Barron 1 Thomas Barron Prof.

Farr PHI 100 7 December 2012 On Marcuses Tolerance Tolerance is a concept that different authors hold many different viewpoints on. Merriam-Webster defines tolerance as follows: sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one's own. (Tolerance) Tolerance, both in the political and ideological realms, remains an important topic of discussion and policy, as it determines whether the very existence of certain groups or practices is allowable. In this paper I aim to analyze Marcuses idea of liberating tolerance and some of the contradictions and implications that it raises for itself upon analysis. In order to better understand and characterize Marcuses ideas, I feel it would be useful to introduce the following concept first: Andrew Murphy, in his paper Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition, presents an interesting distinction between the terms tolerance and toleration. Tolerance, he asserts, is the attitude of allowing dissenting opinions; a willingness to admit the possible validity of seemingly contradictory viewpoints, a hesitancy to pass value or truth judgments on individual or group beliefs (Murphy 600). Toleration, on the other hand, is the action of allowing dissenting opinions; forbearance from imposing punitive sanctions for dissent from prevailing norms (Murphy 596). The two terms, though related and seemingly somewhat interchangeable, do not always coexist; there can exist attitudes of tolerance without actions of toleration, and vice versa.

Barron 2 He divides the permutations of these two terms into four categories: tolerant toleration, intolerant antitoleration, tolerant antitoleration, and intolerant toleration. The two matching combinations (tolerant toleration and intolerant antitoleration) are the most intuitive, but concrete examples of the other two certainly do exist: for tolerant antitoleration, he provides the example of Thomas Hobbes, who, while recognizing the possible validity of opinions differing from his own (particularly in matters of religion), did not support actions of toleration. (Murphy 609) For the case of intolerant toleration, he provides the example of Roger Williams, Puritan theologian and founder of Providence Plantations (later Rhode Island), who, although he was unrelenting in his theological attacks on those who worshipped differently than he did (612), founded Providence Plantations with a strong foundation of religious freedom and toleration. Using these dichotomies, one can identify varying degrees of each combination in modern policies and ideologies. For example, different branches of the libertarian movement consistently support the action of toleration, but differ on whether they support the attitude of tolerance. Though seemingly very similar at their core, this distinction of underlying attitude portrays them as fundamentally different and only unified in their proposed practices. An even more intriguing situation arises when applying these ideas to Herbert Marcuses Repressive Tolerance. Herbert Marcuses work Repressive Tolerance presents an interesting juxtaposition of tolerance/intolerance and toleration/antitoleration. In it, he proposes (as most philosophers do) that tolerance is an ideal to be strived towards (Marcuse 1); but almost immediately he puts forth the caveat that tolerance should only be extended to those things which themselves promote tolerance: this tolerance cannot be indiscriminate and equal with respect to the contents of expression, neither in word nor in deed; it cannot protect false words and wrong deeds which

Barron 3 demonstrate that they contradict and counteract the possibilities of liberation. (3) He more directly states his intention later in the paper: Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right, and toleration of movements from the Left (9). Marcuse aims to show that his ideology holds the attitude of tolerance and practices the actions of toleration; this would place him in the tolerant toleration classification. However, by overtly and unabashedly stating that the Left is good and the Right is bad, Marcuse reveals the distinctly intolerant attitude of his ideologies; by stating that he wishes practice the withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements [the Right] before they can even become active; intolerance even toward thought, opinion, and word (10), he shows his intention to implement the practice of antitoleration. Thus, there arises a curious dichotomy of both tolerance and intolerance, of toleration and antitoleration. He attempts to reconcile this by stating that the doctrine of intolerance only applies to those political movements, attitudes, schools of thought, philosophies which are political in the widest sense affecting the society as a whole, demonstrably transcending the sphere of privacy; the tolerance and toleration, then, is presumably reserved for the private and non-political spheres. But even with this political-only caveat, intolerance is still denounced by some authors as inherently unacceptable; e.g., Mieczyslaw Maneli, to this end, states that the denial of freedom and tolerance even to one category of people or beliefs can undermine the very existence of tolerance. (Maneli 87) With this insight in mind, the title of the work can take on a curious double meaning. Marcuse, in his essay, explains that what he dubs abstract tolerance (i.e., tolerance which does not distinguish between the Left and the Right) is in fact reinforcing repressive movements, and thus presumably he titled the work in reference to this abstract tolerance. Another reading of the title, however, finds that it could refer not only to abstract tolerance but to the authors own

Barron 4 proposed liberating tolerance. Marcuses liberating tolerance promotes systematic withdrawal of tolerance toward regressive and repressive opinions and movements (7), an action which itself is repressive. Marcuse would argue that this repression of repression itself is beneficial (a claim which will be challenged in the next paragraph), but the phrase repressive tolerance is recalled nonetheless in the readers mind upon reflection. Marcuse provides several specific examples of movements which, in his liberating tolerance, justify having the democratic tolerance extended toward them to be revoked: groups and movements which promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc. This list highlights what I consider to be a deep flaw of his proposed liberating tolerance: the wide range of behaviors and ideologies that could be considered regressive and repressive. While discrimination on the grounds of race and religion is pretty universally considered to be a bad thing, all other examples provided are popular within one or several political groups, and as such should not be so easily and arbitrarily dismissed. Marcuses system of liberating tolerance also calls for several other negative practices, which again call into question the true tolerance of the movement. He says that censorship, even precensorship will be necessary to free the people of the false consciousness imposed by mass media (Marcuse 10); rigid restrictions on teachings and practices in [] educational institutions will be necessary in order to prevent the institutions from their present tendency to enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse and behavior (7). The condoning of these practices is, as recognized by Hans Achterhuis, an authorization to deprive any and all individuals of their freedom if, according to the new rulers, it serves the true interests

Barron 5 of humanity. (Achterhuis 162) To use Murphys tolerance/toleration dichotomy from above, these actions, if implemented, would amount to not only an antitoleration but a gross antitoleration of the opposing ideas, with strong intolerance undergirding them. This specific practices, once again, raise the question of whether Marcuses liberating tolerance has a right to be called tolerance at all. Another point of possible confliction is raised by Marcuses text with the concept of encouraging revolution. He provides the quote himself: Surely, no government can be expected to foster its own subversion (Marcuse 7)and yet this is exactly what the society created by liberating tolerance demands. In fact, barely one page later in the paper, Marcuse goes on to explicitly state: by virtue of its inner logic, withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements, and discriminatory tolerance in favor of progressive tendencies would be tantamount to the ofcial promotion of subversion. (8-9) Such a political system, one which effectively encourages its own fall from power, is, as Paul Eidelberg describes it, the Maoist formula for permanent revolution. (Eidelberg 456) In summary, I believe that Marcuses concept of liberating tolerance has some deeply rooted and wide-reaching implications in regards to tolerance. The ideas in this work, Repressive Tolerance, are presented by the author in a way which, I feel, does not adequately address these implications. I do not mean to say that these implications condemn the ideas entirely; certainly, Marcuse and his liberating tolerance raise some very interesting ideas which can be fully contemplated and considered (for mental exercise if nothing else). Rather, I think that in order to be able to fully appreciate the ideas, one must also be cognizant of the implications and seemingly contradictory points I have presented in the paper above, and decide for oneself how these points are to be reconciled.

Barron 6 Works Cited Achterhuis, Hans. Violent Utopias. Peace Review 14.2 (2002): 157164. Web. 7 December 2012. PDF. Eidelberg, Paul. The Temptation of Herbert Marcuse. The Review of Politics 31.4 (1969): 442-458. Maneli, Mieczyslaw. Freedom and Tolerance. Octagon, 1984: 87. Web. Marcuse, Herbert. Repressive Tolerance. 1965. Web. 7 December 2012. PDF. Murphy, Andrew R. Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition. Polity 29.4 (1997): 593623. Web. 7 December 2012. PDF. Tolerance. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Web. 7 December 2012.