Of Thorns and Roses: The Logic of Belief in Gregory Nazianzen

FREDERICK W. NORRIS In the twentieth century some significant secondary literature concerning Gregory Nazianzen has emphasized either his attacks on philosophy or the absence in his works of a rationale for the relationship between philosophy and theology. At times these apparent weaknesses are explained as integral to his rhetorical education and interests, almost as if all rhetoricians are the opposite of philosophers. 1 Rosemary Ruether's Gregory of Nazianzus: Rhetor and Philosopher, the most influential monograph to deal specifically with these questions in the last few years, does depict Nazianzen's rationale for relating philosophy and theology. Yet she concludes that "we would be wrong if we were to suppose that Gregory either acknowledges or is aware of any dependence of Christianity on those [philosophical] traditions," even though he loved and studied them. For her the Cappadocian stands in the line of Christian apologists who saw both Greek philosophy and religion as blasphemous. 2 T w o approaches can be followed in testing Ruether's conclusion: first, a description of general comments which Nazianzen made about philosophy, and then a closer study of how he used it in argument. Although Gregory was critical of philosophy, he did suggest ways in which it could be employed. T h e basic principle is stated apothegmatically in at least two places within his work, "Avoid the thorns; pluck the roses." 3 T h a t is hardly a clear guide, but it does suggest the manner in which his sharp attacks on philosophy are to be understood.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the a n n u a l meeting of the American Society of C h u r c h History in Washington, D . C . on 28 December 1982. I wish to thank the A n d r e w W . Mellon Foundation and T h e Catholic University of America for a Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship in 1981-1982 which offered the time and support for unhindered study of Nazianzen. 1. M a r c e l Guignet, S. Grgoire de Nazianze et la rhtorique (Paris, 1911), Eugene Fleury, S. Grgoire de Nazianze et son temps (Paris, 1930), and J e a n Plagnieux, S. Grgoire de Nazianze Thologien: Etudes de science religieuse (Paris, 1952) tend to describe Nazianzen as a technical rhetorician rather than a sophisticated philosopher. 2. Rosemary Ruether, Gregory of Nazianzus: Rhetor and Philosopher (Oxford, 1969), pp. 174 and 167. 3. ad Seleucum 1.61. Greek text with Latin translation in J a c q u e s Paul M i g n e , Patrologiae cursus completus series graeca (Paris, 1862), vol. 37, col. 1581 (Hereafter cited as PG) and de vita sua 1.472; PG 37, 1062.

Mr. Norris is professor of Christian Religion, Johnson City, Tennessee.

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W h e n he warned of the thorns, he could appear to find nearly all philosophies dangerous. H e insisted that certain Greek thinkers were like the plagues of Egypt. H e dismissed the general speculation about principles of anarchy or polyarchy in relation to God as "the sport of the children of H e l l a s " and on one occasion refused to enrich Christian arguments with what he called the "oil of sinners." In most cases, however, his criticism is quite specific. Plato often receives harsh treatment, but only at particular points. Gregory was wary of his bewitching eloquence and condemned his theory of ideas, his teaching about the transmigration of souls, his doctrine of remembrance, and his description of the soul's erotic love for physical bodies. Nazianzen warned that Socrates's concern for beauty was tainted by his interest in boys and castigated Plato for his gluttony. 4 Aristotle also was rebuked. W h a t he brought forth as art was bad art. Following him one was liable to become lost in a logical labyrinth. Christians must remember "to philosophize in the manner of fishermen, not in the manner of Aristotle." T h a t teacher's view of happiness which required external well-being could not be correct. His petty doctrine of providence, his artificial system, his discourses on the mortality of the soul, and his humanism should be attacked. 5 Other philosophers did not fare much better Epicurus's atheism, his unphilosophic view of pleasure, and his teachings about atoms made him objectionable. Plotinus's doctrine of overflowing good in his discourses on the First and Second Causes was unworthy as a metaphor for the Trinity. T h e Stoics could be haughty and the Cynics both greedy and vulgar. T h e Hermetic literature indicated that its author had not grasped the incomprehensibility of God. In fact the writer craftily said that it was difficult to comprehend God and impossible to express his nature in words. Such a position was taken skillfully. T h e philosopher appeared to have grasped God's nature and could not be faulted when he failed to define it For Gregory, however, the truth lay not in the difficulty of stating the nature of God, but in the absolute inability to comprehend it fully. Nazianzen was quite critical of the philosophical pretensions which he saw in the emperor J u l i a n and his teachers. In terms of logic, he indicated that he found Pyrrhon's objections, pretexts, and antitheses to be sophistic sayings and Chrysippus's use of syllogisms to be unintelligible. 6
4 Oration (hereafter, Or ) 32 26, PG 36, 201 Or 29 2, PG 36, 76 Or 31 6, PG 36, 140 Or 27 10, PG 36, 24-28 Or 32 15, PG 36, 189-192 Or 4 72, PG 35, 661 5 Or 32 25, PG 36, 201 de virtute 48-49, PG 37, 684 Or 23 12, PG 35,1164 Ep 32, PG 37, 69 Or 27 10, PG 36, 24-28 6 Or 4 72, PG 35, 661, Or 27 10, PG 36, 24-28 Or 28 8, PG 36, 33-36 Or 29 2, PG 36, 76 Or 4 72, PG 35, 661 Or 27 10, PG 36, 24-28 Or 28 4, PG 36, 29-32 Although most commentators attribute the citation in Or 28 4 to Plato's Timaeus, 28c, Jean Ppin, "Grgoire de Nazianzen, Lecteur de la Littrature hermtique," Vigiliae Christianae 36 (1982) 251-260, demonstrated that the citation occurs almost word for word in the Hermetic writings See Andr Festugire, Corpus Hermeticum, vol 3 (Pans, 1954), fr 1 1, 2,1-2 Or 4 43-44, PG 35, 568 and 570 Or 32 25, PG 36, 201

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Yet philosophy was not entirely thorns. W h e n Plato spoke of the sun as holding the same position among material objects as God does among objects of thought, he said something quite important even though he was a heathen author. Indeed Plato was probably one of the philosophers Gregory had in mind when he praised the more advanced Greek thinkers who believed in one fundamental principle and attacked both polytheism and demons. Plato or contemporary Platonists who spoke of Spirit as the mind of the world were among the philosophers whom the Theologian viewed as closest to the Christian position. 7 It may have been a phrase from Aristotle about Spirit as the external mind which received the same praise. For Gregory both Aristotle and M e n a n d e r were correct to see the vices as next-door neighbors to virtues. T h e Cynics should be honored for their rejection of material goods, while Chrysippus, the Peripatetics, and the Stoicsas well as Platowere right when they argued for justice and taught that it is a duty to accept wrong rather than inflict it. Some heathen philosopher, unnamed by Nazianzen and unknown to me, was commended because he asked: " W h a t gave movement to these [things in nature] and drives their ceaseless and unhindered motion?" 8 T h e rose garden is much larger than what has been described here. Gottwald, in his inaugural dissertation at Vratislava in 1906, goes beyond the title De Gregorio Nazianzeno Platonico by systematizing a number of doctrines in which Gregory used philosophical language and concepts from various schools of thought in the ancient period. T h e net he casts is too fine, but his work does indicate how deeply Gregory was involved in his times. 9 T h e suggestion of dependence is strong, although in fairness to Ruether, such lists do not in themselves demand that Gregory "acknowledged" that dependence. W e do have, however, expansions of Gregory's maxim about philosophy which are clearer on the positive side. In his praise of Basil, Nazianzen says: I take it all intelligent men agree that among human advantages education holds first place. I refer not only to our nobler form of it which disdains all the ambitious ornaments of rhetoric and attaches itself only to salvation and the beauty of spiritual contemplation, but also to that external culture which many * Christians by an error of judgment scorn as treacherous and dangerous and as turning us away from God. The heavens, the earth, the air, and all such things are not to be condemned because some have wrongly interpreted them and venerate the creatures of God in place of God. On the contrary, we select from them what is useful both for life and enjoyment and we avoid what is dangerous, not opposing
7. Or. 28.30; PG 36, 69-72. Or. 31.15-16; PG 36, 149-152. Or. 31.5; PG 36, 137. 8. Ibid. Or. 43.64; PG 36, 580-581. Or. 43.60; PG 36, 573-575. Or. 4.43; PG 35, 568 and 570. Or. 28.16; PG 36, 45-48. 9. Ricardus Gottwald, De Gregorio Nazianzeno Platonica (Vratislaviae, 1906). Heinrich Drrie, "Gregors [Gregor von Nyssa] Theologie auf dem Hintergrunde der neuplatonischen Metaphysik," Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie (Leiden, 1976), p. 21, correctly criticizes Gottwald's work as improper. Gottwald did depend too heavily on single words. But parts of his investigation can be appropriated by more critical studies.

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C H U R C H HISTORY creation to the Creator, as the foolish do, but acknowledging the Maker of the world from His works, and as the holy Apostle says, bringing every mind into captivity to Christ Thus, we know that neither fire nor food nor iron nor any other element is in itself either very useful or very harmful, but that all depends on the user Even from certain reptiles we have at times compounded salutary medicines So also from the pagans we have received principles of inquiry and speculation, while we have rejected whatever leads to demons, and error, and the abyss of perdition. And from such material we have drawn profit for piety, by learning to distinguish the better from the worse, and from its weakness we have made our own doctrine strong Therefore we must not dishonor education because certain men are pleased to do so Rather, we should regard such men as ignorant and uncultured who would have all others be like themselves, that their own deficiencies might be hidden in the general mass, and their want of culture escape reproach. 10

T h e tension of the apothegm, "Avoid the thorns; pluck the roses," is still present. But we should have no difficulty in recognizing the awareness of, indeed, the stated recognition of dependence upon Greek paideia. Negatively Nazianzen warns about the demonic, the misleading, and the wasteful found in Greek literature. Yet that learning is not to be seen as essentially treacherous and dangerous. H e refers to Romans 1:20 and 1:25 and II Corinthians 10:5 as biblical bases for pursuing education. M o r e importantly, he acknowledges his reliance on Greek paideia when he also states that it is precisely the skill at examining things and the speculative or theoretic disciplines which have been received from such writings. T h e use of the words exetastikos (skillful at examining) and theoretikos (speculative or theoretic) in this passage is instructive. Gregory is selective, eclectic, in his acceptance of Greek metaphysical and ethical views. H e chooses under the guidance of biblical or traditional principles and texts. But at least at the lower levels of epistemology and within the field of logic Gregory acknowledges his dependence upon non-Christian literature. Although he can be blunt in his attack on philosophers, he presents an ever so short rationale for the contribution they have made to his grasp of reality. Of 11 course, he relies upon revelation in Christ and seeks the mystical vision. But knowing how to get to the bottom of things, and perhaps even how to approach the heights of contemplation, came from pagan literature. T h i s rationale, so often lost in recent secondary treatments, forms the context of his encomium for Basil. T h e style, argumentation, and content of the piece indicate Nazianzen's dependence upon his education, his reliance upon Greek paideia. When he describes Basil as better than some of the famous philosophers, he also views him as someone who knew and employed
10 Or 43 11, PG 36, 508-509 The translation is by Leo McCauley, Funeral Orations by S Gregory Nazianzen and S Ambrose, Fathers of the Church 22 (New York, 1953), pp 35-36 The italics are mine 11 See his description of what is necessary for a theologian, Or 27 3, PG 36, 13-16 and Or 28 1-3, PG 36, 25-29

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the "necessary syllogisms" for defending the faith. The Caesarean bishop could philosophize about the practical and the theoretical and could use logical demonstrations and antitheses in the service of the church. Basil's dialectical skill and power were so great that he silenced his opponents and showed when writing that his pen was borrowed from the Spirit.12 Such statements, however, are not in themselves conclusive. Gregory also castigates the Eunomians for being dialecticians and thus uses the term as an epithet of disgrace. They are technologists, logic-choppers of the worst sort.13 But that is the point. Neither techne (art or skill) nor dialectike (the art of debating or arguing,) is necessarily bad in itself. What infuriates Nazianzen is that these Eunomians produce elementary treatises and are without full education, that is, without a broad sense of paideia.14 Therefore grounds for supporting a rationale in which Gregory is "aware of his dependence upon philosophy" and "acknowledges" it must come also from the second approach suggested for testing Ruether's conclusion. We know that both Eunomius and his mentor Aetius often stated their views in terms of syllogisms.15 How did Nazianzen structure his refutation of their positions? In at least one section of his Against Eunomius, Basil warned that the Neo-Arians borrowed devices from Aristotle and Ghrysippus. He attacked Eunomius for relying on worldly wisdom, particularly for using Aristotle's The Categories for Interpretation when his statements about God's essence concerned the concepts of possession and deprivation. Basil insisted that he himself preferred the teaching of the Spirit.16 In his Theological Orations, however, Gregory did not make that charge. Instead he used a knowledge of Aristotle to refute Eunomian positions rather than attacking them for their dependence on the Stagirite. He ridiculed the Neo-Arians for proposing agennetos (unbegotten) as descriptive of God's essence because they showed themselves to be unaware of the principle that possession precedes deprivation. In Nazianzen's view, they gave evidence of their poor education since they did not know that everything predicated of a class cannot be predicated without fail of every individual of that class. Both mistakes indicated an ignorance of Aristotle's Categories. The Eunomians also confused the conditioned and unconditioned use of a single term, a phrase which appears in Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations. When Gregory inquired about the sense of their positions he raised his questions in the form
12. 13. 14. 15. Or. 43.23 and 68; PG 36, 525-528 and 586-588. Or. 29.21; PG 36, 101-104. Or. 29.2 and 9; PG 36, 76 and 84-85. Lionel Wickham's, "The Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomean," Journal of Theological Studies 19 (1968): 532-569, offers an edition which indicates how much Aetius relied upon theological syllogisms. Richard Paul Vaggione's forthcoming edition of the pieces from Eunomius demonstrates that he also depended upon such methods. 16. Contra Eunomium 1.5 and 9; PG 29, 516 and 532. Elsewhere within this work Basil did employ Aristotelian syllogisms for his own purposes.

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and through the vocabulary which is described in the Prior Analytics and the Rhetoric}1 His reliance upon Aristotle, however, goes much deeper than scattered quotations of Aristotelian logical principles. In 1912 Johannes Focken published his inaugural dissertation from Berlin, written under Norden and Diels.18 He studied the use of arguments in Nazianzen. Correctly he showed how Gregory stood in the stream of philosophical rhetoric, faithful to the type of education which he had received. Yet Focken also demonstrated his own grasp of the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy by devoting the introductory chapter to the use of Aristotelian enthymeme within parts of the Nazianzen corpus. The enthymeme described by Aristotle in his Rhetoric as a loosely stated syllogism in which one of the premises often remained unexpressed dominated Focken's discussion. In his view, only if the interpreters of the Theologian know the relationship between the enthymeme and the syllogism in Aristotle can they see the intricate way in which Nazianzen employed Aristotelian logic. Focken selects his primary examples from the Third Theological Oration. In that piece Gregory attempted to show that the Eunomians did not have a mastery of paideia, particularly at the level of understanding their own misuse of logic. Focken describes five passages within that oration, sections 2, 10,11,12, and 16, in which Gregory uses enthymeme. These loose syllogisms can be stated fully in the formal syllogistic fashion and can be referred to various passages of Aristotle's Prior Analytics, part 1, particularly chapters, 1, 4, 25, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39, and 41. 19 There is absolutely no doubt that Nazianzen had studied logic seriously enough to employ it against the Eunomian or Neo-Arian leaders. Yet Focken was able to advance his argument two steps further. Not only does the Third Theological Oration offer examples of this use of Aristotelian enthymematic and syllogistic reasoning; so does the poetry. Focken again demonstrated that formal Aristotelian logic as seen in the Prior Analytics stands behind the enthymematic structures within the poetry. As a second step, he carefully studied examples of Aristotle's rhetorical induction which appear in both Gregory's orations and his poetry. I do not see how his case concerning Nazianzen's judicious employment of Aristotelian logic can be
17. Or. 29.12; PG 36, 89. Compare Aristotle, The Categories of Interpretation 12a, 26-43, trans. H. P. Cooke, Loeb Classical Library (hereafter LCL) (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), p. 84. Eunomius saw the point about agennetos and did not find it telling, Apology 8; PG 30, 844. Or. 29.15; PG 36, 93. Compare Aristotle, Categories la, 20-24, LCL, p. 14. Or. 30.15; PG 36, 124. Compare Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations 167a, 1-7, trans. E. S. Forster, LCL, p. 26. Among many examples, see Or. 29.7-8; PG 36, 84. Compare Aristotle, Prior Analytics 64a, 33-38, trans. H. Tredennick, LCL, p. 482 and Aristotle, Rhetoric 1419a, trans. J. H. Freese, LCL, pp. 462-466. 18. Johannes Focken, De Gregorii Nazianzeni Orationum et Carminum Dogmaticorum Argumentandi Ratione (Nrnberg [sic Nurnburg], 1912). 19. Ibid., pp. 3-20.

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faulted.20 I would add, however, two further pieces of evidence for Gregory's reliance on philosophical method. First, he not only used such logic to attack the Eunomian logical positions; he also employed it and other principles from grammar and rhetoric to assail their interpretation of scripture. In at least seven different places within the Fourth Theological Oration, he referred to some logical, grammatical, or lexicographical principle which they had broken in their exegesis of scripture.21 Elias of Crete, the eleventh-century commentator on Gregory, insisted that Aristotle and Hermogenes were the major sources for these principles.22 Second, within the Third Theological Oration, Gregory's interest in logic reached a somewhat different level. In introducing the liar's paradox as an example of two things which are contradictory and yet both must be true, he took a position which is quite similar to one treated by Ghrysippus. Diogenes Laertius tells us about the content of Ghrysippus's position and that the great Stoic had written more than one treatise on the subject.23 It is not possible to connect Gregory's position directly with that of Chrysippus. We do not have such clear evidence of his reliance upon Stoic logic as John Rist has given us for Origen.24 But the suggestion remains that Nazianzen had spent considerable time in his education attempting to understand the puzzles of logic.25

20. Ibid., pp. 20-35. 21. Or. 30.4, 6-8, 10-12; PG 36, 108, 112-113, 116, 120. 22. Johannes Leunclavius, ed., Gregorius Nazianzenus, Operum tomi tres. Aucit nuncprimum Caesarii, Eliae Cretensis Episcopi, Pselli, et ipsius Gregorii librorum aliquot accessione (Basil, 1571), particularly pp. 118-119. The comments excerpted by Jahn and printed in PG 37 do not do justice to Elias's learning and insight as the fuller Latin translation of Leunclavius does. Vatican Green 1219, the main manuscript for Elias's commentary on Gregory, has not been edited yet. 23. Or. 29.9; PG 36, 84-85. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.196-197, trans. R.D. Hicks, LCL, pp. 308-310. 24. John M. Rist, "The Importance of Stoic Logic in the Contra Celsum," in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in honour of A.H. Armstrong, eds. H.G. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (London, 1981), pp. 64-78. 25. The strongest possible evidence for Nazianzen's dependence on Aristotelian logic would be at hand were we certain that an anonymous piece, which includes a synopsis of logic and comments on the quadrivium, had been written by him. In the seventeenth century Johannes Wegelinus edited this synopsis and the quadrivium. On the basis of Augsburg manuscripts 1600 and 1602 he pfeced them under GregoryV name. Omont's inventory- of Greek manuscripts at Paris notes that Greek 2062 has a synopsis of the Aristotelian Organon which he describes as ex ore Gregorii Nazianzenii. The problem, however, with such a fourteenth-century Byzantine manuscript is that this late use of the phrase apo phones (from the voice of) most often designates material as after the style and thought of a famous person rather than from the hand of that authority. Johan Heiberg published a modern critical text of the Anonymi Logica et Quadrivium, "Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser XV, 1" (Copenhagen, 1929). He indicated that Vatican Greek 15 from the fifteenth century and Vatican Greek 1026 from the fourteenth or fifteenth century place the synopsis under the name of Gregory, while Paris Greek 1931 from the sixteenth century and Laurentian. LVIII 20 from the fifteenth century carried the name of Gregory for the quadrivium. But Heiberg left the piece anonymous because some manuscripts attributed the quadrivium to

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Only in the light of this dependence upon secular literature and particularly of his insight into the relationship between formal Aristotelian syllogisms, the less formal rhetorical enthymeme, and the approach of rhetorical induction can we turn to the question about Gregory's logic of belief. From Ruether's standpoint, he basically follows Christian tradition and does not acknowledge his reliance upon Greek paideia. But if it is correct that he employs Aristotelian logic, and it has been demonstrated that he acknowledges such usage, how then does Gregory relate faith and reason? T h e r e are two passages within the Theological Orations which, when taken by themselves, indicate that Nazianzen viewed faith as the leader which reason would follow. In the first text, after a long series of questions which draw attention to the limits of reason, Nazianzen says: "If you have traversed the air and reckoned u p all it involves, come now with me, touch heaven and things celestial. Faith rather than reason shall lead us, if, that is, you have learned the feebleness of reason to deal with matters quite close at hand, and have acquired enough knowledge of reason to recognize things which surpass reason. If so, it follows that you will not be a wholly earthbound thinker, ignorant of your very ignorance." 2 6 In the second he comes to his conclusion by saying: This is the answer we make perforce to those posers of puzzles. Perforce because Christian people find long-winded controversy disagreeable and one Adversary enough for them. Yet our attackers made it essential, since remedies too must be made for diseases, if they are to learn that their wisdom is not complete and that they are not invincible in their lavish attempts to nullify the Gospel. For when we abandon faith to take the power of reason as our shield, when we use philosophical enquiry to destroy the credibility of the Spirit, then reason gives way in the face of the vastness of realities. Give way it must, set going, as it is, by the frail organ of human understanding. What happens then? The frailty of our reasoning looks like a frailty in our creed. Thus it is that, as Paul too judges, smartness of argument is revealed as nullifying the Cross. Faith, in fact, is what gives fullness to our reasoning.27 Were a student to write a treatise on reason and faith in Gregory Nazianzen, these two paragraphs well might be employed alone and misleadingly as classical loci. Yet in context they are both revealing. In the Second Theological Oration Gregory insisted that his Eunomian opponents inquire about their ability to understand nature and themselves through their limited reason. Introducing examples from many sources, particularly ArisMichael Psellus and the two oldest manuscripts from the eleventh century, Palatin. Heidelberg Greek 281 and Mutin. Estens. Ill C 11, are anonymous. While reading through Heiberg's edition I found no contents which demand that the synopsis be attributed to Nazianzen. Some enterprising student of antiquity or Byzantium might be able to identify this interesting work. The case made in this paper is enhanced by the fact that some copyists and editors have seen similarities between the work of Nazianzen and this synopsis of Aristotelian logic. 26. Or. 28.28; PG 36, 65-68. Also see Or. 28.16-17; PG 36, 45-49. 27. Or. 29.21; PG 36, 101-104. Also see Or. 36.4; PG 36, 269.

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totle's On Animals, he pointed out instance after instance in which h u m a n reason is unable to penetrate to the core of the example. If the h u m a n mind is then incapable of grasping the essence of these lesser things, how can the Neo-Arians claim that they fully understand the nature of God? Faith ultimately must lead, but it leads in a relationship in which a humbled reason serves as a weaker partner, one aware of its own inability to grasp the nature of realities less complex than God. Knowing how difficult it is to find the way around Athens provides a greater appreciation of Jerusalem. By learning one's ignorance of earthly things, one can begin to learn of heavenly things. Faith is finally the forerunner, but at least for the most enlightened it moves ahead only after reason has gone as far as it can. T h i s interpretation appears sound when the statement in the Third Theological Oration also is put in context. From the first through the sixteenth section of that oration, Gregory has engaged in the most rigorous logical investigation found in his works. H i s dependence upon his Greek education in philosophical rhetoric, specifically in logic, is obvious. Yet it is precisely when, to his satisfaction, reason has demonstrated that the popular Eunomian opinions about the nature of God are filled with logical errors that the importance of faith becomes most clear. In Nazianzen's view, when our frail reason has destroyed an opponent's position and has seen its own limitations, then faith's bringing reason to fullness makes sense. T h e r e is no hint of belief on the basis of the unreasonable. But there is also no sense of giving reason full priority, nor of adopting large, interconnected theories of reality from Greek paideia to serve as overarching explanations or foundations of Christian faith. Therefore, however we might assess the contribution of the Theologian, we may not follow Ruether's conclusion that he neither knew nor acknowledged his debt to Greek paideia. Neither should we accept a claim that he did not recognize a positive relationship between reason and faith. T h e absence of a fully explicated rationale for the use of philosophy should not deceive us into thinking that none is operative. George Kennedy expresses his disappointment that Nazianzen did not leave behind a handbook concerning his understanding of rhetoric. 28 T h e r e is no treatise about his views of rhetoric, just as there is none devoted to an explanation of his use of philosophy. Yet it is Kennedy who in a recent work describes Gregory as "the most important figure in the synthesis of classical rhetoric and Christianity." Not only does he see Nazianzen's panegyric to Basil as "probably the greatest piece of Greek rhetoric since the death of Demosthenes"; Kennedy also insists that Nazianzen treated Greek culture "with respect, even reverence." In his view, four of the five Theological Orations "are philosophical disquisitions in which Gregory's theses are supported by syllogistic argument . . . and by rhetorical
28. George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient Modern Times (Chapel Hill, 1980), pp. 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 . to

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methods." In those four, "the basis of his premises are commonly accepted rational views, as would be the case of dialectic, rather than an appeal to authority." 29 Any student would appreciate from Nazianzen a fuller statement of how he viewed the relationship of Greek culture and Christian faith. At least we do not have a piece like that from Basil in which "despoiling the Egyptians" while misrepresenting their views appears to be the way selected for teaching Greek literature to Christian youth.30 Despite its deficiencies Gregory's position is clear. In terms of paideia, he stands in the line of philosophical rhetoricians described in Plato's Phaedrus and Aristotle's Rhetoric. He walks in the footsteps of those who took the problems of persuasion and logic seriously.31 Although it may not be proper to see him as the most profound of the Cappadociansan accolade usually awarded to Nyssathe recognition of his contributions by Christians in early centuries and by certain contemporary Christian traditions is not unworthy as sometimes thought. He followed the lead of Justin, Clement, and Origen who had criticized, praised, and thoughtfully used philosophy and anticipated some of the interest of Leontius of Byzantium in Aristotle, even though he did not formulate the faith positively in syllogisms to the extent that Didymus the Blind had done. Gregory's attractiveness is in his complexity and liveliness. He insisted that being a philosopher was not for everyone and that faith would be nothing if it were founded on wisdom, eloquence, and logical demonstration alone. Yet he praised Basil as a dialectician who demonstrated the "necessary syllogisms" of the faith and himself used philosophy both by showing how non-Christians took positions similar and dissimilar to that of Christians and by defending the faith through logical demonstration. He is certainly not always consistent. In his vitriolic invective against Julian he criticized Anaxarchus, Epictetus, and Socrates as being poor examples of the highest moral character, since their decisions were made more from compulsion than from choice. When he wrote Philagrius, however, he urged him to study these three carefully, since the nobility of their moral choices is similar to that of biblical heroes and indeed quite admirable. In spite of such difficulties and contradictions, his position about philosophy and its relationship to theology is rather clear. He not only warned about the thorns; he thoroughly enjoyed the roses.32
29. George Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors, History of Rhetoric 3 (Princeton, 1983), pp. 215-239. 30. For a scathing criticism of Basil's approach, see Ernest Fortin, "Hellenism and Christianity in Basil the Great's Address Ad Adulescentes," in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought, pp. 189-204. His quotation of passages from Nazianzen's Ep. 58.11-12 indicates that some of the opinions which he abhors in Basil are to be found in Gregory. 31. William Grimaldi, Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric, Hermes Einzelschriften 25 (Wiesbaden, 1972), brilliantly describes the Aristotelian basis of philosophical rhetoric. For a concise, definitive discussion of "philosophical rhetoric" see Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, chap. 4. 32. Or. 27.3; PG 36, 13-16. Or. 32.26; PG 36, 204. Or. 43.23 and 68; PG 36, 525-528 and 586-588. Or. 4.70; PG 35, 592. Ep. 32; PG 37, 69.

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