* Jacob Kovalio b

h3
k

Japan's Perception of Stalinist Foreign Policy in the Early 1930s

wing the Manchurian Incident, Japan and the Soviet Union the two powers whose actions most directly affected stability Far East. The main factors responsible for this ation were: China's weakness, amply proved in 1929 and 1931;' ang Kai-shek's decision, following the Japanese invasion of anchuria, to give priority to fighting the Chinese communists than the Japanese; the internal economic and political ms of the major western powers - stemming from the Great epression - that lessened their ability and readiness to take an active part in East Asian affairs; and the geographic proximity of Japan and the USSR. Therefore, Japanese-Soviet relations in this period were by and large unaffected by other powers. The Soviet Union returned as an active and permanent military factor in the power structure in North East Asia in 1929 for the first time since the Civil War that followed the Bolshevik takeover. The renewed Soviet involvement in Far Eastern affairs was directly connected with the so-called Manchuli Incident. n the summer of 1929, Chang Hsiieh-liang, the warlord of Manchuria, considered that since the Soviet Union possessed no meaningful military power in the Far East, the time was ripe for the hinese to take over the Soviet share of the Chinese Eastern ailway (cER).~ This move was a clear violation of the 1924 greement between the two sides which provided for joint manageent of the line. Chang's official reason for this move was the ent need to combat communist propaganda in North ~ h i n a . ~ lang Kai-shek, in Nanking, increasingly confident of his power nd convinced that the Soviets would not react as they had not one in 1927 when their embassy in Peking was raided by police in earch of communists, supported Chang, though not actively.
urnal of Contemporary H&ory (SAGE,London, Beverly Hills and New Delhi), 1. 19 (1984). 315-335

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Journal of ContemporaryHistory

Chang's forces attacked the Soviet consulate in Harbin, in the fall of 1929, and forced Soviet officials to relinquish their country's facilities on the CER. But the Russians, after an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Chinese to return to the status quo ante, dispatched troops of the new Special Far Eastern Army (SFEA), established in order to deal with the Chinese provocation. The SFEA, commanded by Marshal Vassily Blucher, one of the most prominent commanders of the Soviet Army, after indecisive initial moves, launched a coordinated air-land attack on 17 Novembe 1929, using fresh reinforcements from European Russia. Within week, Bliicher's troops crushed Chang's army and took 10,000 o his soldiers prisoner. Chang sued for peace on 1 December 1929. An agreement reached at Sibirsk-Ussuriisk, a small town on th Manchuria-Primorie border, in February 1930, put the CER bac under joint Soviet-Chinese management. However, diplomat relations between Moscow and Nanking were severed and remaine so until December 1932. The Manchuli Incident proved that China was still fragmente and weak despite Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition and w in no position to oppose strong and resolute military pre~sure.~
The death of V.I. Lenin in January 1924 had been followed by years of conflict within the higher echelons of the ruling munist Party of the Soviet Union. Leon Trotsky's exile in marked the emergence of his rival, Joseph Stalin, as the Sovi Union's most powerful leader. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Stalin and the rest of the Sovie leadership were deeply preoccupied with what they perceived as steady deterioration in their relations with the outside world. On 2 January 1930, Pravda opened its editorial with the following state ment: 'There is no doubt that we have entered a new phase in aggression of world imperialism against the USSR'.' High tar and increasing accusations from foreign governments that th Soviet Union and the Comintern were to blame for the social un in countries from Germany to the United States were probably reasons for the bleak report in Pravda. Stalin recognized that the communist regime, backward weak as it was, could not realistically embark on a ceaseless r tionary drive as advocated by Trotsky, when it could not even guarantee its own existence. Therefore, the pursuit of 'world

Kovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

revolution' - the Trotskyite concept - was set aside temporarily as the avowed raison dJ2tre of the Soviet state, in favour of a Stalinist policy embodied in the slogan 'socialism in one country'. This slogan set the primary goal of the regime in the pursuit of a domestic and foreign policy whose main priority was the creation of a strong communist state, industrially independent of the capitalist countries, which would then be able to become the base for world revolution. Accordingly, following directives passed at the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress, on 29 May 1929, the Soviet government formally launched the first general Five Year Plan of national development. The pyatiletka - the popular Russian word for Five Year Plan - became the foundation of an intensive effort aimed at the industrialization of the economy and the modernization of agriculture. The Five Year Plan system meant the immediate abandonment of the New Economic Policy (NEP), Lenin's 1922 policy which had allowed the existence of a limited private economic sector in light industry and agriculture. Nationalization and centrally-planned development of the economy as well as mechanization and complete collectivization of the agriculture were to be forcefully implemented. There was special stress on the rapid increase of the country's industrial capacity in European Russia and Western Siberia. The pivotal feature of the new Soviet economic development model was the emphasis on heavy industry - the industry that would give the Soviet state the military strength necessary to assure its survival. This was made clear in a June 1930 Communist Party resolution according to which 'the most important task of the Five Year Plan is to rapidly develop those industries that are connected to the defence of the Soviet ~ n i o n ' . ~ In late 1932, the Soviet Union announced that, following the completion of the first Five Year Plan, it had reached the level of highest industrial production of tzarist Russia, that of 1913. Defence expenditure between 1928 and 1932 jumped from 1.3 per t. cent to 5 per cent of the GNP and by 1933 had reached two billion rubles a year. By late 1933, the Soviet Union apparently possessed the potential capacity to manufacture 550 cannons, 150 tanks and 1 400 planes a month.' Highly indicative of Stalin's political realism is the fact that the enunciation of the new policy of 'socialism in one country', which temporarily renounced the goal of world revolution, came at a time ? when the capitalist world faced disastrous economic conditions.

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Stalin realized, however, that the economic crisis that the non-communist countries did not signal the end o system as Marx, Lenin and Trotsky had expected. On th he feared that the depression in the western world, acco it was by a rapid strengthening of anti-communist and forces, would bring about the realization of his greatest fe concerted capitalist intervention to destroy the Sovi fear of annihilation was at the root of the launc ambitious plans for the industrialization and military buildthe country. Stalinist foreign policy during the 1930s was gear mount target, the accomplishment of which requir element: time. To allow their regime to advance ec militarily through the pyatiletka, the Soviets de policy designed to achieve the necessary breathi peredishka in Russian. The peredishka foreign policy approach consisted o elements: on the one hand, an increase in contacts an establishment of good relations with the capitalist countri means of a so-called 'peace offensive' and the signing of., aggression pacts, with the purpose of preventing or delay On the other hand, the approach provided for continuous mainly through the Cornintern's agitation among the wherever possible, to create popular support for the comm state in foreign countries and thus guarantee its existence..r 3 The ways and the targets of the peredishka foreign policy very clearly stated in an article on 22 January 1930 in Iz Soviet government's organ. Entitled 'Leninist Princi Foreign Policy', the article was written by an 'Outsid be Stalin himself. The article describes the peredishka a follows:
What are the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy? The lon imperialistspostpone their attack on the Soviet state, the more time we sh to build up in peace our socialist economy, the more time the communist of the west will have to bring the ranks of the working classes togeth longer the national revolutionary movement in the countries of the East wi to develop, and the more advantageous for international communism will conditions when the encircling capitallst countries launch their inevitable on the Sovief state. Hence, the first and basic directive of Leninist foreign follows quite logically: to stretch out the breathing space won by the Republic for the first time in the Brest-Litovsk period. This prolongation breathing space is the foundation and the most essentialformula of the policy of the USSR.'

ovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

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chief method by which this foreign policy was to be carried out ,persistent, systematic and uninterrupted propaganda for peace ch the 'Outsider' described as 'something n the most down-trodden and backward d the most powerful weapon in the hands '.' The other method of Leninist foreign policy to be 'the practical demonstration of the advantages for the talist encirclement of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet

t (NAP) was a major weapon in the Soviet rior to the enunciation of the comprehensive offensive' strategy in 1929-1930. In fact, it can be said that s an expanded version of the basic concept of the inently in the relentless

e neighbours and other countries as well by ordon sanitaire of NAPS. Up to 1931, the Soviets concluding treaties with Germany, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Turkey, Afghanistan and ing of their contacts with Japan, the Soviets e and again, the issue of a NAP between the two s. The Soviet goal was the securing of their weak Far flank. In early 1926, following the establishment of ions with Tokyo, the Soviet Consul-General, vsky, inquired about the Japanese government's attitude a non-aggression and neutrality pact between the two panese did not react to the idea at all." proposal was made twice, in January and May 1927, after ambassador, Dobgarevsky, in Tokyo. The om Japan was that commercial pacts should be priority over political agreements.12When in July of the same , the Soviet ambassador was instructed to offer expanded exchange for a NAP, Premier and Foreign inister Tanaka Giichi answered that 'the time has not come yet ical treaty with the Soviet union'.13 The Soviets a h sounded out the Japanese on the issue on 14 October 1927, at

Journal of Contemporary History

a meeting between Soviet Foreign Commissariat officials and t Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Tanaka Tokichi. Aware of t increasing Japanese sensitivity concerning Manchuria, the Sov side assured Tokyo that it had no intention of increasing its existi interests in the region. Prime Minister Tanaka, nevertheles showed no change in his attitude. In March 1928, the new Soviet ambassador to Japan, Troyanovsky, raised the issue of a NAP .and again met Japanese refusal. Tokyo did not react to new Soviet initiative late 1928, on the occasion of visits to the Soviet Union by Japanese delegations, one led by the businessman and right-wi politician, Kuhara Fusanosuke, and another by Goto Shimpei, advocate of close Russo-Japanese ties. Following this episo there was a cooling-off in the Soviet advances to Japan about NAP. The Russian 'peace offensive' toward Japan after Manchurian Incident brought back to life the issue of a NAP. As the 1920s, it was the Soviet Union that pushed the idea, while Jap was unenthusiastic at best. In October 1931, the Soviets propos the signing of a , treaty of non-aggression and friendship Ambassador Tanaka, who replied evasively that 'the issue of a no aggression pact should be dealt with only following arrangeme regarding pending questions between the two countries'.14 The next Soviet attempt came on the occasion of a stopo made in Moscow by Japan's ambassador to France, Yoshiza Kenkichi, who was returning to Japan to assume the po Foreign Minister. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Comm proposed the signing of a NAP between the two countries, an Japanese diplomat, at a meeting on 31 December 1931, promised give serious consideration to the matter once he assumed his n p0st.l5 In January 1932, Ambassador Troyanovsky attempted to i Premier Inukai Tsuyoshi in the importance of a NAP b Japan and the Soviet Union, while in March Litvinov explaine merits of such an agreement to Count Matsudaira, Japan's sentative at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In both ca Japanese answer was that rhe circumstances were not rig Matsddaira also mentioned the fears that such an agreement wou arouse among other countries, especially the western powers.16 In late November 1932, although Japan had yet to reply to the December 1931 NAP proposal which Litvinov had made t

@ :*

Kovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

321

zawa, the Soviet Union approached Japan on the issue for the time since 1926. The occasion was a meeting between Lev han, the Soviet Vice-Foreign Commissar, and Am5 Eiji, the panese charge d'affaires. The Soviet diplomat expressed oscow's willingness to sign a NAP with Manchukuo, the apanese puppet-state in Manchuria, if Japan would agree to a lar pact. The Soviet proposal is highly indicative of Moscow's tion toward the Japanese satelljte, one which completely red from that of the western powers, especially the United On 12 December 1932, the Japanese Foreign Ministry transmitted its country's official reply to the Soviet proposal of a year earlier regarding a NAP. The reply was negative, on the grounds that 'we should wait for better circumstances'." Even though the latest rebuff of their NAP proposal had come in December 1932, the Soviets, on 8 January 1933, raised the issue again with the Japanese Foreign Ministry." During 1933, Japanese reluctance to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union was strengthened by the communist state's renewal of diplomatic relations with the Nanking government in December 1932. This development presented Japan with the unpleasant possibility of a two-frgnt situation on the continent. In fact, Japanese Army Minister Araki Sadao, in a number of meetings with Soviet Ambassador Alexander Yurenev in early 1933, warned him of the possible consequences of the Soviet rapprochement with China on the chances of the conclusion of a NAP between Tokyo and Moscow. Nevertheless, Genera1 Araki, in a January 1933 communique, expressed the opinion that the Japanese government should not go so far in the direction of accommodation with the Soviet Union as to sign a NAP.'^
When it appeared likely in the late 1920s that the Japanese would

attempt to solidify their position in Northern China, the Soviets ust have considered with glee the possibility of a full-scale SinoJapanese war. Japanese intervention in Northern China would help he USSR in three ways. First, it would pieclude, at least emporarily, the possibility of a Japanese attack in Siberia. Second, it would prevent Chiang Kai-shek from continuing with his plans to extirpate communism from China. Third, it might provoke a dramatic switch in the western, especially American, attitude

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Journal of ContemporaryHistory

toward Moscow, because of the effect such a Japanese step wou have on the economic interests of those powers in China. But none of the Russian assumptions materialized when t Japanese attack in Manchuria took place in September 1931. T Japanese quickly crushed all Chinese resistance, and after on three months, there was no doubt about who had the upper hand Manchuria and Northern China. Chiang had no intention yet to s out on a war of liberation, and the west, although displeased wi the shadow cast by Tokyo over a highly lucrative area, was ready to fight for China's grossly violated independence. The Soviet government was upset over the course o Manchurian invasion and expressed its fears of the Kwantu Army's advance into Northwestern China, close to the Sov border. Foreign Commissar Litvinov and his deputy Karakh conferred on the subject with Japanese Ambassador Hirota every few days after the outbreak of the ~ncident.~' Ru The fears deepened when the Kwantung Army, in spite of assurances the contrary from Hirota, penetrated into Northern and Nort western ~ a n c h u r i a . ' ~ Despite their suspicions, the Soviets went out of their way t express and manifest their accommodating attitude toward t Japanese in the period immediately following the invasion o Manchuria. On 29 October 1931, Izvestia published an official statement proclaiming the Soviet Union's 'policy of stri neutrality' concerning the Manchurian affair.*' This announc ment signalled the beginning of a long series of peaceful declarations and appeasing policies by Moscow. In early November 1931, Marshal Klementi Voroshilov, Soviet Defence Commissar, stated that 'the Soviet Union gover ment's policy toward the Manchurian Incident is one of absolut non-interference. . . . Since the outbreak of the crisis, the Sovie Union has not moved even one soldier or cannon into the border area near ~ a n c h u r i a . Then, in February 1932, at the First All '~~ Soviet Kolkhoz Congress, Stalin himself mentioned that 'the Sovi Union is bound to continue its peaceful policies in the Far East The peaceful statements toward Japan in the Soviet press often accompanied by attacks on Japanese militarism an American and Japanese imperialism for reasons of polit propaganda aimed at the international communist movement. Izvestia article entitled 'The Serious Situation in Manchur~a published on 29 November 1431, constitutes a good example of th

Kovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

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above-mentioned 'peace offensive' strategy of Soviet foreign policy

We do not think that Japan is interested in allowing itself to be pushed into the USSR while it is seeking Manchurian spoils. Japan is taking an us risk in seizing Manchuria, for only military dullards can forget that China's temporary weakness, the Chinese masses have a tremendous for resistance. Japan is far from being guaranteed that its imperialist enemles will not support the Chinese movement against Japan. . . . This alone should warn Japan against the creation of a tense situation toward the USSR, the only country which really pursues a policy of peace.2'

The Soviets capped their policy of showing a friendly attitude ward Japan during the Manchurian Incident with the proposal of 1 December 1931 for the conclusion of a NAP discussed earlier. It me in the midst of a new Japanese drive into Northern anchuria. On 29 January 1932, Ambassador Hirota comunicated to Karakhan that the Japanese Army, contrary to earlier urances, would take Harbin, the symbol of Russian influepce in ina and the centre of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In February city was occupied. The Soviets mumbled a protest to Japan but hing more. This attitude was highly indicative of the coninuation of an appeasing Soviet approach toward Japan. An Izvestia article on 4 March 1932 reiterated the Soviet policies the previous year, although they were carefully wrapped in equate ideological phraseology:
From the outset of the Far Eastern conflict, the USSR has maintained a position of strict neutrality. The sympathy of the toilers of the Soviet Union for the Chinese people suffering under the yoke of imperialist exploitation is completely indisputable. But this sympathy for the struggle of liberty of the Chinese workers and peasants has in no way interfered with the unchanging policy of strict neutrality which naturally follows from the general peaceful policy of the Soviet

Statements to placate the Japanese were backed up by Soviet teps in the same direction, to an extent unmatched by any other reign power after the Manchurian invasion. On 16 March 1932, e Russian Consul General in Harbin, Slawsky, and the Soviet overnor of the CER, Kuznetsov, presented their credentials to the ew Manchurian authorities. Then in April 1932, the Soviet Union rdered the closing of all the Chinese consulates in Siberia. The atter half of 1932 saw the establishment of Manchurian consulates

324

Journal of Contemporary History

in Siberia at Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok Chita. The Soviets'put an end to all anti-Japanese broadcastin the Chinese from Soviet territory, notably those under the direction of General Ma Sen-shan in Blagoveshchensk. They also disarmed and interned the forces of Chinese General Su Ping-wen who fled to Siberia after being defeated by the ~apanese.~' In the economic sector, in August 1932, a new fishing agreemen favourable to Japan was signed, followed by the conclusion of long-term treaty for economic cooperation and a multi-ye contract for the supply of Soviet gasoline to Japan. Lastly, immediately after the establishment of the state of Manchukuo, the new Soviet Consul-General in Harbin, Vassily Znamensky, mad an official visit to the Japanese military authorities to discuss th problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In his talks with the Japanese, the Soviet representative was quite explicit in assert his country's quick adaptability to the new situation in the a
Although there are old treaties between the Soviet Union and China (concerning the CER) and certain problems might arise (with the establishment of) the new (Manchurian) state (in regard to the CER) . . . (the Soviet Union) is definitely going to acquiesce in the new situation and may recognize the new state. The ': CER may be put under the jurisdiction of the new state's Transportation
8

ini is try.^'

In accordance with the established policy toward Manchur from the beginning the Soviets refused to have anything to do wit the League of Nations' Lytton Commission. During the time Lytton Commission was active, between 1931 and 1933, the Sov officially explained that they opposed it because they did n belong to the international body. Although the Soviet leaders may also have distrusted the world organization because of participation of its most powerful members, including Japan, i the armed intervention against the Soviet state between 1918 an 1922, one is more inclined to believe that this opposition was base on the realities of Soviet foreign policy toward Japan at the time. I the 12 October 1932 issue of Izvestia, the famous ideologu columnist and historian, Karl Radek, lashed out at the League o Nations proposal that Moscow take part in the Lytton Commissi by branding it 'an attempt to bribe the USSR in order to induce to join a possible anti-Japanese front'.29 Then, a few years late Foreign Commissar Litvinov described his country's lack cooperation with the Lytton Commission more frankly: '(We

Kovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

325

not participate in the Lytton Commission) first because we did not beIieve in the honesty and consistency of the governments associated with it, and even more because we did not seek nor do we seek now an armed conflict with ~ a p a n . ' ~ ' The Soviet policy of adjustment to the postSeptember 1931 realities in the Far East was revealed best over the issue of the CER. The seizure of Harbin, the heart of the CER system, was followed by the Japanese occupation of Northern Manchuria, so that by the summer of 1932 the Kwantung Army was directly facing the Red Army across the Amur River. Nevertheless, the Soviets, starting in February 1932, were 'positive indeed' in allowing the Japanese Army to use the CER for the transport of troops and military ~nateriel.~' 21 March 1932, with Moscow's acquiescence, the On new flag of Manchuria - Manchukuo from September of the same year - was hoisted over the CER headquarters in Harbin, and in June the line was renamed the North Manchurian Railway. The Soviets continued to hold their share. For appearance's sake, they insisted that official Chinese approval be obtained before Japan used the railroad. The Japanese government entrusted Colonel Doihara Kenji, the head of military intelligence in Manchuria, with the task of obtaining Chinese approval. Doihara 'solved' the problem by a forced reshuffling of the Chinese membership on the railway board. The new board quickly agreed to all Japanese demands. The Soviets accepted with no strong objections the official Japanese stand that, since the Japanese government paid for the use of the railroad by its troops, the nature of the load was unimportant. The explanation was inappropriate since the original Russo-Chinese agreement forbade the military use of the C E R . ~ ~ Moreover, the Soviets in their CER policy actually went along with Japan's position that its soldiers were present in Northern Manchuria in order to defend Japanese settlers and thus no act of aggression was committed. By late 1932, the CER had become a strategic liability to the Soviet government. The Soviets realized that their share in the CER, by then a small indefensible enclave in Japanese-occupied territory, might ultimately drag them into a war they were not yet ready to fight. Moreover, the economic importance of the railway was rapidly deteriorating, both because of combat operations and bandit attacks and because of the construction by Japan of a parallel line from Harbin to the Korean city of Rashin. The

326

Journal of Contemporary Histo

Japanese planned that this port would rival Vladivostok become Northern Manchuria's soybean centre. The increase in the number of armed clashes along th Manchukuo-Soviet border became the immediate reason for th May 1933 announcement by Litvinov of his country's readiness t sell its share in the CER either to Japan or to ~ a n c h u k u o . ~ ~ was another step toward Soviet recognition of the Manch puppet-state following the establishment of its consulates in t Soviet Union and amounted to a complete Soviet withdrawal fr China. Legally, the Soviet decision to sell its share of interest i'n t railway to Japan or Manchukuo was a clear violation of the Sino-Soviet agreement that provided that 'the future of the shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union o Soviet Socialist Republics to the exclusion of any third party par tie^'.^ The Soviets, however, took the position that Nanki was excluded from any role in the management of the railway force of circumstances. The issue of purchasing the CER from Soviet Union aroused a hot dispute in Japan, but ultimately agreement was reached between the two countries in 1935. The Soviet decision to end its presence in China was t primarily on grounds of strategic convenience. The suggestion the selling of the CER to Japan was done in order to balance th impact of the resumption of relations between Moscow and Nankin is probably correct in part.35 The Japanese-Manchurian threat t the Soviet Union, however, is a more likely reason especially whe seen from the perspective of the communist power's new strategi position toward Japan after the Manchurian Incident. Th' position demanded an overall deterrent posture built on the s military foundation provided by troops stationed along the b between Manchukuo and Soviet Siberia. Designed to compleme the appeasing approach toward Japan politically, this strat stand emerged in the spring of 1932, and parallel with deepening of the Japanese penetration into Manchuria, assume proportions that provoked concern within the Japanese militar ~eadership.~~

The relentless Japanese advance into Manchuria, despite offi assurances to the contrary, worried the Soviet government, w feared a surprise Japanese attack from the south and southeast

Kovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

327

eginning in 1932, Soviet leaders expressed their fears publicly. hese Russian suspicions were first voiced when Premier Molotov, king at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January' 1932, sed the need to prepare the country against plots by foreign, ecially Japanese, militarism and imperialism, 'following the big dent in the Far East which has become the most important blem of our foreign policy'.38 ther similar statements followed. Political commentator Piotr ss in an article entitled 'The Invasion of Manchuria and perialistic Competition' in Izvestia on 22 January, stated that he Manchurian Incident) . . . could give Japan the pretext to the Soviet state at any time now'.39 The 'Cornintern ive to the Communist Party of Japan' of 26 May 1932 was ost explicit on the possibility of a coordinated attack against the ommunist state: 'By making an attack in the Far East, Japanese mperialism is trying to create the necessary conditions for a simulaneous or subsequent attack by France and its vassals (Romania nd Poland) on the USSR from the west.'40 The Soviets were also concerned with the issue of hostile activities against their 'regime by former Russian tzarist ('white') officers based in Manchuria and led by former General Semyonov. In early 1932, the Soviets expressed to Ambassador Hirota their issatisfaction with the Japanese Army's organization of,'white' nits under its guidance. The Soviets complained that Japanese officials had stated that the white among the five colours of the flag of Manchukuo symbolized the 'whites'. It took Hirota three months in the winter of 1932 to convince the Soviets that there were no operative plans of any kind regarding the 'whites' on the part of Japan and its satellite. Even more disquieting for the Soviet Union were statements made by Japanese officers like the former military attach6 to Moscow, Colonel Kasahara Yukio, who, after his return to Tokyo, called for an early strike against the communist state to prevent it from undermining Japan's positions in the Far East. The Soviets uoted in particular an article written by Kasahara in the Asahi himbun on 29 March 1932, in which he described the situation in the Far East as follows:
The Soviet Union is strengthening its military power very rapidly and in the future it is bound to embark on aggressive policies in the Far East. . Japan must prepare in order to win a future war with the Soviet Union. . . Japan should aim for a quick victory at the ,end of which it should have advanced at least up to Lake ~aikal."

.. .

328

Journal of Contemporary Histq

By spring 1932, fearful that its appeasing policies toward Jap might not prevent war, the Sovlet Union started a series of fran activities at the diplomatic and military level. The Soviets too some steps that were antagonistic to Japan and thus rendered the policy toward Tokyo ambivalent, since they continued to displ their previous accommodating attitude. Three events that affect the Japanese directly stand out in this respect. First, in ear December 1932, the Soviets agreed to give shelter to 4000 Chine fighters who had fought against the Japanese in Manchuria sin 1931. Not only did the Russians refuse to heed Japanese deman to surrender the Chinese to the Kwantung Army, but they tran ferred them to European Russia, allowing them to return to Chi via Europe. The second event of much more immediate importance w renewal of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Nanki The situation seemed particularly delicate because of the possibi that the new Russo-Chinese ties might develop into an alliance. an article published three daya after the resumption of S Chinese relations entitled 'The Confusing Relationship be Japan-Manchuria and the Soviet Union', Japanese journal~st Nashimoto Yuji wrote: 'The restoration of diplomatic ties and the possibility of the signing of a non-aggression pact between Russia and China cast a shadow over the relations between Manchuria and Russia and especially those between Japan and the ~ o v i e t s . ' ~ During 1932, the Soviet Union also launched a renewed diplomatic offensive to gain recognition from the United States. The offensive was successful in the following year. The third event, which upset Japan most, was the unprecedented strengthening of the Soviet milltary capability in the areas adjacent to Manchuria and the Japanese mainland.43 The far-reaching military build-up undoubtedly was the most meaningful and longlasting new element in the emerging Soviet dualism toward Japan. Karl Radek, the Soviet politiccll commentator, in November 1932 published an analysis of the state of Soviet-Japanese relations that was carried by the Asahi Shimbun. Radek's main points of interest, that contained the new Soviet dualism toward Japan, were that Japan, like the Soviet Union, was endangered by American imperialism. Therefore, the two countries should cooperate closely. But, should Japan choose an adventuristic course in its Soviet policy, it should keep in mind that the communist state was very strong militarily and could easily smash any aggressor.

Kovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

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the easternmost part f Siberia, the Maritime Provinces (Primorie), and especially their outheastern flanks, became most important strategiof their proximity to Japan. Southern Primorie on northern Manchuria. Manchuria borders on vsk and Birobidjan, the Jewish Autonomous District, west lies the Chita district. In the eventuality of a attempt to overrun the Maritime Provinces by land, sk would have been the main target.44 The role of irobidjan was to defend Khabarovsk and the western part of morie. Even further to the west, the border town of Blagoalso of strategic importance, and on the western East with European ateway to the Eastern state in the Far East in the 1930s on its ability to establish a strong military ence in those areas. golia, to the south of Transbaikal, also possessed ic importance for Soviet defence. The Mongolian Soviet d in 1921 after the Red Army drove out the forces eral Baron Ungern, maintains until today a kind of tionship with Moscow that is almost identical to the one that ted between Japan and Manchukuo from 1932 to 1945. These rengthened during the 1930%were formally based on on-aggression and mutual defence pact signed in 1923. tressed that the huge area described here was not ain target of investment and development in the first e Year Plan. However, starting in the spring of 1932, it received Soviet government's attention, both economically and building of feeder lines from the Trans-Siberian 3 1, was accelerated in Maritime Provinces. among these railroads were: the Transbaikal line that Chita to Kalimskaya, the Amur line that ran through the k-Amur region and the Ussuri line from Khabarovsk to Manchurian border. In 1932, the Soviet government started struction of the Baikal-Amur (BAM) trunk line. Designed as a the Trans-Siberian, the new line ran for 2000 miles from shet, west of Lake Baikal, to the newly established of Komsomolsk in Primorie. The building of strategic highreatly intensified in the mountainous Yablonovy area in

330

Journal of Contemporary History,

the southwestern part of Primorie. New cities such as Komsomolsk and Voroshilov were hastily put up and industrial facilities built in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in order to lessen the economic dependence of the area on European Russia. Khabarovsk and Komsomolsk became the centres of the Soviet military industry in f' the Soviet Far East. Military defence measures in the area were also accelerated during this period. In the summer of 1932, static border defence lines between the Maritime Provinces and Manchukuo were set up: The lines were composed of reinforced concrete bunkers called t~chika.~' Military settlements called zemlyanka were established along the Manchurian border and kolkhoz-divisions (agricultural: communes manned by soldiers), one in the Western Amur region and another in the south of Primorie, were formed. Manned' mainly by kazakhs, the zemlyanka and kolkhoz-divisions w meant to provide border security as well as limited self-sufficie in agricultural products. On 11 December 1933, a new governm decree provided for exemption of the obligatory quotas to t for ten years for kolkhozes and five years for individual pea the Far East region. This step was aimed at attracting settlers to t sparsely populated area. Soldiers upon discharge were encoura and sometimes even forced to stay in Siberia. The military concentrations in the area were undertaken in manner that would capitalize on the advantageous strat position of Primorie to the Japanese mainland. In 1932-1933, Soviets quickly deployed into the area a great number of militar aircraft. This air build-up presented the Japanese military le ship with a major problem and caused significant changes in planning. Many airstrips were built in Eastern Primorie and a n three-engine middle-range bomber, the TB-5, was deployed in area. Long-range TB-3 bombers appeared in increasing numbers late 1932 in the central and northern parts of Primorie. Prior to Manchurian Incident, the Special Far Eastern Army contained divisions. By /ate spring of 1933, there were twelve Soviet divis~on in the area - seven of them in Primorie alone. Between 350 400 planes were also concentrated in Primorie and they faced m smaller Japanese forces.46The Kwantung and Korea Armies of t Japanese, confronting the Soviet Special Far Eastern Army, we outnumbered two to one - twelve divisions vis-8-vis six infantry and almost four to one in the air by 1933. It was only In armoured strength that the Japanese reduced the gap from five to one in 1932 to three to one in 1933.

Japanese Army

- Kwantung and Korea Armies - Forces

VS.

Soviet Special Far Eastern Army (SFEA) Forces Late 1931-Late 1933,

Infantry & Cavalry Divisions Japanese Army Late 1931 3 + 1 Japanese Army

Tanks Japanese Army 30

Planes

SFEA 5

SFEA

SFEA

+0
+2

50

250

200

Late 1932

5 + 1

100

Late 1933

5 + 1

10

+2

100

300

130

350-400

* On the Japanese side 'white'-Russian units organized by the Kwantung Army in Manchuria have not been taken into account. Regarding the Soviet concentrations, 'hidden' forces such as kolkhoz-based units manned by retired soldiers or kozakhs and having a rather auxiliary character have also been left out.

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Journal of Contemporary History :

By 1933, the strengthened SFEA was organized in three mai nuclei: 1) Primorie - the 19th Army Corps, stationed in vicinity of Vladivostok and Khabarovsk and composed of t divisions under the direct command of Marshal Bliicher. Fou other divisions were stationed to the west in the Spasskoe area. 2 Eastern Siberia and Transbaikal - three divisions and a tank forc of 300 machines. This force was headquartered in the town Chita. 3) The central area along the Amur River with Bla veshchensk as its main centre. Here there are two divisions and bulk of the tochika positions. Thus having completed the dramatic increase in Soviet milita capability in the Far East and, overall, by employing a policy o military deterrence combined with efforts to induce the Japanese sign a NAP and economic cooperation, Stalin hoped to prevent at least postpone an armed confrontation with Japan.

Notes

1. In 1929, Chinese forces belonging to Manchurian warlord Chang Hs were routed by the Soviet Far Eastern Army in the so-called Manchuli subsequently described in brief. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 invasion of northeastern China 2 pulverized Chiang Kai-shek's chances to complete unification of China, since it prevented him from bringing northern under his direct control. 2. In 1896 and 1898, Russia secured concessions to build a railroad which wou link Chita on the Trans-Siberian Railway with Vladivostok, through Chin territory. A branch line was then built which ran from Harbin to Dairen and Po Arthur in Manchuria. Construction of the line was completed in 1903 and it ca be known as the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). Eventually its southerli reached Chahar, its eastern extension the Russian border-town of Pogranich while its western branch, the longest, went up to Manchuli. After the RussoJapanese War, Japan acquired the southern portion of the railway, renaming it the South-Manchuria Railway. The rest of the line was first managed by Russia. After . the Bolshevik Revolution, however, until 1924, the CER was under international management with an American as top executive. The 1924 accord for the renewal of " diplomatic relations between Moscow and Nanking provided, for the first time, for joint management of the railway with a Soviet official as president. 3. The warlord may also have wanted to eliminate the Soviets from the area because they supported General Ma Chan-shan who had challenged him as well as his father Chang Tso-lin.

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5 ,

4. The short Manchuli confrontation may have encouraged those segments $within the Japanese military who carried out the takeover of Manchuria in 1931,

by Ishiwara Kanji and his fellow staff-officers in the Japanese tioned in northeastern China -the perpetrators of the Japanese uria - convincing them that the Chinese province could be

J, 7. Bbeich6 bbeikensh6jo senshishitsu, Kantbgun (The Japanese Defence Agency Research Institute, The Kwantung Army, Tokyo, Asagumosha 1969). 75. 8. Eudin-Slusser, op. cit., vol. I, 237; my italics. Calling Soviet foreign policy at the time Leninist was only a matter of convenience for Stalin and his backers. This was because of the unassailable prestige of the dead founder of the Soviet regime. It is quite safe to assume that in the ongoing struggle with Rotsky and his supporters, Stalin found it useful to employ the Leninist prestige to his advantage. In this case, historical fact was on Stalin's side, too, since the signing of the humiliating BrestLitovsk treaty was the result of Lenin's decision.
11. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 21 October 1926. ; 12. Morishima Morihito, Inbc ansatsu gunt6: gaikckan no kois13 (Intrigue, Murder and the Military: Reminiscences of a Foreign Ministry Officer) (Tokyo

19. The opposition of the Japanese Army Minister was prompted mainly by his deep concern over the massive concentration of Soviet troops along the Manchurian border and in the Soviet Maritime Provinces opposite the Japanese mainland. Araki suspected that in the mid-1930s, when its military reinforcement plans would have been completed, the Soviet Union would be apt to deal a heavy blow at Japan's preponderance in East Asia, taking advantage of the confrontation expected between Tokyo and Washington and London over the renewal of naval agreements. For the attitude of General Araki and the Japanese Army command toward the Soviet Union in the 1931-34 period see Jacob Kovalio, 'Araki Sadao, Japanese Army Factionalism and the Soviet Union', doctoral thesis, University of Pittsburgh
*.., 20.

The Soviets feared Japan's intentions even more than those of Germany following Hitler's coming to power. This feeling would continue even after the signing of the NAP in April 1941. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin did not reduce substantially the Soviet military capability in the Far East, fearing a Japanese invasion despite the April treaty.

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Journal of Contemporary History

21. In trying to alleviate Soviet suspicions of Japan's real plans, Hiro consistently reminded the Russians that in 1929, when the Soviet Union undert its punishment operation against Chang Hstieh-liang, Japan did not intervene. 22. Izvestia, 29 October 1931. 23. Gaimushd chhabu, Manshii jihen ik6 sogawa y5nin no tainichi (Foreign Ministry Research Section: Declarations by Important Soviet Pers regarding Japan since the Manchurian Incident, Tokyo, 1936), 2. 24. Ibid., 7. 25. Eudin-Slusser, vol. I, 347. 26. Ibid., vol. 11, 435. 27. K. Kawakami, Manchuria - The Child of Conflict (New York 1933), 78 ' 28. Manshiikokugun kano iinkal, Manshukokugun (The Committee for Commemoration of the Manchurian Army, The Manchurian Army, Tokyo 197 24. 29. Izvestia, 12 October 1932. 30. Harriet Moore, Soviet Foreign Policy: 1931-1945 (New York 1945), 72. :;J 3 1. Nishi Hanthiko, N k o kokkyg mondai (Problem in Japanese-Sovr Relations) (Tokyo 1 WO), 126. 32. Chlng Chung-wang, 'The Proposed Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway', The Asiatic Review, XXIX, 99 (July) 1933), 522. 33. Malcolm Kennedy, The Estrangement of Great Briloin and Japan (New York 1%9), 286. 34. Ching, op. cit., 520. 35. Ibid., 523. 36. In summer 1933, the Japanese Army Minister held a series of special

conferencesaimed at analyzing ways of dealing with the strategic threat posed by the intensive Soviet military concentrations in areas adjacent to the Japanese empire! Two approaches were presented: one calling for a preventive strike against the Soviet Union within the following two years and another, supported by Army Minister Araki himself, stressing deterrent policies. The second approach was adopted although the continuing clash of opinions caused an atmosphere of deep controversy within the high command. For detalls see Jacob Kovalio, 'The Personnel Policies of Army Minister Araki Sadao Re-examined', in P.G. O'Neill (ed.), Zkadition and Modern Japan (Tortenden 1981), 102-109. 37. Colonel Kawahara Naokazu in his book The Problem of the ManchurianSoviet Border (Tokyo 1939), mentioned that the Soviets, panicking at the Japa advance into northern Manchuria, In January 1932 blew up all the railroad bri in the area in an effort to slow down the Kwantung Army. The Soviets even have established a secret provisional government of the Far East which was to started its activities in the area had it come under direct threat; 33. 38. Nishi, op. cit., 218. 39. Izvestia, 22 January 1932. 40. Eudin-Slusser, vol. If, 441. 41. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun. 29 March 1932. 42. Nashimoto Yuji, 'Fukuzatsuks shita nichimanro kankei', Kaibd jidai (The Age of Analysis, March 1933), 37. 43. The Japan-Russia Almanac of 1932 mentioned that the rapid advancement off the Japanese Army into Manchuria and the Kwantung Army's support of Russiani 'whites' in the area were impeding good relations between Tokyo and Moscow.4
f

:' Kovalio: Stalinist Foreign Policy and Japan

335

the Japanese publication especially stressed Japan's own fears in which military build-up figured prominently: 'Soviet secret deals with China, more the far-reaching strengthening of its military power in the Far East ght the tension between the two countries to a climax and the possibility of as greatly increased.' 16. Kant6gun, op. cit., 189. the tochika see Hayashi SaburB, Kantdgun to kyokutd sorengun (The g Army and the Soviet Far Eastern Army) (Tokyo 1975), 72.

Jacob Kovalio is affiliated to the Aranne School of History at the University of Tel-Aviv. He is the author of The Preponderance of the Military in Japanese Politics in the I938 - a View (Mexico City 1976) and is at present working on a political biography of General Araki Sadao.