NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL DIGEST

Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295 (2012)

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR: KIMBERLY BUTLER RAINEN I. Procedural History

At trial, the judge rejected the defendants non-discriminatory reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against the only African-American juror in a first degree murder trial where race would be at issue. The trial judge also issued a jury instruction that limited prior inconsistent statements of a witness to the evaluationof the witnesss credibility, and not for the statements truth. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) deferred to the trial judges determinations on these two issues.1 II. Facts On August 7, 2004, the defendant, Daniel J. Prunty, confronted Jason Wells about items that were missing from his home after a party Wells attended at the defendants house the previous evening. An altercation took place at the defendants home involving Wells and other party attendees over the missing property. The defendant, a white male in his 20s, retrieved a rifle from his bedroom, pointed it at Wells, and threatened that if he did not return his property he would shoot him. The defendant used racially discriminatory statements in addressing Wells, an AfricanAmerican, during this altercation. After Wells admitted to taking the stolen items and attempted to reach the persons he believed possessed the items, the defendant again aimed the rifle at Wellss head and fatally shot him.2 A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and attempted extortion.3 During jury empanelment, defense counsel posed a peremptory

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Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 313-314, 318 (2012). Id. at 296-297. 3 Id.

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challenge to Juror 16, the last juror to be empanelled. The prosecution objected to the challenge because juror was the only potential AfricanAmerican juror on the panel. When asked for justification for the challenge, defense counsel argued that the juror was likely to be prejudiced because the juror was a school teacher and because there was evidence of young people in their twenties using drugs. The judge found that the proffered reason for [the] challenge [was] not bona fide, but rather [was] a mere sham because two jurors were retired teachers and three other jurors had minor children.4 During trial, Rebecca Pape testified that the statement she gave to the grand jury, which was being used on cross examination to impeach her credibility, had been perjury. Pape initially testified to the grand jury that she and the defendant were in the bathroom together when Wells shot himself in the head. She later admitted to lying for the defendant, testifying that she witnessed the defendant shoot Wells in the head. At trial, the judge gave a jury instruction limiting the use of Papes prior inconsistent statements to assessing her credibility and not for their truth.5 The defendant appealed arguing that the limiting instruction was reversible error as the limiting instruction hindered his ability to rebut the Commonwealths case by excluding valuable exculpatory evidence from the jurys consideration.6 III. Issues Presented 1. Whether the trial court judge erred in rejecting the defendants peremptory challenge against the only potential African-American juror on a jury panel that was required to consider issues of defendants racism against the African-American victim at trial. 2. Whether the jury instructions, which limited the jury to using the witnesss prior inconsistent statements to solely assess the witnesss credibility, were proper. IV. Holdings and Reasoning Peremptory challenges are not absolutethe basis for a challenge cannot be discriminatory. In deciding whether a challenge is discriminatory, a judge has not abused his discretion unless juror prejudice is manifest.7 Therefore, appellate judges give great deference to the decisions of trial court judges on preemptory challenges. In this case, however, the prosecution successfully rebutted the presumption that the

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Id. at 309-310. Id. at 303 n.10. 6 Id. at 296, 317. 7 Prunty, 462 Mass. at 304, citing Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 443 (2001).

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defendants peremptory challenge was proper by showing that the juror was the only African-American to be empanelled. Moreover, the trial court judge was entitled to reject the defendants proffered nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenge that the jurors occupation as a teacher would make it difficult for the juror to be impartial. Thus, the SJC concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and sufficiently discharged his responsibility to consider the adequacy and genuineness of the defendants proffered explanation.8 Lastly, the SJC concluded that the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the defendants argument that the African-American juror could not be impartial because he had experienced racism. Without some evidence of the jurors inability to be impartial, the fact that the juror had experienced racism is an illegitimate and impermissible race-based argument for a peremptory strike.9 Additionally, the SJC concluded that the jury instruction that limited the use of the witnesss prior inconsistent statements solely to assessing the witnesss credibility did not give rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice because: (1) there was overwhelming evidence of defendants guilt, (2) the instruction did not affect the defendants ability to rebut the Commonwealths case,10 and (3) the jury did not need to believe the truth of the witnesss statements to acquit the defendant.11

Id. at 306-307, 311. Id. at 313-14. 10 Id. at 316-17. 11 Id. at 317, citing Commonwealth v. Laguer, 448 Mass. 585, 598 n. 30 (2007) (finding that to succeed on motion for new trial the defendant must establish that there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence would have made a difference in the jury's verdict).
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