Case Digest on Maruhom v. COMELEC G.R. NO.

139397 FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Because of several irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as the winner. Petitioner filed a case with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation, but later withdrew it. He also filed an election protest with the RTC. Petitioner orally moved for dismissal of the protest, but it was denied. The court ordered the Revision Committee to convene and start the revision of the ballots. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition. HELD: The SC held that the summary dismissal of petitioners Motion to Dismiss was not a grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings as evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the revision ballots. Also, a motion to dismiss is not a prohibited pleading in an election contest filed before the regular courts. PERALTA vs. COMELEC 82 SCRA 30 Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.