Myerson Attorney Fees Declaration in Civil Rights Suit Against NYPD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________
ANDREW ROSA,
PLAINTIFF

vs 11 Civ 2942 (LBS)

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, etc.,
et al.,
DEFENDANTS
____________________________
____________________________
GABY DAY,

PLAINTIFF


et al.,

DEFENDANTS
____________________________
____________________________
MIRSAD ISUFI,
PLAINTIFF


et al.,
DEFENDANTS
____________________________
____________________________
ALLEN RUBIN,
PLAINTIFF


et al.,

DEFENDANTS
____________________________

DECLARATION OF JAMES I. MEYERSON RE: FEE & COSTS
Case 1:11-cv-02942-LBS Document 15 Filed 06/08/12 Page 1 of 82
2

James I. Meyerson, being duly admitted to practice
law in and before the Courts of the State of New York and
in and before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York [among others] and being duly
aware of the penalties for perjury and being duly aware of
the sanctions which may be imposed by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York for
the violation of its Rules, affirms and declares under
penalty of law and under the threat of the imposition of
sanction by this Court as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Along with Jeffrey A. Rothman, Esq., I am the
attorney for the respective Plaintiffs in the above
captioned and numbered matters.
2. I submit this Declaration in support of the
Application for the award of fees and costs associated with
the accepted Rule 68 Offers of Judgments in the above
matters.
3. In the respective Offers of Judgment, each of the
Plaintiffs was offered a specific sum plus fees and costs
to be determined.
4. Each of the Plaintiffs accepted the respective
Offers of Judgment.
5. Associated with the acceptance, each of the
Plaintiffs attorneys (as co-counsel in these matters)
provided to the Defendants attorney documentation of the
time which each of us invested in the efforts up to the
point in time of the Rule 68 Offers of Judgment were
3
tendered and, in addition, the documentation of the costs
which each of us incurred in the preparation and
prosecution of the litigations up to the point in time that
the Rule 68 Offers of Judgment were tendered.
6. The above captioned matters arise out of the same
mass arrest of a collective group of individuals by the
Defendant New York City Police Officers as a consequence of
the late evening and early morning July 17 and July 18,
2008 police undercover field operation at the Hot Lap Dance
Club on West 38
th
Street, New York City, New York.
7. Each of the respective Plaintiffs was employed by
the ownership of the Hot Dane Lap Club.
8. Each of the Plaintiffs alleged that he was
arrested without probable cause for his arrest and simply
because he was rounded up, with others, including patrons
and all of the other employees of the establishment, simply
because each was present in the establishment, and for no
other reason, at the time of the execution of the New York
City Police Department field operation.
9. During the course of the litigations, I
collaborated and worked with Jeffrey Rothman as co-counsel
for each of the Plaintiffs.

4
10. Among other matters, I actually drafted pleadings
and/or reviewed pleadings drafted by Mr. Rothman.
11. In addition, Mr. Rothman and I consulted with each
other on a regular and collaborative basis and, as well,
with our respective clients.
12. Each of us reviewed documents which we obtained in
the course of the litigation and litigation related efforts
including documents that we obtained independent of the
formal discovery in these matters and including documents
which we obtained during the course of discovery in these
matters.
13. Throughout collaborative efforts, Mr. Rothman and
I endeavored to avoid redundant work.
14. That being stated, there were certain tasks which,
necessarily, over-lapped, for example our respective review
of documents so that we could discuss such with our clients
and between ourselves as we prepared to move forward with
the litigation, particularly given the delay that occurred
as a consequence of the City Attorneys inability to
provide us a timely response to our collective early
resolutions settlement demands and, associated therewith,
the schedule set by the Court to complete discovery by
early June, 2012 (a schedule which was set at the initial
conference in this matter in or about December, 2011).
5
15. I am requesting that the Court award me a rate of
$650.00 per hour for a total of 64.2 hours.

II. JAMES I. MEYERSON AND HIS BODY OF WORK

16. I am a sole practitioner. I maintain my law
offices at 64 Fulton Street - Suite # 502, New York, New
York 10038.
17. I graduated from the University of Pittsburgh,
with a B.A. degree, in 1966, and from the Syracuse
University College of Law, with a J.D. degree, in 1969.
18. Upon graduating from law school, I moved to
Charlotte, North Carolina, where I associated with the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Legal Aid Society as a VISTA
volunteer/attorney.
19. In October 1970, I secured a position as an
Assistant General Counsel in the Office of the General
Counsel of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People [NAACP] in New York City, where I remained
until 1981, at which time I opened my own office that I
have maintained since then. For most of the time that I was
employed at the NAACP I worked under the auspices of the
General Counsel, the Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones who,
while I was employed, was nominated by President Jimmy
Carter to a position on the United States Court of Appeals
6
for the Sixth Circuit. Eventually, Judge Jones was
confirmed and he remained on the Court, through some period
of senior status, until he retired and became of counsel
for a national firm whose main offices were located in
Cincinnati, Ohio. I also worked under the auspices of the
late Thomas Atkins who, in addition to his distinguished
career as an attorney, served on the Boston City Council,
the cabinet of the governor of Massachusetts, and, as I
recall, on a board of governing individuals at Harvard
University from which he obtained his law degree.
20. I am a member of the Bar of the State of New York.
I am also admitted to the Bars of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and the United States District Courts for
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. Throughout
my approximately 43 years of practice, I have also been
admitted to practice before the United States Courts of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits as well as the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York.
21. Over my approximately forty three years of
practice, I have been admitted on specific cases to
practice before numerous jurisdictions throughout the
country. These courts include, among others, the United
7
States Courts of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit, the United States District Courts for the Western
District of New York, the Eastern District of Arkansas, and
the District of Columbia and federal District Courts in,
among other jurisdictions, Ohio, Florida, and Oklahoma. I
have also practiced before the Supreme Court of Kansas, and
trial courts in the States of Kansas and Arkansas.
22. While with the NAACP, I tried and argued many
cases in numerous federal District and Circuit Courts
throughout the country and, as well, in the United States
Supreme Court. See: Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc.,
44 U.S.54 (1980).
23. My trial and appellate practice have included such
diverse issues as housing and employment discrimination,
public school segregation and discrimination in the
delivery of educational services, due process matters, and
the rights of African American military personnel under the
NATO Status of Forces Treaty. See: Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.
2
nd
1211 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
24. While at the NAACP, I tried numerous New York City
school desegregation matters including what has, to date,
been the only successful school desegregation case in New
York City. See: Hart v. Community School Board, 383 F.
8
Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)/383 F. Supp. 779 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
Affirmed 512 F. 2
nd
37 (2
nd
Cir. 1975).
25. Other public school segregation/discrimination
matters which I have tried and argued include: Pride v.
Community School Board # 18, 482 F. 2
nd
257 (2
nd
Cir.
1973)/Pride v. Community School Board # 18, 488 F. 2
nd
321
(2
nd
Cir. 1973)(known as New York Citys Little Rock in as
much as white parents sought to block the entry of African
American students to public schools in the Canarsie section
of Brooklyn, New York); Parent Association of Andrew
Jackson High School v. Ambach, 451 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), Reversed and Modified 598 F. 2
nd
705 (2
nd
Cir. 1979),
738 F. 2
nd
574 (2
nd
Cir. 1984)(which case included a
substantial hearing on cross district line relief involving
school districts on the Nassau County side of the
Queens/Nassau County border proximate to the location of
the Andrew Jackson High School in the Cambria Heights
section of the far eastern area of Queens, New York];
BrodyJones v. Macchiarola, 503 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
26. Moreover while at the NAACP, I successfully tried
a wrongful death civil rights case arising out of the
shooting death of a young African American man in the Star
City, Arkansas jail by a Star City, Arkansas Police Officer
9
in the presence of an Arkansas State Trooper. See: Russ v.
Ratliff, 538 F. 2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976) and Russ v. Ratliff,
578 F. 2d 221 (8th Cir. 1978).
27. In connection with the Russ litigation, I was
responsible for the successful challenge to the United
States Justice Department's then deferral policy to local
and State law enforcement officials in cases involving
alleged criminal conduct by law enforcement officers
resulting in the death of a citizen. The litigation caused
the United States Justice Department to revise the policy
that had been instituted when William Rogers was Attorney
General of the United States (during the Eisenhower
administration) and to make independent assessments rather
than to automatically defer simply because a local
jurisdiction was involved or declined to be involved. See:
NAACP v. Bell, 76 F.R.D.134 (D.C.C. 1977) and NAACP v.
Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1976).
28. Moreover and during that period of time, I worked
with the Chicago based attorneys who conducted the federal
Court litigation arising out of the death of Fred Hampton
by City of Chicago police officers. See: Hampton v.
Hanrahan, 600 F. 2
nd
600 (7
th
Cir. 1979). Such is when and
where I met Jonathan Moore to whom I previously referred
10
[although as I recall he was not himself involved in the
Hampton litigation].
29. I also worked with the attorneys who represented
Rubin Hurricane Carter in his efforts to secure his
exoneration and release from prison as a result of his
conviction for the murder. See: New Jersey v. Carter and
Artis, 91 N.J. 86, 489 A. 2
nd
1280 (S. Ct. 1982). In that
regard, such is when I met Myron Beldock who has submitted
an Affirmation in support of my rate herein.
30. While at the NAACP, I also represented the then
last surviving Scottsboro defendant, Clarence Norris.
Working with attorneys in the State of Alabama and working
with attorneys in the Office of then Alabama State Attorney
General William Baxley, I had the over-all responsibility
for the efforts which achieved a pardon from the State of
Alabama for Mr. Norris and, by such and in a de facto
manner and fashion, for the other eight, then deceased,
Scottsboro defendants [of that long ago case of the
1930s when the world took notice of the racism in the
criminal justice/injustice system in the State of
Alabama and elsewhere in America].
31. Since I started my own practice in 1981, I have
been continuously engaged in civil litigation in the
federal and state courts. My practice since then has been
11
devoted overwhelmingly to civil and constitutional rights
involving claims involving, among other things, First
Amendment activity and police misconduct.
32. In addition to the matters detailed above, I was
co-counsel [with lead counsel responsibilities] in a
successful challenge to unconstitutional police practices
in Suffolk County that resulted in the malicious
prosecution of two citizens. See: Gentile v. County of
Suffolk, 926 F. 2d 142 (2nd Cir. 1991), Affirming Gentile
and Rydstrom v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y.
1990). See also: King v. Conde (and Gentile and Rydstrom
v. County of Suffolk), 121 F. R.D. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
[establishing the procedures to be followed for discovering
law enforcement personnel information in federal civil
rights cases].
33. Along with co-counsel [again where I had lead
counsel responsibilities], I successfully represented
Patrick Antoine, the other, less known, victim of the
police misconduct that resulted in international focus upon
Abner Louima and brutality in the New York City Police
Department. See: Antoine v. City of New York, 98 Civ. 5082
(E.D.N.Y.).
34. As I mention above, my practice also involves
representing individuals whose free speech and
12
associational rights have been infringed and who are the
victims of employment discrimination. See: Velez v. Levy,
401 F. 3rd 75 (2nd Cir. 2005), where I represented the
Plaintiff and where the Second Circuit in part reversed
Judge Koeltls dismissal of First Amendment/retaliation
claims brought by a lower east side District # 1 Community
School Board member against former Chancellor Levy of the
New York City public school system. See also: Elliot v.
City of New York, et al., 00 Civ 9308 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
where I was second seat co-counsel [without primary
responsibilities for the preparation of the prosecution of
the case] in an employment discrimination/hostile work
environment action that ended in a jury verdict in the
Plaintiffs favor.
35. In addition and while both at the NAACP and, then,
after I left my employment at the NAACP, I successfully
defended civil rights advocates in defamation litigations
commenced against them by individuals who claimed that they
were unjustly engaged in racially discriminatory/racist
conduct. See: Scarpelli v. Rempson, 229 Kan. 210, 626 P.
2
nd
785 (S. Ct. Kan. 1981) [where I represented several
former African American University of Kansas medical
students, all of whom had graduated and been licensed as
physicians who were sued for defamation by Dante Scarpelli,
13
formerly the Chairperson of the University of Kansas
Medical School Department of Pathology who had been accused
of racist conduct by the then students in his treatment of
them]; and Paskiewicz v. NAACP, 628 N.Y.S. 2
nd
405, 216 A.D.
2d 550 (2
nd
Dept. 1995), Leave to Appeal denied 641 N.Y.S.
2
nd
829, 87 N.Y. 2
nd
807, 664 N.E. 2
nd
895 (1996)[where the
NAACP and a Suffolk County, New York Branch president were
sued for defamation by a school official whose conduct was
described by the Branch president as racist].
36. A more extensive discussion of my body of work
over the course of my approximately forty three years of
practice is attached hereto. See: Biographical Information,
annexed hereto as Exhibit A.
37. My clients have traditionally been and continue to
be unable to afford the services of a lawyer on an hourly
basis. Few if any have enough money to pay even a minimal
retainer. I have always taken my cases on a contingency
basis and I am compensated based on a portion of any
judgment or settlement obtained, or through fee petitions.
38. I do so with those who, even if not without any
resources, nonetheless, in the totality of their
circumstances have very limited resources, in order to be
able to represent individuals who have been aggrieved by
misconduct and who seek to obtain some sense of redress,
14
vindication, and justice for the perceived violation of
their constitutional and civil rights and the injuries
which they have suffered [whether it be at the hands of
government employees, including but not limited to law
enforcement agents, or at the hands of private
individuals].
39. In the course of my approximately thirty one [31]
plus years as a solo practitioner after leaving the NAACP
in mid-1981, I have probably not charged a client and been
paid by a client on an hourly rate other than perhaps in
two or three matters, the last of which was probably
fifteen to twenty years ago [and those cases as I recall
such did not involve civil rights issues but involved the
very few almost none, non civil rights cases: collection
of debt and suit against a roofing contractor for
negligence and, as I recall, one case in which I defended a
cooperative relating to an employment issue]. It is my
recollection that in those two or three matters in which I
charged an hourly rate they did not involve civil rights or
constitutional matters but rather were general law practice
matters [commercial in nature as I recall].
40. It is my judgment and opinion, which I have
formed as a consequence of my extensive and substantial
trial and appellate civil rights and constitutional law
15
litigation practice [both while at the NAACP for
approximately eleven years and since then in my own solo
practice for the last approximately thirty one years or
thereabouts] that there is no such thing as a simple
civil rights/constitutional law litigation.
41. The simplest civil rights/constitutional law case
is by its nature complex and is always a difficult and
risky and time consuming and costly undertaking.
42. In fact, because of the risk involved in taking
such cases, I do not know too many lawyers, especially
those few who undertake to engage in solo practice in New
York City, who are willing to devote a substantial part of
his or her practice to civil rights litigation, let alone,
as I have done over the course of my career and before
civil rights litigation was deemed to be more acceptable in
the courts and society at large, his or her entire
practice.
43. There is no simple and straight forward civil
rights and constitutional law litigation and this case, in
all of its respective aspects, is testament to such.
III. THE HOURLY RATE SOUGHT BY JAMES MEYERSON
44. I am seeking the rate of $650.00 [six hundred and
fifty dollars] per hour.
16
45. Such is a rate which my colleague, Jonathan Moore,
Esq., sought and which was found, over the objection of the
Citys attorney, by Judge Alvin Hellerstein of this Court
in the matter of Long vs The City of New York to be a
reasonable rate for my colleague Jonathan C. Moore See:
August 6, 2010 Order in Long v. City of New York (03 Civ
6009/SDNY, annexed hereto as Exhibit B.
46. Recently, moreover, another of my colleagues,
Michael Spiegel, had, without objection from the City
Attorneys Office in the City of White Plains, been
awarded, as reasonable, a rate of $625.00 in the context of
the resolution of a Rule 68 fee matter in a civil rights
police misconduct litigation encaptioned and numbered
Barbour, et al. vs The City of White Plains, et al. (07 Civ
3014/SDNY). See: May 24, 2011 Opinion and Order of Judge
Robert P. Patterson, annexed hereto as Exhibit C.
47. Respecting the same I believe that Mr. Spiegel and
Mr. Moore are outstanding attorneys with whom I have worked
over the course of time, particularly and especially with
Mr. Moore whom I came to know when he resided in Chicago
and when I was employed in the Office of the General
Counsel of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People; and with whom I associated on a number of
17
matters when he first came to New York and with whom I have
continued to associate since that time.
48. That being said my experience and body of work in
the civil rights trial and appellate litigation arena over
the course of my professional career are in my judgment
comparable and the equivalent, if not more extensive than,
that of either Mr. Spiegel or Mr. Moore.
49. I believe that I have practiced for a longer
period of time than either of them; I believe that I have
brought many more police misconduct litigations in this
Court and otherwise than either; and, with humility, I
believe my recorded body of work, both at the federal trial
court level and at the federal appellate level, in civil
rights litigation, generally, and in the area of police
misconduct litigation, specifically, is more extensive and
broader than their respective experiences (without at all
seeking to dismiss or demean or otherwise minimize what I
believe to be is their extraordinary professional careers
and careers and experience and outcomes for which I have
the highest respect).
50. With deep humility, I assert that it is my
judgment that, among attorneys who practice in the Southern
District of New York, I probably have instituted and
litigated as many if not more police misconduct civil
18
rights litigations than any other attorney who has appeared
in this Court to date [during the period of over forty
years that I have been litigating in this Court].
51. One last point respecting rate. Back in September,
1991, I counseled the First Department Assigned Counsel
Corporation. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a copy of a
letter written by Geoffrey Q. Ralls, then President of the
First Department Assigned Counsel Corporation, to Judge
Jack B. Weinstein wherein he wrote in the context of my
work that:
In 1989 a labor dispute arose when the office
terminated the employment of one of the staff
attorneys. Mr. Meyerson was recommended as a
specialist in the area, and the corporation approached
him about advising the Board of Directors, and
potentially representing the corporation, if that
became necessary. Mr. Meyerson, on a pro bono basis,
Responded quickly, thoughtfully, and thoroughly. His
advice was invaluable and, indeed, assisted us in
defusing a potentially explosive (and litigious
situation). While I am unfamiliar with the going rate
for legal fees, I believe we were counseled at a level
at least equal to that which we would have received
from a white shoe law firm.

52. Again, with humility I believe that, now as then
and even more so at this point in time with my
significantly increased experience, expertise, and body of
work, I am entitled to a white shoe law firm senior
partner rate the equivalent of which is at least the
$650.00 per hour rate that I am now seeking, in as much as
19
I believe that my work in this matter and in the area of
civil rights trial and appellate litigation has reflected
that which was described of me and my abilities and efforts
back in 1991 - my thoughtfulness, my energy and
resourcefulness as an attorney leading to invaluable
advice and an invaluable outcome therein as it has
herein.
53. I am providing, contemporaneous herewith, annexed
hereto as Exhibits E and F, respectively, Affidavits from
two [2] distinguished attorneys in the City of New York
whose respective practices in substantial part consist of
trial and appellate civil rights litigation [Myron Beldock,
Esq. and Richard Emery, Esq.].
54. I have known each of the individuals for decades
and I have worked and consulted with them over a
significant portion of my approximately forty three year
professional career. Each of the individuals knows my work
and my experience.
55. Each believes that the six hundred and fifty
dollar [$650.00] hourly rate is, at a minimum, reasonable,
perhaps even modest, and certainly appropriate for a person
of my background and my civil rights trial and appellate
litigation experience, expertise, and body of work.
20
56. Those Affirmations were submitted by the attorneys
to this Court within the last two months or thereabouts in
the matter of Branch vs The City of New York, etc., 11 Civ
3048 (JGK)(MHD).
57. That case was police misconduct civil rights
litigation brought against the City of New York and a
number of its police officers.
58. A Rule 68 Offer of Judgment was made by the New
York City Attorneys Office in that case which described a
sum certain for the Plaintiff plus reasonable fees and
costs, to be determined.
59. Ultimately and as Plaintiffs attorney, I made the
application for fees in which I requested the rate of
$650.00 per hour for approximately 370 hours.
60. The matter was resolved by the parties for a
modest discount which was based on a modification of my fee
rate, for purposes of achieving the resolution of the
matter without a formal decision by the Court, to $625.00
per hour. The total hours, which included some minimal
hours for work invested in the matter after receipt of the
Offer of Judgment, was discounted by a total of
approximately ten percent.
61. In addition and as a means to resolve the matter,
I voluntarily declined to seek any monies for the time I
21
invested in preparing and submitting the fee and cost
application, the latter of which I believe propelled the
City Attorneys office to finally engage in discussions and
ultimately the resolution of the matter when the City
Attorneys Office elected to place a very substantial sum
on the table in response to the total figure that I would
be seeking from the Court and from which I agreed to the
over-all modest reduction.
62. The City was very aware, however, that, if we did
not resolve the matter as we did, I was prepared to submit
the matter to the Court for all of the hours at a rate of
$650.00 per hour plus additional fees for the work that I
had invested in preparing and submitting the fee
application.
IV. THE DOCUMENTED HOURS INVESTED, AND EXPENSES
INCURRED, BY JAMES MEYERSON IN THIS LITIGATION

63. Attached hereto as Exhibit G and made part hereof
is the contemporaneous time and cost sheet records made by
me during the course of this litigation and most recently
reviewed by me in the context of the preparation of this
Declaration.
64. I believe that all of the hours, as described and
set forth, were necessary for my effective representation
of the Plaintiffs interests throughout these litigations
22
even with the work of my esteemed and valued co-counsel,
Mr. Rothman.
65. If my addition is correct [math was and continues
to be, among others, a weakness], the total of the hours
which I have spent in the preparation and prosecution of
this matter in all of its respects and dynamics -- up to
the date of the service of the Rule 68 Offer of Judgment is
sixty four point two [64.2] hours.
66. In addition to the hours described and set forth
for which I seek a rate of $650.00 per hour for each such
documented hour, I have documented out of pocket expenses
in the total amount of two thousand one hundred and seventy
five dollars and eighty four cents [$2, 175.84].
V. CONCLUSION
67. I am reminded of the thoughts of a great 60s
jurist, of the then great United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Elbert P. Tuttle. He wrote:
The professional man is in essence
one who provides service...He has no
goods to sell, no land to till. His only
asset is himself. It turns out that there
is no right price for service, for what is
a share of a mans worth? If he does not
contain the quality of integrity, he is
worthless. If he does, he is priceless. The
value is either nothing or it is infinite...
Like love, talent is only useful in its
expenditure, and it is never exhausted.
Certain it is that man must eat; so set what
price you must on your service. But never
23
confuse the performance, which is great,
with the compensation, be it money, power,
or fame, which is trivial.

68. So I set what price I must for my service and I
ask the Court to adopt such and so order the same,
recognizing, if I may be permitted to say so, that,
although there is no right price for my service,
nonetheless I must set a price for such, as I do, but that,
in doing so, I do not confuse the value of the services
that I rendered, which value is infinite, with the value of
money, which like the value of power and fame, is trivial.
WHEREFORE and in light of the foregoing, it is
respectfully requested that the Court award me a reasonable
attorneys fee in a total amount of forty one thousand
seven hundred and thirty dollars [$41,730.00] which
represents a total of 64.2 hours of service rendered at a
rate of $650.00 per hour for the time which I invested in
this litigation [as described in my time records and
otherwise explained in part herein]; and, in addition the
sum of two thousand one hundred and seventy five dollars
and eighty four cents [$2,175.84] for the out of pocket
expenses and costs which I incurred over the course of the
six year litigation.

24

The total reasonable attorneys fees and costs and
expenses which I am seeking is forty three thousand nine
hundred and five dollars and eighty four cents
[$43,905.84].

DATED: New York, New York
June 4, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

[s]/James I. Meyerson_____
JAMES I. MEYERSON
64 Fulton Street @ Suite # 502
New York, New York 10038
[212] 226-3310
[212] 513-1006/FAX
jimeyerson@yahoo.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
BY:_____________________

Exhibit A

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

James I. Meyerson was born and raised in Syracuse, New York where he attended the public
schools. Mr. Meyerson graduated from the University of Pittsburgh in 1966. Thereafter he attended
the Syracuse University College of Law from which he graduated with a J.D. degree in 1969. Mr.
Meyerson then moved to Charlotte, North Carolina where he was associated as a VISTA Volunteer
with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Legal Aid Society.
In October, 1970, Mr. Meyerson joined the Office of the General Counsel of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] in New York City. He remained a
part of the NAACP staff and family until July, 1981 when he opened his own law office which he
continues to maintain at present.
Mr. Meyerson maintains a civil rights trial litigation and appellate practice. He focuses on
matters involving law enforcement misconduct, employment discrimination, and general
constitutional and civil rights issues.
While at the NAACP Mr. Meyerson tried and argued many cases in numerous federal
District and Circuit Courts throughout the country and, as well, in the United States Supreme Court
where he successfully argued Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. See: 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
Mr. Meyerson's trial and appellate practice has included such diverse issues as housing and
employment discrimination, public school segregation, discrimination in the delivery of educational
services, due process rights, and the rights of military personnel under the NATO Status of Forces
Treaty. See: Holmes v. Laird, 459 F. 2d 1211 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
During his tenure at the NAACP, Mr. Meyerson tried a wrongful death civil rights case
arising out of a police action in Star City, Arkansas. See: Russ v. Ratliff, 538 F. 2d 799 (8th Cir.
1976) and Russ v. Ratliff, 578 F. 2d 221 (8th Cir. 1978). In connection with the Russ litigation, Mr.

2
Meyerson successfully challenged the United States Justice Department's deferral policy to local and
State law enforcement officials in cases involving alleged criminal conduct by law enforcement
officers resulting in the death of a citizen causing the United States Justice Department to revise the
policy which had been instituted when William Rogers was Attorney General of the United States
[during the administration of President Eisenhower].See: N.A.A.C.P. v. Bell, 76 F.R.D. 134 (D.D.C.
1975); and N.A.A C.P. v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1976).
Moreover, Mr. Meyerson worked with the Chicago based attorneys who conducted the
litigation arising out of the death of Fred Hampton at the hands of City of Chicago police officers:
See: Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F. 2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979). In addition, Mr. Meyerson assisted and
participated in aspects of the defense of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter. See: New Jersey v. Carter and
Artis, 91 N.J. 86, 449 A. 2d 1280 (S.Ct. 1982).
While at the NAACP, Mr. Meyerson represented the then last surviving Scottsboro
defendant, Clarence Norris. Mr. Meyerson, working with attorneys in the State of Alabama and with
attorneys in the Office of then Alabama State Attorney General William Baxley, had the over-all
responsibility for the efforts which achieved a pardon from the State of Alabama for Mr. Norris, and,
by such and in a de facto manner and fashion, for the other eight, then deceased, "Scottsboro"
defendants.
Mr. Meyerson has tried numerous New York City school desegregation matters including
what has, to date, been the only successful school desegregation case in New York City. See: Hart
v. Community School Board, 383 F. Supp 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)/383 F. Supp. 779 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
Affirmed 512 F. 2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1975).
Other public school segregation/discrimination matters which Mr. Meyerson has tried and

3
argued include: Pride v. Community School Board # 18, 482 F. 2d 257 (2nd Cir. 1973)/Pride v.
Community School Board # 18, 488 F. 2d 321 (2nd Cir. 1973); Parent Association of Andrew
Jackson High School v. Ambach, 451 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), Reversed/Modified and
Remanded 598 F. 2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1979)/738 F.2d 574 (2nd Cir. 1984); Brody-Jones vs
Macchiarola, 503 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
Mr. Meyerson successfully defended four African American graduates of the University of
Kansas Medical School who were sued for defamation by a then member of the faculty at the
University of Kansas Medical Center when, as students, they accused him of being racist. See:
Scarpelli v. Rempson, 229 Kan. 210, 626 P. 2d 785 (S.Ct. Kan. 1981).
After leaving his position at the NAACP, Mr. Meyerson successfully defended the NAACP
and a president of a Long Island, New York Branch of the NAACP both of whom were sued for
defamation when the Branch president described the actions and conduct of a teacher at a local high
school as racist. See: Paskiewicz v. NAACP, 628 N.Y.S. 2d 405, 216 A.D. 2d 550 (2nd Dept. 1995),
Leave to appeal denied 641 N.Y.S. 2d 829, 87 N.Y. 2d 807, 664 N.E. 2d 895 (1996).
Over the course of time, Mr. Meyerson has been involved in ten death cases involving law
enforcement misconduct and/or privately promoted racial violence and, among those cases, he has
conducted six trials.
In that regard, he was a member of the team which represented the family of Michael
Stewart in one of New York City's most high profile police custody death cases. See: Stewart v. The
City of New York, 86 Civ 6979 (S.D.N.Y.). In addition, he successfully represented the wife and
mother of the Howard Beach victims in a litigation which was instituted against the City of New
York and which resulted in some compensation to her as a consequence of that infamous incident in

4
the history of New York City race relations. See: Griffith-Sandiford v. The City of New York, 89
Civ 2869 (E.D.N.Y.).
Among other of the police misconduct "death cases" in which Mr. Meyerson was primarily
responsible was a matter that was cited in the Mollen Commission Report on corruption in the New
York City Police Department [undertaken and issued in the administration of the Honorable David
Dinkins]. The litigation addressed the issue of the failure of the City to effectively oversight the
corruption of its police officers resulting thereby in the death of an Asian American shop owner in a
Brooklyn, New York neighborhood by a corrupt, off duty New York City Police Officer who
utilized his position as a police officer to gain entry into the shop and to commit a robbery and to
murder the shop owner. See: Chan, etc. v. The City of New York, et al., 93 Civ 0587 (E.D.N.Y.).
In addition, Mr. Meyerson worked with attorneys for the Asian American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund in a lawsuit addressing the shooting death of a young Asian American high school
student by a New York City Police Officer. See: Huang, etc. v. The City of New York, 95 Civ 2822
(S.D.N.Y.).
Moreover, Mr. Meyerson represented the family of an arrestee who died while in police
custody at the Manhattan Central Booking facility because of a diabetic shock which he suffered as a
consequence of the failure of the facility custodians to address the arrestee's medical condition. See:
Blair Lawrence, etc. v. The City of New York, 95 Civ 4406 (S.D.N.Y.).
Mr. Meyerson was co-counsel in a successful challenge to unconstitutional police practices
in Suffolk County which resulted in the malicious prosecution of two citizens. See: Gentile v.
County of Suffolk, 926 F. 2d 142 (2nd Cir. 1991), Affirming Gentile and Rydstrom v. County of
Suffolk, etc., et al., 129 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). See also: King v. Conde and Gentile and

5
Rydstrom v. County of Suffolk, 121 F. R.D. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
Along with co-counsel, he successfully represented Patrick Antoine the other, less known,
victim of the police misconduct which resulted in international focus upon Abner Louima and
brutality in the New York City Police Department. See: Antoine v. The City of New York, etc., et
al., 98 Civ 5082 (E.D.N.Y.). See also: Miller v. City of New York, 92 Civ 4879 (E.D.N.Y.)(jury
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in a police shooting case in which the jury rejected the accounting of
the several testifying police officers). See also: Spencer v. Casavilla, 717 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), Vacated 903 F. 2d 171 (2nd Cir. 1990), On Remand 839 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
Affirmed in part and vacated in part 44 F. 3rd 74 (2nd Cir. 1994) (death case/private actor and
conspiratorial racial violence); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F. 2d 522 (2nd Cir.
1993)(law enforcement misconduct involving the failure of law enforcement to protect a young
Vietnamese man who had cooperated with law enforcement against Vietnamese Born to Kill gang
members and was killed by the gang).
Mr. Meyerson has represented plaintiffs in hundreds of litigations including many that have
resulted in numerous written and/or reported decisions.
Among such reported cases in which Mr. Meyerson has been actively engaged and in which
he was the primary trial and appellate litigation attorney, both during his career at the NAACP and
since leaving his position with the NAACP, are: Sarnicola v. The County of Westchester, 229 F.
Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)(strip search); Greenfield v. City of New York, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1164 (S.N.D.Y. 2000)(denying summary judgment in a police misconduct case.); Jerome v.
Napolitano, 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) [up-holding Defendant verdict in police
misconduct litigation); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F. 3rd 73 (2nd Cir. 1994) (police misconduct); Johnson

6
v. Doherty, 713 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) and Posr v. Doherty, 751 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). See also: Posr v. Doherty, Affirmed in part and reversed in part 944 F. 2d 91 (2nd Cir. 1991)
(police misconduct); Posr v. City of New York, 835 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), Affirmed 22 F.
3rd 1091 (2nd Cir. 1994)( failure to discipline police officer misconduct after federal judgment
against the officer); Maldonado v. Pharo, 940 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (federal law enforcement
misconduct); Morales v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (federal law enforcement
misconduct); Lopez v. City of New York, 901 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (police misconduct);
Smith v. State of New York (unjust conviction)(New York State Court of Claims which resulted in a
trial verdict in favor of the Claimant in one of few cases to be tried under the New York State unjust
conviction statute); Guce v. City of New York (E.D.N.Y.)(malicious prosecution)(case settled for a
significant sum to redress the consequences of prosecution and incarceration. See: Guce v. State of
New York, 224 A.D. 2d 492, 637 N.Y.S. 2d 483(2nd Dept. 1996), Appeal denied 88 N.Y. 2d 805,
646 N.Y.S. 2d 985, 670 N.E. 2d 226 (1996) (unjust conviction)); Richburg v. The City of New York
(S.D.N.Y. 90's)(death case/police misconduct); Herring, etc. v. The City of New York, 81 Misc. 2d
1060, 367 N.Y.S. 2d 698 (Onondaga County Court 1975)/372 N.Y.S. 2d 588 (4th Dept. 1975)(death
case/police misconduct); Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(surreptitious
drugging by agents of the United States); Smith v. City of New York, 611 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y.)
(discovery of police officer's pre employment psychological test results); Rogers v. Britton, 476 F.
Supp. 1036 (E.D. Arkansas 1979), Reversed 631 F. 2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980)(criminal justice);
Richards v. Board of Education, 668 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), Affirmed 842 F. 2d 1288 (2nd
Cir. 1988)(employment); Polk v. Kramarsky, 711 F. 2d 505 (2nd Cir. 1983)(employment); Griffin v.
Buck, 551 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1982/566 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(employment); Huntley

7
v. Community School Board # 14, 543 F. 2d 979 (2nd Cir. 1976) and 579 F. 2d 738
(1978)(employment/due process); Valentin v. New York City Transit Authority, etc., et al., 94 Civ
3911 (E.D.N.Y.)(gender based hostile work employment/expert witness testimony); Weise and
Mortenson v. Syracuse University, 522 F. 2d 397 (1975)(employment); Hernandez-Cruz v.
Fordham University, 521 F. Supp. 1059 (1981)(employment); Gordon v. Katz, 934 F. Supp. 79
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), Affirmed 101 F.3rd 1393 (2nd Cir. 1996)(employment); Murphy v. Middletown
School District, 525 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (employment); Buckley v. Coyle Oklahoma
School District, 476 F. 2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973)(employment); Snead v. Department of Social Services
of the City of New York, 351 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)/355 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
Vacated 416 U.S. 977, 94 S. Ct. 2376, 40 L.Ed. 2d 755 (1974)/389 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
Vacated 421 U.S. 982, 95 S. Ct. 1985, 44 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1975)/409 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
Vacated 425 U.S. 457, 96 S. Ct. 1630, 48 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1976) (due process); Laurido v. Simon, 489
F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (due process); Powell v. Syracuse University, 580 F. 2d 1150 (2nd
Cir. 1978)(employment); Jackson v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, 419 F. Supp.
809 (1976)(heath care services); In the Matter of Rene Thornton a/k/a "Asha", 560 F. Supp. 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)(contempt/grand jury); Fruchtman v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 534
F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(constitutional challenge to bar examination results and process
associated therewith); Graham v. State of New York, 653 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
Remanded for further consideration 861 F. 2d 381 (2nd Cir. 1988), On remand 716 F. Supp. 802
(S.D.N.Y.1989), Affirmed 907 F. 2d 324 (2nd Cir. 1990) (re: issues of retroactivity under Title VII
arising out of employee benefits claim); Mack v. Rumsfeld, 609 F. Supp. 1561 (W.D.N.Y. 1985),
Affirmed 784 F. 2d 438 (2nd Cir. 1986) (constitutional challenge to policy excluding single parents

8
with children under age of eighteen from enlisting in Army and Air Force and Army and Air Force
Reserves).
For other cases, see also: Francis and Brown v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(First amendment challenge to the disciplining of correctional officers because they wore hair in
modified dredlocks in deference to their Rastafarian religious beliefs); Julius Williams v. The City of
New York, et al., 03 Civ 4468 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(race discrimination in employment); Velez v. Levy,
et al., 274 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded 401
F. 3
rd
75 (2
nd
Cir. March 11, 2005)(constitutional challenge to the removal of Community School
Board member on Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process and First
Amendment grounds); Savino v. County of Suffolk, 774 F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (challenging
the racial composition of a jury panel in the Suffolk County, Long Island Division of the Eastern
District of New York); Elliot v. City of New York, etc., et al., 00 Civ 9308 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)(employment/hostile racial work environment-jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff; second seated
Colleen Meenan, Esq.); Arthur v. Starrett City, 98 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (housing)/89 F.R.D.
547 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Marr v. Rife, 545 F. 2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976)(housing); Fair Housing
Development Fund Corp. v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414 (E.D.N.Y.)(housing); Duckett v. Silberman, 568
F. 2d 1020 (2nd Cir. 1978)(housing); Stevens v. Artuz, 97 Civ 5821 (S.D.N.Y.)(prisoner rights);
Rene Rogers v. United Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)(terms and conditions of
employment and discrimination, based on race, associated therewith); Robert Pinter v. The City of
New York, etc., et al.,710 F. Supp. 2
nd
408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), Reversed in and remanded for further
proceedings(2
nd
Cir. November 18, 2011);Bradley v. The City of New York, 2007 WL 232945
(S.D.N.Y. January 26, 2007); Bradley v. Jusino, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11558 (S.D.N.Y. February

9
14, 2008); Bradley v. Jusino, 2008 WL 3891529 (S.D.N.Y. August 19, 2008); Bradley v. Jusino,
2009 WL 1181617 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2009); Bradley v. Jusino, 2009 WL 1403891 (S.D.N.Y. May
18,2009);Bradley v. Jusino, 374 Fed. Appx. 144, 2010 WL 1462072 (2
nd
cir. April 14, 2010)(police
misconduct). The Bradley litigation eventually resulted in a successful jury rendered damage
verdict and, associated therewith, the eventual resolution of the litigation.
In the early 90s, Mr. Meyerson was elected to, and served on, a New York City Community
School Board for a term of three years. He also served for a term on the Board of Directors of the
National Employment Law Project, a federally funded Legal Services back up center. Mr. Meyerson
has appeared on panels over his career to discuss various substantive issues growing out of his multi
faceted civil rights litigation experiences.
Mr. Meyerson lives in New York City with his wife of thirty four years who has always been
and remains the rock in his life. He is the enormously proud father of a twenty six year old daughter
who since her birth has always been and continues to be the inspiration in his life and the source of
his greatest joy and happiness and pride.
Mr. Meyerson believes, as his father wrote to him, that the "moral force of a just cause is
irresistible" and that the moral force and the just cause, not he, should be the focus of his labors in
the civil rights and human rights struggle.

Exhibit B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

CHRISTOPHER LONG,

Plaintiff,

-against-

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; a municipal entity; NEW
YORK CITY POLICE OFFICER PATRICK POGAN
(Shield No. 28957), individually and in his official
capacity; and NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICER
JOHN DOE No. 1 and NEW YORK CITY POLICE
SUPERVISORS RICHARD ROES Nos. 1 & 2,
individually and in their official capacities,

Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
ORDER RESOLVING
PLAINTIFFS MOTION
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS

09 Civ. 6099 (AKH)

------------------------------------------------------------------------ x
ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiff Christopher Long brings this motion to recover attorneys fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 and the terms of the Judgment entered in this case on October 19,
2009.
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive
force and unlawful arrest in violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiff alleged that when he was participating in a Critical Mass bicycle ride,
NYPD Officer Patrick Pogan pushed him off his bicycle without provocation, tackled him when
he got to his feet, dragged him to the sidewalk, kneeled on his head and arrested him. He was
taken to the precinct where the officers allegedly gave a false account of the events to cover up
what had occurred. Plaintiff was held at the precinct until he was arraigned on charges of
Attempted Assault, Resisting Arrest, and Disorderly Conduct, and was released on his own
recognizance. Shortly after his release, a video of Pogan pushing plaintiff off the bicycle became
Case 1:09-cv-06099-AKH Document 39 Filed 08/09/10 Page 1 of 4 Case 1:11-cv-02942-LBS Document 15 Filed 06/08/12 Page 36 of 82
2
public. As a result, the New York County District Attorney dismissed all charges against
plaintiff. Pogan was subsequently indicted on felony charges of falsifying a business record and
filing a false instrument in connection with plaintiffs arrest. He was convicted on April 29,
2010 in New York County Supreme Court of offering a false instrument for filing.
The City of New York made an offer of judgment to plaintiff on September 23,
2009, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the sum of $65,001.00 plus
reasonable attorneys fees, expenses and costs to the date of this offer for plaintiffs federal
claims, if any, against defendant City of New York or any official , employee, or agent, either
past or present, of the City of New York, or any agency thereof, other than former Police Officer
Patrick Pogan. The judgment was in full satisfaction of plaintiffs federal and state claims
against the City of New York and its officials, employees or agents other than Officer Pogan.
Plaintiff accepted the offer on October 7, 2009.
The parties have since been unable to resolve the amount of attorneys fees,
expenses and costs to which plaintiff is entitled. The rulings set out below address certain
disputed categories. The parties shall renew their attempt to settle the dispute in light of the
rulings below. If they are unable, I will hold a conference.

(1) The terms of the Rule 68 offer of judgment limit recoverable fees, costs and
expenses to those incurred in pursuit of plaintiffs federal claims. Plaintiff accepted the
offer and is bound by its terms. See Tucker v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 4753 (VM),
2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 30064, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010) ([T]he Offer of
Judgment explicitly . . . encompassed attorneys fees and costs related only to plaintiff's
federal claims, and th[e] issue [of whether plaintiffs counsel is entitled to fees and
3
expenses incurred in pursuit of state claims] thus should be governed by and decided as a
matter of ordinary contract law principles.). As such, plaintiffs counsel is not entitled
to compensation for (a) time associated with pleading and pursuing state law claims, (b)
time spent drafting and reviewing plaintiffs notice of claim, (c) time associated with
plaintiffs 50-h hearing, including client preparation and attendance, and (d) review of
plaintiffs 50-h transcript. None of this work was necessary to pursue plaintiffs federal
claims.

(2) Plaintiffs federal claims against the City and associated parties were based on the
conduct of Officer Pogan. Plaintiffs counsel is thus entitled to compensation for the
time spent in pursuit of the claims against him.

(3) The rates requested by plaintiffs four attorneys are reasonable. Any hours
charged that are unreasonably duplicative must be excised.

(4) Plaintiffs preparation of initial disclosures and discovery and interrogatory
requests was reasonable if only to assess the strength of the case. Accordingly, plaintiffs
counsel is entitled to compensation for this work.

(5) The services that Defendant characterizes as clerical and administrative, see
Defts Opp. Memo at 18-19 & n.20, were reasonable and proper substantive legal
services. Plaintiffs counsel is thus entitled to compensation for the hours spent
performing them.
Case 1:09-cv-06099-AKH Document 39 Filed 08/09/10 Page 4 of 4
(6) An percentage reduction of plaintiff's counsel's time is not
warranted. Defendant has not established that the services plaintiffs counsel performed
were not reasonably necessary to the outcome of the case. See Tucker v. City of New
York, 08 Civ. 4753 (VM) (MHD), 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 30270, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 9, 2010), adopted by Tucker v. City ofNew York, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 30064.
(7) Finally, plaintiff's counsel is not entitled to fees and expenses for work done
preparing and filing this motion. The Rule 68 judgment limited recoverable fees and
expenses to those incurred prior to the date of the offer. If the City's dispute over
recoverable fees were in bad faith, than compensation for the work necessary for
plaintiff's fee application may be justified. No such showing has here been made.
In light of these rulings, the parties are to meet and attempt to settle their fee
dispute. They shall report to the court within thirty days, indicating the status of negotiations. If
the parties are unable to reach agreement, I will hold a conference. The Clerk shall mark the
motion (Doc. No. 19) as terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August, 2010
New New York
4

Exhibit C
Case 1 :07 -cv-03014-RPP Document 67 Filed 05/24/11 Page 1 of 16
-----------------------------------------------------------)(
DEJA BARBOUR, SHINNEL GONZALEZ,
and RAKA YY AH MASSEY,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
THE CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, et al.,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------)(
ROBERT P. PATTERSON, JR., U.S.D.J.
07 Civ. 30 14 (RPP)
OPINION AND ORDER
On March 14, 2011, Plaintiffs' attorneys Michael L. Spiegel and Scott A. Korenbaum
moved for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $280,940.44 pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1988. On March 28, 2011, Defendants filed an affidavit and memorandum of law in opposition
to the request for fees, arguing first that Plaintiffs are not entitled to any fees, and, in the
alternative, that Plaintiffs' request is excessive. On April 7, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief, in
which Mr. Spiegel lowered his portion of the request for fees by seven hours in response to
Defendants' objections. The reply brief also amended the amount of Plaintiffs' request by
incorporating additional fees for work performed on the reply by Mr. Spiegel and Mr.
Korenbaum. Plaintiffs' final request for fees and costs totals $290,997.94.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Deja Barbour, Shinnel Gonzalez and Rakayyah Massey commenced this action
by filing the Complaint on April 16, 2007, following the favorable termination of criminal
proceedings against them in 2006. (Declaration of Michael L. Spiegel ("Spiegel Decl.") ~ 19.)
Plaintiffs' Complaint arises out of their arrest during an incident in the early morning of April
- '
Case 1 :07-cv-03014-RPP Document 67 Filed 05/24/11 Page 2 of 16
25, 2004. (.Ml:. -u 20.) That morning, the three women had walked out of a White Plains diner
when they observed several police officers questioning and ultimately arresting two of their male
friends. ~ ) Plaintiffs protested the rough treatment their male friends were receiving at the
hands of the officers, and they were placed under arrest by the officers, who were Defendants in
this case. (ld.) The criminal case against Plaintiffs proceeded for two years; Plaintiff Massey's
case was dismissed mid-trial and the other two Plaintiffs were acquitted. (1QJ
Following the resolution of their criminal case, Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for false
arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution and failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. I983
and for malicious prosecution under New York state law. (Compl. at 4-8.) They also brought
I983 claims against the City of White Plains under theories of supervisory liability and
municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). An initial
pre-trial conference was held before Judge Robinson on September 14, 2007. The case was then
transferred to Judge Karas, before whom a pre-trial conference was held on May 20, 2008.
Judge Karas set a discovery deadline of July I, 2008. The parties appeared for a settlement
conference before Magistrate Judge Davison on March 4, 20IO. On January 7, 201I, this case
was transferred to this Judge, before whom a conference was held on January 21, 2011. A trial
date was set for March 14, 20 11.
On March I, 20 II, Defendants made three Rule 68 Offers of Judgment, each for the
"total sum ofTEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 00/I 00 ($I 0,000) for the settlement of all
claims pending against the defendants in this action." (Spiegel Decl., Ex. A.) On March 2,
20 II, notices of acceptance of Rule 68 Offers of Judgment were filed with the Court, and on
March 8, 20 I1, Judgment Pursuant to Rule 68 was entered in favor of each Plaintiff for the sum
of$IO,OOO, "with the costs accrued, including reasonable attorneys' fees, in an amount to be
2
determined by the Court." On March 14, 20 11, Plaintiffs' counsel filed their application for
attorneys' fees.
DISCUSSION
Rule 68 provides that "[m]ore than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms,
with the costs then accrued." Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. 42 U.S.C. 1988 provides, in relevant part,
that in an 1983 action, a court may award the prevailing party "a reasonable attorney's fee as a
part of the costs." Plaintiffs contend that they are prevailing parties in this 1983 suit by virtue
of their acceptance of Defendants' Rule 68 offer, and that they are entitled to costs of the
litigation, including attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs contend that these costs are to be paid by
Defendants in addition to the $10,000 per Plaintiff settlement. Defendants argue that by
incorporating the language "for the settlement of all claims" in the Rule 68 Offers of Judgment,
they intended for the $10,000 sum to include attorneys' fees, and that therefore Plaintiffs are not
entitled to any additional fees. Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not prevailing
parties entitled to fees pursuant to 1988, and that Plaintiffs' request for fees is excessive.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' application is granted.
I. Attorneys' Fees in Rule 68 Offers of Judgment
Defendants argue that the language "settle all claims" in the Rule 68 Offers of Judgment
"show[s] that legal fees were contemplated in the Rule 68 Offer made to Plaintiffs." (Affidavit
of Joseph A. Maria ("Maria Aff.") at 3.) Therefore, Defendants contend, an award of legal fees
in addition to the $10,000 payment is inappropriate. Plaintiffs argue that because the Rule 68
Offer did not state specifically that costs were included in the $10,000 figure, and did not specify
3
an amount for costs, an additional award of costs, including attorneys' fees, is warranted. (Pis.'
Mem. in Supp. at 4.)
It is settled law that if a Rule 68 offer of judgment is intended to include costs in the
offered sum, it should expressly state that intent. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 6 (1985) ("[i]f
the [Rule 68] offer does not state that costs are included and an amount for costs is not specified,
the court will be obligated by the terms of the Rule to include in its judgment an additional
amount which in its discretion, it determines to be sufficient to cover the costs"). If Defendants
had intended its offers to include costs and attorneys fees, its offers of judgment should have so
stated. Sas v. Trintex, 709 F. Supp. 455, 457-58 (S.D.N.Y. I989) ("[i]fthe offer of judgment ...
simply had stated that it was to include costs, its acceptance would have prohibited an additional
claim for attorney's fees").
While Defendants now object that they intended for the $I 0,000 offer to be inclusive of
costs, this case is on all fours with Sas, in which Judge Goettel stated "[t]he ... fact of the
matter is that the defendant's counsel never anticipated that the plaintiff would accept the offer of
judgment and, indeed, that offer would not have been accepted had it included attorney's fees.
Defendant's counsel simply erred in failing to protect against an acceptance of the offer followed
by a request for costs, including attorney's fees." Sas, 709 F. Supp. at 458. Defendants drafted
the Rule 68 offer. If they intended for it to be inclusive of attorneys' fees, the offer should have
clearly expressed that intent.'
In addition to their argument regarding the offer's language, defense counsel's affidavit
alleges that the March 8, 20 II Judgment signed by the Court could be fairly read to mean "that
1
In this Court's view, the offer does not suggest that attorneys' fees are included in the $10,000 sum. Were the
offer ambiguous, however, it would nevertheless be interpreted against the drafter as not including attorneys' fees.
Photopaint Technologies. LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (reaffirming the rule that
ambiguous contracts are interpreted against the document's drafter).
4
Case 1:07-cv-03014-RPP Document 67 Filed 05/24/11 Page 5 of 16
the Court properly has decided that some amount ofthe $10,000.00 to each person is awardable
to the Plaintiff as legal fees." (Maria Aff. at 2.) Defendants' counsel's reading of the Judgment
is incorrect. The law is clear, as set forth above, that because the offers did not specify that they
were to include fees, the Court is required to allow a separate award of fees.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of fees because "the
Judgment which the Court issued was not a Consent Order ... the parties' settlement by way of a
Rule 68 Settlement offer and the Court's judgment did not constitute sufficient bases upon which
an award of counsel fees should have been made." (Defs.' Mem. in Opp. at 4.)
Contrary to Defendants' arguments, Rule 68 provides that the offeror is to pay the costs
of the accepting party: "At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a
claim may serve on an opposing party and offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the
costs then accrued." Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. "The critical feature of this portion of the Rule is that
the offer be one that allows judgment to be taken against the defendant for both the damages
caused by the challenged conduct and the costs then accrued." Marek, 473 U.S. at 6 (emphasis
original). In the context of 1983 actions, such as this case, the Supreme Court has held that
"costs," as referred to in Rule 68, include attorneys' fees. Marek, 473 U.S. at 8-12.
Defendant is incorrect that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees because they
accepted a Rule 68 offer instead of obtaining a consent order. Rule 68 itself and the Supreme
Court's decision in Marek make clear that parties accepting Rule 68 offers are entitled to recover
costs, including attorneys' fees.
II. Plaintiffs as Prevailing Parties
Defendants also contend that because several of Plaintiffs' original claims were
voluntarily discontinued, Plaintiffs cannot be prevailing parties and thus are not entitled to fees
5
under 1988. (Maria Aff. at 4-5.) Defendants also argue that it is impossible to distinguish
Plaintiffs' claims for fees for work performed on those claims that survived versus those claims
that were terminated prior to settlement, and that therefore no legal fees should be awarded.
(Maria Aff. at 5.)
Defendants are correct that prior to the Rule 68 offer, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
their excessive force claims, and dismissed their Monell claims and supervisory liability claims
against White Plains. See Pretrial Memorandum, Barbour et al. v. City of White Plains et al., 07
Civ. 3014, ECF No. 22 (Nov. 2, 201 0). Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution, false arrest, and failure
to intervene claims brought pursuant to 1983 as well as New York state law, remained. ld.
Defendants' arguments fail. First, settlement in Plaintiffs' favor is sufficient to establish
Plaintiffs as the prevailing parties in this action. "[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights
plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an
enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief
through a consent decree or settlement." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. I 03, Ill (1992) (citations
omitted). Obtaining a Rule 68 judgment on behalf of each Plaintiff in the amount of $10,000
constitutes "some relief."
Second, Plaintiffs dismissed their non-viable claims in the interest of efficiency. The
facts underlying these claims arose from the same incident as the remaining claims, and all of the
claims had the same nucleus of fact and law. Plaintiffs' counsel attest that they are not claiming
any fees for time spent exclusively on those claims that were dismissed. (Pis.' Reply Mem. in
Supp. at 6 n.l.) Thus, the fact that Plaintiffs dismissed several claims before accepting the Rule
68 offer does not mean that they are not prevailing parties. Plaintiffs' counsel have eliminated
costs and fees for the time spent exclusively on those claims.
6
III. Reasonableness of the Requested Fees
Defendants object to the amount of Plaintiffs' fee request for several reasons. First, they
argue that "no comprehensive work [was] done," and that Plaintiffs' billing is inflated in several
particular instances. (Maria Aff. at 3, 4-6.) Defendants also challenge the request for fees
because it is disproportionate to the recovery.
2
Defendants do not state an objection to Plaintiffs'
counsel's hourly rates or expenses, nor do they state any objections to any particular time entries
of Mr. Korenbaum, or his hourly rates.
A. Standard Governing Reasonableness of Fees
In Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1669 (20 I 0), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
utility of the lodestar approach to evaluate the reasonableness of fee applications in the 1988
context. The lodestar approach entails "determining the amount of a reasonable fee [by
calculating] the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983). In Arbor Hill
Concerned Citizens v. Cty. of Albany, 522 F .3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit
determined that "[t]he meaning of the term 'lodestar' has shifted over time, and its value as a
metaphor has deteriorated to the point ofunhelpfulness." Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190. Further,
the Second Circuit reasoned that "[ w ]hat the district courts in this circuit produce is in effect not
a lodestar as originally conceived but rather a 'presumptively reasonable fee."' Id. at 189. Under
either approach, Plaintiffs' counsel's fee request is reasonable.
2
On page 3ofthe Maria Affidavit, Defendants explain "the award is truly nominal when it is considered an entire
civil rights matter settled for the sum of$10,000." On page 4 of the Affidavit, Defendants cite a New York
Supreme Court case Continental Building Co. Inc. v. The Town of North Salem, 150 Misc. 2d 145 for the
proposition that "there must be some relationship to the results obtained and to the legal fees awarded." These
arguments are construed as challenges to the request for fees on the basis of proportionality to the award.
7
B. Time Reasonably Expended
Defendants object to Plaintiffs' application for fees primarily on the grounds that
Plaintiffs bill for an excessive amount of time. Defendants claim that "there was no
comprehensive work done," and that "20 hours alone are dedicated to the instant application for
fees." (Defs.' Mem. in Opp. at 3.) Defendants also make several specific objections to
Plaintiffs' bill, arguing that the time expended for various tasks was excessive. (Maria Aff. at 5-
6.) Plaintiffs respond by justifying their expenditures and pointing out that Defendants' delay in
making a reasonable settlement offer unnecessarily extended the litigation up to thirteen days
prior to a firm trial date.
"In determining whether hours should be excluded, the inquiry is not based on what
effort appears necessary in hindsight, but rather on whether 'at the time the work was performed,
a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures."' Harrell v. VanDer
Plas, No. 08 Civ. 8252, 2009 WL 3756327 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2009) (quoting Grant v.
Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992)). As set forth in the pretrial memorandum, at the time
of the Rule 68 offers, Plaintiffs' counsel were preparing to proceed to trial on behalf of three
clients, on claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution and failure to intervene, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1983 and state law, against six police officers who had testified against them at trial.
Pretrial Memorandum, Barbour et al. v. City of White Plains et al., 07 Civ. 3014, ECF No. 22
(Nov. 2, 201 0).
Defendants' first argument, that there was no comprehensive work done, is unsupported
by any citations to the record, and is directly contradicted by Mr. Spiegel's and Mr.
Korenbaum's billing records, which demonstrate comprehensive and conscientious preparation
for trial.
8
Defendants next object to Plaintiffs' counsel's application for fees for the time spent
preparing their motion for fees. (Maria Aff. at 3.) This objection is contradicted by the law,
which dictates that a prevailing civil rights plaintiff may include the costs of drafting a motion to
recover fees as part of a fee award. Weyant v. Okst, 198 F .3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999) ("motion
costs should be granted whenever underlying costs are allowed."); Davis v. City of New
Rochelle, 156 F.R.D. 549,560 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (attorneys should be compensated for"time
reasonably spent ... in establishing their fee pursuant to fee-shifting statutes such as 1988").
Defendants also voice several specific objections to certain time entries. Their first
objection questions an entry for "January 26, 2006- a call and correspondence to Joseph A.
Maria's office adjourning a 50-h Hearing which took approximately 24 minutes. Clearly this is
an inflated item." (Maria Aff. at 5.) Defendants' affidavit is inaccurate, because there is no
entry in Mr. Spiegel's or Mr. Korenbaum's billing records for that date. (Spiegel Decl., Ex. 8;
Declaration of Scott A. Korenbaum ("Korenbaum Decl.") Ex. B.) The only entry that aligns
with that description appears on page 2 of Mr. Spiegel's records and corresponds to a call on
October 27, 2006. (!9.:. at 2.) This entry reads "Call and write Joseph, Maria, Esq., re:
adjournment of 50-h hearings." (!9.:.) In the event this is the entry that Defendants challenge, it
is reasonable that a call and preparation of a letter regarding adjournment of these hearings could
take four tenths of an hour (twenty-four minutes). Moreover, in response to Defendants'
objections, Plaintiffs have agreed to adjust all of Mr. Spiegel's hours expended with regard to the
50-h hearings by deducting seven hours. (Spiegel Reply Decl. ~ 6.) Such an adjustment is
adequate to satisfy Defendants' objections to Mr. Spiegel's billing relating to the 50-h
proceedings.
9
Second, Defendants object to conversations Plaintiffs' counsel Mr. Spiegel had with his
clients in January 2010 and on March 4, 201 0 with regard to pre-trial and settlement conferences.
(Maria Aff. at 5-6.) Defendants contend that it was improper for Plaintiff to devote eight hours
to discussing settlement with his clients and attending a settlement conference when a settlement
offer had not yet been made. Defendants' characterization of these entries appears, again, to be
inaccurate. The first call to which Defendants object is a call between Mr. Spiegel and his
clients on January 25, 2010 in preparation for a court conference on February 9, 2010. iliL, at 5.)
The call that took a total of one hour and twelve minutes. (Spiegel Decl., Ex. B at 9.) In view of
the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel represented three clients, these calls averaged 24 minutes per
client, which, considering that the calls were in. preparation for the first court conference in over
six months, is not excessive. See Docket Sheet, 07 Civ. 3014, ECF Nos. I 1, 13. Moreover, Mr.
Spiegel affirms in his Reply Declaration that Defendants' counsel failed to appear for the
February 9 court conference, or to send a colleague in his stead, rendering the conference
useless. (Spiegel Reply Dec I . ~ 4.) If Defendants' counsel wished to avoid unnecessary
attorneys' fees, minimizing the amount of his opponent's time wasted due to his failure to appear
for court conferences would have been an effective strategy.
Defendants next dispute an entry on February 17, 2010, arguing that the fact that
Plaintiffs' counsel spent additional time on calls to his client on that date, so soon after the calls
on January 25, indicates that his bill is inflated. (Maria Aff. at 6.) Mr. Spiegel's entry indicates
that for one hour and 48 minutes on February 17 he conducted calls with his clients in advance of
a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Davison scheduled for March 4. (Spiegel Decl.,
Ex. B. at 9.) During that period Mr. Spiegel also prepared for the conference himself, including
reviewing documents and drafting an ex parte letter. (I d.) Mr. Spiegel also billed five hours for
10
.
.
attending the settlement conference. (ld.) Defendants argue that "if you take in excess of 8
hours to discuss a settlement where no offers were forthcoming, this is clearly improper."
3
(Maria Aff. at 6.) The Court disagrees. A settlement conference before a Magistrate Judge
requires each party's counsel to determine the strengths and weaknesses of their case and their
clients' willingness to settle and for what figure, in view of those strengths and weaknesses.
Furthermore, the bulk of the eight hour period (five hours) that Defendants challenge was spent
in conference with the Court. Plaintiffs' counsel's attendance at a settlement conference
scheduled by the court certainly does not represent excessive billing.
Defendants also object that Plaintiffs' counsel spent an inappropriate amount of time
preparing for trial in November and December of2010 and January of2011, and that Plaintiffs'
counsel overbilled for its preparation to cross examine Defendants Heffner and Christopher.
(Maria Aff. at 6.) Both of these arguments are unavailing. Plaintiffs' counsel's records are
detailed and specific and make clear that he was engaged in the types of tasks that are necessary
to trial preparation, including reviewing his client's deposition testimony, developing requests to
charge, drafting in limine motions, and preparing direct and cross examinations of witnesses, in
large part based on trial transcripts of Defendants' prior testimony on the same subject matter.
{Spiegel Decl., Ex. Bat 11-13.) There is no reason to believe that any of these efforts were
unnecessary.
Furthermore, Defendants maintained the position that they were unwilling to settle
throughout the litigation, until the time the Rule 68 offers were made right before trial. (Spiegel
Decl. ~ ~ 24-25.) This approach ultimately increases the costs of litigation. Defendants "could
3
To arrive at the eight hour figure, defense counsel apparently added the entries representing the calls on January
25, 20 I 0, the calls and other preparation on February 17, 2010, and attending the settlement conference on March 4,
2010.
II
have avoided liability for the bulk of the attorney's fees for which they now find themselves
liable by making a reasonable settlement offer in a timely manner." City of Riverside, 477 U.S.
561,580 n.ll (1986). Plaintiffs' counsel could not have foreseen that Defendants would make a
settlement offer at the eleventh hour, and thus were ethically bound to prepare adequately for
trial. "In determining whether hours should be excluded, the inquiry is not based on what effort
appears necessary in hindsight, but rather on whether 'at the time the work was performed, a
reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures." Harrell, 2009 WL
3756327 at *6.
Upon review of Defendants' billing records, and in view of the prior trial dates set, the
amount of time expended to prepare this case was reasonable.
C. Hourly Rates
Defendants do not articulate an objection to Plaintiffs counsel's hourly rates in their
opposition papers. Nevertheless, the Court will briefly review Plaintiffs' counsel's requested
rates and the documents offered in support of these rates in order to evaluate their
reasonableness.
Plaintiffs' attorney Michael Spiegel seeks a rate of$625 an hour, which he states is the
rate he charges in civil rights contingency fee agreements. (Spiegel Decl. ~ 30.) This rate is
somewhat higher than the rates granted in judicial decisions cited by Mr. Spiegel. See Vilkhu v.
The City ofNew York, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73696 at *13 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009)
(describing the range of rates paid to experienced civil rights attorneys as "$250 to $600 ... with
average awards increasing over time."); Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F. Supp.2d 527, 546
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (awarding an experienced civil rights litigator fees at $600 per hour).
12
Case 1:07 -cv-03014-RPP Document 67 Filed 05/24/11 Page 13 of 16
In support of this rate, Mr. Spiegel cites his extensive experience as a civil rights litigator
in this district, including litigating approximately 150 civil rights cases. (Spiegel Dec I . ~ 7 .) Mr.
Spiegel also submits three declarations from other experienced civil rights litigators who each
attest that their hourly rate matches or exceeds that of Mr. Spiegel's, and contend that Mr.
Spiegel's requested rate is within a standard range for fees paid to lawyers of Mr. Spiegel's
experience and ability. (llh ~ 33; Exs. D, E & F.) Mr. Spiegel also attaches several statistical
reports indicating that $625 is well within the range of hourly rates for attorneys in civil rights
cases in the Southern District and Washington, D.C. area. (Spiegel Decl. ~ ~ 34, 35; Exs. G and
H.)
In view of Mr. Spiegel's extensive experience and the evidence presented that his
claimed rate is within a standard range charged by other attorneys in this District with similar
levels of experience and skill, and in view of the absence of any defense objection to Mr.
Spiegel's rate, Mr. Spiegel's rate of $625 is reasonable.
Mr. Spiegel's colleague, Scott Korenbaum, seeks $450 per hour. In support of his
application, Mr. Korenbaum explains that he has twenty-two years of legal experience, and
maintained his own practice focused on civil rights litigation since 2000. (Korenbaum Decl. ~ ~
8, 14.) He attests that $450 is the usual rate that he charges in his civil rights retainer
agreements. (ld. ~ 15.) Mr. Korenbaum also cites to cases in this district and the Eastern District
in which he was awarded similar rates. ilih ~ ~ 16, 17, and 18.) Mr. Korenbaum presents a
declaration from Matthew Brinkerhoff, an attorney specializing in civil rights litigation, who
states that Mr. Korenbaum' s rate of $450 is lower than his own rate and well in line with the rate
paid to attorneys of similar skill and experience. (Korenbaum Dec I., Ex. A.)
13
After review of Mr. Spiegel's and Mr. Korenbaum's declarations and their appended
exhibits, the requested rates are found to be reasonable and within the range of fees paid to civil
rights attorneys of similar skill and experience in the Southern District of New York.
D. Proportionality of the Fees to the Recovery
Defendants' counsel appears to argue that the fees requested by Plaintiffs' attorneys are
excessive in view of the $10,000 recovery paid to each Plaintiff. Without citing any law,
Defendants assert that "the legal fees awarded pursuant to Federal Law must bear some basis to
the actual successfulness of the Plaintiffs in the case at bar." (Maria Aff. at 5.)
"Congress enacted fee-shifting statutes ... to encourage private enforcement of civil rights
statutes, to the benefit of the public as a whole," Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F .3d 422, 426
(2d Cir. 1999). Fees in civil rights statutes are not to be linked to the dollar value of a claim. I d.;
Vasguez v. Ranieri Cheese Corp., No. 07 Civ. 464, 2011 WL 554695 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. February
7, 2011) ("courts have rejected the notion that fee awards should be proportionately tied to a
plaintiffs recovery").
Plaintiffs' acceptance ofthe Rule 68 offer of$10,000 to each Plaintiff represents "some
success" on the merits of their claims. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover attorneys' fees,
despite the fact that the fees requested are substantially larger than the ultimate recovery. Farrar
v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, Ill (1992).
E. Paralegal Fees and Costs
Plaintiffs also seek recovery of paralegal fees in the amount of $8,712.50 and reasonable
expenses in the amount of $4,932.94. Defendants do not make an objection to such an award
and thus paralegal fees and costs and expenses are granted.
14
CONCLUSION
The time expended by Plaintiffs' counsel in preparing this case on behalf of the three
Plaintiffs was reasonable, and their requested rates are found to be within the range of rates paid
to civil rights lawyers in the Southern District of New York of similar skill and experience.
Plaintiffs are entitled attorneys' fees in addition to the amount of the Rule 68 offer because the
offer did not specify that it was to include atton1eys' fees.
Plaintiffs are awarded a total of$290,997.94 for costs including attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs' attorney Mr. Spiegel is awarded $212,687.50 and Plaintiffs' attorney Mr. Korenbawn
is awarded $64,665. Plaintiffs are also awarded paralegal fees in the amount of$8,712.50 and
costs and expenses of $4,932.94.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: New York, New York
May 2 ~ 0 1 1
Copies of this order were sent to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Michael L. Spiegel, Esq.
111 Broadway, Suite 1305
New York, NY 10006
(212) 587 8558
Fax: (212) 571 7767
Robert P. Patterson, Jr.
U.S.D.J.
15
Scott A. Korenbaum, Esq.
111 Broadway, Suite 1305
New York, NY 10006
212-587-8558
Fax: 212-346-4665
Attorney for Defendants:
Joseph Anthony Maria
Joseph A. Maria, P.C.
301 Old Tarrytown Road
White Plains, NY 10603

Fax:914-684-9772
16

Exhibit D
FIRST DEPARTMENT ASSIGNED COUNSEL CORPORATION
Geoffrey Q. Ralls, President
Ira Mickenberg, Vice President
E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Vice President
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
17 September 1991
.Dt.;_ Application of James Meyerson, _Esq.
.
Dear Judge Weinstein:
in the matter of Gentile et ano. y. County
of Suffolk. etc . et al. 87 Civ 2359
At the request of James Meyerson, Esq. I write in support
of his application for attorney at the rate of $275 per
hour. Although I have no knowledge of the nature of this action
nor the efforts of Mr. Meyerson in pursuing it on behalf of his
clients, I have had prior dealings with him was impressed
with his abilities, energy, and resourcefulness as an attorney.
The First Department Assigned Counsel\Corporation is a
small not-for-profit corporation established in 1988 to run the
Officeof the Appellate Defender, a public interest law firm
specializing in criminal appeals in the New York State Appellate
Division, First Department. The office accepts assignments from
that Court and is reimbursed for its efforts at.a flxed rate
through the Assigned Counsel Plan (18-B) system. As such, the
resources of the corporation are extremely limited.
In 1989 a labor dispute arose when the office terminated
the employment of one of the staff attorneys. Meyerson was
recommended as a specialist in the area, and the corporation ap-
proached him about advising the Board of Directors, and pgten-
tially representing the corporation, if that became necessary.
Mr. Meyerson, on a bQnQ basis, quickly, thougbt-
fully, and thoroughly. His advice was invaluable, and indeed,
assisted us in defusing a potentially explosive (and litigious)
situation. While I am unfamiliar with the going rate for legal
I believe we were counseled at a level at least equal to
that which we would have received from a "white shoe" law firm.
Sincerely,
45 West 45th Street Suite 706 New York, NY 10036 (212) 719-0766
. ..

Exhibit E
---------------------------------------------------------------x
VERNON BRANCH, :
: 11 Civ 3048 (JGK) (MHD)
Plaintiff, :
: DECLARATION OF
- v - : MYRON BELDOCK
:
CITY OF NEW YORK, etc., et al., :
:
Defendants. :
---------------------------------------------------------------x
MYRON BELDOCK, being duly admitted to practice law in and before all the Courts of
the State of New York and before this Court and being duly aware of the penalties for perjury
and for violation of the rules of this Court, affirms and declares under the penalty of perjury and
sanction, as follows:
1. I am an attorney admitted in New York State and Federal Courts who has been
continuously practicing law since graduation from Harvard Law School and admission to the
New York State Bar in 1958.
2. I make this declaration in support of the application of James I. Meyerson for fees
and costs in this matter. The purpose of this declaration is to inform the Court of what I know of
Mr. Meyersons qualifications and expertise; of my understanding of what lawyers of
comparable skill, experience and reputation charge for their services in the metropolitan New
York area and particularly in the Southern District of New York; and of other factors relevant to
Mr. Meyersons application.
3. After my admission to practice, I served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, E.D.N.Y.,
from 1958 to 1960. I was an associate in a general practice firm and then an individual
practitioner during the next four years. I have been a partner in Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP
since 1964. My firm currently has twelve partners, five associates and two paralegal assistants.
Our practice includes a wide variety oflitigation in Federal and State courts and administrative
tribunals. My practice has always been heavily concentrated in State and Federal litigation (trials
and appeals, criminal and civil). I am essentially a general practitioner with specialties in a
number of areas, including civil rights cases such as the action at bar. Over the years I have
represented plaintiffs and litigated in many civil rights and tort actions based on police and
official misconduct and on employment discrimination. Some of those cases are listed in my
website information attached as Exhibit A. The majority of those cases have involved complex
issues and lengthy commitments. For example, I am currently lead counsel in a civil rights
action brought by YusefSalaam, one of the individuals convicted and imprisoned but ultimately
exonerated in the so-called Central Park Jogger case, In re McCray, USDC, SDNY, 03 CV I 0080
(DAB)(RLE), as well as being co-counsel on behalf ofthree others of those individuals (and all
plaintiffs' family members); lead counsel in a civil rights action brought by an individual named
Cy Green, Greene v. City of New York, et al., USDC, EDNY, CV 08-243 (RJD)(CLP), whose
liberty was obtained in a State court proceeding in which I represented him and whose wrongful
conviction was set aside after he had served 22Y2 years in prison; and lead or co-counsel in four
other substantial civil rights actions against a variety of governmental entities and individuals.
4. I am advised, through discussions with Mr. Meyerson and my review of his time
and expense records, of the First Amended Supplemental Complaint and ofMr. Meyerson's fee
request Declaration, about the nature and extent of the services he rendered in this case in order
to ultimately bring about what I view to be a successful result for his client.
5. I have known Mr. Meyerson since the mid-1970s, when he volunteered to assist
2
me and other attorneys during our representation of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter, whose New Jersey
State Court wrongful conviction I and several other attorneys were able to set aside after many
years of diligent efforts. See, e.g, Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533 (1985) (Sarokin, J.). Mr.
Meyerson and I became and remain close professional colleagues who have regularly exchanged
thoughts about legal issues and various of our cases. I know the very high quality of Mr.
Meyerson's work from the Carter case forward, including other cases ofhis that have come to my
attention. Many years ago we worked together as co-counsel in a civil rights action. Several
years ago I referred a civil rights action to Mr. Meyerson and again had a direct opportunity to
appreciate the quality of his legal work.
6. I understand that Mr. Meyerson is making an application to have his fees set at
$650 an hour in this case. I have regularly kept myself knowledgeable about fee application
issues in civil rights cases. I have read many decisions, articles and attorneys' submissions to
courts on the issues of what is an appropriate fee. My regular hourly rate is $690, which I believe
is in the mid-range, if not towards the lower end of the range, for lawyers of my experience and
competence in New York City. I believe that the rate requested by Mr. Meyerson is appropriately
comparable with rates charged and approved by courts in civil rights action for lawyers of
equivalent experience and competence. For example, my partner Jonathan Moore, who has been
practicing in the civil rights field for over thirty years, had his rate of $650 an hour upheld by
Justice Hellerstein in an August 6, 2010 Order (Long v. City of New York, USDC, SDNY 03 Civ
6099) regarding plaintiffs application for attorneys fees and costs.
7. Although my regular hourly rate is $690, I do charge various and sometimes lower
rates for various persons depending upon their circumstances and do a great deal of pro bono
3
unpaid or modestly compensated work. I know that Mr. Meyerson is of a similar philosophy and
experience. But when we have an appropriate case in which we have served our clients well and
there is a fee-shifting provision that allows us to be compensated at an appropriate substantial
rate, it is critical to the economic viability and continuation of practice as civil rights lawyers that
a court not reduce our hourly rate because of our willingness to serve some needy and deserving
clients for lesser rates.
8. I know from my direct experience with and from the outstanding reputation Mr.
Meyerson has throughout the civil rights bar- and, I believe, among Federal and State judges-
that he is one of the most diligent, well-qualified and able practitioners in the field. I trust that
the Court will consider Mr. Meyerson's requested rate of compensation to be appropriate.
Dated: New York, New York
March 29,2012
Myron Beldock
4
mbeldock@blhny.com
212.277.5820 tel
212.557.0565 fax
PARTNER
Myron Baldock graduated from Erasmus Hall High School in 1946, Hamilton
College in 1950 and Harvard Law School in 1958. He served in the U.S. Army
from 1951 to 1954 and as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of
New York from 1958 to 1960. After several years as an associate with a small
New York City firm and as a single practitioner, he brought together two
friends and former Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Elliot Hoffman and Larry Levine,
to form Baldock Levine & Hoffman in 1964. He is best described, by his own
definition, as an old-time general practitioner. He concentrates on trial and
appellate litigation, in state and federal courts, in defense of criminal charges
and in pursuing plaintiffs' civil rights actions based on police and prosecutorial
misconduct and employer and governmental discrimination. He regularly
consults and defends charges of professional discipline. He represents
plaintiffs and defendants in a wide variety of personal and business related
matters, working with others in the firm's various practice areas.
Carrying on the firm's original and continuing objective of successful practice
combined with public service, he has represented numerous persons who
have suffered from unfair treatment or unjust charges, frequently on a pro
bono basis. He has served as post-conviction counsel seeking new trials
and/or parole release in violent felony cases, predominantly homicides.
Spanning over four decades, some cases, involving George Whitmore, Rubin
"Hurricane" Carter, Darryl King, Albert Victory and Yusef Salaam, have been
widely publicized as well as the subject of books and films.
A relentless worker, Mr. Baldock still enjoys life's human comedies and
sometimes manages to break away to sing and play jazz drums.
PRACTICE AREAS
Civil Rights, Professional Responsibility and Legal Ethics, International Human Rights, Criminal Defense
EDUCATION
Hamilton College (B.A., 1950)
Maryland University School of Foreign Studies and Sorbo nne University (1950-51)
Harvard University (LL.B., 1958)
BAR ADMISSIONS
Admitted to bar, 1958, New York; 1960, U.S. District Court, Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and
U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; 1973, U.S. Supreme Court; 1981, U.S. District Court, Northern District of
New York; U.S. District Court, Western District of New York.
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
http://www.blhny.com/attorney.cfm/ID/15
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York, 1958-1960
Director and Vice President- Brotherhood-In-Action, Inc., 1972/1973-2006
Director, The Brookdale Revolving Fund, Inc., 1973-1976
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Member, Special Committee on Penology, 1974-1980; Member,
Committee on the Judiciary, 2000-2003; Member, Council on Criminal Justice, 2004-201 0)
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers;
New York Criminal Bar Association; Kings County Criminal Bar Association; National Lawyers Guild; New York
State Bar Association; New York County Lawyers Association; Brooklyn Bar Association.
REPRESENTATIVE CASES
People v. Wise, Richardson, McCray, Salaam & Santana, 194 Misc.2d 481, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Co. 2002)
(Newly discovered evidence results in dismissal of criminal charges against Yusef Salaam and other
defendants in "Central Park Jogger" case ten years after conviction).
Busch v. City of New York, eta/., 224 F.R.D. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (Section 1983 action against police officers
alleging excessive force in deadly shooting; new trial for plaintiff estate to prevent manifest injustice when jury
verdict against weight of evidence).
People v. Gurley, 197 A.D.2d 534, 602 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2nd Dept. 1993) (Previously undisclosed and newly
discovered police ballistics report warrants vacating murder conviction after over 22 years in prison).
Skibo v City of New York/Taylor v. City of New York, 109 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Granting extensive
discovery in two police misconduct civil rights actions - lAD procedure manual, internal evaluations of lAD
effectiveness and 150 civilian complaint reports in each of two precincts over five years; rejecting self critical
analysis and executive privilege claims).
U.S. v. Freeman, 498 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1974) (Reversing conviction after non-jury trial and holding that guilt for
conspiracy to import cocaine and for counts of importation, possession and distribution with intent to sell could
not be based on efforts to conceal several conspirators after conspiracy had miscarried).
State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 354 A.2d 627 (1976) (Reversing 1967 triple murder convictions on Brady grounds
due to suppression of evidence impeaching eyewitness testimony and prosecution's knowing use of false
testimony); State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 139, 449 A.2d 1280, 1309 (1981) (Four to three decision upholding 1977
second trial convictions); Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 5332 (D.C.N.J. 1985) (Sarokin, J.: Granting habeas
corpus writ and vacating 1977 conviction due to prosecution withholding material evidence and misrepresenting
result of polygraph testimony of the only testifying eyewitness and contention of racial motivation for shooting
death of Caucasian males by African Americans based on defendants' race without evidence of racial
animosity), affd. 826 F.2d 1288 (3rd Cir. 1987) (Due process Brady grounds sufficient, without considering
racial motivation prejudice issues).
King v. New York State Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1st Dept. 1993) (Denial of parole
improper where solely based on felony murder shooting victim being off-duty police officer and where parole
commissioner considered factors outside those statutorily authorized - including penal philosophy, historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and
consequences to society - in an attempt to determine appropriate penalty for murder; board should fairly
consider all relevant statutory factors and not re-sentence according to personal opinions).
http :1/www. blhny. com/ attorney .cfm/ID/15
U.S. ex ref. Whitmore v. Malcolm, 476 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1973) (Two to one decision affirming denial of habeas
corpus writ; dissent based on trial court failure to grant hearing to consider newly discovered eyewitness
evidence); (Rehearing en bane granted March 1, 1973 - parties to file briefs addressed to progress of Kings
County District Attorney investigation); (Order April 23, 1973 vacating order denying petition for habeas corpus
and dismissing appeal as moot); Whitmore v. City of New York, 80 A.D.2d 638, 436 N.Y.S. 2d 323 (2d Dept.
1981) (Upholding cause of action against police officers for misconduct and malicious prosecution and ruling
that 1973 dismissal of the charges on District Attorney's motion was a favorable determination of criminal
proceedings for purposes of civil action since it was based on discovery of "fresh evidence" which cast doubt
upon sufficiency and trustworthiness of trial evidence).
http://www.blhny.com/attomey.cfm/ID/15

Exhibit F
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
VERNON BRANCH,
PLAINTIFF
vs
THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
etc., et al.,
DEFENDANT
STATEOFNEWYORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
SS.:
11 Civ 3048 (JGK)(MHD)
AFFIRMATION OF
RICHARD D. EMERY IN
SUPPORT OF APPLICATION
OF JAMES I. MEYERSON
FORAN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES
RICHARD D. EMERY, an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Court of the
State of New York, affirms the following to be true under penalties of perjury:
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice law in and before this Court, among others,
and I submit this Affirmation in support in support of the Application of James I.
Meyerson for the award of attorney's fees and costs as an attorney for the prevailing
party Plaintiff in this litigation.
2. I was admitted to the Bar of the State ofNew York in 1971 and I have been
involved as a civil rights litigator for most all of my career as an attorney.
3. Since 1971, I have been an attorney litigating various civil rights matters and I am
familiar generally with the civil rights bar in New York City.
4. I attach hereto a copy of my resume which reflects my body of work over the
course of my professional career including my various professional affiliations over the
course of time.
5. I have known James I. Meyerson since 1978.
6. In the past and in the course of my career, I have regularly consulted with Mr.
Meyerson on civil rights matters, particularly on Section 1983 issues and, more
specifically, on matters related to police misconduct litigation.
7. With respect to the latter, Mr. Meyerson has been known and continues to be
known as an expert in the area and an innovator in the litigation of such cases.
8. In my opinion, Mr. Meyerson is one of the best, most dedicated civil rights/civil
liberties attorneys in New York.
9. Mr. Meyerson was litigating police misconduct cases even before it became a
specialized field and he is one of those attorneys who, because of his work, helped to
create police misconduct litigation as a specialized area of the law.
I 0. To my knowledge, Mr. Meyerson enjoys the reputation among the civil rights bar
as one of the leading advocates in Section I983 litigation, particularly in matters
involving police misconduct.
II. What is particularly impressive about Mr. Meyerson's body of work is that his
practice in the area of Section I983 litigation and in police misconduct litigation involves
not only a trial court level expertise but, as well, an appellate court expertise where Mr.
Meyerson has argued numerous Section I983 cases in many of the Circuit Courts of
Appeal throughout the country including many such cases in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. In addition, Mr. Meyerson has had actual experience in successfully arguing a
civil rights case before the United States Supreme Court concerning an issue related to
the award of fees to a successful plaintiff litigant, New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,
447 U.S. 54, I 00 S. Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723 (I980).
I2. In my judgment, Section I983 police misconduct litigation is complex and high
risk.
I3. The instant litigation is an example of police misconduct litigation that is complex
and high risk.
14. In my judgment Mr. Meyerson possesses sophistication and experience in the area
of police misconduct trial and appellate litigation that few attorneys have who practice in
the police misconduct area.
I5. By analogy, in the area of Section 1983 police misconduct litigation, Mr.
Meyerson's skills, judgment, and experience are equal to that of a senior partner in a
large commercial firm.
I6. Based on my understanding of the claims in this litigation, this is case which
reflects the necessity of the highest levels of skill to prepare, prosecute and achieve a
successful conclusion.
17. It is the exception, when a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, exclusive of fees and costs,
is tendered by the City in a six figure amount as was the case here.
2
18. I understand that Mr. Meyerson accepts these cases and has historically taken them
on based on a contingency and that he has never charged a client a specific fee in lieu of
contingency.
19. I understand that Mr. Meyerson is seeking a rate of$650.00 per hour for his
successful efforts and work in this litigation.
20. It is my judgment and opinion that the hourly rate which Mr. Meyerson is seeking
is a reasonable hourly rate for his time investment throughout the entire period of the
litigation. Based on what I know with respect to hourly rate fees, the rate which Mr.
Meyerson is seeking is reflective of the prevailing rates for persons of Mr. Meyerson's
background and experience and sophistication and expertise in the field of Section 1983
trial and appellate litigation and, within that field, the very specialized area of police
misconduct trial and appellate litigation, and that the rate which Mr. Meyerson is seeking
is fair and reasonable market rate for the services he provided in this case.
21. I understand, too, that Mr. Meyerson has represented that, over the course of the
pre-Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, he invested approximately 375 hours of work in the
litigation. I have reviewed his time records respecting such.
22. In my judgment, the 375 hours appear to be reasonable given the complexities of
the issues.
23. Finally, given the high risk of the case and the inherent complexities in bringing
such a case to a successful conclusion, I believe that in rare cases, such as this one,
consideration of a multiplier is appropriate to encourage others to become involved in the
vigorous representation of individuals where their constitutional and civil rights have
been placed in jeopardy by law enforcement officials.
DATED:
New York, New York
April18, 2012
3
Richard D. Emery, Partner
Mr. Emery is a founding partner of the finn of Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP.
His practice focuses on civil rights, election law, commercial litigation, intellectual
property, and entertainment. Mr. Emery enjoys a national reputation as a
litigator, representing clients at all levels, from the U.S. Supreme Court to federal and
state appellate and trial courts in New York, Washington, D.C., California, Washington
State, and others.
Prior to forming Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, Mr. Emery had his own firm and
was a partner at Lankenau Kovner & Bickford, where he successfully challenged the
structure of the New York City Board of Estimate under the one-person, one-vote
doctrine, resulting in the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous invalidation of the Board on
constitutional grounds. Before then he was a staff attorney at the New York Civil
Liberties Union, and director of the Institutional Legal Services Project in Washington
State, which represented persons held in juvenile, prison, and mental health facilities. He
.was a law clerk for the Honorable Gus J. Solomon of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon. Mr. Emery was a member of Governor Cuomo's Commission on
Integrity in Government and is a member of both the New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct and the Commission on Public Integrity. He has also taught at the New
York University and University of Washington schools of law.
Education
Columbia Law School, J.D., cum laude, 1970, Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar
Brown University, B.A., 1967
Admissions
U.S. Supreme Court; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, and Federal Circuits;
U.S. District Court, Southern and Eastern Districts of New York; U.S. District Court,
Eastern and Western Districts of Washington; New York; Washington
Memberships
New York State Commission on Government Integrity; New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct; National Police Accountability Project Advisory Board; Municipal Art
Society Law Committee; Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committees on
Election Law, Criminal Justice Operations, and Criminal Courts
Honors
Children's Rights Champion Award, 2008; New York Super Lawyer 2006 & 2007, The
Top Attorneys in Manhattan; Common Cause, I Love an Ethical New York Award,
October 2000; New York Magazine, Best Lawyers in New York, 1995; Park River
Democrats Public Service Award, 1989; New York State Bar Association, DavidS.
Michaels Memorial Award for Courageous Efforts in Promoting Integrity in the Criminal
Justice System, 1987
Representative Cases
Successfully represented a class of approximately 100,000 pretrial detainees who were
illegally strip searched in McBean, et al. v. The City of New York, et al.
Successfully represented the Public Advocate ofNew York to gain access to police
records in Green v. Safir.
Represented John McCain in his bid to gain access to the 2000 New York Republican
presidential primary ballot in Molinari v. Powers.
Preserved New York City candidates' four-to-one public financing matching funds in
New York City v. The Campaign Finance Board.
Represented the New York City Council in litigation to guarantee its approval of cable
. franchise renewals in City Council v. The Public Service Commission.
Obtained injunction to keep polling stations in nursing homes in Smith v. New York City
Board of Elections.
Represented a class of more than 60,000 misdemeanor detainees in a successful challenge
to New York City's strip search policy in Tyson v. City of New York.
Prevailed in a challenge allowing Steve Forbes to gain a place on the ballot for the New
York State presidential primary in Rockefeller v. Powers.
Successfully represented corporate officers in a securities fraud class action (jury trial to
verdict) in ICN v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Selected Publications
"Why the Civil Rights Laws Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of
Indemnification and a Proposed Solution," Fordham Urban Law Journal, December 2000
(with Ilann M. Maazel)
"Five Cases Follow Traditional Course," New York Law Journal, October 2, 2000 (with
Nina Morrison)
"The Verdict: Poor Training and Supervision," New York Times, February 26, 2000
"Dazzling Crime Statistics Come at a Price," New York Times, February 19, 1999
"Disorderly Conduct Statute and the First Amendment," New York Law Journal, October
20, 1997 (with Andrew G. Celli, Jr.)
"Four Ways to Clean Up the Police," New York Times, August 26, 1997
"Frank Askin, Defending Rights: A Life in Law and Politics," New York Law Journal,
June 13, 1997
"Adversary System: Cameras in the Courtroom after O.J.?," New York Times, October
18, 1995
"Weighted Voting," Touro Law Review 159, 1989
"In New York City, Power to the People," New York Times, May 6, 1989
"The Even Sadder New York Police Saga," New York Times, December 12, 1987
"End New York City's One-Party System," New York Times, September 19, 1987
"Giuliani's Unfair Tactics," New York Times, October 31, 1985
"Curbing New York's Police," New York Times, May 7, 1985
"Pointless Grand Jury Secrecy," New York Times, February 11, 1985
"Recast New York's Board of Estimate," New York Times, September 15, 1984
"Courts Can't Do It All, New York Times, July 16, 1983
The Rights of Mental Patients: An ACLU Handbook (New York: A von Books, 1978)
(with Bruce J. Ennis)

Exhibit G
Meyerson time and expenses for: Andrew Rosa, Gaby Day,
Mirsad Isufi, and Allen Rubin
Time:
Date Time Activity
Spent
(hours)
12/31/10 .5 Met with Jeffrey Rothman and referring
attorney to discuss case
03/05/11 2.5 Meeting With Andrew Rosa
03/05/11 1.5 Review of Rosa and other HLD Documents
03/06/11 5 Draft of Rosa Complaint and Related
Discovery Materials
03/06/11 .3 Email Communications with Andrew Rosa
03/06/11 .2 Telephone and Email Communication with
Gaby Day
03/06/11 .3 Email Communication with Jeffrey
Rothman
03/07/11 . 4 Telephone Communications and Email
Communications with Andrew Rosa
03/07/11 . 3 Email Communications with Jeffrey
Rothman
03/07/11 .4 Review of Rosa Documents
03/08/11 .4 Email Communications with Jeffrey
Rothman
03/08/11 1 Work on Draft of Rosa Complaint
03/10/11 1 Review of Search Warrant
Application/Search Warrant
03/10/11 .2 Email Communications With Jeffrey
Rothman
03/10/11 1.5 Work on Draft of Rosa Complaint
03/10/11 .5 Review of Document related to Arrests
03/11/11 3 Meeting With Gaby Day
03/11/11 .2 Email Communications with Gaby Day
Rothman
03/11/11 . 1 Email Communication with Andrew Rosa
03/11/11 4.5 Draft of Gaby Day Complaint and
related papers
03/12/11 . 3 Telephone and Email Communications
with Andrew Rosa
03/13/11 1.5 Work on Draft of Draft of Gaby Day
Complaint
03/13/11 .2
Email Communications with Jeffrey
Rothman
03/14/11 . 1
Rothman
03/15/11 .2 Email
Communication with Gaby Day and
Email Communications with Gaby Day
03/16/11 . 4
Rothman
03/16/11 .2
Telephone Communication with Gaby Day
03/17/11 2.5
Work on Drafts of Andrew Rosa and Gaby
Day Complaints
and Gaby Day
and Gaby Day
and Gaby Day
04/29/11 2.5 Work on Draft of Rosa and Day
Complaints
04/29/11 .3 Telephone Communication and Email
Communication with Jeffrey Rothman
04/30/11 . 1 Email Communication with Jeffrey
Rothman
05/01/11 . 1 Email Communication with Gaby Day
05/02/11 .2 Preparation of Statement of
Relatedness Day to Rosa
05/02/11 . 5 Letter Communications with Andrew Rosa
and Gaby Day regarding the filing of
the Complaint
05/02/11 . 1 Letter Communication to Process
Service
05/02/11 .2 Email Communications and discussion
with Jeffrey Rothman regarding the
filing of the Rosa and Day Complaints,
etc.
05/03/11 .2 ECF Communications respecting the
filing of the Rosa and Day Complaints
Rothman
05/13/11 . 1 ECF filing of Affidavits of Service in
Rosa and Day
05/23/11 . 1 Telephone and Email Communications
2
with Assistant Corporation
Counsel
Camiel Richards
06/02/11 .5
Draft of Rule 26 Voluntary
Disclosures
in Rosa and Day
06/02/11 . 1
Email Communication with Jeffrey
Rothman
06/03/11 . 1
Email Communications with
Jeffrey
Rothman
06/18/11 .5
Review of Rubin and Isufi
Complaints
06/18/11 .2
Email Communications with
Jeffrey
Rothman
06/18/11 . 1 Email Communication with Camiel
Richards
Richards
Rothman
06/20/11 . 1 Telephone Communication with Assistant
Corporation Counsel David Pollack
07/14/11 .2 Email Communications with Camiel
Richards
07/14/11 . 1 Letter Communication with Process
Service -re: Brian Conroy
07/14/11 . 3 Work on Rule 26 Voluntary Disclosures
in Rosa and Day
07/14/11 . 1 Telephone Communication with David
Pollack
Rothman
07/15/11 . 3 Telephone Communication and Email
Communications with Camiel Richards
07/16/11 . 1 Email Communication with David Pollack
Rothman
07/27/11 . 1 ECF Email respecting Affidavit of
Service on Conroy in Rosa and Day
Richards
08/04/11 . 1 Email Communication With Camiel
Richards and Davaid Pollack
Richards
08/04/11 . 1 Letter Communication with Process
Service respecting Braille service
3
08/04/11 . 1
Email Communications with David
Pollack
08/04/11 . 1
Telephone and Email Communications
with Process Service
08/08/11 . 1
ECF Email Communication respecting
filing of Affidavit of Service
08/26/11 . 1
Email Communication with Camiel
Richards and David Pollack
08/29/11 .2
Email Communications with Andrew Rosa
09/06/11 . 3
Telephone Communication with Gaby
Day
and Email Communication with Gaby Day
09/06/11 . 1
Email Communication with Camiel
09/06/11 . 1
Rothman
09/12/11 .2 Spoke with Jeffrey Rothman
09/14/11 .2 Email Communications with David
Pollack
Rothman
09/15/11 .2 Email Communication with Andrew Rosa
and Gaby Day
Rothman
09/20/11 . 1 Spoke with Jeffrey Rothman
and Camiel Richards
Rothman
Pollack
10/04/11 .2 Email Communication with David Pollack
10/11/11 .3 Telephone Communication with David
Pollack and Jeffrey Rothman
Pollack
Rothman
4
10/14/11 .1
Email Communication with David Pollack
10/17/11 .2
Letter Communication to Judge Sand
10/17/11 . 1
Email Communication with David Pollack
10/17/11 . 1
Spoke with Jeffrey Rothman
10/18/11 .5
Review of Answer in Gaby Day
10/18/11 . 1
Email Communication with David
Pollack
10/18/11 .2
Spoke with Jeffrey Rothman
10/24/11 . 1
Telephone Communication with David
Pollack
10/24/11 .2
Email Communications with David
Pollack
Pollack
Pollack
11/04/11 .2 Telephone and Email Communications
with David Pollack
11/04/11 1 Review of Rosa, Rubin, and Isufi
Answers
11/04/11 . 1 Letter Communication with David
Pollack
Rothman
11/11/11 . 1 Telephone Communication with Jose
Lopez in Judge Sand's chambers
11/11/11 .2 Email Communication with David Pollack
11/14/11 . 1 Telephone Communication with Jose
Lopez
11/16/11 . 1 Email Communication to Counsel
regarding the scheduling of conference
with Judge Sand
and Gabriel Day
12/01/11 .2 Telephone Communication with David
Pollack and Email Communication with
David Pollack and Camiel Richards
5
12/05/11 2.5
Review of Materials in advance of
Conference with Judge Sand
on December
6, 2011
12/06/11 . 8 Conference With Judge Sand and
discussion with Jeffrey Rothman
12/07/11 2.5
Review of Defendants Rule 26
Disclosures and Documents attached
thereto and Other related Documents
12/12/11 .2
Email Communications with Gaby Day
12/21/11 . 1
Telephone Communication with David
Pollack
Rothman
01/09/12 . 1 Email Communication with Counsel
Rothman
Rothman
Rothman
Rothman
03/09/12 .2 Email Communications and spoke with
Jeffrey Rothman
03/16/12 . 3 Email and spoke with Jeffrey Rothman
Rothman
and Gaby Day
Rothman
03/29/12 .3 Email Communication and spoke with
Jeffrey Rothman
04/05/12 .2 Email Communication with Gaby Day
Pollack
Jeffrey Rothman
Rothman
6
Rothman
Jeffrey Rothman
04/15/12 .2 Telephone Communication with Gaby Day
04/15/12 . 3 Telephone Communication with Jeffrey
Rothman
04/16/12 .2 Telephone Conference with Judge Sand
and counsel including David Hazan
04/16/12 .2 Telephone Communication with Jeffrey
Rothman and David Pollack
04/16/12 .2 Telephone Communication with Andrew
Rosa
04/16/12 .2 Telephone Communications with Jeffrey
Rothman
05/01/12 .1 Conference Telephone Communication
with Mr. Rothman and Mr. Pollack
05/01/12 .2 Telephone Communications with Mr.
Rothman and with Judge Sand's chambers
05/01/12 . 3 Letter Communication to Judge Sand
05/02/12 . 1 Email Communication with Mr. Day
05/09/12 . 1 Spoke with Mr. Rothman
05/10/12 1.0 Review of Materials From Mr. Pollack
Andrew Rosa
Gaby Day
05/12/12 1.5 Review of Defendants' Responses to the
Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests and
Previously transmitted documents
05/12/12 . 3 Email Communication with Mr. Pollack
05/14/12 . 1 Email Communication with Mr. Rothman
05/15/12 .2 Telephone Communications with Mr.
Rothman
64.2
64.2 hours X $650 per hour= $41,730 in Meyerson fees
7
Expenses:
05/02/11 $350.00 Filing Fee for Andrew Rosa
05/02/11 $350.00 Filing Fee for Gaby Day
05/02/11 $115.84 Hard Copy Printing-Reproduction Costs
in Rosa and Day
05/12/11 $720.00 Presidential Process Service-Service
Costs in Andrew Rosa
Costs in Gaby Day
Costs in Gaby Day
Costs in Andrew Rosa/Gaby Day
=
$2175.84
in
Meyerson
expenses
8

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