Domestic Tribunals is somewhat similar to the administrative tribunals. They are associated with many professions and trades.

It is another area in which persons or groups of persons or other public agencies exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions over others. Generally, these are disciplinary committees concerned with the regulation of certain professions and trades, some having been set up by statute (e.g. the disciplinary committee of the Law Society) and others merely by contract between members and the association concerned (e.g. the disciplinary committee of a trade union). Examples of these tribunals regulating professions are what might be referred to as the Disciplinary Committees of the Law Society, the Professional Standards Committee of the ICAEW and the Inns of Court etc. With reference to regulation of the Investment Industry and the City of London, there is the Financial Services Authority operating under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, together with recognised Investment exchanges, e.g. the London Stock Exchange. Domestic Tribunals are not public authorities but private associations based on contracts. As a result, the courts cannot control the decisions these tribunals make by the process of judicial review, leading to an issue of mandatory order, a prohibiting order or a quashing order (Law v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd (1983) (3 All ER 300) where it was concluded It is unnecessary for purposes of this appeal to decide

whether decisions of the Jockey Club may ever in any circumstances be challenged by judicial review and I do not do so. Cases where the applicant or plaintiff has no contract on which to rely may raise different considerations and the existence or non-existence of alternative remedies may then be material. I think it better that this court should defer detailed consideration of such a case until it arises. I am, however, satisfied that on the facts of this case the appeal should be dismissed. A tribunal by contract suggests if a person joins a Chartered Institute, he agrees to be bound by its Charter and Bye-Laws including provisions which may in certain circumstances result in disciplinary action against him. The precise circumstances in which a person may be disciplined and the procedure to be followed are laid down by the statute, charter or other relevant document but certain general principles usually apply. For example, if a body operating under a Royal Charter proposed to take action against one of its members for unprofessional conduct, the Charter would usually provide that: a special meeting of the disciplinary committee is called to hear the complaint; the accused is given reasonable opportunity for himself / representative to attend; he has the right to call witnesses and cross examine witnesses called against him; if found guilty, the right to appeal. The Charter also provides what penalties may be imposed for example, a reprimand or suspension or expulsion from membership. In the case of

bodies established by statute, there may be provision for an appeal from the disciplinary body to the ordinary courts. At one time, members were bound by the rules of these tribunals no matter how unreasonable or unfairly they might operate. For example, if the rules allowed for expulsion there was no remedy against this even though a person so expelled might be unable to work if he was not a member of the association. The breakthrough came in the decision of the Court of Appeal, in Lee v Showmens Guild of Great Britain (1952), which brought domestic tribunals under the control of the courts. Since then, courts have intervened to see that the rules of these associations are correctly interpreted and that the principles of natural justice are observed. A jurisdiction has been developed to redress wrongful expulsion; wrongful refusal to admit to member-ship; refusal to admit women and restrictive activities in terms of what members can do. In Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson (1968), the House of Lords decided that the Society could not by its rules restrict chemists in terms of what they sold in their shops. In R v Panel on Take-overs, ex parte Datafin plc (1987), the Court of Appeal decided that having regard to the public consequences of non-compliance with the code, e.g. that a bid by one company for another could be declared invalid if the procedures of the code were infringed, application for judicial review of Panel decisions would be available in an appropriate case. This represents a considerable extension of the law to allow

judicial review of domestic bodies where their decisions have effect upon the nonmember public. It is doubtful whether the Datafin decision could be extended to purely domestic tribunals, (proceedings affect members only), and not to any significant effect the public (non-members). The decision was distinguished in R (application of Sunspell

Ltd) v Association of British Travel Agents (2000). The High Court ruled that unlike the
Panel, the government did not seek to regulate the travel industry through ABTA. The power ABTA possessed arose entirely from the truly voluntary submission of its members to its authority. It was not a public or governmental body in its nature. Like administrative tribunals, all domestic tribunals are governed by the ultra vires doctrine, and an aggrieved person may appeal to the ordinary courts on the grounds that the tribunal acted ultra vires or has not observed the principles of natural justice. If the court is satisfied that the allegation is well-founded, it can grant an injunction to prevent the tribunal from implementing the decision which it has made or give a declaratory judgment indicating the legal position of the parties.