TAN v.

TROCIO 191 SCRA 764 (1990) Facts: o School owner and directress, Felicidad Barian Tan filed a complaint seeking disbarment of Atty. Galileo Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. o She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal counsel of the school, overpowered her inside the office and against her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. And as a result, she begot a son whom she named Jewel Tan. o She further alleged that he used to support Jewel but subsequently lost interest and stopped. o She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years from the incident because of Trocio threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband and due to the fact that she was married with eight children. o Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her family but denies he sexually assaulted her. o The lower Court and the Solicitor General completed the required pleadings and thus forwarded the case to the SC Issue: WON he had, in fact, sexually assaulted the Complainant, as a consequence of which the latter begot a child by him (and is thus a ground for Trocios disbarment for immoral conduct) Held: Complaint for disbarment dismissed o The court found insufficient basis for the allegations o The alleged threat to deport her husband could not hold because she admitted having lost contact with her husband when he learned of the respondents transgression that very same evening. The fear had thus become inexistent o Even after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the respondent with Trocio acting as her personal and familys legal counselas though nothing happened. o Complainants contention that Respondent continued supporting the child for several years for which reason she desisted from charging him criminally, has not been substantiate. In fact, the fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even be construed as condonation. It is likewise strange that an unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be called Jewel. o Witness, Elueterias (domestic help) testimony did not hold as how near she was to the crime scene, considering it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been shown. o Testimonies of Felicidad and witness Marilou (another domestic help) to show unusual closeness between Trocio and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity Pictures of Jewel and Trocio showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other is inconclusive evidence to prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of Complainants person. More importantly, Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should b in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok. BARRIENTOS v DAAROL FACTS Victoria BARRIENTOS is single, a college student and about 20 years and 7 months old during her relationship with Transfiguracion DAVID, a lawyer and the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative who was about 40 years old and married to SUMAYLO. Flashback Parang sine DAVID had been known by the BARRIENTOS family for quite some time being the former student of Victoria BARRIENTOS father and a former classmate of Victoria BARRIENTOS mother. DAVID courted BARRIENTOS and after a week of courtship, BARRIENTOS accepted DAVIDS love. At this time, DAVID was separated from his wife for 16 years. BARRIENTOS, with her parents permission, was DAVIDS partner during the Chamber Commerce affair. After the event and before going home, they parked the jeep at the beach and after the usual preliminaries (what a term), they consummated the sexual act. This was their set up until BARRIENTOS got pregnant. DAVID suggested abortion but BARRIENTOS disagreed. During her pregnancy until she gave birth, it was BARRIENTOS family who took care of her. BARRIENTOS then filed an administrative case against DAVID with the National Electrification Administration which was however dismissed. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE W/N DAVID SHOULD BE DISBARRED HELD YES, LACK GOOD MORAL CHARACTER --- A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT TO BE ABLE TO PRACTICE LAW RATIO From the records, it is indubitable that BARRIENTOS was never informed by DAVID of his real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by DAVID only after BARRIENTOS became pregnant. Moreover, DAVID misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been separated from his wife for 16 years and even dangled a marriage proposal. Interestingly enough, DAVID lived alone in Dipolog City though his son also studies in the same area. Moreover, he never introduced his son and went around with his friends as though he was never married. These circumstances belie DAVIDS claim that the BARRIENTOS family knew about his marital status at the very start of the courtship. But what surprises the Court is the perverted sense of DAVIDS moral values when he said that I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married. Worse, he even suggested abortion. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. DAVID having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action --- disbarment.

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997 PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent. Facts; Respondent a Justice of the Court of Appeals was charged with Bigamy by complainant and is being recommended for suspension from practice of law. Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz married each other pending the court's decision on the former's marriage. However, their relationship was shortlived as right after the marriage, the complainant left their would-be-honeymoon place after some unbearable utterances made by the respondent. Several months after, the complainant learned that respondent a subsequently married a certain Lydia Geraldez, thus, the basis of this complaint. Issue; WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of law. Ruling; Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court found the respondent engaging in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceiful conduct and recommends SUSPENSION with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter. CALUB Facts: o o o Issue: Can Atty Suller be disbarred? Held: Yes. Acquittal in a criminal case is not determinative of an administrative case for disbarment. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows that he lacks moral character to continue as officer of the court. The rape by a lawyer of his neighbors wife constitutes such serious moral depravity. v SULLER (page 19 book natin sa LE na blue) Atty Suller raped the wife of his neighbor Cristino Calub. A criminal complaint for rape was filed against Suller. A complaint for disbarment was also filed by Calub before the SC. The CFI acquitted Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Narag vs. Narag Facts: Atty. Narags spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite. IBP disbarred him, hence, this petition. Held: Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Figueroa vs. Barranco Facts: Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since their teens. Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son born out of wedlock. At this point (1964) Barranco promised Figueroa that he would marry her when he passes the bar examinations. After four takes, he finally passed but did not hold true to his promise of marriage. In 1971, their relationship ended. Years later, he married another woman. When Barranco was about to take his oath to enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to the court what happened between her and Barranco. Until 1988, Barranco has filed three motions to dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute and because for the past years, he has become elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has actively participated in various civic organizations and has acquired a good standing within his community while the case was pending. The court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended that Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa reappeared and intercepted the scheduled oath-taking of Barranco which led to its delay.

Issue: Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his oath despite the accusations of Figueroa. Held: Yes. The maintenance of an intimate relationship between a man and a woman, both of whom had no impediment to marry and voluntarily carried on with the affair, does not amount to a grossly immoral conduct even if a child was born out of the relationship. His previous acts may be said to be a question to his moral character but none of these are so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Her allegations that she was forced to have sexual relations with him cannot lie as evidenced by her continued cohabitation with him even after their child was born in 1964. The ignobleness of his treatment of Figueroa is sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he has been prevented from entering the profession he has worked so hard for.

Remedios Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar (293 SCRA 331) Facts: Respondent was previously dismissed as CFI judge for maintaining and cohabiting with his mistress. Despite this, he later married the same woman and had children with her. He even made statements displaying contempt for the SC and mocking the law and said court. Petitioner, his lawful wife, filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against her husband. IBP disbarred him. Held: Disbarred (ratio is the same as the Narag case). A judge is a visible representation of the law and, more importantly of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. A judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Likewise, an attorney is also invested with public trust. As officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. DE LOS REYES v AZNAR Facts: Delos Reyes filed a complaint against Atty. Aznar for gross immorality. It appears that Atty. Aznar raped Delos Reyes. From the evidence, it appears that Aznar was the Chairman of the Board of Southwestern University. Delos Reyes failed her Pathology subject. As such, she approached Aznar for reconsideration. Aznar assured her that she would pass. Despite her plea, she failed the subject. Aznar told Delos Reyes that she should go with him to Manila or else she will flunk. They went to Manila. After dining in a restaurant, Aznar raped her twice in the evening and thrice the next morning inside the Ambassador Hotel. Aznar denies all the allegations and says that when he went to Manila, he slept at the house of his friends. Issue: W/N Aznar is guilty of gross misconduct. Held: Aznar is guilty of gross misconduct. The court agrees with the Sol. Gen.s finding that Aznar committed gross misconduct. While Aznar denied having taken Delos Reyes to the Ambassador Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her, he did not present any evidence to show where he was on that date. It is the duty of the lawyer, whenever his moral character is put into question, to satisfy the court that he is fit and proper to enjoy continued membership in the bar. He cannot dispense with the high exacting moral standards of the profession. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle on to continue in the practice of law.

UI v BONIFACIO FACTS LESLIES side of the story LESLIE Ui married CARLOS and had 4 children with him Subsquently, LESLIE found out CARLOS was having illicit relations with Atty IRIS Bonifacio and begot a daughter CARLOS admitted this relationship with LESLIE who confronted IRIS IRIS told LESLIE everything was over between her and CARLOS However, LESLIE found out later the illicit relations continued and IRIS even had 2nd child with CARLOS LESLIE filed a complaint for disbarment against IRIS on ground of immorality IRIS side of the story Met CARLOS who represented himself as a bachelor with children by a Chinese woman with whom he had long been estranged CARLOS and IRIS got married in Hawaii Upon return to Manila, they did not live together because CARLOS wanted his children with the Chinese woman to gradually know and accept his marriage with IRIS When IRIS knew about the 1st marriage, she cut all ties with him In proceedings before the IBP Commission, LESLIE filed a motion to cite IRIS in contempt for making false allegations in her Answer to impress upon the IBP that her 1st child by CARLOS was within wedlock IRIS indicated in Answer she got married to CARLOS in Oct 22, 1985 However, Certificate of Marriage certified by State Registrar revealed that date of marriage was actually Oct 22, 1987 ISSUE W/N IRIS SHOULD BE DISBARRED HELD NO RATIO Immorality Requisites to admission to practice of law includes being a person of good moral character and possession of such must be continuous Loss of good moral character is a ground of revocation of the privilege of the practice of law In the case at bar, IRIS was imprudent in her personal affairs Circumstances existed which should have at least aroused her suspicion that something was amiss (i.e. not living together as husband and wife, children by another woman, etc) but she did not do anything about it However, the fact remains that IRIS relationship with CARLOS was clothed with marriage and cannot be considered immoral Moreover, such conduct to warrant disciplinary action must be grossly immoral that is so corrupt and false to constitute a criminal act or moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community RIS act of immediately distancing herself belies the alleged moral indifference and proves she has no intention of flaunting the law Hence, IRIS should not be disbarred False allegation Any normal bride would recall date and year of marriage Difficult to fathom how IRIS could forget the year of her marriage Moreover, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading especially in this case since IRIS had personal knowledge of facts stated therein Hence, IRIS should be reprimanded for attaching marriage certificate with an altered date

Lizaso vs Amante SHIRLEY CUYUGAN LIZASO, complainant, vs.ATTY. SERGIO AMANTE, respondent Facts; Complainant entrusted Att. Sergio Amante of P 5,000 as investment of which a return of 10% daily interest plus repayment of principal after two months were promised. Respondent failed to do so after several attempts of the complainant to recover the same. The investigation of the office of the Solicitor General showed the respondent submitting falsified documents claiming the complainant's loan of P 20,000 to him and that the amount of P 5,000 now in contest was just a repayment thereof. Issue; WON Atty Sergio Amante be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law. Ruling; The Supreme Court ruled to SUSPEND INDEFINITELY the respondent having been found engaging in unlawful, dishonest and immoral conduct citing Rule 191 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ VS ATTY. BENJAMIN GRECIA

42 SCAD 438 Legal Ethics Gross Misconduct
In 1990, Linda Aves was admitted to St. Lukes Hospital. Among the doctors who treated her was Dr. Alberto Fernandez. She was treated well hence she was sent home but then the next day she died together with her unborn child. Damaso Aves, husband, then filed a damage suit against the hospital and he impleaded the attending doctors which included Fernandez. Aves hired Atty. Benjamin Grecia to represent him. Grecia requested St. Luke to surrender before the court the medical records of Linda Aves. St. Luke complied and the medical records were delivered to the Clerk of Court. In the morning of July 16, 1991, Grecia went to the office of the clerk of court to borrow the said medical records. While Grecia was examining the said medical records, he tore in front of the Clerk and one office staff two pages from the medical records and then handed it back to the Clerk. The Clerk was stunned as she watched Grecia walk away. She then reported the incident to the judge. The judge immediately took action and the torn pages were eventually recovered as it turned out that Grecia handed the torn pages to someone else. Grecia was then administratively charged by Dr. Fernandez. Apparently, Grecia has been disbarred before. However, he was able to get to the good side of the Supreme Court hence he was reinstated to the profession. ISSUE: Whether or not Grecia should be disbarred again. HELD: Yes. Grecia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a lawyer, he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. Considering that this is his second offense, an incorrigible practitioner of dirty tricks, like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of an instrument to advance the ends of justice. By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR. Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on 04 October 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the matter. Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and motions from the Philippine Association of Law Schools and various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations in Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another examination on the subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or movants, among these reasons being the physical, emotional and financial difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on the subject were to be held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading out of the weight of Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge the results of the examinations on the basis only of the performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court, finding merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September 2003 resolution. In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the allocation of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to wit: Subject Original Adjusted Relative Adjusted Percentage Percentage Weight Relative Weight Weight Weight Political and International Law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53% Labor and Social Legislation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35% Civil law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53% Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%

Criminal law Remedial Law Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises

10% 20% 5%

11.765% 23.529%

2 4

2.35% 4.71%

5.882% 1 1.18% 100% 20% In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Investigating Committee: Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo Justice Vicente V. Mendoza The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage, the parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations. On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in the said examination.[1] Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken. Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003). In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and recommendations on or before December 15, 2003. The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Committee: Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations. The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7, 2003. The following witnesses appeared and testified at the investigation: 1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee; 2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug 3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law; 4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos; 5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez; 6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez; 7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center; 8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez; 9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman; 10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman; 11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity; 12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial Application, MlSO; The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation and three times to deliberate on its report. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee, testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day after the Bar examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in his office in the Supreme Court, his secretary,[2] Rose Kawada, informed him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that something was wrong with the examination in mercantile law, because previous to the examination, i.e., on Saturday afternoon, the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She did not pay attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she was

hard-pressed to finish her review of that subject, using other available bar review materials, of which there were plenty coming from various bar review centers. However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of them were the same questions that were asked in the just-concluded-examination. Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court, but Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that Marlo and Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them at Robinsons Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that. Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinsons Place at the appointed time and showed the test questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the leaked questions and compared them with the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the differences she noted between the leaked questions and the bar examination questions. Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who compared them with the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He found the leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to him as chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee. However, not all of those questions were asked in the bar examination. According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself, were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not among the leaked test questions. Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four days before the examination in mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1). ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the latter received the test questions from one of her co-bar reviewees staying, like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex Review Center gives them away for free to its bar reviewees. ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law firm of BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in commercial law. He accepted the assignment and almost immediately began the preparation of test questions on the subject. Using his personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was done inside his office with only him and his secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the latters office that afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitugs confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on it. He does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Palma who devised it (Id., p. 71). His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day only. He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Courts Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office, reported that there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other viaLocal Area Network (LAN) and one (1) stand-alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty. Balgos law partner, former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez took it away when he became the Secretary of Justice. The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos computer, are: 1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003) 2. Claravel Javier 3. Rolynne Torio 4. Mark Warner Rosal 5. Charlynne Subia 6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D]) 7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner 8. Concepcion De los Santos

9. Pamela June Jalandoni Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage. He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year law student at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and operating computers. It was he and/or his brother Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos computer, without the latters knowledge and permission. Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or bar ops of the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member, but he clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003). The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003). Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions and his proposed test questions, with marginal markings made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions are similar: (S); or different: (D), together with the percentage points corresponding to each question. On the basis of this comparative table and Atty. Balgos indications as to which questions were the same or different from those given in the final questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked questions. The proposed questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions. Attached to this Report as Annex A is the comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1. CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past six years, testified that she did not type the test questions. She admitted, however, that it was she who formatted the questions and printed one copy as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos testimony regarding her participation in the operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that what appears in Atty. Balgos computer can be seen in the neighborhood network if the other computers are open and not in use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty. Balgos computer when the latter is open and not in use. ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on October 16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him 72 hours to explain in writing why you should not be terminated for causing the Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of the leakage aforesaid. On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation effective immediately. He explained that: Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved condemnation and humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of, my mind. It is just unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though, that I have never been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and integrity of the firm, its partners and members. (Exh. D) DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an awardee for academic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU (Mindanao State University). As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and participated in the fraternitys bar ops. He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos computer, (which he often did without the owners knowledge or permission), to download materials which he thought might be useful to save for future use, he found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might be preparing. He saved them in his hard disk. He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity brods, a certain Ronan Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but did not pass. On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination, De Guzman faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was informed by Garvida that he was retaking the bar examinations. He advised Garvida to share the questions with other Betan examinees. He allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions. Later, after the examination was over, Garvida texted (sent a text message on his cell phone) him (De Guzman), that he did not take the bar examination. Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another fraternity brother named Arlan (surname unknown), through Reynita (Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the questions to still another brod named Erwin Tan who had helped him during the bar ops in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p. 28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by text message, that they were guide questions, not tips, in the mercantile law examination. When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination, (news of the leakage was already in all the newspapers), De Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the test questions. De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received the test questions. However, Erwin informed him that the questions were kalat na kalat (all over the place) even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29, 2003).

De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain. Arlan also texted De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the examination. Erwin Tan commented that many of the leaked questions were asked in the examination, pero hindi exacto; mi binago (they were not exactly the same; there were some changes). De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response. De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, and through selfstudy, by asking those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers since 1997, and he bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses at home. REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her participation in the reproduction and transmittal by fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De Guzman. RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32 years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling disease although it may have periods of remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands and fingers may tremble in performing simple actions; the eyesight can be impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2, Readers Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.). All these symptoms were present when Garvida testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions regarding his involvement in the leakage of the examiners test questions in mercantile law. Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior by one and a half years. Although they had been out of touch since he went home to the province on account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number from his compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him possible questions in the bar examination in mercantile law. Because the test questions had no answers, De Guzman stressed that they were not tips but only possible test questions. Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in the Consortium Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee. However, on his way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take the bar examination, he suffered pains in his wrist - symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician advised him to go to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did. He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to attend the review classes at the Consortium Review Center because he did not want to waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course (Nahihinayang ako). That was presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test questions in mercantile law. Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his brod Randy Iigo who was reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied them for distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the test questions, but Randy who has a high regard for De Guzman, believed that the questions were tips. Garvida did not fax the questions to any other person than Randy Iigo. He allegedly did not sell the questions to Randy. I could not do that to a brod, he explained. In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the left margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials BEA-MLQU, indicating that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU. RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity conducted Bar Ops for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the biggest activity of the fraternity every year. They start as soon as new officers of the fraternity are elected in June, and they continue until the bar examinations are over. The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from alumni brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for the use of their barristers (bar candidates) in the various review centers, providing meals for their brod-barristers on examination days; and to rent a bar site or place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat members can convene and take their meals during the break time. The Betans bar site for the 2003 bar examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start of the examination, Collados fraternity distributed bar review materials for the mercantile law examination to the examinees who came to the bar site. The test questions (Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iigo. Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials of the fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU examinees taking the bar exams. Because of time constraints, frat members were unable to answer the test questions despite the clamor for answers, so, they were given out as is - without answers. DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong City, was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical Exercises at theLex Review Center which is operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He learned about the leakage of test questions in mercantile law when he was delivering the preweek lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked questions were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture in mercantile law because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied having bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center. F I N D I N G S

The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked questions before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have been assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%! The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman. Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin Tan. In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain. Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQUBeta Sigma [Lambdas] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar candidates. Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions in mercantile law from the latters computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge. Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos right to privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution). He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduates academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law. However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the assistance and cooperation of other persons, such as: Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos himself, was the only person who knew the password, who could open and close his computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a computer may not be accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must have opened Atty. Balgos computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein. Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos computer with the other computers outside Atty. Balgos room or office, and who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of Atty. Balgos computer. The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked test questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the sale of the test questions. They could not have been motivated solely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was widespread (kalat na kalat) according to Erwin Tan. The possible coconspirators were: Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, Ronald Collado, and Allan Guiapal The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked his job and future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations. On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine which he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to deep

secret the test questions that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use the password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the machine whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its use for so sensitive an undertaking as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home, (instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the proximate cause of the bar leakage; it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would not have been sullied by the scandal. He admitted that Malisiguro ako, but that was what happened (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). R E C O M M E N D A T I O N This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers: Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the profession. In another case, it likewise intoned: We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. (Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer who violates this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the publics respect for the legal profession, should be disciplined. After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that: 1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in another bar scandal, causing the cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution. 2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a result of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the leakage of Attorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject. 3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law. With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Courts Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would be welladvised to refrain from including in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter.[3] The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation, of the Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will not countenance any act or conduct that can impair not only the integrity of the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court. The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of its employees assigned to the Management Information Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the Courts Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR) database[4] was installed in the computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the system, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The installation thereof to any external computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Velasco informed the two Court employees that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De Guzman on the computer being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would also need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to obtain a copy of the Courts CALR database. WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to (1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION; (2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile Law; (3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar examination leakage and to conduct an investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database. Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of thePhilippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Office of the Court Administrator to all courts. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006 FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. x--------------------------------x G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006 VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, CJ: This Court defers to the Sandiganbayans evaluation of the factual issues. Not having heard any cogent reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-graft courts findings. In any event, after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no ground to reverse the Sandiganbayan. The Case Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review1 assailing the March 8, 2002 Decision,2 and the January 33 and 14, 20034 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20194. Francisco SB. Acejas III and Vladimir S. Hernandez were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III and Jose P. Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an Information that reads thus: "That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ and VICTOR CONANAN, being then employed both as Immigration officers of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating with Senior Police Officer 3 EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District Command, Manila, together with co-accused Atty. FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW OFFICES, and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses BETHEL GRACE PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the return of the passport of said Japanese Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and out of said demand, the complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and delivered the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos in marked money to the above-named accused at a designated place at the Coffee Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond Hotel, Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said complainants in the aforesaid amount of P25,000.00, and to the prejudice of government service." 5 After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged Decision disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, Expedito S. Perlas and Francisco SB. Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00). Accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and Victor D. Conanan shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. Costs against the accused. "On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The surety bond he posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold Departure Order against him embodied in this Courts Order dated July 24, 2000 is recalled."6 The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other accused. The second Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas Motion for New Trial. Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7 The Facts The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows: "At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to the house of Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila. His purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12 dated December 13, 1993, issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints against him in Japan and that he was suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien. "To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez who issued an undertaking (Exh. B) which Aoyagi signed. The undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi promised to appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a guarantee for his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez acknowledged receipt of the passport. "On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito Dick Perlas 9 and informed him about the taking of her husbands passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he would refer their problem to his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas introduced the Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario. They discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December 20, 1993.

"As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty. Rufino M. Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance (Exh. 6 Acejas). Atty. Margate requested for copies of any complaintaffidavit against Takao Aoyagi and asked what the ground was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagis passport. "Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. 5 Hernandez) which was submitted to Ponciano M. Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that Takao Aoyagi, who was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under custodial investigation. "In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty. Francisco Acejas III who was then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would be he who would handle their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. D) dated December 22, 1993 was entered into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented the Lucenario Law Firm. "In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the Domestic Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas P40,000.00, P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket fee (Exh. O). The Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the morning flight was postponed. "On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her brother, Filomeno Jun Pelingon, Jr., about her husbands passport. "On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao and told the latter of Takao Aoyagis problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card and told Pelingon to call him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs. Aoyagi flew back to Manila. "On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic Conanan and Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard. "Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with Jun Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending. "On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao Aoyagis passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica Somera, an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the NBI, and Atty. Somera who arranged the entrapment operation. "On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the Coffee Shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked money representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas, Acejas and Victoriano were brought to the NBI Headquarters."10 Version of the Prosecution Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno "Jun" Basaca Pelingon, Jr., and Carlos Romero Saunar.11 The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5, 1994, when P1 million as consideration for the passport was demanded. Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a drug trafficker and Yakuza member. The money was to be used to settle the alleged "problem" and to facilitate the processing of a permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to lower the amount demanded, Conanan stated that there were many of them in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). 12 During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the press and government enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial payment of P300,000, but Pelingon said that the whole amount would be given at just one time to avoid another meeting.13 After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,14 Pelingon called up Dick Perlas to schedule the exchange. Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adds the following facts: "1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the Aristocrat Restaurant. [Acejas] informed Pelingon that he would file a P1 million lawsuit against the BID agents who confiscated the passport of Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed Pelingon several papers, which allegedly were in connection with the intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and Conanan arrived at the Aristocrat Restaurant, [Acejas] never mentioned to the BID agents the P1 million lawsuit. [Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside his [Acejas] bag. "1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi pay the amount of P1 million in exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao) in securing a permanent visa in the Philippines. [Acejas], who was Aoyagis lawyer, did nothing. "1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the Hotel Nikko. Thereat, Hernandez informed the group that certain government officials and even the press were after Takao Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment of P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi would pay in full the amount of P1 million so as not to set another meeting date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout the negotiations. xxx xxx xxx "1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond Hotel. Hernandez handed the passport to [Acejas], who handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to Takao Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport, Bethel Grace handed to Hernandez the envelope 15 containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused and motioned that [Acejas] be the one to receive it. [Acejas] willingly got the envelope and placed it beside him and Perlas. x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagis pass- port, he reminded the group of their earlier agreement of kaliwaan, i.e., that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1 million."16 Version of the Defense

Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan and Ponciano M. Ortiz testified for the defense.17 To the Sandiganbayans narration, Hernandez adds: "6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), went to the house of Private Respondents Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce and serve a Mission Order issued and assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio on December 13, 1993, for the arrest of Takao Aoyagi. "7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husbands passport, [Hernandez] found out that the latters [authority] to stay had already been duly extended. He invited private respondents to go with him to the BID office. They declined, but made a written undertaking to appear at the BID office for investigation on December 20, 1993. As security for said undertaking, Bethel Grace Aoyagi entrusted to [Hernandez] her husbands passport, receipt of which [Hernandez], in return, acknowledge[d] in the same instrument. "8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of Aoyagi has been cleared and that he can pick up his passport at the BID office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez] was invited by Perlas to make the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond Hotel Coffee Shop. Upon arrival thereat, [Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas, Aoyagis counsel, and within less than ten minutes, he left the coffee shop."18 In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows: "1. 18th December 1993 The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco & Acejas was engaged by the spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi. x x x. xxx xxx xxx "3. 22nd December 1993 "a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas] about the facts regarding the confiscation by agents of the BID of the passport belonging to a Japanese client. x x x. "b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to meet his brother-in-law Mr. Expedito Perlas, who happened to be a policeman and a friend of Mr. Takao Aoyagi. Thus, [Acejas] met Mr. Perlas for the first time in the afternoon of this date. "c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the Diamond Hotel, where they were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that the law firm decided that the clients can file an action for Replevin plus Damages for the recovery of the Japanese passport. "d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client and the law firm, thru [Acejas] as partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php.50,000.00) was agreed to be paid by way of Case Retainers/Acceptance Fees, which was supposed to be payable upon (the) signing (t)hereof, and the sum of Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance fee. However, the client proposed to pay half only of the acceptance fee (Php.25,000.00), plus the estimated judicial expenses for the filing or docket fees (Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further agreed that the balance of Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be given upon the successful recovery of the Japanese passport. "e) The clients informed [Acejas] that they are supposed to leave for Davao the following day on the 23rd because they will spend their Christmas in Davao City; but they promised that they will be back on the 26th, which is a Sunday, so that on the 27th, which is a Monday, the complaint against the BID officers will have to be filed in Court. xxx xxx xxx "6. 27th December 1993 (T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas that the Japanese did not come back on the 26th (December), x x x so that the case cannot be filed on the 27th instead (it has) to wait for clients instruction. "7. 4th January 1994 In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone call from Mr. Perlas informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and he was requesting for an appointment with any of the lawyer of the law firm on January 5, 1994. "8. 5th January 1994 [Acejas] met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon Jr. including a certain Nimoto Akira. x x x. "b) [Acejas] told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but, of course, the Japanese client and the wife should first read the complaint and sign if they want to pursue the filing of the complaint against the BID agents. "c) For the first time, Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the case. x x x He instead suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the BID agents. "d) Thereafter, Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID agent who confiscated the Japanese passport. Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon were able to contact the BID agent. "e) For the first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez, when the latter arrived and also accused Victor Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a confrontation ensued between [Acejas] and [Hernandez] concerning the legal basis for the confiscation of the passport. [Acejas] demanded for the return of the Japanese passport x x x. Mr. Hernandez said that if there are no further derogatory report concerning the Japanese client, then in a matter of week (from January 5 to 12), he will return the passport. "f) [Acejas] gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese passport will not be returned in one (1) weeks time, then (the law firm) will pursue the filing of the replevin case plus the damage suit against him including the other BID agents. "g) x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing thereof saying that his Japanese brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in his own words magbibigay naman [i.e. will give money anyway]. "9. 8th January 1994 "a) Again, Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the Japanese client is now in Manila. Petitioner attended the meeting they arranged in (Makati) and meet Dick Perlas, Vladimir Hernandez and Pelingon Jr. x x x. "b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with anybody because anyway they are willing to pay or negotiate.

"c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] met him for the second time. x x x [Acejas] said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to return the passport on or before January 12, 1994, then the law firm will have no choice but to file the case against him x x x. Again, for the third time Mr. Pelingon warned against the filing of the case because he said that he would directly negotiate with the BID agents. "d) The Makati meeting ended up with the understanding that Mr. Hernandez will have to undertake the return [of] the Japanese passport on or before January 12, 1994. "10. 12th January 1994 "a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was already in Manila and was requesting for an appointment with the lawyers at lunchtime of January 12 at the Diamond Hotel where he was billeted. xxx xxx xxx "c) x x x x x x x x x "At this meeting, the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and he was wondering why the Japanese passport is not yet recovered when according to him he has already paid for the attorney fees. And so, [Acejas] explained to him that the case has to be filed and they still have to sign the complaint, the Special Power of Attorney and the affidavit relative to the filing of replevin case. But the Japanese would not fully understand. So, Pelingon Jr. again advised against the filing of the case saying that since there is no derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the BID office, then the BID agents should return the Japanese passport. xxx xxx xxx "e) Thereafter, Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr. Hernandez. Since, they were able to contact the latter, we waited until around 2:00 p.m.. When Mr. Hernandez came, he said that the Japanese client is cleared at the BID office and so, he can return the Japanese passport and he gave it to [Acejas]. x x x When [Acejas] received the Japanese passport, (he) checked the authenticity of the documents and finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted to give it to the Japanese client. "Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to the Japanese across the table, the Japanese was motioning and wanted to get the passport under the table. x x x [Acejas] found it strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to receive things like that under the table. But nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the table and instead passed it on to Mr. Dick Perlas who was seated at (his) right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from [Acejas] and finally handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi. x x x. After that, there was a little chat between Mr. Hernandez and the client, and Mr. Hernandez did not stay for so long and left. "Still, thereafter, (w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and [Acejas] were talking and she said since the Japanese passport had been recovered, they are now willing to pay the Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee. "Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr. Hernandez to receive it while Mr. Hernandez was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive it. "Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope. xxx xxx xxx "Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was signaling something as if there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas] immediately stood up and left hurriedly. When [Acejas] approached Mr. Victoriano, he said that the car which [Acejas] parked in front of the Diamond Hotel gate, somebody took the car. [Acejas] went out and checked and realized that it was valet parking so it was the parking attendant who took the car and transferred the car to the parking area. [Acejas] requested Mr. Victoriano to get (the) envelope and the coat, at the table. "g) When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking attendant to get the car. When the car arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose Victoriano and Mr. Dick Perlas coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI agents." They then were taken to the NBI, except the accused Vladimir Hernandez." 19 Ruling of the Sandiganbayan The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery,20 as well as conspiracy in the commission of the crime,21 had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;22 Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants;23 and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave it to Perlas.24 Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.25 Although he had picked up the envelope containing the payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other accused.26 The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was the balance of the law firms legal fees.27 If he had indeed believed that the money was payable to him, he should have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had merely been pretending to protect his clients rights when he threatened to file a suit against Hernandez.28 The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for Reconsideration of Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to be present during the meetings on January 8 and 12, 1994.29 His presence during one of those meetings, on January 5, 1994, did not conclusively show his participation as a coconspirator. The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas Supplemental Motion, which prayed for a new trial. The Issues Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues: "I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part of the conspiracy to extort money from private respondents, despite lack of clear and convincing evidence.

"II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it overlooked the fact that the legal requisites of the crime are not completely present as to warrant [Hernandez] complicity in the crime charged. "III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled erroneously when it relied solely on the naked and uncorroborated testimonies of the late Filomeno Jun Pelingon, Jr. in order to declare the existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as the guilt of the accused. "IV. Whether or not [respondent] courts acquittal of co-accused Victor Conanan and its conviction of [Hernandez] for the offense as charged effectively belies the existence of a conspiracy. "V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it found [Hernandez] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery." 30 On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points: "1. The Conspiracy Theory 2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to clients cause; lawful performance of duties 3. Instigation not entrapment 4. Credibility of witness and testimony 5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of the accused 6. Elements of bad faith 7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery) 8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence"31 In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points they raised are therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly. The Courts Ruling The Petitions have no merit. Main Issue: Finding of Guilt The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official duties.32 Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.33 Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly, he was merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate Takao Aoyagi.34 The passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at the BID office, but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.35 The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who had taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi.36 On various dates,37 he met with Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on the payoff,38 during which he directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.39 Bethel Grace Aoyagis testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded as follows: "PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR: "Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened? "A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty. Acejas, sir. "Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas? "A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir. "Q: After that, what happened? "A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir. "Q: The passport? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or what did Mr. Aoyagi do? "A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir. xxxxxxxxx "Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the passport? "A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would give the money so when Mr. Perlas handed to my husband the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to my husband and he passed it to Mr. Hernandez who refused the same. "ATTY. ACEJAS: "Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness referred to the money it pertains to the brown envelope which allegedly contains the money x x x . "AJ ESCAREAL: "Noted. "PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR: "Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope? "A: No, sir.

"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do? "A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas. "Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything? "A: None, sir, he just motioned like this. "INTERPRETER: "Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right. "PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR: "Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom? "A: Expedito Perlas, sir. "Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: After that, what happened? "A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir. "Q: And then, what happened? "A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.] Mr. Vlademir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the envelope, sir."40 Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or his representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held outside the BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was not a standard operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations.41 It can readily be inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some time despite the absence of any legal purpose. Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanans acquittal.42 While the testimony of Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy,43 there was an abundance of evidence showing Hernandezs involvement. Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the prosecutions version that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the passport.44 According to him, he kept giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport, with threats to file a court case. Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by Spouses Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have just been a charade and was in fact belied by Pelingons testimony regarding the January 5, 1994 meeting: "ATTY. VALMONTE: "Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas? "A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of me, sir. xxxxxxxxx "Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty. Acejas was showing you documents that he was going to file [a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you were talking with each other, Atty. Acejas also threatened, reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a] P1 million damage suit should Hernandez [fails] to return the passport? "A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit] was not [anymore] mentioned, sir."45 Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his clients behalf, he still failed to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified that he had received the purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony of Bethel Grace Aoyagi: "Prosecutor Montemayor: xxxxxxxxx "Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do? "A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas. "Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything? "A: None, sir, he just motioned like this. "Interpreter: "Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right. "Prosecutor Montemayor: "Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?

"A: Expedito Perlas, sir. "x x x x x x x x x "Q: After that, what happened? "A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir. "Q: And then, what happened? "WITNESS: "A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.] Mr. Vladimir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the envelope, sir. "Prosecutor Montemayor: "Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the envelope? xxxxxxxxx "A: Victoriano, sir."46 Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firms legal fees. That it was given to Hernandez immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that the money was a consideration for the return. Moreover, Acejas should have kept the amount if he believed it to be his. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayans pronouncement on this point: "x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee, how come he passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that the same did not contain the balance of the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained it. Moreover, the three prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to Hernandez who refused to accept the same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not for the balance of the acceptance fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez. xxxxxxxxx "Acejas defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left immediately after the brown envelope was given to him was uncorroborated. He should have presented accused Victoriano to corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who allegedly called him and caused him to leave their table. This, he did not do. The ineluctable conclusion is that he was, indeed, in cahoots with his co-accused."47 Lawyers Duty Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship with the complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest48 and had the right to be present when the passport was to be returned.49 True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His presence at Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified. This fact, however, does not support his innocence Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of the payoff, but did nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated that he was to get a share. Thus, he received the money purporting to be the payoff, even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was a conspirator. The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics50 when confronted by public officers who extort money. Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities.51 If the extortion is directed at the client, they must advise the client not to perform any illegal act. Moreover, they must report it to the authorities, without having to violate the attorney-client privilege.52 Naturally, they must not participate in the illegal act.53 Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists. Instigation Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame them into accepting the payoff.54 Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons into the commission of an offense in order to prosecute them.55 As opposed to entrapment, criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator.56 There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed an extortion attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had arranged for the payoff. During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate Justice Escareal clarifying question as follows: "AJ ESCAREAL: "[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport to your husband? "A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to abide with the agreement that upon handing of the passport, the money would also be given immediately (magkaliwaan)."57 Alleged Discrepancies According to Acejas, Pelingons testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit, Supplemental-Affidavit, inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of Desistance were contradictory.58 He cites these particular portions of Pelingons Affidavit: "5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I might be prosecuting innocent men, I have decided on my own disposition, not to further testify against any of the accused in the Sandiganbayan or in any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of action. "6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily executed, and that no reward, promise, consideration, influence, force or threat was executed to secure this affidavit."59 Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a threat to his life. 60 He did not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to him. Allegedly, his true testimony was in the first Complaint-Affidavit that he had executed.61

By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit of Desistance. An affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive evidence given on the witness stand.62 Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly inconsistent. The Court therefore adopts the Sandiganbayans finding that these were minor details that were not indicative of the lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses.63 People v. Eligino64 is in point: "x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their testimony completely discarded as worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing statements neither dilute the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Thus, inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not, in any way, destroy the credibility of witnesses, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and unrehearsed."65 Suppression of Evidence Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money was supposedly demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a witness.66 The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People. 67 The freedom to devise a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the prosecution.68 Necessarily, its decision on which evidence, including which witnesses, to present cannot be dictated by the accused or even by the trial court. 69 If petitioners believed that Takao Aoyagis testimony was important to their case, they should have presented him as their witness.70 Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence was not resolved by the Sandiganbayan.71 In that Comment/Objection, he had noted the lateness in the filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence. It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas Comment/Objection was deemed immaterial. It could not overrule the finding of guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that the Sandiganbayan needed to act upon.72 Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court. 73 We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence adduced in this case. In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties. For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as principals. 74 The evidence shows that the parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design. 75 The act of one is the act of all. WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice Chairman, First Division WE CONCUR: CONSUELO Associate Justice YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA Asscociate Justice AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

ROMEO J. Associate Justice

CALLEJO,

SR.

(No part. Ponente MINITA V. Asscociate Justice

of

assailed Resolutions) CHICO-NAZARIO

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

A.M. No. P-06-2177 June 27, 2006 (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC) RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR . RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This administrative case is a result of the audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the books of accounts of Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar. The audit covered the period March 1985 to October 31, 2005. The OCA, in its memorandum dated April 18, 2006, had the following findings: (1) there was a shortage ofP545.00 in remittances to the General Fund; (2) a cash shortage of P24.00 in the Sheriffs General Fund; and (3) Atty. Kho did not deposit on time in the authorized depository bank the collections for the Fiduciary Fund (P60,000) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (P5,000). It also noted that Atty. Kho had already restituted the P545.00 and P24.00 cash shortages. Regarding the delayed remittance of the amount of P60,000 representing the amount of a confiscated cash bond, Kho explained that the Land Bank of the Philippines (the authorized depository bank) had no branch in their locality. The nearest Land Bank branch was approximately 95 kilometers away so it was his practice to keep his collections in the courts safety vault. On the other hand, the amount of P5,000 was collected as filing fee for an election protest. According to Kho, this was collected under Rule 40 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure. In defense, he presented a letter addressed to Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao inquiring where to remit said amount. The OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, responded that pending official instructions on how to manage the money collected under Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules, it was to be treated as trust deposits and temporarily deposited in the Fiduciary Fund. 1 However, Kho failed to do this. Consequently, the audit team advised him to deposit the P5,000 in the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund as provided under Sec. 21 (g) of the amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004.2 He was also advised to deposit the confiscated P60,000 cash bond in the Judicial Development Fund account. He complied with both directives on November 15, 2005. On January 26, 2006, the OCA received a letter-complaint with the information that Kho, along with his alleged common-lawwife, stenographer Riza Amor L. Libanan, was engaged in lending out to court employees money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interest earned. The OCA found Kho liable for violating OCA Circular No. 8A-933 dated April 21, 1993 when he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. All clerks of lower courts are supposed to deposit all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections with the Land Bank upon receipt thereof. Thus, it recommended that (1) the audit report be docketed as a regular administrative complaint against Kho and (2) a fine in the amount ofP10,000 be imposed on him. We agree with the OCAs recommendations. Public office is a public trust.4 Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.5 Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.6 A clerk of court, aside from being the custodian of the courts funds, revenues, property and premises, is also entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds.7 Safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to an orderly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. 8 Clerks of court have always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.9 Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. This was inexcusable because he could have purchased postal money orders from the local post office payable to the chief accountant, Accounting Division, FMO-OCA. The money could have earned interest had he not kept them in the vault for over a year. 10 As found by the OCA, although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds. The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary.11 Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. However, Kho showed remorse by immediately restituting the cash shortages and complying with the directives of the audit team. And considering that this is his first offense, we find that the penalty of P10,000 fine is sufficient. We note that Kho has already transferred to the Department of Justice. However, it neither renders this matter moot nor frees him from liability. Moreover, his misconduct reflects on his fitness as a member of the bar. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1,12 Rule 1.0113 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he should explain why no further disciplinary sanction should be imposed on him. WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for his failure to make timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000 within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution. Atty. Kho is further ordered to SHOW CAUSE within the same period why he should not be disciplined for such misconduct as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. SO ORDERED.

Advincula vs. Atty. MacabataAC No. 7204March 07, 2007 Facts: The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabataon the grounds of Gross Immorality.The complainant sought for legal advice from the respondent regarding hercollectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed to settle its accountswith the complainant. Thus, the possibility of filing a case against Queensway Traveland Tours was discussed.After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ridehome. As the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm,kissed her cheek and embraced her tightly.Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. Onthe road, the complainant felt sleepy for no obvious reason. The respondentsuddenly stopped the car in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.This time, the respondent forcefully held her face, kissed her lips and held her breast.The complainant managed to escape and decided to hire another lawyer for hercase. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the respondent apologized.The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered thatthere was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything wasspontaneous. Issues: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or whichconstitute serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension fromthe practice of law Decision: The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship andcamaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of the respondent,though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on thelips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable,cannot be considered grossly immoral.The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her.However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor.The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, foralleged immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent andcautious in dealing with his clients. Roberto soriano vs. Atty. Manuel dizon Facts: This is a case of disbarment filed against the accused due to his conviction of frustrated homicide. The case stemmed from a traffic altercation by the respondent with the complainant. In the course of their trouble, respondent was able to hit the neck of the complainant by his revolver making the complainant physically paralyzed. The manner which the respondent attacked the complainant and a credible corroboration of witnesses as to the crime lead the conviction of the respondent of the said crime but later the rtc suspended the sentence by granting the respondent a probation. Respondent banking his defense on a concocted story and alibi which later disregarded by the court due to existence of credible documentary and testimonial evidence. Issue: whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude? Whether his conviction warrants disbarment? Ruling: The court resolved the matter by declaring the actuation of the respondent in the crime of frustrated homicide involved moral turpitude. The court also consider the rtcs findings of treachery as a further indications of skewed morals of respondent. It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed canon 1 of the code of profession of responsibility thru his possession of an unlicensed fire arm and his unjust refusal to satisfy civil liabilities. The court remind him both the attorneys oath and code of professional responsibility. The appalling vindictiveness and, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as member of the bar. Thus the court disbarred the respondent and ordered the name of the latter be stricken from the roll of attorneys. PRISCILA L. TOLEDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERLINDA ABALOS, respondent. RESOLUTION MELO, J.: This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back. On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment of said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit B). After the lapse of six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline. On February 1, 1995, the Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer the complaint. On August 17, 1995, Investigating Commissioner Benjamin B. Bernardino, issued an order setting the case for hearing on September 29, 1995 at 2 p.m. Despite due notice, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly, complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after which, the case was considered submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as shown by the registry return. However, she again did not do anything about it. On June 19, 1999, the Commission passed a resolution recommending the suspension from the practice of law of respondent for a period of six months for her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer. The Commission, however, declined to discipline her for failing to meet her financial obligation, the same having been incurred in her private capacity.

We agree with the Commission that respondent may not be disciplined either by the IBP or by this Court for failing to pay her obligation to complainant. Complainants remedy is to file a collection case before a regular court of justice against respondent. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 569 [1923]; Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]). We, however, find the recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months to be grossly disproportionate to the act complained of ,i.e., her failure to appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. With her legal knowledge and expertise, respondent may have known all along that the Commission has no jurisdiction over a complaint for collection of a sum of money which she borrowed in her private capacity. Hence, her adamant refusal to appear before said body. We do not, of course, ignore the fact that by virtue of ones membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. However, as the complaint lodged against the respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act that she committed in the exercise of her profession, the IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline respondent. As the Commission on Bar Discipline correctly suggested, complainants remedy is to file the necessary collection case in court for her to recover the amount respondent owed her. It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for one month is warranted. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished all courts of the land and the Office of the Bar Confidant. This Resolution shall likewise be spread on the personal record of respondent attorney. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, andYnares-Santiago, JJ., concur. A.C. No. 3919 January 28, 1998 SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO, respondent. BELLOSILLO, J.: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Socorro T. Co, a businesswoman, against Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino charging him with unprofessional and unethical conduct indicating moral deficiency and unfitness to stay in the profession of law. Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was following up the documents for her shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino, introducing himself as someone holding various positions in the Bureau of Customs such as Executive Assistant at the NAIA, Hearing Officer at the Law Division, and OIC of the Security Warehouse. Respondent offered to help complainant and promised to give her some business at the Bureau. In no time, they became friends and a month after, or in November of the same year, respondent succeeded in borrowing from complainant P120,000.00 with the promise to pay the amount in full the following month, broadly hinting that he could use his influence at the Bureau of Customs to assist her. To ensure payment of his obligation, respondent issued to complainant several postdated Boston Bank checks: No. 092601 dated 1 December 1989 for P21,950.00, No. 092602 dated 4 December 1989 for P6,750.00, No. 092615 dated 15 January 1990 for P65,000.00 and No. 092622 dated 15 January 1990 for P10,000.00 (Exhs. "A-3," "B," "C," "D," respectively). Respondent also issued a postdated Urban Development Bank check No. 051946 dated 9 January 1990 for P5,500.00 (Exh. "E"). However, the checks covering the total amount of P109,200.00 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of account. Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant that he would be able to pay her if she would lend him an additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be secured by a chattel mortgage on his Datsun car. 1 As complainant agreed respondent handed her three (3) copies of a deed of chattel mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6) copies of the deed of sale of his car with the assurance that he would turn over its registration certificate and official receipt. The agreement was not consummated as respondent later sold the same car to another. Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation respondent chose to evade complainant altogether so that she was constrained to write him a final demand letter dated 22 September 1992 2 preceding the filing of several criminal complaints against him for violation of BP Blg. 22. 3 Complainant 4 also filed a letter-complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of the Ombudsman. It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed several criminal and civil cases against respondent similarly involving money transactions. 5 Ms. Ortiz claimed that respondent had volunteered to sell to her a 20-footer container van filled with imported cotton fabric shirting raw materials from the Bureau of Customs warehouse for P600,000.00 in time for the holidays. However, despite her successive payments to respondent totalling P410,000.00, the latter failed to deliver the goods as promised. Worse, respondent's personal check for P410,000.00 representing reimbursement of the amount he received from Ms. Ortiz was returned dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to complainant Co by way of rediscounting and that these were fully paid when he delivered five cellular phones to her. He brushed aside the allegations of complainant and Ms. Ortiz as ill-motivated, vague, confusing, misleading and full of biases and prejudices. Although he is married he insinuated a special relationship with the two (2) women which caused him to be careless in his dealings with them. On 3 March 1993 the Court referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. On 17 May 1997 the IBP issued a resolution recommending the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months based on the following findings 1. No receipt has been produced by respondent showing that the face value of the subject checks has been paid or that the alleged five (5) units of cellular phones have been delivered to the complainant; 2. The Decision in the criminal cases that were filed vis-a-vis the subject bouncing checks and wherein he was acquitted clearly shows that his acquittal was not due to payment of the obligation but rather that private complainant knew at the time the accused issued the checks that the latter did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the same. No violation of BP Blg. 22 is committed where complainant was told by the drawer that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank; and 3. Respondent subsequently paid the complainant as shown by a receipt dated 26 August 1995 . . . and the release of real estate mortgage . . . If it is true that he had already paid his obligation with five (5) cellular phones, why pay again? The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]). The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed. 6 While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court. Thus we held in Lizaso v. Amante 7 where Atty. Amante enticed complainant to invest in the casino business with the proposition that her investment would yield her an interest of 10% profit daily, and Atty. Amante not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof (P5,000.00) despite complainant's repeated demands As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil. 567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client . . . In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: . . . As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions . . . The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him . . . . 8 Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo 9 where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. "The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him . . . . Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law . . . and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support." 10 Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, entitled The Lawyer and Society of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this Rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties. In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that the procurement of personal loans through insinuations of his power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid government office constitute conduct in gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The recommended suspension of respondent for six (6) months is less than what he justly deserves. His propinquity for employing deceit and misrepresentations as well as his cavalier attitude towards incurring debts without the least intention of repaying them is reprehensible. This disturbing behavior cannot be tolerated most especially in a lawyer who is an officer of the court. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all

courts in the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records. SO ORDERED. Case Digest on Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson (300 SCRA 129) Facts: respondent was accused of having appropriated for his own benefit the amount of P 2, 5000.00 representing the amount which was delivered by the Resurreccion to the respondent as compensation or settlement money of a case for homicide thru reckless imprudence. Sayson did not turn over the amount to his client, the Complainant in the criminal case, forcing Resurreccion to pay the same amount again. Sayson was later convicted for estafa. Held: Sayson DISBARRED. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain extant in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Acts of moral turpitude (i.e. done contrary to justices, honesty & good morals) such as estafa or falsification render one unfit to be a member of the legal proession. Also, Saysons acts of delaying the hearings before the OSG and the IBP reinforce this view. DR. RAUL C. SANCHEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALUSTINO SOMOSO, respondent. DECISION VITUG, J.: In his complaint-affidavit filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Dr. Raul C. Sanchez, a member of the medical staff of Sta. Lucia General Hospital, stated that he was the attending physician of respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso during the latters confinement at the hospital from 31 March to 09 April 1998. When respondent was discharged on 09 April 1998, he urged complainant that, since it was a public holiday and banks were closed that day for business, the latter be good enough to accept a check in payment of the hospital bills due complainant totalling P44,347.00. Although apprehensive at first, complainant was later persuaded, however, by respondents plea of his being a lawyer who can be trusted as such. Complainant thus accepted two personal checks from respondent; to wit: BANK CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT Metrobank 2620115754 04/14/98 P22,347.00 (Lagro Branch) Metrobank 2620115755 04/16/98 P22,000.00 (Lagro Branch)[1] When deposited, the checks were dishonored. Complainant immediately met with and informed respondent about it. Respondent promised to redeem the dishonored checks in cash; he never did. Ultimately, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On 15 August 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution holding that the necessary Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) should be filed against respondent. Pursuant to the resolution, two Informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. A warrant for his arrest was issued but, somehow, respondent was able to evade arrest. Complainant in his administrative complaint submits that respondent is a disgrace to the law profession and unfit to be a member of the bar, and that he should be disbarred and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Pursuant to an order, dated 31 July 2002, of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), respondent was furnished with a copy of the complaint and ordered to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of a copy of the complaint. Despite the receipt of the IBP-CBD order in his two given addresses, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. Respondent was finally declared to be in default. In its report and recommendation, the IBP-CBD found sufficient evidence on record to substantiate the charges made by complainant against respondent and recommended that the latter be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. In Resolution No. XV-2003-177, dated 26 April 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Clearly, respondents action of issuing his personal checks in payment for his medical bills, knowing fully well that his account with the drawee bank has by then already been closed, constitutes a gross violation of the basic norm of integrity required of all members of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that: Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but also in his personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.[2]

When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had already been closed, the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. His conduct deserve nothing less than a severe disciplinary sanction. The law profession is a noble calling, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent and fit to exercise it.[3] WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso GUILTY of misconduct, and he is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from receipt of this decision, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The Case and the Facts This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an attorney. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise: The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent refusal to make good on four (4) RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith effect immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation ofP22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again, in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the initiation of this present complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness.[2] In his Answer[3] dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of the following: (a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice; (a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity), which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or a check in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank, through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude; (b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court would not countenance; (c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, by the Supreme Court; and (d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of the doubt. [4] On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply.[5] Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on October 4, 2001. After several

cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing, respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorneys fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys fees in the next hearing. On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted on leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency. Complainants counsel objected and Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a loud voice, Its up to you, this is only disbarment, my family is more important. [6] And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly left. He made no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness before leaving. Report and Recommendation of the IBP In his September 19, 2002 Report,[7] Commissioner Cunanan found respondent guilty of violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The former explained that, contrary to the latters claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that [w]hile no criminal case may have been instituted against [respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1) but four counts of violation of BP 22.[8] The refusal [by respondent] to pay his indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude towards complainants counsel and the [commission sufficiently] warrant the imposition of sanctions against him.[9] Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law. In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,[10] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years. The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b). The Courts Ruling We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the period of suspension to one year. Administrative Liability of Respondent Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [11] In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless checks, he contends that such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no obligation to accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with earlier payment plans for the same debt. Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to the payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had no real intention to settle them is evident from his unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier attitude in incurring debts without any intention of paying for them puts his moral character in serious doubt. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.[12] It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public order.[13] Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In Co v.Bernardino,[14] the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus: The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]). The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court.

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him x x x. Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support." We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.[15] Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter to attend to, he could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating commissioner and asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and the investigating commissioner. We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[16] It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. [17] In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.[18] Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, in line with Co v. Bernardino,[19] Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr.[20] and Saburnido v.Madroo[21] -- which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers -- we find the suspension of one year sufficient in this case. WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., andAzcuna, JJ., concur. Quisumbing, J., on leave. Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave. Cruz vs. Jacinto Facts A certain Concepcion Padilla requested a P285,000 loan from the Cruz spouses through Atty. Ernesto Jacinto. The spouses, believing the representation of their lawyer that Padilla was a good risk, authorized Jacinto to prepare the necessary documents for the registration of the Real Estate Mortgage as a security of the loan in favor of the couple. When the loan became due, Padilla was nowhere to be found. Later it was discovered that the mortgage had for its object a fake TCT. Estrella Palipada (secretary of Jacinto) testified that she was instructed by Jacinto to notarize the mortgage by signing the name of Atty. Ricardo Neri. His housemaid Avegail Payos also admitted that she simulated the signature of Emmanuel Gimarino (Deputy Register Of Deeds) upon the command of her amo. Issue/s whether or not Jacinto committed malpractice

Resolution malamang !!! suspended from the practice of law for 6 months Rationale 1) business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of law no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor 2) a higher standard of good faith is required of a lawyer when he engages in business dealings this is because his position gives him an advantage which he might abuse

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL, Complainant,

A.C. No. 5736 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and PEREZ,* JJ. Promulgated:

- versus -

ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO, Respondent.

June 18, 2010 x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors [1] of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the management and operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation. The Facts On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. [2] RBCI alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank. In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent

entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks vault. Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol. Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies. The Ruling of the IBP On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty. According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could not just forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position papers. On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a more severe penalty.[4] On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP denied respondents motion.[5] The Ruling of the Court We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution. The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6] Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. [7] Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. [8] It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.[9] We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion: Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.[10]

A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.[12] WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.