Paper session 1: Friday 1130-1300

Paper 1: Yahia Baiza (Group 1, Friday 1130-1200)

Jihad in Afghanistan: a religious sacrifice or a political struggle? This paper examines the roots of jihad in Afghanistan, from 1978 to 2001, which began with the rise of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (April 1978-April 1992) and was legitimized by the Soviet invasion (December 1979-February 1989), whether it was a religious sacrifice or a political struggle. Nationally and internationally, the Afghan resistance, during this period, was known as jihad, and those who participated in jihad were known as Mujahideen. As this paper will move into examining the term jihad in the context of Afghanistan, the term resistance will be preferred to jihad because the former is more neutral and not value loaded. Of course, others could prefer the term jihad for its religious connotation, or, at least, a freedom fight for its national glorification, and those who participated in jihad as Mujahideen, or freedom fighters. However, as this paper will examine, the term jihad looses its value after February 1989, when the Soviet army had completely been withdrawn from Afghanistan; whereas the term resistance can still be applied in post-Soviet invasion era. This paper argues that, although the term and idea of jihad is rooted in the Quran, the holy book of Islam, the motivation behind the Afghan resistance varied at various levels and was not always purely religious. For example, when the Afghan resistance, primarily composed of local people, proved to be a challenging force to the PDPA rule and later to the Soviet army, the resistance attracted non-Afghan participants from the neighbouring and regional countries, and wider international community. Each of these participating elements were motivated by their own goals and objectives. This paper, however, underlines that the resistance was primarily led and fought by the Afghan citizens, who were also the primary victims of the armed conflict. Also at the grass root level the resistance had a religious dimension and people fought for a religious cause and gave sacrifices. However, this aspect of resistance was soon diluted and suppressed by the Pakistan- and Iran-based resistance leaders, who politically led the resistance, but also fought each other for leadership and control of power. Thus this paper concludes that the resistance (jihad) in Afghanistan that had been led, administered and channeled through the resistance parties, based in Pakistan and Iran, was more a political jihad and a political struggle for control of power than a pure religious sacrifice for a pure religious cause. The religious tone of, and the Quranic references to, jihad was used as a political mechanism to motivate the feelings of the ordinary people who provided the main support system for the resistance. This paper will be arranged in three parts. Part one explores and discusses the meaning of jihad from the Quranic perspectives. This part will provide a theoretical and Quranic foundation for understanding the term jihad, its usage and implication in Afghanistans context. Part two presents a brief contextual background to Afghanistan with reference to the development of resistance movements in Afghanistan. Part three discusses the factors that influenced and shaped these developments and the way the resistance movements used the idea of jihad for political purposes. This part will show that the developed resistance parties in Afghanistan fought for leadership and control of power than for a pure religious struggle against a common enemy that was eroding the religious principles and values of the people of Afghanistan.

Paper 2: Shapour Fereydouni (Group 1, Friday 1200-1230)

Philosophy of Sacrificing in Islam with Shieah Religion Derivative We can see in religion history that in all religions, sacrificing exists (animal even human sacrificing), in non theological religions sacrificing exist too. It appears that social events affect sacrificing. In Islam, sacrifice event of Ishmael with Prophet Abraham caused muslims when they go to Mecca sacrifice a sheep. In another hand cultural heritage and sacrificing of sheep and caws in front of magnates politicians and clergies affected to disperse sacrificing. In duration of time history humans sacrifice for protection from disaster events, for instant in Iran some people when they buy a new house or car sacrifice an animal in front of them. Another type of sacrificing is oblation that consists sacrificing and give gifts. Today we can see extremis and no Islamic type of sacrificing in terrorist action of Alghaedeh. In this article these subjects were discussed: 1- The philosophy of sacrificing in Islam. 2- Problem of oblation and its relationship with sacrificing. 3- Misunderstanding of some groups from sacrificing problem, for instance suicide attacks. 4- Some samples of sacrificing in Iran. 5- Giving solutions to make religions near each other, and appropriate taking from theological taught. Key words: Religions, Sacrificing, Islam, Iran, Oblation.

Paper 3: Mohammad S. Zahedi (Group 1, Friday 1230-1300)

Love, self sacrifice, and God in Rumis thought While sacrifice is a symbolic ritual in Islam and there is a feast with this name, the concept of sacrifice has a mystical and spiritual meaning in Islamic mysticism. This interpretation of sacrifice has had a main role in Islamic mystical world view and especially in mystical ethics. In this paper Im going to examine the concept of sacrifice in the works of one of the greatest Sufis Jalal- al- Din Rumi- in Islam.

Paper 4: Katherine Munn (Group 2, Friday 1130-1200)

Why Sacrifice? Old Concept, Contemporary Context A significant linguistic trend has been the secularization of religious concepts, of which sacrifice is a prime example. As such concepts are employed increasingly in contexts which extend beyond the scope of their original meaning, their linguistic meaning gradually changes. The result is that they cease to make sense when we attempt to re-apply them to describe their original contexts. Because of this, we often feel compelled to regard these contexts as no longer relevant to us. Some might celebrate this process as a welcome adjustment of old concepts to fresh, contemporary contexts. Against this view, I will argue that the loss of our ability to understand these concepts in their original contexts renders them useless at best, or misleading at worst, in describing our contemporary ones. The reason is that there are certain truths about the human condition which stay true even as the meaning of our words change,

and that these new meanings often obscure these truths (even though they may sometimes reveal new ones). I motivate my argument with the example of sacrifice and its relation to another concept, love, which has undergone even more dramatic secularization. I concede that the new meaning of love captures come aspects of our contemporary context. But I argue that, all things considered, it renders our contemporary context difficult to make sense of, because it deprives us of our ability to describe the religious truths which it originally illuminated. That is: in the religious context, we are made in Gods image, rendering his love a model for our love. His love includes sacrifice, which we cannot truly make sense of apart from his love. I conclude by showing how the original meanings of sacrifice and love reveal more truths about our contemporary context than their secularized counterparts do.

Paper 5: John Lippitt (Group 2, Friday 1200-1230)

Proper self-love and proper self-sacrifice: On selfishness, self-hatred, self-centredness and pride According to Harry Frankfurt, proper self-love is the deepest and most essential and by no means the most readily attainable achievement of a serious and successful life.1 Recent naturalist accounts of self-love like Frankfurts have been criticised for lacking a concept of self-sacrifice or self-denial. Yet self-love and self-sacrifice are notorious problems in Christian thought, and the tradition is littered with prima facie incompatible claims about them. For Kierkegaard, self-denial ... is Christianitys essential form.2 Whereas for Alasdair MacIntyre, self-sacrifice ... is as much of vice, as much of a sign of inadequate moral development, as selfishness.3 What are the proper limits of self-sacrifice and self-denial? In this paper, I draw upon Kierkegaard, Jean-Luc Marion, Robert Adams and some recent feminist thought to re-examine the related problems of proper self-love and proper selfsacrifice. I argue that in order to unpack these notions, we need to make several key distinctions. First, we need to understand where proper self-sacrifice fits on a sliding scale between self-limitation and self-annihilation.4 Second, while some have argued that the key distinction is between proper and selfish self-love,5 I argue that we need to distinguish selfishness from other potential threats to proper self-love, such as self-centredness and pride. I argue that: both are distinguishable from selfishness per se; both have proper and improper forms; and that the appropriate forms of both are important components of proper self-love. I suggest that virtuous forms of these modes of being are central to avoiding the dangerous slide from proper self-sacrifice to outright self-annihilation.

1 2

Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 68. Sren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, translated by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 56. 3 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), p. 160. 4 See for example Ruth Groenhout, Kenosis and Feminist Theory, in C. Stephen Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 312. 5 See for example M. Jamie Ferreira, Loves Grateful Striving: a Commentary on Kierkegaards Works of Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Oliver ODonovan, The Problem of Self-love in St Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980; reprinted Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2006).

Paper 6: Petruschka Schaafsma (Group 2, Friday 1230-1300)

Sacrifice in an age of autonomy: modern readings of Antigone Today sacrifice is not an undisputed phenomenon. There is a tension between modern movements of liberation and the ideal of sacrifice as found in religions, especially in Christianity. Feminist thinkers in particular have pointed at the oppressive consequences of sacrifice if it functions as an unchallenged ideal for a specific group (e.g. women, the lower classes, the poor, etc.). By now, however, a contrary movement can be perceived as well, which explores the possible value of sacrifice. The attention paid in recent thinking to ideas like fragility, vulnerability and dependency also alters the one-sided disapproval of sacrifice. This paper investigates the disputed value of sacrifice and religious sacrifice in particular on the basis of different modern readings of Sophocles myth Antigone. What may be called classical readings from Hegel to Ricoeur focus on the self-sacrifice of Antigone for the sake of familial and religious duties. Other, e.g. feminist interpretations have questioned these readings, especially the obviousness of the distinctions from which they start, like male/female, public/private, secular/religious, core/margin, conform/dissent etc. In these different interpretations of Antigone we find different perceptions of sacrifice and religious sacrifice. This paper analyses the differences in perception by means of the ideas of autonomy and dependency. Is sacrifice is regarded as the ultimate act of autonomy, or of submission and dependency, or as a specific kind of combination of the two? This focus is chosen because autonomy expresses a central ideal of modernity, which is moreover important for its problematic relationship towards religion as characterised by dependency. Thus, this analysis of sacrifice in the myth of Antigone illuminates different ways of relating to modernity and its consequences for views of religion.

Paper 7: Ramona Rat (Group 3, Friday 1130-1200)

Substitution as the Possibility of Sacrifice A concept that stays in the core of Levinas Otherwise than Being, substitution belongs to a subject which beyond a self-identifying Ego, outside being, is a Self not in an identity with itself but in the uniqueness of being chosen by the other: I am the one whom the other is addressing, the one who has to respond, I am the one responsible for the other. This responsibility occurs prior to my freedom of choice, in an an-archic passivity, which is outside the duality of passivity and activity. According to Levinas, in passivity, that is before any act of will, before the possessive power of consciousness, in the an-archic disturbance of proximity, the subject is not concerned for itself but it is open for the other. Only in this context, sacrifice is possible. Substitution as an opening up of the subject towards the other constitutes the condition for sacrifice. As a concept substitution didnt appear in the early work of Levinas, not even in Totality and Infinity. There is a tendency to believe that one can find in it a response to Derridas critique to Totality and Infinity. It is certain that by introducing the notion of substitution, Levinas, if not changed the notion of subject, at least made clearer the importance of the other in the (non)identity of the subject. In this sense, the substitution of a subject already responsible with one degree of responsibility more for the other, could be seen as the an-archic sacrifice. It is not given by will or any act of consciousness, it is always already there,

carrying the trace of the other. And in the mean time, the subject becomes a Self for-the-other, a hostage of the other by his responsibility, the only subject capable of true sacrifice.

Paper 8: Gry Ardal Christensen (Group 3, Friday 1200-1230)

Sacrifice, obedience and ethical selfhood Lvinas and the possibility for an ethical notion of sacrifice The concept of sacrifice can be helpful when pursuing an account of ethical selfhood because it concerns a pertinent problem for such an account: what is the nature of my commitment to the good? In my paper I analyse two concepts of obedience found in Emmanuel Lvinas, namely the ethical obedience to the call of the other and the violent obedience to tyranny that is at play when obedience ceases to be an obedient conscience and becomes an inclination (Lvinas 1987, Collected Philosophical Papers, p.16, Martin Nijhoff Publishers), that is, when the grounds of ones actions are detached from the immediate experience of the others face. Sren Kierkegaards analysis of Abrahams sacrifice of Isaac, and Lvinas well known disapproval of it, points to the same problem: how to know the difference between orders coming from tyranny and the ethical imperative of alterity. In working out this issue I look at how Lvinas (in a critical dialogue with Kant) argues for a moment of heteronomy in the constitution of moral autonomy, and at how the passivity of the subjects response (here I am) to the ethical demand can correspond to a morally accountable and responsible self. The purpose of my analysis is to bring this to bear on the concept of sacrifice in order to discuss the question: can sacrifice be though of as an ethical notion within Lvinas antiteleological ethics of passivity? And if so, what is the consequence for a Lvinasian account of ethical selfhood? Simon Critchley recently at a lecture on trust that he delivered at Stony Brook University gave a definition of his model of ethical selfhood. To him, ethical subjectivity is a name for the way in which a self finds itself with some conception of the good; it is a name for the way in which the self binds itself to this good (the lecture is available online at www.stonybrook.edu/trust). While Critchley does not play a central role in my paper his definition is a good opening line for my engagement with the theme of this conference. The concept of sacrifice brings the question of my commitment to the good into focus because it makes necessary the human ability to discern or judge appropriately, and hence pertains to the relationship between the ethical self and the giver of the ethical command.

Paper 9: Stefan Stofanik (Group 3, Friday 1230-1300)

Sacrifice, responsibility and secrecy rethinking John Caputos theology of the event. In John Caputos theology of the event, sacrifice is linked directly to responsibility. This is in line with Derridas analysis as we find it in The Gift of Death. Responsibility is the key term; self-sacrifice is the form it takes. In Caputos words, responsibility implies heteronomy not autonomy, being held captive by the needs of the other, not the freedom to satisfy ones needs 6 which, obviously, implies sacrificing oneself for the sake of the other.
Cf. John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2006), 138.
6

Caputos self-sacrifice presupposes Levinassian understanding of ethical subject subject becomes singular through its responsibility for the external other. It also presupposes Derridean secrecy subject cannot translate to words its own secret of responsibility, just like Derridas Abraham cannot say a word about his decision to sacrifice Isaac. Thus, both Levinassian ethics ones absolute responsibility for the other, as well as Derridean secrecy ones absolute inability to speak about his/her secret of responsibility, define Caputos theology. Abraham is alone in this world and he is condemned to silence. I seek to challenge both absolute responsibility for the other and absolute secrecy which characterize Caputos theology. Based on the work of Rudi Visker, I argue that singularization has to do with more than just the external transcendence of the Levinassian face of the other it is equally effected by subjects internal otherness. If Abraham decided to sacrifice his son only in response to the external mysterium tremendum, he could remain silent. But his yes to Gods request came out of his own self; something worked within him that was both his own and foreign to him and the question he had to answer was not only why he would do what he did but also why he would do it, he and nobody else. Thats where stories begin when we sacrifice others because we cannot sacrifice our own secret selves.

Paper 10: Melanie J. van Oort (Group 4, Friday 1130-1200)

I teach you the Superman: Self-Sacrifice and the Alchemical Creation of Nietzsches bermensch The French philosopher and anthropologist Ren Girard has proposed that the scapegoating mechanism is behind the ritual sacrifices that pervaded archaic religion (Violence and the Sacred, 1972) and its myths. For Girard, the origin of religion and human civilization was not paradisiacal and did not develop out of some Hesiodic Golden Age that gradually degenerated into our present day circumstances, but was rather violent from the beginning. Although his negative stance has been criticized by prodigious thinkers like John Milbank, Girards position on the violent origins of religion has been supported by the work of the classical historian Walter Burkert (Homo Necans, 1972). Moreover, Girards ideas on how primitive religion developed align him with the classical philologist and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy (1872). In this work, Nietzsche began to develop his concept of the Dionysian and his revaluation of traditional (Judeo-Christian) values. In later writings, Nietzsche claims that humanitys ultimate hope is the creation of the bermensch, a superior being, who transcends the present in his opinion degenerate state of humanity. Out of a so-called love for humanity, Nietzsche claims that its breeding calls for great sacrifices, perhaps even the sacrifice of the present state of humanity itself. What is seldom discussed is the possible spiritual background of Nietzsches breeding program. We propose that a better understanding of the western alchemical and Hermetic Tradition an esoteric tradition that strongly influenced certain strands of German Lutheran pietism -- can open up new vistas in coming to grips with Nietzsches religious understanding of reality and divinity. Together with an evaluation of the Hermetic/alchemical processes of self-divinization, Girards scapegoating theory can help to explain the role of sacrifice and divinization in ancient religion as well as the function of sacrifice and even suicidal selfsacrifice in the Nietzschean religion of bermenschlichkeit, which can be detected in various strands of contemporary esoteric spirituality today.

Paper 11: Andrew OShea (Group 4, Friday 1200-1230)

From Sacrifice to Self: A Hermeneutics of Foundational Violence Ren Girard's anthropology of the sacred involves an analysis of sacrifice as a reenactment of foundational violence for the purposes of harnessing the unifying and cathartic power of this event. The ritual itself he believes circumscribes differences in an ordered and unambiguous way so as to channel the more destructive 'mimetic' forces that can otherwise hold sway. Hence sacrifice functions to protect and preserve communities from the excesses of violent reciprocity. Marcel Eliades' 'creative murder' becomes Girard's 'scapegoat mechanism'. However, despite the explanatory power of Girard's mimetic hypothesis his diagnosis of the modern world remains troubling. Since it understands contemporary culture as being in the throws of a 'sacrificial crisis'. This paper presents a challenge to Girard's negative assessment of the modern period. I will begin by examining one of the central themes of his mimetic theory: the loss of difference, which I will consider at the levels of 1.) culture/society, 2.) history, and 3.) subjectivity. The combined effect of Girard's analysis at all three levels tends toward a 'totalization' of crisis. By drawing on Charles Taylors philosophical anthropology I will argue that what characterizes the modern period is a preoccupation with 'identity' over and against the clearly marked differences that were the concern of a pre-modern order. A generally accepted loss of difference at the level of culture/society need not imply crisis at the level of history or subjectivity, as Girard believes. The question becomes whether Taylor can provide a model of human agency to compensate for the loss of difference at level one, and crucially whether he can do so while taking seriously the danger of homo religiosus and the apparent need for sacrifice. To try and answer this question I will consider moral space and narrative in Taylors work, and their role in allowing the self to generate non-violent unity.

Paper 12: Jacob Sherman (Group 4, Friday 1230-1300)

Metaphysics and the Redemption of Sacrifice: On Rene Girard and Charles Williams Rene Girard is something of a Janus for philosophers of religion interested in the question of sacrifice. On the one hand, few thinkers in any century have made such a compelling case for the importance and centrality of sacrifice within all human culture. On the other hand, Girard has steadfastly insisted that sacrifice be understood in exclusively anthropological terms thus foreclosing the metaphysical and theological questions that prima facie seem to attend any robust consideration of sacrifice. In this paper, I seek to move beyond this Girardian impasse by supplementing Girards late-thought with a more robust metaphysics of sacrifice as found in the work of the novelist, literary critic, and theologian, Charles Williams (one of the Oxford Inklings and a close companion of C.S. Lewis). To begin with, I first explain Girards understanding of the mimetic mechanism and the sacrificial origins of human culture. I argue that the profound anthropological insights in Girards theories are jeopardized by the severity with which he detaches them from any account of the world or of human destiny within the world. Although Girards later work seems to adumbrate an implicit mimetic ontology by pushing the origins of mimetic desire back into the chthonic depths of evolutionary history, this ontology is both insufficiently sketched and profoundly ambivalent, providing no reason for the choice of Christian nonretaliation over pagan sacrificial violence.

I argue that Girards insights can be saved however when supplemented with the kind of relational metaphysics found in Williams most perfectly realized novel, Descent into Hell. Rather than dispensing with ontology in favour of praxis, Williams transforms the profoundly Girardian themes of mediated desire, the doppelganger, mimetic rivalry, ritual, and the function of sacrifice by placing them in the context of what he calls the metaphysics of coinherence. This allows Williams to provide a far more positive account of both mimesis and sacrifice (even in its substitutionary mode) than Girard, not just non-retaliation but the actual bearing of one anothers deepest burdens in communion, prayer, and love.