Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-4656 November 18, 1912 RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants. Gaspar de Bartolome, in his own behalf. B. Gimenez Zoboli, for appellees. TORRES, J.: This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs. Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of whom, absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and jewelry already divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution of her will, and left at her death the real properties which, with their respective cash values, are as follows: 1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated on Escolta Street, Vigan, and valued at 2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No. 88 Washington Street, Vigan; valued at 3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan; valued at 5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at Total P6,000.00 1,500.00 100.00 60.00 86.00 150.00 7,896.00

That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that, notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and to deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkept

promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be rendered by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisal, of the undivided property specified, which one-half amounted approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be vested with the full and absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-half of the properties in question, as universal testamentary heir thereof together with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and damages, and to pay the costs. Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother Manuel, their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the said properties; and stated that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's mother was Felin, and not Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be Felin, and likewise paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal property and the jewelry, since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry was in the possession of the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a bridle curb and a watch charm consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and bearing the initials M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins, four small gold buttons, two finger rings, another with the initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that the defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in conformity with their petitions, one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948. In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to divide the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of the same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in 1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission; that, between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle Washington,La Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which been destroyed by an earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on the part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to August 1, 1905, including the rent from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters, the plaintiff and the defendant, would make the latter's share P1,299.08; that, as shown by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a statement in settlements of accounts, and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the sum of P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided property claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration of the percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing to pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting therefrom the amount found to be owing them by the plaintiffs, and asked that judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from the latter that amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit. The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations contained in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs were obliged to pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed him by law; that, as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more than P3,654.15 and the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of

the difference between the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and asked that judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from the plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904, the date when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums to which the defendant Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided properties in question. By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission to amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with the assessed value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by substituting the following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the judgment by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of the undivided properties described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by the expert appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between these two appointees such value shall be determined by a third expert appraiser appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at public auction; or, in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties; furthermore, it is prayed that the plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for losses and damages, and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the defendants, the said amendment was admitted by the court and counsel for the defendants were allowed to a period of three days within which to present a new answer. An exception was taken to this ruling. The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed between themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question, there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order of December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta, the lot on which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the inclosed land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and that the defendants were likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Candon. After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8, 1906, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to the complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310, and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each party had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indivisoproperties; that, therefore, the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount which the plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs, the former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a close, would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase and sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties alloted to the defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a renouncement of the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination of the pro indiviso status of the property. The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by

counsel for the defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied, exception whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and the same was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript of the evidence. Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her will by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings were had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division between them of the said hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized and approved in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed from. The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in addition to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta, Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08, demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a percentage claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the amendment be held to have been improperly admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their written motion of August 21, 1905, against the opposition of the defendants, through which admission the latter were obliged to pay the former P910.50.lawphil.net Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to the plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta house, which was pro indivisoproperty of joint ownership. By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been decided which was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and damages, wherein are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the upper story of the said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome. Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court, between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had it been rented to a stranger. Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their rights. Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs. Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises, together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last

named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the properties of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta onehalf of the rents which might have been derived from the upper of the story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of the property. Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan. With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs, was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully rebutted, was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by the defendants, for the rents collected by them were not sufficient for the termination of all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and to replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in question, when it was in a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the amount expanded in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction was worth P9,000, according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by the defendants for the payment to them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the amount of one-half of the rents which should have been collected for the use of the quarters occupied by the justice of the peace, the payment of which is incumbent upon the husband of the defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants. The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of the counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, inasmuch as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to

pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any such amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay as reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until final disposal of the case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the debtor be deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in connection with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial decision from what date the interest will be due on the principal concerned in the suit. This rule has been established by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code, reference on April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901. With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the defendant Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership, inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he administered the said pro indivisoproperty, one-half of which belonged to his wife who held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered while acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and preserve the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in exchange for the trouble occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned, without payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have produced had they been leased to another person. With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts, without success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason for holding that the said gift was not made. As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as determined by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of the property, and this being appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint ownership. These two experts took part in the latter proceedings of the suit until finally, and during the course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of the pro indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the disagreement between and nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now to claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the difference between the assessed value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for the reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to the benefit of both parties. In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment appealed from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented by the defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of the sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the

defendants as a balance of the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed by the latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the defendant Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of the quarters on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace court of Vigan; and we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents which could have been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal interest from December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of the pro indivisoproperty belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the sum of P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation and the price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be made of jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding is made regarding the costs of both instances. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009 NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO,Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the May 12, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43085 and the December 1, 2004 Resolution2 denying reconsideration of the challenged decision. The pertinent facts and proceedings follow. In 1974, petitioners3 filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of First Instance (now, Regional Trial Court [RTC]) of Maasin, Southern Leyte against respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-1949. The property subject of the case was a parcel of coconut land in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, declared under Tax Declaration No. 3587 in the name of petitioner Nieves with an area of 2.6360 hectares. 4 In their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages.5 Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners allegation of ownership and possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas. 6 Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land. Based on the testimonies of petitioners witnesses, the property passed on from Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her siblingsJose, Victor and Victoria.7 After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners Jose, Victor and Victoria. In its April 19, 1993 Order,8 the trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without prejudice, thus: This Court, much as it wants to decide the instant case on the merits, being one of the old inherited cases left behind, finds difficulty if not impossibility of doing so at this stage of the proceedings when both parties have already rested their cases. Reluctantly, it agrees with the defendants in the observation that some important indispensable consideration is conspicuously wanting or missing. It is not the Courts wish to turn its back on the crucial part of the case, which is the pronouncement of the judgment to settle the issues raised in the pleadings of the parties once and for all, after all the time, effort and expense spent in going through the trial process. But, rules are rules. They have to be followed, to arrive at a fair and just verdict. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: "x x x Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants." What the Court wants to say here is that the instant case should have been dismissed without prejudice a long time ago for lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final determination of the case. Not impleading them, any judgment would have no effectiveness. They are that indispensable that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the Court cannot proceed without their presence. There are abundant authorities in this regard. Thus

"The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that when it appears of record that there are other persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either plaintiffs or defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). x x x Where the petition failed to join as party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should be dismissed. x x x When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. (People, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. Nos. L14059-62, September 30, 1959) (sic) "Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court). The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff. (39 Amjur [sic] 885). The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, 38 Phil. 177, 178). "An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without inquiring or affecting such interest; a party who has not only an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. (67 C.J.S. 892). Indispensable parties are those without whom no action can be finally determined." (Sanidad v. Cabataje, 5 Phil. 204) WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, both the complaint and the counterclaim in the instant case are ordered DISMISSED without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.9 Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In the challenged May 12, 2004 Decision, 10 the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further, declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action.11 With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1, 2004 Resolution,12 petitioners filed the instant petition. The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for disposition on the merits. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment.1avvphi1.zw+ The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.13 With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions. Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.14 Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is coowned by Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latters behalf.15Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith. 16 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate proceedings. The trial court is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH DISPATCH. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice WE CONCUR: G.R. No. 171571 March 24, 2008 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO, namely: TEODORO SORONO, LUCIO SORONO, JR., ARSENIO T. SORONO, RODULFO S. OLIVAR, ALFONSA T. SORONO, CONSTANCIO S. LUMONGSOD, EULALIA S. LIMPANGOG, and FLORENCIA S. BAGUIO; HEIRS OF JUAN L. AMISTOSO,1 namely: MARIO L. AMISTOSO, LYN-LYN AMISTOSO, ALLAN L. AMISTOSO, RAQUEL S. AMISTOSO, EUFRONIO S. AMISTOSO, JR., and ROGELIO S. AMISTOSO; HEIRS OF BRIGILDA D. AMISTOSO, namely: VICTOR A. YAGONG, HEDELIZA A. YAGONG, and CIRIACA A. YAGONG; HEIRS OF PASTOR DIGNOS; HEIRS OF ISABEL DIGNOS, namely: DR. NAPOLEON A. AMORES, VICENTE A. BASMAYOR, DOMINGO A. BASMAYOR, and LYDIA A. BASMAYOR; HEIRS OF DONATA DIGNOS, namely: TRINIDAD D. FUENTES, NICASIA D. FUENTES, and IRINEO D. FUENTES; HEIRS OF SEGUNDA DIGNOS, namely: HONORATA D. CORTES and BENIGNO D. CORTES; HEIRS OF GREGORIA DIGNOS, namely: RITA D. FUENTES and JOSE D. FUENTES; HEIRS OF DOMINGO FUENTES, namely: CIRILA P. DIGNOS and BASILIO P. DIGNOS; and HEIR OF ISABELO DIGNOS, namely: TERESITA R. DIGNOS,2 Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Assailed via petition for review on certiorari is the April 23, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals3 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54.4 Lot Nos. 2296 and 2316 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon, Lapu-lapu City were adjudicated on December 7, 1929 by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in four equal shares: a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono share in the two lots;

b) c)

Tito Dignos, married to Candida Torrebillas share in the two lots; Isabel Dignos, married to Fabiano Amores; Donata Dignos, married to Estanislao Fuentes; Segunda Dignos, married to Demetrio Cortes; Gregoria Dignos, married to Severo Fuentes; Domingo Dignos, married to Venturada Potot; and Isabelo Dignos, married to Petronilla Gamallo share in the two lots; and Silveria Amistuoso, married to Melecio Tumulak; Mario Amistuoso, married to Rufina Tampus; Juan Amistuoso, married to Narcisa Cosef; Brigilda Amistuoso, married to Casimiro Yagong; and Pastor Amistuoso, widower share in the two lots.5

d)

It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees. It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who, as reflected above, was awarded share in the two lots, sold for P2,565.59 the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on October 11, 1957, without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two lots.6 In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), erected a security fence traversing Lot No. 2316 and relocated a number of families, who had built their dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security in line with the standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Federal Aviation Authority. MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of Tax Declaration No. 00548 covering Lot No. 2296 and Tax Declaration No. 00568 covering Lot No. 2316. Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the lots but the same was ignored.1avvphi1 Respondents thereupon filed on January 8, 1996 a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City,7 alleging that the existence of the tax declarations "would cast a cloud on their valid and existing titles" to the lots. They alleged that "corresponding original certificates of title in favor of the decreed owners were . . . issued but the same could no longer be found and located, and in all probability, were lost during the Second World War."8 (This claim was not specifically denied by petitioner in its Answer with Counterclaim.)9 Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them any written notice of its acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos. Respondents thus prayed as follows: 1) Upon the filing of this complaint, that a restraining order be issued enjoining the defendant and any of its officers, agents, employees, and any third person acting on their behest, to desist from occupying their portions of Lots 2296 and 2316, Opon Cadastre, and upon due notice and hearing, to issue the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction for the same purpose; 2) To declare the tax declarations of the defendant or any of its predecessors-in-interests covering Lots 2296 and 2316, Opon Cadastre, to be null and void: 3) To grant unto the plaintiffs the right of preemption in the sale of the one-fourth share of Tito Dignos in the above-mentioned parcels of land under the provisions of Articles 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code; 4) To order the defendant to reimburse plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 acceptance fee, the sums ofP1,000.00 per appearance fee, the sum of P10,000.00 for costs of litigation;

5) To order the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages. Plaintiffs further pray for such orders as may be just and equitable under the premises.10 (Underscoring supplied) Republic of the Philippines, represented by the MCIAA (hereafter petitioner), in its Answer with Counterclaim,11maintained that from the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value; and assuming arguendo that it did not have just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years, acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. At all events, petitioner contended that respondents action was barred by estoppel and laches. The trial court found for respondents. It held that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were in peaceful and continuous possession of their shares in the lots, and were disturbed of such possession only in 1996 when petitioner put up the security fence that traversed Lot No. 2316 and relocated families that had built their houses within the airport perimeter to a portion of said lot. On petitioners claim that it had acquired ownership by extraordinary prescription, the trial court brushed it aside on the ground that registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Neither, held the trial court, had respondents action prescribed, as actions for quieting of title cannot prescribe if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property in question, as in the case of herein respondents. On petitioners defense of laches, the trial court also brushed the same aside in light of its finding that respondents, who have long been in possession of the lots, came to know of the sale only in 1996. The trial court added that respondents could not be charged with constructive notice of the 1957 Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the lots to CAA as it was erroneously registered under Act No. 3344,12 the law governing recording of instruments or deeds relating to real estate which are not registered under the Torrens system. The subject lots being registered, the trial court found, the registration of the deed should have been made under Act No. 496, 13the applicable law in 1957. In fine, the trial court held that the registration of the deed under Act No. 3344 did not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.14 Concluding, the trial court held that the questioned sale was valid only with respect to Tito Dignos share of the lots, and that the sale thereof was subject to the right of legal redemption by respondents following Article 1088 of the Civil Code, reading: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before partition, any or all of the coheirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. In light of its finding that the heirs of Tito Dignos did not give notice of the sale to respondents, the trial court held that the period for legal redemption had not yet lapsed; and the redemption price should be of the purchase price paid by the CAA for the two lots. The trial court thus disposed: WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the Court rules in favor of plaintiffs and hence renders judgment: a) Declaring Tax Declarations Nos. 00915 and 00935, as well as all other tax declarations covering Lot 2296 and Lot 2316 under the names of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the Bureau of Air Transportation and the defendant Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority, as null and void and directing the City Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City to cancel them; b) Declaring the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale affecting Lot 2296 and Lot 2316 (Exhibit "H" for plaintiffs) as void and ineffective as regards the three-fourth[s] (3/4) shares of plaintiffs in both lots and declaring the herein plaintiffs as owners of such three fourth[s] shares and;

c) Ordering the defendant to resell to plaintiffs for a total price of Six Hundred forty Pesos (P640.00) the one-fourth (1/4) shares in Lot 2296 and Lot 2316 it had purchased from the heirs of the late Tito Dignos in 1957; No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 15 As priorly stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which proffers the following GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION WHEN RESPONDENTS NO LONGER HAVE ANY RIGHT TO RECOVER LOTS 2296 AND 2316 DUE TO THE PRIOR SALE THEREOF TO THE REPUBLIC AND UPON THE EQUITABLE GROUNDS OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES.16 The petition fails. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA: As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)]. From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots. Petitioners insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie. The trial courts discrediting thereof is well taken. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs in 1957, the following material portions thereof validate the claim of respondents that the two lots were registered: xxxx 4. That since the Original Transfer Certificate of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies has/have been lost and/or destroyed, or since the said lot/s is/are covered by Cadastral Case No. 19, and a decree issued on March 19, 1930, bearing Decree No./s 474824 & 474825, and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute said title/s at its own expense and that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law[.]18 xxxx The trial courts discrediting of petitioners invocation of laches and prescription of action is welltaken too. As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the prevailing market value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, "(1) they received just compensation for the

property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2) the property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several hundreds of millions of pesos,"19 the law is not on its side. Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides: Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots. As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify respondents about the sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus: That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake and agree to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein sold against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to petitioners right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest. WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. SO ORDERED.

IRSO D. MONTEROSO, - versus -

G.R. No. 105608 Petitioner, Present:

The Facts It is not unusual. Acrimonious litigation between and among siblings and immediate relatives over inheritance does occur. It is unfortunate when the decedent had, while still alive, taken steps to precisely avoid a bruising squabble over inheritance. In a sense, Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, started it all. During his lifetime, Don Fabian married twice and sired eight children, four from each union. In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this marriage were born Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso passed away. A little over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia Pendejito. From this union were born Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr. After the death of his first wife, but during the early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Agusan an intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife, Soledad D. Monteroso, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 309, apparently to obviate any dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage. Subsequently, the CFI receivedand later approved per an Orden[3] (Order) dated March 11, 1936a Proyecto de Particion[4] (Project of Partition) dated February 21, 1935. The partition in SP No. 309 covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5, while the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5. The intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was partitioned and distributed to her four children in equal shares. Subsequently, a Mocion[5] (Motion) was filed for the delivery to Soledad D. Monterosos four children, her legal heirs, their respective shares in her intestate estate, as adjudicated among them under the duly CFI-approved Project of Partition. In the meantime, the children of Don Fabian from his first marriage married accordingly: The eldest, Soledad to Atty. Perfecto Cagampang, Sr.; Reygula to Jose Bayan; Benjamin to Mauricia Nakila; and Tirso to Melecia Taa. Benjamin died on February 1, 1947 leaving behind four children with wife Nakila, namely: Ruby, Marlene, Adelita, and Henrieto. A year and a half later, or on October 26, 1948, Don Fabian also passed away. Before and shortly after Don Fabians demise, conveyances involving certain of parcels thus mentioned were purportedly made. The following is an illustration of the lineal relation of the parties or the family tree of the direct descendants of Don Fabian from his two marriages: This brings us to the objects of the squabble: the conjugal patrimonies of Don Fabian from his two successive marriages. During the lifetime of Don Fabian, the following properties were acquired, viz: PARCEL F-ONE A parcel of coconut plantation on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan described as follows: North by the property of Telesforo Ago and Gregorio Cupay; East by Miguel Y Climaco Cabonce, Isidro Maamo and Buenaventura Sandigan and Pandanon River, and West by Gregorio Axamin,

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, COURT OF APPEALS, SOLEDAD TINGA, MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, VELASCO, JR., and REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, BRION, JJ. PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR., SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, HEIRS OF FABIAN MONTEROSO, JR., REYNATO MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, ADELITA MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and HENRIETO MONTEROSO, Respondents. x-----------------------------------------------x SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE G.R. No. 113199 MONTEROSO, SOLEDAD MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR., REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, HENRIETO MONTEROSO, ADELITA MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and REYNATO MONTEROSO, Petitioners, - versus COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO Promulgated: D. MONTEROSO, Respondents. April 30, 2008 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case Before us are two petitions for review under Rule 45, the first docketed as G.R. No. 105608, and the second docketed as G.R. No. 113199, both assailing the Decision[1]dated March 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 which modified the June 9, 1987 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Butuan City in Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332.

10

Alex Fores and Ventura Sandigan with a superficial extension of 10 has. 62 ares and 42 centares. PARCEL F-TWO A parcel of coconut land situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 6 hectares, 50 ares bearing Tax No. 14801 of the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, x x x. PARCEL F-THREE A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 17167 situated on sitio Calibunan, Cabadbaran, Agusan with superficial extension of 8 hectares and 34 centares x x x. PARCEL F-FOUR A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 14600 situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 27 hectares, 96 ares and 28 centares x x x. PARCEL F-FIVE A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 18477 situated within the Poblacion of the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a house of strong materials found on the same lot with a superficial extension of 660 square meters x x x. PARCEL F-SIX A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 5374 situated within the Poblacion of the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 3,890 square meters x x x. PARCEL F-SEVEN A parcel of coconut and corn land under Tax No. 1769 situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 8 hectares x x x. PARCEL F-EIGHT A parcel of coconut land situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, under Tax No. 2944, with a superficial extension of 7 hectares, 59 ares and 96 centares x x x.[6] PARCEL S-ONE A parcel of land situated at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax Dec. No. 5396 with an area of 24 hectares more or less x x x. PARCEL S-TWO A parcel of coconut land situated at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No. 69 with an area of 24 hectares more or less x x x.

PARCEL S-THREE A parcel of coconut land situated at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan, under Tax No. 21639 with an area of 1.4080 hectares more or less x x x. PARCEL S-FOUR A parcel of land situated at Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No. 3367 with an area of 1,000 sq. m. bounded x x x.[7] The F designation signified that the covered properties were acquired during the first marriage, to distinguish them from those acquired during the second marriage which are designated as S properties. On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, namely: Ruby Monteroso, Marlene M. Pospos, Henrieto Monteroso, and Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel, filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D. Monteroso. Docketed as Civil Case No. 1292, and later raffled to Branch 4 of the court, the complaint involved a portion of Parcel F-4, described in the Project of Partition, as follows: (1) One parcel of coconut land with the improvements thereon existing, Tax No. 14600 with a superficial extension of 6 hectares, 99 ares and 32 centares, bounded as follows: on the North, Regula Monteroso; on the East by the Provincial Road Butuan-Cabadbaran; on the Sourth Tirso Monteroso and on the West Diego Calo.[8] As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with the above-described one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father per SP No. 309. However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age. Tirso countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share in said property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her. On April 14, 1970, Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with Receivership docketed as Civil Case No. 1332, involving 12 parcels of land (i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-8 and Parcels S-1 to S-4, mentioned above) against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and halfsiblings and/or their representatives. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was subsequently amended to include Perfecto, as co-defendant, and Pendejito, as guardian ad litem for the minor children of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr., who died in 1970 after the filing of the complaint. In Civil Case No. 1332, Tirso, inter alia, alleged the following: (1) the aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian; (2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for the reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth share or legitime over the said three parcels of land; and (3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired

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during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso. Answering, the defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 contended that Don Fabian acquired Parcel F-6 during the second marriage, while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were Don Fabians exclusive properties having been acquired through a donation from the heirs of one Benito Tinosa. They further maintained the validity of the judicial partition under SP No. 309 which operates as res judicata insofar as Parcels F-1 to F-5 are concerned. In particular, they asserted that Parcels F-1, F2, F-3, and one-half of F-5 were adjudicated to Don Fabian as his share in the conjugal partnership of the first marriage, while Parcel F-4 and the other half of Parcel F-5 were equally divided among the four children of the first marriage; that during his lifetime, Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang; that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso D. Monteroso, and Mauricia Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso donated Parcel F-6 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as Parcel S-1 was acquired by her through a homestead patent, Parcel S-2 through adverse possession, and Parcels S-3 and S-4 by purchase. The Initial Ruling of the RTC Involving practically the same properties and parties, Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332 were consolidated and jointly heard. After a long drawn-out trial spanning almost 15 years, with six different judges successively hearing the case, the RTC, presided by Judge Miguel Rallos, rendered on July 22, 1985 a Decision,[9] dismissing Civil Case No. 1292 on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, but finding, in Civil Case No. 1332, for Tirso. What appears to be a victory for Tirso was, however, short-lived. Acting on four separate motions for reconsideration duly filed by the various defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, a new judge, who took over the case from Judge Rallos who inhibited himself from the case, rendered a new decision. The Subsequent Ruling of the RTC Dated June 9, 1987, the new Decision set aside the July 22, 1985 RTC Decision of Judge Rallos and gave due course to both Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332. In full, thefallo of the new decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, both complaints in Civil Cases No. 1292 and 1332 are hereby given due course and judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Declaring, confirming and ordering that Lot 380, Pls-736 located at Pandanon, Cabadbaran, belongs to the children of first marriage and partitioned as per subdivision survey map made by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Libarios, Exh. 7, page 72 of the records as follows: (a.) Lot 380-A, Share of Soledad Monteroso Cagampang with an area of 5.3376 hectares, with technical description therein;

(c.)

Lot 380-C, Share of the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso with an area of 5.3376 hectares with technical description therein; Lot 380-D, Share of Tirso D. Monteroso with an area of 5.3376 hectares and Lot 351, Pls-736 with an area of 6,099 sq. meters, with both technical description therein;

(d.)

2. It is hereby ordered that Tirso D. Monteroso must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 3.7815 hectares being portion of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 indicated in the subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records, Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2, Exh. V, to the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso who are absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, the total sum of Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Four and 70/100 (P260,844.70) Pesos with interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the present and until fully paid; 3. It is hereby ordered that Reygula Monteroso Bayan must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 1.6128 hectares which is part of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated in the subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. V, to the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso who are the absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983 the total sum of One Hundred Six Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty and 40/100 (P106,960.40) Pesos with interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the present and until fully paid; 4. It is hereby ordered that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 1.0929 hectares being portion of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated in the subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. V, to her sister Reygula Monteroso Bayan who is the absolute owner of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Reygula Monteroso Bayan the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, the total sum of Seventy Seven Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Five and 96/100 (P77,625.96) Pesos with interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the present and until fully paid, subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if any, was ever received by Reygula M. Bayan. 5. The three alleged Absolute Sale, Exh. C, D and E with all its submarkings are declared fictitious, simulated and no consideration. It can never be considered a donation because aside from being inofficious and impairing the legitime of other heirs, the vendee had not signed therein which could be considered acceptance and above all, these documents were prepared and acknowledged by Notary Public squarely disqualified and highly prohibited. Therefore, all are declared null and void and of no legal effect.

(b.)

Lot 380-B, Share of Reygula Monteroso Bayan with an area of 5.3376 hectares, with technical description therein;

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So, parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-6, F-7 and F-8 [remain] as part of the intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. 6. The Register of Deeds and the Provincial Assessor, both in the Province of Agusan del Norte are hereby ordered to cancel as the same are cancelled and nullified, all transfer of certificates and tax declarations now in the name of Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. which parcels of land originally were registered and declared in the name of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., and to register and declare again in the name of Heirs of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., more particularly the following: (a.) [TCT No. RT-203] (420) for Lot 432, Cad. 121, with an area of 10.0242 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-018-0224, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-05050 known as Parcel F-1; TCT No. RT-205 (424) for Lot 100, Cad. 121, with an area of 1.9083 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0488, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-08002 known as F-2; TCT No. RT-204 (423) for Lot 103, Cad. 121, with an area of 2.8438 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 02-019-0335, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-08-017 known as F-2; Parcel of coconut land located at Poblacion, Cabadbaran, known as F-3 with area of 6.3100 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-001-1810, Series of 1980 and PIN-02-001-30-027; Residential Lot, known as F-5 located at Poblacion, Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No. 18447 then under Tax Dec. No. 1922, containing an area of 660 sq. meters bounded on the North by Washington Street; on the East by Progresso Street; on the South by Rizal Street; and on the West by Ramon Cabrera. Residential Lot known as F-6 located at Poblacion under Tax Dec. No. 5374, Series of 1949 and Tax Dec. No. 499, Series of 1954, consisting of 3,890 sq. meters bounded as follows: North Andres Atega South Rill East Luis Jamboy now Celestino Udarbe, Sixto Ferrer and New Road West Atega Street; (g.) Coconut land known as F-7, located at Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte under Tax Dec. No. (h.)

1769, Series of 1955 and Tax Dec. No. 10-030273, Series of 1980 with an area of [8.000] hectares; Parcel of coconut land known as F-8, located at Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte with an area of 7.5996 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 2944 and Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273, Series of 1980; Parcel of S-1, located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No. 11506, Series of 1963 with an area of 24 hectares in the name of Sofia Vda. de Monteroso; Parcel of S-2, located at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 1888, Series of 1948, Tax Dec. No. 669, Series of 1952, and subsequently transferred in fraud of other heirs, in the name of Florenda P. Monteroso under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974, Tax Dec. No. 02-0060047, Series of 1980; Parcel of S-3, located at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 5373, Series of 1949 with an area of 1.4080 hectares and bounded as follows: North Pandanon River South Crisanto Dolleroso East Pandanon River West Pandanon River and Peregrino Aznar; (l.) Parcel S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 3367 with an area of 1.6500 hectares and bounded as follows: North Hrs. of G. Corvera South C. Vda. de Alburo East Ellodoro Delleroso West A. Ventura 7. It is hereby declared that upon the death of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. on March 26, 1948, the following are the properties belonging to his intestate estate: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) Whole parcel Lot 432, F-1; Whole parcels Lot 100 and 103, F-2; Whole parcel cocoland, Calibunan, F-3; One-half (1/2) parcel F-5; One-half (1/2) parcel F-6; One-half (1/2) parcel F-7;

(i.)

(j.)

(b.)

(c.)

(k.)

(d.)

(e.)

(f.)

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(g.) (h.) (i.) (j.) (k.)

One-half (1/2) parcel F-8; One-half (1/2) parcel S-1; One-half (1/2) parcel S-2; One-half (1/2) parcel S-3; One-half (1/2) parcel S-4.

The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subjected to deduction of whatever amount any heir may have received by way of cash advances. The net amount shall be subjected to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present or until fully paid. 10. Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. being in possession and enjoying the fruits and income of Parcel F-3, are hereby ordered to pay to the following heirs, the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P49,727.35 To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P49,727.35 To Tirso D. Monteroso P49,727.35 To Florenda P. Monteroso P49,727.35 To Reynato P. Monteroso P49,727.35 To Alberto P. Monteroso P49,727.35 To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P49,727.35 To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) P49,727.35

8. It is hereby ordered that Lot 432 under TCT [No.] RT-203 (420) with an area of 10.0242 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-018-0224 (1980) is hereby divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso and the one-ninth (1/9) share be held in usufruct by the widow Sofia Pendejito Monteroso during her lifetime. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso being in possession and enjoying the fruits or income of F-1 is hereby ordered to pay and deliver immediately to the following heirs the corresponding amount of net income of F-1, Lot 432, from 1948 to 1983: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang P78,521.32 To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P78,521.32 To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P78,521.32 To Tirso D. Monteroso P78,521.32 To Florenda P. Monteroso P78,521.32 To Reynato P. Monteroso P78,521.32 To Alberto P. Monteroso P78,521.32 To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P78,521.32

The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash advance any heir may have received. Then the net balance of said [amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. 9. It is hereby ordered that Lot 100 under [TCT No. RT-205] (424) with an area of 1.9083 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0488, Series of 1980 and Lot No. 103 under [TCT No. RT-204] (423) with an area of 2.8438 hectares and under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0335, Series of 1980, [both known as Parcel F-2,] shall be divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. and one-ninth (1/9) share shall be held in usufruct by the widow, Sofia P. Monteroso, during her lifetime. Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are ordered to deliver to [their] co-heirs their shares in these parcels of land, F-2, free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever, and to pay each of them the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, namely: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P34,976.85 To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P34,976.85 To Tirso D. Monteroso P34,976.85 To Florenda P. Monteroso P34,976.85 To Reynato P. Monteroso P34,976.85 To Alberto P. Monteroso P34,976.85 To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P34,976.85 To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) P34,976.85

The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash advance, if any, such heir may have received. Then the net [amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are both ordered to deliver to the above-mentioned co-heirs their respective shares free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever. 11. Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7 and F-8 are declared real properties belonging to the first marriage. Hence one-half (1/2) of each of these four parcels shall equally be divided by the four (4) children of the first marriage and the other half must be divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., and one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by the widow, Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso. Therefore, it is hereby ordered that F-6 is divided as follows: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) (i.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - - - 702 sq. m. To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - - - 702 sq. m. To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - - - 702 sq. m. To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - 702 sq. m. To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m. To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m. To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m. To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - - - - 216 sq. m. To Sofia P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.

12. It is hereby ordered, that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. must deliver to all heirs their respective shares on F-7 and F-8 including usufruct of Sofia P. Monteroso as declared in

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paragraph five (5) and in addition, must pay and deliver the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, summarized as follows: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P189,665.88 To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P189,665.88 To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P189,665.88 To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73 To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73 To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73 To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - - P 58,358.73 To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) - - - - P 58,358.73

Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, consisting of 24 hectares is hereby declared null and void being in fraud of other heirs. It is clearly inofficious and impairs the legitime of her brothers, sisters and nephews and nieces. Therefore, the tax declaration in the name of Florenda P. Monteroso under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974 and Tax Dec. No. 02-006-0047, PIN-02-006-02-002 are hereby ordered cancelled and the said land shall be declared again in the name of Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is not required to render accounting as to the income of S-2 because the coconut trees therein were planted by her while being already a widow. One-half (1/2) of the land where the coconut trees are planted shall be her share and the other one-half (1/2) shall be divided into nine (9) shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso including her 1/9 usufruct thereon. 17. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver immediately the net income in arrears of parcel S-3 located at Pandanon to the following heirs with the corresponding amount: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - P49,349.02 To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P49,349.02 To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P49,349.02 To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P49,349.02 To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P49,349.02 To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P49,349.02 To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P49,349.02 To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P49,349.02

all with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. However, it is subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if ever any heir, may have received. 13. The Deed of Donation in 1948, Exh. F, over parcel known as F-5, is declared null and void because the same was prepared and acknowledged before a Notary Public disqualified and prohibited to do so under Notarial Law (Barretto vs. Cabreza, 33 Phil. Reports 112). Hence, the transfer of tax declaration is hereby ordered cancelled and the same must be declared again in the name of the Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. and ordered partitioned in the proportion stated in paragraph eleven (11) hereof. 14. Parcels of land known as S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 are declared conjugal properties of the second marriage. Hence, one-half (1/2) thereof belongs to Sofia Pendejito Monteroso and one-half (1/2) shall be equally divided into nine (9) shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. where the one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by Sofia P. Monteroso during her lifetime. 15. For the net income in arrears of S-1 located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver to the following heirs the corresponding share: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - P93,998.12 To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P93,998.12 To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P93,998.12 To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P93,998.12 To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P93,998.12 To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P93,998.12 To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P93,998.12 To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P93,998.12

However, [the] above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deductions, if any cash advance was ever made or received by any heir. Then the net amount receivable shall be subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. 18. For the net income in arrears of parcel S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia P. Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver to the following heirs their corresponding shares: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) (e.) (f.) (g.) (h.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - P6,477.54 To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P6,477.54 To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P6,477.54 To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P6,477.54 To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P6,477.54 To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P6,477.54 To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P6,477.54 To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P6,477.54

However, all these amounts shall be subject to deduction, if any cash advance was ever made or received by any heir. The above-mentioned [amounts are] subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1948 to the present until fully paid. 16. The alleged Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sofia P. Monteroso in favor of Florenda P. Monteroso over a coconut land located at

However, all these amounts shall be subject to deductions, if any cash advance was ever made or received by any heir.

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The above-mentioned amount is subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is ordered to deliver to the abovementioned heirs their respective shares free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever. 19. These cases involved inheritance, hence the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of Agusan del Norte at Butuan City is hereby notified for prompt, proper and appropriate action. Likewise, the Provincial Treasurer of Agusan del Norte and the Municipal Treasurers of Cabadbaran and Tubay are hereby informed and reminded for their prompt, proper and appropriate action in the assessment and collection of real estate taxes including transfers tax. 20. That all the heirs are hereby directed, and ordered to pay all taxes due in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of judgment hereof, otherwise, upon proper application or manifestation by appropriate or concerned government agency, a portion of the intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., shall be sold at public auction for such purpose. 21. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, is hereby ordered to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel and Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) P10,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; P3,000.00 for costs of suit; and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.

24. It is hereby ordered that a judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. shall be appointed by this Court upon written recommendation by all the parties within thirty (30) days from promulgation of this decision. Should the parties fail to submit unanimously a recommendee, the Court at its discretion may appoint an administrator, unless none of the parties appeal this decision and this judgment is complied with by all the parties and/or so executed in accordance with the provisions of the New Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.[10] As regards Civil Case No. 1292, the RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin have indeed been deprived of their inheritance which corresponds to one-fourth share due their father from the intestate estate of their grandmother, Soledad D. Monteroso. Thus, the court ordered the equal distribution of Parcel F-4, i.e., Lot 380, Pls-736 located in Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, among the children of the first marriage of Don Fabian, and partitioned it based on the subdivision survey map prepared by a geodetic engineer. Turning on the alleged sale of Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, the RTC found the covering three deeds of absolute sale[11] to be null and void for the reason that the alleged conveyances were fictitious, simulated, and/or without sufficient consideration. Alternatively, the RTC ruled that the conveyances, even if considered as donation, would be inofficious for impairing the legitime of the other compulsory heirs, not to mention the lack of due acceptance of the donation by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang. Adding a vitiating element to the conveyances, as the RTC noted, was the fact that the corresponding documents were prepared by and acknowledged before Perfecto, who happened to be the husband of the alleged vendee, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang. The RTC also declared as null and void the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula MonterosoBayan owing to clear legal infirmities attaching to the covering deed of donation. [12] For one, the parcel in question, while purportedly donated free from any liens or encumbrance, was in fact the subject of a deed of absolute sale between Don Fabian and the Cagampang spouses. For another, one of the signatory-donors, Mauricia Nakila, Benjamins widow, did not have the right to effect a donation because she was not a compulsory heir of her husband by representation. The RTC added that the real owners of the rights and interests of Benjamin over Parcel F-5 are her children as representative heirs. Finally, the RTC declared the Order dated March 11, 1936 issued in SP No. 309 approving the Project of Partition to be valid, and that it constitutes res judicata on the affected properties, i.e., Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5, which were equally distributed to the heirs of Soledad D. Monteroso. Pursuing this point and on the finding that Parcels F-1 to F-8 were acquired during the first marriage and Parcels S-1 to S-4 during the second, the RTC thus held that Don Fabians intestate estate consisted of the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3; and half of Parcels F-5 to F-8 and half of Parcels S-1 to S-4, to be distributed in accordance with the law on intestate succession. This means, the RTC concluded, that the estate shall descend to Don Fabians compulsory heirs and their representatives, as in the case of the late Benjamin and Fabian, Jr., subject to accounting of the income or produce of the subject properties for the applicable period, less advances made or received by any heir, if any. The Ruling of the CA From the above June 9, 1987 Decision, Tirso, defendant in Civil Case No. 1292, appealed to the CA, so did the Cagampang spouses, defendants in Civil Case No. 1332. The other defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, namely: Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso, Florenda Monteroso, Alberto Monteroso, Heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Jr., Reynato Monteroso, and Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, also

22. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and Reygula Monteroso Bayan are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel and Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) P10,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; P2,000.00 for costs of suit; and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.

23. Under Civil Case No. 1332, Soledad Monteroso Cagampang, Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. and Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso or their heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally, unto and in favor of Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, the following sums of money: (a.) (b.) (c.) (d.) P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for exemplary damages; P5,000.00 for costs of suit; and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.

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interposed their own appeal. The separate appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15805. On March 31, 1992, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with modification the June 9, 1987 RTC Decision, disposing as follows: follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified, as a) In the event that a homestead patent over Parcel S-1 is issued by the Bureau of Lands pursuant to the patent application of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso, said patent shall issue not in the name of the applicant but in favor of the eight heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. who thereafter shall be declared absolute owners of the said parcel of land in the proportion stated in this decision but who nevertheless shall allow Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso to exercise during her lifetime usufructuary rights over a portion of the said parcel of land equivalent to the share therein of each of the heirs of her deceased husband; b) The said heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. are hereby declared absolute owners of Parcel F-6 to the extent of their respective shares therein as presently individually possessed by them pursuant to an extrajudicial partition of the said parcel of land which the Court hereby declares as a valid contract among the said heirs; and c) With the exception of those pertaining to Parcel F-4 as stated in this decision, the parties thus found to have unjustly misappropriated the fruits of the subject parcels of land are hereby directed to render an accounting thereof consistent with our findings in the case at bar. With the exception of the foregoing modifications, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.[13] The CA summarized into three issues the multifarious assignments of errors raised by the parties, to wit: first, whether or not the intestate estate of Soledad Doldol Monteroso was settled in SP No. 309, thus according the Project of Partition approved therein the effect of res judicata; second, whether or not it was appropriate to partition Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and half of Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7, F-8, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4; and third, whether or not Tirso D. Monteroso is entitled to damages. The CA resolved the first issue in the affirmative, SP No. 309 being a valid and binding proceedings insofar as the properties subject thereof are concerned, i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-5 of which

the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5, as Soledad D. Monterosos intestate estate, were distributed to her heirs. This is not to mention that the authenticity and due execution of the documents filed or issued in relation therewithreferring to the Proyecto de Particion dated February 12, 1935 which is a carbon copy of the original, the Orden issued by the CFI on March 11, 1936, and the Mocion dated March 18, 1936having duly been established. Affirming the RTC, the CA rejected Tirsos claim that SP No. 309 is void for settling only a part of the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso. The CA held that partial settlement is not a ground for the nullification of the judicial partition under either the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or the present Civil Code. The appellate court added that the proper remedy in such a situation is to ask for the partition and the subsequent distribution of the property omitted. The CA likewise disposed of the second issue in the affirmative, dismissing the opposition of the Cagampang spouses and Reygulo Monteroso-Bayan who all claimed ownership over some of the parcels of land on the strength of the deeds of conveyance executed in their favor. The CA upheld the RTCs finding that the three deeds of absolute sale in which Don Fabian purportedly sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang were infirm. The CA noted that even the Cagampang spouses recognized these infirmities, and instead of denying their existence, they tried to justify the same and seek an exception therefrom. On the alleged donation of Parcel F-5 by Don Fabian to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, the CA likewise agreed with the RTCs finding on the nullity thereof. The CA pointed out that Reygula Monteroso-Bayan did not controvert the RTCs finding, except to gratuitously say that the trial courts declaration of nullity was wrong since nobody questioned the authenticity of the donation in the first place. Apropos Parcel S-1, a disposable agricultural land of the public domain which is the subject of a homestead patent application by Don Fabian, the CA, as opposed to the RTCs disposition, held that a patent, if eventually issued, ought to be in the name of the legal heirs of Don Fabian, not of his surviving spouse, Pendejito. This conclusion, so the CA explained, is in line with the provision of Section 105 of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), as amended. As to Parcel S-2, the CA agreed with the RTC that it is a conjugal property acquired during the second marriage through a deed of sale[14] executed on August 15, 1947 by Marcelo Morancel. Likewise, the CA said that Parcels S-3 and S-4 are conjugal properties as no evidence was adduced supporting the alleged purchase by Pendejito of said properties with her own funds. Anent the RTCs order partitioning Parcel F-6, the CA agreed with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 that Parcel F-6 has long been partitioned equitably among all the eight children of Don Fabian. Thus, the CA further modified the RTC on this point. On the third and last issues, the CA set aside all awards of actual damages made by the RTC premised on the income generating capacity of the subject properties, except that of Parcel F-4, as an order of accounting of the fruits of the other subject properties unjustly appropriated by them would address the issue of damages. It bears to stress at this juncture that, save for the grant of damages and the disposition of Parcels F-6 and S-1, the CA affirmed the questioned RTC Decision on all other points. On June 15, 1992, Tirso D. Monteroso thereafter filed before the Court his partial petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 105608. On the other hand, Pendejito, together with the other defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, first interposed a joint motion for partial reconsideration, which the CA denied per its equally

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assailed December 16, 1993 Resolution,[15] before elevating the case via a petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 113199. G.R. No. 105608 Denied with Finality Per its Resolution[16] dated June 29, 1992, the Court denied Tirso D. Monterosos petition under G.R. No. 105608 for late payment of fees and non-compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court and Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91 on the submission of a certified copy of the assailed decision/order and a certification of non-forum shopping. Another Resolution[17] of August 12, 1992 followed, this time denying with finality Tirso D. Monterosos motion for reconsideration filed on July 29, 1992. On August 31, 1992, an Entry of Judgment[18] was issued. In net effect, the March 31, 1992 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 is final and executory as to Tirso D. Monteroso, and the Court need not pass upon the issues he raised in his petition under G.R. No. 105608, albeit we shall take stock of his Comment[19] and Memorandum[20] in G.R. No. 113199. The Issues Petitioners in G.R. No. 113199 raise the following issues for our consideration: 1. Whether the finding that the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits C, D and E) were not supported by valuable consideration and sham, fictitious and simulated is supported by the evidence. 2. Whether the finding or conclusion that petitioners Spouses Atty. Perfecto and Soledad Cagampang did not dispute the finding of the trial Court that the Deeds of Sale in question are sham, fictitious and simulated is supported by evidence. 3. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in concluding that, By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership. 4. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in upholding partition as the proper remedy of private respondent Tirso Monteroso to recover the properties sold by Fabian Monteroso, Sr. to Soledad D. Monteroso de Cagampang when co-ownership is not pleaded as theory in the Complaint. 5. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in holding that the cause of action of private respondent Tirso Monteroso is not barred by extinctive prescription and laches. 6. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in granting reliefs not prayed for in the Complaint in favor of parties who did not assert or claim such relief, such as partition and accounting among the parties and the nullification of the donation in favor of petitioner Reygula Bayan when x x x Tirso Monteroso and the petitioners herein who are signatories to the Deed of Donation did not question or ask for the nullification of the donation in favor of Reygula Bayan. 7. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in ordering the partition of parcels S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 which are admitted in the Complaint to be in the exclusive, adverse possession of petitioners Sofia vda. de Monteroso, Florenda, Alberto and Reynato and the Heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. since the

death of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. in 1948, appropriating the harvests unto themselves, to the exclusion of plaintiff (private respondent Tirso Monteroso) who was deprived of his share continuously up to the present.[21]

The Courts Ruling After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the parties and in the light of the practically parallel findings of the RTC and CA, we find the petition under G.R. No. 113199 to be devoid of merit. It is a rule of long standing that: [T]he jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. [22] None of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case. First and Second Issues: Simulated Sale In connection with the first two related issues, petitioners maintain that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTCs conclusion on the fictitious or simulated nature, for lack or inadequate consideration, of the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits C, D, and E), noting that Tirso failed to present substantial evidence to support the alleged infirmity of the underlying sale. The fact that one of the lots sold under Exhibit C on May 10, 1939 for PhP 2,500 was used as collateral for a PhP 600 loan is not, so petitioners claim, proof that the amount of PhP 600 represents the maximum loan value of the property or that the sale in question is not supported by valuable consideration. Moreover, petitioners belabored to explain that the trial court erred in concluding that the property conveyed under Exhibit C and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT203 (420) in the name of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, married to Perfecto, was fictitious on the ground that the certificate did not indicate that it was a conjugal property. Petitioners assert that the registration of a property only in the name of one of the spouses is not proof that no consideration was paid therefor. As petitioners would stress, what determines whether a given property is conjugal or separate is the law itself, not what appears in the certificate of title.

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Lastly, petitioners take exception from the appellate courts posture that the Cagampang spouses did not dispute the trial courts finding that the deeds of sale (Exhibits C, D, and E) were simulated and fictitious for lack of consideration. Petitioners insist that they in fact contested such conclusion of the RTC in their brief before the CA, adding they only raised the issue of prescription as an alternative defense without conceding the RTCs findings on contract infirmity. We are not persuaded. The antecedent facts, as borne by the records, strongly indicate the simulated character of the sale covered by the deeds of absolute sale over Parcels F-1 (Exhibit C), F-2 (Exhibit D), F-3, F-5, F-7, and F-8 (Exhibit E). As found below, Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his lifetime. The first deed,Exhibit E, was executed on May 1, 1939; the second, Exhibit C, on May 10, 1939; and the third, Exhibit D, on September 24, 1939. Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, however, only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabians death in 1948 or nine years after contract execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby. The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest on the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back portion of the titles. If only to stress the point, when the deeds were executed in 1939, Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang, the notarizing officer, were already married. A property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wifes paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move. Hence, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that the unexplained situations described above sufficiently show that the purported conveyances were simulated. We also accord credence to Tirsos allegation that the Cagampang spouses tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the properties which have to be hidden by means of simulated conveyances to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang. The fact that only one of the subject lots was used as collateral for a PhP 600 loan which the Cagampang spouses took out does not weaken the conclusion on the simulated character of the contracts, as logically drawn from the twin circumstances adverted to. The Court can allow that petitioners indeed attempted to traverse, before the CA, the RTCs findings on the area of simulated sale and that they only raised the matter of acquisitive prescription as an alternative defense. However, as we shall explain shortly, the fact of petitioners having made the attempt aforestated will not carry the day for them. Third Issue: Recognition of Co-ownership in Acquisitive Prescription In its assailed decision, the CA declared, By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership x x x. The petitioners tag this declaration as flawed since the benefit of prescription may be availed of without necessarily recognizing co-ownership. Prescription and co-ownership, they maintain, are so diametrically opposed legal concepts, such that one who invokes prescription is never deemed to admit the existence of co-ownership. Petitioners are mistaken; their error flows from compartmentalizing what the CA wrote. The aforecited portion of the CAs decision should not have been taken in isolation. It should have been read in the context of the appellate courts disquisition on the matter of Tirso being a co-owner of the subject undivided properties whose rights thereto, as a compulsory heir, accrued at the

moment of death of Don Fabian, vis--vis the defense of acquisitive prescription foisted by the Cagampang spouses. For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portion of the assailed decision: Nor do we find any merit in the third. From the allegation in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 as well as from the arguments advanced by the parties on the issues raised therein, this Court is convinced that therein plaintiff Tirso Monterosos principal cause of action is unmistakably one for partition which by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches x x x. The only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an action for partition is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be partitioned had been properly repudiated by a coowner at which instance the remedy available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership among the heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. over the properties forming the decedents estate.[23] (Emphasis ours.) From the foregoing disquisition, what the appellate court tried to convey is clear and simple: partition is the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties by virtue of his being a compulsory heir, like siblings Soledad, Reygula, and Benjamin, of Don Fabian. The right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Consequently, acquisitive prescription or laches does not lie in favor of the Cagampang spouses and against Tirso, the general rule being that prescription does not run against a co-owner or co-heir. The only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, the appellate court ruled that by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a coowner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to set in. Taking off from that premise, the appellate court then proceeded to tackle the issue of repudiation by the Cagampang spouses. Therefore, we hold that the appellate court did not err in finding that the Cagampang spouses are effectively barred from invoking prescription, given that the subject properties are conjugal properties of the decedent, Don Fabian, which cannot be subjected to acquisitive prescription, the necessary consequence of recognizing the co-ownership stake of other legal heirs. Fourth and Fifth Issues: Partition Proper, not Barred by Laches nor by Acquisitive Prescription Being inextricably intertwined, we tackle both issues together. Petitioners, citing Article 494 of the Civil Code[24] and Art. 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, aver that the right to ask partition is proper only where co-ownership is recognized. They also suggest that no co-ownership obtains in this case considering that no less than Tirso avers in his complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 that from the time of Don Fabians death in 1948, the lots in question have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public possession of the Cagampang spouses. Assayed against this perspective, petitioners submit that partition is not proper, ergo unavailing, but an action for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. Corollary to the posture above taken, petitioners assert that there being no co-ownership over the properties sold by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirsos cause of action, under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) in relation to Art. 1116 of the Civil Code, [25] had already prescribed, either in 1949, i.e., 10 years after the subject properties were registered in Soledad Monteroso-Cagampangs name, or in 1958, i.e., 10 years after the cause of action accrued in

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1948 (death of Don Fabian), citingOsorio v. Tan.[26] Tirsos complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was commenced in 1970. Petitioners contend that the evidence adduced clearly demonstrates that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang acquired ownership of the subject properties by virtue of the deeds of sale executed in 1939 by Don Fabian. After the sale, she registered them under her name and then took exclusive, adverse, and public possession over them. Thus, they submit that the prescriptive period applicable to the instant case under Act No. 190 had long expired, adding that the CA erred in finding that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang repudiated the co-ownership only in 1961 when she and the other heirs ignored the demand of Tirso for partition.

indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share. [30] Contrary to petitioners stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned. Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.[31] In the instant case, however, no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other compulsory heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because effective repudiation had not timely been made against the former. As aptly put by the appellate court, the repudiation which must be clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal of the co-ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed apprised of the repudiation by the Cagampang spouses. However, considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code[32] applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that Tirsos cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the Cagampang spouses since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription period[33] of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the Cagampang spouses took exclusive possession of the subject properties. Sixth Issue: Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties of Second Marriage On the ground of prescription under Act No. 190, petitioners assert that Tirso lost the right to seek the partition of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4, he having admitted, as early as 1948, the adverse, exclusive, and public possession thereof by Pendejito and her children. This type of possession, they maintain, works as a repudiation by Pendejito and her children of the coownership claim of Tirso. They further argue that Parcel S-1 pertains to Pendejito as her paraphernal property since the homestead application therefor was under her name. We are not persuaded. Tirsos acknowledgment of Pendejito and her childrens possession of Parcels S-1, S-2, S3, and S-4 cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso from pursuing his right to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such intention. To be sure, Tirso and his siblings from the first marriage have a stake on Parcels S-2, S-3, and S-4, even if these parcels of land formed part of the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. There can be no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage. Anent Parcel S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it belongs to the heirs of Don Fabian under Sec. 105 of CA 141, which pertinently provides:

As a final point, petitioners alleged that the exclusion of Tirso from the enjoyment of the fruits of the subject properties since after the death of Don Fabian in 1948 is consistent with Soledad Monteroso-Cagampangs claim of exclusive ownership and dominion. We cannot subscribe to petitioners theory. The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per seargue against the existence of a co-ownership. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of coownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the hereditary properties. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon. Consequently, we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.[27] Also, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis ours.) Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death, [28] i.e., onOctober 26, 1948. Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabians intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirsos right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. [29] As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro-

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Sec. 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or issued under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis ours.) It is undisputed that Don Fabian was the homestead patent applicant who was subrogated to the rights of the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo, by purchasing from the latter Parcel S-1 on May 8, 1943. Don Fabian cultivated the applied area and declared it for taxation purposes. The application, however, would be rejected because death supervened. In 1963, Pendejito filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1. Assayed against the foregoing undisputed facts in the light of the aforequoted Sec. 105 of CA 141, the heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1. Said Sec. 105 has been interpreted in Soliman v. Icdang[34] as having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of Act No. 926, otherwise known as the Public Land Act of 1903, a patent in her own name, thus: [W]e should bear in mind that, although Adolfo Icdang was married to plaintiff when he filed the homestead application, an applicant may be said to have acquired a vested right over a homestead only by the presentation of the final proof and its approval by the Director of Lands. (Ingara vs. Ramelo, 107 Phil., 498; Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 498; Republic vs. Diamon, 97 Phil., 838.) In the case at bar, the final proof appears to have been presented to, and approved by the Director of Lands, in 1954, or several years after the death of Adolfo Icdang and the dissolution of his conjugal partnership with plaintiff herein. Hence, the land in question could not have formed part of the assets of said partnership. It belonged to the heirs of Adolfo Icdang, pursuant to section 105 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, reading: xxxx It is worthy of notice that, under the Public Land Act of 1903 (Act No. 926, section 3), in the event of the death of an applicant prior to the issuance of a patent, his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her upon showing that she has consummated the requirements of law for homesteading the lands, and that only in case the deceased applicant leaves no widow shall his interest in the land descend and the patent issue to his legal heirs. Incorporated substantially in section 103 of the Public Land Act of 1919 (Act No. 2874), this policy was changed by Act No. 3517, pursuant to which the deceased shall be succeeded no longer by his widow, but by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patentif they show that they have complied with the requirements therefor. And this is, in effect, the rule maintained in the above quoted section 105 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.[35] (Emphasis added.)

It appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for meeting the requirements of law for homesteading Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot be categorized as the paraphernal property of Pendejito. Thus, the homestead patent thereto, if eventually issued, must be made in the name of the compulsory heirs of Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito shall be entitled, pursuant to Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over the property equal to the corresponding share of each of Don Fabians compulsory heirs, i.e., his eight children. Seventh Issue: Judgment Must not Only be Clear but Must Also be Complete Petitioners bemoan the fact that both the trial and appellate courts granted relief and remedies not prayed for by the parties. As argued, Civil Case No. 1292, initiated by the heirs of Benjamin against Tirso, basically sought recovery of real properties; while Civil Case No. 1332, a countersuit filed by Tirso, was for partition and damages, the main thrust of which is to recover his alleged share from properties in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of other heirs since the death of Don Fabian in 1948. Thus, petitioners take issue against both decisions of the trial and appellate courts which ordered partition not only in favor of Tirso but also in favor of the other petitioners he sued. What is particularly appalling, according to them, is the order for accounting which no one requested.

Petitioners lament, while understandable, is specious. Our judicial system requires courts to apply the law and grant remedies when appropriately called for by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate, courts have the discretion to apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room for application where there is law. [36] In the instant case, a disposition only ordering partial partition and without accounting, as petitioners presently urge, would be most impractical and against what we articulated in Samala v. Court of Appeals.[37] There, we cautioned courts against being dogmatic in rendering decisions, it being preferable if they take a complete view of the case and in the process come up with a just and equitable judgment, eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Surely, the assailed path taken by the CA on the grant of relief not specifically sought is not without precedent. In National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, where the petitioner questioned the competence of the courts a quo to resolve issues not raised in the pleadings, and to order the disposition of the subject property when what was raised was the issue of right to possession, this Court in dismissing the challenge stated that a case should be decided in its totality, resolving all interlocking issues in order to render justice to all concerned and to end the litigation once and for all.[38] Verily, courts should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation. [39] Eighth Issue: Deed of Donation Null and Void Finally, as an incidental issue, petitioners asseverate that the deed of donation (Exhibit F) executed on September 19, 1948, or after the death of Don Fabian, in favor of Reygula M. Bayan, is valid, particularly so since Tirso and the heirs of Benjamin, as represented by their mother, Nakila, do not question the validity of said deed as they in fact signed the same. That the donated property was the same property described and included in the deed of sale (Exhibit E) in favor of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang is not, they contend, an invalidating factor since what Don Fabian sold under Exhibit E did not extend beyond his conjugal share thereon.

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Just like the issue of the nullity of the three deeds of absolute sale (Exhibits C, D, and E) heretofore discussed, we agree with the determination of the RTC and CA as to the invalidity of the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula M. Bayan. We need not repeat the reasons for such determination, except the most basic. We refer to the authority of the person who executed the deed of donation. As it were, the widow of Benjamin, Nakila, signed the deed of donation. She, however, cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet[40] applies to this instance as Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Besides, Nakila signed the deed of donation in her name and not in the name of her children who are the heirs in representation of their father, Benjamin. Lest it be overlooked, the then minor children were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila, a situation which thus disqualifies her from signing on their behalf. The fact that nobody objected to the donation is of little consequence, for as the CA aptly observed, The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or implied.[41] WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 1992 and December 16, 1993, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 160956 February 13, 2008 JOAQUIN QUIMPO, SR., substituted by Heirs of Joaquin Quimpo, Sr., petitioners, vs. CONSUELO ABAD VDA. DE BELTRAN, IRENEO ABAD, DANILO ABAD, MARITES ABAD, ANITA AND HELEN ABAD, respondents. RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56187, and the October 16, 2003 Resolution denying the motion for its reconsideration. Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad (Eustaquia) was the owner of several parcels of land in Goa, Camarines Sur, described as follows: Parcel I - Residential land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area of 684 square-meters; Parcel II Coconut land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area of 4.3731 hectares; Parcel III Residential land situated at San Jose Street, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area of 1,395 square meters; and Parcel IV Abaca and coconut land situated at Abucayan, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area 42.6127 hectares.2 Eustaquia died intestate in 1948 leaving these parcels of land to her grandchild and great grandchildren, namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents Consuelo, Ireneo, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, all surnamed Abad. In 1966, Joaquin and respondents undertook an oral partition of parcel III (San Jose property) and parcel IV. Half of the properties was given to Joaquin and the other half to the respondents. However, no document of partition was executed, because Joaquin refused to execute a deed. Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their respective shares in the San Jose property, and installed several tenants over their share in parcel IV. Joaquin, on the other hand, became the administrator of the remaining undivided properties and of the shares of respondents Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, who were still minors at that time. In 1989, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted to them, but Joaquin prevented them from occupying the same. Joaquin also refused to heed respondents demand for partition of parcels I and II, prompting respondents to file a complaint for judicial partition and/or recovery of possession with accounting and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines Sur.3 Joaquin denied the material allegations in the complaint, and averred, as his special and affirmative defenses, lack of cause of action and prescription. He asserted absolute ownership over parcels III and IV, claiming that he purchased these lands from Eustaquia in 1946, evidenced by deeds of sale executed on August 23, 1946 and December 2, 1946. He, likewise, claimed continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of these lots since 1946, and alleged that Consuelos occupation of the portion of the San Jose property was by mere tolerance.4 During the pendency of the case, Joaquin died. Accordingly, he was substituted by his wife, Estela Tena-Quimpo and his children, namely, Jose, Adelia, Joaquin, Anita, Angelita, Amelia, Arlene, Joy and Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo (the Quimpos). On December 12, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents, declaring them as coowners of all the properties left by Eustaquia. It rejected Joaquins claim of absolute ownership over parcels III and IV, and declared void the purported deeds of sale executed by Eustaquia for lack of consideration and consent. The court found that at the time of the execution of these deeds, Joaquin was not gainfully employed and had no known source of income, which shows that the deeds of sale state a false and fictitious consideration. Likewise, Eustaquia could not have possibly given her consent to the sale because she was already 91 years old at that time. The RTC also sustained the oral partition among the heirs in 1966. According to the trial court, the possession and occupation of land by respondents Consuelo and Ireneo, and Joaquins acquiescence for 23 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was actual partition of the properties. It held that Joaquin and his

heirs are nowestopped from claiming ownership over the entire San Jose property as well as over parcel IV. The RTC disposed, thus: WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Consuelo Vda. de Beltran, Ireneo Abad, Marites Abad, Danilo Abad, Anita Abad and Helen Abad and against defendant Joaquin Quimpo, substituted by the latters wife Estela Tena and their children, Amparo, Jose, Amelia, Joaquin Jr., Adelia, Arlene, Anita, Joy, Angelita and Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo, as follows: 1. Ordering the above-named substituted defendants, and the plaintiffs to execute their written agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. III and IV more particularly described in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and for them to execute an agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. I and II, both parcels are more particularly described in paragraph 7 of the complaint; 2. Declaring the plaintiffs Danilo Abad, Marites Abad, Anita Abad and Helen Abad the owner of six (6) hectares a portion included in parcel No. IV also described in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and therefore, entitled to its possession and ordering the said substituted defendants to deliver that portion to them as their share thereto; 3. Ordering the above-named substituted defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency, as reasonable attorneys fees and the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) also of Philippine Currency, as litigation expenses and for the said defendants to pay the costs. The counterclaim, not being proved, the same is hereby ordered dismissed. SO ORDERED.6 On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Sustaining the RTC, the CA declared that it was plausible that Eustaquias consent was vitiated because she was then 91 years old and sickly. It was bolstered by the fact that the deeds of sale only surfaced 43 years after its alleged execution and 23 years from the time of the oral partition. The CA also rejected petitioners argument that the action was barred by prescription and laches, explaining that prescription does not run against the heirs so long as the heirs, for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. The CA found no repudiation on Joaquins part. It, therefore, concluded that respondents action could not be barred by prescription or laches. The Quimpos, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari imputing the following errors to the CA: 1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS DID NOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OVER [THE] SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND BY WAY OF DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN THEIR FAVOR; 2) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT CO-OWNERSHIP EXISTS AMONG PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND; 3) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE PROVEN THEIR FILIATION TO THE ORIGINAL OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND BY MERE SCANT EVIDENCE; 4) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT LACHES HAS TIMEBARRED THE RESPONDENTS FROM ASSAILING THE ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND; AND 5) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES.7 The Quimpos insist on the validity of the deeds of sale between Joaquin and Eustaquia. They assail the probative value and weight given by the RTC and the CA in favor of the respondents pieces of evidence while refusing to give credence or value to the documents they presented. Specifically, they contend that the notarized deeds of sale and the tax declarations should have adequately established Joaquins ownership of parcels III and IV.

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The contention has no merit. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme Courts role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the parties. Since such findings are generally not reviewable, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support from the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.8 Petitioners fail to convince us that the CA committed reversible error in affirming the trial court and in giving no weight to the pieces of evidence they presented. The stated consideration for the sale are P5,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively, an amount which was so difficult to raise in the year 1946. Respondents established that at the time of the purported sale Joaquin Quimpo was not gainfully employed. He was studying in Manila and Eustaquia was the one supporting him; that when Eustaquia died two (2) years later, Joaquin was not able to continue his studies. The Quimpos failed to override this. Except for the incredible and unpersuasive testimony of Joaquins daughter, Adelia Magsino, no other testimonial or documentary evidence was offered to prove that Joaquin was duly employed and had the financial capacity to buy the subject properties in 1946. In Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals,9 reiterated in Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corp,10 we held that a deed of sale, in which the stated consideration has not been, in fact, paid is a false contract; that it is void ab initio. Furthermore,Ocejo v. Flores,11 ruled that a contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where it appears that the same is without cause or consideration which should have been the motive thereof, or the purchase price which appears thereon as paid but which in fact has never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. Likewise, both the trial court and the CA found that Eustaquia was 91 years old, weak and senile, at the time the deeds of sale were executed. In other words, she was already mentally incapacitated by then, and could no longer be expected to give her consent to the sale. The RTC and CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for not giving credence to the deeds of sale in favor of Joaquin. Petitioners also presented Tax Declaration Nos. 3650,12 3708,13 and 365914 to substantiate Joaquins claim of absolute dominion over parcels III and IV. But we note that these tax declarations are all in the name of Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad. These documents, therefore, do not support their claim of absolute dominion since 1946, but enervate it instead. Besides, the fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Joaquin Quimpo does not necessarily prove ownership for it is well settled that a tax declaration or tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.15 The CA, therefore, correctly found this proof inadequate to establish Joaquins claim of absolute dominion. For forty-three (43) years, Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their portions of the San Jose property and significantly, Joaquin never disturbed their possession. They also installed tenants in parcel IV, and Joaquin did not prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his ownership over the same. These unerringly point to the fact that there was indeed an oral partition of parcels III and IV. In Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot,16 we held, viz.: [P]artition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded. Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal,17 we explained that: On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties

thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty. In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground ofestoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in sustaining the oral partition over parcels III and IV and in invalidating the deeds of sale between Eustaquia and Joaquin. Similarly, we affirm the CA ruling that respondents are co-owners of the subject four (4) parcels of land, having inherited the same from a common ancestor Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad. Petitioners assertion that respondents failed to prove their relationship to the late Eustaquia deserves scant consideration. During the pre-trial, Joaquin Quimpo admitted that: Eustaquia Perfecto Abad and Diego Abad had two (2) children by the names of Leon Abad and Joaquin Abad; that Leon Abad has three (3) children namely: Anastacia, Wilfredo and Consuelo, all surnamed Abad; that Joaquin Abad has only one (1) child, a daughter by the name of Amparo; that Wilfredo has four (4) children, namely, Danilo, Helen, Marites and Anita; Amparo has one child, son Joaquin Quimpo, x x x 18 Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia, while respondents Danilo, Helen, Marites, Anita and also Joaquin Quimpo were Eustaquias great grandchildren. As such, respondents can rightfully ask for the confirmation of the oral partition over parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and II. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches. 19 Finally, petitioners challenge the attorneys fees in favor of respondents. The grant of attorneys fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court. It may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other,20 as in this case. In fine, we find no reversible error in the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 56187, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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TY B. LACBAYAN,Petitioner,- versus -BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent. Promulgated: March 21, 2011 x- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. This suit stemmed from the following facts. Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979.[3] During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company.[4] Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described as follows: 1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan.[5] 2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan.[6] 3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy.[7] 4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L. Samoy.[8] 5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L. Samoy.[9] Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400square meter property in Don Enrique Heights.[10]

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.[11] Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.[12] However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused.[13] Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition[14] of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999. In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.[15] Respondent, in his Answer,[16] however, denied petitioners claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.[17] During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning.[18][19] Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent established. Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.[20] He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.[21] Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building.[22] On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.[23] In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.[24] Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.[25] Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner: Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties name as husband and wife.

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The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellants claim of coownership.[26] Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments: I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.

ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. xxx The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x[29] (Emphasis supplied.) While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.[31] Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,[32] but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.[33] The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.[34] Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.[35] Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.[37] Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof. Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative. An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.[38] Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against respondents interest as to the existence of co-ownership between the parties. III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating coownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute. IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by respondents self-serving assertion to the contrary. V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.[27] Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized into only three: I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;

II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.

We find the petition bereft of merit. Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[28] is definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus: The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-

26

To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.[39] A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[40] Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign. As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondents favor is DELETED.

27

URORA L. TECSON,SPOUSES TECSONand LEONILA TECSON, Petitioners,

JOSE

L.

G.R. No. 180683 Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PERALTA,* and PEREZ, JJ.

-versus-

Defendant-appellee Atty. Jose L. Tecson is entitled only to 507 square meters under Lot 2189-A; he is DIRECTED to reconvey, within thirty (30) days from notice, the excess of 457 square meters thereof to herein plaintiff-appellants in order to restore the latters original area of 508 square meters under Lot 2189-B pursuant to Exhibit B (Subdivision Plan Psd-09-06000110 dated March 25, 1974) and Exhibit C (the Agreement of Partition dated April 15, 1974). Failure on his part to reconvey the aforesaid 457 square meters within the period prescribed thereto, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 19, Pagadian City, is hereby directed to cause the transfer of the same in favor of herein plaintiff-appellants pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Defendant-appellees Aurora L. Tecson and Atty. Jose L. Tecson are directed to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellants the following: a.) b.) c.) P200,000 as moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages; and P20,000 as attorneys fees.

MINERVA, MARIA, FRANCISCO, AGUSTINA, JOSE, ROMUALDO, ELIZABETH and VICTOR, all surnamed FAUSTO, and ISABEL VDA. DE FAUSTO, Respondents.

Promulgated: June 1, 2011

The antecedents of this case are as follows: Sometime in 1945, Atty. Agustin Fausto (Atty. Fausto) acquired in co-ownership with his sister, Waldetrudes Fausto-Nadela (Waldetrudes), Lot 2189a one thousand fifteen (1,015) square meter parcel of land situated at Jose Zulueta Street corner National Highway in Pagadian City, Zamboanga Del Sur.[6] In 1953, Atty. Fausto constructed his house on a portion of the said lot. [7] In 1970, following a cadastral proceeding, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes were recognized as co-owners of Lot 2189. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 734[8] covering Lot 2189 was issued in the names of: [I]n undivided shares, Waldetrudes Fausto, married to Leon Nadela; and Agustin Fausto, married to Isabel Pareja, x x x. Not long after, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes decided to partition Lot 2189. For this purpose, Waldetrudes hired one Engr. Ernesto D. Aguilar (Engr. Aguilar) to prepare a subdivision plan for the lot. On 25 March 1974, Engr. Aguilar prepared subdivision plan Psd-09-06-000110 (First Plan)[9] that divided Lot 2189 into two (2) lots, i.e., Lot 2189-A with an area of 507 square meters, and Lot 2189-B with an area of 508 square meters. An illustration of the First Plan shows this division:

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION PEREZ, J.:

On 6 April 1974, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands approved the First Plan. For Review[1] are the Decision[2] dated 12 December 2006 and Resolution[3] dated 2 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70303. In the said decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 of Pagadian City[4] thereby allowing the respondents to recover four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land from Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4,342 in the name of petitioner Jose Tecson. The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:[5] WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. On 15 April 1974, Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes formalized their decision to subdivide Lot 2189 by executing an Agreement of Partition. [10] Under this agreement (First Partition Agreement), Waldetrudes was to be given absolute ownership over Lot 2189-A, while Atty. Fausto was to be conferred separate dominion over Lot 2189-B.[11] The First Partition Agreement, however, was never registered with the Register of Deeds. On 14 March 1975, Atty. Fausto died. He was survived by herein respondents, who are his wife[12] and children.[13]

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On 7 July 1977, however, Waldetrudes entered into a Contract to Sell [14] with herein petitioner Aurora L. Tecson (Aurora). In it, Waldetrudes undertook to sell, among others, her ideal share in Lot 2189 to Aurora upon full payment of the purchase price.[15] On 28 July 1977, Engr. Aguilar prepared a second subdivision plan (Second Plan)[16] for Lot 2189. The Second Plan, designated as Psd-268803, drastically altered the division of Lot 2189 under the First Plan.[17] It introduced the following changes: 1. Waldetrudes Lot 2189-A with an area of 507 square meters under the First Plan was now Lot 2189-B with an increased area of 964 square meters.[18] 2. Atty. Faustos Lot 2189-B with an area of 508 square meters under the First Plan was now Lot 2189-A with a decreased area of 51 square meters.[19] An illustration of the Second Plan will further highlight these changes:

4.

On the very same day, the above deed was registered with the Register of Deeds.[30]

On 20 February 1980, TCT No. T-4,338 was cancelled. In its place, TCT No. T4,342[31] was issued, this time, in the name of Atty. Tecson. Seven (7) years after, or on 28 May 1987, the respondents filed a Complaint [32] for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Titles, Reconveyance and Damages against Waldetrudes and the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City. In essence, the respondents seek the recovery of four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land from TCT No. T-4,342, which they believe was unlawfully taken from the lawful share of their predecessor-in-interest, Atty. Fausto, in Lot 2189.[33] The respondents allege that Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes are, in actual fact, co-owners in equal share of Lot 2189.[34] They insist on the First Partition Agreement as the only true, correct and binding division of Lot 2189.[35] Hence, Atty. Fausto is entitled not merely to the meager fifty-one (51) square meter lot actually given to him under the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement, but to the five hundred eight (508) square meters of land allotted for him under the original partition.[36] Verily, Waldetrudes could not have sold more than her rightful share of only five hundred seven (507) square meters.[37] The respondents, thus, ask for the nullification of the sale of Lot 2189-B to the petitioners, at least with respect to the excess amounting to four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters.[38] In the same vein, the respondents impugn the validity and binding effect of the Second Plan and the ensuing Second Partition Agreement.[39] They denounce the said plan and agreement as mere handiworks of respondent Atty. Tecson himself in a fraudulent scheme to get a lions share of Lot 2189.[40] More particularly, the respondents claim that: 1. Atty. Tecson was the one who deceived them into signing the Second Partition Agreement.[41] The respondents say that they were not involved in the preparation of the Second Partition Agreement.[42] It was only respondent Atty. Tecson who presented them with the said agreement and who misleadingly told them that it was required to facilitate the sale of Waldetrudes share.[43] The respondents explain that they believed Atty. Tecson because he was their long-time neighbor, a close family friend and, not the least, a respected member of the community being a former governor of the province.[44] 2. The respondents also point out that the Second Partition Agreement did not specify the exact areas allotted for each component lot, and that they were never furnished with copies of the Second Plan.[45] 3. The Second Plan, which supposedly supplants the First Plan and divides Lot 2189 into two (2) vastly unequal portions, was prepared without the respondents knowledge or consent.[46] For which reason, the Second Plan could not be binding upon them. 4. The guardianship proceeding purportedly initiated in the name of respondent Isabel was actually orchestrated and financed by Atty. Tecson.[47] Atty. Tecson was the one who hired Atty. Fausto M. Lingating, his former legal adviser during his term as governor, to handle the guardianship case for and on behalf of Isabel.[48] On 20 October 1988, Waldetrudes, who was originally sued by the respondents as a defendant in the RTC, executed an affidavit[49] expressing her intent to join the respondents in their

The Second Plan was approved by the Land Registration Commission on 12 August 1977. On 28 September 1977, a second partition over Lot 2189 (Second Partition Agreement)[20] was executed between the respondents in their capacity as heirs of Atty. Fausto on one hand, and Waldetrudes on the other. Presumably with the Second Plan as a new basis, the agreement named Waldetrudes as the owner of Lot 2189-B while the respondents were allocated Lot 2189-A. On 8 May 1978, Waldetrudes sold Lot 2189-B, with an area of nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters, to Aurora.[21] Meanwhile, it would seem that the Register of Deeds had refused registration of the Second Partition Agreement in view of the fact that several of the respondents, namely Jose, Romualdo, Elizabeth and Victor were still minors.[22] Hence, a guardianship proceeding was commenced by respondent Isabel Vda. De Fausto (Isabel)the wife of Atty. Faustoto secure her appointment as the legal guardian of her minor children in connection with the Second Partition Agreement.[23] On 28 July 1978, the guardianship court granted Isabels Petition [24] and, on 17 January 1980, issued an Order approving the Second Partition Agreement. [25] On 19 February 1980, the following events transpired: 1. The Second Partition Agreement was finally registered with the Register of Deeds. As a consequence, OCT No. 734 covering Lot 2189 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, were issued the following titles: a. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4,335 covering Lot 2189-A in the name of Atty. Fausto; and b. TCT No. T-4,336 for Lot 2189-B in the name of Waldetrudes.[26] 2. The sale of Lot 2189-B in favor of Aurora was likewise registered with the Register of Deeds.[27] Accordingly, the newly issued TCT No. T-4,336 was immediately cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-4,338[28] in the name of Aurora. 3. Aurora executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,[29] conveying Lot 2189-B to her brother, herein petitioner Atty. Jose L. Tecson (Atty. Tecson).

29

cause. In the mentioned affidavit, Waldetrudes confirmed the allegations of the respondents as follows: xxxx 4. That the truth of the matter is that, my brother the late Agustin Fausto and I are co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 734 of Lot 2189, situated at Gatas District, Pagadian City, containing an area of 1,015 square meters, more or less, in equal share pro indiviso; 5. That sometimes (sic) in 1974 the late Agustin Fausto and myself agreed to terminate our co-ownership and have the area surveyed and the same was approved and designated as PSD-09-06-000110, of which we have executed an agreement of partition on April 15, 1974 apportioning Lot No. 2189-A with an area of 508 square meters in favor of my late brother Agustin Fausto and Lot No. 2189-B with an area of 507 square meters in my favor; 6. That the aforestated documents were not registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds until the death of my brother Agustin Fausto on March 14, 1975, however, the papers or documents involving Lot No. 2189 was kept by me; 7. That due to financial problem especially I am already very old and sickly, I thought of selling my portion which is Lot 2189-B in favor of Jose L. Tecson, however, in the document the vendee appears to be the sister of Jose L. Tecson in the person of Aurora L. Tecson; 8. That I do not know later on how Jose L. Tecson maneuvered to have the parcel of land again surveyed reducing the area of my brother to only 51 square meters, when in truth and in fact the portion of my late brother has an area of 508 square meters; 9. That while it is true that I sold Jose L. Tecson my portion of Lot 2189-B but the area sold is only 507 square meters and there is no intention on my part to sell to Jose L. Tecson more than that area; 10. That several occasion in the past I was made to sign documents by Jose L. Tecson in relation to the portion sold in his favor, trusting him to be closed (sic) to the family, not knowing later on that he maneuvered to change the area of my portion from 507 square meters to 964 square meters encroaching the share of my late brother Atty. Agustin Fausto thereby reducing his area to 51 square meters; 11. That because of the illegal maneuvering which does not reflect to be my true intention in selling my share to Jose L. Tecson, I am informing the Honorable Court that I am joining as party plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2692 in order that the truth will come out and justice will prevail. On 18 August 1992, the trial court ordered Waldetrudes to be dropped as a party-defendant from the case and, instead, be impleaded therein as a party-plaintiff.[50] During the trial, Isabel[54] were able to testify. Waldetrudes[51] and respondents Romualdo,[52] Minerva[53] and

In its decision dated 8 December 2000, the RTC dismissed the complaint of the respondents.[55] The trial court found no merit in the position of the respondents and considered the petitioners to be innocent purchasers for value of Lot 2189-B.[56] The dispositive portion of the ruling of the trial court reads:[57] WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case, and placing defendants spouses Jose Tecson and Leonila F. Tecson in physical possession of Lot No. 2189-B, with an area of 964 square meters in accordance with the approved subdivision plan on August 12, 1977 of the then Land Registration Commission; and ordering the plaintiffs to pay defendants: a. b. c. Moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; Attorneys fee in the amount of P15,000.00; And the cost of litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00.

As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court on appeal.[58] Hence, the present appeal by the petitioners. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the respondents may recover the four hundred fifty-seven (457) square meters of land from TCT No. T-4,342, registered in the name of petitioner Atty. Tecson. The petitioners would like this Court to answer in the negative. The claim of petitioner Atty. Tecson over the entire nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters of land covered by TCT No. T-4,342 is intricately linked with the validity of the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement. As a perusal of the facts reveal, TCT No. T-4,342, along with its precursors TCT Nos. T-4,338 and T-4,336, are but derivates of the division of Lot 2189 fixed by the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement. Understandably, the petitioners argue in favor of the validity of the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement.[59] They deny Atty. Tecsons participation in the preparation of the said instruments.[60] The petitioners insist that the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement were voluntary and intelligent deeds of Waldetrudes and the respondents themselves. [61] The petitioners also claim that the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement present a more accurate reflection of the true nature of the co-ownership between Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes. Contrary to what the respondents profess, Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto were not actually co-owners in equal share of Lot 2189.[62] In truth, the siblings were not even co-owners at all.[63] According to the petitioners, Lot 2189 was originally the conjugal property of Waldetrudes and her late husband, Leon Nadela.[64] At the inception, Atty. Fausto was never a co-owner of Lot 2189.[65] Suitably, it was only Waldetrudes who initially declared Lot 2189 for taxation purposes per Tax Declaration No. 6521.[66] During the cadastral proceedings in 1970, however, Waldetrudes allowed Lot 2189 to be registered in her name and the name of Atty. Fausto as co-owners.[67] The petitioners claim that Waldetrudes consented to such a registration only because Atty. Fausto had already constructed his house on a portion of Lot 2189.[68] The registered co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto is, therefore, based merely on the siblings actual occupancy of Lot 2189.[69] The petitioners point out that the interest of Atty. Fausto in Lot 2189 was only limited to the house he constructed thereonwhich, as it happened, lies evenly on the fifty-one (51) square meter portion eventually assigned to him under the Second Plan and Second Partition

30

Agreement.[70] Hence, the Second Plan and the Second Partition Agreement must be sustained as perfectly valid instruments. We are not convinced. Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are Co-owners in Equal Share After reviewing the arguments and evidence presented in this case, We rule that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are, indeed, co-owners of Lot 2189. Moreover, We hold that the siblings have equal shares in the said lot. First. The mother title of Lot 2189, OCT No. 734, states in no unclear terms that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto were co-owners of the subject lot. The inscription in the original title for Lot 2189 carries more than sufficient weight to prove the existence of a co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto. Second. Other than the bare assertion of the petitioners, there is absolutely no proof on record that Waldetrudes was the sole beneficial owner of Lot 2189. Tax Declaration No. 6521 simply cannot prevail over OCT No. 734 as conclusive evidence of the true ownership of Lot 2189.[71] Third. During the cadastral proceeding involving Lot 2189, Waldetrudes herself stated that Atty. Fausto was a co-owner of the subject lot. The transcript taken from the proceeding shows:[72] Commissioner: What is your relation with Waldetrudes Fausto who is the claimant of Lot No. 2189 (portion) of a parcel of land located at Pagadian City and more particularly bounded as follows: On the North by Lot No. 2190, on the East by Zulueta St., on the South by National Highway and on the West by Gatas Creek with an area of 1015 sq. meters and a house as a permanent improvement. A: I am the very one sir. Q: How did you acquire the said land? A: I purchase (sic) it from Sofia Vda. Claro in the year 1945 but a copy of the document was lost. xxxx Q: Who is your co-owner of this land? A: My co-owner is my brother Atty. Agustin Fausto. Fourth. There was likewise no evidence behind the petitioners allegation that the registered co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto was based on their actual occupancy of Lot 2189. On the contrary, OCT No. 734 categorically states that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto are co-owners in undivided share of Lot 2189. The conspicuous silence of OCT No. 734 as to the definite extent of the respective shares of Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes in Lot 2189 gives rise to a presumption that they are in equal measure. We are at once reminded of Article 485 of the Civil Code,[73] to wit:

Article 485. x x x. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. Fifth. The equality in terms of share in Lot 2189, was affirmed by Waldetrudes when she testified in open court, to wit:[74] DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA Q: Now considering that you are, you owned that parcel of land jointly with your younger brother Atty. Agustin Fausto, what is the extent of your ownership? A: We have co-equal shares sir. Clearly, the evidence preponderates in favor of the position that Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto were co-owners in equal share of Lot 2189. Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement is Invalid Having settled the existence and extent of the co-ownership between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto, We next inquire into the validity of the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement. We find the Second Plan and Second Partition Agreement to be invalid. We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Atty. Tecson was behind the execution of the Second Partition Agreement.[75] It was Atty. Tecson who misled Waldetrudes and the respondents into signing the Second Partition Agreeement without giving them notice of the existence of a Second Plan.[76] As a consequence, Waldetrudes and the respondents were misinformed as to the true nature of the Second Partition Agreement. These factual findings are adequately supported by the positive testimonies of respondents Romualdo Fausto,[77] Minerva Fausto[78] and Isabel,[79] to wit: ROMUALDOS DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Will you please go over if this is the machine copy of the Deed of partition which was brought to you by Atty. Tecson and requested you to sign the same? A: Yes sir that is the one. xxxx Q: When was that Deed of Partition marked as Exhibit G presented to you by Atty. Tecson?

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A: Early part of 1977. I was already connected with the Provincial Assessor that was the time I have seen so many Deed of Sale and the area is specified so before I signed I asked Atty. Tecson where is the area and he told me never mind the area it will be surveyed and I did not insist because I trusted him very much. Q: By the time this was presented to you by Atty. Tecson there was no survey of 2189? A: There was no survey. xxxx

A: Yes, sir. xxxx ATTY. PERALTA: Q: When Atty. Tecson went your house to request you to sign how did he tell you? A: He told us just to sign the document and the survey will just follow we just sign the document without the area and he told us that the area will just follow later. Q: When you signed the document with your mother, brothers and sisters Atty. Tecson brought the documents? A: Yes, sir. MINERVA FAUSTOS DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Why, at the time when who brought this deed of partition for signature? A: Jose L. Tecson. Q: You are referring to one of the defendants, Jose L. Tecson? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, when this was brought by Jose L. Tecson, the defendant Jose L. Tecson, where did he COURT: For a moment. Q: You said that defendant Jose L. Tecson brought that deed of partition. Were you there when defendant Jose L. Tecson brought that deed of partition? A: Yes, your Honor. Q: Where was it brought? A: In the house. COURT: Proceed. ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Who were present in your house when this was brought by defendant Jose L. Tecson?

COURT: This document which you said you were present during the signing of your brothers and sisters but you cannot remember whether you were present for the others where did you sign this document? A: At our house. COURT: Who delivered this document to you[r] house? A: Atty. Tecson. COURT: You want to impress this court that when you affixed your signatures in your house Atty. Tecson was present? A: Yes sir. COURT: After signing what was done to this document? A: We are not aware of that but we just waited for the survey because Atty. Tecson told us that the survey follows later. COURT: Who kept this document? A: My Auntie Waldetrudes Nadela. COURT: It is clear now that this document was signed in your house and it was kept by your Auntie?

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A: Myself, Neneth or Agustin, Romualdo and Jose Fausto. There were four (4) of us when that deed of partition was brought to the house, myself, my sister Agustina, my brothers Romualdo and Jose. Q: Do you want to convey to the Court that when this was brought to you Francisco Fausto, Victor Fausto and your sister Elizabeth, Maria Fausto were not around when this was brought by Jose L. Tecson for signature in your house? A: Yes, sir. xxxx Q: Why did you sign above the typewritten name of Francisco Fausto knowing that he was not around? A: Because defendant Jose L. Tecson told me to affix the signature of Francisco Fausto because this deed of partition is just to facilitate the transferring (sic) of the title of the land. xxxx Q: Who signed for her, for and behalf of Maria Lilia Fausto? A: I signed myself. Q: Why did you sign for Maria Lilia Fausto? A: Because Jose L. Tecson told me to sign the document in order that the deed of partition could be accomplished. xxxx Q: Now, how about the residence certificates appearing after the name of Agustina Fausto, with her own residence certificate 3976584 to have been issued January 6, 1977, Pagadian City, and the Residence Certificate of Jose Fausto which has the same number 3976584 issued on January 6, 1977, Pagadian City, who placed this residence certificate? A: All of us sir never exhibited our residence certificates. It was the Tecsons who supplied the residence certificate numbers. ISABELS DIRECT EXAMINATION ATTY. PERALTA: Q: Do you remember having signed a Deed of Partition together with some of your children? A: Yes sir[.] I can remember.

Q: Who brought that Deed of Partition for signature together with some of your children? A: Governor Tecson. Q: Were you able to sign the Deed of Partition? A: I signed that Deed of Partition because according to him just sign this for purposes of subdividing the property. xxxx Q: Do you recall if you have filed guardianship proceeding? A: I have not remembered having filed a guardianship proceeding. Q: Have you heard that there was guardianship proceeding? A: All I can remember about that guardianship proceeding was that when Gov. Tecson let me sign a guardianship because some of my children were not around. Q: Do you want to convey to this court that personally you have not filed guardianship proceeding but it was Governor Tecson who let you sign some documents regarding guardianship? A: It was Governor Tecson who explained to me to sign that guardianship proceeding because according to him it will facilitate and I thought that guardianship was only for purposes of being guardian to my children as a mother. Indeed, the lack of a plausible explanation why a co-owner would gratuitously cede a very substantial portion of his rightful share to another co-owner in partition renders the foregoing testimonies more credible as against the plain general denial of Atty. Tecson. On this point, We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The established facts have several legal consequences: First. The Second Plan, having been prepared without the knowledge and consent of any of the co-owners of Lot 2189, have no binding effect on them. Second. The Second Partition Agreement is null and void as an absolute simulation,[80] albeit induced by a third party. The fraud perpetrated by Atty. Tecson did more than to vitiate the consent of Waldetrudes and the respondents. It must be emphasized that Waldetrudes and the respondents never had any intention of entering into a new partition distinct from the First Partition Agreement. The established facts reveal that Waldetrudes and the respondents assented to the Second Partition Agreement because Atty. Tecson told them that the instrument was merely required to expedite the sale of Waldetrudes share.[81] In other words, the deceit employed by Atty. Tecson goes into the very nature of the Second Partition Agreement and not merely to its object or principal condition. Evidently, there is an absence of a genuine intent on the part of the co-owners to be bound under a new partition proposing a new division of Lot 2189. The apparent consent of Waldetrudes and the

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respondents to the Second Partition Agreement is, in reality, totally wanting. For that reason, the Second Partition Agreement is null and void. Third. The Second Partition Agreement being a complete nullity, it cannot be ratified either by the lapse of time or by its approval by the guardianship court.[82] Fourth. The First Plan and the First Partition Agreement remain as the valid and binding division of Lot 2189. Hence, pursuant to the First Partition Agreement, Waldetrudes is the absolute owner of Lot 2189-A with an area of only five hundred seven (507) square meters. Atty. Fausto, on the other hand, has dominion over Lot 2189-B with an area of five hundred eight (508) square meters. Fifth. Inevitably, Waldetrudes can only sell her lawful share of five hundred seven (507) square meters. The sales in favor of Aurora and, subsequently, Atty. Tecson, are thereby null and void insofar as it exceeded the 507 square meter share of Waldetrudes in Lot 2189. Nemo dat quod non habet.[83] Atty. Tecson is not an innocent purchaser for value The remaining bar to the recovery by the respondents of the excess area held by Atty. Tecson is the principle of an innocent purchaser for value of land under the Torrens System of Registration. The petitioners claim that they are bona fide purchasers of the entire nine hundred sixtyfour (964) square meters of land covered by Lot 2189-Bwith Aurora merely relying on the strength of TCT No. T-4,336 in the name of Waldetrudes, while Atty. Tecson placing confidence in TCT No. T-4,338 in the name of Aurora. Both TCT Nos. T-4,336 and T-4,338 define the area of Lot 2189-B as nine hundred sixty-four (964) square meters.[84] The petitioners allege that at the time they made their respective purchase, they did not know of the existing partition of Lot 2189 per the First Plan and the First Partition Agreement.[85] We disagree. The proven facts indicate that Atty. Tecson knew or, at the very least, should have known that Atty. Fausto and Waldetrudes were co-owners in equal share of Lot 2189. We must be reminded of the following circumstances: 1. Atty. Tecson was a long-time friend and neighbor of the Faustos.[86] Atty. Tecson himself testified that he considered Atty. Fausto as a good friend and even admitted that he would sometimes visit the latter in his house to play mahjong.[87] By this, Atty. Tecson knew that Atty. Fausto has an actual interest in Lot 2189. 2. Atty. Tecson was the one who presented the Second Partition Agreement to Waldetrudes and the respondents;[88] 3. Waldetrudes and the respondents were not involved in the preparation of the Second Partition Agreement and, at the time they signed the said agreement, had no knowledge of the existence of the Second Plan;[89] and 4. The Second Partition Agreement failed to state the specific areas allotted for each component of Lot 2189 and made no mention of the division proposed by the Second Plan. [90] Being the one behind the execution of the Second Partition Agreement, there is no doubt that Atty. Tecson knew that Lot 2189 was owned in common by Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto. This, taken together with the instruments unusual silence as to the definite area allotted

for each component lot and the Second Plan, reveals a deliberate attempt on the part of Atty. Tecson to conceal from Waldetrudes and the respondents the unequal division of Lot 2189. The necessity to conceal the disproportionate division of Lot 2189 can only be explained by Atty. Tecsons prior knowledge that such a partition is inherently defective for being contrary to the actual sharing between Waldetrudes and Atty. Fausto. Atty. Tecson is clearly in bad faith. Verily, Atty. Tecson cannot be considered as an innocent purchaser of the excess area of Lot 2189-B. Based on the facts and circumstances prevailing in this case, Atty. Tecson may be charged with actual notice of the defect plaguing the Second Partition Agreement. The respondents may, therefore, recover. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the appealed Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 70303 dated 12 December 2006 is herebyAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION

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CO GIOK LUN v. Jose Co x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari assailing the Decision2 dated 23 April 2008 and Resolution3 dated 10 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 85920. The Facts This case involves two lots allegedly co-owned by two brothers, petitioner Co Giok Lun (Lun) and Co Bon Fieng (Fieng), the father of respondent Jose Co (Co). The lots, which are situated in Sorsogon province, one in the town of Gubat and the other in the town of Barcelona, are described as: Gubat Property A parcel of commercial/residential land, located at Poblacion, Gubat, Sorsogon, containing an area of 720.68 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Angel Camara, on the East by Rodolfo Rocha, on the South by Guaria Street and on the West by Zulueta Street declared under Tax Declaration No. 11379 in the name of Co Bon Fieng and assessed at P12,370.00.4 Barcelona Property Terreno cocal radicada en el sitio de Telegrafo barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I. F. cabida de sesenta y cinco (65 a.) lindates por Norte Hertrudes Casulla, por sur Antonio Evasco, por Este con los manglares y por Oeste Atanacio Espera y Eugenio Esteves. Terreno cocalero ubicado en el barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I.F. cabida de una hectaria dies y ocho areas y sesenta y ciete centiarias (1 hects. 18 hareas 67 centiareas) lindantes al NorteCementerio Municipal antes Eugenio Esteves, al Este Gabriel Gredoa y Laudia Asis, al Sur Amando Torilla y Florentino Mercader, y al Oeste Carretera Provincial. Terreno solar con doce ponos de coco situada en el barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I.F. cabida de dos riales y quevalente a trienta y cuatro areas y un camarin de materiales fuertes y deficadadentro de la misma lindante al Norte Camino para S. Antonio, al Sur Eugenio Esteves, al Este Carretera Provincial y al Oeste a los herederos del defunto Feliciano Fontelar.5 Petitioners, the legal heirs of Lun who died on 12 January 1997, filed a complaint6 for partition and damages against Co with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gubat, Sorsogon,Branch 54. Claim of Petitioners

Petitioners claimed that Lun and Fieng came to the Philippines from China in 1929. Lun allegedly acquired the Gubat property from the P8,000.00 capital the brothers inherited from their father, Co Chaco (Chaco), before Chaco returned to China in 1926 due to old age. The Gubat property was named under Fieng only since it has been a common practice and custom in China that properties intended for the children are placed in the name of the eldest child. The Barcelona property, on the other hand, was acquired by Chaco in 1923 while he was still doing his business in Gubat. Lun and Fieng set up a business, selling and trading of dry goods, called the Philippine Honest and Company. Using the companys funds, they rented the property of Crispina Rocha (Rocha), which was mortgaged and finally sold to them in 1935. Later, from the income of the business, they acquired the two adjoining residential and commercial lots which increased the size of the Gubat property to its present area of 720.68 square meters. In 1946, Lun and Fieng dissolved and liquidated the business. After receiving his share of P26,000 from the liquidation, Lun established his own dry goods business called Shanghai Trading. Fieng, on the other hand, entered into other businesses with different partners. Petitioners claimed that Lun stayed at the Gubat property from the time he arrived in China in 1929. Lun was the one who religiously paid for the realty taxes and made several repairs on the building to make the Gubat property habitable. It was only sometime in 1946 when Lun and Fieng decided to divide the two lots. However, the partition did not push through on the insistence of their mother, Po Kiat, who wanted to preserve and maintain close family ties. Petitioners also alleged that Lun prevented the Gubat property from being appropriated when the lot was used by Fieng as a loan guarantee. Fieng incurred the P4,500 obligation fromErquiaga Corporation which Lun assumed and paid without any contribution from respondents, specifically Co. After Fieng suffered financial bankruptcy in Manila, he went back toGubat. Upon the request of their mother, Lun lent his brother P30,000 which Fieng used to start up a business. However, until Fiengs death on 8 July 1958, the amount which Lun lent was never returned to him. Lun even extended financial assistance to Co amounting to no less than P30,000 which remained unpaid. Later, when Lun already refused to lend money to Co, the latter made himself the administrator of the Gubat property without Luns knowledge. Thereafter, Co filed a case for unlawful detainer against Lun with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gubat, docketed as Civil Case No. 210. This case was decided by the MTC in favor of Co but was reversed by the RTC in its Decision dated 28 April 1994. The RTCs decision was later affirmed by the CA and this Court. Claim of Respondents On the other hand, respondents, in their Amended Answer, maintained that the Gubat property is the exclusive property of their father. They asserted that Fieng acquired the lot by purchase from Rocha in 1935 or nine years after Chaco left for China in 1926. While Lun was still in China, Fieng and Rocha entered into an agreement for the use of the lot whereFieng built a camalig and started his sari-sari store business. On 13 March 1929, Fieng and Rocha entered into another contract extending Fiengs right to occupy the lot until 17 August 1938. On 16 March 1930, another extension was given until 19 August 1940. On 13 October 1935, Fieng and Rocha executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where Rocha sold the lot to Fieng for P3,000. On 6 August 1936, Ireneo Rocha also sold a parcel of the adjoining land to Fieng which increased the size of the Gubat property to its present area. Both documents had been properly notarized. Fieng used the property not only as the familys residence but also for business and trade purposes until his death in 1958. It was even Fieng who had constructed the commercial building on the property in 1928. From 1937 to 1983, the land and tax declarations of the property was in the sole

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name of their father. In 1983, Co became the administrator of theGubat property and had the property declared in his own name in substitution of his father without any objection from Lun. Respondents denied that Lun and Fieng entered into any business together. Respondents claim that it was only in 1956 or 1957 when Lun was taken in by Fieng, who was then ill and could not manage his general merchandising business. Fieng allowed Lun to use the lower portion of the Gubat property and let him manage his business and properties as administrator.Lun was in possession of the property even after Fiengs death in 1958 because of the consent and tolerance of the respondents who were still young at that time. Respondents further insisted that Chaco gave the Barcelona property to Fieng exclusively as advance inheritance and denied that Co ever borrowed money from Lun. As a counterclaim, respondents asked for the payment of rent for the use by Lun of the Gubat property, as well as moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The RTCs Ruling In a Decision7 dated 21 July 2004, the RTC decided the case in favor of petitioners. The RTC stated that the documentary evidence presented in court showed that the Gubat property is indeed under Fiengs name. However, the chain of events prior to the purchase of the property and the evidence submitted by the petitioners prove the presence of co-ownership. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered that the Heirs of Co Chaco are pro indiviso owners of the Gubat and Barcelona properties which are to be partitioned among these heirs. They are hereby directed to cause the survey of the property and to submit to this Court the plan of partition for approval. No costs. SO ORDERED.8 The Court of Appeals Ruling Respondents appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated 23 April 2008, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion states: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gubat, Sorsogon (Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 1601, is REVERSED. The order of the trial court to cause the survey of the subject properties for the partition thereof is SET ASIDE. The subject properties are declared exclusively owned by Co Bon Fieng, and now by his legal heirs, herein appellants. SO ORDERED.9 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated 10 September 2008. Hence, this petition. The Issue The main issue is whether the CA erred in holding that no co-ownership existed between Lun and Fieng over the Gubat and Barcelona properties and in declaring Fieng as the exclusive owner of both properties.

The Courts Ruling The petition lacks merit. The original complaint filed by Lun involves an action for partition and damages. A division of property cannot be ordered by the court unless the existence of co-ownership is first established. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,10 we held that an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the property. Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. Article 484 of the Civil Code which defines co-ownership, states: Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. x x x In the present case, petitioners insist that their predecessor-in-interest Lun co-owned the Gubat and Barcelona properties with his brother Fieng. To prove co-ownership over the Gubatproperty, petitioners presented: (1) tax declarations from 1929 to 1983 under the name of Fieng but paid by Lun; (2) the renewal certificate from Malayan Insurance Company Inc.; (3) the insurance contract; and (4) the statements of account from Supreme Insurance Underwriters which named Lun as administrator of the property. Likewise, to prove their right over the Barcelona property as legal heirs under intestate succession, petitioners presented a Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923 between Chaco, as buyer, and Gabriel Gredona and EngraciaLegata, as sellers, involving a price consideration of P1,200. On the other hand, respondents presented notarized documents: (1) Deed of Sale dated 13 October 1935, and (2) Sale of Real Property dated 6 August 1936 showing that the former owners of the Gubat property entered into a sale transaction with Fieng, as buyer and Lun, as a witness to the sale. They also presented tax declarations in the name of Fieng from 1937 to 1958. After Fiengs death, Co declared the Gubat property in his name in the succeeding tax declarations. Likewise, the respondents presented documents proving the declaration of the Barcelona property in the name of Co. After a careful scrutiny of the records, we hold that the evidence of petitioners were insufficient or immaterial to warrant a positive finding of co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona properties. The CA correctly observed that petitioners failed to substantiate with reasonable certainty that (1) Chaco gave Fieng a start-up capital of P8,000 to be used by Lunand Fieng in setting up a business, (2) that the Philippine Honest and Company was a partnership between Lun and Fieng, and (3) that the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923 involving the Barcelona property is sufficient to establish coownership. Also, petitioners were not able to prove the existence of the alleged Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest child as provided under Article 12 11 of the Civil Code. In contrast, respondents were able to show documents of sale from the original owners of the Gubat property rendering the claim of custom as immaterial. 12 Also, respondents sufficiently established that Fieng was the registered owner of the Gubat and Barcelona properties while Lun was merely an administrator. The relevant portions of the CA decision provide: x x x As to the Gubat property, appellee (petitioner Co Giok Lun in this case) failed to establish the following with reasonable certainty: a) that Co Chaco gave Co Bon Fieng P8,000.00 as business capital for him and his brother; and b) that Philippine Honest and Company is a partnership between him and Co Bon Fieng. Appellees testimony is that his father told him that the latter gave Co BonFieng P8,000.00 is hearsay since he had no personal knowledge of the fact that Co Chaco gave Co Bon Fieng said amount. Even if the trial court admitted said testimony, it

36

remains without probative value. x x xAllegedly, this amount was the contribution of appellee and Co Bon Fieng to the capital of their partnership Philippine Honest and Company. Nevertheless, by reason of appellees failure to prove the existence of this amount, the existence of the partnership remains doubtful. Appellee present[ed] the certification of registration of the Philippine Honest and Company to prove the existence of the partnership but the registration indicates only the name of Co Bon Fieng as the owner thereof. Without the capital contribution and the partnership, appellees claim of co-ownership over the Gubat property does not have any basis. To further prove his claim of co-ownership over the Gubat property, appellee presents Tax Declarations pertaining to the subject property from 1929 to 1983, renewal certificate from Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., insurance contract and statements of accounts from Supreme Insurance Underwriters. These documents, however, uniformly indicate Co Bon Fieng as the owner of the subject property and appellee as mere administrator thereof. Too, appellee proffers utility bills and receipts indicating payment to Erquiaga, Inc., a creditor of Co Bon Fieng, in support of his claim of co-ownership. These documents however, find no relevance in this case. Appellees assumption of Co Bon Fiengs liabilities and his payment of utilities without getting any contribution from appellants are kind acts but certainly do not prove his claim of co-ownership. Neither do the court declarations in Civil Case No. 210 prove appellees claim of co-ownership, for only issues concerning possession were resolved in said unlawful detainer suit. Lastly, contrary to the claim of appellee, the affidavit of Co Che Bee, which recognizes appellee as a co-owner of the subject property, cannot bind Co Bon Fieng, for well-settled is the rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Hence, appellees claim of co-ownership over the Gubat property must fail. Concerning the Barcelona property, appellee proffers a deed of sale dated 24 August 1923 to support his claim that he and Co Bon Fieng are co-owners thereof. Under said deed, the subject property was sold to Co Chaco. Nevertheless, the deed proves just that Co Chaco purchased the subject property. It does not establish subsequent events or validly dispute the transfer of the subject property by Co Chaco to Co Bon Fieng. Moreover, said document does not have any probative value to refute the real property tax declarations of the subject property in the name of appellant Jose Co. This document is inadequate to establish co-ownership between appellee and Co Bon Fieng over the Barcelona property. In fine, appellees evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the finding that the subject properties fall under the purview of coownership. Appellee failed to prove that he is a co-owner of the subject properties. In contrast, appellants offer convincing evidence that their father, Co Bon Fieng owns the subject properties exclusively. In the Deed of Sale dated 13 October 1935 and the Sale of Real Property dated 6 August 1936, the former owners of the Gubat property sold the same to Co Bon Fieng only. Although appellees signature appears in the first document as a witness to its execution, there is no indication in said document or in the other that he was purchasing the subject property together with Co Bon Fieng. Appellee interjects that the foregoing deeds indicate Co Bon Fieng as the owner of the subject property because of the Chinese custom that in similar transactions, the eldest son of the family is normally placed as the purchaser of a property. Appellee, however, failed to prove this custom as a fact; hence cannot be given weight. xxx

After purchasing the Gubat property, Co Bon Fieng declared the same in tax declarations from 1937 to 1958 as his property. After the death of Co Bon Fieng, appellant Jose Co declared the Gubat property in his name in ensuing tax declarations over the same. As well, the Barcelona property is declared in the name of Jose Co. The Barcelona property was even surveyed for the benefit of appellants, as heirs of Co BonFieng. xxx x x x Here, we find compelling reasons to reverse the findings of the trial court and hold that the subject properties were owned exclusively by Co Bon Fieng, and now by his legal heirs.13 We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona properties. The action for partition cannot be acted upon since petitioners failed to establish any rightful interest in the properties. Petitioners also failed to prove that co-ownership existed between the parties predecessors-in-interest. Thus, respondents, as legal heirs of Fieng, are entitled to the exclusive ownership of the Gubat and Barcelona properties. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 April 2008 and Resolution dated 10 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 85920. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila FIRST DIVISION THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners, -versus ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents. G.R. No. 157537

Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it with his own money.[7] On October 3, 2002,[8] the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.[9] Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that: xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid.[10] Quoting Tolentinos commentary on the matter as authority,[11] the RTC opined: In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino, says [sic] Alienation by the survivor. After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the community property in order to pay outstanding obligation of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property affected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belongs to the vendor as determined in the liquidation and partition. Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited only to the contingent share or interest of the vendor in the particular property involved, but not to the corpus of the property. This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or disposal of the conjugal property without the required formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the law recognizes their validity so long as they do not exceed the portion which, after liquidation and partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse who made the contract. [underlining supplied] It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on the provisions of the New Civil Code and the Family Code on the alienation by the surviving spouse of the community property that jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because why invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property that will eventually be his/her share in the final partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it would be absurd.

Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated:

September 7, 2011 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights. Antecedents On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,[1] whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.[2] On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for 5,686,768.00.[3] On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property,[4] but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute,[5] they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.[6]

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Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140 square-meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go will eventually get as their share in the final partition of the property. So the sale is still valid. WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost and damages. SO ORDERED.[12] The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration[13] prompted the petitioners to appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law. Issue The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation. In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs. [14]

property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied] It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.[16] The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,[17] to wit: Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. (399) Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share.[18] Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.[19] Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.[20] This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).[21] Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale. In their separate comments,[22] the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already received a certain allotted portion at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did not present any public document

Ruling The appeal lacks merit. Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz: Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their

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on the allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Martas estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,[23] to wit: From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one

co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra]. Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx[24] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz: xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.)[25] WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

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