Abramac Gabi Abramac International Relations in the Post WWII Era 9 August 2011

Venezuelan Foreign Policy Under Chvez: Venezuela and the United States

The United States appear to be destined by Providence to plague America with misery in the name of liberty - Simn Bolvar The relationship between Venezuela under Hugo Chvez and the United States has been politically tense, although the United States remains Venezuela's most important trading partner. Having lived in Venezuela for three years, the author of this paper had been exposed to a wide array of internal confusion in the country. Venezuelans today can be broadly divided into Chavistas and anti-Chavistas. Nonetheless, everybody is aware of the stern relationship that the country has with the United States. While an anti-Chavista will follow the concern of the Western world for the future of its country, a Chavista will think in lines of Chvez's conspiration theories which range from alleged assassination to American armament of Columbian paramilitary forces whose goal is to get into Venezuelan territory and cut off the petroleumrich state of Zulia which is bordering Columbia. The author believes that living in Venezuela under Chvez, being exposed to Venezuelan media and interacting with

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citizens has given her a different, insider's view of Venezuelan domestic and foreign policy. This paper will examine, analyze and explain the relationship between Venezuela and the United States and the broader context of Venezuelan foreign policy under Chvez's governance.

The United States and Latin America According to the Independent Task Report no. 60 of the Council on Foreign Relations, the era of the United States as the dominant influence in Latin America is over. US Task Force also identifies four critical issues and four strategic relationships that merit special attention at this point in time. Poverty and inequality, public security, human mobility, and energy security represent fundamental challenges and opportunities for the region and for U.S.-Latin America relations. In addition, the Task Force calls for the redefining of relations with Venezuela and Cuba. The Task Force finds that strong institutions designed to reduce poverty and inequality and improve citizen security are necessary for Latin American citizens as well as for the realization of core U.S. objectives in the regiondemocratization, economic growth, and drug control. Much of the concern has centered on President Chvez of Venezuela. Since being elected in 1998, he has used oil profits to fund high-profile public projects and welfare programs while ruling by decree and systematically eradicating checks on his own power.

Abramac Venezuelan Oil

Venezuela is the ninth-largest producer of oil in the world and the fourth-largest supplier to the United States. The Venezuelan Government dominates the economy. The state oil company, Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), controls the petroleum sector. In May 2009, the National Assembly passed an oil services sector law reserving to the state all primary hydrocarbons activity. This legislation laid the foundation for the expropriation of nearly 80 oil services companies, including three U.S. firms. As per Task Force Report, Venezuela has devoted much of its oil revenues to funding government programs and foreign policy initiativesby directly subsidizing supplies to sympathetic nations, especially in Central America and the Caribbeanrather than robust reinvestment. While these choices may boost Chvezs domestic popularity and win him regional allies, they have diminished PDVSAs efficiency and led to production declines. In response to the Chvez governments demands for a majority stake in all joint oil ventures, a number of private multinationals have curtailed further investment in the exploitation of difficult-to-access, but potentially lucrative, crude reserves, while others have decided to close operations altogether.

Given the importance of Venezuela as a supplier, any decline in exports would have problematic implications for the United States. Even though Venezuelan production has fallen since 2001, oil exports to the United States have remained relatively stable.

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Venezuelan Foreign Policy and Relationship between Venezuela and the United States After seizing the power in 1998, Chvez's first steps were rewriting the rules in order to make the presidency stronger and to ensure himself overwhelming control of the Constituent Assembly. Between 1999 and 2003, the rise of authoritarianism in Venezuela followed a consistent pattern: The government would target institutions almost one at a time, attempting to strip each of power in turn. The opposition would protest, and the government would answer by becoming more hard-line and exclusionary. (Corrales: 105). As of 2003 Chvez's government has been heavily rewarding loyalists and punishing dissidents. Since 2004, Chvez has had almost no reason to feel politically threatened or encumbered yet has notoriously leaped in the direction of authoritarianism. (Corrales and Penfold, in Diamond, 2003: 185). Chvez is ensuring votes through aid distribution. In 2007 Venezuela pledged nearly $9 billion for financing, energy funding, and welfare programs. (Pearson, 2007). It includes $1 billion worth of Argentine bonds that Venezuela pledged to buy in 2007, but does not include another $4 billion of Argentine bonds that Venezuela claims to have bought in the past two years. Since 2004, Washington has repeatedly criticized Venezuela. For the Bush Administration, Venezuela ceased to be a safe and reliable country. The US disapproved of Venezuela's close relationship to Cuba, of its democracia participativa, its economic model under control of state and Venezuelas strategic alliances with Russia, China, Iran and Syria. (Romero 2002: 115).

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According to Romero (2006: 1), Hugo Chvez's electoral victory and the implementation of a new type of democracy are two factors that transformed Venezuelan foreign policy, and in particular, the bilateral relationship with the United States. Chvez's international activism, in addition to his Bolivarian policy signaled a shift from safe partner to partner with reservations in the country's relations with Washington. Although Venezuela considered itself a Latin American showcase in previous years, the author argues that Chvez's populist tendencies, his critical posture towards the promotion of democracy and human rights, and his supposed links with Columbian guerrillas has led to a wait-and-see policy characterized by high levels of caution on the part of the United States. The wait-and-see policy of 1999-2002, has converted into a suspicious policy of 2002-2004 and then since 2005 into a do-it-right policy. When it comes to terrorism, Chvez deems that terrorism is not a product of strategic disbalance but violence generated through socioeconomic circumstances arising from globalization. Within this context, Venezuela's standpoint is that Washington is playing a harmful role through its intentions to impose a unipolar vision upon a multi-polar world. As reported by the US Department of State, since 2005, President Chvez has deepened relations with Iran, by signing multiple economic and social accords and publicly supporting Iran's controversial nuclear program. Chavez continued to define Iran as a close "strategic ally." On 18 August 2010, the Venezuelan Ambassador to Iran publicly said, "We are at the service of Iran and whenever Iran needs it, we will supply it with gasoline." The US Department of State also states that during President Chavez' October visit to Iran, he signed 11 agreements in the oil, energy, industrial,

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and commercial sectors. The Venezuelan Government condemned UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed new sanctions on Iran. At the Fifth Summit of the Americas held in April 2009 in Trinidad, the US and Venezuela have agreed to seek for a relationship based on common interests. These common interests include combating trafficking of narcotics, terrorism and strengthening economic relationship. US Department of State informs that counternarcotics cooperation between the U.S. and Venezuela deteriorated significantly in 2004 and 2005. In March 2005, the Venezuelan National Guard removed its highly experienced members from the U.S.supported Prosecutor's Drug Task Force. In August 2005, the Government of Venezuela accused the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of espionage and terminated cooperation with the DEA pending negotiation of a new cooperation agreement, which had gone unsigned as of October 2006. The United States has concluded that Venezuela demonstrably failed to meet its international

counternarcotics obligations every year since 2005.

Chvez as Populista Hero On April 11, 2002, a group of senior military officers ousted the leftist president, Hugo Chvez, and replaced him with the more conservative Pedro Carmona. The coup had the support of the business community, the upper classes, the mass media, and tacit support from the U.S. (Jacques, 2005). After two days of massive protests, Carmona stepped down and Chvez returned to power. Scholars Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (2003) claim that this scenario has no equivalent in Latin American history (quoted in Jacques, 2005).

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According to Chvezs supporters, he is doing an excellent job in the international arena through his plan to revive the nation encouraging cooperation among countries in South America and the Caribbean, outside of the influence of the United States. According to Jacques (2005), Venezuelas increasing involvement in the Andean Community, OPEC, and neighboring countries shows his commitment to regional integration and international trade, though moves such as oil contracts with Cuba. Moreover, the same scholarly article claims that Chvez has also used the Organization of American States and the United Nations as sounding boards for building regional unity and for defense of political actions.

It is obvious from that different sources presented in this paper reflect completely different rhetoric. According to Venezuelan point of view, Chavismo cannot be easily dismissed as antiglobalization, anti-capitalist or even anti-American. Kelly and Romero (2002: 39) cite regional integration in the form of the Andean Community and Mercosur as an alternative to globalization.

International Organizations Chvez has used international organizations such as the nonaligned movement, the OAS, and the UN as platforms for expressing his criticisms of American policies. In an effort to earn a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council, Venezuelan ambassador Herrera argued that Venezuelas presence on the council would help counteract a model based on preventative war and a situation of permanent interventionism. (El Universal: 2006).

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Chvezs campaign for the seat raised fears that Venezuela would disrupt the UN Security Councils agenda, hinder the development of consensus positions, especially with regards to Iran, and seek to abolish the veto power of the Security Councils five permanent members. In the end, when Panama won the seat, disturbing Chvezs international agenda.

US Policy In 2006, The Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations proposed a framework for U.S. policy toward Venezuela called Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chvezs Venezuela. The author, Richard Lapper, argues that the aim is not to exaggerate the threat and recommends a policy in which the United States makes clear its willingness to cooperate with Caracas on pragmatic issues of mutual interest (despite Chvezs overblown rhetoric), while at the same time seeking to develop an understanding with select Latin American leaders on how to respond if Chvez crosses certain red lines in his foreign and domestic policies. The United States keep a close watch on Venezuela and monitor that Chvezs potentially destabilizing policies within Latin America. An emerging issue for U.S.-Venezuela relations centers on Hugo Chvezs recent announcement that Venezuela will pursue nuclear power. Given the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Venezuelan government and its close ties with Iran, this announcement is particularly troubling. (Task Report no. 60). U.S. policy is powerless in influencing Venezuelan domestic or foreign policy. Nonetheless, the U.S. has identified goals which can be taken to protect its interests in

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Latin America further. These include maintaining official relations with the Venezuelan government, working through multilateral institutions to monitor democratic institutions and criticize antidemocratic behavior in Venezuela, increasing funding for social justice programs and policies and creating incentives for U.S. private sector investment in energy infrastructure in the region and U.S. leadership in the development of alternative fuels.

CONCLUSION: Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections were held in September 2010. The PSUV thus lost their two-thirds majority in the assembly. Chvezs illness has raised new concerns and speculations about 2012 elections, making the US very cautious. There is a surreal quality to Mr Chvez's rhetorical aggression against the United States, said Thomas Shannon, the State Department's top official for Latin America in 2006. President Chvez thrives on conflict with the United States. says the Council Report of the same year. Playing on anti-American sentiment in the region is still very much true. On the other hand, though in a completely un-diplomatic manner, Hugo Chvez is one of the very few country leaders outside the non-Muslim world who criticizes the US openly. Americans deem that only by attacking the root causes of inequality that fuel Chvezs involvement in the affairs of fragile states can the United States regain credibility as an advocate of democracy in the hemisphere (Living with Hugo).

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Venezuelan elections of 2012, Chvezs health condition, Cubas domestic affairs under Castro brothers and Iranian Venezuelan relationship are an interwoven chess game at this point. Each move influences Venezuelan relationship with the US, both economically and politically. As mentioned earlier, the US is very limited in undertaking any steps towards Venezuelan domestic and foreign policies. The wait-and-see policy has turned into a floating status quo.

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References: 1. Narula, Monica and Quiles, Michelle, The United States and Venezuela: More Than Just a Gun Show, COHA Research, 12 August 2008: http://www.coha.org/the-unitedstates-and-venezuela-the-gun-show/

2. Romero, Carlos A., Venezuela y Estados Unidos:una relacin esquizofrnica?, Nueva Sociedad No 206, noviembre-diciembre de 2006, ISSN: 0251-3552 http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3396_1.pdf

3. Romero, Carlos, A., Estados Unidos y Venezuela: una relacin necesaria, Colombia Internacional, 2002, (pg. 112-129): http://colombiainternacional.uniandes.edu.co/view.php/467/index.php?id=467

4. Urrutia, Gonzlez E., Las dos etapas de la poltica exterior de Chvez, Nueva sociedad, 2006: http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3389_1.pdf

5. Goliner, Eva, The Chvez Code, Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela, Pluto Press, 2006

6. Petras, James, U.S. Venezuelan Relations: Imperialism and Revolution, Axis of Logic, 5 January 2010

Abramac 7. Jones, Bart ,"U.S. funds aid Chavez opposition: National Endowment for Democracy at center of dispute in Venezuela". National Catholic Reporter, 2 April 2004 : http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_22_40/ai_n5994685/

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8. Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Marc F. and Brun Abente, Diego: Latin Americas Struggle for Democracy, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008

9. Montaner, Carlos Alberto, Twisted Roots: Latin America's Living Past, Algora Publishing, New York, 2003

10. Corrales, Javier and Penfold, Michael, Venezuela: Chvez and the Opposition (in Diamond, 2003)

11. Corrales, Javier: In Search of a Theory of Polarization: Lessons from Venezuela, 1999-2005, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 79 (October 2005): 1005-18

12. Task Force Report , U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality, Council on Foreign Relations Press, May 2008: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279

13. Pearson Obiko, Natalie and James, Ian, Chvez Offers Billions in Latin America, Associated Press, August 26, 2007. 14. Hakim, Peter: Is Washington Losing Latin America?, Foreign Affairs vol. 85 No 1-2/2006

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15. US Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 8 February 2001: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm

16. Jacques, Rachel M. (2005) "Resistance to U.S. Economic Hegemony in Latin America: Hugo Chvez and Venezuela," McNair Scholars Journal: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 10 http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair/vol9/iss1/10

17. Lapper, Richard, Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chvezs Venezuela, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006