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Ottoman Podillja: The Eyalet of Kam''janec', 1672-1699 Author(s): DARIUSZ KOODZIEJCZYK Reviewed work(s): Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1/2 (June 1992), pp. 87-101 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036452 . Accessed: 08/08/2012 11:53
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Ottoman Podillja:The EyaletofKam"janee', 1672-1699

DARIUSZ KOLODZIEJCZYK

In October 1672 the Ottomandragoman Panaioti congratulatedthe French ambassador in Istanbul on the fortunate conjuction thatprovided two great monarchs Mehmed IV and Louis XIV - withtheirrespectivesuccesses in Thanks to Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel, Pan Poland and the Netherlands.1 the historyof the loss of KanVjanec'-PodilVkyi (Turkish, Wotodyjowski, Kamanie; Polish, Kamieniec Podolski) to the Ottomanshas become partof the Poland's popular history. Unfortunately, later period has been comand the stereotypesabout the "barbarian night" survive pletely neglected even today. And, in spite of Halil Inalck's assertionsthatthe Black Sea and of Cossack question is basic to the understanding seventeenth-century Ottoman history,2 littlehas been done fromthe Turkishside to clear up this very chapterof Ahmed Kprl's3 foreignpolicy. To begin with,we should consider the economic, demographic,and political factorsthatmighthave had some bearing on the Ottomandecision to attackthe Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: Economy: Contraryto common views, Podillja was not a rich province, at least not duringthe second half of the seventeenth century.All the riversin flowed in the "wrong" direction toward the Black Sea. Since the Podillja fifteenth the century economy of the Polish-LithuanianCommonwealthhad been tied to the export of cereals and forestproducts to Western Europe. Michael Postan has estimatedthatthe land transport costs between the Midlands and London may have been higher than the water transportcosts between Warsaw and London.4 This cheap transportwas possible only because of the great Polish riversthatflowed north.The Italian projects for exportingUkrainian products throughthe Black Sea had already failed in
1 A. Galland, Journal. .pendant sjour Constantinople . son (1672-1673), ed. Ch. Schefer, vol. 1 (Paris,1881),p. 225. 2 See H. Inalck, "The Heyday and Declineof theOttoman in HisEmpire," TheCambridge 1970),p. 350. tory Islam,vol. 1A (Cambridge, of 3 The householdof Mehmed Kprlhad remainedin power since 1656. Its founder, was in vizierbyhis son,FazflAhmed(1661- 1676),and Kpriil, succeeded thepostof grand then hisprotg son-in-law, and KaraMustafa (1676- 1683). by 4 M. Postan, "The Tradeof MedievalEurope:The North," TheCambridge in Economic Hisin tory Europe,vol. 2, Trade and Industry theMiddleAges, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, of 1987), p. 196.

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the sixteenthcentury.Traditionally,only the Ottomans were accused of blocking these attempts. Sixty years ago, however, Janusz Pajewski discovered a report from a Polish Senate meeting at which it had been decided not to open the Dniester trade because of the fear thatthis would show the Turkishgalleys the way to Poland; it was more prudentto leave the Ukrainianborderlandundeveloped than to temptthe Ottomans.5These fearsare betterunderstoodif we rememberthatthe Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth,witha population threetimes smaller,had a state budget about timessmallerthanthatof the OttomanEmpire.6 thirty Demography: The same reasons that led to the underdevelopmentof Ukraine under Poland-Lithuania could have enabled its development as a base withinthe OttomanBlack Sea systemforprovisioningConstantinople. For the Ottomansto achieve thislevel of developmentin the area, however, were necessary. From the end of the intensivecolonization and settlement sixteenthcentury,the demographic pressures withinthe Ottoman Empire itselfdeclined sharply.It was unlikelythatthe Ottomans,having failed to colonize the Hungarianplain and the shores of the Black Sea in Bucak and Yedisan, would succeed in colonizing even more remotePodillja. Politics: The third,political, factor should have prevented the Ottomans fromattackingthe Commonwealth in 1672. The attack seeminglycontradicted the Ottomans' traditionalnorthern policy of the sixteenth,seventeenth,and eighteenthcenturies. The main concern of this policy was to preserve equilibrium between the main rivals, Poland-Lithuania and by Muscovy. In the sixteenthcenturya balance was maintainedindirectly reason (slaves and cattle) to the Crimean Tatars. The Tatars had sufficient but raid bothneighboring territories, it was saferto do so underthe Ottoman most of the Tatar raids half of the sixteenthcentury, umbrella. In the first Poland-Lithuania. During the were directed against an actually stronger it second half of thatcentury, was Ivan the Terriblewho was considered the and Ottomanrelationswith Poland were very good in that enemy, primary period. In 1571, the year of the Battle of Lepanto, Poland sold large amounts of tin a strategic material to the Ottomans. In 1579, when
5 "Okoto to na panyRadyNasze, ze gdymy bylipodalimidzy pamitamy, portu Dniestrze nan si ich wielebytoktorzy zezwalali,ale jak tez nie mniejbylo,ktorym zgotanie podobal. ze King Zygmunt ukazuje";from Przeto, si tymsposobemTurkom drogado ziem naszych August's letterto Piotr Zborowski,7 December 1567, in J. Pajewski, "Legacja Piotra za stosunkow do do polsko-tureckich Zborowskiego Turcjiw 1568 roku.Materiafy historii 12 Rocznik Orientalistyczny(1936): 21. Augusta," Zygmunta panowania b I Osmanskiew AVI in "Imperium give some rough estimations D. Kotodziejczyk, i gospodarczym," 78, wieku kilkauwago potencjale PrzeglqdHistoryczny demograficznym no. 3 (1987): 375-94.

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William Harborne succeeded in acquiring the firstEnglish capitulations with the Ottomans, it was stated that the English merchantswould then enjoy the same privilegesas the French,Venetian,and Polish subjects.7 This policy of equilibrium lasted into the seventeenthcentury.Succesover Muscovy in 1619 and 1632 were folsive Polish-Lithuaniantriumphs lowed immediatelyby two Ottomanattacksagainst the Commonwealth in 1621 (Sultan Osman's Xotyn campaign) and in 1633 (led by Abaza Paa). In 1657 the Tatars were sent, this time to help weaken Poland-Lithuania the against the coalition of Sweden, Brandenburg, Cossack Hetmanate,and Transylvania. In 1667, afterthe cataclysms of Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprisingand the wars against Sweden, Russia, and Transylvania,the Commonwealth was forced to cede Smolensk and a great part of Eastern Ukraine, including Kiev, to Russia. Polish historiansconsider this date a turning point in the relations between the two states. Between 1667 and 1795, when the Polish noble state was liquidated, the border moved only westward. Given these circumstances, an Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth could only Russia. strengthen

* *
As we have seen, neithereconomic, nor demographic,nor political reasons can account forthe war of 1672. This war was, in addition,very unpopular among the Ottoman soldiers. Poland was considered a remote and cold country;it did not offergreat spoils and could not even feed the invading army. The road throughthe Balkans and Moldavia was long and exhausting. Poor systems of communicationexcluded any greaterOttoman territorial gain in Eastern Europe. Paul Kennedy's termof "strategicaloverextension"8is applicable not only to the Hungarian and Persian limitationson Ottomangrowth, also to the Polish-Ukrainianlimitations. but It was not accidental that almost all the Turkish-Polish truces were signed at the end of October. The Turks preferredto be home by ruz-i Kasi'm (5 November), the day when peasants paid the second installment of the timar and other taxes. This was also the end of the season for trade traffic the Black Sea. If we consider thatone monthwas necessary for on assembling troops, at least one month was needed to reach the Polish border,and at least one monthmore to return home, the time available for
7 S. A. Skilliter, William Harborne and theTradewith 1578-1582: A Documentary Turkey Relations (London,1977),p. 50. Study theFirstAnglo-Ottoman of 8 P. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: EconomicChange and Military Kennedy, 1500 to2000 (New York,1987),p.l 1. Conflict from

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effective campaigningwas verylimited. In spite of these conditions,Ahmed Kprl, one of the greatestOttoman statesmen,decided to move against Poland. According to his letterto factorleading the Crown deputychancellor JdrzejOlszowski, the primary to the war was the relationshipwith the Zaporozhian Cossacks and their hetmn Petro DoroSenko, to whom the Ottomans had granted protection against the Polish king a few years earlier.9If we accept this explanation not as a pretextbut as a real cause for the war, a further question arises: did the Ottomans involve themselves in supportingsuch an unstable Why element as the Cossacks, whom theythemselveshad many reasons to hate and destroy? From the "classical" point of view, the Cossack raids were considered a just revenge made by a desperate Ukrainian population in reaction to the Tatar raids. The Cossack "revenges," however, were usually directed not against the Tatars but against the rich Turkish towns and villages on the sacked Ukrainian towns and vilBlack Sea. Whereas the Tatars primarily thatwere of lesser economic importancefor the Commonwealth,the lages Cossacks struckat the core of the Ottoman Empire. Narrativesources and Victor Ostapchuk's recentresearchon kadi courtregisters (sicils) fromTrebizond and skdar give evidence of the disastrouseffectsof Cossack raids The importanceof these raids was also strategic. on the Black Sea towns.10 The Venetian Bailo Giacomo Quirini wrote in 1676 that "da questo mar Nero dipende la difensae la conservationedel mar Bianco," citinginstances when the Ottomanswere forcedto send galleys against the Cossacks on the Black Sea thatcould thennot be used against the Venetians in the Mediterranean.11 Cossack raidinghad become more a century, By the end of the sixteenth than a temporary activity.Polish control in Ukraine was very professional it weak. AfterXmel'nyc'kyj's uprising, seemed obvious thatPoland was no longer able to suppressthe Cossacks. It was thenthatthe Ottomansseem to have made theirdesperate decision to stop the Cossack attacks,even at the weakeningthe Compolicy and further expense of breakingtheirtraditional While the direct destructionof the Cossacks monwealthvis--vis Russia.
9 Quotedin thechronicle Silahdar of 1928],vol. 1,pp. 569-72); a [Istanbul, (Silahdartarihi GtwneAkt Dawnych is Polish translation in the Archiwum copy of the contemporary AR, dz. II, ks. 22, pp. 819-21. AGAD), Warsaw, (hereafter 10 V. of "The Effect theCossack Naval Raids on theMuslimand Non-Muslim Ostapchuk, Harin Studies, Black Sea," paperreadat theSeminar Ukrainian of theOttoman Populations 12 vardUniversity, March1992. 1x Le Relazionidegli statiEuropeiletteal senatodagli ambasciatori nel Veneziani secolo series5, Turchia, 2 (Venice,1871),p. 168. ed. pt. decimosettimo, N. BarozziandG. Berchet,

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appeared unlikely, offeringthem Ottoman protection and thus directing did theirattacksnorthward seem a possible solution. Many of the Cossacks and Ukrainianpeasants greetedthe Ottomanswith of years of wars and the recentpartition Ukraine hope followingthe twenty between Poland and Russia. This response is mentioned in the Ottoman chroniclesof Haci Ali and Silahdar, as well as in Polish sources.12The typithe Orthodox Ukrainian peasants against cal Ottomanpolicy of supporting the Catholic Polish nobilityand the extension of the millet policy toward Armenian and Jewishmerchantsmeant thatonly the Polish Catholic communitycould be considered totally opposed to the new rulers. And even fromamong thatgroup therewere some poturczecyP To control the Cossacks, however, an active Ottoman presence a ruled directlyfromIstanbul was necessary. As early as 1670, stronghold the Polish envoy warned the king that the Turks wanted to capture Kam "janee'. That Kam "janee' was a main strategictargetof the war can be deduced fromthe activity or, rather,inactivity of the Ottoman army after it seized the fortressin August 1672: the Ottomans seemed well satisfiedwiththisconquest. The immense strategicimportanceof Kam "janee' in securing Ottoman rule over Cossack Ukraine and Moldavia is evident from its geographic location. According to Metin Kunt, a parallel role was played by the new eyalets (provinces) of Yanova (Romanian, Ineu) and Varad (Romanian, Oradea) in relation to Transylvania.14In times of crisis, and given the unstableallegiance of the threeDanubian principalities, such bulwarkswere indispensable. In this context the strategicimportance of seizing Kosice (Kassau), which in fact ensued a few years later, is also evident. Seizing of Podillja enabled the strengthening control over the Crimean Khanate. Two major Tatar routesto the Commonwealth,the Wotoski(Turkish,Eflak) and theKuczmaski (Turkish,Gcmen yolu), ran across thisprovince. In additionto these strategic reasons, two otherclassical explanationsfor the Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth should be noted: the use of continualcampaigns in maintaining necessary discipline in the armyand the eagerness of Sultan Mehmed IV (who had never taken part personallyin a
12 Haci Ali, Fethname-i Lala Ismail 304, fol. 101a; Kamanie,Sleymaniye Ktpkanesi, Silahdartarihi, vol. 1, p. 610; compare venuta dalla Cortedi Polonia" "Copia di relatione di male la solta nobilte bene la genterostica" in J. [the Turks]"dichiaratosi trattare do Woliski, do 1672-1676," Studiai Materiaty "Materialy dziejw wojnypolsko-tureckiej Historii 10, Wojskowosci pt. 1 (1964): 260. 13 Polish, a whohas "becomea Turk"(i.e.,accepted poturczeniec: person Islam). 14 M. Kunt, "17. yiizyilda Osmanli iizerine yomm," Bogazii Universibir in kuzey politikasi
tesi Dergisi, Beseri Bilimler-Humanities4-5 (1976- 1977): 111-16.

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campaign) to become a Muslim ghazi at the expense of a weak neighbor. The Commonwealthwas completelyunpreparedforthe war. Great Hetman Jan Sobieski, head of the "French faction,"was in sharp conflictwith the pro-HabsburgKing Michat. The hetmn warned of war and asked for money to raise an army,but his opponentsclaimed thatsuch an armycould the overthrow king and thatthe Turkishthreatwas being used as a pretext. It was believed thatthe few Tatar captives the hetmnsent to Warsaw were fromLviv. The commonlyheld opinin factdisguised Armenianmerchants ion was that"the Turks will arriveto sell soap, raisins,and carpets as they 's do every year"; the danger of war was merely the "hetmn imagina-

tion."15 situatedfortress, A remarkably Kam"janec'-PodilVkyj was considered to be a main bulwark against "barbarism" and was in the sixteenth century compared to La Valetta in Malta. The city was surroundedby the deep gorge of the riverSmotryand had verticalgranitewalls. Between the city and the castle a moat was built witha bridge over it. A hydrotechnical system raised the level of water in the gorge. At the beginningof the seventeenthcentury,the Dutch Hornwerk was added (the Poles called it Nowy Zamek}**and the Turks, tabye-i kebir11). However, the fortressthat had been impenetrablein the sixteenth centurywas no longer unconquerable in the epoch of Vauban; the Ottoman army, with its modern artilleryand assisted by French renegade specialists, was able to seize the castle, which was situatedhigherthanthe city. The Ottoman army departed from Edirne on 4 June and reached ' nine days of heavy bombardKam "janee on 18 August.18Aftersuffering On mentand the loss of the Hornwerk,the Poles surrendered. the following 2 September, Mehmed IV celebrated the cuma namaz19 in the Friday, cathedral.He appointeda governor(beylerbeyi)of the new province former of and a judge (kadi) and orderedthe establishment threepious foundations (vakfs). The viziers Ahmed Kprl and Musahib Mustafa, the future grandvizier Kara Mustafa,and the chief preacherVani Efendi followed the sultan's example. Seven churches were converted to mosques and two
15 See "RelacyaKamiecawzietego w polskim przezTurkw roku1672 opisanawierszem in przez Stanisiawa Makowieckiegoz Wielkiego Lukoszyna,stolnikalatyczewskiego," Collection), sygn.168/199. AGAD, Sucha(Branicki Family 16 Literally, New Castle. 1' Great bastion. 18 For moredetailed see book,Ejalet and bibliography, myforthcoming chronology further Nauna 1672-1699. Turcy Podolu (to be published Pastwowe kamieniecki Wydawnictwo by kowe). 19 Friday prayers.

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the schools and a high school20were founded. According to Polish reports, Turks registeredall propertyin Kam "janee'. In this register,which survives in the Istanbul archives,several names of citizens of Kam "janee* can be found: forinstance,the bishop Wawrzyniec Lanckoronskiappears in the registeras "Lankoronki papas-i kebir." The Christianswho remained in The workshops,shops, and houses of Christhe cityretainedtheirproperty. tians who leftthe city withthe Polish soldiers were sold to the new Muslim settlers.21 military According to reports of Polish spies, only Poles and a number of Armeniansremained loyal to the formersovereign. Jews, who by thenhad been excluded from sharing in city rights,were now allowed to settle in Kam "janee'. De la Magdeleine, a French captive and interpreter the in recordeda storythatcharacterizedthe internalclashes in the Turkishcamp, city.Since all the Catholic churcheswere convertedintomosques, the Poles remainingin Kam "janee' were given an Orthodox church. The following day, a delegation of the Ukrainian Orthodoxpopulation asked the Turks to thangive it to the Poles.22 keep dogs in the churchrather Under the terms of the Treaty of Bua (Polish, Buczacz), signed 18 October 1672, the province of Podillja was ceded to the Ottoman Empire. The Commonwealth agreed to pay a yearly tribute. The Cossack Hetmanate of DoroSenko retainedits autonomyunder Ottoman protection. The Ottomans tried to maintaingood relations with the Ukrainian hetmn and even ceded to him the important Podilljan city of Mohyliv as a life tenure.This did not preventrelationsfromsouringin the followingyears. The defeat of 1672 prompteda temporary general reconciliationof factions withinPoland. The diet rejected the Bua treaty and voted new taxes. The army was increased to over fifty and Sobieski was able to thousand, defeatthe serasker HiiseyinPaa at Xotyn(Polish, Chocim; Turkish,Hotin) in November 1673- a victorythatbroughthim the Polish crown afterKing Michal's death. Sobieski was one of the few Polish statesmento realize both the importance of a Baltic policy and the threatfromHohenzollern Prussia, a former Polish tributary that had gained independence in 1657. It is, therefore, ironic that this man spent almost his entirereign in war against the Ottomans.
20 In an Ottoman we a to register find eyh'l-kurra, title applicable a lowermedres professor; see Istanbul, BA), MaliyedenMiidevver (hereafter Babakanlk Arivi(hereafter MM) 4559,p. 4 21 BA, MM 709 passim. " C de la Le ottoman avec unsuccinct rcit tout qui c estpass de de ce Magdeleine, Miroir considerable la des pendant guerre TurcsenPologne, jusqu'en 1676 (Basle, 1677),p. 10.

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Afterthreeyears of successive campaigns with no results,the armistice at Zuravno was signed in October 1676. It is not surprising thatamong the were the Moldavian hospodar Duca and the Crimean khan. intermediaries Duca wanted to throwoffthe burdenof provisioningKam "janee', and the khan was furiousthatthe Ottomans had succeeded in protecting theirnew the Tatars more efficiently than the Poles had done. Both subjects against Duca and the khan, as well as the serasker eytan Ibrahim Paa, led the Poles to believe thattheirambassador in Istanbul would obtain much better peace conditionsforthemthanhad been providedin the Bua treaty. Sobieski hoped that,after signing the new treaty,the Commonwealth as would attack Prussia-Brandenburg, part of a secret alliance with Louis XIV. Contraryto expectations, however, the mission of the palatine Jan The new treaty was in fact a Gniski in Istanbulproved to be verydifficult. of confirmation Buca, with the exemptionof the tributeknown as pike. Only two small fortressesin Right-Bank Ukraine Bila Cerkva (Polish, Biala Cerkiew) and Pavolo - were left in Polish hands. When Gniski returnedto Poland in 1678, it was too late to attack Prussia. In the same year the treatyat Nijmegen was signed, and Louis XIV was no longer in interested an alliance withPoland. The crude mannersof the new grand vizier Kara Mustafa toward Euroof pean envoys are well known and his treatment Gniski was long rememwas accepted by the Diet, but the sense bered in Poland.23The peace treaty were not erased. The possibilityof Ottoof threat and feelingof humiliation man occupation may appear to us today to have been unlikely, but the Poles felt surrounded.The new Ottoman border was seventeenth-century only one hundredkilometersfromLviv, and less thantwo hundredkilometersfromCracow. There was anotherfactorin Polish internal policy which, with Catholic propaganda, forcedthe king to join the Habsburgs combined in 1683: nobles fromthe lost territories preservedtheirprovincialdiets and their seats in the Diet; with their famous rightof veto, these men could paralyze every legislative or fiscal decision. Every diet held in the second half of the seventeenth centurybegan with a reassurance thatthe so-called exulanteswould regaintheirprovinces. In the nineteenthcentury,after the partitions,some Polish historians began to treat the victory of Vienna as a great mistake. Some of them assertedthatit would have been betterto help the Turks seize Vienna rather than defend it. The recentworks of Zbigniew Wjcik, the foremostexpert
23 Gniriski's the from missionwas read to the Diet in 1679. It has been published, report in witha diaryand collectionof letters, F. Putaski,Zrdia do poselstwaJana together w do cheiminskiego Turcyi latach1677-1678 (Warsaw,1907). wojewody Gninskiego

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on Sobieski's times,prove thatall externaland internalfactorsled the Polish king to Vienna in 1683. He simplyhad no otherchoice.24 Following the impressive victoryof the German Empire and the Commonwealthin 1683, the Poles were still unable to regain Kam "janee* until the Karlowitz treatyseventeen years later. The reasons usually given to and artillery and the explain this delay are the shortageof Polish infantry between the king and the new hetmn,Stanislaw Jabtonowski.At friction was the veryeffectiveOttoleast two otherfactorsmustbe added. The first man system of provisioningand the second the heroism of the besieged. Every year, in spite of a Polish blockade, convoys of hundredsof carts and oxen, protectedby Turkish soldiers, were sent fromSilistra,Nikopil', and Bender25to Kam "janee'. In the later period, this task fell mainly to the Tatars and Moldavians. In a 1686 letterto the grand vizier, the governorof Kam "janee', Hseyin Bonak, reportedthateven during Ramadan, every work by torchlight.26 night after ifiar, the soldiers continued fortification Anothersource reportsthatpeople often starved,the corpses of horses lay on the streets,and in the winterTurkish soldiers burned wooden roofs to warm themselves.27 There is, however,anotherproblem to raise. Afterthe Swedish wars, the Polish infantry and artillerywere not as ineffectiveas has often been assumed. In spite of this, Sobieski never attempted an assault on Kam "janee'. According to his plans, the Polish army should firstseize Moldavia and thenforce the starvinggarrisonof Kam "janee' to surrender. From a strategicpoint of view, it seems obvious thatattempting secure to Polish rule in Moldavia, withthe Ottomansstill in controlof the fortress at the rear,was hazardous at best. But it was not the strategy which prevailed. Sobieski's ide fixewas to secure the throneforhis son Jakub.In the Commonwealth,where the nobilityconsidered a hereditary monarchythe beginof ning of absolution dominium,the fulfillment such a plan would prove difficult. According to the king's plans, Moldavia would become a small hereditaryprincipalityof the Sobieski family. No noble would commit fundsforsuch a plan; but,as long as Kam "janee' was not reconquered,the king could be sure thatthe Diet would vote taxes forthe Turkishwar. This
24 For thePolishinternal external and see Z. time, especially Wjcik,Rzeczpoliciesof that pospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674-1679 (Wroclaw, 1976), and idem, Jan Sobieski 1629-1696 (Warsaw,1983). 25 Present-day Bendery. 26 ta' Pastwowe(Cracow), Defter-i masarifat-i mirt,in the WojewodzkieArchiwum Oddzialna Wawelu, Archiwum teki Podhoreckie, A. Potockiego, pudto14,teka4. 11 Letter from z Pamietniki czaswJanaSobieskiego. Lviv,27 January 1695,in K. Sarnecki, Diariuszi relacjez lat 1691-1696, ed. J.Woliski (Wroclaw, 1958),p. 367.

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is not to say thatSobieski did not want to recaptureKam'.'janee'; he was, much more concernedwithcapturingMoldavia. however,certainly In sum, for nineteenof the twenty-seven years of theirrule in Podillja, and of the Ottomanswere confinedto the blockaded fortress, the beylerbeyi was in fact no more than the commander of the garrison in Podillja Kam "janee'. Only between the Treaty of Bua in 1672 and the defeat of Hiisayin Paa at Xotyn in 1673 and between the Treatyof Zuravno in 1676 of and the establishment the alliance in Vienna in 1683 can we speak of a eyalet. normallyfunctioning

* *
strikesone upon looking at the list of Kam "janee' beylerbeyis What first the charton pp. 100-101) is thatthe professionof Ottomanamir was (see not very safe- at least not duringthe great war. Most of the amirs died at the hands of others.Usually transferred from and to the neighboringEurosooner or later theywere also moved to the otherparts of pean provinces, of thisthree-continental empire. Because the average appointment a beylerwas less then two years, it was probably considered beyi at Kam "janee' neitheran advance nor a demotion. However, duringthe last ten years we can see the depreciation of this post. For Ahmed, the ninth beylerbeyi, Kam "janee' was probablyhis first post. He must also have been important inexperienced,provokingthe riotin which he was killed by the soldiers (on the otherhand, it probablydid not take much to provoke a riotin a starving garrison). Kahraman Paa, the man appointed to succeed Ahmed, does not fitthe scheme at all. He remained ten years in the post, and then, after to Kam "janee' was returned Poland, he was appointedas only a sancakbeyi of Anatolian Nigde. The chronicles of Defterdar and Raid call him a even statesthathe was memberof the Kam "janee' garrison;a Polish report confirmedby the Porte. Silahdar elected fromamong the riotersand later defineshim as a relativeof the khan,which is also probable, given the good relationsbetween Istanbul and Bahesaray in the 1690s and the Crimean in participation provisioningKam "janee'.28 The average numberof soldiers in Kam "janee' exceeded six thousand; of these,threethousandwere Yenieriyan-i Dergah-i Ali29(the full name of
28

at, Hamidiye Ktphanesi, l-Vekayi Sleymaniye Compare:MehmedEfendi,Zbdet' 949, fol. 180a- 180b; Tarih-iRaid Efendi,vol. 1, fol. 151b; Silahdar tarihi,vol. 2, pp. dated11 March1689,in "Kopiariusz to 's korespondencji 410-12; Sobieski letter J.Dowmont, k. AGAD, AKW,Dz. tur., 78, t.483, no. 808,p. 32. krlewskiej," 29 Janissaries thesultan'scourt. instance, 1678 thegarrison of consisted 2,782 cenin For of (BA, 283 tral (cebeci), and 2,055 local soldiers (topu),261 armorers janissaries, artillerymen (compare D.BM 343; BA, MM 3113). To this shouldbe added over 500 r/mar-holders

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themfromthe local troops). With more the centraljanissaries, to distinguish than two hundred guns, Kam' 'janec' was among the largest and most of important the Ottoman fortresses Baghdad, Buda, Belgrade, and Candia in Crete. The othergarrisonsin Podillja- in Bar, Medzybiz, Jazlovec', and Cortkiv barelyexceeded one hundredsoldiers each. OttomanproThe eyalet of Kam "janee', like otherseventeenth-century vinces (Crete, Varad, Yanova, and Uyvar) was much smaller than the classical sixteenth-century Ottoman province. In all the new, late seventeenthmentionedabove, the Ottomanstriedto introducethe classieyalets century cal landholding(timar) system a systemthathad already been abandoned in the centralprovinces. These efforts should perhaps be considered within the the contextof Kprl's policy of strengthening state under the motto of returning to the golden age of Sultan Suleyman. it The main task facing the Ottoman bureaucracy in the newly conquered was to registerall taxpayersand sources of income. The first such territory -i mufassal) for Podillja was prepared probably in 1672 but register(defter is not extant.It is mentionedin Polish reportsand in the laterTurkishregisthis ter.The war interrupted first survey. In 1680, only after the new treaty (at Zuravno) was confirmed,the former defterdar (treasurer), Ahmed Paa, was appointed as the new Kam "janee' beylerbeyiand given the task of settingthe new boundaries withthe Polish commissioners.Both detailed Polish and Turkishreportson thisaction exist.30 After setting the borders, the new mufassal register was prepared (between the autumn of 1680 and the spring of 1681). The eyalet was divided into four sancaks (sub-provinces) and nineteennahiyes (districts). The central sancak of Kam "janee' comprised the valleys of the most rivers the Dniester, Smotryc,and Zbruc. The three other sanimportant caks of Bar, Jazlovec', and Medzybiz were much smaller. The sole kadi resided in Kam "janee'.

Archiwum 1682,Poznan,Wojewdzkie Paristwowe, Defter-i ruzname, 2). sygn. 30 The Turkish ms (Cracow), 609, no. 21, fols.81-85 copyis in theBiblioteka Czartoryskich in (see below) on pp. 378-83; Polish (pp. 159-68), and is also registered Defter-i mufassal can in k. and reports be found AGAD, AKW, Dz. tur., 77, t. 479, no. 803 (detailedrelation), Biblioteka Teka of 178,pp. 187-96 (copyoftheofficial Czartoryskich, Naruszewicza protocol See do delimitation). also [J.Lelewel],Materiaiy dziejw (Poznan,1847),pp. 165-67 polskich in of a (thetextof another copy,burned 1944); and thememoirs FlorianDrobyszTuszyriski, nobleman-soldier to Polishcommissioners, Dwa pamietnikiXVII wieku. . , in z . assigned escort ed. A. Przybo (Wroclaw, 1954),p. 66.

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ConsideringHeath Lowry's skepticismabout the usefulnessof defiersas assai is far demographic sources,31close examination of the Podilljan muf from discouraging. Whereas the Polish inventoriesand poll-tax registers fromthe sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesmentionedfewer than seven hundred settlementsin Podillja, the defter-i mufassal lists over eight hundred even more than on the best maps from the nineteenthcentury. were Anotherpoint to note is that almost 70 percent of these settlements deserted{kali ez reayet). The populationof Podillja was estimatedat 96,000 in by the end of the sixteenthcentury;32 1662, afterXmel'nyc'kyj's uprisit was only 55,OOO;33 and, according to the mufassal,in 1680 the popuing, lation,excluding the soldiers of the garrison,did not exceed 40,000.34 The Commonwealth was catastrophicdepopulation in the seventeenth-century extremein Podillja. In addition to the Cossack uprisings,Tatar particularly and the robberies,plagues, and climatic changes raids, Polish pacifications, global crisis, the Ottomans usually linked with the seventeenth-century their part in depopulating that particular province. They cannot, played however,be held solely responsible,as has been done before. On the conto the trary, Ottomansmade some effort resettlethe province,especially the Dniesterregion (Podnistrov"ja; Polish, Podniestrze). results. In the springof Their efforts, however, did not bring sufficient before the new war, the beylerbeyiof Kam "janee', who already 1683, just enjoyed extraincome (arpalk) fromthe Bulgarian sancak of Nikopol', was given, in addition,a yearly salary (salariye) fromthe Anatolian sancak of Bolu, because the peasants in his has domain in Podillja had not yet

returned (reaya heniizyerlerinegelmedi).35 According to the Ottomanprovincial budget drawn up in 1681, thirteen for million ake were spent yearlyin Kam "janee', primarily soldiers' pay Of this amount, less than 3 percent was collected in Podillja (mevacib).

31 See H. Lowry, as Defterleri a SourceforSocial and EconomicHisTahrir "The Ottoman paper preparedfor the FourthInternational unpublished tory:Pitfallsand Limitations," 4-8 August1986. Social andEconomic on Munich, History, Congress Turkish 32 A. Jabtonowski, vol. 8, Polska XVI wiekupod wzgledem geograficzno-statystycznym, i Ziemie Ruskie, Woiy Podle,Zrodladziejowe,19 (Warsaw,1889),pp. 12,62, 73. 33 AGAD, ASK, oddz. I, sygn. 71, Pogiowne generalne(Poll-taxregister from1662); see of On estimations. thegeneral author's depopulation Podillja in thatperiod, M. Krykun, PodilVkohovojevodstva misti sil Ukrajiny istorii "Vailive dferelo vyvennja (Lustracija dlja Arxivnoho biuleter URSR, 1963, no. 2/3,pp. 1665 r.),"Naukovo-informacijnyi upravlinnja 23-24. 34 BA, no. Tapu Tahrir, 805. 35 BA, Ali Emiri,IV. Mehmed, no. 1659 (beratissuedforAbdurrahman Paa). The same in is order confirmed Ahkam (BA, MM 2931,p. 29). defteri

THE EYALETOF KAM"JANEC

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itself;the restwas sentfromthe centraltreasury.36 In September 1683, war again broke out in Podillja. In 1684 Polish soldiers removed thousands of peasants from SouthernPodillja to the neighboring provinces with the aim of starving the Kam' 'janee' garrison. According to a letterfromSobieski to the pope, some of these peasants had become Muslims under Ottoman rule and had been circumcized, though to theirwives had remainedmore faithful the old religion.37 to In conclusion, let us return "the greatpolitics." Polish historiansagree that the statesman Ahmed Kprl made a great mistake in taking Kam "janee': the conquest pushed the Commonwealth toward the alliance with the Habsburgs and into the long exhaustingwar thatcaused Ottoman defeaton one hand and the further weakening of the Commonwealthon the other. The real winners were the Habsburgs and Russia. This analysis is generallyacceptable, thoughthe issues were somewhat more complicated. In 1672, when the decision for the conquest of Kam "janee' was made, the Commonwealthdid not appear capable of making such great efforts the as rescue of Vienna or even the Xotyn victory.Furthermore, Muscovy of the Aleksei Mikhailovich did not yet resemble the Russian Empire of Peter the Great and CatherineII. During the twenty-seven years of its existence,the eyalet of Kam "janee' ensured Moldavian and Crimean loyalty. The Cossacks - the main reason forits foundation seem to have disappeared fromthe Black Sea, although this matterstill needs further research. The usefulnessof Kam "janee' as a northern bulwark of the Ottoman Empire was proved after 1699 when the Ottomans took Xotyn first as a nahiye and then as an independent - fromthe Moldavian hospodar to replace Kam "janee'. sancak

WarsawUniversity

36 BA, MM 4559 (this coverstwoyears). budget 37 "Videre Mahometanam ultraet rsticos, nuperfuit non sine horrore septuagenarios benevole constantiae foeminas sectam, circumcisos, amplexos majorisque repertas, mantis que suis contactum Mahometismi dissuasere, rursus eo retraxere"; aut aut ab a "Copia literarum serenissimoPoloniae Rege ad Sanctissumum," A. Zahiski, Epistolarumhistoricoin tomus 1710),p. 899. familiarwn primus, 2 (Brunsbergae, pt.

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