That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany Author(s): Allen W.

Dulles Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2003), pp. 2-8 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033751 . Accessed: 28/12/2012 08:42
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Flashback

That

Was

Then

Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation ofGermany

A NOTE FROM THE EDITORS

INTHINKING ABOUT reconstruction Iraq, the of many have lookedfor insight to theAmerican experiences in rebuilding Germany and
Japan afterWorld War II. Optimists point to similarities across the cases and argue that they bode well for the Bush administration's

efforts today. Pessimistspoint to differencesand draw the opposite

conclusion. In truth, some aspects of the occupations look familiar and some do not. As the saying goes, history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. What ismost striking about the comparison is that in all three cases, severalmonths into the postwar era the ftiture of the country was still hanging in the balance. Picking theirway through the rubble, officials early in theTruman administration had as little clue about the eventual outcome of their experiments as their counterparts inWashington and Baghdad do today.They saw little choice but to grope forward as best they could,

respondingto immediateproblems and fast-movingeventswhile

trying to keep their eyes steady on a grand long-term vision. Knowing how the story ended, it is difficult for us to escape the tyranny of hindsight and see those earlier cases as they appeared to contemporary observers-in their full uncertainty, as history in the making rather than data to be mined for present-day polemics. Foreign Affaairs is pleased, therefore, to be able to open a window directly onto occupied Germany sevenmonths afterV-E Day, taking readers back inmedia res. [2]

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DuringWorld War II,Allen

W. Dulles served as the Bern

station chief for the Office of Services.(Hewould later Strategic

serve as the head of a successor

organization,theCentral Intelli genceAgency, from1953to 1961.) Dulles was themain American liaison with the German resistance
and a close observer of the early

stagesof thepostwaroccupation.
After the oss was disbanded in late September 1945,he decided to

return private On December to life.

3, less than aweek before leaving

CORBIS

he government service, gavea frank

Allen W Dulles

and unvarnished update on the situation inGermany to an off-the

record meeting of theCouncil on ForeignRelations.

At the time the meeting was held, the United States and the Soviet Union were watching each other warily across the ruins of

Europebut hadnot yet descendedinto whatwould becomeknownas theColdWar. Germany was stillone country, althoughdivided into four occupation zones. George Kennan's "Long Telegram"and Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain"speechwere stillmonths off, theTruman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, andNATO years in the still
future. Washington was trying to put Germany back on its feetwhile

simultaneously demobilizingand turningto domestic matters. Few Americanshad any inkling just of what theircountry's commitment topostwar Europe would eventually involve; most simply wanted the troopsto comehome. According to the council's archival policies,all substantive council records more than25yearsold areopen foruse, subjecttopermission being obtained from any living person for remarksattributed to them. Since thenotesof that Dulles meeting areno longer protect
ed, we are publishing them here for the first time, with only slight

editing,as a contributiontopublicdebate.

F O R E IG N AF FA I R S * November/December2003

[3]

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THE

PRESENT

SITUATION

IN GERMANY

Digest ofa meetingwith Allen W Dulles at theCouncilonForeignRelations,Decemeber3,1945

of refusal being what they were, they Germany today is a problem of extraordi joined the Party. I know of one instance nary complexity. For two and one-half years the country has been a political and where two brothers tossed a coin to see was which one would join the ss. Imention economicvoid inwhich discipline There isno dangerous these things not because I think any well-maintained.

now although substantial operating there numberof Germanswere underground

some newspapers in theUnited States played up such a story.The German lead ers, of course, could not admit defeat and today the attitude of the people is not so much a feeling of shame and guilt as one of having been let down by their leaders. opposed to the Party but rather to point out how misleading and decisive a label can be. Furthermore we had altogether too many rules and regulations dealing with the Germans to make an adequate supply of men available to us. There were

Germany 126categories Germans excludedfrom of and Economically industrially,

has scraped the bottom of the barrel, and any activity or from posts inGerman there are few shops with anything to sell. administration. Take, for example, the case of aman who owned zinc and coal As soon as you attempt to get Germany mines inUpper Silesia. He was a bitter to tick and tomake arrangements for a and proven anti-Nazi and aman of government, the lack of men becomes apparent at once. Most men of the caliber undoubted courage and integrity. Iwas not permitted to use him because he When suffera political taint. required came under category io6, being classified we discover someone whose ability and as awar economy supervisor. politics are alike acceptable, we usually We tried hard to find financial advisers, find aswe did in one case that the man but most of the bankers who had been in has been living abroad for the past ten Germany in the twenties and thirties had years and is hopelessly out of touch by this time been liquidated. I found with the local situation.We have already a banker in the prisoner's cage who had found out that you can't run railroads been arrested on an automatic charge without taking in some Party members. because in the early part of thewar he Labels are always arbitrary and had been appointed custodian for the sometimes they effectively mask what property of an alien, a post he later re For example, citizens lies underneath. signed. I am told that during the period A, B, C, and D who didn't care about of his responsibility he discharged his trust politics one way or the other were told with scrupulous honesty. I had to bring they had to join the Nazi Party in order tomake up the proper quota in the factory his case before the Joint Chiefs of Staff in inwhich theyworked. The consequences Washington before Iwas permitted
[4] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume82No. 6

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CORBIS

to Berliners, 1947 Theprice ofvictory: distributingpotatoes to use him. Then there Doctor was stateof affairs. After all,we couldnot in one Sauerbruch, of the leadingsurgeons examineeachcase individually theearly
in Berlin. Him, also, I found in a cage. It took a cable to London from Washing dayswhen the chief taskwas to occupy

ton toget his casestraightened and out get him released usefuil for service, this is based on the agreements reached at and had no sooner been done when a few days Tehran,Yalta, andPotsdam.Tehran latertheBritish rearrested because was madewhen Churchill felt somewhat him did he cameunder someother category. shaky. The arrangement not include In ourzonewe arrested 70,ooo people. theFrenchzone,which was added later. of There was no such thing as a habeas cor But regardless itsgenesis,by and large unworkable. pus and therewas no forum towhich one the schemeisalmostentirely Wurttem couldapplyfora hearing,althoughlater We havechoppedupBaden, zones. In on we did set up a tribunal of sorts. I do burg,andHesse intoartificial not blameourpeople toomuch for this the case of Saxony, the Russian zone
F O R E IGN AF FAI R S * November/December2003 [5]

most effective manner. Germanyin the Germany political set-upin The present

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Allen W Dulles
cuts off theAmerican and British zones Industry inGermany is at its lowest

there.It isdifficult ebb except for some coal mining in the fromtheircounterparts Ruhr.The minute one considers what to see how the Allies could have done shouldbe allowedto function otherwise inasmuch as the Russians would industries
not consent toBritish andAmerican domi nation of Germany and theAmericans and Russia get an advantage. Even so, very little progress isbeing made toward the and how best to prime the pump in order to set them going, some very real and So far as the treatment of industry in

refused consider to letting seriousdifficultiesappear. British likewise various zones isconcerned, Russian the
policy isparticularly hard to fathom. It is hard to say whether the Russians really in tend to teardown the zone for the purpose of building up Russia, but there is some ev

To of centralization thevariousservices.
complicate matters, the French have been saying that they could not set up an admin istration in the zone assigned to them until they knew what disposition was going to be made of the Rhine and the Ruhr. In the zone under Russian control the application of Soviet doctrines is thus far confined largely to paper.The Russians are finding it a little difficult tomix collectivist

idence pointingthat The Russians way.

have torn up all the double tracks, they are

keepingallable-bodied Germanprisoners,
and they have takenEast a greatmany in dustrialists, bankers, scientists, and the like. Russian standing in their zone is low. Russian troops are living off the land, and have looted farmore than anyone else. They have gone about Berlin looting work ers' houses in verymuch the sameway they did inHungary. This seems to indicate that in both localities theCommunist party is not very strong.At any rate, the Russians have seen the West and vice versa. In the zone being turned over to Poland there is a good deal of buck passing. It is difficult to saywhat is going on, but in general the Russians are acting little better than thugs. They have wiped out all the liquid assets.No food cards are issued to Germans, who are forced to travel on foot into the Russian zone, often more dead than alive.An iron curtain has descended over the fate of these people and very likely conditions are truly terrible.The promises atYalta to the contrary, probably 8 to lo million people are being enslaved. Unques
Eisenhower were the deputy

of the doctrines,including nationalization

banks, a new system of land tenure, and the creation of a small farmer class,with the set up as it existed under theNazis and more broadly under a capitalist economy. We, ourselves, have excellent men on the job. I have the highest regard for Clay, and Eisenhower is a genius as a diplomat and administrator.* Yet I am in clined to think that the problems inherent in the situation are almost too much for us. Our people inGermany are unduly fearful of criticism in the United States. For example, the road between Frankfurt is so full of holes that it andWiesbaden is almost impossible to drive over it, and one cannot cross theMain between those two places because all the bridges are down. But no repairs aremade since the Army feels certain itwould be criticized for "restoring the German war potential."

*Editors' note.At the time, Generals Lucius Clay and Dwight

of and militarygovernor militarygovernor Germany,respectively. [ 6] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume82No.6

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Germany shouldbe punished. tionably

In this instance, however, I think there will remain a legacy of bitternesswhich will not bode well for the future. I have already said that the problem of Germany very nearly defies a successful What canwe solution. The question is: do?The first step is to get together in deal ingwith what is at bottom a common problem. Next, we must find people we can use.We might use the churcheswhich did not knuckle under toHitler, although it is questionable in theminds of some

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shouldget into whether churches people

politics. We might also consider the sur vivors of the affair of July 20* and see what material the trade unions can furnish. Finally, we can screen the prisoners of war. The women will not be much help to us, although in theory they could be. A saying now current inGermany is that todaymost of the able-bodied men are women. Hitler had an enormous hold over them and Eva Braun's existence appeared to be unknown tomost of them. They are extremely bitter. Altogether the

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verycarefulstudy. problemdeserves
I think itmay well become necessary for us to change the form of our occupa tion. Thus far there has been very little disturbance or misbehavior on the part of our troops. I think we ought to use small, highly mechanized units and put our reliance on planes. These forces Iwould quarter outside of the cities, lest their presence create a talking point forGerman propaganda against the occupation. Trying to arrive at figures in order to set up a standard of living inGermany is a
*Editors' note. An unsuccessful 1944 coup at tempt by anti-Hitler elements in the German army and military intelligence.

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Allen W Dulles difficult almosthopeless and problem, and A: Until the Russians get out-and one perhaps beyond the ingenuity of man. there is no indication that they intend And yet we must somehow find a solution. to-there can be no central administration. Germany ought to be put towork for Hence I think itwill be necessary to at thebenefitof Europe andparticularly tempt to build up local government, not in for thebenefitof thosecountries plundered the sense of trying to divide Germany but by theNazis. Ifwe do not find somework to provide some means of administration. for theGermans and ifwe do not solve Q When will there be civilian admin the refugee problem,* Germans the will istration in theAmerican zone? have their revenge in one form or another A: The Army doesn't like the job and though it takes a hundred years. I don't blame them in the least. When we get civilianadministration dependson
what plans are being made in Washing Q Would you tell us something about ton. Thus far I have heard nothing to the food situation? indicate that such plans exist.@ A: In theAmerican zone the standard is 1,500 calories daily; but this figure has not been realized.Both we and the British will have to import food if theGermans are to stay alive. Sixty percent of the population of Germany is in the French, British, and

Americanzones which produce onlyabout

forty percent of the food. In theRussian zone some of the food there isbeing di verted by the Russians to their own uses. Q There is a groundswell in theUnited States in favor of letting American vol untary agencies help in the feeding and rehabilitation of Germany.What do you think of the idea? A: This poses a great problem because of themultiplicity of agencies. I discussed thismatter with Eisenhower and I think perhaps it can be worked out. I don't know how soon itwill be possible tomake individual remittances toGermany.... Q What are the prospects for setting up a central administration inGermany? with millions of ethnicGermans displaced from *Editors' The country note. was then flooded territories the east. to [8] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume82No.6

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