervand Abrahamian, The Pahlavi Monarchy in The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989): 1-16. Ervand Abrahamian, Social Bases in The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989): 230-40. Ervand Abrahamian, The Politics of Underdevelopment in Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982): 426-434. Jahangir Amuzegar, The Iranian Economy Before and After the Revolution, Middle East Journal 46(1992): 413-425. Bankers Grab the Booty: A rush for Iranian assets sends lawyers into courts on two continents, Time Magazine 114 (1979). William Branigin, Despite Oil, Irans Economy Founders; Iran Economy Plagued by Incompetence, Greed, The Washington Post (1979). Buying into Krupp, Time Magazine 104(1974). Jane Perry Clark Carey, Iran and Control of its Oil Resources, Political Science Quarterly 89 (1974): 147-174.

16

William Claiborne, Ending of Oil Strike Viewed as Pivotal in Iranian Crisis, The Washington Post (1978). William Claiborne, Tehrans Bustling Daily Life Muffles Crumbling of Economy, The Washington Post (1978). DJ, Severe damage to Iranian economy seen if national reneges on $10 billion in loans, The Globe and Mail (1979). Economic Report: Uncertainty, not chaos, hampers Iran with change main economic theme, The Globe and Mail (1979). Konrad Ege, West German Ties with Iran and Iraq, Middle East Research and Information Project 125(1984): 48. Fariborz Ghadar, Its the Economy, Stupid. Trials and Tribulations of the Iranian Economy, Harvard International Review (2011): 22-28. Akbar Karbassian, Islamic Revolution and the Management of the Iranian Economy, Social Research 67(2000): 621-640. Thomas Kent, February 4, 1979 AM Cycle, The Associated Press (1979). MERIP Reports, The Economic Contradictions, Middle East Research and Information Project 69(1978): 9-23. No-Pinch Cutoff Iran loses its oil clout Time Magazine 118 (1980). Sajid Rizvi, Analysis: Irans economy on unsure footing, United Press International (1981).

17

Barry Shlacter, December 23, 1978 BC Cycle, The Associated Press (1978). M.G. Weinbaum, Agricultural Policy and Development Politics in Iran, Middle East Journal 31(1977): 434-450. Robin Wright, Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes, Foreign Policy 103 (1996): 161-175. Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution (New York: Knopf, 2000) , p. 290.

18