PARALLELS AND QUESTIONS

SOUTH OSSETIA AND KOSOVO KOSOVO

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Old churches in Ossetia and old icon (upper part) Monastery Sopocani (13. century) and monastery Decani (14. century) from Diocese Raska and Prizren (middle and lower row ) Front page Head of Jesus Christ in Ossetia Virgin Mary with Christ from Bogorodica Ljeviska in Prizren - Kosovo and Metohija before and after March 17, 2004, when the fresco was burnt

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WHY I HAD TO RECOGNIZE GEORGIAS BREAKAWAY REGIONS RECOGNIZE

We argued consistently that it would be impossible, after that, to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them. Meanwhile, ignoring Russia's warnings, western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo's illegal declaration of independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be impossible, after that, to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians On Tuesday Russia recognised the independence of the ter- (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was ritories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was not a step good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them. In taken lightly, or without full consideration of the conse- international relations, you cannot have one rule for some quences. But all possible outcomes had to be weighed and another rule for others. against a sober understanding of the situation and the histo- Seeing the warning signs, we persistently tried to persuade ries of the Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples, their freely ex- the Georgians to sign an agreement on the non-use of force pressed desire for independence, the tragic events of the with the Ossetians and Abkhazians. Mr Saakashvili refused. On the night of August 7-8 we found out why. past weeks and international precedents for such a move. Only a madman could have Not all of the world's nations taken such a gamble. Did he have their own statehood. believe Russia would stand Many exist happily within idly by as he launched an allboundaries shared with other out assault on the sleeping nations. The Russian Fedcity of Tskhinvali, murdering eration is an example of hundreds of peaceful civillargely harmonious coexisians, most of them Russian tence by many dozens of citizens? Did he believe Rusnations and nationalities. But sia would stand by as his some nations find it impossi"peacekeeping" troops fired ble to live under the tutelage on Russian comrades with of another. Relations bewhom they were supposed to tween nations living "under be preventing trouble in one roof" need to be handled South Ossetia? with the utmost sensitivity. Russia had no option but to After the collapse of commucrush the attack to save lives. nism, Russia reconciled itself This was not a war of our to the "loss" of 14 former Sochoice. We have no designs viet republics, which became Dmitry Medvedev, president of the Russian Federation on Georgian territory. Our states in their own right, even troops entered Georgia to though some 25m Russians were left stranded in countries destroy bases from which the attack was launched and then no longer their own. Some of those nations were unable to left. We restored the peace but could not calm the fears and treat their own minorities with the respect they deserved. aspirations of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples Georgia immediately stripped its "autonomous regions" of not when Mr Saakashvili continued (with the complicity and encouragement of the US and some other Nato members) to Abkhazia and South Ossetia of their autonomy. Can you imagine what it was like for the Abkhaz people to talk of rearming his forces and reclaiming "Georgian territory". The presidents of the two republics appealed to Russia have their university in Sukhumi closed down by the Tbilisi to recognise their independence. government on the grounds that they allegedly had no proper language or history or culture and so did not need a univer- A heavy decision weighed on my shoulders. Taking into acsity? The newly independent Georgia inflicted a vicious war count the freely expressed views of the Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples, and based on the principles of the on its minority nations, displacing thousands of people and United Nations charter and other documents of international sowing seeds of discontent that could only grow. These were law, I signed a decree on the Russian Federation's recognitinderboxes, right on Russia's doorstep, which Russian tion of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I peacekeepers strove to keep from igniting. sincerely hope that the Georgian people, to whom we feel But the west, ignoring the delicacy of the situation, unwit- historic friendship and sympathy, will one day have leaders tingly (or wittingly) fed the hopes of the South Ossetians and they deserve, who care about their country and who develop Abkhazians for freedom. They clasped to their bosom a mutually respectful relations with all the peoples in the CauGeorgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, whose first move casus. Russia is ready to support the achievement of such a was to crush the autonomy of another region, Adjaria, and goal. Dmitry Medvedev, Financial Times, August 27, 2008 made no secret of his intention to squash the Ossetians and Abkhazians. The writer is president of the Russian Federation

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MOSCOWS PLAN IS TO REDRAW THE MAP OF EUROPE

Any doubts about why Russia invaded Georgia have now been erased. By illegally recognising the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Dmitry Medvedev, Russias president, made clear that Moscows goal is to redraw the map of Europe using force. population ethnic Georgians, Greeks, Jews and others leaving the minority Abkhaz in control. Russia also wants us to forget that South Ossetia was run not by its residents (almost half were Georgian before this months ethnic cleansing) but by Russian officials. When the war started, South This war was never about South Ossetia or Georgia. Moscow is using its Ossetias de facto prime minister, defence minister and security minister invasion, prepared over years, to rebuild its empire, seize greater control of were ethnic Russians with no ties to the region. Europes energy supplies and punish those who believed democracy could The next step in Russias invasion script, of disinformation and annexation, flourish on its borders. Europe has reason to worry. Thankfully, most of the is regime change. If Moscow can oust Georgias democratically elected international community has condemned the invasion and confirmed their government, it can then intimidate other democratic European governments. Where will this end? What we know about Russia, and especially unwavering support for Georgias territorial integrity and sovereignty. Our first duty is to highlight Russias Orwellian tactics. Moscow says it in- the current regime, is not encouraging. vaded Georgia to protect its citizens in South Ossetia. Over the past five years it cynically laid the groundwork for this pretence, by illegally distributing passports in South Ossetia and Ab-khazia, manufacturing Russian citizens to protect. The cynicism of Russias concern for ethnic minorities can be expressed in one word: Chechnya. This cynicism has become hypocritical and criminal. Since Russias invasion, its forces have been cleansing Georgian villages in both regions including outside the conflict zone using arson, rape and execution. Human rights groups have documented these actions. Moscow has flipped the Kosovo precedent on its head: where the west acted to prevent ethnic cleansing, in Georgia ethnic cleansing is being used by Russia to consolidate its military annexation. Other Russian lies have The USS McFaul, a guided missile destroyer docks In Black Sea port with Georgia aid also been debunked. The most egregious was Moscows absurd claim on the eve of the invasion that Georgia was committing genocide in South Ossetia, with 2,000 civilian deaths. A week later, Moscow Mr Medvedev is now making menacing statements about Ukraine and admitted that only 133 people had died. These were overwhelmingly mili- Moldova and is replicating its Georgia strategy in the Crimea by distributing tary casualties and came after the Russian invasion. But the genocide claim Russian passports. The message is clear. Russia will do as it pleases. served its goal. In a media era hungry for content, the big lie still works. I believe the most potent western response to Russia is to stay united and Russias campaign to redraw the map of Europe is based on the propagation of misinformation. On Wednesday on this page, Mr Medvedev asserted that Georgia attacked South Ossetia. In fact, our forces entered the conflict zone after Russia rolled its tanks on to our soil, passing through the Roki tunnel into South Ossetia, Georgia. Mr Medvedev also claimed Russia had no designs on our territory. Why then did it bomb and occupy Georgian cities such as Gori? Why does it continue to occupy our strategic port of Poti? Moscow also counts on historical amnesia. It hopes the west will forget ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia drove out more than three-quarters of the local firm by providing immediate material and political support. If Moscow is trying to overthrow our government using its lethal tools, let us resist with democratic tools that have sustained more than 60 years of Euro-Atlantic peace. Backing Georgia with Europes political and financial institutions is a powerful response. Regrettably, this story is no longer about my small country, but the wests ability to stand its ground to defend a principled approach to international security and keep the map of Europe intact. Last week Vaclav Havel, the former Czech president, put us on alert: Russia does not really know where it begins and where it ends. He noted that the Moscow regime is a lot more sophisticated than the Soviets under Leonid Brezhnev. He should know he was on the front line the last time Russia invaded a European country.

Mikheil Saakashvili, Financial Times, August 27, 2008

The writer is president of Georgia

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KOSOVA'S INDEPENDENCE: A CRIME AGAINST INDEPENDENCE: THE SERBS & A CRIPPLING OF THE UN
That the USA was the first out to recognize the break-away state was to be expected. From a country devoid of historical understanding but filled with the solid egocentrism of oil pipelines, with an enormous base, Camp Bondsteel, at Urosevac near Pristina, as a part of the encirclement of Russia-China, so militarist that they could not support Rugova's nonviolence but had to arm the paramilitary UCK (KLA, the Kosova Liberation Army) and launch an illegal war against Serbia in 1999, using their NATO for that purpose to use violence as the final argument - again, all that was to be expected. And an empire on its way down becomes Johan Galtung even more violent and stupid. Its present president helps, what comes next is to be seen. But that most of the EU and some others should subvert international law, circumventing the United Nations with tricks concocted by a former Finnish president and a Swedish prime minister was unexpected, unnecessary and unintelligent. We shall live with the problem created for generations, centuries. Why? Because they have done it before. A state becomes a member of the international community by being recognized not by the USA even if some might prefer that, not by the UN General Assembly, but by the UN Security Council. The General Assembly adopted the division plan for Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish part, Israel declared independence, drove out 710,000 Palestinians, the nakba, the horror, won the war against the Arab states and gained recognition as a fact, grossly supported by European bad conscience and the anti-semitic wish to export "the Jewish problem" away from Europe, into the Middle East. So, what else do Kosova and Israel have in common? A lot. Europe hosts a Christianity divided by a heavy dialectic between the three Christianities and sidelining Judaism and Islam. The Schism Catholicism vs Orthodoxy came in 1054 (Pope Leo IX), reflecting the division of the Roman Empire in 395; Catholicism vs Islam came in 1095 with the Declaration of the Crusades (Pope Urban II) against the Muslims, killing Orthodox (Serbs) and Jews on the way; the division Catholicism vs five Protestantisms culminated in 1517 (Martin Luther); the lasting front against the Jews culminated during the Second world war, from a center in Nazi Germany with much of Europe joining. An ugly continent. The Crusades "liberated" Jerusalem in 1099, not to share it with Jews who left after the destruction of the Temple in 70, but for one of their two most sacred pilgrimages (with Santiago de Compostela). The Israelis "liberated" Jerusalem in 1967, not to share it with the Muslims in Western and Eastern parts where the third most important mosque in Islam is located (after Mecca and Medina), but for themselves. And the Albanians "liberated" Kosova, not to share it with the Serbs, but for themselves. Thus the Jews lost Jerusalem, the Muslims lost Jerusalem, and the Serbs lost their Jerusalem, their holy sites in the cradle of Serbia in Kosovo. And the Jews said "next year in Jerusalem", and the Muslims, not only the Palestinians continue fighting for their Jerusalem, and the Serbs will continue, for theirs. In Kosovo with o, not the Albanian a. For how long? Till they get it back - for generations or centuries. Take some territory and you may get away with it. Take sacred ground and you sow an unrest that may drown you. We are already seeing the reactivation of the 1054 schism, even within the European Union. The Orthodox Arch, from Moscow-Minsk through half of the Ukraine into Romania-Bulgaria and Serbia, turning South through parts of Montenegro-Macedonia down to Greece-Cyprus, is coming alive, with all of them protesting heavily (joined by Spain for its own reasons). There is more to come: if Israel and Kosova, even tearing out the hearts of other nations, get away with defiance of international law, then others who dare not thread on the sacred ground of others but also run up against a veto or two, are already lining up. Not that international law is perfect. The veto, whether exercised by Russia and China to protect Serbia or by the USA (34 times) to protect Israel, or by any other "big" country including the rather smallish UK and France, is a shame. But that is not why they subvert it. The veto is international law, at present, but the veto in the Kosovo case is not their veto. US-EU illegitimate crippling of the UN does not make Kosova independence illegitimate, as expression of self-determination. But there may be a way out, far from unproblematic: independence for a federal Kosova, with very high autonomy for three or so Serbian cantons, some for other nations, mostly for Albanians; encased in an expanding confederation of Serbia with Kosova; with free flow of persons, ideas and products all over. Today Serbia rejects the independence and Albanians the federation. The day after tomorrow, after rounds of negotiation they might see something like this as a far lesser evil. But that was not the road to be traveled by countries with heavy interests, thinking that might is right. How shameful to have missed each and every opportunity for a peaceful and fair solution to the Kosovo conflict! Johan Galtung, February 21, 2008

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KOSOVO COMES BACK TO BITE THE US

With the conflict between Georgia and Russia lowered to a simmer after the "We should not allow this current situation to draw new lines in Europe and signing of a ceasefire agreement, questions still remain about the United prevent a democratically elected government to join NATO if they want," he States role and positions on the start of the conflict as well as where it stands told IPS. moving forward towards a resolution. Many commentators have noted that Russian ambitions to realize independTen days ago, a full-scale war broke out when Russian and Georgian forces ence for South Ossetia and another pro-Russian breakaway region in Georgia, Abkhazia, were greatly bolstered by US support for the independence of clashed over the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia. The US role during the beginning of the conflict on August 7 is unclear, but a Kosovo, which Serbia still considers part of its territory. Washington Post article this weekend revealed that Matthew Bryza, a deputy But many US officials and their defenders have strongly denied that US supassistant secretary of state and a US special envoy to the Caucuses, was port of Kosovo - which came swiftly after its declaration of independence aware of the Georgian military operations before they started. created a legitimate precedent for Russia to support the independence of the At a press conference Tuesday in Washington, and in line with the Georgian Georgian breakaway regions. position, Bryza said the Georgian military movements were a response to In questions after the conference, Burns told IPS that the Kosovar independattacks from Ossetian separatists and initial large-scale ence and South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence Russian movements into South Ossetia. are "fundamentally different". "Who shot whom first?" said Bryza at the Foreign Press "We were right to support the right of independence for Center. "I don't know if we'll ever know the answer to that Kosovo," Burns said, explaining that the fundamental question," he continued, before going on to call the andifference was UN control over Serbia since the war swer "irrelevant" because "Russia has escalated so bruthere in late the 1990s sparked by what Burns called tally" that the international community turned against it. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's "savage attack" on Kosovo. Moscow has denied the Georgian and US timeline, but did not provide the Washington Post with a Russian But some commentators have said that the US should have understood when Kosovo declared independence timeline of the military movements. six months ago that the issue of forming an international Speaking at a forum at the Atlantic Council for the United precedent is not as simple as declaring it as such or not. States, the immediate former secretary of state for political affairs, R Nicholas Burns, said he blamed Russia "[The US] tried very hard and assertively to support completely for the conflict and that the Russian incursions Kosovo's independence, but [to not make it] a precewere the "most disappointing" turn Russia has taken dent," Saunders said. "What the administration doesn't since the fall of the Berlin Wall. understand is that what's a precedent is in the eyes of the beholder." Burns, toeing a line pushed strongly by the US representative to the UN, Zalmay Khalizad, last week - and "We don't get to decide how other people react to what strongly denied by the Russian representative - said the we do," he said. "Other people get to decide." Russian actions were a response to increasing freedom Looking forward to a final resolution of the conflict, Bryza and democracy in Europe since the end of the Cold War. said that Russia and Georgia would be the main players "Russia has put this at risk," Burns said. because of their democratically elected leadership, R Nicholas Burns which the US views as legitimate. Responding to criticisms that unflinching US support for Georgia may have emboldened Georgian President "We support Georgia's territorial integrity," Bryza said. Mikheil Saakashvili to make the misstep of a military move into South Ossetia, "That means that the leaders of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians are not on a generally pro-Russian province that has been pushing for independence the same legal grounds as the democratically elected leaders of Georgia or since the early 1990s, Burns said that the charges were unfounded. the leader of Russia." Those "pointing the finger" at Georgia and the US were wrong, and Russia South Ossetia and Abkhazia, lacking independence, do not have internationwas solely to blame for the conflict, he said. ally recognized de jure governments. However, both regions do have de facto "I don't think the US is to blame for what's happening in Georgia," Burns reiter- independently operating governments with leaders. ated to IPS after the Atlantic Council conference. "I think Russia is to blame." Moreover, with the US constantly citing Georgia's status as a democracy as a But Paul Saunders, the executive director of the Nixon Center and a specialist strong reason to back it, many are left curious by the absence of talk of a 2006 on Russia and US-Russia relations, told IPS that he was not surprised that the referendum in South Ossetia when residents unanimously voted for independUS and Georgia don't blame themselves. ence. Whether the leaders of the breakaway region were democratically "Burns is a person who, as undersecretary of state until recently, was part of elected by international standards or not, their leaders certainly and legitimately forming the US policy towards Georgia," he said, making it unlikely for him to represent this view. find fault with those very policies. "If you asked the people in those two regions where they want to live [in terms As for the US siding with Georgia, a democratic, pro-Western ally, over South of independence or under the Georgian state], it's quite clear that the leaderOssetia and its Russian backers, Burns said the US should not take a role in ship is representative of that," said Saunders. deciding the borders of European countries. But if the US continues to ignore that reality, it could further dilute the US's "We must not be part of the redrawing of lines in Europe," Burns told the wider international standing as an advocate of democracy and self-determination. audience at the Atlantic Council event. "People start to wonder why we are taking these positions," said Saunders. "It When asked later in the day by IPS if Burns' comment mirrored the US posi- gets a lot harder to say we are standing on principle." tion, Bryza said that he wasn't sure exactly what Burns was talking about. But Ali Gharib, Asia Times, August 21, 2008 he was willing to confirm Burns' general message as an appropriate position for the unique case of the Georgian conflict.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH21Ag02.html

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WEST SLAMMED FOR CAUCASUS POLICY AND KOSOVO RECOGNTION CAUCASUS

Romanian President Traian Basescu has strongly criticized the West's policy on the Caucasus, joining a growing number of voices which claim the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence created the problem. After returning from a whirlwind trip to Georgia and other countries in the region, Basescu said Friday, Aug. 2 that the existing peace mechanisms for the Caucasus had proved inefficient and only maintained the tension. He also said it was wrong to grant ethnic minorities collective territorial rights, specifically naming Kosovo as an example. "The problem that started with Kosovo must be stopped," the Romanian president said. His country has not recognized Kosovo's independence. Basescu said he wanted to convey his conclusions to Romania's partners in NATO and the European Union. He also wanted to highlight his concern over the "frozen conflict" in Romania's neighbor, Moldova, and its separatist region of Transnistria. The EU had to be more active in dealing with these conflicts, he stressed. Basescu said that in principle he was in favor of ethnic minority rights of a cultural nature, but only on an individual basis and never in conjunction with territories. Failure by the West to realize this would result in "big problems of territorial integrity" in the Balkans, the Black Sea region and other parts of Europe, Basescu said. Basescu and Foreign Minister Lazar Comanescu embarked Wednesday on a tour of five countries to review the Georgian-Russian conflict and its effects on the region. In just two days, they visited Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, meeting with their counterparts to review developments in the wake of the conflict in Georgia's breakaway province of South Ossetia. In Kiev, Basescu met Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to start a series of top-level meetings. He also met Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Abdullah Gul. Basescu arrived in Tbilisi on Thursday accompanied by humanitarian aid to be distributed to displaced persons in Georgia. Romania recently confirmed that it had provided weapons support to Georgia's infantry, with this assistance falling within international conventions. At NATO's special foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on Tuesday, Comanescu stated that Romania continued to support Georgia's aim to join the Western alliance. Analysts link current crisis to Kosovo's independence Basescu is not alone in linking the current problems in the Caucasus to the West's handling of Kosovo, Analysts believe that if Russia recognizes Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia then the West's backing of Kosovo's independence move this year will have played a key role. In the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi on Thursday tens of thousands of people thronged the main square urging Moscow to back the bid for independence from Tbilisi. Western nations have repeatedly championed Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity even as Russian troops advanced to within 30 kilometers of the capital Tbilisi. However Moscow argues that it has been protecting its nationals in peril abroad, as the United States, France and other western powers would do. West recognition opened Pandora's Box Russian leaders also cite the example of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence from Russian ally Serbia in April and has since been recognized by the United States and 20-odd European Union nations among others. "With the recognition of Kosovo, they opened Pandora's box," said Dmitry Rogozin, head of Russia's mission to NATO. Western officials strongly reject the Kosovo-South Ossetia parallel. "In Kosovo there was a UN presence, there was also the issue of ethnic cleansing, there was a standstill in negotiations, no chance for a negotiated settlement all these different things came into play," one British diplomat said. "I don't think you can draw parallels." His foreign secretary David Miliband puts the case more succinctly, describing the comparison as "completely bogus". NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer speaks of "a special UN trajectory for Kosovo" which has been under United Nations control since NATO bombing in 1999 ousted Serbian forces waging a crackdown on the ethnic-Albanian separatists. But for Alain De Neve, of Belgium's Center for Security and Defense Studies, Moscow and Tbilisi have made the connection even if the West doesn't want to. "Without the issue of Kosovo's independence I don't think that we would have seen this (Georgia) story unfurl as quickly as it has," he argues. "Those opposed to recognizing Kosovo's independence feared above all that it would unleash a series of declarations of independence. But that provoked the intervention of one state, Georgia, which wanted to keep control of all its territory," De Neve told the AFP news agency. Kosovo link goes back to NATO's 1999 war Thomas Gomart of the French Institute of International Relations also believes that "the backdrop behind Russia's moves was the West's behavior in Kosovo, with the launching in 1999 of a military operation without a United Nations mandate and then recognizing its independence ... despite Moscow's opposition." However in his opinion Russia will nonetheless think twice before recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Just as Russia was opposed to Kosovo's unilateral move it would not want to further encourage secessionist tendencies within the Russian Federation, such as the Chechens, he said. Russia is "more interested in maintaining an unclear situation in the two (rebel Georgian) regions, which would allow them to intervene when they wish." Political science Professor Bruno Coppieters thinks the Georgia problem will eventually have to be sorted out as part of a wider solution. "Russia can't expect a lot of countries to follow suit if it recognizes the independence of the two regions. "For their part Western nations haven't got the means to put effective pressure on Russia. The most likely scenario is that the conflict will become frozen again and, in the long term, there will have to be a wider agreement between the permanent members of the UN Security Council." http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3587298,00.html? maca=en-rss-en-all-1573-rdf, August 25, 2008

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GEORGIA AND KOSOVO: A SINGLE INTERWINED CRISIS INTERWINED

When we study the history of the coming period, the war in Kosovo will stand out as a turning point. The Russo-Georgian war was rooted in broad geopolitical processes. In large part it was simply the result of the cyclical reassertion of Russian power. The Russian empire - czarist and Soviet - expanded to its borders in the 17th and 19th centuries. It collapsed in 1992. The Western powers wanted to make the disintegration permanent. It was inevitable that Russia would, in due course, want to reassert its claims. That it happened in Georgia was simply the result of circumstance. There is, however, another context within which to view this, the context of Russian perceptions of U.S. and European intentions and of U.S. and European perceptions of Russian capabilities. This context shaped the policies that led to the Russo-Georgian war. And those attitudes can only be understood if we trace the question of Kosovo, because the Russo-Georgian war was forged over the last decade over the Kosovo question. Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics in the early 1990s. The borders of the republics did not cohere to the distribution of nationalities. Many - Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and so on - found themselves citizens of republics where the majorities were not of their ethnicities and disliked the minorities intensely for historical reasons. Wars were fought between Croatia and Serbia (still calling itself Yugoslavia because Montenegro was part of it), Bosnia and Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia. Other countries in the region became involved as well. One conflict became particularly brutal. Bosnia had a large area dominated by Serbs. This region wanted to secede from Bosnia and rejoin Serbia. The Bosnians objected and an internal war in Bosnia took place, with the Serbian government involved. This war involved the single greatest bloodletting of the bloody Balkan wars, the mass murder by Serbs of Bosnians. Here we must pause and define some terms that are very casually thrown around. Genocide is the crime of trying to annihilate an entire people. War crimes are actions that violate the rules of war. If a soldier shoots a prisoner, he has committed a war crime. Then there is a class called "crimes against humanity." It is intended to denote those crimes that are too vast to be included in normal charges of murder or rape. They may not involve genocide, in that the annihilation of a race or nation is not at stake, but they may also go well beyond war crimes, which are much lesser offenses. The events in Bosnia were reasonably deemed crimes against humanity. They did not constitute genocide and they were more than war crimes. At the time, the Americans and Europeans did nothing about these crimes, which became an internal political issue as the magnitude of the Serbian crimes became clear. In this context, the Clinton administration helped negotiate the Dayton Accords, which were intended to end the Balkan wars and indeed managed to go quite far in achieving this. The Dayton Accords were built around the principle that there could be no adjustment in the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. Ethnic Serbs would live under Bosnian rule. The principle that existing borders were sacrosanct was embedded in the Dayton Accords. In the late 1990s, a crisis began to develop in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Over the years, Albanians had moved into the province in a broad migration. By 1997, the province was overwhelmingly Albanian, although it had not only been historically part of Serbia but also its historical foundation. Nevertheless, the Albanians showed significant intentions of moving toward either a separate state or unification with Albania. Serbia moved to resist this, increasing its military forces and indicating an intention to crush the Albanian resistance. There were many claims that the Serbians were repeating the crimes against humanity that were committed in Bosnia. The Americans and Europeans, burned by Bosnia, were eager to demonstrate their will. Arguing that something between crimes against humanity and genocide was under way - and citing reports that between 10,000 and 100,000 Kosovo Albanians were missing or had been killed - NATO launched a campaign designed to stop the killings. In fact, while some killings had taken place, the claims by NATO of the number already killed were false. NATO might have prevented mass murder in Kosovo. That is not provable. They did not, however, find that mass murder on the order of the numbers claimed had taken place. The war could be defended as a preventive measure, but the atmosphere under which the war was carried out overstated what had happened. The campaign was carried out without U.N. sanction because of Russian and Chinese opposition. The Russians were particularly opposed, arguing that major crimes were not being committed and that Serbia was an ally of Russia and that the air assault was not warranted by the evidence. The United States and other European powers disregarded the Russian position. Far more important, they established the precedent that U.N. sanction was not needed to launch a war (a precedent used by George W. Bush in Iraq). Rather - and this is the vital point - they argued that NATO support legitimized the war. This transformed NATO from a military alliance into a quasi-United Nations. What happened in Kosovo was that NATO took on the role of peacemaker, empowered to determine if intervention was necessary, allowed to make the military intervention, and empowered to determine the outcome. Conceptually, NATO was transformed from a military force into a regional multinational grouping with responsibility for maintenance of regional order, even within the borders of states that are not members. If the United Nations wouldn't support the action, the NATO Council was sufficient. Since Russia was not a member of NATO, and since Russia denied the urgency of war, and since Russia was overruled, the bombing campaign against Kosovo created a crisis in relations with Russia. The Russians saw the attack as a unilateral attack by an anti-Russian alliance on a Russian ally, without sound justification. Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not prepared to make this into a major confrontation, nor was he in a position to. The Russians did not so much acquiesce as concede they had no options. The war did not go as well as history records. The bombing campaign did not force capitulation and NATO was not prepared to invade Kosovo. The air campaign continued inconclusively as the West turned to the Russians to negotiate an end. The Russians sent an envoy who negotiated an agreement consisting of three parts. First, the West would halt the bombing campaign. Second, Serbian army forces would withdraw and be replaced by a multinational force including Russian troops. Third, implicit in the agreement, the Russian troops would be there to guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty. As soon as the agreement was signed, the Russians rushed troops to the Pristina airport to take up their duties in the multinational force - as they had in the Bosnian peacekeeping force. In part because of deliberate maneuvers and in part because no one took the Russians seriously, the Russians never played the role they believed had been negotiated. They were never seen as

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part of the peacekeeping operation or as part of the decision making system On May 15, during a conference in Ekaterinburg, the foreign ministers of over Kosovo. The Russians felt doubly betrayed, first by the war itself, then by India, Russia and China made a joint statement regarding Kosovo. It was the peace arrangements. read by the Russian host minister, Sergei Lavrov, and it said: "In our stateThe Kosovo war directly effected the fall of Yeltsin and the rise of Vladimir ment, we recorded our fundamental position that the unilateral declaration of Putin. The faction around Putin saw Yeltsin as an incompetent bungler who independence by Kosovo contradicts Resolution 1244. Russia, India and allowed Russia to be doubly betrayed. The Russian perception of the war China encourage Belgrade and Pristina to resume talks within the framework directly led to the massive reversal in Russian policy we see today. The instal- of international law and hope they reach an agreement on all problems of that lation of Putin and Russian nationalists from the former KGB had a number of Serbian territory." roots. But fundamentally it was rooted in the events in Kosovo. Most of all it The Europeans and Americans rejected this request as they had rejected all was driven by the perception that NATO had now shifted from being a military Russian arguments on Kosovo. The argument here was that the Kosovo alliance to seeing itself as a substitute for the United Nations, arbitrating re- situation was one of a kind because of atrocities that had been committed. gional politics. Russia had no vote or say in NATO decisions, so NATO's new The Russians argued that the level of atrocity was unclear and that, in any case, the government that committed them was long gone from Belgrade. role was seen as a direct challenge to Russian interests. More to the point, the Russians let it be clearly known that they would not Thus, the ongoing expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union and the accept the idea that Kosovo independence was a one-of-a-kind situation and promise to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO were seen in terms of the that they would regard it, instead, as a new precedent for all to follow. Kosovo war. From the Russian point of view, NATO expansion meant a further exclusion of Russia from decision-making, and implied that NATO The problem was not that the Europeans and the Americans didn't hear the reserved the right to repeat Kosovo if it felt that human rights or political issues Russians. The problem was that they simply didn't believe them - they didn't required it. The United Nations was no longer the prime multinational peace- take the Russians seriously. They had heard the Russians say things for keeping entity. NATO assumed that role in the region and now it was going to many years. They did not understand three things. First, that the Russians had reached the end of their rope. Second, that Russian military capability expand all around Russia. was not what it had been in 1999. Third, and most important, NATO, the Then came Kosovo's independence. Yugoslavia broke apart into its constitu- Americans and the Europeans did not recognize that they were making politient entities, but the borders of its nations didn't change. Then, for the first time cal decisions that they could not support militarily. since World War II, the decision was made to change Serbia's borders, in For the Russians, the transformation of NATO from a military alliance into a opposition to Serbian and Russian wishes, with the authorizing body, in effect, regional United Nations was the problem. The West argued that NATO was being NATO. It was a decision avidly supported by the Americans. no longer just a military alliance but a political arbitrator for the region. If The initial attempt to resolve Kosovo's status was the round of negotiations NATO does not like Serbian policies in Kosovo, it can - at its option and in led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari that officially began in Febru- opposition to U.N. rulings - intervene. It could intervene in Serbia and it inary 2006 but had been in the works since 2005. This round of negotiations tended to expand deep into the former Soviet Union. NATO thought that was actually started under U.S. urging and closely supervised from Washing- because it was now a political arbiter encouraging regimes to reform and not ton. In charge of keeping Ahtisaari's negotiations running smoothly was Frank just a war-fighting system, Russian fears would actually be assuaged. To the G. Wisner, a diplomat during the Clinton administration. Also very important to contrary, it was Russia's worst nightmare. Compensating for all this was the the U.S. effort was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian fact that NATO had neglected its own military power. Now, Russia could do Affairs Daniel Fried, another leftover from the Clinton administration and a something about it. specialist in Soviet and Polish affairs. At the beginning of this discourse, we explained that the underlying issues In the summer of 2007, when it was obvious that the negotiations were going behind the Russo-Georgian war went deep into geopolitics and that it could nowhere, the Bush administration decided the talks were over and that it was not be understood without understanding Kosovo. It wasn't everything, but it time for independence. On June 10, 2007, Bush said that the end result of was the single most significant event behind all of this. The war of 1999 was negotiations must be "certain independence." In July 2007, Daniel Fried said the framework that created the war of 2008. that independence was "inevitable" even if the talks failed. Finally, in Septem- The problem for NATO was that it was expanding its political reach and ber 2007, Condoleezza Rice put it succinctly: "There's going to be an inde- claims while contracting its military muscle. The Russians were expanding pendent Kosovo. We're dedicated to that." Europeans took cues from this their military capability (after 1999 they had no place to go but up) and the line. West didn't notice. In 1999, the Americans and Europeans made political How and when independence was brought about was really a European decisions backed by military force. In 2008, in Kosovo, they made political problem. The Americans set the debate and the Europeans implemented it. decisions without sufficient military force to stop a Russian response. Either Among Europeans, the most enthusiastic about Kosovo independence were they underestimated their adversary or - even more amazingly - they did not the British and the French. The British followed the American line while the see the Russians as adversaries despite absolutely clear statements the French were led by their foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had also Russians had made. No matter what warning the Russians gave, or what served as the U.N. Kosovo administrator. The Germans were more cau- the history of the situation was, the West couldn't take the Russians seriously. tiously supportive. On Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized It began in 1999 with war in Kosovo and it ended in 2008 with the independrapidly by a small number of European states and countries allied with the ence of Kosovo. When we study the history of the coming period, the war in United States. Even before the declaration, the Europeans had created an Kosovo will stand out as a turning point. Whatever the humanitarian justification and the apparent ease of victory, it set the stage for the rise of Putin and administrative body to administer Kosovo. The Europeans, through the Eurothe current and future crises. pean Union, micromanaged the date of the declaration. George Friedman, Stratfor, August 27, 2008

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WAR IN GEORGIA: IT HAD TO HAPPEN HAD

I was part of a TFF fact-finding mission to Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhasia in 1994. That the August 8 war would happen was predictable, albeit not the exact time. My time perspective is about 20 years, my space is global and my subject is the underlying conflict, not the war as such. Let me begin, therefore, with the dissolution of the terrible Soviet Union under the visionary leadership of a man we should still all be deeply grateful to, namely Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. - Gorbachev withdraws from Afghanistan and set Sakharov free. No reaction in the West. His entire philosophy of change deprives the West of its beloved enemy. - Gorbachev suggests an entirely new security structure, a European House with the OSCE and the UN as centerpieces. The triumphalist West ignores it. - Gorbachev asks for economic support in the West to perestroika and glasnost, to create what would have been an open social democraticinspired society. The G8 decides to ignores it and gambles on Jeltsin, a populist with no similar vision and charisma. - The West - understandably - wants to unite Germany, but that is the great threat for historical reasons in the eyes of the Russians. Russia is promised that NATO will not expand. - The Warsaw Pact is dissolved, NATO remains and expands rapidly. And it maintains its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons. - The Clinton administration begins a huge U.S. military expansion program in 1992, building bases, positioning advisers and infiltrating ministries with advisers and people from mercenary companies in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, and all around Russia. Russias protests about its near abroad are ignored. - Serbs are cast in the role of the always and only bad guys, as the Russians of Yugoslavia, expansionist and dangerous vis--vis smaller allegedly freedom-loving democratic actors such as Croatias Franjo Tudjman, Bosnias Alija Izetbegovic, and Kosovos Agim Ceku. NATOs bombing of Serbia and Kosovo violates all international law, takes place without UN Security Council mandate and leaves a thoroughly destroyed country behind. Russian arguments for a negotiated solution are ignored. - The Ballistic Missile Defence, BMD - not a defensive system but part of the US nuclear doctrine to protect the U.S. territory against retaliation if and when the US has started a nuclear attack on someone else develops as if the world has not changed at all. Russia thinks it is a bad idea, as bad as a similar system set up by the Russians across the border in Mexico would appear to the Americans. As a show of respect for democracy, the deal is made with Poland where 90% of the people is against the BMD on their territory. Russian worries are ignored allegedly they dont understand that BMD is to protect us all against well, Iran and other imagined enemies of the US/West. - The U.S. and major EU countries decide that Kosovo shall be an independent state. All substantial Russian arguments for a negotiated compromise and predictions of that secession stimulating secession elsewhere are ignored. - Russia increasingly being seen as the new great threat against which NATO must gang up - has military expenditures that are roughly 5% of NATOs, 7% of those of the United States, and 13% of the EUs. What about Georgia in all this? Already in 1994 at the U.S. office in Tblisi, I was told that this country was a centerpiece of the US strategy and interests in the region - and Georgian officials told me that they were just waiting for Georgia to be selected to host the huge oil and gas pipelines, then it would become a regional power to be reckoned with. The U.S. Pentagon has conducted a number of comprehensive train-andequip programs, U.S. Special Forces and U.S. Marines; and Georgia became a Partnership for Peace member of NATO in 2004. Israels considerable military support to Georgia is largely ignored in the media as is the fact that Georgias defence minister, Davit Kezerashvili, is a former Israeli. Here is what the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, IWPR, stated in mid-2007: In late June, the Georgian government increased the defence ministrys budget of 513 million laris (315 million US dollars) by 442 million laris (260 million dollars). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, Georgia currently has the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world. Some independent experts are worried that the spending is not fully accounted for, while others say that it could undermine the peace processes with the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The military budget of Georgia increased 50 times over the period from 2002 (US $ 18 million.) to 2008 (US $ 900 million.), reaching almost 9% of Georgia's GDP. Georgia is the third largest occupier in Iraq, present also in Afghanistan and has been in Kosovo. Georgia emphatically supports the U.S. war on terror. It would be nave to think that Saakashvili had not obtained Washingtons green light for his attack on South Ossetia. This region is as complex as, say, former Yugoslavia: History, traumas, ethnicity, minorities in minorities, economic and constitutional crisis and all kinds of corruption and double standards blend. The future s bleak for us all that is, until somebody stops to think instead of merely re-acting and justifying their own participation in the game of militarism and power politics. So what is needed to diffuse this crisis? One, some little consideration of history. Two, some little empathy with non-US and non-EU actors. Three, some recognition that Western actions are not always innocent in their consequences. Four, an understanding of the utter counter-productivity of militarization and its psycho-political effects, including miscalculating your power when you have some guns in your hand. Five, that negotiations are far superior to threats and intellectual poor fearology. The Russians have now said: This far, but no longer. It would be wise of the West to listen to the warning. It is not in its own best interest to continue bullying and humiliating Russia, disrespecting its history, dignity and resources. And, if I may, it would be helpful if Western mainstream media would stop a) re-cycling the Cold War images of the all-aggressive Russia and b) disseminating, Pravda-style, what Western militarist elites say. The art of reading and asking good questions should re-enter international journalism and foreign policy reporting, freeing the profession from complicity in the next much larger war. Jan Oberg, August 28, 2008 http://www.transnational.org/Resources_Treasures/2008/ Oberg_GeorgiaHadToHappen.html

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WOODROW WILSONS WAR

Last week, a host of Clinton administration officials emerged to identify and lament the causes of the Russia-Georgia war. Strobe Talbott, Ronald Asmus, and Richard Holbrooke - all Democratic former State Department officials - fingered a variety of actors for blame in Moscow, Washington, and Tbilisi. But they ignored one place they could have found another guilty party: the mirror. Asmus and Holbrooke scolded that the Kremlin's actions could jeopardize the Clintonite vision for Europe - where "realpolitik and spheres of influence were supposed to be replaced by new cooperative norms and a country's right to choose its own path." The road to this Wilsonian Shangri-la, they insisted in the 1990s, would be paved by the rapid expansion of NATO to include former Soviet republics. Recall, too, that Asmus, Holbrooke, and Co. waved off early warnings that create the pretense for Putin's latest move." Asmus' solution? Someone should have "shield[ed] Georgia from the possible fallout from Kosovo." How? By granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the recent NATO summit, which would have "reassure[ed] Georgia and deter[red] Russia." But Russia had been raising the temperature on the South Ossetia question for years, and would have been unlikely to back down. A MAP does not guarantee the military protection that full NATO membership confers, and it would have taken years to get Georgia into NATO as a member. So rather than Asmus's "reassure and deter" effect, granting Georgia a MAP more likely would have made Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili even more reckless in his South Ossetia policy, and made all the more urgent Russia's desire to conclude the territorial dispute to their advantage. It has been left to Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary of state in the Clinton administration, to make the case that the Kremlin's carefully cultivated Kosovo analogy should not apply. Talbott complains that the analogy is absurd, since "only after exhausting every attempt at diplomacy did NATO go to war over Kosovo." Presumably the Russians felt, however - to the extent they were interested in diplomacy at all - that diplomacy had failed the moment Saakashvili launched an artillery barrage into South Ossetia and sent an armored column into a province occupied by Russian troops. The fact is: the questionable step of expanding NATO closer to Russia's borders - a process urged forward at every step by Clinton officials is what set the stage for this war. True, RussiaGeorgia tensions would still have existed without any NATO involvement. But instead of causing hand-wringing in Washington that "a new cold war" has emerged, those tensions would have been dismissed as a regional political squabble far detached from U.S. interests. In 1997, no less an authority than George F. Kennan warned that such a NATO expansion Richard Herrmann, Director of the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, stands with would be "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war," because it Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution, and Sean Kay, Professor of Politics and would inflame Russian militarism, stifle democGovernment at Ohio Wesleyan University racy, and generally "impel Russian foreign policy their idealistic future was an illusion - capitalizing on what the New York in directions decidedly not to our liking." Times then called "the public's lack of interest in foreign policy in the afterEach of those troublesome developments, of course, has come to pass. math of the cold war." At that time, the Times pointed out during the nonHolbrooke, eulogizing Kennan in a 2005 op-ed, recounted a 1996 dinner in debate over expanding NATO, 63 percent of Americans favored NATO which Kennan argued to a distinguished audience that expanding NATO expansion, but only 10 percent could name one of the three countries that would represent "an enormous and historic strategic error." Holbrooke were scheduled to join. bragged in that article that "events, of course, proved Bill Clinton right and Asmus has since offered a few solutions that in his view could have pre- Kennan . . . wrong." Perhaps in the wake of this war, it's worth taking a movented the Russia-Georgia conflict. First, he argues that neutral peacekeep- ment to consider whether NATO expansion, the recognition of Kosovo, and ers should have been inserted into Georgia alongside the Russian ones. the general tendency in Washington to ignore the national interests of RusBut who would have deployed them? Russian "peacekeepers" were al- sia really has been worth the cost. ready on the ground in South Ossetia under a 1992 agreement with GeorJustin Logan, National Review, August 22, 2008 gia that explicitly authorized them to be there. The chance of any country - Justin Logan is associate director of foreign policy studies at the trying force its way in under those circumstances - be it the U.S. or, even Cato Institute. less likely, Western Europe, China, or India - was roughly zero. http://article.nationalreview.com/? Asmus also said NATO's 1999 action against Serbia, and the decision to q=MWRlODY4MzQ5ZDZiMTEzYTY4MWQ4YmQ2YTUyYTA0M pry out Kosovo and then grant it independence earlier this year, "helped Tg

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REVENGE OF THE BALKANS BALKANS

American policy makers had repeatedly told us that Kosovo was supposed to be a unique case, but apparently Vladimir Putin didnt get the memo. Strategic shortsightedness-defined as mistaking problems and issues of secondary or tertiary importance for those of vital importance, and being unable to foresee the predictable consequences of specific actions-is becoming a chronic malaise in Washington. So characteristic of U.S. policy in the Balkans in the 1990s and the more recent Iraq tragedy, it is now again apparent in U.S. actions with regard to Kosovo, and their spillover effects in the Caucasus. American policy makers had repeatedly told us that Kosovo was supposed to be a "unique" case, but apparently Vladimir Putin didn't get the memo. The ghosts of our Balkan problems, it seems, continue to haunt us. The roots of the current crisis in U.S.-Russian relations spread far and wide, and some go back to the Balkans in the 1990s, especially the 1999 U.S. and NATO bombing of Serbia. Although little remarked upon in the West, NATO's first war marked a watershed in Russian perceptions of the United States and Europe, and, even more importantly, in Russia's post-Soviet evolution itself. Yegor Gaidar, one of the architects of Russia's post-Soviet economic reforms, told U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at the time "if only you knew what a disaster this war is for those of us in Russia who want for our country what you want." The late Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn said much the same, noting that Russian views of the West, started changing with the cruel NATO bombings of Serbia. It's fair to say that all layers of Russian society were deeply and indelibly shocked by those bombings. . . . So, the perception of the West as mostly a "knight of democracy" has been replaced with the disappointed belief that pragmatism, often cynical and selfish, lies at the core of Western policies. For many Russians it was a grave disillusion, a crushing of ideals. The consequences of this shift in Russian attitudes and perceptions, both for Russia itself and for the United States, were profound. Although it is impossible to say exactly what impact the Kosovo crisis had on Vladimir Putin's rise to power-less than two months after the end of the Kosovo war he was appointed prime minister, and within seven months he had become president of Russia-the section of Russian elite opinion that he embodied, and how it felt about NATO's actions in the Balkans, is clear enough. Thus, at an historical juncture at which the primary purpose of U.S. foreign policy should have been fostering an international environment encouraging Russia's democratic transition, American policymakers chose instead to exploit Moscow's temporary weaknesses and engage in dubious military adventures (e.g., the bombing of Serbia) and strategic initiatives (e.g., NATO's expansion to Russia's borders, often in violation of previous promises made to Moscow) of questionable real value to U.S. national interests. Thomas Friedman put the matter into perspective when he recently asked "Wasn't consolidating a democratic Russia more important than bringing the Czech Navy into NATO?" After the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq-importantly, without UN Security Council approval-Moscow's concerns about U.S. unilateralism, forcefully articulated by Putin at his February 2007 address before the Munich Conference on Security Policy-were inflamed by the U.S. push to grant Kosovo independence. At the G8 summit in Germany in June 2007, then-Russian President Putin was already signaling that what he called "universal principles" had to be applied to the frozen conflicts in Kosovo and the Caucasus, and Putin would later warn that U.S. and EU support for Kosovo's secession from Serbia was "illegal and immoral." In the UN Security Council, Russia's permanent representative Vitaly Churkin was trying to impress upon his colleagues the gravity with which Moscow viewed the Kosovo situation, saying that the Kosovo issue could represent the most important question the Security Council dealt with in this decade, and going to the extraordinary length of organizing a Security Council fact-finding mission to the region. The warnings from Moscow over Kosovo, however, were brushed aside by Brussels and Washington, and in both places it was widely assumed that Russia would roll over when presented with a fait accompli. The result has been yet another questionable foreign policy initiative for the Bush administration. Six months after declaring independence, only forty-six countries have recognized Kosovo. The EU itself cannot agree on a position, with six of the twenty-seven members refusing to recognize the breakaway Serbian province. Most of the remaining countries that have recognized Kosovo include the likes of San Marino, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands and Burkina Faso. None of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have recognized, nor has Indonesia (the largest Muslim country in the world), nor any of the Arab states. All told, three-fourths of the international community is following Moscow's lead on the Kosovo issue rather than Washington's. In the Caucasus, meanwhile, Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17 led to an immediate increase in tensions. Call the Russians what you will, but you can't say that they are not fast learners. In the current crisis, Moscow copied Washington's Kosovo playbook in full, accusing Georgian forces of ethnic cleansing and war crimes, labeling Saakashvili a war criminal (just as Washington had done in 1999 with Slobodan Milosevic), and claiming that Georgian actions had disqualified it from ruling over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the future. Much like NATO officials had done in 1999, Russian officials also claimed that their intervention in Georgia was based on "humanitarian" motives. In fact, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov specifically compared Russian military actions in Georgia to NATO's actions in Serbia. According to Lavrov, Our military acted efficiently and professionally. It was an able ground operation that quickly achieved its very clear and legitimate objectives. It was very different, for example, from the U.S./NATO operation against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, when an air bombardment campaign ran out of military targets and degenerated into attacks on bridges, TV towers, passenger trains and other civilian sites, even hitting an embassy. In this instance, Russia used force in full conformity with international law, its right of self-defense, and its obligations under the agreements with regard to this particular conflict. Russia could not allow its peacekeepers to watch acts of genocide committed in front of their eyes, as happened in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica in 1995. Lavrov is on strong ground here; both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have determined that many of NATO's actions in 1999 constituted attacks against illegitimate civilian targets, if not outright war crimes. The Russians also seem relatively unmoved by Western accusations that they are intent on "regime change" in Georgia; probably with good reason, because in the Balkans the United States and the United Kingdom have recently been involved in a bit of regime change themselves. After Serbia's May parliamentary elections, the American and British ambassadors in Belgrade played key roles in the formation of a coalition government that removed Vojislav Kostunica, the man who defeated Slobodan Milosevic at the polls, from the prime ministership. The parties in the coalition government these ambassadors helped bring into office-believe it or not-include Slobodan Milosevic's former Socialist Party, and the party of the assassinated Serbian gangster-cum-warlord Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, whose paramilitaries were involved in numerous war crimes in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. Apart from Kostunica's uncompromising stance on defending Serbia's territorial integrity regarding the Kosovo issue, it is hard to see what the American and British ambassadors had against him. Perhaps they didn't like Kostunica's translation of the Federalist Papers. Or maybe they had some issues with his scholarly work on Rousseau and Tocqueville. Predictably, Washington neocons are now invoking a new cold war against Russia. Russians themselves, meanwhile, are growing tired of the double

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

standards they see Washington using against them. Former-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, summed up the feelings of many of his compatriots when he questioned the value of Russian participation in international institutions: For some time now, Russians have been wondering: if our opinion counts for nothing in those institutions, do we really need them? Just to sit at the nicely set dinner table and listen to lectures? Indeed, Russia has long been told to simply accept the facts. Here's the independence of Kosovo for you. Here's the abrogation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and the American decision to place missile defenses in neighboring countries. Here's the unending expansion of NATO. All of these moves have been set against the backdrop of sweet talk about partnership. Why would anyone put up with such a charade? Why indeed? You do not have to be Russian to see the weak foundations on which so much of official Washington's criticisms of Russia are based. As David Remnick recently noted in the New Yorker, Even ordinary Russians find it mightily trying to be lectured on questions of sovereignty and moral diplomacy by the West, particularly the United States, which, even before Iraq, had a long history of foreign intervention, overt and covert -politics by other means. After the exposure of the Bush Administration's behavior prior to the invasion of Iraq and its unapologetic use of torture, why would any leader, much less Putin, respond to moral suasion from Washington? That is America's tragedy, and the world's.

Page 13

Developing a serious policy for dealing with a more powerful and assertive Russia will of necessity be high on the agenda of the next presidential administration. In the 1990s, Washington policy makers may have been able to ignore Russia's views, or to delude themselves into believing that Russia would never be a serious international player again. But those days are over. This makes it even more urgent for U.S. policy makers to better understand the strategic importance of preventing a renewed downturn in U.S.Russian relations. Ideological rants, moral outrage and attempts to paint the world in black and white make good TV, but they are dangerous when applied to complex problems that, upon careful and thoughtful analysis, reveal themselves in shades of gray. The late, great American diplomat and statesman (and lifelong Russia hand) W. Averell Harriman once said, "To base policy on ignorance and illusion is very dangerous. Policy should be based on knowledge and understanding." Harriman would probably be mortified today at the thought that so much of US policy appears based not on ignorance and illusion, but perhaps on something far worse-contempt, be it for post-Soviet Russia, for "old Europe," or for the United Nations and the Geneva Conventions. For some in Washington, perhaps, even contempt for our own democratic principles and traditions. Gordon N. Bardos, National Interest, Friday, August 29, 2008 Gordon N. Bardos is assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19706

THE RECOGNITION GAME

cussions for both regional and global security. By discarding the ideas of compromise, accommodation and reintegration, support for dividing Serbia as a solution to ethno-national conflicts was both myopic and ill-conceived. Further reiterations of the inevitability of, and lack of alternatives to, independence for Kosovo constrained discussion over the possibility and nature "History will judge!" were the bullish of other potential solutions, including innovations in sovereignty and autonwords of Bernard Kouchner, the French omy in line with UN security council resolution 1244. foreign minister, in response to Konstantin Kosachev, president of the Rus- The new recognition game of international politics is unlikely to end here, sian Duma foreign affairs committee, with the aspirations of local ethnic majorities elsewhere fuelled by the Koswho warned that "You are absolutely ovo case. Secessionist movements within and beyond the EU's borders wrong on Kosovo. It is a terrible prece- continue to insist that Kosovo is a model for their own respective causes. In Ian Bancroft dent", during a press conference earlier the former Soviet Union, for instance, Armenian and Azerbaijani forces this year following Kosovo's unilateral have clashed over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, whilst the declaration of independence. With Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian presi- Moldovan province of Trans-Dniester continues to seek recognition as an dent, signing a decree on the independence of Georgia's break-away prov- independent state. inces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the judgments of history are likely to Kouchner's assertion that "when two communities cannot speak to each be delivered far sooner than Kouchner and others expected. other, but they only speak through arms, there is no choice but to separate By relying upon reiterations of "uniqueness" to justify their recognition of Kosovo's independence, the US and a majority of EU member states have ensured that appeals to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia sound both hollow and hypocritical, particularly President Bush's insistence that "Georgia's territorial integrity and borders must command the same respect as every other nation's, including Russia's". An international system defined by such arbitrary reiterations of "uniqueness", as opposed to universal principles, is always going to be vulnerable to contrived acts of imitation. The miscalculation of Kosovo is now, with conscious Russian assistance, recoiling back onto its instigators. them" is not only blind to Europe's very own history, principles and practices, but also to efforts to build peaceful co-existence throughout the western Balkans. The recognition of Kosovo's independence has contributed to the further erosion of two of the fundamental pillars of the international system sovereign equality and the principle of the inviolability of borders. The resulting recognition games and "parades of sovereignty" will have a number of destabilising effects throughout the world. Only through a UN framework and respect for international law can progress be made towards a model of multilateral governance to contend with the challenges of the 21st century. As predicted, Kosovo's declaration of independence has reverberated around the world most thunderously in Georgia

In collapsing the distinction between international law and politics, those http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/28/georgia.russia who supported Kosovo's independence have opened up a Pandora's box Ian Bancroft, The Guardian, August 29, 2008 of mutual recognitions and assertions of sovereignty, with damaging reper-

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ASSESSING THE GEORGIAN CRISIS GEORGIAN

After delays, the Russian promise to withdraw its military forces from Georgia seems to be taking shape. By the terms of the French-brokered ceasefire Russian troops will remain in South Ossetia, plus occupy a security belt of undisclosed width in South Ossetia. The situation remains fluid and far from resolved. The South Ossetian leadership has indicated its unwillingness to have international monitors on its territory as was agreed in the ceasefire arrangement. There are also new indications of breakaway intentions on the part of Abkhasia, the other ethnic enclave hostile to Georgian claims of sovereignty, including the seizure of the Kodori Ridge, a strategic strip of land by Abkhas soldiers in the Caucasus Ridge. There is no doubt that at this point the territorial unity of the Georgian state has been shattered on a de facto basis as a result of the crisis, and that Russia power will act as a guarantor of South Ossetian and Abkhasian autonomy, which will achieve at minimum de facto independence for these two ethnic enclaves. Without qualification the scope and intensity of Russian military moves against Georgia deserve legal, moral, and political condemnation, but at the same time Georgian and United States responsibility for the crisis is significant, and should not be overlooked. Russia violated the core norm of the UN Charter by sending its military forces beyond its borders to attack a small neighbor on August 12, doing heavy damage in the densely inhabited capital city of Tskhinvali by firing a flurry of rockets and missiles, including cluster munitions. There are unconfirmed media reports that as many as 2000 civilians died from the combined Georgian and Russian attacks on South Ossetia, with the bulk of these being caused by Georgia. The violence has also displaced tens of thousands, fleeing both the war zone and fearful of being caught in the ethnic crossfire. It has been established that Russia was especially targeting several villages in the region populated by Georgians, which adds an ethnic cleansing element to the accusations of aggression being made against Russia. These violations of Georgian sovereignty amount clearly to a crime against the peace and the military tactics deployed by Moscow are flagrant violations of the laws of war. Beyond this, if the charges of ethnic cleansing hold up, this would seem to make Russia guilty of crimes against humanity. The Georgian government of Mikheil Saakashvili is far from innocent. It did its irresponsible best to provoke the crisis, militarily attacking the Russian peacekeeping presence in the minority republic of South Ossetia five days earlier, and doing serious damage to the resident population, even generating Russian claims of a genocidal Georgian acts and intentions. The apparent objective of this major use of force by Georgia was to disrupt the ceasefire arrangements that had been in place there since 1992, which had allowed a limited number of Russian troops to remain in South Ossetia along with contingents from Georgia and South Ossetia as a tripartite peacekeeping force. Saakashvili made no secret of his goal to drive the Russians out and bringing about a regime change in South Ossetia that would install Georgian leaders compliant with the will of his Tiblisi government in place of the current leader, Eduard Kokoity, who is popular with the local population and enjoys the backing of Russia. The South Ossetians had voted overwhelmingly in a 2006 referendum to join their brethren in North Ossetia, which enjoys a high degree of autonomy within the Russian state. The disputed sovereignty of South Ossetia poses a delicate issue of self-determination that was just beneath the surface of the current phase of the struggle before the crisis erupted. It has now been brought to the surface by Russias formal diplomatic recognition of the political independence of South Ossetia (and Abkhasia), allegedly in response to the Georgian provocation of August 7th that killed South Ossetian civilians and Russians military personnel present in their peacekeeping roles. By taking this step Russia is further antagonizing the West that has seemed so inept in responding to this challenge directed at its Georgian ally. The actual status of South Ossetia is likely to remain contested for the foreseeable future, with Russia, possibly joined by other states, recognizing the de facto independence of the breakaway enclave, and the West continuing to insist that this political entity remains part of Georgia. This claim is not as simple as it might seem for several reasons. First of all, it had been the understanding that claims of self-determination that fragmented the unity of existing states had no validity in international law, but this consensus was set aside without much hesitation by European countries eager to facilitate the breakup of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Secondly, the ugly realities in this small enclave of 70,000 or so raise questions about its legitimacy as a political entity, taking into account its small size and considering the prevalence of gangsterism, ranging from money laundering to human trafficking. At this point there is no comfortable solution for the future of South Ossetia or Abkhasia squeezed in a tight geopolitical vise between Russia and the United States/Georgia, and lacking an acceptable self- governing process of its own. Thirdly, the Russian principled claim that Georgias abuse of South Ossetians and Abkhasians resulted in the forfeiture of its sovereign rights contradicts Russias brutal and bloody suppression of Chechnyas secessionist movement. At the same time, the NATO approach to Kosovos independence claims, in the face of Russian opposition, was no less state-shattering than what Moscow is seeking to achieve in Georgia, and resting on the same combination of forfeiture and consensus arguments, that is, Serbias violation of human rights forfeited their sovereign rights and the Kosovar consensus favored political independence. As with Russia, NATO led by the United States, fought a war to ensure that Serbia would be divested of its sovereign rights in Kosovo, initiated without any prior approval by the UN Security Council. Such a precedent played a role in seeming to establish a precedent for the sort of unilateralism exhibited in 2003 when the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq, and made a variety of claims, including liberating the Iraqi people from tyrannical rule. Our understanding of this seemingly local struggle cannot get very far without an appreciation of these complex geopolitical forces that are at play. There is to begin with the geopolitics of oil, the strong desire of the West to have pipelines from the Caspian Sea area that pass through a friendly country, and somewhat lessen dependency on Middle Eastern oil. This gives the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline a major strategic importance, as well as directly engaging Turkeys interest in the conflict. This helps to explain why both Russia and the United States are so interested in controlling the outlook of the Georgian government. Here again Saakashvili, and

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

his backers in Washington that include President Bush, have taken a militaristic approach to security for Georgia that was bound to agitate a leadership in Moscow newly preoccupied with Russian border security and international status. The United States has poured military assistance and training units into Georgia ever since Saakashvili came to power, as well as exerted great pressure a few months ago to gain NATO membership for the country, ignoring warnings from the Russian leadership such a move was unacceptable, and would cause trouble. The major European powers, including France and Germany, were quite sensible in opposing membership in Georgia, being unwilling to accept a future commitment that would include an obligation to defend Georgia in a situation such as now exists. The events of August are quite likely to put NATO membership on hold, perhaps indefinitely, although NATO formally did indicate before the recent crisis that Georgia and Ukraine could become members at some future time. From a Russian perspective recent American moves and rhetoric are bound to be troublesome, especially in the wider context of American plans to deploy an anti-missile interceptor system on Polish soil as well as to locate an elaborate military radar system in the Czech Republic. These recent American moves seem coordinated efforts to threaten Russia with hostile encirclement, although they can be interpreted as gestures of support for the governments along Russias borders that are disturbed by this obvious effort by Moscow to reassert its will at the expense of the sovereign rights of its neighbors. It is impossible to overlook the timing that set off the destabilizing chain of events. The aggressive Georgian posture toward South Ossetia was struck just as Russia was beginning to flex its post-Soviet muscles having apparently regained its geopolitical confidence and ambition. This probably reflects the effects of its sustained rapid economic growth in recent years that has been given added weight as a result of the rising monetary value of its vast energy reserves. Even if Vladimir Putin were a more moderate leader with a better human rights record, Georgian violent provocations in South Ossetia on August 7th would almost certainly produced some sort of show of Russian force, although the extreme rapidity of such a major and organized Russian response raises suspicions that Moscow was waiting for an opportunity for a show of force to challenge Georgias sovereign rights. Of course, Saakashvilis overt hostility to the Putin/Medvedev government seems in this sense to have played into Russias hands, especially given the inability of the United States to back Georgia up with any support more tangible than strong words and humanitarian relief. Taking all these considerations into account makes it tragically clear that South Ossetia, and even Georgia, are hapless pawns in the larger geopolitical chess game that is beginning to assume alarming proportions reminiscent of the worst days of the Cold War era. We are also witnessing a collision of two contrasting geopolitical logics the interplay of which pose great dangers for regional and world peace, as well as to the wellbeing of the peoples of the world. Russian behavior seems mainly motivated by a traditional spatially limited effort to establish a friendly and stable security belt in countries near its borders. It is reasserting an historic sphere of influence that has always been at odds with the sovereign rights of its neighbors, sparking their fear and hostility. We can interpret Russias behavior in this respect as seeking indirect control over its so-called near abroad that was mainly lost after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992. In light of NATO expansion to incorporate the countries of Eastern Europe, the assertion of Russian primacy in relation to its former Soviet republics is a high priority for which Moscow seems willing to pay a considerable price, including a deep chilling of relations with the United States. Russias behavior in Georgia undoubtedly is meant to serve as a warning to other governments on its Southern border, especially Ukraine, not to opt for strong ties with Washington.

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The clash arises with the United States, which especially during the Bush presidency, has stressed its intention to encourage the democratization of the former Soviet republics. Georgia was treated as the shining example of the success of this policy. From Moscows viewpoint, what was proclaimed as democratization was surely perceived as Americanization, with only a slightly disguised anti-Russian agenda. In this sense, Saakashvali was the ideal leader as far as Washington was concerned, being so avowedly committed to the United States, even sending 2,000 troops to aid the American effort in Iraq, but the worst possible leader from the Russian viewpoint. He spoke of Russia in derogatory terms, and was eager to do what Russia feared, join in a dynamic process of military encirclement as part of the American global security project that has pushed so hard during the neoconservative presidency of George W. Bush. In comparison with Russia, Washington considers that the entire world has become its geopolitical playing field in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, and as an aspect of the global war on terror. The United States follows a global imperial logic rather than Russias pursuit of a limited regional sphere of interest logic. Thinking along these lines means that Georgia falls dangerously within both Russias sphere of influence and is a battlefield in the American attempt to build an informal global empire that acknowledges no geographic limits. The whole world is Washingtons near abroad. This tension if allowed to persist is likely to produce a revival of an arms race reminiscent of the Cold War, and could easily lead to a horrifying renewal of the East-West conflict, even reviving risks of great power warfare fought with nuclear weapons. It is not a happy moment, perhaps the most ominous time from the perspective of world peace since the 9/11 attacks. There is also much to worry about of a less grandiose character. Russia now joins the United States as a major power willing to use non-defensive force in world politics without authorization from the United Nations, and hence in violation of international law. It adds its irresponsibility to the recklessness of the United States proceeding in 2003 to invade Iraq despite the refusal of the UN Security Council to support the claim of the Bush presidency that the basis for a defensive preemptive war existed due to Iraqs arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and Baghdads demonstrated willingness to use force aggressively against foreign states. In this respect, the crisis surrounding the events in South Ossetia puts at greater risk the grand design adopted after World War II, never either fulfilled or renounced, resting on governments foregoing the war option as a matter of foreign policy discretion except in situations of self-defense. There is much to be learned and much to be feared in relation to these recent events. The Russian resurgence means, above all, that the central rivalry of the last half century again must be treated with utmost seriousness. It can no longer be ignored. Ideally, this should encourage countries threatened by the dangerous geopolitical maelstrom to work toward respect for international law and the authority of the United Nations. If such an effort fails, as it likely will, then it becomes more important than at any time since the breaching of the Berlin Wall that both Moscow and Washington exhibit sensitivity to each others fundamental interests as great powers. It will not be possible to avoid encounters arising from this clash between regional and imperial geopolitics, but at least diplomacy can do a far better job of avoiding showdowns than has happened in relation to South Ossetia and Georgia. In the end, prospect for peace and justice in the 21st century depend on respect for sovereign rights, and eventually on the repudiation of geopolitics, but we are not nearly there yet. And these developments suggest that the world may be drifting anew into the most dangerous form of geopolitics, namely, reliance on force to resolve international disputes. Richard Falk, August 26, 2008 http://www.transnational.org/Resources_Treasures/2008/ Falk_GeorgianCrisis.html

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

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WAR IN THE CAUCASUS: TOWARDS A BROADER RUSSIA-US MILITARY CONFRONTATION? RUSSIAUSSIA

During the night of August 7, coinciding with the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, Georgia's president Saakashvili ordered an all-out military attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The aerial bombardments and ground attacks were largely directed against civilian targets including residential areas, hospitals and the university. The provincial capital Tskhinvali was destroyed. The attacks resulted in some 1500 civilian deaths, according to both Russian and Western sources. "The air and artillery bombardment left the provincial capital without water, food, electricity and gas. Horrified civilians crawled out of the basements into the streets as fighting eased, looking for supplies." (AP, August 9, 2008). According to reports, some 34,000 people from South Ossetia have fled to Russia. (Deseret Morning News, Salt Lake City, August 10, 2008) The importance and timing of this military operation must be carefully analyzed. It has far-reaching implications. Russia has already begun consultations with the ambassadors of the NATO countries and consultations with NATO military representatives will be held tomorrow," Rogozin said. "We will caution them against continuing to further support of Saakashvili." It is an undisguised aggression accompanied by a mass propaganda war, he said. (See Moscow accuses NATO of having "encouraged Georgia" to attack South Ossetia, Russia Today, August 9, 2008) According to Rogozin, Georgia had initially planned to: "start military action against Abkhazia, however, 'the Abkhaz fortified region turned out to be unassailable for Georgian armed formations, therefore a different tactic was chosen aimed against South Ossetia', which is more accessible territorially. The envoy has no doubts that Mikheil Saakashvili had agreed his actions with "sponsors", "those with whom he is negotiating Georgia's accession to NATO ". (RIA Novosti, August 8, 2008) Contrary to what was conveyed by Western media reports, the attacks were anticipated by Moscow. The attacks were timed to coincide with the opening of the Olympics, largely with a view to avoiding frontpage media coverage of the Georgian military operation. On August 7, Russian forces were in an advanced state readiness. The counterattack was swiftly carried out. Russian paratroopers were sent in from Russia's Ivanovo, Moscow and Pskov airborne divisions. Tanks, armored vehicles and several thousand ground troops have been deployed. Russian air strikes have largely targeted military facilities inside Georgia including the Gori military base. The Georgian military attack was repelled with a massive show of strength on the part of the Russian military. Act of Provocation? US-NATO military and intelligence planners invariably examine various "scenarios" of a proposed military operation-- i.e. in this case, a limited Georgian attack largely directed against civilian targets, with a view to inflicting civilian casualties. The examination of scenarios is a routine practice. With limited military capabilities, a Georgian victory and occupation of Tskhinvali, was an impossibility from the outset. And this was known and understood to US-NATO military planners. A humanitarian disaster rather than a military victory was an integral part of the scenario. The objective was to destroy the provincial capital, while also inflicting a significant loss of human life. If the objective were to restore Georgian political control over the provincial government, the operation would have been undertaken in a very different

Georgia is an outpost of US and NATO forces, on the immediate border of the Russian Federation and within proximity of the Middle East Central Asian war theater. South Ossetia is also at the crossroads of strategic oil and gas pipeline routes. Georgia does not act militarily without the assent of Washington. The Georgian head of State is a US proxy and Georgia is a de facto US protectorate. Who is behind this military agenda? What interests are being served? What is the purpose of the military operation. There is evidence that the attacks were carefully coordinated by the US military and NATO. Moscow has accused NATO of "encouraging Georgia". Russias Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov underscored the destabilizing impacts of "foreign" military aid to Georgia: . It all confirms our numerous warnings addressed to the international community that it is necessary to pay attention to massive arms purchasing by Georgia during several years. Now we see how these arms and Georgian special troops who had been trained by foreign specialists are used, he said.(Moscow accuses NATO of having "encouraged Georgia" to attack South Ossetia, Russia Today, August 9, 2008) Moscow's envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, sent an official note to the representatives of all NATO member countries:

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

fashion, with Special Forces occupying key public buildings, communications networks and provincial institutions, rather than waging an all out bombing raid on residential areas, hospitals, not to mention Tskhinvali's University.

Page 17

Let us be under no illusions. This is not a civil war. The attacks are an integral part of the broader Middle East Central Asian war, including US-NATOIsraeli war preparations in relation to Iran. The Role of Israeli Military Advisers While NATO and US military advisers did not partake in the military operation per se, they were actively involved in the planning and logistics of the attacks. According to Israeli sources (Debka.com, August 8, 2008), the ground assault on August 7-8, using tanks and artillery was "aided by Israeli military advisers". Israel also supplied Georgia with Hermes-450 and Skylark unmanned aerial vehicles, which were used in the weeks leading up to the August 7 attacks. Georgia has also acquired, according to a report in Rezonansi (August 6, in Georgian, BBC translation) "some powerful weapons through the upgrade of Su-25 planes and artillery systems in Israel". According to Haaretz (August 10, 2008), Israelis are active in military manufacturing and security consulting in Georgia. Russian forces are now directly fighting a NATO-US trained Georgian army integrated by US and Israeli advisers. And Russian warplanes have attacked the military jet factory on the outskirts of Tbilisi, which produces the upgraded Su-25 fighter jet, with technical support from Israel. (CTV.ca, August 10, 2008) When viewed in the broader context of the Middle East war, the crisis in Southern Ossetia could lead to escalation, including a direct confrontation between Russian and NATO forces. If this were to occur, we would be facing the most serious crisis in US-Russian relations since the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962. Georgia: NATO-US Outpost Georgia is part of a NATO military alliance (GUAM) signed in April 1999 at the very outset of the war on Yugoslavia. It also has a bilateral military cooperation agreement with the US. These underlying military agreements have served to protect Anglo-American oil interests in the Caspian sea basin as well as pipeline routes. (The alliance was initially entitled GUUAM, Uzkbekistan subsequently withdrew and the name was changed to GUAM: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova). Both the US and NATO have a military presence in Georgia and are working closely with the Georgian Armed Forces. Since the signing of the 1999 GUAM agreement, Georgia has been the recipient of extensive US military aid. Barely a few months ago, in early May, the Russian Ministry of Defense accused Washington, "claiming that [US as well as NATO and Israeli] military assistance to Georgia is destabilizing the region." (Russia Claims Georgia in Arms Buildup, Wired News, May 19, 2008). According to the Russian Defense Ministry "Georgia has received 206 tanks, of which 175 units were supplied by NATO states, 186 armored vehicles (126 - from NATO), 79 guns (67 - from NATO), 25 helicopters (12 - from NATO), 70 mortars, ten surface-to-air missile systems, eight Israeli-made unmanned aircraft, and other weapons. In addition, NATO countries have supplied four combat aircraft to Georgia. The Russian Defense Ministry said there were plans to deliver to Georgia 145 armored vehicles, 262 guns and mortars, 14 combat aircraft including four Mirazh-2000 destroyers, 25 combat helicopters, 15 American Black Hawk aircraft, six surface-to-air missile systems and other arms." (Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, Aug 7, 2008) NATO-US-Israeli assistance under formal military cooperation agreements involves a steady flow of advanced military equipment as well as training and consulting services. According to US military sources (spokesman for US European Command), the US has more than 100 "military trainers" in Georgia. A Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman "said there were no plans to redeploy the estimated 130 US troops and civilian contractors, who he said were

In this image made from television, Russian military vehicles are seen moving towards the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, on Friday, Aug. 8, 2008. The Russian response was entirely predictable. Georgia was "encouraged" by NATO and the US. Both Washington and NATO headquarters in Brussels were acutely aware of what would happen in the case of a Russian counterattack. The question is: was this a deliberate provocation intended to trigger a Russian military response and suck the Russians into a broader military confrontation with Georgia (and allied forces) which could potentially escalate into an all out war? Georgia has the third largest contingent of coalition forces in Iraq after the US and the UK, with some 2000 troops. According to reports, Georgian troops in Iraq are now being repatriated in US military planes, to fight Russian forces. (See Debka.com, August 10, 2008) This US decision to repatriate Georgian servicemen suggests that Washington is intent upon an escalation of the conflict, where Georgian troops are to be used as cannon fodder against a massive deployment of Russian forces. US-NATO and Israel Involved in the Planning of the Attacks In mid-July, Georgian and U.S. troops held a joint military exercise entitled "Immediate Response" involving respectively 1,200 US and 800 Georgian troops. The announcement by the Georgian Ministry of Defense on July 12 stated that they US and Georgian troops were to "train for three weeks at the Vaziani military base" near the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. (AP, July 15, 2008). These exercises, which were completed barely a week before the August 7 attacks, were an obvious dress rehearsal of a military operation, which, in all likelihood, had been planned in close cooperation with the Pentagon. The war on Southern Ossetia was not meant to be won, leading to the restoration of Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia. It was intended to destabilize the region while also triggering a US-NATO confrontation with Russia. On July 12, coinciding with the outset of the Georgia-US war games, the Russian Defense Ministry started its own military maneuvers in the North Caucasus region. The usual disclaimer by both Tblisi and Moscow: the military exercises have nothing to do with the situation in South Ossetia. (Ibid)

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

stationed in the area around Tblisi." (AFP, 9 August 2008). In fact, USNATO military presence in Georgia is on a larger scale to that acknowledged in official statements. The number of NATO personnel in Georgia acting as trainers and military advisers has not been confirmed. Although not officially a member of NATO, Georgia's military is full integrated into NATO procedures. In 2005, Georgian president proudly announced the inauguration of the first military base, which "fully meets NATO standards". Immediately following the inauguration of the Senakskaya base in west Georgia, Tblisi announced the opening of a second military base at Gori which would also "comply with NATO regulations in terms of military requirements as well as social conditions." (Ria Novosti, 26 May 2006). The Gori base has been used to train Georgian troops dispatched to fight under US command in the Iraq war theater. It is worth noting that under a March 31, 2006, agreement between Tblisi and Moscow, Russia's two Soviet-era military bases in Georgia - Akhalkalaki and Batumi have been closed down. (Ibid) The pullout at Batumi commenced in May of last year, 2007. The last remaining Russian troops left the Batumi military facility in early July 2008, barely a week before the commencement of the USGeorgia war games and barely a month prior to the attacks on South Ossetia. The Israel Connection Israel is now part of the Anglo-American military axis, which serves the interests of the Western oil giants in the Middle East and Central Asia. Israel is a partner in the Baku-Tblisi- Ceyhan pipeline which brings oil and gas to the Eastern Mediterranean. More than 20 percent of Israeli oil is imported from Azerbaijan, of which a large share transits through the BTC pipeline. Controlled by British Petroleum, the BTC pipeline has dramatically changed the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucusus: "[The BTC pipeline] considerably changes the status of the region's countries and cements a new pro-West alliance. Having taken the pipeline to the Mediterranean, Washington has practically set up a new bloc with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Israel, " (Komerzant, Moscow, 14 July 2006) While the official reports state that the BTC pipeline will "channel oil to Western markets", what is rarely acknowledged is that part of the oil from the Caspian sea would be directly channeled towards Israel, via Georgia. In this regard, a Israeli-Turkish pipeline project has also been envisaged which would link Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon and from there through Israel's main pipeline system, to the Red Sea. The objective of Israel is not only to acquire Caspian sea oil for its own consumption needs but also to play a key role in re-exporting Caspian sea oil back to the Asian markets through the Red Sea port of Eilat. The strategic implications of this re-routing of Caspian sea oil are far-reaching. (For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, The War on Lebanon and the Battle for Oil, Global Research, July 2006) What is envisaged is to link the BTC pipeline to the Trans-Israel EilatAshkelon pipeline, also known as Israel's Tipline, from Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. "Turkey and Israel are negotiating the construction of a multi-million-dollar energy and water project that will transport water, electricity, natural gas and oil by pipelines to Israel, with the oil to be sent onward from Israel to the Far

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East, The new Turkish-Israeli proposal under discussion would see the transfer of water, electricity, natural gas and oil to Israel via four underwater pipelines. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite? cid=1145961328841&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull Baku oil can be transported to Ashkelon via this new pipeline and to India and the Far East.[via the Red sea]" "Ceyhan and the Mediterranean port of Ashkelon are situated only 400 km apart. Oil can be transported to the city in tankers or via specially constructed under-water pipeline. From Ashkelon the oil can be pumped through already existing pipeline to the port of Eilat at the Red Sea; and from there it can be transported to India and other Asian countries in tankers. (REGNUM) In this regard, Israel is slated to play a major strategic role in "protecting" the Eastern Mediterranean transport and pipeline corridors out of Ceyhan. Concurrently, it also involved in channeling military aid and training to both Georgia and Azerbaijan. A far-reaching 1999 bilateral military cooperation agreement between Tblisi and Tel Aviv was reached barely a month before the NATO sponsored GUUAM agreement. It was signed in Tbilisi by President Shevardnadze and Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyu. These various military cooperation arrangements are ultimately intended to undermine Russia's presence and influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a pro forma declaration, Tel Aviv committed itself, following bilateral discussions with Moscow, on August 5, 2008, to cut back military assistance to Georgia. Russia's Response In response to the attacks, Russian forces intervened with conventional ground troops. Tanks and armored vehicles were sent in. The Russian air force was also involved in aerial counter-attacks on Georgian military positions including the military base of Gori. The Western media has portrayed the Russian as solely responsible for the deaths of civilians, yet at the same time the Western media has acknowledged (confirmed by the BBC) that most of the civilian casualties at the outset were the result of the Georgian ground and air attacks. Based on Russian and Western sources, the initial death toll in South Ossetia was at least 1,400 (BBC) mostly civilians. "Georgian casualty figures ranged from 82 dead, including 37 civilians, to a figure of around 130 dead.... A Russian air strike on Gori, a Georgian town near South Ossetia, left 60 people dead, many of them civilians, Georgia says." (BBC, August 9, 2008). Russian sources place the number of civilian deaths in South Ossetia at 2000. A process of escalation and confrontation between Russia and America is unfolding, reminiscent of the Cold War era. Are we dealing with an act of provocation, with a view to triggering a broader conflict? Supported by media propaganda, the Western military alliance is intent on using this incident to confront Russia, as evidenced by recent NATO statements. Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, August 10, 2008 http://globalresearch.ca/?context=va&aid=9788

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

Page 19

EU CAPITAL FACES GEORGIA AND RUSSIA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN GEORGIA

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - The guns may have fallen silent in Georgia but the propaganda war on who started the conflict has just begun, with Russia and Georgia each selling their side of the story to diplomats, MEPs and media in Brussels. Over the past three weeks, the EU capital has been flooded with various timelines of events, differing body counts, tallies of the wounded and calculations of the number of refugees, as both parties try to rubbish each other's bloody arithmetic. EU on a Russian column south of the Roki Tunnel, the Georgian advisor said. 'Blatant lie' "This is a blatant lie," Russia's ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, told EUobserver in his turn, saying that Georgian military action began in midafternoon on 7 August not just before midnight, as the Georgians claim. "At 14:42, Georgian officers in the joint peace-keeping headquarters [where Russian peacekeepers were also based] suddenly left, saying they were following the instructions of their capital. "Shelling of the headquarters started thereafter and an hour later we had lost 10 Russian peacekeepers from the contingent." The Georgian general in command of the Georgian peacekeepers, Mamuka Kurashvili, then appeared on television in the early afternoon of 7 August to announce that a military operation "to restore 'constitutional order'" had begun. "The Georgians began shelling the capital, Tskhinvali, at 22:35, using longrange artillery and multiple rocket launchers," Mr Chizhov said. At 00:45 on 8 August, the Georgians were not firing on invading Russian forces, he added. "They were firing on a sleeping city." Counting the dead The day after fighting broke out, the South Ossetian separatists' leader, Eduard Kokoity, said Georgian forces killed some 1,400 people. Russia backed the figure, then spoke of 2,000 deceased civilians, repeatedly calling Georgia's actions "genocide." The Georgians say that as of 25 August (the most recent date for which they have offered figures), 75 Georgian civilians had died as a result of Russian actions and 273 wounded. Tbilisi scorns the Russian Tskhinvali death-toll, but has not offered an alternative count. Human Rights Watch has also questioned the Russian numbers. "That the Russians came up with such a figure so quickly - within 48 hours gives solid grounds to question the accuracy," the group's Rachel Denber said. "It takes a long time to gather accurate statistics on casualties, not just from hospitals, but [also] families who have buried relatives without reporting a death." "[But] there is no doubt that the Georgian attack produced serious civilian casualties, as any indiscriminate use of force will do," she added. As to the question of genocide, "this is perhaps the gravest crime there is," Ms Denber said. "One has to begin asking if when governments are increasingly throwing out terms like that, whether it is diminishing the meaning of the word." EU on message European capitals don't want to talk about who started the war, turning attention to the aid effort and saying Russia has failed to adhere to the sixpoint ceasefire plan it agreed with France and Georgia. "Who started the conflict is not an easy question with an easy answer," the spokesperson for the German mission to the EU, Ricklef Beutin, said. "It's up for historians to decide," the spokesperson for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rob Dekker, indicated. Spain "cannot take a concrete position" on the matter, a Spanish diplomat added. But one EU diplomat privately blamed Georgia for the mess. "Of course it was Georgia that started it, and the dialogue we have with Georgia will have to include this," the contact said, explaining that the EU is keeping silent on the matter so as not to diffuse its message on Russia's subsequent actions. "We need to send a very strong message to Russia that what they did is not OK. On that, we're all very unified. That's got to be the focus." Leigh Philips, 30.08.2008 http://euobserver.com/9/26659/?rk=1

Russian soldiers on the streets of Tskhinvali after the war diplomats refuse to discuss - publicly - who struck first, preferring to focus on Russia's subsequent actions and delivery of aid. But while most of Europe stands shocked after Russian jets bombed towns deep inside Georgia, Tbilisi's decision to attack Tshkinvali - the rebel capital of the breakaway South Ossetia region - has not gone unnoticed either. "Most of the Western press have misunderstood what happened before the war, meaning most people think that Georgia either fell into Russia's trap or that [Georgian president] Sakaashvilli was reckless," a Georgian government advisor told EUobserver. "Georgia only attacked Tskhinvali after Russia entered Georgian territory," he said, adding that Mr Saakashvili "had no other option" and that "in the course of the Georgian action, there were no known atrocities." The Georgian timeline describes how from 15 July to 2 August, Russia conducted military exercises near the breakaway regions. After the manouevres (code-named "Caucasus 2008") ended, the troops were never redeployed. Georgia also highlights a 29 July escalation in which rebels began shelling Georgian-controlled villages and the subsequent mobilisation of North Caucasus mercenaries, whom Tbilisi blames for a series of atrocities in the 1990s. "If the Georgian attack was such a 'surprise,' as the Russians repeatedly call it," the Georgian advisor asked, "how were they able to mobilise 80,000 troops on such short notice?" The centrepiece of the Georgian narrative is that at 23:30 local time on 7 August, the Georgian government received intelligence reports from an unnamed foreign government that some 150 Russian armoured vehicles were approaching the Roki Tunnel - the only road connecting Russia and South Ossetia. It was only after Russian armed forces crossed into Georgian territory - at 23:50 - that Georgia attacked Tkshinvali. At 00:45 on 8 August, Georgia fired

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

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U.S. ROLE IN GEORGIA CRISIS

The international condemnation of Russian aggression against Georgia and the concomitant assaults by Abkhazians and South Ossetians against ethnic Georgians within their territories is in large part appropriate. But the self-righteous posturing coming out of Washington should be tempered by a sober recognition of the ways in which the United States has contributed to the crisis. It has been nearly impossible to even broach this subject of the U.S. role. Much of the mainstream media coverage and statements by American political leaders of both major parties has in many respects resembled the anti-Russian hysterics of the Cold War. It is striking how quickly forgotten is the fact that the U.S.-backed Georgian military started the war when it brutally assaulted the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali in an attempt to regain direct control of the autonomous region. This attack prompted the disproportionate and illegitimate Russian military response, which soon went beyond simply ousting invading Georgian forces from South Ossetia to invading and occupying large segments of Georgia itself. The South Ossetians themselves did much to provoke Georgia as well by shelling villages populated by ethnic Georgians earlier this month. However, Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili ruled out signing a non-aggression pact and repeatedly refused to rejoin talks of the Joint Control Commission to prevent an escalation of the violence. Furthermore, according to Reuters, a draft UN Security Council statement calling for an immediate cease fire was blocked when the United States objected to a phrase in the three-sentence draft statement that would have required both sides to renounce the use of force. Borders and Boundaries In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Russian empire and its Soviet successors, like the Western European colonialists in Africa, often drew state boundaries arbitrarily and, in some cases, not so arbitrarily as part of a divideand-rule strategy. The small and ethnically distinct regions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Ajaria were incorporated into the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and on the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 remained as autonomous regions within the state of Georgia. Not one of the regions was ethnically pure. They all included sizable ethnic Georgian minorities, among others. Despite cultural and linguistic differences, there was not much in the way of ethnic tension during most of the Soviet period and inter-marriage was not uncommon. As the USSR fell apart in the late 1980s, however, nationalist sentiments increased dramatically throughout the Caucasus region in such ethnic enclaves as Chechnya in Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, as well as among those within Georgia. Compounding these nationalist and ethnic tensions was the rise of the ultra-nationalist Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who assumed power when the country declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. With the possible exception of the Baltic states, Georgia had maintained the strongest sense of nationalism of any of the former Soviet republics, tracing its national identity as far back as the 4th century BC as one of most advanced states of its time. This resurgent nationalism led the newly reemerged independent Georgia to attempt to assert its sovereignty over its autonomous regions by force. A series of civil conflicts raged in Georgia in subsequent years, both between competing political factions within Georgia itself as well as in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, resulting in widespread ethnic cleansing. Backed by Russian forces, these two regions achieved de facto independence while, within Georgia proper, former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze emerged as president and brought some semblance of stability to the country, despite a weak economy and widespread corruption. Russian troops, nominally in a peacekeeping role but clearly aligned with nationalist elements within the two ethnic enclaves, effectively prevented any subsequent exercise of Georgian government authority over most of these territories. Meanwhile, the United States became the biggest foreign backer of the Shevardnadze regime, pouring in over $1 billion in aid during the decade of his corrupt and semi-authoritarian rule.

The Rose Revolution Though strongly supported by Washington, Shevardnadze was less wellrespected at home. For example, The New York Times reported how Georgians have a different perspective than the generous pro-government view from Washington, citing the observation in the Georgian daily newspaper The Messenger that, Despite the fact that he is adored in the West as an architect of democracy and credited with ending the Cold War, Georgians cannot bear their president. Though critical of the rampant corruption and rigged elections, the Bush administration stood by the Georgian regime, as they had the post-Communist dictatorships in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and most of the other former Soviet republics. Georgia enjoyed relatively more political freedom and civil society institutions than most other post-Soviet states. Nevertheless, high unemployment, a breakdown in the allocation of energy for heating and other needs, a deteriorating infrastructure, widespread corruption, and inept governance led to growing dissatisfaction with the government. By 2003, Shevardnadze had lost support from virtually every social class, ethnic group, and geographical region of the country. Heavy losses by his supporters in parliamentary elections early that November were widely anticipated. Still, Shevardnadze continued to receive the strong support of President George W. Bush due to his close personal relationship with high-ranking administration officials. Contributing to this relationship were his pro-Western policies, such as embarking upon ambitious free market reforms under the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund, agreeing to deploy 300 Georgian troops to Iraq following the U.S. invasion, and sending Georgian troops trained by U.S. Special Forces to the Pankisi Gorge on the border of Chechnya to fight Chechen rebels. Opposition leaders Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvilli strongly criticized the United States for its continued support of the Georgian president. In addition to the electoral opposition, a decentralized student-led grass roots movement known as Kmara emerged, calling for an end to corruption and more democratic and accountable government as well as free and fair elections. Though not directly supported by the Bush administration, a number of Western NGOs, including the Open Society Institute (backed by Hungarian-American financier George Soros) and the National Democratic Institute (supported, ironically, by U.S. congressional funding) provided funding for electionmonitoring and helped facilitate workshops for both the young Kmara activists and mainstream opposition leaders. This led to some serious tension between these non-governmental organizations and the U.S. embassy in Georgian capital. For example, when U.S. ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles learned that some leaders from the successful student-led nonviolent civil insurrection in Serbia three years earlier were in Tbilisi to give trainings to Kmara activists, he tried to discourage them by telling them that Shevardnadze is the guarantee for the peace and stability of the region. Noting that the United States was providing training and equipment of the Georgian army that anti-government demonstrators would soon be facing down in the streets, he referred to the Kmara as troublemakers. Similarly, Miles discouraged Kmara leaders from working with the Serb activists, whom he had known from his prior post as chief of mission in Belgrade, insisting that Georgia is not the same as Serbia. (The young Serbs ignored him, and the scheduled trainings in strategic nonviolent action went forward anyway.) The parliamentary elections that November were marred by a series of irregularities. These included widespread ballot-stuffing, multiple voting by government supporters, late poll openings, missing ballots, and missing voter lists in opposition strongholds. These attempts to steal the election elicited little more than finger-wagging from the Bush administration. The Georgians themselves did not take the situation so lightly, however. They launched general strikes and massive street protests against what they saw as illegitimate government authority. This effort was soon dubbed the Rose Revolution. Gaining support from the United States only after the success of the nonviolent civil insurrection appeared inevitable, this popular uprising forced Shevardnadze to resign.

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

Presidential elections, certified as free and fair by international observers, were held two months later, in which opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili emerged victorious. Four months later, the authoritarian ruler of the autonomous region of Ajaria, a Shevardnadze ally, was ousted in a similar nonviolent civil insurrection. Though not responsible for the change of government itself, the Bush administration soon moved to take advantage of the change the Georgian people brought about after the fact. U.S. Embrace of Saakashvili Despite its longstanding support for Shevardnadze, the Bush administration quickly embraced Georgias new president. Taking advantage of Georgias desperate economic situation, the United States successfully lobbied for a series of additional free market reforms and other neoliberal economic measures on the country, including a flat tax of 14%. Though official corruption declined, tax collection rates improved, and the rate of economic growth increased, high unemployment remained and social inequality grew. With strong encouragement from Washington, Saakashvilis government reduced domestic spending but dramatically increased military spending, with the armed forces expanding to more than 45,000 personnel over the next four years, more than 12,000 of whom were trained by the United States. Congress approved hundreds of millions of dollars of military assistance to Georgia, a small country of less than five million people. In addition, the United States successfully encouraged Israel to send advisors and trainers to support the rapidlyexpanding Georgian armed forces. Although facing growing security concerns at home, the Bush administration also successfully pushed Saakashvili to send an additional 1,700 troops to Iraq. Thus, Georgia increased its troop strength in Iraq by more than 500% even as other countries in the U.S.-led multinational force were pulling out. Though Georgia is located in a region well within Russias historic sphere of influence and is more than 3,000 miles from the Atlantic Ocean, Bush nevertheless launched an ambitious campaign to bring Georgia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russians, who had already seen previous U.S. assurances to Gorbachev that NATO would not extend eastward ignored, found the prospects of NATO expansion to the strategically important and volatile Caucasus region particularly provocative. This inflamed Russian nationalists and Russian military leaders and no doubt strengthened their resolve to maintain their military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Washingtons embrace of Saakashvili, like its earlier embrace of Shevardnadze, appears to have been based in large part on oil. The United States has helped establish Georgia as a major energy transit corridor, building an oil pipeline from the Caspian region known as the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan) and a parallel natural gas pipeline, both designed to avoid the more logical geographical routes through Russia or Iran. The Russians, meanwhile, in an effort to maintain as much control over the westbound oil from the region, have responded by pressuring the governments of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to sign exclusive export agreements and to construct natural gas pipelines through Russia. (See Michael Klares Russia and Georgia: All About Oil.) Amid accusations of widespread corruption and not adequately addressing the countrys growing poverty, Saakashvili himself faced widespread protests in November 2007, to which he responded with severe repression, shutting down independent media, detaining opposition leaders, and sending his security forces to assault largely nonviolent demonstrators with tear gas, truncheons, rubber bullets, water cannons, and sonic equipment. Human Rights Watch criticized the government for using excessive force against protesters and the International Crisis Group warned of growing authoritarianism in the country. Despite this, Saakashvili continued to receive strong support from Washington and still appeared to have majority support within Georgia, winning a snap election in January by a solid majority which despite some irregularities was generally thought to be free and fair. Lead-up to the Current Crisis A number of misguided U.S. policies appear to have played an important role in encouraging Georgia to launch its August 6 assault on South Ossetia. The first had to do with the U.S.-led militarization of Georgia, which likely emboldened Saakashvili to try to resolve the conflict over South Ossetia by military means. Just last month, the United States held a military exercise in

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Georgia with more than 1,000 American troops while the Bush administration, according to The New York Times, was loudly proclaiming its support for Georgias territorial integrity in the battle with Russia over Georgias separatist enclaves. As the situation was deteriorating last month, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a high-profile visit to Saakashvili in Tbilisi, where she reiterated the strong strategic relationship between the two countries. Radio Liberty speculates that Saakashvili may have felt that his military, after several years of U.S.-sponsored training and rearmament, was now capable of routing the Ossetian separatists ("bandits," in the official parlance) and neutralizing the Russian peacekeepers. Furthermore, Saakashvili apparently hoped that the anticipated Russian reaction would immediately transform the conflict into a direct confrontation between a democratic David and an autocratic Goliath, making sure the sympathy of the Western world would be mobilized for Georgia. According to Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States may have caused Saakashvili to miscalculate and overreach by making him feel that at the end of the day that the West would come to his assistance if he got into trouble. Another factor undoubtedly involved the U.S. push for Georgia to join NATO. The efforts by some prominent Kremlin lawmakers for formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia coincided with the escalated efforts for NATOs inclusion of Georgia this spring, as well as an awareness that any potential Russian military move against Georgia would need to come sooner rather than later. And, as a number of us predicted last March, Western support for the unilateral declaration of independence by the autonomous Serbian region of Kosovo emboldened nationalist leaders in the autonomous Georgian regions, along with their Russian supporters, to press for the independence of these nations as well. Despite the pro-American sympathies of many in that country, Georgians were notably alarmed by the quick and precedent-setting U.S. recognition of Kosovo. No Standing to Challenge Russian Aggression Russias massive and brutal military counter-offensive, while immediately provoked by Georgias attack on South Ossetia, had clearly been planned well in advance. It also went well beyond defending the enclave to illegally sending forces deep into Georgia itself and inflicting widespread civilian casualties. It has had nothing to do with solidarity with an oppressed people struggling for selfdetermination and everything to do with geopolitics and the assertion of militaristic Russian nationalism. While the international community has solid grounds to challenge Russian aggression, however, the United States has lost virtually all moral standing to take a principled stance. For example, the brutally punitive and disproportionate response by the Russian armed forces pales in comparison to that of Israels 2006 attacks on Lebanon, which were strongly defended not only by the Bush administration, but leading Democrats in Congress, including presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama. Russias use of large-scale militarily force to defend the autonomy of South Ossetia by massively attacking Georgia has been significantly less destructive than the U.S.-led NATO assault on Serbia to defend Kosovos autonomy in 1999, an action that received broad bipartisan American support. And the Russian ground invasion of Georgia, while a clear violation of international legal norms, is far less significant a breach of international law as the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, authorized by a large majority in Congress. This doesnt mean that the Russias military offensive should not be rigorously opposed. However, the U.S. contribution to this unfolding tragedy and the absence of any moral authority to challenge it must not be ignored. Stephen Zunes is a senior analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus and serves as a professor of politics and international studies at the University of San Francisco.

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5465

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

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On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one weve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldnt be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end. Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict. The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order. The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the worlds oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful. The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act. The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the

THE REAL WORLD ORDER

United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over. As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states. Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system. As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it. From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an antiRussian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States. If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time. And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russias southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus. Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively. The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible. The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran. The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States reevaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian

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technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later. The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground. We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they dont, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isnt absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another. The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it cant do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the Unit ed States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see). One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order. George Friedman, Stratfor, August 18, 2008

GEORGIA TOWARDS A NEW CRISIS AFTER MANIPULATED ELECTIONS NEW

At a large manifestation with thousands of participants on the national day, May 26, the opposition parties of the South Caucasus republic of Georgia escalated their accusations against the Saakasvili regime for ruling the country on the basis of electoral fraud and suppression of alternative opinions. Levan Gachechiladze, who came second at the presidential election in January this year, threatened that the opposition will refuse to take the few seats they won according to the official result of the parliamentary elections some days earlier May 21st and prevent the new parliament from convening if necessary by force. If this really comes true it would be an ironical repetition of the method the present regime used to take power through the Rose Revolution in November 2003. Then angry representatives of the opposition of that time, considering their loss at the parliamentary elections a couple of week earlier to be the result of manipulation and oppression, invested the Parliament building when president Shevardnadze was giving his inauguration speech. The present President, Micheil Saakashvili wrote his name into the history of Georgia by sipping some of the still tepid tea that Shevardnadze hade left behind when he fled, accompanied by his body guard. Some days later Shevy resigned and in January 2004 Saakashvili was elected president by some 98 per cent of the votes without anyone claiming it to be the result of fraud. But during the following year alarming reports from Human Rights organisations and independent observers painted a picture of power abuse, suppression of dissident opinions and authoritarian methods by the new rulers. After the mystic death of prime minister Zurab Zhvania early 2005 in a gas accident, which many Georgians are convinced was a covert assassination, the regime seems to have given up all restraints and has, according to many commentators, started to commit the same type of abuses that it accused its predecessors for. November 2007 saw an explosion of discontent, enhanced by the fact that the growth figures that the World Bank refer to for praising the Tbilisi rulers, so far havent improved every day life for the majority of the population. After manifestations of protest because of the enforced closure of a TV station, the regime was

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

forced to go for early presidential and parliamentary elections. When Saakashvili was reelected in January he managed to pass the 50 percent barrier by a narrow margin, just enough to avoid a second round against Levan Gachechiladze. The opposition claimed that the victory was possible only through massive fraud, started a hunger strike and mobilised for the parliamentary elections. Some independent opinion polls showed that the elections could end by a draw or even a victory for the opposition.

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ineffaceable ink. Tsikarishvili explained to me that if so is not done, it is not just a mere example of regrettable negligence, but a part of a very sophisticated fraud method where large groups of voters, extended families or clans, are bribed to abstain from voting and hand over their ID cards to agents of the ruling party who will vote in their place. This is possible if inking is not taking place, because then a few agents can vote a large number of times. Most Western Europeans probably consider this to be wild That is why the dismay was great when the official election results were conspiratorial theories by bad losers. One OSCE-observer also publicly at the press conference in Tbilisi the day after the published and showed a landslide victory for the elections, accused the opposition of not having ruling party, the National Movement. Out of the half of understood an important element of democratic states the Parliament which is elected proportionally the that the losers in elections should congratulate the government got 60 seats. Only three out of eleven winners! But to somebody, as me, who has observed opposition parties passed the 5 percent barrier and several Georgian elections, it its clear that the method received together 15 seats. Out of the other half, Tsikarishvili described is only on of several very which is elected according to the majority system, the imaginative fraud methods that the present regime ruling party received 70 seats, the opposition only 5 rightly criticized its predecessors for using, but that it (including 2 from a party that did not pass the 5 has apparently inherited and developed further, percent barrier). This means that the regime by a methods that cannot be discovered by parallel vote good margin controls a two thirds majority, which is counting. required for amendments to the constitution, maybe to give Saakashvili a possibility to remain as president longer than the two terms allowed by the present constitution. The opposition rapidly gave its verdict: Massive fraud. The report by the observers from OSCE also contains quite a lot of criticism, but all the same is phrased so that it could be used by the government as an international approval. But of course there are other contributing causes for the landslide victory of the government. Some improvement has taken place since November 2003, such as some economic growth which could be seen especially in Tbilisi where new buildings and shops for luxury commodities increase every day although one third of the population lives in absolute poverty.

When I after the election met with one of the most The Russian opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta vivid leaders of the Georgian opposition, Salome (the newspapers where the murdered Anna Per Gahrton Zurabishvili, she was disappointed with the Politkovskaya worked) quotes an anonymous Europeans: The too hasty approval by the OSCE and the EU will make member of the Georgian opposition who claims that the opposition parties lots of pro-European Georgians furious and disappointed. Zurabishvili was were amateurs in modern campaigning, had non-professional marketing brought home from France by the present regime to become its first etc. More serious probably was that the opposition is divided, populist and minister of Foreign Affairs, but resigned after a short time and joined the has no really alternative political program. Almost all opposition parties are opposition. Zurabishvili, who just like the majority of the opposition, is, if just as neoliberal, pro-West, anti-Russian and pro-NATO as the regime. possible, even more pro West and pro EU than the government, even did There was virtually no debate about political programs, only about who is not mind comparing the Georgian president to Vladimir Putin. A similar the most despicable liar, oppressor, abuser of power and manipulator, opinion was expressed by the opposition newspaper Resonansi, which which made many voters rather exhausted and depressed. came out two days after the election with the main headline: The ghost of The paradox is that this very pro-West opposition is feeling deceived by the Putinization. And in an interview in the same newspaper the respected West. Or as it was put by Tsikarishvili: More and more Georgians who are political scientist Soso Tsikarishvili, who is also president of the European basically pro-West get the feeling that the West, primarily the USA but also Integration Forum, fully supported the sometimes seemingly exaggerated the EU, dont care about democracy in Georgia but only have an interest in accusations by the opposition against the regime and declared that having Georgia as a strategic ally against Russia. They want us to be unfortunately fraud and manipulations have increased. satisfied with third class democracy, but we arent! When I met with him personally and asked how that judgment corresponds with the fact that parallel vote counting by independent groups has shown almost the same result as the official one, Tskikarishvili explained that the methodology of fraud has been developed. It is not any more a matter of manipulation of figures but of much more sophisticated methods of intimidation, pressure, bribes, vote buying, abuse of public offices and resources, total control over major TV stations. Also the joint European report, which has been presented as an approval of the elections, did contain criticism. Some of it becomes quite severe if looked upon by eyes that are acquainted with Georgian fraud methods. One of the problems mentioned in the OSCE report is problems with inking. All voters shall after having voted be marked on one finger with The paradoxical result is that Georgia may be pushed closer to Russia despite the serious conflict about the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Russian boycott of Georgian wine and mineral water (however direct flight between Russia and Georgia have been restored since spring this year). It is true that virtually no Georgian politician is proRussia, but the reality is in favour of Russia. Almost all investments come from Russia or Kazakhstan, politically close to Russia. The dependence on energy from Russia is almost complete. The potential for Georgian goods is the Russian market. And in the every day life everything Russian is still very much more present than anything American or European. Still everybody speaks Russian; there are Russian newspapers, TV-stations. Bookstores are full of Russian books, at least ten for every English one. One evening I checked twenty radio stations in Tbilisi and found only music

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

on five, song or talk in Portuguese on one, in French on one, in Georgian on three, in English on four and in Russian on six. In an interesting article in Novaya Gazeta Julia Latynina accuses the Putin regime of having made Russia into a copy of the Mongols which after their rule left nothing but desert behind. Why not behave like the Romans or British which kept an enormous cultural and ideological influence long after the dissolution of their empires? When the Soviet Union of Jagoda and Beria was gone the Russia of Dostojevskij and Pushkin still had a chance, she writes. This is very obvious for Georgia. If it was not for the bullying tactics of Putin, the Georgian society is still prepared for another relation to Russia. Salome Zurabishvili told me she thinks it was an insult by the EU to give Georgia 2 million euro in order to guarantee a democratic election without

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consulting the opposition. And the visit by several EU-ministers of foreign affairs a few days before the elections, which formally was to show support for Georgia against Russia, was interpreted by many as a support for the ruling party in the elections. When such a pro-EU politician as Salome Zurabishvili starts to doubt the intentions of the EU, maybe Brussels should start to reconsider its unreserved support for the more and more Putin-like rule by Michael Saakashvili. Per Gahrton, June 5, 2008 Former Member of he European parliament and rapporteur on South Caucasus, member of the advisory council of the Regional Environmental Center for South Caucasus, Tbilisi, Georgia. President of the Swedish Green Think Tank COGITO, Stockholm, Sweden.

LONDON - If America's former president, Richard Nixon, the erstwhile red baiter, wasn't safely in his grave, most probably he would be writing an oped in the New York Times this week to say that, "we are in danger of losing Russia". For all the bodies of the liberal /left in America, dispatched by him on the way to the pinnacle of power, he became as president the originator of detente with the Soviet Union and at the same a respecter of its history and Russia's massive contribution through the arts, its culture and its Orthodox religion to the great civilization we call the Western world.

THE LONG INSULT TO RUSSIA RUSSIA

In his own words Nixon was a Russophile. Once communism was defeated, he used to argue, Russia could assume its rightful place as a powerful European nation. It seems that no one, neither in the U.S. nor in Europe, has the courage to stand up and say this, to educate the populace that the way things are with Russia we are falling back on our well-honed, over simplistic, reflexes of the Cold War.

Jonathan Power

The invasion of Georgia didn't just happen because of some Kremlin malevolence. It happened because of the West's ill thought out position on the independence on Kosovo, the self-defeating military support President George W. Bush provided for an unstable Georgian leader and, not least, because the West did not make full use of its opportunities to bring Russia into the fold after the death of the Soviet Leninist system. This is not to exonerate Prime Minister Vladimir Putin for his continuous macho posturing and his disregard of the importance of building a nation not of men but of laws. Neither is it to exonerate Boris Yeltsin for his erratic presidency that allowed the deterioration of much of his country, the economy not least, and the rise of the robber barons. But the West was the victorious party in the Cold War. The West was shining in its triumph. The West was economically healthy and politically at the beam in its own eye. Jonathan Power, August 29, 2008 robust. It had nothing to lose and everything to contribute to the new Russia. http://www.transnational.org/Columns_Power/2008/33.InsultToRussia.html

But it dragged its feet in the most appalling way. If it had been sensible it would have started to move off its haunches when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev came to the London G8 and asked for financial aid for a careful but steady transition to a more open economy and more open and pro Western society. Despite all the warm words spoken about welcoming Perestroika, the West demurred from getting too involved. Nixon's plea for a much more positive response fell on deaf ears. As Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center, wrote in Foreign Affairs last year, "Washington's crucial error lay in its propensity to treat post-Soviet Russia as a defeated enemy." Washington's attitude was totally at variance with that of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin who expected to see developing a common strategic partnership. At the same time Washington missed the great opportunity offered for large scale nuclear disarmament and took the fatal step, mainly for electoral reasons at home, of expanding NATO up to Russia's doorstep, ignoring the pledge made to Gorbachev by the administration of George W. Bush Snr.. The Clinton Administration couldn't resist taking advantage of Russia's weakness, hoping to win a geo-political advantage that Russia never could unwind, even if one day it recovered its strength. It was even low down enough as to exploit Yeltsin's heavy drinking, extracting concessions when he was over the limit. Washington wanted Russia to have no independent foreign policy and to swallow economic reforms at such a speed they would have been instantly spat out in any self-respecting Western democracy. It failed to understand Moscow's reservations about going to war against Serbia without the necessary legal approval from the UN's Security Council. Washington tolerated Yeltin's excesses, in particular his decision to literally go to war with Russia's parliament, the Duma, as long as these merciless "economic reforms" continued on track. Later, when Putin was in power, Washington blatantly ignored his offer to cooperate against al Qaeda and the Taliban, believing the U.S. could do the job unaided and preferred to annoy Moscow by concentrating on bringing ex-Soviet Muslim states under Washington's wing. Even after September 11th 2001, when Putin went out of his way to aid Washington, allowing the U.S. overflying rights, endorsing the establishment of American bases in Central Asia and facilitating access to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, a Russian-trained military force, the U.S. continued to treat Russia as a country it could walk over. The Kremlin side is by no means faultless, but Washington badly needs to look

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

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KOSOVO PRECEDENT PREVAILS PREVAILS

It is difficult to imagine how Washington and its NATO allies could have Russia has now demonstrated that two can play the game of using military more egregiously mishandled the Kosovo situation. force against another country to detach discontented ethnic enclaves. And the United States and NATO are not able to do much about When the United States and its key European allies ignored it. Russia's protests and recognized Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in February, Secretary of State Rather than escalate the already alarming tensions with Condoleezza Rice blithely insisted that the Kosovo situation Russia, Washington needs to walk back its policy on was unique and set no international precedent whatsoever. Kosovo and seek a deal with Moscow. The U.S.-EU Prominent members of the foreign policy communities in position on Kosovo is untenable from the standpoint of both Europe and the United States echoed her argument. wise diplomacy and basic logic. American officials have put themselves in the awkward position of arguing that quasiMoscow's August 26 decision to recognize the democratic Georgia's territorial integrity is sacrosanct while independence of Georgia's separatist enclaves of South fully democratic Serbia's is not. Moreover, despite the Ossetia and Abkhazia demonstrates the arrogant folly of that expectation of leaders in Washington and Pristina that the position. In just a matter of months, the Kosovo precedent vast majority of countries would quickly recognize Kosovo's has backfired on the United States and generated independence, only a meager forty-seven have done sodangerous tensions between Russia and the West. and most of them are long-standing American allies and It is difficult to imagine how Washington and its NATO allies clients. The rest of the world still worries about the broader could have more egregiously mishandled the Kosovo implications of the Kosovo precedent and withholds situation. Western policy has been a debacle from its recognition. beginnings in the early 1990s. When Belgrade attempted to Ted Galen Carpenter Washington should propose a mutual diplomatic retreat to suppress the secessionist campaign by the Albanian majority in Kosovo, NATO intervened with air strikes to compel Serbia to Moscow, in which the United States would rescind its recognition of relinquish control of the province to an international occupation force. Kosovo's independence and urge the Kosovars to accept Belgrade's NATO's actions ignored Moscow's vehement objections and showed proposal for a negotiated status of "enhanced autonomy," which comes contempt for Russia's long-standing interests in the Balkans. The Clinton very close to de facto independence. Russia would be expected to adopt a administration also bypassed the UN Security Council (and, hence, similar policy with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia's veto) to launch that military operation, exhibiting further disdain for If U.S. leaders do not suggest this course, they will face the unpleasant Russia's prerogatives as a permanent member of the Council and a major prospect of further demonstrating NATO's inability to do anything effective to power in the international system. reverse Russia's conduct in Georgia. American miscalculations have Russian leaders fumed, but Moscow was too weak to do anything but issue already underscored the alliance's impotence; it is not a lesson that officials futile protests. Ultimately, the NATO powers offered Moscow the sop of a should want to reinforce. Moreover, if Washington and Moscow do not back belated UN resolution that professed to recognize Serbia's territorial off from their tenacious positions, relations between the two countriesintegrity, which included Kosovo, even though that province had been put already in bad shape-may degenerate into a new cold war. Conversely, under international control. How much that resolution was worth became some common sense and flexibility on the twin secessionist issues could be apparent in 2007 and early 2008 when the United States and the major a catalyst for repairing that important relationship. European Union governments pressed for Kosovo's independence without Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies Belgrade's consent and-once again-without UN Security Council at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, authorization. Moscow warned at the time that such action would set a including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America dangerous international precedent; countries as diverse as China, India, (2008). He is also a contributing editor to The National Interest. Indonesia, Spain and Greece expressed the same concern. Most Ted Galen Carpenter, National Interest, Wednesday, August 27, 2008 ominously, Russian officials specifically cited Abkhazia and South Ossetia http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19656 as places where the Kosovo precedent could apply.

In February, with U.S. backing, Kosovo declared its independence-nine years after NATO went to war to end Serbia's thuggish behavior in the province. Shortly after Kosovo hoisted its new national flag, Russia, Serbia's patron, warned (in the words of its foreign minister) that the theory of secession used to strip away Kosovo had "created a precedent" applicable elsewhere. Now, in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Georgia-supposedly for the protection of separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia-it's a good time to pause and ask, was Kosovo worth it? A recent visit to the tiny country underscores how difficult life can be for a microstate. The good news is that Kosovo has a young pro-Western population that speaks English, has strong tech skills and is excited at the thought of creating a new government. But there is plenty of bad news. The unemployment rate for young people is 60 percent. The landlocked, mountainous country has a long growing

WHY KOSOVO WASNT WORTH IT WORTH

season and could serve as a garden for Europe, but it lacks any transport beyond two-lane roads, a rusting rail line and expensive air links. The current prime minister, Hashim Thaci-a former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)-promises to build a real highway to next-door Albania in five years, but that's hardly the best path to the outside world. Meanwhile, the electricity frequently shuts off for hours at a time, even in the capital, Pristina, and the construction of a World Bank-financed power plant has been slowed by quarrels over who will supply the coal. Pristina bustles with restaurants supported by a large population of international personnel whose spending habits outprice the locals. The roads leading to Kosovo's borders are lined with half-completed brick houses. But these are funded by remittances from young people who've left to work in Germany, Switzerland and Italy. Inside the country, the economy is so bad that many fear that unemployed young men will start turning to

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

old-fashioned, illicit forms of cross-border commerce: trafficking in narcotics, weapons or human beings. As for the government of this nascent state, there's still a great deal of confusion about who's in charge. Blocked by Russia, the U.N. Security Council has not been able to lift its supervisory political framework put in place after the NATO intervention. The international proconsul, Lamberto Zannier-the U.N. secretary-general's special representative-remains in Kosovo, though his duties have become increasingly unclear. But he's still needed, since Belgrade refuses to talk directly to the Kosovo government. The U.N. Mission is also the only local authority accepted by the many Serbs who still live in northern Kosovo, including in the contested city of Mitrovica. The European Union and the United States have recently mounted an independent effort to help the fledgling state write laws and solve administrative problems. But the wiring of this operation would fox any electrician. The EU was to deploy 1,700 police, judges, prosecutors, jail guards and Customs officials to help, but their assignments have been delayed because of the confusion over who's in charge. More than 15,000 NATO troops remain on duty in the tiny state. But NATO forces failed to control ethnic riots the last time they broke out, in March 2004, with disastrous consequences, including eight reported deaths, 900 injured, the destruction of hundreds of Serb homes and the burning of churches and priceless artifacts. NATO countries have since loosened the rules of engagement that hamstrung the troops, but they remain soldiers, not police, and it's not clear whether they have the tools for nonlethal riot control.

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The recent return of former KLA leader Ramush Haradinaj to political life may further roil the new state. Haradinaj was acquitted in April by The Hague tribunal on charges of complicity in the murder of Serb civilians during the war. This decision, following the intimidation and deaths of witnesses, further unnerved the local Serb community, and Haradinaj's return may also threaten Thaci's leadership. Internationally, the outlook isn't much brighter. Only 45 countries have recognized Kosovo's independence. It will never be admitted to the United Nations while veto-wielding Russia opposes it, though it can join the World Bank, where no vetoes can be cast. Among its European neighbors, Bosnia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Slovakia-and, notably, Georgiahave all refused to grant recognition. Kosovo's newly issued passports may go unrecognized at international airports, leaving Kosovar travelers stranded. Although the United States pushed for Kosovo's independence earlier this year, at least one former U.S. secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, warned against it, saying that the creation of new microstates would needlessly provoke Russia and other multiethnic countries. The irony is that Kosovo could have achieved almost as much through an international guarantee of autonomy within Serbia. Yet Washington never permitted that alternative to be discussed. Now, given Russia's misuse of the Kosovo precedent in Georgia, it's worth reviewing this option should similar cases arise in the future. Ruth Wedgwood, Newsweek, September 01, 2008 Wedgwood is a professor of international law and diplomacy at Johns Hopkins University.;,http://www.newsweek.com/id/156317

HOW NOT TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA

LONDON - That bar, the Red Star, on the far side of eastern Europe is closed. So why is the Black Star on this side still open, and even extending its drinking hours? Once the Warsaw Pact closed shop there was no good or honest reason for keeping NATO going. The threat that NATO was created to deter disappeared when the Soviet Union collapsed. Let the European Union take the strain, by trade, investment, diplomacy and political intimacy, the hallmarks of a successful union that has mastered the art of expansion and influence by clever use of the carrot, whilst America has led its quest for influence by application of the Bush doctrine of "preventive war". As Mark Leonard, the director of foreign policy at the Center for European Reform wrote in his clever, little book of three years ago, "the contrast between the two doctrines is stark. The Bush doctrine attempts to justify action to remove a 'threat' before it has a chance of being employed against the U.S.. It is consequently focused very closely on physical assets and capabilities, necessarily swift in execution and therefore short term in conception, and unavoidably entirely military in kind. The European doctrine of pre-emption, in contrast, is predicated on long-term involvement, with the military just one strand of activity, along with pre-emptive economic and legal intervention, and is aimed at building the political and institutional basis of stability, rather than simply removing the immediate source of threat." This is why NATO is no longer needed in Europe. Passive aggression - the outward expansion of the Eurosphere - is what Europe needs. For countries such as Turkey, Serbia or Bosnia, the only thing worse than having the Brussels bureaucracy descend on its political system with its multitude of new rules is to have its doors closed to them. At the time when the expansion of NATO was first being discussed by the Clinton administration, it was none less than a group of conservative experts, led by Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to former president, George Bush, Sr, who wrote in the New York Times, "antagonism is sure to grow if the alliance extends ever closer to Russia....We will have misplaced our priorities during a critical window of opportunity." George Kennan described it as, "the most fateful error of the entire post Cold War era." According to the former president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, he was assured by James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State, that if the Soviet Union permitted the reunification of West and East Germany "there would be no extension of NATO's current jurisdiction eastward". Gorbachev's words have the ring of truth. Why at that time would a Soviet president voluntarily concede such an important piece of the chessboard without a reasonable quid pro quo? Jack Matlock, Jr, the American ambassador in Moscow at the time, has confirmed the deal, "When Gorbachev and others say that it is their understanding NATO expansion would not happen, there is a basis for it." The U.S. has rolled all over that commitment - with a supine EU going along with it. Not only is NATO right up to Russia's borders, U.S. troops are now to join the Polish military to operate an American Patriot anti-missile battery right on Russia's front lines. If, as the White House has long maintained, its antimissile system is only directed at Iran why has it announced this new agreement with Poland in the week that Russia invaded Georgia? Europe has missed an important beat with Georgia. It should not have allowed the U.S. to set the pace, pulling Georgia into its embrace, aggressively pushing the homeland of Stalin to be made a member of NATO. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France and also currently of the European Union, has done much to redeem Europe's position, rushing in the first hours of the Georgian crisis to Moscow and securing a peace deal, whilst Bush still dozed at the Olympics. This needs to be followed up by a dramatic realignment of Europe's eastward stance. An offer of membership negotiations to both the Ukraine and Georgia, with a reaffirmation of the goal, as carefully spelt out by Zibigniew Brzezinski in an interview in World Policy Journal, Prospect Magazine and the Arab News with me, that one day Russia too will be invited to join the EU. This is what the Ukraine and Georgia both badly need and the present leaders of their countries do them a bad service by emphasizing their military needs rather than their social, economic and legal. At the moment the plan is to start the Ukraine's NATO accession talks in December. Unless Europe wants to be party to laying the ground work for a re-ignition of the Cold War it should veto this and concentrate on expanding the Eurosphere.

Jonathan Power, August 29, 2008 http://www.transnational.org/ Columns_Power/2008/32.NotDealWithRussia.html

Parallels & Questions - South Ossetia and Kosovo

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In commenting on the war in the Caucasus, most American analysts have tended to see it as a throwback to the past: as a continuation of a centuries-old blood feud between Russians and Georgians, or, at best, as part of the unfinished business of the Cold War. Many have spoken of Russias desire to erase the national humiliation it experienced with the collapse of the Soviet Union 16 years ago, or to restore its historic sphere of influence over the lands to its South. But the conflict is more about the future than the past. It stems from an intense geopolitical contest over the flow of Caspian Sea energy to markets in the West. This struggle commenced during the Clinton administration when the former Soviet republics of the Caspian Sea basin became independent and began seeking Western customers for their oil and natural gas resources. Western oil companies eagerly sought production deals with the governments of the new republics, but faced a critical obstacle in exporting the resulting output. Because the Caspian itself is landlocked, any energy exiting the region has to travel by pipeline and, at that time, Russia controlled all of the available pipeline capacity. To avoid exclusive reliance on Russian conduits, President Clinton sponsored the construction of an alternative pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Tbilisi in Georgia and then onward to Ceyhan on Turkeys Mediterranean coast -- the BTC pipeline, as it is known today.

RUSSIA AND GEORGIA: ALL ABOUT OIL

Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency in 2000, Moscow has sought to use its pivotal role in the supply of oil and natural gas to Western Europe and the former Soviet republics as a source both of financial wealth and political advantage. It mainly relies on Russias own energy resources for this purpose, but also seeks to dominate the delivery of oil and gas from the Caspian states to the West. To further its goals in the Caspian, Putin and his protg Dmitry Medvedev until recently the chairman of Gazprom, the Russian state gas monopoly have enticed (or browbeaten) the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan into building new gas pipelines through Russia to Europe. The Europeans, fearful of becoming ever more dependent on Russian-supplied energy, seek to build alternative conduits across the Caspian Sea and along the route of the BTC pipeline in Azerbaijan and Georgia, bypassing Russia altogether. It is against this backdrop that the fighting in Georgia and South Ossetia has been taking place. The Georgians may only be interested in regaining control over an area they consider part of their national territory. But the Russians are sending a message to the rest of the world that they intend to keep their hands on the Caspian Sea energy spigot, come what may. This doesnt necessarily mean occupying Georgia outright, but they will certainly retain their strategic positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for all practical purposes, daggers aimed at the BTC jugular. So even if a cease-fire is put into effect, the struggle over energy resources sometimes hidden and stealthy, sometimes open and violent will continue long into the future.

The BTC pipeline, which began operation in 2006, passes some of the most unsettled areas of the world, including Chechnya and Georgias two breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With this in mind, the Clinton and Bush administrations provided Georgia with hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid, making it the leading recipient of U.S. arms and Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at equipment in the former Soviet space. President Bush has also lobbied U.S. Hampshire College, the author of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New allies in Europe to fast track Georgias application for membership in NATO. Geopolitics of Energy (Metropolitan Books, 2008), and a columnist for All of this, needless to say, was viewed in Moscow with immense resentment. Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org). Klares previous book, Blood and Oil: Not only was the United States helping to create a new security risk on its The Dangers and Consequences of Americas Growing Dependency on southern borders, but, more importantly, was frustrating its drive to secure Imported Petroleum has been made into a documentary movie to order control over the transportation of Caspian energy to Europe. Ever since and view a trailer, visit www.bloodandoilmovie.com

DECLARATION OF THE GEORGIAN PEACE COMMITTEE GEORGIAN

Once more Georgia was launched into a situation of chaos and bloodshed. A new fratricidal war exploded with renewed strength on Georgian soil. To our great disappointment, the alerts of the Georgian Peace Committee and of progressive personalities of Georgia on the pernicious character of the militarization of the country and on the danger of a pro-fascist and nationalist policy had no effect. The authorities of Georgia once again organized a bloody war, feeling the support of some Western countries and of regional and international organizations. It will take decades to cleanse the shame poured by the current holders of the power over the Georgian people. The Georgian armyarmed and trained by U.S. instructors and using also U.S. armamentssubjected the city of Tskhinvali to a barbaric destruction. The bombings killed Ossetian civilians, our brothers and sisters, children, women and elderly people. Over 2,000 inhabitants of Tskhinvali and of its surroundings died. Hundreds of civilians of Georgian nationality also died, both in the conflict zone as well as in the entire territory of Georgia. The Georgian Peace Committee expresses its deep condolences to the relatives and friends of those who have perished. The entire responsibility for this fratricidal war, for thousands of children, women and elderly dead people, for the inhabitants of South Ossetia and of Georgia falls exclusively on the current president, on the Parliament and on the government of Georgia. The irresponsibility and the adventurism of the Saakashvili regime have no limits. There is no doubt the president of Georgia and his team are criminals and must be held responsible. The Georgian Peace Committee, together with all the progressive parties and social movements of Georgia, will struggle to assure that the organizers of this monstrous genocide have a severe and legitimate punishment. The Georgian Peace Committee declares and asks broad public opinion not to identify the current Georgian leadership with the people of Georgia, with the Georgian nation, and appeals to all to support the Georgian people in the struggle against the criminal regime of Saakashvili. We appeal to all the political forces of Georgia, the social movements and the people of Georgia to unite in order to free the country from the Russian-phobic and pro-fascist anti-popular regime of Saakashvili! The Georgian Peace Committee Tbilisi, Aug. 11, 2008 Unofficial translation by the Portuguese Peace Council, edited by Workers