Locke,BerkeleyHume CENTRALTHEMES

BYJONATHANBENNETT CLARENDONPRESSOXFORD iii

Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, OxfordOX26DP Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris So Paolo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by, Oxford University Press Inc., New York Oxford University Press 1971 Firstpublished1971
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser ISBN 0-19-875016-1 10 Printed in China iv

PREFACE
THISbookdiscussesthreetopics,inthecompanyofthreephilosophers:meaning,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

causality,objectivity;Locke,Berkeley,Hume.These'centralthemes'aretheonlylarge philosophicalareasonwhicheachofthesephilosophershadagooddealtosay. Berkeleysaysalmostnothingaboutinnateideas,oraboutpersonalidentity,butmyreal reasonforomittingtheseempiricistthemesisthatIhavenothingworthwhiletosay aboutthem. Idonotaimtobescholarly,exceptinthelimitedsensethatIsometimesattendclosely totextualdetails.Noraremyconcernshistorical:theyrelateprimarilytothreetopics, andonlysecondarilytothreephilosophers.Ihopetocontributetotheunderstandingof thelatter,notbypresentinganamplyroundedpictureoftheirthought(evenonthe centralthemes),butbymakingiteasiertogetafirmholdonthelogicofsomeofwhat theywrote.Byfocusingonjustthesephilosophers,Idonotimplyanhistorical judgement.Ineednotcare,forinstance,whetherHumereadBerkeley.AllIneedisthe assumption,forwhichIhopemyownbookisevidence,thattheworkofeachofthe threecanbeusefullyrelatedtotheworkoftheothers. ThebookgrewoutoflecturesgiveninCambridgein195860and19624.Morerecently, IhaveconductedcoursesontheBritishempiricistswhilevisitingCornellUniversity,the UniversityofMichigan,andPrincetonUniversity:Iamdeeplygratefultothese universitiesfortheirhospitality,andtothestudentswhomItaughtthereforallthat theytaughtme.IhavebeenhelpedbymorepeoplethanIcannamehere,butIdowish toexpressespecialgratitudetoRobertM.Adams,JohnGatesBennett,MalcolmBudd,E. J.Furlong,ArnoldHerschorn,AnneWilburMacKenzie,GeorgePitcher,H.H.Price,Richard Sorabji,andMichaelTanner. Adozensectionsofthebookareversionsofmaterialwhichhasappearedbefore11, 1416,20,2425intheAmerican Philosophical Quarterly,and359inPhilosophy.I
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

amindebtedtotheeditorsfortheirpermissiontoreprint. ReadersareadvisedtoglanceovertheBibliographybeforetryingtocopewiththe footnotes. University of British ColumbiaJ.F.B. v

[This page intentionally left blank.] vi

CONTENTS
I.IDEASANDMEANINGS:LOCKE
1.Meaningandunderstanding 2.Classifying 3.Abstractideas 4.Thedoubleuseof'idea' 1 11 21 25 31 35 39 43
pdfcrowd.com

II.IDEASANDMEANINGS:BERKELEY
5.Hownottoreifysense-data 6.Againstabstractness 7.Abstractideas:apositiveaccount 8.Abstraction'sconsequences
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

9.Berkeleyonclassifying 10.Berkeleyonmeaningandunderstanding

47 52 59 63 68 70 74 79 83 89 94 96 100 102 106 112 118

III.SUBSTANCEANDREALITY
11.Substance 12.Reality 13.The'veil-of-perception'doctrine 14.ThetwodoctrinesinBerkeley 15.ThetwodoctrinesinLocke 16.Thetwodoctrinesinthe20thcentury 17.Connectingsubstancewithreality

IV.PRIMARYANDSECONDARYQUALITIES
18.Primaryqualitiesand'body' 19.TheAnalyticThesis 20.Indefenceofadistinction 21.Corollaries 22.TheCausalThesis 23.Theotherversions 24.Berkeley'sconflation 25.Theconflation'ssourcesinLocke vii

V.BERKELEYONREALITY:AGAINSTLOCKE
26.Twospecificarguments 27.'Meaningless'and'contradictory'
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

124 128
pdfcrowd.com

28.Meaninglessbeliefs

132 135 139 145 150 152 160 165 167 169 172 180 185 188 199 206 209 212 222 225 230
pdfcrowd.com

VI.BERKELEYONREALITY:IDEALISM
29.Idealismandphenomenalism 30.'Onlyideasareperceived' 31.ThesourceofBerkeley'serror 32.Ananti-phenomenalistskirmish 33.SomeconsequencesofBerkeley'serror 34.Appearanceandreality

VII.BERKELEYONGODANDSCEPTICISM
35.Thepassivityargument 36.Berkeley'susesof'depend' 37.Thecontinuityargument 38.Berkeley'sindifferencetocontinuity 39.'Afalseimaginaryglare' 40.Berkeleyand'theMob' 41.ContinuityintheCommentaries

VIII.ACTIVITYANDCAUSALITY
42.Berkeleyoncausation 43.BerkeleyandHumeonvolitions 44.Activityandpassivity 45.Spirits

IX.EMPIRICISMABOUTMEANINGS
46.Ideasandimpressions 47.Hume'smeaning-empiricism 48.ThegeneticnatureofHume'stheory
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

viii

X.HUME'SPHILOSOPHICALLOGIC
49.Thegeneralpicture 50.Intuitionanddemonstration 51.Mattersoffact 52.Twokindsofsafety 53.Amuddleaboutrelations 235 238 244 247 250 257 260 263 268 272 275 279 282 287 293 295 299 304 307
pdfcrowd.com

XI.HUMEONCAUSATION:NEGATIVE
54.Introduction 55.Impressionsofnecessaryconnexion 56.Theconjecturetheory 57.Theshifttologicalnecessity 58.Causallawsaslogicallynecessary 59.'Causallawsaresynthetic':abadargument 60.Humeandthebadargument 61.'Causallawsaresynthetic':anotherargument 62.'Distinctideas'

XII.HUMEONCAUSATION:POSITIVE
63.Whywepredict 64.'Necessaryconnexion' 65.Predictersasvictims 66.Ananalyticsalvage 67'TheHumeanview'
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

XIII.HUMEONOBJECTIVITY
68.Theproblemstated 69.Arejectedanswer:thesenses 70.Alsorejected:reason 71.Apartlyacceptedanswer 72.Whymoreisneeded 73.Preliminarytoacompletion:identity 74.Serialidentity-statements ix 313 315 319 322 327 333 336

75.Identityandobjectivity 76.Theanswercompleted 77.Unownedperceptions 78.Thedespairingconclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY SUBJECTINDEX INDEXOFNAMES x

340 342 345 349 354 358 360

I IDEASANDMEANINGS:LOCKE
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

1.Meaningandunderstanding
SOMEONEmayutterwordsandmeannothingbythem,orhearwordsandunderstand nothingbythem:communicationinvolvesnotjustutteringandhearing,butalso meaningandunderstanding.Whatisittoattachameaningtoanutterance?Or,totake plainlyrelatedquestions,whatisitforatypeofutterancetohaveameaning,orfora systemofsuchtypestoconstitutealanguage?Iintendtheseasquestionsaboutthe meaningof'mean','language'andsoon,notaboutwhatelsegoesonwhensomeone speakswithmeaning,hearswithunderstandingorthelike. Onekindoftheoryaboutthishasbeenwidelyacceptedacrossthecenturies.Lockeand Humeweredevoteesofit,andBerkeleywasafellowtraveller.Iwanttoexamineitboth foritsownsakeandbecauseagraspofitisessentialtoanunderstandingofallthreeof thesephilosophers.LetusexaminethetheoryinLocke'sversionofit.BecauseGod wantedustobeabletocommunicatewithoneanotherinlanguage,Lockesays: Man,therefore,hadbynaturehisorganssofashioned,astobefittoframe articulatesounds,whichwecallwords.Butthiswasnotenoughtoproduce language;forparrots...makearticulatesoundsdistinctenough,whichyetby nomeansarecapableoflanguage.Besidesarticulatesounds,therefore,itwas furthernecessarythatheshouldbeabletousethesesoundsassignsof internalconceptions;andtomakethemstandasmarksfortheideaswithinhis ownmind,wherebytheymightbemadeknowntoothers,andthethoughtsof men'smindsbeconveyedfromonetoanother.1 Toattachmeaningtoanutterance,then,istomakeit'standasamark'foroneormore 'internalconceptions'or'ideas'inone'sownmind,andlanguage'smaintaskisto
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

transferideasfromonemindtoanother.Thisisthetranslationviewoflanguage: wishingtosharewithyousomethinginmymind,Itranslateit ____________________ 1Essay III. i.12. 1

intothepublicmediumofarticulatesounds;youheartheobjective,interpersonalnoises thatImake,andretranslatethembackintosomethinginyourmind;andso communicationiscomplete.ThusLocke,explicitly: Man,thoughhehavegreatvarietyofthoughts,andsuchfromwhichothersas wellashimselfmightreceiveprofitanddelight;yettheyareallwithinhisown breast,invisibleandhiddenfromothers,norcanofthemselvesbemadeto appear.Thecomfortandadvantageofsocietynotbeingtobehadwithout communicationofthoughts,itwasnecessarythatmanshouldfindoutsome externalsensiblesigns,whereofthoseinvisibleideas,whichhisthoughtsare madeupof,mightbemadeknowntoothers....Thuswemayconceivehow words,whichwerebynaturesowelladaptedtothatpurpose,cametobe madeuseofbymenasthesignsoftheirideas.2 Thissurelyhastruthinit.Wedohaveprivatethoughtswhichwecommunicatethrough language,andwhencommunicationsucceedswhenyouandIattachthesamemeaning tomywordsitisreasonabletosaythatI,throughmywords,transmitmythoughtto you.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Animportantdetail:assentencesarebuiltoutofwords,Lockeimplies,so'thoughts'are builtof'ideas';anideaisanatomofmeaning,expressiblebyawordwhichisanatom oflanguage.Thisdeservestolerancetoo,forisitnotnaturaltosay'Hisideaof communismisdifferentfrommine',forexample,meaning'Hedoesnotmeanby "communism"whatIdo'? ManyfamiliardistinctionscanbeexpressedintermsofLocke'stheory:betweenwhatI usuallymeanbyagivenwordandwhatImeanbyitononeoccasion,betweenits standardornormalmeaningandwhatSmithmeansbyit,betweenmisunderstandingit andattachingnomeaningtoit,andsoon.Forexample,Lockecanequatethe weaning of the sentence Swiththe kind of thought people usually associate with S.Thisistoo simple(westilldonotknowjusthow'themeaningofS'relatesto'whatxmeansbyS'), butitgoesintherightdirection.Locke'stheorydoes,inaway,work. Butheretolerancestops.Thosevirtuesinthetheoryaresuperficialoneswithoutwhich itcouldhardlyhavetemptedanyone.Whenthetheoryisprobed,fataldefectscometo light.Ishallexpoundtwoofthese:eachdependsonlyuponthetheory's ____________________ 2Essay III. ii.1. 2

generalstructureandnotitsspecialdetails,andthetwotogetherpointtowardsan alternativekindoftheorywhichismuchmorepromising. AccordingtoLocke,ifIsay'Passthesugar'andgivethissentenceitsnormalmeaning,

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thenImusthaveinmymindan'ideaofsugar'thatis,Imustbethinkingaboutsugar. Whatabouttheconverseofthis?IfIthinkaboutsugarwhileusingtheword'sugar', doesitfollowthatIamgiving'sugar'itsstandardmeaning?(1)IfLockesaid'Yes',he wouldbewrong.Obviously,someonecouldbroodoverhisneedforsugarwhileuttering thesentence'Passthesugar'withoutmeaningbythatsentencethatthesugarwasto bepassed,andindeedwithoutmeaningbyitanythingatall.Forexample,hemight knownoEnglishand,inthecourseofexperimentallytryingtomakeEnglishsounding noises,happentoproducethatsentencewhilewishingthatsomeonewouldpasshim thesugar.(2)Infact,Lockewouldanswer'No':foraspeakertomeansomethingbyhis words,hemustnotmerelyhaveideasinhismindbutmustusehiswordsto'standas marksfor'hisideas.Lockeusuallyincludesthisextracondition,andmostclearlyhere (myemphasis): Sofaraswordsareofuseandsignification,sofaristhereaconstant connexionbetweenthesoundandtheidea,and a designation that the one stands for the other;withoutwhichapplicationofthem,theyarenothingbut somuchinsignificantnoise.3 Itisimplausibletosaythatwords,whenusedmeaningfully,alwaysstandforideasin thespeaker'smind;butnevermindthat.4MycomplaintisthatLockeofferstoexplain 'meaning'yethelpshimselfto'standfor',asthoughthisneedednoexplanation.Thetwo arenotequivalent,forplentyofmeaningfulwords,suchas'when',donot straightforwardly'standfor'anything;butstilltheyaremuchtoocloselyconnectedtobe splitapartasLockesplitsthem.Someonewhoasks'Whatisitforawordtobeuttered andmeant?'willsurelyalsothinkitworthwhiletoasktheslightlylessgeneralquestion 'Whatisitforawordtobeusedtostandforsomething?'Locke'sonlyanswertothe latteristheanswergeneratedbyhisanalysisof'meaning'generally:'Tousetheword
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

"sugar"[say]tostandforsugaristouseitto ____________________ 3Essay III. ii.7. 4SeeKretzmann,"'TheMainThesisofLocke'sSemanticTheory'". 3

standfortheideaofsugarinone'smind'whichisnoansweratall. Thisdifficultyabout'speaker'smeaning'alsoinfects'hearer'smeaning'i.e. understanding.Tocountasunderstandingwhatonehears,itisnotenoughthatwhile hearingitonealsohasacertainthought.Norisitenough,asLockeperhapsthinks,that thethoughtbecausedor'excited'bywhatonehears:5yourwordsmightexcitea thoughtinmethroughapsychologicalmechanismofwhichIknewnothing;inwhichcase Imightwronglythinkthattheyhadnothingtodowiththeadventofthethought,and rightlythinkthatIunderstoodnothingbythem.Lockemightstrengthentheconditions forunderstandingthus:Iunderstandsomethingbyyourwordsiftheyexciteinmea thoughtwhichItaketobeliketheoneyouusedyourwordsto'standfor'.Thatwouldbe amoveintherightdirection,since,broadlyspeaking,whatIunderstandbyyourwords iswhatItakeyoutomeanbythem.Butjustbecausetheconceptof'hearer'smeaning' isinthiswaydependentuponthatof'speaker'smeaning',Locke'sfailurewiththelatter isalsoafailurewiththeformer. MysecondcriticismofLocke'stheoryisaddressedtoasingleaspectofit,namelyits implyingthatmeaningissomethingwhichonedoesorundergoeswhileuttering.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Becauseonecanutterwordswithoutmeaninganythingbythem,'HeutteredSand meantsomethingbyit'saysmorethan'HeutteredS'.Itdoesnotfollow,though,that theformerstatementconjoinsareportononethinghedid(uttering)withareporton anotherthinghedidatthesametime(meaning).Ifitdidfollow,weshouldhavetosay thattwosynchronousactivitiesarereportedby'HecriticizedKantandtherebymadea foolofhimself'orby'HegaveJohntendollarsandtherebydischargedhisdebt'and thatwouldclearlybewrong.Sotheconclusionthattoutterandmeanistodotwo thingsatonceisnotadequatelysupportedbythetruepremissthatonecanutter withoutmeaning. Theconclusionisnotjustinadequatelysupported,butisfalse.Iproceedtoarguethis byreductioadabsurdum. Ifmeaningsomethingbywhatyouutterinvolvesutteringwhiledoingorundergoing somethingelse,thenthe'somethingelse'mustbeaninneractivityorprocess.Thatis, itcannotbeanythinglikeanovert,casuallyobservable,physicalgestureor ____________________ 5Essay III. ii.6. 4

expression.Thisisbecause,asweallknow,twopeoplemayutterasentence,onlyone ofthemmeaningsomethingbyit,withouttherebeinganyoutward,observable, behaviouraldifferencebetweenthematthetime;whenceitfollowsthatifoneofthem performsan'actofmeaning'andtheotherdoesnot,itmustbeaninneract.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

An'inneract',inmysense,neednotbeamentalactandneednotbeessentially private.Itcouldbethepushingaroundofelectronsinone'sbrain.Lockedoesrepresent theactofmeaning(orprocessofunderstanding)asakindofmentalhappening,andhe maybecommittedbythattogetherwithotheraspectsofhisphilosophytosayingthat onecouldnotdiscoverwhetheranyoneelseeverperformedsuchanactorunderwent suchaprocess.Andtotakeanotherwayinwhichhemakeshimselfunnecessarily vulnerable6hecommitshimselftotheviewthatactsofmeaningandunderstanding areopentointrospection,andthatonecouldnotperformsuchanactwithoutbeing awareofit.ButIshallappealtonosuchrelativelydetailedpointsinLocke'stheory. Justbyhavingasynchronousacttheoryofmeaning,Lockecommitshimselftotheact's being'inner'inmyweaksense,i.e.toitsbeingonethatdoesnotmeettheeyeofthe unskilledthoughalertbystander;andthissufficestorefutethetheory.For,evenifwe couldcometoknowwhetherourfellowhumansperforminneractsoftherelevantkind (whateverthatmaybe),wehavenotyetgainedsuchknowledge:whatmostofusdo knowaboutoneanotherisrestrictedtowhatcanbelearnedfrompassive, unexperimental,handsoffobservation;andsowedonotinfactknowwhatinneracts,if any,theyperform.So,ifaninneracttheoryofmeaningiscorrect,wedonotyetknow thatpeoplesometimesdo,andthatotheranimalssometimesdonot,meansomething bywhattheyutter,anda fortioriwedonotyetknowwhatanyonemeansbywhathe utters.Sinceweclearlydohaveknowledgeofthiskind,thatrefuteseveryinneract theoryofmeaning,andthuseverysynchronousacttheoryofmeaning. Forexample,Lockecouldnotcomfortablyexplainhowheknowsthat'parrotsmake articulatesoundsyetbynomeansarecapableoflanguage'.Accordingtohiskindof theory,theparrot'scriesare'insignificantnoise'ratherthanmeaningful ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

6SeeJ.J.Katz,The

Philosophy of Language(NewYork,1966),pp.17685. 5

languagebecausearequisiteinneractivityorprocessisnotgoingonintheparrotbut howdoesLockeknowthatitisn'tgoingon?Again,heisnotentitledtohisconfidence thatpeopleoftenmeansomething,andhisfrequentconfidenceaboutwhattheymean, bythewordstheyutter.ForyearsnowSmith'suseofEnglishhasbeennormaland sociallyacceptable;butwehavenotcheckedonwhathasbeenhappeninginsideSmith's bodyor'inside'hismind;andsowedonotaccordingtoLocke'stheoryknowthathe haseverunderstoodormeantanything. Lockeseldommentionsthisagnosticconclusion,thoughinoneplaceheseemstoaccept itwithsomecomplacency.7Elsewhereheseesitasaprimafaciedifficultywhichhe undertakes,agooddealtooblandly,todispatch.Admittingthattwopeoplemightusea wordinthesamewayinthesamecircumstancesandyetgiveitdifferentmeanings,he airilybrushesthispossibilityasidebecause(1)wecouldnotknowwhetheritwas realized,(2)itisprobablynotrealized,and(3)evenifitwererealizeditwouldnotbe usefultoknowthis!TheincoherenceofthisshowsLocke'sfailuretoseethedepthofhis difficulty: Neitherwouldit[matterif]the same object should produce in several men's minds different ideasatthesametime;v.g.iftheideathatavioletproduced inoneman'smindbyhiseyeswerethesamethatamarigoldproducedin anotherman's,andviceversa.For,[1]sincethiscouldneverbeknown,... neithertheideashereby,northenames,wouldbeatallconfounded,orany
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

falsehoodbeineither...[2]Iamneverthelessveryapttothinkthatthe sensibleideasproducedbyanyobjectindifferentmen'sminds,aremost commonlyverynearandundiscerniblyalike.Forwhichopinion,Ithink,there mightbemanyreasonsoffered:butthatbeingbesidesmypresentbusiness,I shallnottroublemyreaderwiththem;butonlymindhim,that[3]thecontrary supposition,ifitcouldbeproved,isoflittleuse,eitherfortheimprovementof ourknowledge,orconveniencyoflife,andsoweneednottroubleourselvesto examineit.8 IhavetreatedthatpassageasanepisodeinLocke'stheoryofmeaning,butdoesitnot lookmorelikephilosophyofperception?Itisinfactbothatonce,andthisisexplained byaspecialfeatureofLocke'stheorywhichwillloomlargerasweproceednamelythe useof'idea'torefertoamentalitemwhichcouldendowa ____________________ 7Essay III. ii.4. 8Essay II. xxxii.15. 6

wordwithameaningandtorefertoasenseimpressionorsensedatum.ForLocke,this isnotanambiguityin'idea'.Thetwoquestions'Doyoumeanby"violet"whatIdo?'and 'Dovioletthingssensorilyaffectyouastheydome?'aredoubtlesscloselyrelated;but Lockegenuinelydoesnotdistinguishthem,takingthemtobetwoversionsofthesingle, univocalquestion'Areyourideasofvioletthesameasmine?'Ishallreturntothispoint later.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ThesecondobjectionIhavebroughtagainstLocke'stheoryraisesaproblem.If'He utteredSattimetandmeantsomethingbyit'doesnotconjointworeportsonthingshe didatt,whatdoesitdo?Whatsortofadditiondoesitmaketothesimple'HeutteredS att'?Wittgensteinhashelpedustoseehowtoanswerthiswithoutrepresenting meaningasanactorprocess.9ThequestionofwhatsomeonemeansbySwhenhe uttersitattcould,Wittgensteinsuggests,beequivalenttooneormorequestionsof theform'Whatwouldhehavesaidordoneattif...?'togetherperhapswithquestions abouthissayingsordoingsatothertimes.So,twospeakerswhodon'tdifferoutwardly attmaybothutterSattwithonlyoneofthemmeaningsomethingbyit,fortwo reasons.Firstly,theymaydifferintheirdispositionsatt;thatis,questionsoftheform 'Whatwouldhehavesaidordoneattif...?'mayhavedifferentanswersforeach. Secondly,theymaydifferintheiractualbehaviour,linguisticandotherwise,attimes otherthant.Bothsortsofdifferenceareavailabletothecasualobserver,becausethe secondsortgivesevidenceforthefirst. Aswellasdispositionaldifferencesattandepisodicdifferencesatothertimes,there maywellbeepisodicdifferencesattperhapsphysiologicaloneswhichwouldcausally explainthedifferingbehaviouraldispositions,ordifferencesinthementalimageryofthe twospeakers.Butinneraccompanimentswhetherphysiological,imaginative,orwhat youwillarenotconstitutiveofmeaning.Theymayhavearoleinthescientific explanationorthenaturalhistoryofmeaningphenomena,buttheydonotfigureinthe analysisoftheconceptofmeaning:whenwesay'OneofthemmeanssomethingbyS andtheotherdoesnot'wearenotsayingthatthereisaninnerepisodicdifference betweenthem. Totakeacloselyrelatedpoint:itmaybetruethatnohuman
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 9L.Wittgenstein,The Blue and Brown Books(Oxford,1958),pp.3744. 7

canperformwellenoughtocountasknowingalanguageunlesshehasacquireda certaininnerstructure,e.g.byhavingunconsciouslyconstructedagenerativegrammarof thelanguageinquestion.Butcoulditbemaintainedwithanyplausibilitythatwhenwe saythatsomeone'knowsEnglish'wemeansomethingaboutthegenerativegrammar whichhehasunconsciouslyconstructed?Chomskyapparentlythinksso: Supposethatweweretoproposethattoknowalanguageistohave constructed,tobesureunconsciously,aspecificgenerativegrammar.A familiarargumentagainstthisproposalisthatIcantellwhethersomeone knowsEnglish,butIknownothingoftheinternalworkingsofhismind.The argumentseemstomeweak,becauseitbegsaquestionratherliketheone underdiscussion.Ifwearepreparedtoadmitthatthemindcanincorporate unconscioustheories,systemsofprinciplesandrulesthatwemightdescribe asunconsciousknowledge,thenitisatleastconceivablethatIhavean unconscioustheorythatattributestootherpersonsmindsofacertain character,andthatassignstothemmentalstatesbyvirtueofcertainactions thattheyperform.Suppose,furthermore,thatthistheoryrelatestomy unconscioustheoryofEnglishinsuchawaythatIbelievesomeonetoknow EnglishwhenIattributetohimthementalstatedescribedby(or incorporating)therulesandprinciplesofEnglishgrammar,arrivingatthis conclusiononthebasisofhisbehaviour.Iseenoincoherenceinthis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

formulation,whichwouldleadtotheconclusionthatmyconcept'knowledgeof alanguage'isdirectlyrelatedtotheconcept'internalizationoftherulesof grammar'.10 ThesuggestionseemstobethattheremightbeaspecificmentalstructureM,which 'incorporates'anadequategenerativegrammarforEnglish,suchthatweunconsciously acceptbothatheoryoftheform'Ifx'sbehaviouris...,thenxhasM'andthetheory thatifxhasMthenxknowsEnglish.Ishallnotobjecttotheformerofthese.Ifthereis amentalstructureMwhichIhave,andwhichunderliesmyownlinguisticcompetence, thenindeedImightunconsciouslyrelateyourlinguisticperformancestoyourhavingM, eventhoughIhaveabsolutelynoconsciousknowledgeofwhatMis.Butwhatofthe other'unconscioustheory'theonebyvirtueofwhichIamsupposedtomovefrom'xhas M'to'xknowsEnglish'?Thissocalled'theory'issupposedtorelatemyconceptofMto myconceptofknowingEnglish;and ____________________ 10N.Chomsky,"'KnowledgeofLanguage'",Times Literary Supplement,15May1969,p. 524. 8

somyhavingthis'theory'mustreallybemymeaningby'knowsEnglish'something whichinvolvesthemeaningof'hasM'.Furthermore,Iamsupposedtomeanthis 'unconsciously'beingunabletomeanitconsciouslyuntilgrammaticalor neurophysiologicalresearchdiscoverswhatMis.ThisisjustChomsky'ssuggestionwith thewrapsoff,andIsubmitthatitisobviouslyuntenable.Hisphrase'unconscious

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

theoryofEnglish'ismisleading:itsuggeststhatwhatChomskyissupposingisindeed 'ratherlike'thesortofunconsciousmentalstructuretowhichhealludesatthestartof thequotedpassage;butreallyitisnotlikethattoanysignificantextent. IamnothereobjectingtoanythinginChomsky'ssuggestionaboutwhatisinvolvedin knowingEnglish:forpurposesofmypresentargumentIdo'admitthatthemindcan incorporateunconscioustheories'etc.ButIdenythatitistherefore'conceivable'that whatwemeanbysomeexpressionshouldvastlyoutrunthelimitsofourconscious knowledge. Ofcourse,Chomsky'ssuggestionmightbeplausibleifitwerewatereddowntothis:we unconsciouslyacceptatheoryoftheform'Ifx'sbehaviouris...,thenxhaswhatever mentalstructurewouldaccountforthisbehaviour',andwemeanby'xknowsEnglish' somethingoftheform'xhaswhatevermentalstructurewouldaccountforhis behaviour'sbeing...'.Iamnotsurethatthisdifferssignificantlyfromthe Wittgensteinianthesisthatwhatwemeanby'xknowsEnglish'isjustsomethingabout howxdoesbehaveandhowxwouldbehaveif....Inanycase,thewatereddown versioncannotbewhatChomskywantstodefend:ifitwere,thenthe'familiarargument' couldobviouslyberebuttedwithoutappealingtoafurtherdoubledoseofunconscious theory. LetusnowreturntomyfirstcriticismofLocke'stheory.Itamountedtothis:thetheory makesnosatisfactoryprovisionforthenotionofwhatismeantorunderstoodby,an utterance;toescapeconnectingtheutterancetothemeaningfartooloosely,ithasto invokeaconnexion('standingfor')whichbegstoomuchofthequestion.Sothat criticism,liketheotherone,locatesaproblem,namelythatofgivingaproperaccountof 'meaningby'.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Theconceptofintendingpresentsaglitteringprospect.Ifmeaningwereakindof intending,then'meaningsomethingbywhatoneutters'couldbeelucidatedintermsof themoregeneral 9

'intendingsomethingbywhatonedoes':evenifmeaningwereaveryspecialcaseof intending,relatabletoitonlythroughaverycomplexanalysis,onemightexpectthe notionof'...ingby'tocarrythroughfromgeneraltospecial,fromintendingto meaning. Itiseasytothinkthat'meaning'canbeelucidatedintermsof'intending',andindeed withoutmuchcomplexity:tomeansomethingbywhatyouutterisjusttointendbyyour utteringtoproduceinyourhearersacertainresultabeliefifyoumeanastatement,an actionifyoumeanacommand,anutteranceifyoumeanaquestion,andsoon.Minor detailsapart,haven'tweheretheessentialsofasatisfactoryanalysisof'mean'interms of'intend'?Notoriously,wehavenot.Thereareinnumerablecaseswhere'Heintended byutteringStoproduceinhishearers...'istruealthoughthecorrespondingstatement oftheform'WhathemeantbySwas...'isfalse;andattemptstodealwiththese casesbypiecemealrepairstotheanalysishaveregularlyfailed. Still,intendingisnotyetoutoftherunning,foraremarkablepaperbyH.P.Grice containsafreshandhighlypromisingsuggestionastohowmeaningmightbeaspecial caseofintending.11Grice'sworkneedsinadditiontominorcorrectionsmajor expansionandelaboration.12Asitstands,itismuchlessthanafullfledgedanalysisof theconceptofmeaning.Butinmyjudgement,whichIshallnotdefendhere,itisa
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thoroughlypromisingstartingpointforsuchananalysis. Thethreadscannowbedrawntogether. Thereisagrowingconsensusamongphilosophersthatastatementoftheform'Bydoing Aatt,heintended...'doesnotreportaprocessoractivityofintendingwhichoccurred att,butrathersayssomethingaboutwhathewouldhavedoneattif...,andperhaps alsoaboutwhathedidorwillorwoulddoatothertimes.Ifthisgeneralviewabout intendingiscorrect,andifmeaningisakindofintending,thenwereachWittgenstein's viewthatwhatsomeonemeansattisamatterofhowhebehavesatothertimesand abouthowhewouldbehaveattoratothertimesifcircumstancesweredifferentin variousways.AndthiswastheviewIadvocatedinconnexionwithmysecondcriticism ofLocke'stheory. ____________________ 11H.P.Grice,"'Meaning'",Philosophical Review,vol.66(1957). 12SeeH.P.Grice,"'Utterer'sMeaningandIntentions'",Philosophical Review,vol.78( 1969). 10

Sotheproblemof'meaningsomethingby...'pointstothenotionofintending,and Grice'sworkmakesitpossibletofollowthepointer;andthenacertainplausibleview aboutintendinghasimplicationswhichsolveourotherproblem,namelytheoneabout howtorepresentmeaningaspubliclyaccessibleandthereforeassomethingotherthan anactivitywhichissynchronouswithuttering.Grice'swork,then,promisestoadddepth andexactnesstoWittgenstein'ssuggestionsaboutmeaning,andalsorelatesthemto

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

neighbouringconceptualareas.Tobefair,Ishouldaddthatitdoesthisonlywiththe helpofageneralviewaboutintendingwhichitselfowesmuchtoWittgenstein.13

2.Classifying
Howdoesonerecognizedistinctparticularthingsasbeingofthesamekind,andthus knowtoapplyasingleclassificatorywordtoeachofthem?Lockesoughttoanswerthis, apparently,bydescribingaruleortechniqueorgeneralmethodforclassifyinga methodwhichrequiresthateachwordshallbeassociatedwithakindofidea.This 'theoryofclassification'ofLocke'sisnotoftenseparatedassharplyasitshouldbefrom histheoryofwordmeaning.14Ishalldiscusstherelationsbetweenthemattheendof thissection,butinthemeantimeItaketheformertheoryseverelyonitsown. Beforeexpoundingthetheory,Ishallarguethatitfails,thatitmustfailbecauseit attemptstheimpossible.Theargumentcanbestatedbriefly,sincethelineofthoughtit involveshasitsownliteratureandisnowfairlyfamiliar.15 AcomprehensiveruleortechniquefordoingDmustbestatableasinstructionstoa novicethatis,instructionswhichsomeonewhocannotyetdoDcouldinprinciplefollow andtherebybeenabledtodoD.Butanoviceatclassificationsomeonewhodoesnot yetknowhowtoassignanyparticularstoa ____________________ 13Onthethemeofthisentiresection,seeFlew,Hume's Philosophy of Belief,ch.2. 14ButseeW.Doney,"'Locke'sAbstractIdeas'",Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,vol.16(1956),pp.4078. 15I.Kant,Critique of Pure Reason A 132-4 = B 171-4.L.Wittgenstein,The Blue and
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Brown Books(Oxford,1958),pp.119;Philosophical Investigations(Oxford,1953), Pt.I,18990;Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics(Oxford,1956),Pt.I, 14.D.F.Pears,"'Universals'",inA.Flew(ed.),Logic and Language,secondseries (Oxford,1953).A.M.Quinton,"'PropertiesandClasses'",Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,vol.58(19578). 11

kindcannotfollowanyrulesorinstructions.Theinstructionsmusttaketheform: 'ClassifyxinsuchandsuchawayifandonlyifFx';andthenovicecanfollowthemonly ifhealreadyknowshowtodeterminewhetherFx.Butifhecanestablishsometruth,no matterwhat,aboutx,thenheisnotanoviceofthekindwewant,forhecanalready classifywithouttheaidoftheprofferedrule.Aruleforclassifyingassuch,then,could befollowedonlybysomeonewhodidnotneedit;anysuchrulemustbecompetence presupposing. Thecrucialstatementaboutxwhichtheruleorinstructionsembodiedmightbea relationalone,buttheargumentstillstands.Arelationisjustapropertyofpairs,trios, etc.,andsosomeonewhocandeterminewhetherGxyorwhetherHxyzissomeonewho canclassifyandisthereforenotournovice.Thisuseof'classify'mightbearbitraryor wronginsomecontexts,butnothere.Therearenogroundsfordemandingatechnique formonadicclassificationsthekindinvolvedinapplyingadjectivesandgeneralnounsto individualswhileassumingthatnosuchaidisneededfordyadic,triadic,etc., classificationsofthekindinvolvedinrelationalstatementsaboutpairs,trios,etc.,of individuals.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Theforegoingargumentpredictsthatanysupposedruleortechniqueforclassifyingwill beinsomespecificwaycompetencepresupposing.Thispredictioniscertainlyfulfilledby whatIshallcall'universalism',i.e.thetheorythatweclassifyparticularsbyattendingto theuniversalswhichtheyinstantiate.16Iwanttoknowwhetheragivenparticular,x,is ofthesamekindascertainothers,becauseIwanttoknowwhethertodescribexas 'green',say.Universalismtellsmetocalltomindtheuniversalwhichallthoseothers instantiated,andwhichIassociatewith'green',andtonotewhetherxinstantiatesit too.Ifitdoes,thencallx'green';otherwisedon't.Thiscouldnothelpanovice,forit presupposestheability(a)toreidentifytheappropriateuniversaland(b)torecognizea caseofinstantiation,i.e.totellthatthatishowxrelatestotheuniversal.Asregards (a):forpresentpurposes,Icontend,reidentifyingtheverysameuniversalisonapar withclassifying.Thisisnotobvious,butIshalldefenditsoon.Asregards(b):itmight berepliedthatthereisnorelationofinstantiationthattosay'xinstantiatesthe universalof ____________________ 16SeeB.Russell,The Problems of Philosophy(London,1912),chapters9and10. 12

greenness'isnottorelatextosomethingelsebutismerelytosaythatxhasthe propertyofgreenness,i.e.thatxisgreen.Thatdefence,though,rendersthewhole theorynugatory,fornowitsinstructionssay:'Classifyxasgreenifandonlyifitis green'.Versionsofuniversalismdocharacteristicallywaverbetweenthemysteriousand covertlycompetencepresupposing,andtheclearbutexplicitlycompetence presupposing.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Lockerejecteduniversalism:notbecauseitiscompetencepresupposing,stillless becauseitisboundtobeso,butforthebadreasonthat'Allthingsthatexistareonly particulars',17andsotherearenouniversals,andsouniversalismisjustfalse.Locke hadnoinhibitionsabouttryingtoproducearivaltheorywhichwouldsucceedin universalism'simpossibletask.Hesawtheessentialrivalryasconsistinginhis replacementofnonparticularoruniversalitemsintheobjectiverealmby'generalideas' inourminds: Generalanduniversalbelongnottotherealexistenceofthings;butarethe inventionsandcreaturesoftheunderstanding,madebyitforitsownuse,and concernonlysigns,whetherwordsorideas.Wordsaregeneral...whenused forsignsofgeneralideas.18 That,however,istremendouslymisleading,andweshallseethatitthrewBerkeleyright offthescent.Letuscomedowntodetails,patiently. (Lockefocusesonlanguageembodiedclassificationson'ShallIdescribexas"green"?' ratherthan'ShallIclassifyxasgreen?'Whenthetwoquestionsareexpressedinwords theirdifferencesarenegligible;butacreaturewithnolanguagemaynevertheless classify,andsoLocke'sapproachdoesnarrowthearea.Still,thenarrowingmakesfor brevityanddoesnorealharm:allmyargumentscould,thoughlaboriously,be generalizedintoobjectionstoLocke'stheoryconsideredasofferingatechniquenotjust fordescribingbutforclassifyinggenerally.) Iwanttoknowwhethertodescribexas'green'.Locketellsmetobringtominda 'generalidea'ofthekindassociatedwiththeword'green',andtocheckthisagainstx:if they'agree',Imaycallx'green';iftheydonot,Imaynot.Inhisownwords:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Themindmakestheparticularideasreceivedfromparticularobjectstobecome general;whichisdonebyconsideringthemastheyarein ____________________ 17Essay III.iii.6. 18Essay III.iii.11. 13

themind,...separatefromallotherexistences,andthecircumstancesofreal existence,astime,place,oranyotherconcomitantideas....Suchprecise, nakedappearancesinthemind,withoutconsideringhow,whence,orwithwhat otherstheycamethere,theunderstandinglaysup(withnamescommonly annexedtothem)asthestandardstorankrealexistencesintosorts,asthey agreewiththesepatterns,andtodenominatethemaccordingly.19 Thistechniqueforclassifyingis,likeuniversalism,doublycompetencepresupposing.To 'rankrealexistencesintosorts'byLocke'smethod,onemustalreadybeable(a)to recognizeagiven'generalidea'asbeingoftheappropriatekind,and(b)torecognize casesof'agreement'betweengeneralideasandparticulars.Eachpointneeds elaboration. (a)LockemightbeandbyBerkeleyhewasthoughttoagreewithuniversalismthat thereareinherentlygeneraloruniversalitems,andtopartcompanywithitonlyin 'locating'theseitemsinthemindratherthanoutthereintherestoftheworld.This wouldbeamisinterpretation,forLockeinsiststhata'generalidea'isamentalparticular
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whichis'general'onlyinthesensethatitisusedinacertainway: Wordsaregeneral...whenusedforsignsofgeneralideas,andsoare applicableindifferentlytomanyparticularthings;andideasaregeneralwhen theyaresetupastherepresentativesofmanyparticularthings:but universalitybelongsnottothingsthemselves,whichareallofthemparticular intheirexistence,eventhosewordsandideaswhichintheirsignificationare general...[Generalideas]areonlycreaturesofourownmaking;theirgeneral naturebeingnothingbutthecapacitytheyareputinto,bytheunderstanding, ofsignifyingorrepresentingmanyparticulars.Forthesignificationtheyhaveis nothingbutarelationthat,bythemindofman,isaddedtothem.20 Thenotionofamentalparticularisunclearandsuspect(see5below);butLocke's stressontheparticularityofallideashassomefairlyclearimplications,e.g.thata singleideaasdistinctfromapairofsimilaronescannotoccurintwominds.Another consequence,onewouldthink,isthatonecannothavetheverysameideainone'smind onseparateoccasions,andthatLockeoughtnottosaythatthemind'laysup'ideasas thoughtheyweredurableobjectsbeingstoredforoccasionaluse.Inonerather inconclusivepassagehedoeshalfconcedethis,21andIthinkthat ____________________ 19Essay II.xi.9. 20Essay III.iii.11. 21Essay II.x.2. 14

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ifpressedhewouldhaveagreedthatasingleideacannotoccuratseparatetimesin someone'smind. Butthenhistechniqueforclassifyingisobviouslycompetencepresupposing.Itorders me,whenIamwonderingwhethertocallx'green',toforminmymindanideaofthe kindassociatedwith'green',andIcannotobeyunlessIcanalreadyclassifyideas.In short,Lockepresentsideasas'standards'tobeusedinallclassificationsofparticulars, butideasarethemselvesparticularsandcannotserveasstandardsuntiltheyhave themselvesbeenclassified. OfthesuggestionthatIobeytheorder'Fetchmesomethingred'byimagining somethingredandthenlookingforanobjecttomatchtheimage,Wittgensteinsays: Considertheorder'imaginearedpatch'.Youarenottemptedinthiscaseto thinkthatbeforeobeyingyoumusthaveimaginedaredpatchtoserveyouas apatternfortheredpatchwhichyouwereorderedtoimagine.22 ThisputsaprecisefingerononecircularityinLocke'skindoftheory. Lockeprobablyoverlookedtheneedtoclassifyideasbecausetheyareinthemindand, asWittgensteinremarks,'themind'oftenservesasahavenforthenottobeexplained. SupposethatinLocke'stheorywereplacementalimagesbyphysicalonessuchas paintings.Thetheorythatimagesareallpurposeaidstoclassificationis,nowthatthe imageisaphysicaloneandhasthuslostits'occult'character,obviouslyworthless.'It wasinfact',Wittgensteinadds,'justtheoccultcharacterofthemental[image]which youneededforyourpurposes.'23ThisseemsanotunfaircommentonLocke's statement:'Themindhasapowerinmanycasestoreviveperceptionswhichithasonce
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

had,withthisadditionalperceptionannexedtothem,thatit has had them before',24 whichoccurs,withoutdefenceorexplanation,inthechapteron'Retention'which immediatelyprecedesLocke'sfirstsketchofhistheoryofclassification. IhaveconstruedLocke'stechniqueassaying:'Forminyourmindanideaofthe"green" associatedkind...'.Buteveniftheidentityofideaswerelikethatofuniversals,or alternatively ____________________ 22L.Wittgenstein,The Blue and Brown Books,p.3;seealsop.12. 23Ibid.p.5. 24Essay II.x.2. 15

likethatofdurableparticularobjects,sothattheverysameideacouldrecuron separateoccasions,theobjectionwouldstillgothrough.Forthetechniquewouldstill requireonetoreidentifyanindividualideaondistinctoccasions,andtoreidentifyisto classify:reidentifyinganyenduringitemAisclassifyingoccasionsasAencounters.This iswhytheuniversalisttechniqueforclassifying,inrequiringonetoidentifyagiven universalastheoneinstantiatedinthepastbysuchandsuchparticularsorastheone customarilyassociatedwithsuchandsuchaword,presupposesclassificatoryability. (b)GiventhatIsomehowknowthatIhavea'green'associatedideainmymind,Locke's techniquenowrequiresmetodeterminewhetherthisidea'agrees'withoris 'conformable'tox.Butthisistodeterminewhetheracertainrelationholdsbetweenx andtheidea,whichisanotherexerciseinclassifying.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Lockeuses'agreewith'tomean'resemble'.Idenythatanideaormentalimagecan resembleanextramentalobject(see5below),butevenifitcanthepresentcriticism stillstands.Todiscoverthatxresemblesyistodiscoverthatx-yisaresemblingpair, whichislogicallyonaparwithdiscoveringthatJohnholdshandswithMary,i.e.that JohnMaryisahandholdingpair. Thisissometimesdenied.Price,forexample,inacontextcloselyrelatedtoourpresent theme,saysthatresemblance'istoofundamentaltobecalledarelationatall,inthe ordinarysenseoftheword"relation".'25Lockehimselfmayhavesomesympathywith thisview:therearepointersinthatdirectioninhispeculiartheorythatrelationsare'not containedintherealexistenceofthings,but[are]somethingextraneousand superinduced',26andinwhathesaysaboutcomparisonasthebasisforallour relationalstatements.27Butthisistoocomplexamattertobeexploredhere,andIcan onlysaythatifLockedidnotcountresemblanceasarelationIdonotknowwhy. Thereis,however,anotherreasonwhyhemighthaveoverlookedthesecondfailureof histechnique.Hemayhaveintendedthetechniquetodemandaresemblancebetweenx andtheidea,andhaveassumedthatresemblance,evenifitisarelation,issomehow sospecial,soultimate,thatnoquestioncouldarise ____________________ 25H.H.Price,Thinking and Experience(London,1953),p.26. 26Essay II.xxv.8. 27Essay II.xii.7;xxv.9;xxviii.12. 16
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

abouthowoneknowswhetheronethingresemblesanother.Foranobliquebut penetratingcriticismofthisassumption,IreferthereadertoWittgenstein.28 Atechniqueforclassificationsofagivenkindneednotpresupposeanabilitytomake classificationsofthatkind.Forexample,instructionsforapplyingtermsindiagnostic medicinecanbefollowedbysomeonewhocannotyetapplyanyofthoseterms.So Lockemightsay:'Wefinditeasiertoclassifyideasthantoclassifyextramentalobjects ("realexistences"),andeasiertodiscoverresemblancesthanotherrelations.Mytheory describesthetechniquewhereby,startingwithacommandoftheeasiertasks,we advancetoacommandoftheharderones.'Thiswouldclearhimofbothmycriticisms, butonlybylayinghimopentoanother,namelythatthetheoryisrefutedbyempirical evidence.Ofcourse,eveninitsunrestrictedformthetheoryconflictswiththeempirical evidence,butaproponentofitmightsay'Well,wemustacceptthistheoryifwecan't findanalternativetoit:therehastobesometechniquewhich,whetherornotweare consciousofit,weemployinclassifying;forotherwiseourabilitytoclassifyisjustan intolerablemystery.'Butthetheoryinitsrestrictedformcannotbebackedupwithany suchplea.Supportforitmusttaketheform:'Onecanclassifywithoutemploying anythinglikearuleorgeneraltechnique;butinfactsomeofourclassificatoryactivities dodependuponatechniqueofcomparingobjectswithalreadyclassifiedideas.'Itwould beabsurdtoacceptthiswithoutempiricalevidenceinitsfavour,butinfactthe empiricalevidencegoesstrenuouslyagainstit. SoLocke'spurportedtechniquewillnotstand,whetheritisintendedasfully comprehensiveoronlyasatechniqueformakingsomeclassificationsgiventheprior abilitytohandleothers.WhichwaydidLockewanthistechniquetobeunderstood? Thereisprobablynorightanswer.Indeed,Lockewouldprobablyhaverejectedeach
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

alternativeifithadbeenpresentedtohimclearlyandexplicitly,butthatconjectureis notadefenceofhim.AsGibsonsaysinadifferentconnexion: Inattackingapositionthepracticalstrengthofwhichdependsuponan absenceofcleardefinition,itisnecessarytoplacethealternative interpretationsofwhichitissusceptibleinassearchingalightas ____________________ 28L.Wittgenstein,Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics(Oxford,1956),Pt.I, 3. 17

possible;andtheenterprisecannotbeheldtohavefailedofitsobject,ifthe resultistoshowthatevenintheopinionofitsdefendersnopartofthe groundistenable.29 Therearecountlesspossibletheoriesofclassificationagainstwhichmyargumentsdo nothave,andarenotintendedtohave,anypoweratall.Amongtheseareindefinitely manytheoriesoftheform'InmakingFclassificationsweutilizeourpriorabilitytomake Gclassifications,inthefollowingway...'.Somesuchtheorieswillbetrue,others false;butIhavearguedagainstonlyoneofthem,namelythetheorythatweclassify extramentalthingsonthebasisofapriorabilitytoclassifyideasandtospot resemblances.Clearly,ifLockeisadvancingatheoryofthisgeneralsortitmustbethat oneinparticular. Ishouldmentionakindoftheorywhich,thoughcoveringallclassifications,nevertheless
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

escapesmyargumentsinthissection.Incriticizingattemptstobaseclassificationson anallpurposetechnique,Ihavetakena'technique'tobesomethingexpressibleinthe form'If...,doA'whichcomesintoplayonlyifsomeone'sdoingAarisesfromhis acceptingtheconditionalandknowing(orthinking,orseeing,etc.)thatitsantecedent fitshisgivensituation.Itwasoftheessenceofmyargumentthatsomethinglike knowledgehadtobebroughttobearupontheantecedent.Buttherecanalsobe conditionalsoftheform'If...,thenxdoesA',notembodyingtechniquesorrulesor recipesfordoingA,butofferingcausalexplanationsofdoingsofA.Aconditionalofthis sortbearsuponmydoingAjustsolongastheconditionalistrueanditsantecedentfits mysituationIneedn'taccepttheconditionalorbeinanywaycognitivelyor intellectuallyinvolvedwithitsantecedent.Soatheorymight,withoutcircularity,explain everyhumanachievementofclassifyingorrecognizing.Inexplaininganyintellectual featofsomeone's,onemuststartfromsomefactabouthim;butthismaybeafact abouthisbrainorhisbloodstreamorhiseyes,andneednotbeafactaboutsome preliminaryintellectualfeatwhichhashelpedhimtotheonebeingexplained. Evenatheoryofthissortmightcomeunderfirefromsomeonewhoseinterestisnotin humanfunctionsbutintheNatureofGenerality.Somephilosophersprobablyincluding Lockehavebeeninclinedtoask'Whatmakesitpossibleforgeneralitytobe ____________________ 29Gibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,p.40. 18

imposeduponaworldofparticulars?'Thisseemstodemandthatourabilitytoclassify
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

beexplained,andyetitisplausibletosaythatevenacausalexplanatorytheoryof classificationwouldsubtlybegthisquestion,orpseudoquestion.Butthedetailed developmentofthispointwouldtakemetoofarafield. Anyway,wecannotattributeacausaltypeoftheorytoLocke.Admittedly,hedoesnot describeclassifyingasalongdrawnoutprocedureinthewayIhaveimplied,andIhave donelessthanjusticetohispreparednesssometimestoview'theunderstanding'notas anagentbutasareceptacleformentalhappenings.30Sohemaywellseethe classifyingprocedurethus:thepatternideajustcomesintoone'smind,unbidden,atthe momentoneperceivestheitemtobeclassified;andthetwoareinstantlycheckedoff againstoneanother;sothatthequestionisansweredbeforeitcanbeasked.Butif Lockeistoescapefrommymaincriticism,heneedsmorethanthis.Specifically,hehas tosaythatinclassifyingoneneedneitherrecognizethepatternideanorsee thatit matchesorresemblestheitemtobeclassified.IcannotthoughIshouldliketo believethisaccountofhisintentions.31 InmyfirstsectionIacceptedabroadlyWittgensteinianapproachtoquestionsabout meaning.Oneaspectofthisapproachcouldbesummedupinthestatementthatwhat someone(usually)meansbyagivenwordWisdeterminedbyhowhe(usually)doesor woulduseW.Thislinksmeaningwithclassifying,since,formanyvaluesofW,howWis usedislargelyamatterofwhatparticularthingsitisappliedto.Forexample,the questionofhowsomeoneuses'elastic',andthusofwhathemeansbythatword, involvesthequestionofwhetherhewouldapplyittosuchthingsasabrick,anocean,a rubberband. Thatisnotallitinvolves,though.Afullgraspofthemeaningof'elastic'includes,as wellastheabilitytopickoutelasticthingsanddescribethemaloneaselastic,alsothe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

abilitytousethewordproperlyingeneralstatements,conditionals,questions,andso on.Furthermore,wordslike'if'and'perhaps'and'is'and'yesterday'havemeanings whichcannotbedescribedevenpartlyintheseterms.Wecannotevenstarttodiscover thatsomeoneuses'if'correctlybyconsideringwhatparticularthingsheappliesitto. ____________________ 30Essay II.i.22,25;x.78. 31Essay III.iii.13,20. 19

Soanytheoryabouttheapplicationofclassificatorywordstoparticularswouldfall doublyshortofbeingacomprehensivetheoryofwordmeaning:itwouldbesilenton manyaspectsofthemeaningsofclassificatorywords,andonallaspectsofthehostsof wordswhicharenotclassificatory.32Locke,however,wasnotapttoseethis.Hetends towriteathoughouronlyuseofclassificatorywordsweretoapplyorwithholdthem, likelabels;and,thoughheacknowledgestheexistenceof'particles'suchas'is'and'if', hisverycursorytreatmentofthemamountstoadepictionofthemasclassificatoryafter allspecifically,aswordsforclassifying'theseveralposturesof[the]mindin discoursing'.33SoIthinkLockewouldtendtoexaggeratetheproportionofthetotal areaof'meaning'whichisalsocoveredby'classifying'. Ifhedid,thenhecouldsummononeofhistheoriestotheaidoftheother,particularly intryingtodealwithmycharein1thathemakesmeaningsinaccessibletothecasual observer.(1)Hemightstickbyhistheoryofmeaning,andsaythatIcanknowthatmy neighbourmeanswhatIdoby'green'throughareliablesymptom,namelyhiscalling
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

'green'thethingsthatIdo.Thatthisisareliablesymptomfollowsfromthetheoryof classifying,whichsaysthathow my neighbour applies'green'tothingsintheworld depends(causally)uponwhat ideas he associates withthatword,andbyLocke'stheory ofmeaningthisisequivalent(analytically)towhat he means bythewords.(2) Alternatively,Lockemightrelinquishhistheoryofmeaningasformulated,admittingthat whatconstitutesthemeaningonegivestoawordishowoneusesitinthepublic domain;yetgoontomaintaintheoryevenoftheyarenotdefinitiveof'meaning'.For, hemightsay,meaningisconstituted(analytically)byuse,butthetheoryofclassifying showsthatdisciplineduseismad(causally)possibleonlybyassociatingwordswith ideas. Lockewastoounawareofhisowndifficultiestobeabletoadopteitherofthese approaches,butthefactthateachwasprimafacieopentohim,Isuggest,helpsto explaintheconfidencewithwhichheconnectsmeaningwithideas. ____________________ 32SeeP.T.Geach,Mental Acts(London,1957),11;alsoZabeeh,Hume,pp.7880. 33Essay III.vii.3. 20

3.Abstractideas
TheideasfiguringinLocke'stheoriesofmeaningandclassificationweresupposedtobe 'abstract'inasensewhichmustnowbepartiallyexplained.Letusstarthere:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Themindhavinggotananideawhichitthinksitmayhaveuseofeitherin contemplationordiscourse,thefirstthingitdoesistoabstractit,andthen getanametoit;andsolayitupinitsstorehouse,thememory,ascontaining theessenceofasortofthings,ofwhichthatnameisalwaystobethemark.

34

So,wehavetoabstractanideainordertomakeitusable.Theprocessisessentially oneofneglecting,omitting,settingaside: Themindmakestheparticularideasreceivedfromparticularobjectstobecome general;whichisdonebyconsideringthemastheyareinthemind... separatefromallotherexistences,andthecircumstancesofrealexistence,as time,place,oranyotherconcomitantideas.ThisiscalledABSTRACTION, wherebyideastakenfromparticularbeingsbecomegeneralrepresentativesof allofthesamekind.35 Abstraction,though,involvessomehowstrippinganideanotjustofthe'circumstances' inwhichitslikeoriginallycameintoone'smind,butalsoofsomeofitsinternaldetail: When[childrenlearn]thatthereareagreatmanyotherthingsintheworld, thatinsome[respects]resembletheirfatherandmother,andthosepersons theyhavebeenusedto,theyframeanidea,whichtheyfindthosemany particularsdopartakein;andtothattheygive,withothers,thenameman,for example.Andthustheycometohaveageneralname,andageneralidea. Whereintheymakenothingnew;butonlyleaveoutofthecomplexideathey hadofPeterandJames,MaryandJane,thatwhichispeculiartoeach,and retainonlywhatiscommontothemall.36
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thisprocedurecanberepeatedtoyield,forexample,thestillmoreabstractideaof animal: whichnewideaismade,notbyanynewaddition,butonlyasbefore,by leavingouttheshape,andsomeotherpropertiessignifiedbythenameman, andretainingonlyabody,withlife,sense,andspontaneousmotion, comprehendedunderthenameanimal.37 ____________________ 34Essay II.xxxii.7.ThemaintextsareII.xi.810andIII.iii.69. 35Essay II.xi.9 36Essay III.iii.7. 37Essay III.iii.8. 21

Inthenextsectiontheterm'abstract'isreintroduced,andthenotionofomissionis furtherstressed.Somuchforthetextualbasis. IhavealreadynotedthatLocketakesall'ideas'tobesomethinginthenatureofsense dataeitherasacquiredinordinaryperception,hallucinationsetc.,orasimaginatively conjuredupatwill.Thisfactwhichnowshiftstowardsthecentreofourconcerns showsinhissaying,above,thatthe'ideas'involvedinmeaningandclassifyingare developedbyabstractionfrom'particularideasreceivedfromparticularobjects'.The latterarecertainlymeanttobethesensedataacquiredinordinaryperception;andthe ideaswhichfigureinmeaningandclassifyingtheonesthatmaybeabstract,andthat canbecalledtomindatwillandare'excited'inuswhenweunderstandaresupposed
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

tobecopiesofthem.Youhaveacopyideainyourmindwhen,forexample,youseea faceinyourmind'seyeorhaveatunerunningthroughyourhead. Soan'abstract'ideaisacopyidea,anideasuchasonemighthaveinimagining something,whichisinsomewaysketchyorundetailed.Problemsaboutjustwhatthis meanswillbediscussedin67inconnexionwithBerkeley'sviewthattherecannotbe abstractideas.Atthepresentstage,Iampreparedtosayconfidentlythatsomething likeaLockeanabstractideacanoccur,onthegroundsthatsomeonecanclosehiseyes andpictureawoman'sface,neither'seeing'herassmilingnor'seeing'herasunsmiling whichItaketoimplythathehasasomewhatabstractideaorimageofher.Havinga poorvisualimagination,Ipreferanexamplelikethis:Iplayatuneinmyhead,andI 'hear'itasorchestrated,whichisdifferentfrom'hearing'itasplayedonatinwhistle; yetIdonot'hear'itasorchestratedinanycompletelyspecificfashion,neitheras involvingatleastthreeoboesnorasinvolvingfewerthanthreeoboes;andsomy auditoryideaorimageisabstract.Mostpeopleagreethattheycandosomethingofthe sortIhavehereroughlyandmetaphoricallydescribed.Whetherimagescanbesketchy tothesamedegreethatwordmeaningscanbegeneralis,ofcourse,anotherquestion. Asthatremarkimplies,thetheoryofabstractnessisrequiredbyLocke'sviewthatthe meaningofawordisdeterminedbytheidea(orclassofsimilarideas)associatedwith it.Hereisthereason.IfIsayofsomething'Thatisananimal',givingthisits 22

ordinarymeaning,Isaynothingaboutwhatsortofanimalitis;andsothe'ideaof animal'inmymindmustnotbetheideaofavertebrateanimal,normayitbetheidea
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ofaninvertebrateanimal;sinceanideaofeitherofthesekindswouldendowmy utterancewithastrongermeaningthanisordinarilycarriedby'Thatisananimal'.In short,ifmeaningsaredeterminedbyideas,thenthefactthatmeaningscanbemoreor lessinformativeorspecificimpliesthatideasmustbeabletobemoreorlesssaturated withdetail.Tomeanwhatisordinarilymeantby'animal',Imustmakeit'standfor'an ideawhichhasenoughdetailtocountdecisivelyasanideaofananimalbutisn't detailedenoughtocountasanideaofanFanimal,foranynonvacuousF.Clearly,the theoryofmeaningsubjectsthetheoryofabstractnesstosomestrenuousdemands. Berkeley,wemaynoteinpassing,givesaquitedifferentaccountof'thesourceofthis prevailingnotion'thatthereareabstractideas.38Obscureasthisaccountis,Iamfairly surethatitsmainthrustifithasoneiscorrectlydescribedbyWarnock.39Accordingto Warnock'sBerkeley,Lockethoughtofgeneralwordsaspropernames,eachreferringto someoneentity;andhepostulatedabstractideasbecausetheywereneededtoplay theroleofsuchentitiessothat'green',forinstance,isthepropernameoftheabstract ideaofgreen.Now,someonemightarriveatthetheoryofabstractideasbythisroute, butisthereanyevidencethatLockedid?IhavenoreasontothinkthatLockeregarded generalwordsaspropernames,40orthathethoughtthatcorrespondingtoevery generalwordthereisjustoneabstractidearatherthandifferentabstractideasinthe mindsofdifferentpeopleandatdifferenttimes.Andevidenceisneeded,forBerkeley's explanationcannotbeforcedontousastheonlypossibleone. Thetheoryofabstractideascanalsobeseenasanaidto,orincidentin,Locke'stheory ofclassification.IfIamtodiscoverwhetherxisamanbycheckingxagainsta'man' associatedidea,itmayhelpifIhaveanideawhich'agrees'ascloselywithanymanas withanyotherman;anidealackingthesortofdetailwhichusuallyinformstheideas(= sensedata)Ihavewhensensorilyconfrontedbyrealmen;anidea,thatis,whichis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

abstract.The ____________________ 38Principles,Introduction18. 39Warnock,Berkeley,pp.723. 40SeeEssay III.iii.12. 23

theoryofabstractness,then,hasaroletoplayinLocke'saccountofclassification,and thisistherolethatLockeancommentatorsusuallystress,inthebeliefthatitisa leadingone.'How,inanutshell,didLocketrytosolvethe"problem"ofexplainingour abilitytoclassifyparticulars?'Mostcommentators,andindeedLockehimself,would answer:'Bymeansofhistheoryaboutabstractideas.'Thisanswerismisleading. ThecrucialpointisthatLocke'sabstractnessdoctrinegoesnowaytowardsmeetingthe chargethathistheoryofclassificationpresupposescompetenceintwodistinctways. Thequestions'HowdoIknowthatthisideaisa"man"linkedone?'and'HowdoIknow thattherelationbetweenxandthisideaisoneofagreement?'arenotmadeonewhit moreanswerablebythestipulationthattheideainquestionisanabstractone.The irrelevanceoftheabstractnessdoctrinetotheobjectionswhichkillthetheoryof classificationimpliesthattheformerisnotalargeorvitalpartofthelatter.Infact,the abstractnessdoctrineisnotevenprimafacieasolutionofthe'problem'ofhowwecan applyonewordtomanyparticulars,butonlyofthefollowingtinypartofit. Ifweclassifythingsbycheckingthemagainst'patterns'orsamples,howdoweknow whichfeaturesofagivensamplearerelevant?Someonewonderswhethertodescribex
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

as'red',andhehasestablished,somehow,thatSisasampleofredandthatS resemblesx.Buttheresemblanceisnottotal:infact(thoughheisnotinapositionto saythis),Sisred,square,madeoftweed,roughtothetouch,andsmellingfaintlyof lavender;whilexisred,round,madeofsilk...etc.Howcanheselectfromamongall thefeaturesofStheoneswhicharerelevanttohisproblemofwhethertodescribexas 'red'?41 Thetheoryofabstractnessis,atleastprimafacie,asolutionofthis'problem'.Itsays thatthesampleisalwaysanideawhichissketchyorabstracttosuchadegreethatit simplydoesn'thaveanyfeatureswhichareirrelevanttotheclassificationinquestion,so thattheproblemof'howtoselecttherelevantfeatures'doesnotarise. Soifwecouldrendercrediblethethesisthatwealwaysclassifythingsbycomparing themwithsamples,whileleavingshroudedinmysterythequestionofhowwemanage toselecttherelevant ____________________ 41SeeL.Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations(Oxford,1953),Pt.I,73. 24

feature(s)ofanygivensample,thenweshouldhaveaproblemtowhichthetheoryof abstractnessmightbethesolution.Butinrelationtothelarge'problem'ofhowweare abletoclassifyparticulars,abstractnessassuchisperipheral.Assomeofthequoted passagesshow,Lockedidnotseethis.Hesawhistheoryofideasasarivalto universalisminexplaininghowweclassify,andthoughtthatthecruxofhistheorythe featureofitwhichfittedittodouniversalism'sworkwithoutinvokinguniversalswas

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

preciselyitssayingthattheideasweuseaspatternsareabstract.Inthisheerred.

4.Thedoubleuseof'idea'
Locke'sthoughtisdominatedbyhisattempttouse'idea'univocallyasakeyterminhis accountsofperceptionandofmeaningor,inshorthand,hisuseof'idea'tocoverboth sensedataandconcepts.Passagesalreadyquotedshowthisuseatwork,butnot sharplyenough. HereisLocke'sinitialexplanationoftheword'idea': Imusthere...begpardonofmyreaderforthefrequentuseofthewordidea, whichhewillfindinthefollowingtreatise.Itbeingthattermwhich,Ithink, servesbesttostandforwhatsoeveristheobjectoftheunderstandingwhena manthinks,Ihaveusedittoexpress...whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking.42 Thenlaterhesays:'Toask,atwhattimeamanhasfirstanyideas,istoask,whenhe beginstoperceive;having ideas,andperception,beingthesamething'.43Ifthetwo passagesseemtoconflictviolently,recallthatDescartes,bywhomLockewasmuch influenced,waspreparedtouse'think'tocovermentalgoingsonofanysortatall. Takentogether,thesetwopassageshavetheeffectofstretching'think'inonedirection and'perceive'intheother;andLocke'swillingnesstomakethesestretchesis fundamentaltohisthought. Hisdoubleuseof'idea',then,isnotamereterminologicalnuisance:itembodieshis substantivemistake,sharedwithBerkeleyandHumeandothersintheempiricist
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

tradition,ofassimilatingthesensoryfartoocloselytotheintellectual.Havingmade somegeneralremarksaboutthismistakeelsewhere,Ishall ____________________ 42Essay,Introduction8. 43Essa II.i.9. 25

hereconfinemyselftopresentingdetailedinstancesofit.44Tounderstandthe empiricists'writingsonemustbeabletohandletheirassimilationsofthesensorytothe intellectual:torecognizethem,correctthem,salvagesensefrompassagesinfectedby them,tracetheirinfluence,andsoon.Icanoffernoclearrulesorreliabletechniquesfor doingthis;butexamplesmayhelp,andthemainpurposeofthissectionistoprovide some. (1)Lockewasanempiricistaboutmeanings:heheldthatnoclassificatorywordmakes sensetousunlesseither(a)wehavesensorilyencounteredthingstowhichitapplies, or(b)wecandefineitintermsofwordswhichsatisfy(a).Ishalldiscussthistheory,in Hume'sversionofit,morefullyinchapterIX;justnow,oneaspectofitwillserveto illustratethesensoryintellectualassimilation.AccordingtoLocke,onemakessenseofa wordbyassociatingitwithakindofidea,andideasarealsotheitemsonehasin ordinaryperception;andsohecandrasticallyoversimplifymeaningempiricismbytaking ittosaymerelythatonecannothaveideasinonewaywithoutfirsthavingthemin another.Adoctrinewhichissocomplexthatnoonehasyetstateditadequatelythus appearstoLocketohavethesamelogicalformasthesimpleuntruth:'Youcannotseea
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

playwithoutfirstreadingit.' ThisspurioussimplicityofmeaningempiricismprobablyalsoincreasesLocke's confidenceinitstruth.Anykindofideamusthaveenteredmymindinthefirstplaceex nihilo nihil fitwhichisjusttosaythatitmusthaveenteredfromtheoutside,i.e.have firstbeenhadinsensoryencounterswiththings.SowefindLockesaying: Ifitshallbedemandedthen,whenamanbeginstohaveanyideas,Ithink thetrueansweris,when he first has any sensation.For,sincethereappear nottobeanyideasinthemindbeforethesenseshaveconveyedanyin,I conceivethatideasintheunderstandingarecoevalwithsensation.45 Thewords'thereappearnottobe'suggestthatLockeisofferingatentativeempirical conjecture(see47below).Butdoesn'thealsoseeminclinedtothinkthatitstandsto reasonthatideasmustenterthemindfromsomewhere,andthustoregardhis meaningempiricismasasimple,obvious,inevitabletruth? ____________________ 44J.Bennett,Kant's Analytic(Cambridge,1966),17. 45Essay II.i.23. 26

Forafurtherillustrationofhowthedoubleuseof'idea'simplifiesmeaningempiricism, lookbackatthe'violet/marigold'passagediscussedin1above. (2)Lockeavoidsacertaindifficultyinhistheoryofmeaningbysayingthatwords'stand

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

for'theideaswithwhichtheyareassociated,whichseemstoimplyimplausiblythata wordstandsforitsmeaning.Remember,though,thatforLocke'ideas'arealsosense data.Heisgiventosayingthatinourexperienceoftheobjectiveworldallweare directlyconfrontedwithareourown'ideas'orsensorystates;andthisallowshimto thinkthatineverythingwesayourmostimmediateandintimatesubjectmatter consistsofourownideas,thereferencetothingsbeingasecondaryone.Thisisathesis about'ideas'notasmeaningsbutassensedata,butitcanalsobeexpressedinthe words'Ourwordsstandforourideas'. Idonotdefend'Ourwordsstandforourideas'oneitherinterpretationofit,butmerely notethatLocke'sdoubleuseof'idea'makesbothinterpretationsavailabletohim.I furthersuggestthathisacceptanceofastatementwhichseemstoimply'Iusetheword "sugar"tostandforitsownmeaning'maybepartlyexplainedbyhisconstruingitsoas toimply'Iusetheword"sugar"tostandforsugarasIexperienceit,orforthesense dataIhavewhenIseeortasteortouchsugar'. (3)Ishallintroducemorestrikingconsequencesofthedoubleuseof'idea'in52,62 below;butInowrestrictmyselftoonefurtherexample,notofwhatLockeisledintoby thismistake,butratherofthewayinwhichitspresenceinhisworkcanenrichand complicateourexegesis. TheexampleconcernsLocke'suseof'idea'tomean'quality'.Hetriestokeepthewords apart,andtellsushowtoconstruehisfailurestodoso: Whatsoeverthemindperceivesin itself,oristheimmediateobjectof perception,thought,orunderstanding,thatIcallidea;andthepowerto produceanyideainourmind,Icallqualityofthesubjectwhereinthatpower is.Thusasnowballhavingthepowertoproduceinustheideasofwhite,cold,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andround,thepowertoproducethoseideasinus,astheyareinthe snowball,Icallqualities;andastheyaresensationsorperceptionsinour understandings,Icallthemideas;whichideas,ifIspeakofsometimesasin thethingsthemselves,Iwould 27

beunderstoodtomeanthosequalitiesintheobjectswhichproducethemin us.46 'Thatlastexplanationmustbeunnecessary.Surelynoonewouldslipintothepracticeof speakingofideas"asinthethingsthemselves".'Onthecontrary,Lockeunwittingly adoptsthepracticeinthisverypassage!Thecrucialwordsare:'thepowertoproduce thoseideasinus,astheyareinthesnowball',where'they'mustreferbackto'ideas' andnottothesingular'power'.WemightconjecturethatLockemeanttowrite'powers'; butthen,apparently,hewouldbereferringtothepowersofasnowballas'sensationsor perceptionsinourunderstandings',whichwon'tdoeither. Anyway,Lockeoftenspeaksofideasasinthethingsthemselves.Hereisoneofthe moreglaringexamples:'Wecannotobserveanyalterationtobemadein...anything, butbytheobservablechangeofitssensibleideas;norconceiveanyalterationtobe made,butbyconceivingachangeofsomeofitsideas.'47Thispassagecanbeunpacked accordingtoLocke'sinstructions,andsoperhapscaneveryotheruseof'idea'tomean 'quality'.Butwhyshouldheadoptthispeculiarusageinthefirstplace?Ihavetwo suggestions,onecorrespondingtoeachbasicfunctionoftheword'idea'.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

(a)ItisplausibletosaythatthemeaningofanyclassificatorywordWisdetermined solelybythequalitiesathingmusthaveifWistoapplytoit;sostatementsabout meaningsarepreciselycorrelatedwithstatementsaboutqualities;48andsothework doneby'quality'canaswellbedoneby'idea'(=meaning). (b)Sensedataareouronlysourceofinformationaboutthequalitiesofthings;sowhen wespeakofthings'qualitiesourimmediatesubjectmatterconsistsinthesensedata thingscauseinus;andsotheworkdoneby'quality'canaswellbedoneby'idea'(= sensedatum). Ofthese,(b)isthelikelierexplanationofthe'snowball'passage,butistheavailability of(a)asheercoincidence?IsubmitthatLocke'stendencytouse'idea'tomean'quality' isfedbyboththesesources. Berkeleysaidthatqualitiesareideas:forhimthiswasnotan ____________________ 46Essay II.viii.8. 47Essay II.xxi.1. 48Cf.G.Ryle,'John Locke on the Human Understanding',pp.1819. 28

ellipsistobeunpacked(see14below).Inhiscasetheexplanationliesin(b),ofwhich heacceptedaverystrongform;and(a)probablyhaslittletodowithit.Butevenif(a) wereasubstantialpartoftheexplanationinBerkeley'scasetoo,itwouldbewrongto say,asIoncedid,thatBerkeleywasledtouse'idea'tocoverqualitiesbyhishaving

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thedoubleuseof'idea'whichismymainthemeinthissection,i.e.itsusetocoverboth meaningsandsensedata.49Mymistakewasnotexegeticalbutphilosophical.A philosopherwhodidnotuse'idea'tocoversensedatacouldstillcomebyroute(a)to useittocoverqualities;andonewhodidnotuse'idea'tocovermeaningscouldstill comebyroute(b)touseittocoverqualities.Conversely,aphilosophermightuse'idea' forbothmeaningsandsensedatayetdeclinetouseitforqualitiesbecauseherejected both(a)and(b).Inshort,themeaning/sensedatumequivocationdoesnotofitself leadtospeakingof'theideasofthings'meaning'thequalitiesofthings';allityieldsis thepossibilityofsomeone'scomingtospeakinthiswayfortwodistinctreasons,one havingtodowithmeaningsandtheotherwithsensedata. ItisdangeroustospeakasIhavedoneofLocke's'doubleuseof"idea"',forthis suggeststhatwearehereconfrontedwithacaseofsimpleambiguity.The misleadingnessofthataccountofthesituationcanbeseenbyconsideringthecommon viewthatLockean'abstractideas'arenotsupposedtobesketchyimages,asBerkeley unfairlysupposed,butrathertobegeneralmeanings.50ThatcomplaintagainstBerkeley assumesthatLocke'suseof'idea'isstraightforwardlyambiguous:itallegesthatin someofhisusesof'idea'andalwaysinthephrase'abstractidea'Lockesimplyuses theword'idea'tomean'meaning'.51Butthenhistheoryofabstractideasisjustthe thesisthattherearegeneralmeanings,whichisboring,uncontroversial,andnoteven primafacieexplanatory.Lockethoughthewasexplaininghowtherecanbegeneral meanings,andtodojusticetothisaspectofhis ____________________ 49J.Bennett,'Substance, Reality and Primary Qualities',Martinp.94(alsoinEngle). 50ThusC.R.Morris,Locke, Berkely, Hume(Oxford,1931),pp.723.Againstthis mistake,seeWarnock,Berkely,p.68;andJ.Linnell,"'Locke'sAbstractIdeas'",
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,vol.16(1956). 51C.Maund,Hume's Theory of Knowledge(London,1937),pp.67,1667;D.Greenlee, "'Locke'sIdeaofIdea'",Theoria,vol.33(1967).Foramuchbetteraccount,seeFlew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief,p.22. 29

intentionswemustconstruehistheoryassayingthatwordsgetgeneralmeaningsby beingassociatedwithquasisensoryimagesofacertainsort,theselatterbeingknown as'abstractideas'. Ihavenobrief,satisfactorywayofsayingwhatthesituationisregardingtheuseofthe word'idea'byLockeorBerkeleyorHume. 30

II IDEASANDMEANINGS:BERKELEY
5.Hownottoreifysense-data
IHAVEsaidvaguelythatLocke's'ideas'are,firstandforemost,sensedata.Alittlemore carefully:'ideasofsensation'aresensedata;thesearetheideasonehasinperceiving theobjectiverealm,inhallucinations,andsoon.'Ideasofreflection',ontheotherhand, aresupposedtooccurwhenwereflectorintrospect,andtoexplainourunderstandingof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

aresupposedtooccurwhenwereflectorintrospect,andtoexplainourunderstandingof wordslike'pain','thought','puzzlement',etc.1ThisispartofLocke'saccountofself knowledgeas,almostliterally,akindofpeeringinwards.Iagreewiththecurrently popularviewthattheaccountisinterestingbutuntenable,andmyonlyreasonforside steppingitandtheassociatedproblemsaboutBerkeley'sattitudetoit2isthatI knowIhavenothingworthwhiletosayonthesetopics. Revertingnowtotheideas(ofsensation)whicharesensedata:ingivingthemarolein histheoryofmeaning,Lockedoesnotsaythatsomeonewhohearsandunderstandsthe sentence'Thehouseisonfire'hasideasexactlylikethosehewouldhaveifhesawor feltorheardthefire;forhewouldallowadifferenceofdetailednessandperhapsalsoof intensity.Still,toexplainwhatLockesupposesan'idea'tobeinanyofitsphilosophical roles,wemustbeginbysaying:ideasaresensedata. Aretheresuchthingsassensedata?WhenIseeatree,doIimmediatelyapprehenda visualsensedatuman'ideaofsensation'throughorbymeansofwhichIseethetree? Manyphilosophersnowrejectthisapparentreduplicationoftheobjectsofexperience, thuscondemningbothLockeandmywayofexplaininghim.Inselfdefence,andalsoin preparationforsomeBerkeleianthemes,ImustexplainwhyandhowIthinkit legitimatetousetheterm'sensedatum'.Mymaintaskwillbetocriticizeanimproper wayofusingitoneofwhichLockeand ____________________ 1SeeEssay II.i.4,78;vi.AlsoGibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,pp.567,8990. 2E.J.Furlong,'An Ambiguity in Berkeley's Principles',Hermathena,vol.94(1960);G. A.Johnston,The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy(London,1923),pp.1427. 31
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Berkeleywerebothguilty,thoughitdidnotcontributemuchtoanyofthemistakesof Locke'swhichIhavediscussedsofar.Itisamisusewhichloomslargeinmost twentiethcenturydefencesof,andattackson,the'sensedatum'terminology. Thequestionaboutsensedata,andtheanswertoitwhichIshalldefend,involvea certainlogicalstructurewhichshouldperhapsfirstbedisplayedinalesscontroversial application.SoIshallfirstconsiderthequestion'Aretheresuchthingsasmoods?',in thehopethatthiswillclarifynot supportwhatIhavetosayaboutthequestion'Are theresuchthingsassensedata?'Instressingthelogicalsimilaritybetweenthetwo questions,andbetweentheirrespectiveanswers,Ideliberatelysnubapopularpoint whichseemstometohavenophilosophicalsignificancenamelythat'sensedatum'does not(as'mood'does)belongtovernacularEnglish. Ofcoursetherearemoods.Iwasinabadmoodthismorning,andmymoodchanged aroundnoon.Still,onehesitatestosaythattherearesuchthingsasmoodsitseems wrongtoreifymoods.Toclarify'Itiswrongtoreifymoods'Iofferthefollowingtwopart justificationofit.Firstly,theonlyintelligiblestatementsaboutmoodsarestatements whichmaybenegative,general,conditional,etc.aboutpeople'sbeinginmoods.Itake thistobeobviouslytrue.Secondly,anystatementaboutsomeone'sbeinginamoodis equivalenttoanexplicitlynonrelationalstatementaboutthatperson.Ibasethatupon theavailabilityoftranslationslikethese: Heisinagoodmood=HeischeerfulandfriendlyHeisinabadmood=Heis gloomyandirritableHismoodhaschanged=Hedoesn'tfeelashedid. Ifbothpointsareright,thenallstatementsaboutmoodscanbeexpressedwhollyas
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

nonrelationalstatementsaboutpeople,andthisfact,Isuggest,primarilyexplainsour convictionthatmoodsareradicallyunthinglike.Moodsarenotthingsbutemotional states. Doesitfollowthatwecannotsayaboutmoodsanythingofthesortwecansayabout things?Itdoesnot.Moodsarestates;andstates,likethings,canbeownedandclocked andcomparedwithoneanother;sowehaveatleastthefollowingthreewaysoftalking aboutmoodswithoutreifyingthem.(i)Moods,likegramophonesandhandkerchiefs,can beowned.Thepersonwho 32

isin,orhas,amoodisjustthesubjectofthecorrespondingnonrelationalstatement:a moodofdepressionismineifandonlyifitisIwhoamdepressed.(ii)Moods,like objects,canbeclockedcancomeintoandgooutofexistenceatstatedtimes.Thisis becausewecansaywhensomethingstartedorfinishedbeinginagivenstate,e.g. whenitbecametrue,orwhenitbecamefalse,ofmethatIwasdepressed.(iii)Moods canbecomparedandcontrastedwithoneanother,asobjectscan,andmaybeclassified anddescribedonthebasisofsuchcomparisons.Yourmoodislikeminebecause,sofar asourpresentemotionalstatesgo,youarelikeme;andmypresentmoodisunlikemy moodoflastnightbecauseIdon'tfeelthewayIdidlastnight. Sowemaysayofamood,asofacigarette,thatitwasmine,thatitdidnotlastfor long,andthatitwasunlikeseveralothersIhavehad.Butwemaynotaskwhethera moodwasliterallyblackerthanpitch;orthinkthatavacantmoodisanuninhabitedone, amoodwithnobodyinit;orwonder,whensomeoneisinbluevelvetandafilthymood,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whetherthemoodisinsidethevelvet.Aboveall,wemaynotspeculateaboutthe nicetiesof'therelationofinness'whichamanhastohismood.Becauseamood's existingisitshavingthisoneunique'relation'tosomeperson,the'relation'isnota relationatall. Toreifymoodsonthataccountofwhatisinvolvedwouldobviouslybepreposterous, andnobodyneedstobeconvincedofthis.ThatiswhyIchoosemoodsasanexample. Aretheresuchthingsassensedata?Yesandno:therearesensedatabutitiswrong toreifythem.InelaboratingthisIshallkeepparalleltothediscussionofmoods.Firstly, then,theonlyintelligiblestatementsaboutsensedataarestatementsabouttheirbeing had,apprehended,perceivedetc.bysentientbeings('people',forshort).And,secondly, anystatementaboutsomeone'shavingetc.asensedatumisequivalenttoanexplicitly nonrelationalstatementaboutthatperson,attributingtohimacertainsensorystate, sayinghowhesensorilyis.Ibasethissecondpointontheavailabilityofequationsof theform: Hehasasensedatum=Itiswithhimasthoughhewereperceivinga.... =Heissensorilyaffectedinthewayheusuallyiswhenheperceivesa.... 33

Ifbothpointsareright,thenallstatementsaboutsensedatacanbeexpressedwholly asnonrelationalstatementsaboutpeople;andthisiswhyitiswrongtoreifysense data,formytwopointsimplythatsensedataarenotthingsbutsensorystates. Likemoods,sensedatamaybebroughtunderpersonalpossessives,maybeclocked,

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andmaybecomparedandcontrastedwithoneanother.Whatelsecanbesaidabout them?Theansweris:anythingthatcanbereexpressedinnonrelationalstatements aboutpeople,usingnosuchnounas'sensedatum'.Theredoesnotseemtobemuch elsethatpassesthistest.3Forexample,adjectivesofshape,colour,size,pitchetc. seemtobeapplicableonlyinmetaphors,tobecashedthroughtheequationsabove,so that'Hehasaredsensedatum'becomes'Itiswithhimasthoughhewereseeing somethingred'.(ThatiswhyIdisagreedin2withLocke'sviewthatan'idea'can resembleanextramentalthinginrespectofshape,colour,etc.)Furthermore,weought nottodebatewhetheraman'srelationshiptohissensedatumisoneofpossession, awareness,apprehension,perceptionetc.;forthereisnomorearelationbetweenaman andhissensedatumthanbetweenamanandhismoodorhissize. Beforeproceeding,Iturnasidebrieflytostressadistinction.Ihavecontended(a)that ifwearetoapplyphysicalobjectlanguagetosensedatawemustusetheasthough onewereperceivingdevice.Ialsoagreewiththosewhosay(b)thatifweareto describesensedatainpubliclyintelligiblewayswemustavailourselvesofphysical objectlanguage.4Butthesearedistincttheses.Someonemightaccept(a)andyet, beinginerroraboutwhatisneededforcommunication,reject(b);oraccept(b)andyet, wronglyreifyingsensedata,reject(a).ItisbecausebotharetruethatIdonottryto describesensedataexceptbythe'asthoughonewereperceiving'device.EvenifIhada privatevocabularyfordescribingmysensedata,avocabularywhichwasnot semanticallylinkedwithanypubliclanguage,Icouldhavenoreasontoparadeitina publishedbook.(Whethersuchavocabularyisevenpossibleisatangledquestionon whichIhereexpressnoopinion.)Someonewhounderstandsthatthisiswhy descriptionsofsensedataalwaysseemrelational,oroblique,orindirect,will presumablynotbetemptedtoinferthatsensedata
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 3SeeB.Mates,'Berkeley was Right',Pepper,pp.1645. 4G.Ryle,The Concept of Mind(London,1949),pp.2013. 34

mustinsomemysteriouswaybe'diaphanous'orlackinginpropertiesoftheirown. Ihavedonemoretoexplainthantodefendthethesisthatoneoughtnottoreifysense data.Ratherthandefendingitdirectly,Ishalladoptitasanhypothesisand,atintervals throughoutthisbook,testitbyputtingittowork.Itspowertosolveproblemswill recommenditmorehighlythancouldanydirectargument. Theantireificationthesisalsoabolishespseudoproblems.Tomanyreaders,writingsin thephilosophyofperceptionseemtobeaddressedpartlyto(a)genuineandinteresting philosophicalproblemsandpartlyto(b)mildlylunaticconundrumswhichonewould ignoreiftheydidnotseemtobeforceduponusbytheoriesadducedtosolve(a).5 Amongthequestionswhichmanywouldincludeinclass(b),ontheirowninherent demerits,arethese:'Cantherebeanunapprehendedsensedatum?';'Aresensedata perceivedinthesameway,orinthesamesenseof"perceive",asarephysicalthings?'; 'Doapprehendedsensedataexistinthesamesenseof"exist"asdounobserved things?';'IsthevisualsensedatumIhavejustafterblinkingtheverysameonethatI hadjustbefore?';'Howdovisualsensedatarelatetothesurfacesofphysicalobjects?' These'problems'constituteagoodpartoftheclass(b)oftopicsinthephilosophyof perceptionwhichnointelligentadultwouldputupwithifhecouldseehowto disentanglethemfrom(a)theworthwhiletopics;andeverysingleoneofthemisvisibly
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

dissolvedbytheantireificationthesis,forifthelatteriscorrectinanyformofitthen eachofthosequestionsisabolishedbythebasiclogicoftheterm'sensedatum'. Takingtheclasses(a)and(b)tobedefinedbyresponseswhichIhaveobservedin myselfandagoodmanyothers,longbeforethinkingaboutreificationassuch,Iam preparedtosaythatIdonotknowofanythinginclass(b)whichisnot,oranythingin class(a)whichis,condemnedbythethesisthatitiswrongtoreifysensedata.Thisis presumablyevidencethatthethesisistrue.

6.Againstabstractness
Berkeleywassurethatthetheoryofabstractideasisfalse: ____________________ 5See,forexample,G.E.Moore,Philosophical Studies(London,1922),pp.189ff.; Some Main Problems of Philosophy(London,1953),pp.34ff.;Commonplace Book( London,1962),pp.11920. 35

Whetherothershavethiswonderfulfacultyofabstracting their ideas,theybestcantell: formyselfIfindindeedIhaveafacultyofimagining,orrepresentingtomyselfthe ideasofthoseparticularthingsIhaveperceivedandofvariouslycompoundingand dividingthem.Icanimagineamanwithtwoheadsortheupperpartsofamanjoinedto thebodyofahorse.Icanconsiderthehand,theeye,thenose,eachbyitself abstractedorseparatedfromtherestofthebody.ButthenwhateverhandoreyeI

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

imagine,itmusthavesomeparticularshapeandcolour.LikewisetheideaofmanthatI frametomyself,mustbeeitherofawhite,orablack,oratawny,astraight,ora crooked,atall,oralow,oramiddlesizedman.Icannotbyanyeffortofthought conceivetheabstractideaabovedescribed[i.e.theone'retainingonlywhatiscommon toall'men].6 Theformationofabstractorsketchyideas,then,isapsychologicalimpossibilityfor Berkeleyand,hethinks,foreveryoneelsetoo:'Ifanymanhasthefacultyofframingin hismindsuchanideaofatriangleasisheredescribed,itisinvaintopretendto disputehimoutofit,norwouldIgoaboutit.'7Heclearlyexpectsnosuchchallenge fromanyonewhotriestoformabstractideasandhonestlyreportstheoutcome. Thechallengeisforthcoming,allthesame.Ofthosewhocanpicturethings imaginatively,mostarecompelledtoleaveoutdetails.Someonewhocanhearatune'in hishead',andindeedhearitasorchestrated,isunlikelytobeabletohearitas orchestratedinanyhighlyspecificfashion:onlyagiftedfewcan'realize'ascorefullyin theimagination. Ontheotherhand,noonewouldclaimtohaveformedanabstract'ideaofanimal'oran 'abstractideaofmotiondistinctfromthebodymoving'.Berkeleyisrighttodenythat ideascanbeabstracttothatextent.8 ItisnottoosurprisingthatLockeimpliesthecontrary.Hiswholetheoryofmeaningand classificationis,if'ideas'areimagesorsensedata,obviouslyempiricallyfalse;to persistwithitatallLockemustfrequentlyforgethisbasicexplanationofwhatan'idea' is;andthiswillenablehimtooverlookhisobligationtotestthetheoryincludingthe partaboutabstractnessagainstthefactsofimagination.ButBerkeley'sdenialthat
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ideascanbeabstractatallisjustasblatantlyatoddswiththefacts,andis ____________________ 6Principles,Introduction10. 7Principles,Introduction13. 8Principles,Introduction910. 36

morepuzzling.Theexplanationofit,Ithink,isthatwithoutquiterealizingitBerkeley objectedtothetheoryofabstractideasnotonpsychologicalbutonlogicalgrounds.For adefinite,wrongreason,hethoughtitlogicallyimpossiblethatthereshouldbean abstractidea. WecancomeatthisreasonthroughapassageofLocke's.Inthecourseofarguingthat abstractideas'donotsoeasilyofferthemselvesasweareapttoimagine',Lockecites, asanexampleofanideawhichitdemands'somepainsandskilltoform', thegeneralideaofatriangle,[which]mustbeneitherobliquenorrectangle, neitherequilateral,equicrural,norscalenon;butallandnoneoftheseatonce. Ineffect,itissomethingimperfect,thatcannotexist;anideawhereinsome partsofseveraldifferentandinconsistentideasareputtogether.9 OnecanunderstandBerkeley'sgleefullytakingthistoconcedealmosthiswholecase againstabstractideas;butthepassagemeritscloserscrutinythanhegaveit. Whatisitthat'cannotexist'?Nottheidea,butatrianglewhichanswerstoor'agrees
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

with'theidea.WhenLockesays'somethingimperfect,thatcannotexist',wemusttake himtomean'somethingimperfectwhichcannotberealized,cannothaveanything correspondingtoit,intheobjectiverealm'.Thisconcessionisdamagingenough,but Lockeoughtnottohavemadeit.Ofthetwothingshesayswhichmightbethoughtto supportit,onedoesimplytheconcessionbutisfalse,whiletheotheristruebutdoes notimplytheconcession. (1)Lockelistsasetofmutuallyexclusiveproperties,andimpliesthatonlyatriangle having'allofthese'wouldanswertotheabstractideaofatriangle.Admittedly,nosuch trianglecouldexist.ButLocke's'allofthese'isjustamistake:toabstractistoomit detail,nottopileondetailtothepointofinconsistency.10Thereferenceto'someparts ofseveral...inconsistentideas'isalsowrongorirrelevant. (2)Thecruxisnot'allofthese'but'noneofthese':iftheabstractiondoctrinecallsin questionanylogicallaw,itisthatofexcludedmiddleandnotnoncontradiction.Locke rightly ____________________ 10SeeCraig,'Berkeley's Attack on Abstract Ideas',p.436. 9Essay IV.vii.9. 37

thinksthatanabstractideaofatrianglemustbeneitheranideaofanequilateral trianglenoranideaofanequicruraltrianglenoranideaofascalenontriangle;andfrom thisheinfers,apparently,thatatriangleansweringtosuchanideamustlackallthree ofthesepropertiescannothavethreesidesofthesamelength,ortwothesameand

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

onedifferent,orallthreedifferent.Andcertainlynosuchtrianglecanexist. Theinference,however,isinvalid.Fromthefactthatanabstractideaofatriangleis(in shorthand)neitheranideaofanFtrianglenoranideaofaGtrianglenoranideaofan Htriangleitdoesnotfollowthatanactualtrianglecorrespondingtotheideamustbe neitherFnorGnorH.Compareatriangle'scorrespondingtoanabstractideawithits answeringtoanincompletedescription.Thedescription'triangular,butneitherFnorG norH'couldfitonlyatrianglewhichwasneitherFnorGnorH,andsonotrianglecan answertoor'agreewith'thatdescription;butthedescription'triangular',whichcontains nothingaboutForGorHness,fitseverytriangle.Mightnotanabstractideahavethe logicalpropertiesof'triangular'ratherthanof'triangular,butneitherFnorGnorH'?Yes, itmight.In7Ishallshowhowanabstractideacansharewithanincomplete descriptiontheprivilegeofremainingsilent,asitwere,aboutdetails.ButfirstIhaveto explainBerkeley'spuzzlingmistake. Ifitwerelegitimatetoreifyideas,itmightbetruethatanideaofatrianglemustitself betriangular,thatanideaofanequilateraltrianglemustbeequilateralaswellas triangular,andsoon.Inthatcaseanabstractideaofatrianglemightitselfhavetobe triangular but neither F nor G nor H;and,sincenothingcananswertothatdescription, therecouldnotbeanysuchidea.Lockewasaconfidentreifierofideas,andoften impliesthatanideaofKnessmustitselfbeK.Thisprobablyexplainshisseemingto sayinthequotedpassagethattheabstractideaitself'cannotexist';thoughthis,being atotalretractionofthewholetheoryofabstractideas,cannotbehisconsciously consideredview. IsuggestthatthisisBerkeley'shalfconsideredview.Althoughhedoesnotreifyideas, hedoesassumethatanideaofKnessmustbeK,andthusthatanabstractideaofa
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

trianglemustbreakthelawofexcludedmiddle.Ithinkthatthislineofthoughtinclined himtotheviewthatabstractideasofthekinddemandedbyLocke'stheoryarelogically impossible.Thiswouldexplain 38

hisconfidencethatthecandidreaderwillagreethathecannotformanyabstractideas; andIknowofnootherexplanation.11 Theantireificationthesisof5impliesthatsomeonewhohasanimageorideaofa triangledoesnot'perceive'or'apprehend'atriangularimage.Thestatement'Hehasan imageofatriangle'isequivalentto'Heisinavisualstateliketheonesheisordinarily inwhenseeingtriangularthings',whichdoesnotimplythatwhilehehastheimage thereisanythingmentalorextramentalwhichisitselftriangular.Westillhavea problem,however,aboutthestatement'Smithhasanabstractidea[image]ofa triangle'.WehavetoequatethiswithsomenonrelationalstatementaboutSmith,and somewaysofdoingthiswouldstillimplythatabstractideasareimpossible.For example,if'Smithhasanabstractimageofatriangle'means'Smithisinavisualstate liketheonesheisordinarilyinwhenseeingthingswhicharetriangularbutneitherFnor GnorH',thenwemuststillcometoBerkeley'sconclusionevenifnotforhisreason.So thereisachallengeheretoanyonewhothinkshecanseeafaceinhismind'seyeand truthfullyanswer'No'bothto'Didyouseeherassmiling?'andto'Didyouseeheras unsmiling?'AbstractideaswillnotdowhatLockeasksofthem;butthoseofuswho thinkthatthereareabstractideasareunderpressuretoshowhowtheyarepossible.I nowtrytomeetthatchallenge.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

7.Abstractideas:apositiveaccount
Theproblemistoshowhowanabstractideacan,asitwere,havethelogicof 'triangular'ratherthanof'triangularbutneitherFnorGnorH'.Wehavetoputtheexact shapeoftheimagedtriangleonaparwiththeexactnumberofLadyMacbeth'schildren. Asafirststep,weneedtoclarifythenotionof'seeinginthemind'seye','hearinginthe mind'sear(orinone'shead)',andsoon.Inwhatwaysisaconjuredupimageofa differentfrom,andinwhatwaysisitsimilarto,thesensedataonehaswhenperceiving areal?Thisistoaskwhatthedifferencesandlikenessesarebetweenaperson'sstate whenheimaginessomethingandhisstatewhenheactuallyperceivesit. ____________________ 11ForconfirmationseeBerkeley,Alciphron VII,6inthefirsttwoeditions(The Works of George Berkely,vol.3,pp.3334).SeealsoHume,Treatise,pp.1920;J.Laird, Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature(London,1932),ch.2,4. 39

Wecanunderstandoneanother'susesof'Iplayedtheslowmovementoverinmyhead' onlybecausewecanagreeonthismuch:apersoncansometimesinduceinhimselfa statewhichissignificantly likethatofperceivingabywhichImeanastatewhichis somewhatlikeperceivingaandismorelikethatthanlikeperceivinganythingelse. This,thinasitis,sufficestounderpinsuchexpressionsas'seeinthemind'seye,as fromthemainentrance'and'hearinthemind'sear,asplayedbyabrassband'. Butitisthin.Theseinducedquasisensorystates,andsimilaruninducedones,arepartly

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

unlikethesensorystateswehaveinactualperception;andonewouldliketobeableto saymoreaboutthedissimilarities,i.e.toimproveupon'significantlylike'asanaccount ofthesimilarities.Attemptstodothishavealwaysfailed.Hume,forexample,saysthat theonlydifferenceisoneofintensity,whichhecalls'strength','liveliness','vivacity'.But auditoryintensityisjustvolume;andhearingatuneinthemind'searisnot,formeat least,exactlylikehearingitplayedextremelyquietly.Nor,formanypeople,isseeing somethinginthemind'seyejustlikeactuallyseeingitinconditionswhichgivethe coloursawashedoutappearance.ProposalsotherthanHume'sseemlikelytomeetthe samefate,namelychallengebysomeonewhosays'Thatisnotwhatthedifferenceisin mycase'. Thequestion'Howdoesone'sstatewhenforminganimageofadifferfromone'sstate whenperceivinga?'maynotadmitofageneralanswer.Thedifferencesmayvaryfrom persontoperson,orfromsensetosenseforasingleperson,orevenfromtimetotime withrespecttoonesenseofonepersonsothathis'mind'seye'visualimagesdiffer fromhisvisualsensedatasometimesinonewayandsometimesinanother.Anyorall ofthesepossibilitieswouldbeconsistentwithourhavingapublicusefor'seeinthe mind'seye'andthelike,andtheywouldexplainourfailuretoagreeonanygeneral accountofhowtheimagesofimaginationdifferfromthoseofperception. Anyway,Ishallleaveitatthis:whensomeonevoluntarilyformsanimageofaheis significantlylikethewayheiswhenheperceivesa.Isuspectthatthe'significantly like'cannotbereplacedbyanyonemorespecificexpression;butevenifitcanevenifit servesmerelytoholdtheplaceopenforastillundiscoveredempiricaloranalytictheory stillwecanadvancefrom 40
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thispointtoabettergraspofwhatitistoformanabstractorundetailedimage.How muchdetailcanbeomittedfromanimageofa?Thefollowingsuggestion(madetome byMichaelTanner)seemsright:onecanomitfromaninducedimageofaonlysuch detailsasonecouldfailtonoticewhenactuallyperceivingaandnoticingthatitwasa .Thissuggestsananswertothedeeperquestionofwhatitistoformanundetailed imageofsomething,i.e.thequestionofhowthethirdoftheserelatestothefirsttwo: 1. Ihaveanimageofaface 2. Ihaveanimageofasmilingface 3. Ihaveanimageofaface,butnotoneofasmilingorofanunsmilingface. Ifwewanttotranslatetheseinaccordancewiththeantireificationthesis,whilealso employingthenotionofnoticing,thefollowinglookplausible: 1. IamsignificantlylikethewayIamwhenIseeafaceandnoticethatitisaface. 2. IamsignificantlylikethewayIamwhenIseeasmilingfaceandnoticethatitisa smilingface. 3. IamsignificantlylikethewayIamwhenIseeafaceandnoticethatitisaface butdonotnoticewhetherornotitissmiling. Iofferthoseasinstancesofageneralanalysisofthenotionofabstractnessor undetailednessasappliedtoimages.Theuseof'significantlylike'mayrepresentan incompletenessintheanalysis;and'notice'mayneedtobereplacedbysomethingmore carefulIhavenotattendedtodifferencesbetweennoticing,beingawareof,takingin, etc.ButIsubmitthattheanalysissolvesinprincipletheproblemofwhatitisforan imagetobeabstract;thatitshowshowimaginedthings,likefictionalthings,canbreak thelawofexcludedmiddle.(Soberlyspeaking,nothingbreaksthatlaw:'imagined things'and'fictionalthings'oughtnottobereified,arenotthings.)
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Theanalysishelpstoexplainwhysomedetailscannotbeomittedfromanimageofa. Lockepostulatesanabstractideacorrespondingtotheword'large',buttherecannotbe suchanimagebecauseonecouldnotperceivesomethinglargeandnotice 41

nothingaboutitexceptthatitwaslarge.Nor,totakeanotherexample,couldonenotice thatasurfacewasequilateralwhilenoticingnothingelseaboutithavingtoanswer 'Perhaps'whenasked'Tensides?'andwhenasked'Athousandsides?'Ontheother hand,onemightseesomethingredandnoticeonlyitscolour:therearespecialreasons, adumbratedin20below,whyLocke'stheoryisatitsmostplausiblewhenappliedto secondaryqualities.Thelimitsonomittabledetailprobablycan'tbecapturedinany general,interpersonallyvalidrule,becausepeoplewillvaryintheircapacitiesfor selectivenoticing.Still,certaingeneralconsiderationsdoruleoutmultitudesofthe 'abstractideas'postulatedbyLocke'stheory. 1. Locke'scatalogueofabstractideasincludessuchideasasthoseofexistenceand unity.12Therecouldnotbesuchideasasthese,notbecauseinnoticingathing's existenceoritsunityonewouldhavetonoticeotherfeaturesofitaswell,but ratherbecauseathing'sexistenceanditsunityarenotfeaturesofitatall.Aproper descriptionofsomethingcannotbegin'Existentand...'or'Oneand...'. Consideranabstractvisualideaofadog.Beingonlyvisual,itwouldnotbe sufficienttoguaranteethatanyobject'agreeing'withitwasadog;forapictureof adogmight'agree'withitbutwouldnot'agree'withafullyfledgedabstractideaof adogwhichwouldpresumablycomprisetactualandauditoryideasaswellasa visualidea.Lockeisnotintroubleyet.But,now,anydogcanberecognized,just fromhowitlooks,asadogratherthananyotherkindofanimal;asingleglance
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

2.

PRO version

pdfcrowd.com

leavesopenthepossibilitythatitisanartfulmodeloratrompe-l'oeilpainting,but itcansettledecisivelythatifthethingisananimalitisadogratherthan,say,a foxoraferret;andLockemustpostulateanabstractvisualideaofadogwhich doesjusticetothisfact.Thiswouldhavetobeavisualideawhichwasofadog thoughnotofanyspecifickindofdog,butwhichatthesametimewasdecisively notanideaofanyotherkindofanimal.Thisisimpossible,becauseonecouldnot noticepurelyvisuallythatsomethingwasadog(andnotafoxoraferret)while noticingnothingaboutwhatkindofdogitwas.Ibasethisonfactsnotabout selectivenoticingbutaboutthevisualappearancesofvariouskindsofdogsandof ____________________ 12Essay II.vii.7. 42

3.

foxesandferrets.Tonoticeenoughaboutananimal'svisualappearancetoseethat itisnotafoxistonoticeenoughtoseeeitherthatitisnotaChihuahuaortosee thatitisnotanAfghanwolfhound.Thisexampleisoneofmanythatcouldbe given. Thisistheplacetoraiseadifficultywhichdoesnotconcernabstractnessassuch butwhichquestionsthespiritofLocke'swholeenterprise.Letuswaivethedifficulty in(2),andaskLocketodescribeanidea'agreement'withwhichissufficientfor somethingtocountasadog.Bynotinsistingthat'agreement'withitalsobe necessaryfordoghood,wefreeLockefromtheburdensofabstractnessandallow himtopresentanextremelyspecificvisualideacombinedwithtactualandauditory andperhapsalsoolfactoryideaswhichcanalsobeasspecificashelikes.But howeverspecificandunabstracthemakesit,'agreement'withitwon'tguarantee
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

PRO version

pdfcrowd.com

doghood.Athing'sbeingadoghastodonotonlywithhowitlooksandfeelsand soundsandsmellsatagivenmoment,butalsowithhowitwasborn,howit behaves,whatitislikeinside,andsoon.Thereisnochanceofembodyingallthat inacomplexideaorimage.Hereagain,examplescouldbemultiplied:tryto describeanideaorimagesuchthatanything'agreeing'withitmustbeaking,ora philosopher,oraneurotic. Thispointisimportant.Itiseasy,evenwhilerejectingLocke'soveralltheory,toaccept toomuchofhispictureofthemeaningstructureofourlanguage:thepictureoflanguage asconsistingofwordswith'simple'meaningswhichcanbedefinedonlyostensively,and ofwordswith'complex'meaningswhicharedefinedoutoftheformerper genus et differentiam.UnderlyingthispictureistheassumptionthatIcandecidewhetherW appliestoxmerelybynotingwhatmysensorystateiswhenIconfrontx.IfWisa secondaryqualitywordawordwitha'simple'meaningthisassumptioncrudely approximatestothetruth;butfortheremaining99.9percentofthewordsinthe languageitisthoroughlyfalse.

8.Abstraction'sconsequences
Berkeleyregardedthedoctrineofabstractideasasnotjustfalsebutpernicious, productiveoferrorwhichhesometimesseemstothinkisworsethanthatof abstractionismitself.Most 43

commentatorseasilyagreewithhimaboutthis,butreallythisisacomplexanddifficult
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

matter. SomeofBerkeley'smostcasualjibesatabstractionism,inwhich'abstract'functionsas littlemorethanasubstitutefor'unintelligible',mayreflectaspecificcomplaintwhichis certainlyvoicedbysomecommentators,13namelythattheabstractiondoctrinedeparts frommeaningempiricismandlicensestheuseofidlewordswhichcannotbecashedin experience.14IfthisisBerkeley'scomplaint,hedoesnotvoiceitexplicitly,nordoeshe evertrytojustifyit.Hadhetriedhewouldhavefailed,forthisaccusationagainst Locke'stheorycannotbesustained. Thetheoryofabstractideas,sofarfromdesertingLocke'smeaningempiricism,contains it.15AnygeneraltermwhichhasmeaningaccordingtoLocke'sabstractiontheorymust standforsomeaspectofexperiencesomefeaturewhichisabstractedfrom,andwas thereforepresentin,unabstractideaswhichwerehadinordinarysenseexperience. Locke,notoriously,countenancesmanytermswhichhismeaningempiricismdoesnot permithim,andsaysthatthereareabstractideascorrespondingtothem.Butinso doinghesinsagainstbothmeaningempiricismandthetheoryofabstractideas,andso theselapsesprovidenobackingforBerkeley'simpliedclaimthattheabstractiontheory encouragesitsadherentstoadoptmeaninglessterminology.Infact,ifitwereproperly applieditwouldallowitsadherentsalmostnoterminologyofanysort(see7above). IfthisseemsaratherbackhandeddefenceofLocke,thenIshouldexplainthatIhave nointerestindefendingLockebutagreatinterestinunderstandinghistheoryof abstractideas. ThereisadifferentfaultwhichBerkeleyseemstofindwiththetheoryofabstractideas, namelythatitimplies,oratleastencourages,theviewthat'sensiblethings'canexist attimeswhentheyarenotbeingperceived.Thisview,andBerkeley'srejectionofit,will
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

beextensivelydiscussedinlaterchapters;atpresentIshallmerelylabeltheview 'materialism',andsaythataccordingtoBerkeleytheexistenceofa'sensiblething' logicallyimpliesitsbeingperceived. ____________________ 13E.g.Warnock,Berkeley,pp.802. 14Principles,Introduction17;Principles13,68,74,81,143;Dialogues,pp.248, 256,258;Philosophical Commentaries,entry779. 15ThusD.Odegard,"'LockeasanEmpiricist'",Philosophy,vol.40(1965),p.187. 44

Ialignmyselfwiththosewhohavetroublefindingthesupposedlinkbetweenthetheory ofabstractideasandmaterialism.16Thecrucialpassageisonewhere,havingalludedto the'opinionstrangelyprevailing'that'sensibleobjectshaveanexistence...distinct fromtheirbeingperceivedbytheunderstanding',Berkeleysays: Ifwethoroughlyexaminethistenet,itwill,perhaps,befoundatbottomto dependonthedoctrineofabstract ideas.Forcantherebeanicerstrainof abstractionthantodistinguishtheexistenceofsensibleobjectsfromtheir beingperceived,soastoconceivethemexistingunperceived?17 Therearealsosomeotherpassageswhichseemtohavethesamelineofthought underlyingthem.18Butwhatlineofthoughtisit?ThebestanswerIcanfindisas follows. ThematerialistwillaffirmbothThere is now a K sensible thingandNobody now
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ThematerialistwillaffirmbothThere is now a K sensible thingandNobody now perceives a K sensible thing,whichis,inBerkeley'sview,toaffirm(P&Q)inacase where(PQ).ForBerkeley,thatis,thematerialistisanentailmentbreaker.NowI havearguedthatBerkeleyseesthedoctrineofabstractideasasfloutingthelawof excludedmiddleorsomethinglikeit:heseesitasaffirmingofsomethingboththatIt is triangularandthatIt is neither F nor G nor H,eventhoughinfactx is triangularentails x is F or G or H.Anadherentoftheabstractiontheory,onthisviewofhim,isalsoan entailmentbreaker.SoBerkeleycanseematerialismandabstractionismasconnectedto theextentthattheyshareacommonlogicalfaultentailmentbreaking. Sothinaconnexionhardlydeservestobementioned.Certainlyitdoesnotsupportthe suggestionthatonedoctrine'depends'upontheother,andonlyonewriterthatIknow ofhasseriouslytriedtoarguethatitdoes.19Butisthere,infactorinBerkeleian theory,anymoresubstantialconnexionthanthis? WemightimprovethestoryslightlybynotingthatBerkeleyseestheabstraction doctrineasguiltyofentailmentbreakinginmorethanoneway.Ihavestressedthe logicallyspecialcase,wherePentails(QorRorS)andsomeoneaffirmsPanddenies ____________________ 16M.C.Beardsley,"'BerkeleyonAbstractIdeas'",Martinp.413(alsoinEngle); Thomson,"'G.J.Warnock'sBerkeley'",p.432. 17Principles5. 18Principles10,11,99;Dialogues,pp.177,1924,222,225,230;De Motu47. 19G.D.Hicks,Berkeley(London,1932),p.80. 45

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

eachofQ,R,S,becauseitisthiskindofentailmentbreachwhichseemstolieatthe heartofBerkeley'srejectionofabstractideas.Buthedoesapparentlythinkof abstractionasviolatinglogicinanotherwayalso,aswhenheconnects'abstractideas' withthedifficultiesweincur'iftimebetaken,exclusiveofallthoseparticularactions andideasthatdiversifytheday,merelyforthecontinuationofexistence,ordurationin abstract.'20Thepassagecontainingthisisveryobscure,butthepointcouldbethatthe conceptoftimelogicallyinvolvestheconceptofhappenings,andthatthedoctrineof abstractideascontradictsthisorincitesitsadherentstodenyit.Berkeleydoesseem topicturetheabstractiontheorynotonlyasinvolvingakindofabstractionwhichis absolutelywrong,butalsoasinvolvinganexcessofsomesortoflogicaloperation which,withinlimits,islegitimate.Butwhatexactlythisoperationis,andwhythetheory ofabstractideasmightbethoughttoencourageit,Ihavenotbeenabletodiscover. Certainly,whatBerkeleysaysabout'time'isnotsignificantlydifferentfromsome remarksofLocke's.21 SoIhavetoconcludethatevenifmaterialismandthetheoryofabstractideasareboth takenatBerkeley'svaluationofthem,theconnexionbetweenthemremains embarrassinglytenuous. Berkeleyrepeatedlydisplayshostilitytotheaskingofcertainkindsofphilosophical questions'intheabstract',asitwere.22Thisattitude,whichisdisplayedinthe'time' passageandelsewhere,arisesfromoneormoreofthefollowingtheses.(a)Itisoften hardtoexplainthemeaningofawordwhichoneisneverthelessabletouse competently.(b)Themeaningofageneralwordevenanunambiguousoneoftenhas tobestatedinapiecemealratherthanaunitaryfashion.(e)Fullytoappreciatethe utilityofcertainwords(suchas'force')onemustseewhatrolestheyplayintheories. (d)Therearecertainusefulgeneralwords(suchas'force')whichdonotstandfor
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

anythingintheworld.23 Isanyofthisdirectlyrelevanttothetheoryofabstractideas?Ithinknot,excepttothis verylimitedextent:Theabstractiontheorypresupposesacertainbroadpictureofwhat sortofmeaningarespectable,unambiguousgeneralwordmusthave,and ____________________ 20Principles97. 21Essay II.xiv.34. 22Principles978,100,III;Alciphron VII,6;De Motu4,39,43. 23SeeC.M.Turbayne,"'Berkeley'sTwoConceptsofMind'",Engle. 46

thispictureconflictswithsomeorperhapsallof(a)to(d).Ifthatisright,then(a)to (d)couldyieldpartofthecaseagainsttheabstractiontheory,bygeneratinganattack ononeofitspresuppositions.Berkeley,however,repeatedlyimpliesthatthereisa closerrelevancethanthat,andinthisIthinkheissimplywrong.Thesis(c), incidentally,ispartofBerkeley'ssignificantcontributiontothephilosophyofscience.24 IdonotminimizethatcontributionbyremarkingthatBerkeleywasnotclearenough abouthow(e)relatestotheabstractiondoctrine.Histendencytoconflate(c)with(b) andwith(d)isperhapsmoreserious,butitlieswellbeyondmypresentscope.

9.Berkelgonclassifying
Berkeleyissometimescreditedwithhavingsoundlyandincisivelycriticizednotjust
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Locke'sabstractiondoctrinebutalsothelargertheoryofclassificationwithinwhichitis nested.Idisagree:Berkeley'streatmentofthismatterisseriouslyflawed,exegetically andphilosophically. Firstly,hemisunderstoodLocke.HethoughtthatLockesoughttoincludeinherently generalitemsinhisontology,andthathedissentedfromuniversalismonlyin'locating' theminthemindratherthanoutsideit.Thismisrepresentationproducessomecurious shadowboxing.Forexample,thereisthepassagewhereBerkeley,havingallowedthat thereare'generalideas'or'universalnotions',goesontoinsistthattheseideasare themselvesmentalparticulars, universality,sofarasIcancomprehendnotconsistingintheabsolute, positivenatureorconceptionofanything,butintherelationitbearstothe particularssignifiedorrepresentedbyit:byvirtuewhereofitisthatthings, names,ornotions,beingintheirownnatureparticular,arerendereduniversal.
25

Thephrase'beingintheirownnatureparticular'is,onecanhardlydoubt,supposedtobe partofthethrustatLocke.YethereiswhatLockesays: Universalitybelongsnottothingsthemselves,whichareallofthemparticular intheirexistence,eventhosewordsandideaswhichintheirsignificationare general.26 ____________________ 24SeePopper,"'ANoteonBerkeley'". 25Principles,Introduction15. 26Essay III.iii.11.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

47

Theimmediateobjectofallourreasoningandknowledge,isnothingbutparticulars. Everyman'sreasoningandknowledgeisonlyabouttheideasexistinginhisownmind; whicharetruly,everyoneofthem,particularexistences....Universalityisbut accidentalto[knowledge],andconsistsonlyinthis,thattheparticularideasabout which[knowledge]isaresuchasmorethanoneparticularthingcancorrespondwithand berepresentedby.27 Ininsistingthatideasare'intheirownnatureparticular',andthatanidea'sgenerality consistsonlyin'therelationitbearstotheparticularssignifiedbyit',Berkeleyisnot disagreeingwithLockeatall. Onecanseewhyhethinksthatheis.InLocke'stheory,anideawhichisgeneral(i.e. usedasanaidtoclassifying)willbeinternallydifferentfromsomenongeneralideas becauseitwillbeabstract(i.e.deprivedofsomedetail);anditsabstractnessisafact aboutwhatitislike,notmerelyabouthowitisormightbeuseditis,inBerkeley's words,afactaboutits'positivenature'andnotaboutany'relationitbears'tothingsit signifies.ButthisinherentpropertyofLockeangeneralideasthisabstractnesssimply isnottheinherentuniversalityBerkeleysometimesimpliesittobe.Lockecaneasily allowthatanygivenabstractideaisamentalparticularwhichcanoccuronlyonceina singlemind. AsonepieceofevidencethatBerkeleyisinvolvedinthismistake,considerhisreference tothe'incomprehensibleideaofManwhichshallhavenothingparticularinit'.Ifhis concernhereiswithabstractness,thephraseshouldberather'...nothingspecificin
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

it';andIconjecturethatBerkeleyused'particular'becausehewasnotclearinhismind aboutthedistinctionbetweenabstract/specificontheonehandanduniversal/particular ontheother.Also,hesaysthis:'Idonotdenyabsolutelytherearegeneralideas,but onlythatthereareanyabstract general ideas.'28If'abstract'isusedproperly,i.e.in Locke'ssense,thatremarkissimplyfalse:Berkeleydeniesnotonlythatthereareany abstractgeneralideas,butalsothatthereareideaswhosegeneralityissomehowbuilt intothem,ideaswhicharegeneraloruniversalinthesensethatoneofthemcouldrecur indifferentmindsoratdifferenttimes,ideaswhosegeneralityconsistsinsomething morethantheusetowhichtheyareput.Insuppressingthissecond ____________________ 27Essay IV.xvii.8. 28Principles,Introduction12. 48

denial,Berkeleyshowsthathehasnotproperlydistinguisheditfromthefirstdenial.29 Iremarkedin3thatinLocke'stheoryofclassificationthebitaboutabstractnessbears onlyonthesub'problem'aboutselectingtherelevantfeaturesofthementalsample. Berkeleydidnotseethis.HesharedLocke'spictureoftheabstractiondoctrineascentral toLocke'swholeaccountofhowweclassify;andsoofcoursehesawhimselfas rejectingLocke'stheoryofclassificationin toto.Interestingly,hedidnottrytoputany rivaltheoryinitsplace.Thisisstrikinglyshowninpartsofthefirstdraftofthe Introductionpartswhichdidnotsurviveinthepublishedversion.Forexample:

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

WhenIsaythewordSocratesisaproper...name,andthewordMan[a] generalname,Imeannomorethan...thattheoneispeculiar& appropriatedtooneparticularperson,theothercommontoagreatmany particularpersons,eachwhereofhasanequallrighttobecalledbythename Man.This,Isay,isthewholetruthofthematter....30 Iwouldfainknow,whyawordmaynotbemadetocomprehendagreat numberofparticularthingsinitssignification,withouttheinterpositionofa generalidea.IsitnotpossibletogivethenameMantoPeter,James,&John, withouthavingfirstmadethatstrange&,tome,incomprehensibleideaofMan whichshallhavenothingofparticularinit?31 What,Ipray,arewordsbutsignsofourthoughts?&howaresignsofanysort render'duniversal,otherwisethanbybeingmadetosignify,orrepresent indifferently,amultitudeofparticularthings?32 DidBerkeleygraspthefundamentaldefectofLocke'stheoryofclassification?Didhesee thatthetheorywasforedoomedbecausenothingcouldcountasatechniqueorall purposeruleforclassifying?Perhapshedid.Whenhesays'Thisisthewholetruthofthe matter',onecantakehimtobeimplyingsomethinglikethis:'Thebasicfactisthatwe doclassifyparticularsindisciplinedandagreedways,anditisjustnouselookingfora comprehensiveaccountofhowwedothis,orforacomprehensiveexplanationofour beingabletodoit.'(Or:'...thatwedoclassifythingscorrectly,and...'the relationshipbetweenthetwoformulations ____________________ 29SeeGibson,Locke's Theory of, Knowledge,pp.6870.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

30A.A.LuceandT.E.Jessop(eds.),The

Works of George Berkeley,vol.2(London

1949),p.127. 31Ibid. 32Ibid.p.128. 49

is,Ibelieve,adeepanddarkphilosophicalmatteraboutwhichIdarenotsayanything.) ThiswouldcreditBerkeleywithanimportantinsightwhichdidnotbecomecommon propertyuntilitwasexpressedanddefendedbyWittgenstein. Thereis,however,anotherexplanationofBerkeley'snottryingtoreviseortoreplace Locke'stheory,namelythathedidnotproperlyseewhatthetheorywastryingtodoin thefirstplace.Thetheorysoughttosolvetheancient'problemoftheOneandthe Many',whichcanbeexpressedinthequestion:'Whatenablesustoimposegenerality uponaworldofparticulars,aswedoinapplyinggeneralwords?'Onthebasisoftheir attitudetothis,philosopherscouldbesortedintothreegroups.(a)Some,suchasLocke andtheuniversalists,thinkthatthe'problem'isagenuineoneandseektosolveit.(b) Some,likeWittgenstein,seethatthe'problem'admitsofnosolution.Theyfeelthe forceofthequestion'Weuniformlyapplyonewordtomanythingshowisthetrick worked?',andperhapsevenregarditasshowinggreatinsightonthepartofthe questioner,buttheyrejectthequestionnonetheless:justbecausethe'trick'isinvolved inallourintellectualactivities,therecannotbeatechniqueforitoracomprehensive accountofhowitisworked.(c)Somefailtolocatethe'problem'inthefirstplace.They donotstandfarenoughbackfromthefamiliartoseeitasstrangeandinneedof explanation;theydonotenterintotheframeofmindofsomeonewhocanask,evenof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

suchanomnipresentandfundamentalactivityasgeneralizingorclassifying,'Howisit done?'Berkeley,Isuggest,belongsnotto(b)butto(c). HisbeingcontenttorejectLocke's'solution'ofthe'problem'ofclassification,without offeringanalternativesolution,wouldbeexplainedbyhisbeingin(b)orin(c).Butthe conjecturethat(b)hehadtheWittgensteinianinsightisingreattensionwithfacts whichpresentnoproblemsfortheconjecturethat(c)hedidn'teverseewhatthefuss wasabout.Forexample,thereisthefactthatBerkeleydidnoteverexplicitlysaythat Locke'stheorywasattemptinganimpossibletask,andhardlyevenhintedatsuchaview exceptinpassageswhichhedidnotpublish.Furthermore,thosepassages,although theygivethebestavailablesupportforaWittgensteinianreadingofBerkeley'sposition onclassifying,alsocontaindetailswhichmakesuchareadingvirtuallyimpossible. Considerthisone: 50

SupposeIhavetheideaofsomeoneparticulardogtowhichIgivethename MelampusandthenframethispropositionMelampusisananimal,where'tis evidentthenameMelampusdenotesoneparticularidea.Andasfortheother name[in]thepropositionthereareasortofphilosopherswilltellyouthereby ismeantnotonlyauniversalconceptionbutalsocorrespondingtheretoa universalnatureoressencereallyexistingwithoutthemindwhereofMelampus dothpartake.Butthiswithreasonisexplodedasnonsensicalandabsurd.But thenthosemenwhohave[explodedit]arethemselvestomeequally unintelligible.Fortheywillhaveitthat...Imustmakethenameanimal standforanabstract,genericalideawhichagreestoandcorrespondswiththe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

particularideamarkedbythenameMelampus.But...Idodeclarethatinmy thoughtsthewordanimalisneithersupposedtostandforanuniversalnature noryetforanabstractideawhichtomeisatleastasabsurdand incomprehensibleastheother.Nordoesitindeedinthatpropositionstandfor anyideaatall.AllthatIintendtosignifytherebybeingonlythis,thatthe particularthingIcallMelampushasarighttobecalledbythenameanimal.33 Thewords'hasarighttobecalledbythenameanimal',whichechotheearlier'hasan equalrighttobecalledbythenameMan',showthatBerkeleyiswanderinginthedark. Whatisitforsomethingto'havearight'tobedescribedas'ananimal'?Well,itistobe ananimal,i.e.tobeproperlycoclassifiablewithotheranimalsorwithotherthings called'animal'.HavingsortedoutBerkeley'sobscurephrasethusfar,wehavereached thepointwheretheLockeananduniversalisttheoriesstart.34Berkeleymerelyhelps himselftotheexpression'hasarighttobecalled...',implyingthatthereisnoproblem aboutit,andclaimingtherebytodisposeofthe'problem'whichwasbotheringLockeand theuniversalists;whereastheexpressionisprimafacieproblematic,preciselybecauseit containswithinitselfthewhole'problem'whichtheoriesofclassificationweresupposed tosolve.TherecouldhardlybeclearerevidencethatBerkeley,ratherthanadvancing beyondLockeonclassifying,stopsshortofhim. Berkeley,likeWittgenstein,isinnocentofanypurportedtheoryofclassificationassuch. Butthecomparisonstopsrightthere.BerkeleyhadnoneofWittgenstein'sgraspofwhat Lockeandothersweretryingtodononeofhissharplyfocusedintellectualsympathyfor thepositionwhichwastobedestroyed. ____________________ 33A.A.LuceandT.E.Jessop(eds.),The Works of George Berkely,vol.2(London
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

1949),p.136. 34SeeEssay III.iii.12. 51

Lingeringdoubtsaboutthisshouldbedispelledbyreadingthe'Melampus'passage immediatelyafterreadingtheopeningpagesoftheBlue Book.

10.Berkelyonmeaningandunderstanding
SinceBerkeleydidnotfeeltheforceofthe'problem'aboutclassification,helackedone motiveforthinkingthat(some)wordsowetheirmeaningstoassociatedideas.Still,he mighthaveacceptedLocke'stheoryofmeaningonothergrounds. Infact,hedidnotacceptitcompletely,forhesaysthatawordcanbemeaningfuleven whennotassociatedwithanideaofanykind.Thisisnotjustaboutabstractor inherentlygeneralideas,andsoitisarejectionofLocke'stheoryofmeaningwhichis independentofBerkeley'sviewsonabstractionandclassification.Hereisasample: Alittleattentionwilldiscover,thatitisnotnecessary(eveninthestrictest reasonings)significantnameswhichstandforideasshould,everytimethey areused,exciteintheunderstandingtheideastheyaremadetostandfor:in readinganddiscoursing,namesbeingforthemostpartusedaslettersarein algebra,inwhichthoughaparticularquantitybemarkedbyeachletter,yetto proceedrightitisnotrequisitethatineverystepeachlettersuggesttoyour thoughts,thatparticularquantityitwasappointedtostandfor.35
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ThisrevivesthehopethatBerkeleyisanticipatingWittgenstein,thistimeabout meaningratherthanaboutclassification.Aswellasdenyingthataword'smeaningisa mentalcorrelateofit,Berkeleyimpliesthatthecruxofourunderstandingofawordis ourabilityto'proceedright'inhandlingit;andthisisapositivesteptowardsthe broadlyWittgensteinianviewthattoknowwhatawordmeansistoknowhowtouseit properly. ThereismuchmoretothesameeffectinBerkeley'swritingsincludingsomeinpassages whichIshouldtakeasdirectlybearingontheclassificationtheme(thelinebetween meaningtheoryandclassificationtheoryispeculiarlyhardtodrawinBerkeley'stexts). SeveralrecentwritersespeciallyWarnock36havemadeitunnecessaryformeto emphasizeBerkeley'sreservationsaboutthecoreofLocke'stheoryofmeaning.Whatis necessaryisto ____________________ 35Principles,Introduction19. 36Warnock,Berkely,pp.6976. 52

bringouthowincompletehisrejectionofthattheorywas;andthisismytopicinthe presentsection. Inthepassagejustquoted,Berkeleysaysthatameaningfulwordneednotbeidea linkedeverytimeitisused.Hedoesnotdeny,andseemstoassume,thatifI understandawordoftherelevantkindImustsometimesallowitto'exciteinmy understanding'anappropriateidea;andtothatextenthisviewofmeaningisstill

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Lockean.Ontheotherhand,Berkeley'sreferenceinthatpassagetowordswhich'stand forideas'isnotinitselfclearevidenceofLockeantendenciesinhisviewsabout meaning;forthoseideasmaybeoneswhich,inBerkeley'sontology,arephysicalobjects andthelike. Intheverynextsection,Berkeleysays: Thecommunicatingofideasmarkedbywordsisnotthechiefandonlyendof language,asiscommonlysupposed.Thereareotherends,astheraisingof somepassion,theexcitingto,ordeterringfromanaction,theputtingthe mindinsomeparticulardisposition;towhichtheformerisinmanycases barelysubservient,andsometimesentirelyomitted....Maywenot,for example,beaffectedwiththepromiseofa good thing,thoughwehavenotan ideaofwhatitis?[Aswith'generalnames',soalsowithpropernames.]For example,whenaSchoolmantellsmeAristotle bath said it,allIconceivehe meansbyit,istodisposemetoembracehisopinionwiththedeferenceand submissionwhichcustomhasannexedtothatname.37 Insimilarvein,inthefirstdraftoftheIntroduction,Berkeleydiscussesthestatement 'ThegoodthingswhichGodhathpreparedforthemthatlovehimaresuchaseyehath notseennorearheardnorhathitenter'dintotheheartofmantoconceive'.Although wecannotformthecorrespondingideas,Berkeleysays,this'saying'isnotmeaningless, because: Thesayingisveryweightyandcarryswithitagreatdesign,butitisnotto raiseinthemindsofmentheabstractideasofthingorgoodnoryetthe particularideasofthejoysoftheblessed.Thedesignistomakethemmore
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

cheerfullandferventintheirduty.38 PerhapsthisgoesagainstLocke,39butitdoesnotgoagainstthecoreofhisposition. Berkeleyisrighttostressthatwordsmaybe ____________________ 37Principles,Introduction20. 38The Works of George Berkely,vol.2,p.137. 39ButseeEssay II.xxi.29inthefirstedition(inFraser'seditionatpp.3756). 53

used'inproprietyoflanguage'forpurposesotherthantheoreticalonesofstatingormis statingwhatisthecaseaboutsomefactualmatter,e.g.thatonemayspeakinorderto 'raisesomepassion'inthehearer.ButifBerkeleyissayingthatwordscanbeused meaningfullyintheabsenceofideasonlybecausewordscanbeusednontheoretically, thenheisdivorcingmeaningfromideasonlyinrespectoftheperipheryoflanguage;he isalongwayfromWittgenstein'sposition;andhehasnottouchedthecentralerrorin Locke'sposition.FlewspeaksofBerkeley's'revolutionaryandhistoricallypremature insight'inthetheoryofmeaning,andcitesinevidenceforthisapassagefromoneof Berkeley'slaterworks: Thealgebraicmark,whichdenotestherootofanegativesquare,hathitsuse inlogisticoperations,althoughitbeimpossibletoformanideaofanysuch quantity.Andwhatistrueofalgebraicsignsisalsotrueofwordsorlanguage, modernalgebrabeinginfactamoreshort,apposite,andartificialsortof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

language,anditbeingpossibletoexpressbywordsatlength,thoughless conveniently,allthestepsofanalgebraicalprocess.40 Berkeleyherechoosesan'algebraicmark'ofwhichonecannotformacorresponding idea,andseemstosaythat'algebraicsigns'arenot,intherelevantrespect,aspecial case:'whatistrueof[them]istruealsoofwordsorlanguage'.Isn'tthisimpressive evidencethathethoroughlyandradicallyrejectsLocke'stheoryofmeaning? Surprisingly,itisnot.Whenthepassageisreadincontextitcanbeseentoconnectnot onlywiththefirstthemeintroducedinthepresentsection('lettersinalgebra'etc.)but alsowiththesecond('theraisingofsomepassion'etc.);andwhentheseconnexionsare sortedout,thefragmentquotedbyFlewchangescoloursubtlyandsurprisinglybut,I contend,quitedecisively.Inthesectionfromwhichthequotedbitisdrawn,Berkeleyis concernedwithnontheoreticalorpracticalusesoflanguage.Hethinksthatmathematics isbestconsiderednotasasetoftheoreticaltruthsbutratherasapracticalinstrument, assomethingwhichcanhelpusbuildbridgesandthelike: Eventhemathematicalsciencesthemselves,...iftheyareconsidered,notas instrumentstodirectourpractice,butasspeculationstoemploy ____________________ 40Alciphron VII,14,quotedinFlew,Hume's Philosophy of Belief,p.262. 54

ourcuriosity,willbefoundtofallshortinmanyinstancesofthoseclearand distinctideaswhich,itseems,theminutephilosophersofthisage,whether
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

knowinglyorignorantly,expectandinsistuponinthemysteriesofreligion.41 Berkeleyobjectedtomathematicsastheory,orasabodyof'speculations'aboutwhatis mathematicallythecase,becausehesawtheincoherenceoftheexplanationscurrently beinggivenofsuchmathematicaltermsas'infinitesimal'.42Hisviewthatmathematics isneverthelessacceptableasan'instrumenttodirectourpractice'issupposedtoinvoke hisusualtheoretical/practicaldistinction.Presumablytheideaisthat,justas'Thegood thingswhichGodhathprepared...etc.'hasthepracticalforceof'Cheerupanddo better',soPythagoras'Theoremhasthepracticalforceof'Ifyouwantsuchandsucha structure,cutyourmaterialsthusandso'.Evenifitisn'thelpfultobracketthese together,treatingthemasinstancesofasinglekindofphenomenonwhichmightbe called'practicalmeaning',Berkeleythinksthatitis.Andinthissectionwhichissimply anexerciseinChristianapologeticsheisdirectlycomparingthem.Facedwiththe accusationthatthe'mysteriesofreligion'cannotbepresentedasclean,cleartheory, Berkeleyisreplyingthatthesameistrueofmathematics,andthatthekindof intellectualrespectabilitythatmathematicscanhaveisalsoavailabletothemysteries ofreligion.Thesectionisaratherwellcontrolledad hominemargument,directed againstthe'minutephilosophers'theminutelycarpingcriticsforwhommathematics, andscienceswhicharemathematicallyexpressible,wereparadigmsofwhatis intellectuallyacceptable.ItistheessenceofthisargumentofBerkeley'sthatitdivorces meaningfulnessfromideasonlyinrespectofpracticalmathematicsandpracticalusesof language;andsoitdoesnotadvancesignificantlybeyondthelimitedantiLockean positionswhichIhavealreadyattributedtoBerkeley.Theargumentasawholedoesnot supporttheviewthatBerkeleyhada'revolutionaryinsight'intowhatitisforlanguage includingtheoreticallanguagetobemeaningful. PassageswhereBerkeleyaccusesLockeofradicalerroraboutmeaningareless
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

importantthanwhatBerkeleysayswhenheisoffhisguard,i.e.whenheisnotself consciouslydiscussingthe ____________________ 41Akiphron VII,14. 42Philosophical Commentaries,entries3516,36875,75968. 55

conceptofmeaningbutratheremployingitinthediscussionofothertopics.Passagesof thelatterkind,aswellasbearingsomewhatonthequestionofwhetherBerkeleyever achievedareallyclearviewofLocke'scentralerroraboutmeaning,aredecisiveonthe questionofwhetherhecleansedhisownthinkingofthaterror.Thatisreallymymain concern.EvenifBerkeleyknewexactlywhattosayaboutLocke'stheoryofmeaning (whichIdeny),thereismuchinhiswritingswhichcanbeunderstoodonlyonthe hypothesisthatBerkeley'susualassumptionsaboutmeaningwerehighlyLockean. Importantexampleswillbediscussedintheirproperplaces;butintherestofthis sectionIpresent,justtobegoingonwith,afewrelevantpassageswhereBerkeleyis offhisguard. Tobeginwith,theclosingwordsoftheIntroduction: Whoeverthereforedesignstoreadthefollowingsheets,Ientreathimtomake mywordstheoccasionofhisownthinking,andendeavourtoattainthesame trainofthoughtsinreading,thatIhadinwritingthem.Bythismeansitwillbe easyforhimtodiscoverthetruthorfalsityofwhatIsay.Hewillbeoutofall dangerofbeingdeceivedbymywords,andIdonotseehowhecanbeledinto
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

anerrorbyconsideringhisownnaked,undisguisedideas.43 Comparethat,asanexampleofemancipationfromtheassociatedideatheoryof meaning,withLocke'sexplanationofwhynearlyonefifthofhisEssayisaboutwords: WhenIfirstbeganthisDiscourseoftheUnderstanding,andagoodwhile after,Ihadnottheleastthoughtthatanyconsiderationofwordswasatall necessarytoit.Butwhen...Ibegantoexaminetheextentandcertaintyof ourknowledge,Ifoundithadsonearaconnexionwithwords,that,unless theirforceandmannerofsignificationwerefirstwellobserved,therecouldbe verylittlesaidclearlyandpertinentlyconcerningknowledge:whichbeing conversantabouttruth,hadconstantlytodowithpropositions.Andthoughit terminatedinthings,yetitwasforthemostpartsomuchbytheintervention ofwords,thattheyseemedscarceseparablefromourgeneralknowledge.At leasttheyinterposethemselvessomuchbetweenourunderstanding,andthe truthwhichitwouldcontemplateandapprehend,that,likethemediumthrough whichvisibleobjectspass,theobscurityanddisorderdonotseldomcasta mistbeforeoureyes,andimposeuponourunderstandings.44 ____________________ 43Principles,Introduction25. 44Essay III.ix.21.SeealsoII.xxxiii.19. 56

Incallingwordsa'disguise'ora'mist',bothconcedetoomuchtotheLockeanviewof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

languageasmerelyapublicvehicleforactivitieswhichhaveaselfsufficientlifeoftheir ownindependentlyoflanguage.ButitisLockewhoescapestheworstconsequencesof thismistakebyresolvingthereforetotakewordsseriouslyasobjectsofstudy,whereas Berkeleycompoundstheerrorbysayingthatsincewordsareasnaretheyshouldbe virtuallydisregardedsothatwemay'clearthefirstprinciplesofknowledge,fromthe embarrasanddelusionofwords'.45 EvenmoreilluminatingisBerkeley'swayofdiscussingthemeaningsofparticular expressionsnotwhathesaysbuthowheexpressesordefendswhathesays. Here,forexample,isanepisodefromthefirstDialogue: PHILONOUS:Tryifyoucanframetheideaofanyfigure,abstractedfromall particularitiesofsize,orevenfromothersensiblequalities.HYLAS:Letme thinkalittleIdonotfindthatIcan.PHILONOUS:Andcanyouthinkit possible,thatshouldreallyexistinNature,whichimpliesarepugnancyinits conception?46 Berkeley'sspokesmanPhilonousheredeclaressomethingtobe'repugnant',meaning selfcontradictoryoratleastlogicallyinadmissible,onthebasisofanimaginativetry out:Hylas'sde factofailureto'frametheidea'issupposedtoprovethattherelevant expressionisdefectiveinmeaning.Itmightbearguedthathere,asinafunnyexchange lateronintheDialogues,47PhilonousisusingLockeanmodesofargumentmerelyad bominem,againstaLockeanopponent.ButotherpartsoftheThree Dialogueswillnot bearthisinterpretation. NorcouldsuchadefenceapplytothemanysimilarexamplesinthePrinciples.For
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

example,ofasupposedkeyphraseinLocke'smetaphysicsBerkeleysays: Tomeitisevidentthosewordsmarkouteitheradirectcontradiction,orelse nothingatall.Andtoconvinceothersofthis,Iknownoreadierorfairerway, thantoentreattheywouldcalmlyattendtotheirownthoughts:andifbythis attention,theemptinessorrepugnancyofthoseexpressionsdoesappear, surelynothingmoreisrequisitefortheirconviction.48 ____________________ 45Principles,Introduction25. 46First Dialogue,p.194. 47Second Dialogue,p.222. 48Principles24. 57

There,inthecontextofagroundfloorphilosophicalargument,Berkeleymakesan explicitmethodologicalremarkbetrayingwhollyLockeanassumptionsaboutmeaning. Alsohere: Itisbutlookingintoyourownthoughts,andsotryingwhetheryoucan conceiveitpossibleforasound,orfigure...toexistwithoutthemind,or unperceived.Thiseasytrialmaymakeyousee,thatwhatyoucontendfor,isa downrightcontradiction.49 NothingwouldbeknownaboutpublicmeaningsifLockewererightaboutthem,andso BerkeleycannotactuallyapplytheinaccessiblecriterialaiddownbyLocke'stheory.Like

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

everyoneelse50hemustbasehisspecificjudgementsaboutmeaningsoncriteriawhich areavailabletohim,i.e.theoneshighlightedbyWittgenstein,andthisfactnaturally showsupinsomethingshesays.Buthedoesnotmakeanythingofthesepassing nonLockeanremarks:hedoesnotseeasalivepossibilitythereplacementofan associatedideatheoryofmeaningbyacomprehensivetheorywhichrelatesmeaningto use.Inresponsetoasuggesteddefinitionof'matter',forexample,Berkeleysays: Ianswer,youmay,ifsoitshallseemgood,usethewordmatterinthesame sense,thatothermenusenothing,andsomakethosetermsconvertiblein yourstyle.Forafterall,thisiswhatappearstometobetheresultofthat definition,thepartswhereofwhenIconsiderwithattention,eithercollectively, orseparatefromeachother,Idonotfindthatthereisanykindofeffector impressionmadeonmymind,differentfromwhatisexcitedbytheterm nothing.51 Wehavethereasentencewhich(becauseof'use'and'convertibleinyourstyle')smacks stronglyofWittgenstein,followedimmediatelybyonewhichispurestLocke. ____________________ 49Principles22. 50e.g.Locke,Essay II.xxvii.910. 51Principles80. 58

III
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

III SUBSTANCEANDREALITY
II.Substance
BERKELEYattackedLocke'sdoctrineofmaterialsubstance,aseveryoneknows.But Lockehadnodoctrineofmaterialsubstance:hewasthevictimofexegeticaland philosophicalmistakesinitiatedbyBerkeleyandinheritedbymanylaterwriters.Locke diddiscusstheconceptofsubstance,andhehadatheoryofreality.Thesetwobitsof workcontributedtothehybridwhichBerkeleycalledhistheoryof'materialsubstance'; andinthischapterIshallexpoundthem,stressingtheissuesraisedbyBerkeley's mistake.InChapterIVIshallconsiderthethirdingredientinthedoctrineof'material substance',namelyLocke'stheoryaboutprimaryandsecondaryqualities.Onlythenwill itbepossible,inChaptersVandVI,tofocusontheworkofBerkeley'swhichmost interestsustoday,namelyhisdislodgementofLocke'stheoryofreality. First,then,theconceptofsubstance.LockeentertainedIwouldnotsayadopteda certainlineofthoughtaboutsubstance,whichrunsasfollows.1 WhatconceptsareinvolvedinthesubjectofthestatementthatThe pen in my band is valuable?Certainly,theconceptsofbeingapenandofbeinginmyhand;buttheseare notall,forthestatementisaboutathing whichfallsunderthesetwoconcepts.What thingisthis?ItisthepurplethingwhichInowsee;butwhenIsaythatthepurplething Inowseeisapenandisinmyhand,Ispeakofathing whichispurpleetc.,andsoI havestillfailedtocapturethewholeconceptofthesubjectinmyoriginalstatement. Anyfurtherexpansionalongtheselinescanonlybeadelayingaction,foritmustomit anessentialelementfromtheconceptofthepeninmyhand.Whatwillbemissingfrom anylistofdescriptiveconceptsistheconceptofa'thingwhich...':thisisaningredient
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

intheconceptofa'thingwhichisF'foreachvalueofF,andsoitcannotbeidentical withtheconceptofa'thingwhichisF'foranyvalueofF.Thisconstituentofevery subjectconceptis ____________________ 1Essay II. xiii.1720;xxiii.16,15,37. 59

theconceptofapropertybearer,orofapossiblesubjectofpredicationletuscallitthe conceptofasubstance.So,ifanyexistentialorsubjectpredicatestatementistrue, thentherearetwosortsofitemsubstances,andpropertiesorqualities.Theformer havetheprivilegeofbearingorsupportingthelatterwithoutthemselvesbeinginthe samewaybornebyanything.Weimplytheexistenceof'substances'inthissenseevery timeweimplythatsomepropertyisinstantiated. Theidea...wehave,towhichwegivethegeneralnamesubstance,being nothingbutthesupposed,butunknown,supportofthosequalitieswefind existing,whichweimaginecannotsubsist...withoutsomethingtosupport them,wecallthatsupportsubstantia;which,accordingtothetrueimportof theword,is,inplainEnglish,standingunderorupholding.2 Notethestresson'general':Lockeisdescribingtheentirelygeneralconceptofathing which...Accordingtoacertaintheory,ourconceptsofparticularsubstancesorspecific kindsofsubstanceincludethisconceptofsubstanceingeneral;butonemayspeakof goldasakindofsubstance,orcomplainofthestickysubstanceonthekitchenfloor, withoutbeingcommittedtothistheoryabouttheanalysisofwhatoneissaying.In
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Locke'swords: Anobscureandrelativeideaofsubstance in generalbeingthusmadewecome tohavetheideasofparticular sorts of substances,bycollectingsuch combinationsofsimpleideasasare...takennoticeoftoexisttogether... Thuswecometohavetheideasofaman,horse,gold,water,&c.;ofwhich substances,whetheranyonehasanyotherclearidea,furtherthanofcertain simpleideascoexistenttogether,Iappealtoeveryone'sownexperience.Itis theordinaryqualitiesobservableiniron,oradiamond,puttogether,thatmake thetruecomplexideaofthosesubstances,whichasmithorajeweller commonlyknowsbetterthanaphilosopher;who,whateversubstantial forms hemaytalkof,hasnootherideaofthosesubstances,thanwhatisframedby acollectionofthosesimpleideaswhicharetobefoundinthem:onlywemust takenotice,thatourcomplexideasofsubstances,besidesallthosesimple ideastheyaremadeupof,havealwaystheconfusedideaofsomethingto whichtheybelong,andinwhichtheysubsist:andthereforewhenwespeakof anysortofsubstance,wesayitisathinghavingsuchorsuchqualities;as bodyisathingthatisextended,figured,andcapableofmotion;spirit,athing capableofthinking....3 ____________________ 2Essay II.xxiii.2. 3Essay II.xxiii.3. 60

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Besidesshowinghow'substanceingeneral'relatesto'particularsortsofsubstances', thatpassageshowsLocke'sambivalentattitudetotheformer.Hesayswehave'no otheridea'ofgoldetc.thanonecomposedwhollyofcertain'simpleideas',andthen proceedsto'takenotice'thatthereisafterallafurtheringredientinourideasofgold etc.Thiswaveringreflectshislackofenthusiasmfor'theideaofsubstanceingeneral'. Sometimesheabusesitintheactofgivingitprimacy: Theideasofsubstancesaresuchcombinationsofsimpleideasasaretakento representdistinctparticularthingssubsistingbythemselves;inwhichthe supposedorconfusedideaofsubstance,suchasitis,isalwaysthefirstand chief.4 Elsewherehejustabusesit: Wehavenoideaofwhat[substanceingeneral]is,butonlyaconfused, obscureoneofwhatitdoes....WeretheLatinwords,inhaerentiaand substantia,putintotheplainEnglishonesthatanswerthem,andwerecalled stickingonandunder-propping,theywouldbetterdiscovertoustheverygreat clearnessthereisinthedoctrineofsubstanceandaccidents,andshowofwhat usetheyareindecidingofquestionsinphilosophy.5 IthinkthatLocke'streatmentof'substanceingeneral'wasmainlyscepticalincontent andironicalinform.ThisisnottrueoftheStillingfleetcorrespondence,butisLocke likelytohavebeenlessclearandcandidinhismagnumopusthaninhisletterstoa touchyandnotveryintelligentbishop?Ishallnotdefendthisminorityopinionatlength, however,andamcontenttocallthesubstratumanalysisoftheconceptofsubstance 'Lockean',meaning,atleast,thatLockesaidagooddealaboutit.Iwanttoconsiderthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

analysisitself,startingfromR.I.Aaron'sdiscussionofit. AaroncreditsLockewiththeviewthatwehavenoexperienceofsubstanceingeneral, andthereforenoideaofsubstanceingeneral.6Thusfar,Iagreewithhim:buttwo aspectsofthefollowingrequirecomment: Lockecertainly'banteredtheideaofsubstance',touseBerkeley'sphrase.He showedthatthetraditionalviewcouldnotstandexamination.Hedidnotdeny thebeingofsubstance,andhedidnotdenythe ____________________ 4Essay II.xii.6. 5Essay II.xiii.1920. 6R.I.Aaron,John Locke(Oxford,1955),pp.1745. 61

needofasupporttoqualities.Buthedeniedthatwehaveknowledgeofthis substance.Experienceitselfsuggestsitsexistence,butitdoesnotrevealits nature.Itishiddenfromusandwillremainhiddenfromus,untilwegain faculties,whichwedonotnowpossess,wherebytheinnernatureofthebeing ofthingswillberevealed.7 First,ageneralpoint.Someonewhosays'Wehavenoideaofsubstratumsubstance', meaningthattheexpression'substratumsubstance'hasnomeaningforus,cannot properlygoontosay'...butstilltheremaybesubstratumsubstances'ortosay'... andIdon'tthinkthereareanysubstratumsubstances'.Ifanexpressionismeaningless

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thenwemaynotuseit,howeverhumbly,agnostically,orsubjunctively.PerhapsLocke didtakethepositionAarondescribes,butitsincoherenceshouldbepointedout. Itcouldarise,incidentally,fromamistakeofwhichLockeissometimesguilty,8namely thatofmakingapointaboutmeaning,expressingitintermsof'ideas',andthen treatingitasonlyapointaboutknowledge.Suchasentenceas'Wehavenoideasof substratumsubstance'hasanambiguitygeneratedbythedoubleuseof'idea'discussed in4above. Secondly,thereissomethingwrongwith:'Experience...doesnotreveal[substance's] nature.It...willremainhiddenfromusuntilwegainfaculties...etc.'TheLockean analysisimpliesthatnothingcouldcountasexperienceofsubstratumsubstance,but thereisalsoadeeperobjection,namelythatLockeansubstratumsubstancecannot have a 'nature' at all.9Lockehimselfspeaksof'thesecretabstractnatureofsubstance ingeneral',10butonthispointLeibnizsawmoreclearly: Indistinguishingtwothingsin[any]substance,theattributesorpredicates, andthecommonsubjectofthesepredicates,itisnowonderthatwecan conceivenothingparticularinthissubject.Itmustbeso,indeed,sincewe havealreadyseparatedfromitalltheattributesinwhichwecouldconceive anydetail.11 Leibniz'sinsightcanbegeneralizedintothefollowingargument,whichexposesthevital defectinthesubstratumtheory.IsthereapropertySnesswhichdefinessubstantiality avalueofS ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

10Essay

II.xxiii.6. 11Leibniz,New Essays II.xxiii.2. 7R.I.Aaron,John Locke(Oxford,1955),pp.1789. 8Essay II.xxiii.2930. 9SeeGibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,ch.5,6. 62

suchthatxisasubstanceifandonlyifSx?(a)IfaproponentoftheLockeantheory says'Yes',thenhisaccountofwhatitisforapropertytobeinstantiated,viz.thatPis instantiatedifandonlyifsomesubstancebearsP,saysmerelythatPisinstantiatedif andonlyifsomeitemisbothSandP.Hisanalysisofastatementaboutthe instantiationofonepropertythusyields,uselessly,astatementaboutthejoint instantiationoftwoproperties.(b)Sohemustsay'No'.Thatis,hemustdenythat substancesareitemsofacertainkind:tobeofakindistohavethepropertieswhich definethekind,andtherecannotbepropertieswhichitemsmusthaveinordertoqualify assubstances.ButtheclaimthatsubstancesareitemsofacertainkindistheLockean theoryofpropertyinstantiation.Thetheory'swholepointandinterestliesinitsclaim thateverysubjectconceptincludestheconceptofakindofitemwhosespecialrightand dutyitistobearproperties. Thetheory'scrucialerroristhemovefrom'Thereisaconceptofathing which..., whichentersintoeverysubjectconcept'to'Thereisakindofitemaboutwhichnothing canbesaidexceptthatsuchitemsbearproperties'.Therearemanykindsofthings,but thingsdonotconstituteakind.Thereis,perhaps,a'conceptofasubjectingeneral'; butitistobeelucidatedintermsofthewaysinwhichmorespecialconceptsfunctionin
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

certainkindsofstatements,andisnottoberegardedasaconceptwhichpicksouta classofitems.

12.Reality
Locke'stheoryofrealityisaviewaboutthenatureofthedistinctionbetweenthe subjectiveandobjective,innerandouter,appearanceandreality;thedistinction betweentherebeingsensoryevidenceforsomething'sbeingthecase,anditsreally beingthecase. Thewords'appearance'and'reality'donot,astheystand,markthedistinctionIwant. Inthestatement'Johnappearedtobeillhewaswhitefacedandtrembling',John's pallorandtremorsarerepresentedasappearancesoftherealitywhichishisillness;but colour,movement,etc.,areobjective,interpersonalfactswhichLockeandIwanttoput onthe'reality'sideoftheappearance/realitydistinction.Anystatementatallmay provideevidence 63

forsomething'sbeingthecase,andinthatsensemayreportwhat'appears'tobethe case;butIuse'appearance'/'reality'torefertothedistinctionwhichhasfactsabout sensorystatesononesideofitandeverythingelseontheother. Thisterminologicalchoicedoesnotmatterinitself,butthereasonforitdoes.Iattend towhatIcall'thedistinctionbetweenappearanceandreality',andIchoosethatlabel forit,becauseIsharewithLockeandBerkeleyandHumethebeliefthatone'sevidence

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

forwhatisobjectivelythecaseconsistsinorrestsultimatelyuponfactsaboutone's ownsensorystates.Forexample,evenifIoffer'Johnwaswhitefacedandtrembling'in explanationofmysaying'Johnappearedtobeill',theformerstatementwillinitsturn restuponsomethingintherealmof'appearance'inmyspecializedsensee.g.itwill restupontheevidenceofmyeyes.Theevidenceofsomeoneelse'seyesmightbe relevant,ofcourse;butonlyifhetellsmewhathesaw,sothatmybeliefaboutJohn's conditionrestspartlyupontheevidenceofmyears.Forthisreason,the'distinction betweenappearanceandreality'(inmysense)goesdeeperthanthesliding,vernacular distinctioninvolvedinsuchstatementsas'Heappearedtobeillhewaswhitefaced andtrembling'. ThedistinctiontowhichIamcallingattentionisonewhichwedooftenenoughemploy. Itisinvolvedinmuchofourknowledgethatthingswhichappeartobethusarereally so:Ihavebeenworkingwithroyalbluesothattheeggshellbluewallnowlooksgreen tome;thecircularsawsoundedlikeachildscreaming;adrunkenfightlookedlikea streetaccident;theyweremussels,buttheysmelledlikesquid.Whenaquestionofthis kindarises,wecancheckwhetherwhatappearstobesoisreallyso.Imaycomparethe wallwiththesamplelabelled'eggshellblue',oraskmywifewhetherthethingsinthe tinlooktoherlikemussels.Thesechecksintroducefurthersensoryevidence,the reliabilityofwhichmayinitsturnbesupportedbyfurtherchecks.Butalthoughwecan checkanything,wecannotcheckeverything.Toassessanyitemofsensoryevidence,it seems,wemustsimplyacceptsomeothersuchitem. Considernowthequestion'Isanythingintheobjectiverealmreallyinanywayasit appearstobe?'whichturnsintothequestion'Istherereallyanobjectiverealmatall?' Wecannottacklethisquestion,allinalump,byanyofthemethodswe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

64

ordinarilyusetocheckontheevidenceofoursenses;forthosemethodsinvolve assessingsomebitsofsensoryevidencebytrustingothers,whereasourpresent questionforbidsustotrustoursensesatalluntilafterthequestionhasbeenanswered. Theconjecture'Perhapsthereisnoobjectiverealm'isnotamereexpansionof'Perhaps thewallisnotreallygreen',anymorethan'Teachmehowtoapplyclassificatorywords' isamereexpansionof'Teachmehowtoapplytheword"neurotic"'. Sosomeonewhoconjecturesthatperhapsthereisreallynoobjectiveworld'outthere'is eithermisusingtheordinarydistinctionbetweenwhatisreallythecaseandwhat(going bywhatwesee,feel,etc.)appearstobethecase,orelseheisemployingsome unordinarydistinctionwhichcouldbeexpressedinthesamewords.Inthelattercase,of course,heowesusanexplanationofwhatunordinarydistinctionhehasinmind. Lockeaddresseshimselftosuchconjecturesseveraltimes,andalwaysfumblesthem.12 Hedoesnotcriticizethequestion'Isanythingreallyasitappearstobe?'or,inhis words,'Howshallthemind,whenitperceivesnothingbutitsownideas,knowthatthey agreewiththingsthemselves?'13onthegroundsthatitprecludesanyuseofthe ordinaryappearance/realitydistinctionwithoutintroducingandexplaininganunordinary alternativetoit.Rather,heseekstoanswerthequestionjustasitstands: Whetherwecan...certainlyinfertheexistenceofanythingwithoutus,which correspondsto[ourideas],isthatwhereofsomementhinktheremaybea questionmade....ButyethereIthinkweareprovidedwithanevidencethat putsuspastdoubting.ForIaskanyone,Whetherhebenotinvincibly
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

conscioustohimselfofadifferentperception,whenhelooksonthesunby day,andthinksonitbynight;whenheactuallytasteswormwood,orsmellsa rose,oronlythinksonthatsavourorodour?14 Butthequestioner,oncestarted,willrightlyrefusetobefobbedoffwiththis;forheis asking,amongotherthings,whetherwedoeverreallylookonthesunortaste wormwood.Hewillsay:'Themerefactthatwhatiscommonlycalled"imaginingthesun" differsmarkedlyfromwhatiscommonlycalled"seeingthesun" ____________________ 12Essay IV.ii.14;iv.45;xi.210. 13Essay IV.iv.3.SeealsoLocke,Examination of Malebranche 51. 14Essay IV.ii.14. 65

doesnotimplythatthelatterkindofexperiencereallyis,atleastsometimes,aseeing ofarealsun.'Ingivinghimthatreply,Iamnotguessingastohisprobablecharacter, butmerelyfollowingoutthelogicofhisoriginalquestion.Thesamepointariseswhen Lockesays: Manyofthoseideasareproduced in us with pain,whichafterwardswe rememberwithouttheleastoffence....Werememberthepainsofhunger, thirst,ortheheadache,withoutanypainatall;whichwouldeithernever disturbus,orelseconstantlydoit,asoftenaswethoughtofit,werethere nothingmorebutideasfloatinginourminds,andappearancesentertainingour fancies,withouttherealexistenceofthingsaffectingusfromabroad.The
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

samemaybesaidofpleasure,accompanyingseveralactualsensations.15 Again,why?WhatreasoncanLockegive,withoutbeggingthequestionatissue,for sayingthatiftherewereno'thingsaffectingusfromabroad'anygivenkindof'idea' wouldbeeitheralwaysorneveraccompaniedbypain? Someofhisargumentsexplicitlybegthequestion:'Itisplainthoseperceptionsare producedinusbyexteriorcausesaffectingoursenses:becausethosethatwantthe organsofanysense,nevercanhavetheideasbelongingtothatsenseproducedintheir minds.'16Thisargumentfortheconclusionthat'oursenses...donoterrinthe informationtheygiveusoftheexistenceofthingswithoutus'17hasapremissabout senseorgans,includingthoseofotherpeople.Butsenseorgansareamongthe'things withoutus'whoserealityisinquestion. LockehasanotherargumentwhosepremisswasalsothecornerstoneofBerkeley's metaphysicsandtheology: SometimesI find that I cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind.Forthough,whenmyeyesareshut,...Icanatpleasurerecalltomy mindtheideasoflight,orthesun,whichformersensationshadlodgedinmy memory;...ifIturnmyeyesatnoontowardsthesun,Icannotavoidthe ideaswhichthelightorsunthenproducesinme.Sothatthereisamanifest differencebetweentheideaslaidupinmymemory...andthosewhichforce themselvesuponme...Andthereforeitmustneedsbesomeexteriorcause, andthebriskactingofsomeobjectswithoutme,whoseefficacyIcannot resist,thatproducesthoseideasinmymind,whetherIwillorno.18
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 15Essay IV.xi.6. 16Essay IV.xi.4. 17Essay IV.xi.3. 18Essay IV.xi.5. 66

Thereisindeedthis'manifestdifference',butwhy'needsmust'itbeexplainedinthat way?Lockecannotreplywithoutbeggingtheoriginalquestion. Whatiswrongwiththequestionis,precisely,thatnothingcouldcountasalegitimate argumentforanaffirmativeanswertoit. Locke'stroubleisnotthatheistoopatientwiththequestion,butthatheisimpatient withitinthewrongwayandforwrongreasons.Hesays(emphasesmine)thatwehave 'thegreatestassurancewe are capable ofconcerningtheexistenceofmaterialbeings', that'Godhasgivenmeassurance enoughoftheexistenceofthingswithoutme',and, combiningbothpoints,that'Thecertaintyofthingsexistinginrerum naturawhenwe havethetestimonyofoursensesforitisnot only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs'.19Allthissuggeststhatthereisroomleftforresidual doubt,andifthatisconcededtheneverythingisconceded. Also,Lockethinksitrelevanttocriticizethequestioner'scharacter.20Hesays:'Ithink nobodycan,inearnest,besosceptical...',andspeaksofthesceptic'sdesire'to surmounteverytheleast(Iwillnotsayreason,but)pretenceofdoubting'.Hesnaps
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatitis'foolishandvain...toexpectdemonstration[=rigorousproof]andcertainty inthingsnotcapableofit'.Andhemakesthedebatingpointthatthesceptic'willnever haveanycontroversywithme;sincehecanneverbesureIsayanythingcontrarytohis ownopinion'.Locke'stormentor,however,canevadethisonslaughtbya'retreat'which yieldsnogroundatall.Forhecansay:'IagreethatIneitherneednorcouldbeentitled tohavegreaterassurancethanIdohaveastotherealityofthingsoutsideme.AllI wanttoknowiswhatentitlesmetothisgreatassurancewhichIhave.'Thisraisesthe oldembarrassingquestion,andLocke'srepliesarefatallyflawednotbyfallingshortof 'demonstration'butbyhavingnoforceatallexceptonassumptionswhichincludethe wholeconclusion. Empiricalarguments,justbecausetheymustmakeassumptionsabouttheobjectiveor 'real'inLocke'ssense,mustmovefromlimitedpremissesaboutsensorystatesto limitedconclusionsabouttheobjectiverealm.Anysuchargumentturnsonthefulcrumof anunquestionedacceptanceoftheexistenceofanobjectiveworldaboutwhichweknow agooddeal.Ifwestandbackandtryto ____________________ 19Essay IV.xi.3,8. 20Essay IV.xi.3,10. 67

focusontherelationbetweensensorystatesasawholeandtheobjectiverealmasa whole,askingen blocwhethertheformerareeverreliableguidestothelatter,empirical argumentscannotgetagrip;andthe'cannot'isalogicalone.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thatisourclue.Thereisaconnexionbetween'sensorystatesasawhole'and'the objectiverealmasawhole',orbetweentheconceptsofappearanceandreality,ofsuch akindthatthequestion'Isappearanceeverareliableguidetoreality?'shouldbe answered'Yes'onlogicalgrounds.(Orofsuchakindthatthequestionislogically improperdependingonhowthequestionertakesit.Analogously,ifsomeoneasked'Are factsaboutactualplumberseveraguidetofactsabouttheaverageplumber?'wemight answer'Yes'onlogicalgrounds;butifthequestionerexpectedustobaseouransweron factsaboutactualoraverageplumbers,ortobeembarrassedbecausewecouldn't,we mightsaythathisquestioninvolvedalogicalmistake.)Usingafamiliarshorthand whichwilllaterbeexplainedanddefended:realityisalogicalconstructionoutof appearances. Thiswillbecalledphenomenalism,andsoindeeditis.Thoughdisinclinedtoapologize, Iwishatthisstagetobeplacatory.AllIneednowisagreement,whichmaybegiven evenbythosewhohavebeenswayedbytheantiphenomenalistliterature,thatLocke didmishandlethegeneralquestion'Isappearanceareliableguidetoreality?'andits immediateoffspring'Istherereallyanobjectiverealm?';21thathewentwrongnotin detailbutinprinciple;andthatthefollowingareimportantparts,causesorsymptomsof hismistake.(a)Hetendedtoviewthegeneralscepticalquestionasjustthesumofall limitedscepticalquestions.(b)Hethoughtthatthequestionneededtobeanswered ratherthancriticized.(c)Hedidnotthinkitrelevanttoinquireintothemeaningsof suchexpressionsas'realthingswithoutus'.(d)Hethoughtthatempiricalarguments couldsupportanaffirmativeanswertothegeneralscepticalquestion. Agreementonthosepointswillsufficeforthepurposesoftherestofthischapterand thenext.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

13.The'veil-of-perception'doctrine
Lockerepresentsthedifferencebetween(a)seeingatreeand(b)beinginavisualstate asofseeingatreethoughthereisno ____________________ 21SeeGibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,ch.716. 68

treetheretobeseen,asthedifferencebetween(a)havingavisual'idea'whileinthe presenceofacorresponding'realthing'and(b)havingsuchan'idea'whilenot confrontedbyanysuch'realthing'.Thisisharmlessinitself.Itbecomesnoxiousonlyif 'realthings'arelogicallydivorcedfrom'ideas',sothatanempiricalbasisissoughtfora rebuttaloftotalscepticismabouttheobjectiverealm.IspeakofLocke's'theoryof reality',referringmainlytohisfumblingoftheissuesassociatedwiththegeneral scepticalquestion;andsotheword'theory'isjustaconvenientmisnomer.Berkeleyhas popularizedtheopinionthatLocke'sthoughtontheseissueshadtheweightand deliberatenessordinarilyassociatedwitha'theory'or'doctrine',buttheopinionisfalse. Lockeputstheobjectiveworld,theworldof'realthings',beyondourreachontheother sideoftheveilofperception;soIcallthisaspectofhisthoughthis'veilofperception doctrine'.Themoreusuallabel,'representativetheoryofperception',isunsatisfactory becauseitdoesnotexpresswhatiswrongwiththetheory.Thereisnothingwrongwith sayingthatwhenIseeatreemyvisualfield'represents'arealthingwithwhichIam confronted.NorisitobjectionabletosaythatIseethetreebythemediationofmy ideasorvisualsensedata,ifthismeansthatwithoutthesensedataIshouldnotsee
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thetree,orthatmyhavingthosesensedataispartbutnotthewholeofmyseeingof thetree.'Butisn'titobjectionableifitmeansthatyourseeingofthetreeisonly indirect?'Idonotknow,becauseIcannotfindclearmeaningintheusesphilosophersof perceptionmakeof'direct'anditscognates. Lockeoftenspeaksofa'correspondence','agreement'or'conformity'betweenmyvisual fieldandthetree,suggestingthatthetworesembleoneanother.Thisisindeed objectionable(see5above),butitisindependentoftheessentialerrorinLocke's theoryofreality,22namelyhissettingtheentirerangeoffactsaboutsensorystates overagainsttheentirerangeoffactsabouttheobjectiverealmandthenlookingfor empiricallinksbetweenthem.Theblanketquestion'Dosensorystateseverrepresent theobjectiverealm?'isindeedabadonenotbecauseofwhat'represent'means,but justbecausethequestionisablanketone.Thephrase'representativetheoryof perception'doesnotcapturethisfact. ____________________ 22ContrastP.D.Cummins,"'Berkeley'sLikenessPrinciple'",Martinpp.3535. 69

PerhapsLockealsohasacausaltheoryofperception.HedoessaythatwhenIseea treethereisarealthingcausingmetohaveacertainvisual'idea'.Butthistooisin itselfharmless,fortheremayinanygivencasebesuchacausalconnexionasLocke postulates.Toknowthattherewas,however,weshouldneedindependentaccessto empiricalfactsabouttheobjectiverealm,andsothereferencetocausalconnexions oughtnottotaketheblanketform:'Thefundamentalrelationbetweenthewholerange

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ofsubjectivefactsandthewholerangeofobjectivefactsisacausalone.'Ihave elaboratedthispointelsewhere.23 Inshort,whetherwesaythatideasrepresentorarecausedbyrealthings,thereis seriouserroronlyifthethesisisexpressedinanallatonceway,purportingtorelate sensorystatesen bloctoobjectivestatesofaffairsen bloc.ThefactthatLockeerredin thatwayisexpressed,fairlysatisfactorily,bycallinghisposition'theveilofperception doctrine'.

14.ThetwodoctrinesinBerkely
TheLockeantheoryofsubstance(11)isutterlydistinctfromtheveilofperception doctrinewhichIhaveexcogitatedfromLocke'shandlingofscepticism(1213).The formertriestosaywhatconceptsweusewhenwesaySomething is F,whilethelatter hastodowiththedifferencebetweenI see a treeandIt is as though I were seeing a tree.Althoughthesetwoconcernsareasdifferentaschalkfromcheese,theLockean treatmentsofthemhavebeenconfidentlyidentifiedbyBerkeleyandmanyothers. SometimesBerkeleydoesisolateoneorotherofthedoctrines.Hediscussesthe substratumtheory,withoutintroducingtheveilofperceptiondoctrine,injusttwo passagesofwhichthisisone: Inthisproposition,adieishard,extendedandsquare,theywillhaveitthat theworddiedenotesasubjectorsubstance,distinctfromthehardness, extensionandfigure,whicharepredicatedofit,andinwhichtheyexist.ThisI cannotcomprehend:tomeadieseemstobenothingdistinctfromthose thingswhicharetermeditsmodesoraccidents.Andtosayadieishard,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

extendedandsquare,isnottoattributethosequalitiestoasubjectdistinct fromandsupportingthem,butonlyanexplicationofthemeaningoftheword die.24 ____________________ 23J.Bennett,Kant's Analytic(Cambridge,1966),7. 24Principles49.SeealsoFirst Dialogue,pp.1979. 70

Elsewhere,muchofthecaseagainsttheveilofperceptiondoctrinecanbefound unmixedwithpolemicagainstsubstrata.25 Nearlyalways,though,Berkeleyweldsthetwodoctrinestogethertoformasingleview about'materialsubstance'.Heusestheword'matter'anditscognatestoreferto Locke'spurported'realthings'whichliebeyondtheveilofperception.(Healso,with morewarrantfromLocke'stext,associates'matter'withLocke'sviewsaboutprimary qualities;butthatmustwaituntilChapterIV.)Hisuseoftheword'substance',onthe otherhand,connectswithLockeonlyinrespectofthesubstratumtheoryaboutwhatit isforapropertytobeinstantiated:theothercontextswhereLockeusesitlieoutside Berkeley'spurview.Thephrase'materialsubstance',then,whichBerkeleyusesso lavishlyandwhichhardlyoccursinLocke,givesanydiscussionofoneofthedoctrinesa goodchanceofbecomingentangledwithadiscussionoftheother. Sometimesthemixtureisfairlyinnocent.Forexample,oneofBerkeley'sattacksonthe substratumtheory,althoughostensiblyconcernedwith'matter',isnotseriouslyinfected
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

byanythingwhichisappropriatetotheveilofperceptiondoctrineratherthanthe substancedoctrine.26 Often,though,themixtureislethal:'Itissaidextensionisamodeoraccidentof matter,andthatmatteristhesubstratumthatsupportsit.NowIdesirethatyouwould explainwhatismeantbymatter'ssupportingextension.'27Berkeleywantstomakea pointaboutsubstratumsubstance.Notonlydoeshedistractinglycallit'matter',buthe alsodrags'extension'intothelimelight.InLocke,'extension'hasmuchtodowith primaryqualitiesandalittletodowiththerealthingsbeyondtheveilofperception,but ithasnospecialroleinthesubstratumtheory.Lockeclearlyregardedthelatteras equallyrelevantorirrelevanttoeverysortofitemwhethercreaturelyordivine, extendedorunextendedthatcaninstantiateor'support'aquality.28 HereisBerkeley'snextattempttolocatethetarget: Ifweinquireintowhatthemostaccuratephilosophersdeclarethemselvesto meanbymaterial substance;weshallfindthemacknowledge,theyhaveno othermeaningannexedtothosesounds,buttheideaof ____________________ 25Principles1820,868. 26Principles68,firsthalf. 27Principles16. 28Essay II.xiii.18. 71

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

beingingeneral,togetherwiththerelativemotionofitssupportingaccidents.
29

ThisfairlyenoughreportstheLockeantheorynotof'materialsubstance'butof 'substance'.Theadjectiveisimportant,forBerkeleyaddsthathedoesnotunderstand theprofferedaccountofthe'meaningannexedtothosesounds',andcontinues: Butwhyshouldwetroubleourselvesanyfarther,indiscussingthismaterial substratumorsupportoffigureandmotion,andothersensiblequalities?Does itnotsupposetheyhaveanexistencewithoutthemind?Andisnotthisa directrepugnancy,andaltogetherinconceivable?30 Then,withthephrase'existencewithoutthemind'ashispivot,hemodulatesintoan attackontheveilofperceptiondoctrine!Acomplaintagainstawronganalysisof subjectconceptsisthusjumbledwithacomplaintagainstLocke'sinsufficientlyidealist analysisoftheconceptofreality. SomeofBerkeley'sturnsofphrasecould,withoutmuchstrain,beconstruedineither way: Ifthewordsubstancebetakeninthevulgarsense,foracombinationof sensiblequalities,suchasextension,solidity,weight,andthelike;thiswe cannotbeaccusedoftakingaway.Butifitbetakeninaphilosophicsense,for thesupportofaccidentsorqualitieswithoutthemind:thenindeedI acknowledgethatwetakeitaway,ifonemaybesaidtotakeawaythatwhich neverhadanyexistence,notevenintheimagination.31 Thismightmean'Ofcoursetherearethingswithproperties,butinsayingthiswedonot
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

employaconceptofnakedthinghood';oritmightmean'Ofcoursetherearereal objects,butthatstatementcanbeanalysedpurelyintermsofmentalstates'.Thereis nobasisforpreferringeitherreading:'support'tendsoneway,butthen'withoutthe mind'tendstheotherway. Herearejusttwomoreexamples: Butthoughitbeallowedbythematerialiststhemselves,thatmatterwas thoughtofonlyforthesakeofsupportingaccidents...32 Ifyousticktothenotionofanunthinkingsubstance,orsupportofextension, motion,andothersensiblequalities,thentomeitismost ____________________ 29Principles17. 30Ibid. 31Principles37. 32Principles74. 72

evidentlyimpossiblethereshouldbeanysuchthing.Sinceitisaplain repugnancy,thatthosequalitiesshouldexistinorbesupportedbyan unperceivingsubstance.33 TherearemanyotherexamplesofBerkeley'sconflatingoridentifyingthetwodoctrines. SomeoftheclearestcasesalsointroduceLocke'sviewaboutprimaryqualities,andwill

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

bequotedlater. ThiscalamitousmistakeofBerkeley'scanbeexplained.Hisphilosophyputintellectual andlinguisticpressuresonhimtomakeitpressurestransmittedalmostwhollybyhis useoftheword'idea'.Ishalltrytoexplainhow. In4aboveInotedLocke'spreparednesstouse'ideaofx'tomean'qualityofxby virtueofwhichxcausesanideainapercipient',andIsuggestedthathiscontentment withthiscuriousellipsismightbepartiallyexplainedthus:'Ideas(=sensedata)giveus allourdataaboutthequalitiesofthings,andsowhatwehavetosayaboutthings' qualitiesmightaswellbeexpressedintermsoftheideaswhichthingscauseinus.' Now,Berkeley'salternativetotheveilofperceptiondoctrineisastrongformof idealism:therealthingsintheobjectiverealmarejustcollectionsofsensorystates thesensorystateswhich,forLocke,arejustsymptomsandeffectsofthepresenceof realthings.SoBerkeleycouldreplacethelineofthoughtwhichexplainsLocke'sidea/ qualityellipsisbysomethinglikethis:'Realthingsaresetsofideas(=sensedata),and sostatementsaboutthequalitiesofthingsarestatementsaboutideas.'Thus,for Berkeleytheuseof'idea'tomean'qualityofathing'issimply,literallycorrect: 'Qualities,ashathbeenshewn,arenothingelsebutsensationsorideas,whichexist onlyinamindperceivingthem.'34Andtheidentificationofqualitieswithideasisalso highlightedbythisstatementofBerkeley'sidealistrivaltotheveilofperception doctrine: Bymatterthereforewearetounderstandaninert,senselesssubstance,in whichextension,figure,andmotion,doactuallysubsist.Butitisevidentfrom whatwehavealreadyshewn,thatextension,figureandmotionareonlyideas existinginthemind,andthatanideacanbelikenothingbutanotheridea,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andthatconsequentlyneithertheynortheirarchetypescanexistinan unperceivingsubstance.35 ____________________ 33Principles76.SeealsoFirst Dialogue,p.197. 34Principles78. 35Principles9. 73

(Isuggestedin4thatLocke'sellipsiswasalsoencouragedbytheroleof'ideas'as meanings.ThiscouldapplytoBerkeleytoo,perhaps,butthereisnoneedofit:the aboveaccountofwhyBerkeleyidentifiesideaswithqualities,involvingonlyideas consideredassensedata,isquitesufficient.Myearlierpublishedattempttoinvolve boththeprimaryrolesof'idea'inasingleexplanationis,asIindicatedin4above,an embarrassingmuddle.) GiventhisfactaboutBerkeley'suseof'idea',itisnaturalthatheshouldconflatethe twoLockeandoctrines;foreachpurportstoofferananchorforfreefloating'ideas'one tyingsensorystatestoobjects,theothertyingqualitiestosubstrataandofeach doctrineBerkeleycansaythatitoverpopulatestheworldbypostulatingsomething unknowablewhenknown'ideas'wouldsuffice.TheratherBerkeleiansentence'Things arejustcollectionsofideas,notsomethingoverandabovethem'canbeinterpreted, takingideastobesensorystates,asdenyingtheveilofperceptiondoctrine;or,taking ideastobequalities,asdenyingthesubstratumtheory. IamnotsayingthatBerkeley,givenhisidealismandhisresultantidentificationofideas
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

withqualities,wasentitledtoidentifythetwoLockeandoctrines.Heshouldhaveseen thathewasconfrontedbywhatlookedliketwodoctrines,andthenperhapsarguedfrom idealismtotheconclusionthatthepairwerereallyjusttwoversionsofasinglethesis. NosuchargumentoccursinBerkeley'spages.Sofarfromsaying'Thatlookslikeagap, butIshalluseidealismtoshowthatitisn't',Berkeleydidnotevenseethattheremight bethoughttobeagap,andranthetwodoctrinestogethereveninhisargumentsfor idealism.

15.ThetwodoctrinesinLocke
TheLockeantheoriesofsubstanceandrealityaredistinctinfact,butaretheyalso distinctinLocke?Onemightexpectnot,givenLocke'stendencytouse'idea'tomean 'quality'.LackingBerkeley'sreasonfortreatingthisasmorethanamereellipsis,he neverthelesshastheotherreasonmentionedin4above:thesetofqualitiesathing musthaveforWtoapplytoituniquelydeterminesthemeaningofW,andthusthe ideasassociatedwithW;butideasareindisputablysense-dataaswell;andso'ideaof x' 74

canunivocallymeanboth'qualityofx'and'appearanceofx'.Withthisconclusion floweringfromrootswhichrunfairlydeepinhisthought,Lockemightwellhave identifiedthesubstratumandveilofperceptiondoctrines. Yetmycitationsonsubstancein11abovecontainnotawordabout'realthings'or 'thingswithoutus';nor,inalltheantiscepticalpolemicquotedin12,does'substance'

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

occurevenonce.Thisisnotbecauseofbiasinmyselectionofpassagestoquote;no biaswasneeded.IntherelevantpartsoftheEssay,Lockesimplydoesnotmakethe wrongidentificationwhichsubsequentlyloomedsolargeinBerkeley'sexegesisofhim.( Berkeleynotwithstanding,thesepartsarenotextensive.Lockesayslittleabout'the ideaofsubstanceingeneral',Ithinkbecauseheregardsitasembarrassingandtrivial; andlittleabout'realthings',perhapsbecausehedoesnotseethedepthofhisproblem aboutthem.) 'Lockesimplydoesnotmake...'orratherhecomplicatedlydoesnotmakethe identification.Withoutintendingtoidentifythesubstratumandveilofperception doctrines,Lockecannothelpexpoundingtheformer,andsomeofitsrelatives,inways appropriatetothelatter.Thetwodrifttowardsoneanotheroftheirownaccord,drawn byforcesinherentinLocke'sbasicassumptionsandchoiceoflanguage.InthissectionI presentsomeexamples. First,Locke'ssubstance/modepolarityneedstobeexplained: ModesIcallsuchcomplexideaswhich,howevercompounded,containnotin themthesuppositionofsubsistingbythemselves,butareconsideredas dependenceson,oraffectionsofsubstances;suchasaretheideassignified bythewordstriangle,gratitude,murder,&c.36 Ithinkthatmodesarejust(ideasof)propertiesorqualities,andthatLocke'speculiar choiceofexamplesistobeexplainedbyhisdistasteforovertlyuniversalistlanguage.37 Thegeometricalstudyof'triangles'isreallyastudyoftriangularity;yetasturdyanti universalist,whowillnotwant'triangularity'inhisinventoryoftheworld'scontents, mayfeelthathecansafelyinclude'triangles(ofthesortstudiedingeometry)'.Again,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

althoughheregardsrednessandvalidityandmanhoodaspartsoftheuniversalist mythology,hemayfeelsafeinadmittingsuchapparently ____________________ 36Essay II.xii.4. 37Essay II.xxii.310;III.v.36. 75

downtoearth,unabstract,observableitemsasgratitudeandmurder.Inshort,modes arepropertiesorqualitiesoruniversals;andLocke,wantingtoallowsuchitemswhile stillmaintainingthat'Allthingsthatexistareonlyparticulars',hastoselectexamples ofmodeswhichdonotgivethegameawaybytheirverbalforme.g.hastoselect 'incest'ratherthan'incestuousness'. Theothersideofthepolarityispresentedthus: Theideasofsubstancesaresuchcombinationsofsimpleideasasaretakento representdistinctparticularthingssubsistingbythemselves;inwhichthe supposedorconfusedideaofsubstance,suchasitis,isalwaysthefirstand chief.38 Something'subsistsbyitself'ifitisathingandnotaquality,notan'affection'of somethingelse,notlogicallydependentonanythingelseasamodeisonasubstance, e.g.asamurderisonamurderer. Thesubstance/modedistinction,then,drawsthelinebetweenparticularsandproperties.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Itisapurelylogicaldistinction,whoselefthandsideisnotrestrictedtoparticularsof somespecialkind,e.g.to'materialsubstances'orto'realthingswithoutme'.Sothe substratumtheory,whichoffersananalysisofthedistinction,isapieceofwholly generalphilosophicallogic:itimpliessomethingaboutwhatthereis,butnotspecially aboutwhatthereisintheobjectiverealmortheworld'withoutme'.AsevenBerkeley sometimessees,39theanalysispurportstodealwith'Iamunhappy'aswellaswith 'Thatissquare'.ThatLockecreditsthesubstratumtheorywiththisdegreeofgenerality isshownbyhiswayofintroducingthesubstance/modedistinction;andthereisother evidencetoo.Forexample,whenhesuggeststhatthebeliefinsubstrataarosefromthe quasireifyingofqualitiesor'accidents':'Theywhofirstranintothenotionofaccidents, asasortofrealbeingsthatneededsomethingtoinherein,wereforcedtofindoutthe wordsubstancetosupportthem',40thereisnohintthatsubstancesareconfinedto 'realthingswithoutus'.Intheprecedingsectionheteasinglyasksthesubstratum theoristswhetherGodandfinitemindsandbodiesareall'substances'inthesame sense;whichpresupposesthatthesubstratumtheoryisintendedtohavefullgenerality.
41

____________________ 38Essay II.xii.6. 39Philosophical Commentaries,entry785. 40Essay II.xiii.19. 41SeealsoEssay II.xxiii.5,15. 76

SomuchfortheapartnessofthesubstanceandrealitydoctrinesintheEssay.Inowturn
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

totheotherhalfofthestory. (1)WhenLockeexplains'substances'asthings'subsistingbythemselves',theself subsistenceinquestionisclearlymeanttobelogical;butthephrasecouldmean 'existingindependentlyofanypercipient',andsocouldlinkthesubstancedoctrinewith thetheoryofreality'Aretheresubstances,i.e.thingssubsistingbythemselves,i.e. realthingswithoutus?'AshiftofthiskinddoesoccurinLocke'swritings.Hemaintains thatinconstructingcomplexideasofmodeswearesubjectonlytothelawsoflogic: 'Thereisnothingmorerequiredtothiskindofideastomakethemreal,butthattheybe soframed,thattherebeapossibilityofexistingconformabletothem',42whereasour ideasofsubstancearesubjecttoamorestringentrequirement: Ourcomplexideasofsubstances,beingmadealloftheminreferencetothings existingwithoutus,andintendedtoberepresentationsofsubstancesasthey reallyare,arenofurtherrealthanastheyaresuchcombinationsofsimple ideasasarereallyunited,andcoexistinthingswithoutus.43 Ifthesepassagesarestipulativelydefining'real'asappliedtoideas,thenwhattheysay cannotbefalse.Butif,asseemslikely,Lockethinksthatanidea(ortheexpression which'signifies'it)islegitimateonlyiftheideais'real',thenwhathesaysaboutthe 'reality'ofideasofsubstancesissurelywrong.If'gratitude'isallrightinaworldwhere nooneisevergrateful,whymaywenothave'horse'inaworlddevoidofhorses?All that,though,isbytheway.MymainpointisthatinmakingthismistakeLockeexplicitly connects'ideasofsubstances'with'thingswithoutus',whichthreatenstoinfectthe substratumtheorywiththeveilofperceptiondoctrine.Buthedoesnotcarryoutthe threat:inthispassage,whereideasofsubstancesaresoovertlyconnectedwith'things withoutus',thereisnomentionofthesupposedideaofsubstance.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

(2)SomeofLocke'sversionsofthesubstratumdoctrinehaveafeaturewhichquietly nudgesitovertowardstheappearance/realityarea.Thegeneraltheoryofsubstratum substance,Ihavemaintained,isaddressedtothequestion'Whatisitforaqualityto beinstantiatedbyaparticular?'Locke,however,saysthat'we ____________________ 42Essay II.xxx.4. 43Essay II.xxx.5. 77

accustomourselvestosupposesomesubstratum'asasupportfor'acertainnumberof simpleideas[which]goconstantlytogether';44andthisseemstonarrowthedoctrine's scope(a)tothespeciesofcaseswhereseveralqualitiesarejointlyinstantiatedbyone particular,and(b)tothesubspecieswherethequalitiesinquestion'goconstantly together'.(a)doesnotmatter,forLockecouldarguethatsincewehavenoroomforthe notionofathingwithonlyonequality,thequestionofaquality'sbeing'had'by somethingdoesnotariseunlessotherqualitiesarealso'had'bythatsamething.But (b)ispuzzling:whydoesLockeconfinehimselftocaseswherethequalitiesall'go constantlytogether',andwhatdoeshemeanbythatanyway? Ihave,ofcourse,beenconstruing'idea'tomean'quality',foronlythusdoesthe passageunderdiscussionbearonthesubstancedoctrineatall.Ourpuzzleabout'ideas whichgoconstantlytogether',however,issolvedifwetakethese'ideas'tobenot qualitiesbutsensorystates.Forthenthepuzzlingphrasereferstocaseswhereone's sensoryhistorymanifestscertainkindsofpatternororderthekinds,infact,whichare
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ourbasisforthinkingthatthereare'thingswithoutus'.Soinsteadofexpressinga queerlyrestrictedversionofthesubstratumdoctrine,thepassageonthisreadingofit gesturestowardstheprovinceoftheveilofperceptiondoctrine. Lockemakesnothingofthisopportunityforerror.Indeed,amerefoursectionslaterhe usesargumentswhich,ineffect,positivelyinsistthatthewholepointofthesubstratum theoryisitsbeingappliedtoparticularsofeverykindandnotjust'realthingswithout us'.Still,itisworthnotingthatabasisforlinking'substance'with'realthing'islaid downintheconnexionoftheformerwith'ideaswhichgoconstantlytogether'. (3)Thepassageinwhichthatphraseoccurs,likesomeothersintheEssay,contains somethingelsewhichdragsthesubstratumdoctrineofftowardstheveilofperception doctrine.Whenwenoticeseveralideaswhich'goconstantlytogether',Lockesays,'not imagininghowthesesimpleideascansubsistbythemselves,weaccustomourselvesto supposesomesubstratumwhereintheydosubsist,andfromwhichtheydoresult,which thereforewecallsubstance'.45Ifthisconcernsthesubstratumdoctrineatall,the 'ideas'inquestionmustagainbequalities;butinthatcase ____________________ 44Essay II.xxiii.1. 45Ibid. 78

Lockeissayingthatsubstancesaresupposedtocausetheirqualities;andonewonders whyheshouldthinkthatanyonehaseversupposedthis.Thispuzzletooisremoved whenwerecallthat'ideas'canalsobesensorystates;forthentheclause'fromwhich

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

[ideas]doresult'echoesthecausalaspectofLocke'stheoryofreality. StillLockedoesnotcashinontheunhappyverbaloverlapbetweenthetwodoctrines. Onthecontrary,heproceedsimmediatelytodrag'idea'apartfrom'quality',andthusto cleansethesubstancedoctrinefromanycausalelementbysayingthatsubstrata supportqualitiesandthatqualitiescauseideas: Ifanyonewillexaminehimselfconcerninghisnotionofpuresubstancein general,hewillfindhehasnootherideaofitatall,butonlyasuppositionof heknowsnotwhatsupportofsuchqualitieswhicharecapableofproducing simpleideasinus.46 ObservethatLockeisnomoreexplicitordeliberateinseparatingthetwodoctrines,and thetworelevantsensesof'idea',thanheisinrunningthemtogether.Hesometimes nearlycommitsBerkeley'soutrightidentificationofthem,andsometimesimplicitly resistsit;butatnostagedoesheseemtobeawareofwhatisgoingon.

16.Thetwodoctrinesinthe20thcentury
SomuchforBerkeleyandLocke;butwhatofthosephilosopherswho,unaidedbythe convictionthat'Qualitiesarenothingelsebutsensationsorideas',havenevertheless collapsedthesubstratumtheoryintotheveilofperceptiondoctrine? IcannotfullyexplainwhyBerkeley'sproblemsaresooftentakenathisownvaluation; butthefollowinghypothesismayhavesomeforce.SomeonemightfollowinBerkeley's footstepsbyillustratingthedistinctionbetweenappearanceandrealitybythequestion 'ItseemstomethatIseesomethingsquare,butistherereallysomethingsquarewhich
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Isee?',andequatingthiswith'Iaminthepresenceofaninstance,inmyvisualfield,of squareness;butamIinthepresenceofsomethingwhichissquare?'Aquestionabout appearanceandrealitywouldthusbequietlytransmutedintoaquestionaboutproperty instantiation.Andsomeonewhonoticedthateachquestioncouldwrongly ____________________ 46Essay II.xxiii.2. 79

thoughplausiblybeanalysedintermsofanelusive'somethingweknownotwhat', mightbefurtherencouragedtoviewthemastwoversionsofasinglequestiontowhich Lockegaveasinglewronganalysis. ThetrainofthoughtIhavesketchedisinvalid,forthequestion'GiventhatIseemto seesomethingsquare,istherereallysomethingsquarethatIsee?'isnotaboutthe instantiationofapresentedproperty,andthesubstratumdoctrineisirrelevanttoit.I provethisbyadilemma,withonehornforthosewhoreifysensedataandanotherfor thosewhodon't. (a)Ifitisallrighttoreifysensedata,thenwecansaythatIhaveorapprehenda squaresensedatum;orthatsomepartofmyvisualfieldissquare.Butinthatcasethe sensedatumisthe'thingwhich'issquare,i.e.itbearsthepropertyofsquarenesswith whichIamnowpresented.ALockeansubstratumsubstanceneednotbephysicalor objectiveorextramental:thewholepointofthedoctrine,asisoftenremarkedevenby victimsofBerkeley'smuddle,isthatitseparatesthesubstancefromallitsproperties, claimingthatpropertiesarebornebyitemsofwhichnothingcanbesaidexceptthat
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

theybearproperties.So:if I have a square sense-datum, I am not in the presence of a property for which I am seeking a bearer,forthepropertyinwhosepresenceIam alreadyhasabearer. (b)Ifitiswrongtoreifysensedata,thenIdon'thaveasquaresensedatumbutamin astatelikethoseIamordinarilyinwhenseeingsquarethings.Butthenmyquestionas towhetherthereissomethingsquarewhichIseeimpliesagnosticismaboutwhetherI ampresentedwithaninstanceofsquarenessatall.Myquestion'Istheworldatthis pointreallyasitappearstobe?'isthereforenotoftheform'Isthereabearerforthis property?'So:if I do not have a square sense-datum, I am not in the presence of a property for which I am seeking a bearer,forIamnot,intherequiredsense,'inthe presenceofaproperty'atall. (Mytreatmentof(a)impliesthatifitisrighttoreifyideasthentheyaresubstances.47 Lockewouldnothavedrawnsuchaconclusion,buthewascommittedtoitforallthat, andhisfailuretoseethecommitmenthadlesstodowithunthoroughnessabout 'substance'thanwithunclarityaboutthestatusof'ideas'.) ____________________ 47Cf.H.H.Price,"'AppearingandAppearances'",American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1(1964). 80

Theforegoingdilemmaisconclusive,butIdonotknowwhetheranyonehasadoptedthe lineofthoughtitattacks.ThenearestthingtoitthatIhavefoundisinBerkeley himself,whoshiftsfrom'Doessomethingrealcorrespondtothissensorystate?'to'Does

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

somethinghavethisproperty?'insomethinglikethewayIhavedescribed: Itisworthwhiletoreflectalittleonthemotiveswhichinducedmento supposetheexistenceofmaterialsubstance....Firsttherefore,itwas thoughtthatcolour,figure,motion,andtherestofthesensiblequalitiesor accidents,didreallyexistwithoutthemind;andforthisreason,itseemed needfultosupposesomeunthinkingsubstratumorsubstancewhereintheydid exist,sincetheycouldnotbeconceivedtoexistbythemselves....48 Asforourcontemporaries,Icanonlyshowthattheydo,forwhateverreason,make Berkeley'smistake.Iselectexampleswhichhelptoexposethemistake'slogical structure. O'Connorseesthatthereisadoctrineaboutsubstanceofapurelylogicalkind.Buthe bringsitinasanafterthought,anddismissesit,withoutargument,asanimpossible readingof'thesubstratumtheory': Itiscertainlynot...truethatcolours,forinstance,cannotoccurexceptas propertiesofacolouredsomething.IfIstareatalightforafewsecondsand thenturnmygazeaway,Ishallseean'afterimage'intheformofacoloured patchwhichcertainlydoesnotinhereinanysubstance.Thesupporterofthe substratumtheoryofsubstancehaseithertoclaimthat(i)theafterimageis itselfasubstanceor(ii)thatitinheresinmyvisualfield.(i)isareductio ad absurdumofthesubstratumtheory,thoughasensedatumwouldqualifyasa substanceinthelogicalsenseoftheword:ithaspropertieswithoutbeing itselfapropertyofanything.49 Withsatisfyingexplicitness,MorrispresentsBerkeley'sidealismascontradicting
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

somethingsaid'onthecreditofAristotle'slogic': Philosophershadalwaystakenitforgranted,largelyonthecreditofAristotle's logic,thatqualitiesmustbesupportedbysomeunderlyingpermanentself subsistentsubstance....Berkeley[arguesagainstthis]thatthroughoutour wholeexperienceofthephysicalworld,wenever ____________________ 48Principles 73. 49D.J.O'Connor,John Locke(PelicanBooks,1952),pp.801. 81

apprehendanythingbutsensiblequalitiesandcollectionsofsensiblequalities. Allweknowofthingsorcanknowofthemiswhatweperceivebysense;if thereweremoreinthingsthanthis,wecouldnotknowit....Thisdoctrineis evidentlybasedontheargumentthatwheneverweareawareofaphysical object,introspectiveanalysisshowsthatthereisnothingpresentinourmind butanumberorcollectionofsimpleideasofqualities;anditistakenby Berkeleytoprovethatknowledgesimplyconsistsintheawarenessofsensible qualities.50 Warnockmixesthesubstratumandveilofperceptiondoctrinesbyslidingsmoothlyfrom 'matter'to'theessential"support"ofqualities'.51Also,andmoreinterestingly,hesays thataccordingtoLocke:'Thereisaworldofphysical("external")objects[whichwithin certainlimits]actuallyhavethequalitieswhichourideasinclineustoassigntothem',
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

52andalsothat:'Lockehadassertedtheexistenceof"matter","materialsubstance",a

somethingofwhichnothingcouldbeeithersaidorknown.'53Warnockpurportstobe describingasingleLockeandoctrineinthesetwopassages.Yetthetwoare inconsistent:itemswhich'actuallyhavethequalities...'cannotbeonesaboutwhich 'nothingcouldbesaid'.OfcoursetheinconsistencyisnotLocke's(forhimitis'real things'which'actuallyhavethequalities...',andsubstrataofwhich"nothingcouldbe said'),butresultsfromtheBerkeleianexegesis.OfallthewriterswhocreditLockewith thinkingthattheessentiallyunqualifieditemswhichsupportqualitiesmayalso resembleourideas,Ihavenotfoundonewhocallsattentiontotheinconsistency. TheerrorofBerkeley'sthatIhavebeendiscussingdoesnotoccurinGibson'smasterly workonLocke;andArmstrongandBroadhavebothrejecteditfairlyexplicitlythough withoutdetaileddiagnosis.54Withthosethreeexceptions,Berkeley'serrorseemstorun untrammelledthroughtheentireliteratureofLockeBerkeleycommentary. Norare'historical'writingstheonlysourceofthemistake.Itisinthecourseofapiece ofstraightphilosophythatAyerusesthephrase'sensibleproperties'inhighBerkeleian fashionto ____________________ 50C.R.Morris,Locke, Berkeley, Hume(Oxford,1931),pp.745. 51Warnock,Berkeley,p.103. 52Ibid.pp.956. 53Ibid.p.109. 54D.M.Armstrong,Introduction to Berkeley's Philosophical Writings(NewYork,1965), pp.1516;Broad,'Berkeley's Denial of Material Substance',p.174.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

82

effectaslidefrom'thethingitselfasopposedtoanythingwhichmaybesaidaboutit'to 'thethingitself[asopposedto]itsappearances': Ithappenstobethecasethatwecannot,inourlanguage,refertothe sensiblepropertiesofathingwithoutintroducingawordorphrasewhich appearstostandforthethingitselfasopposedtoanythingwhichmaybesaid aboutit.And,asaresultofthis,thosewhoareinfectedbytheprimitive superstitionthattoeverynameasinglerealentitymustcorrespondassume thatitisnecessarytodistinguishlogicallybetweenthethingitselfandany,or all,ofitssensibleproperties.Andsotheyemploytheterm'substance'torefer tothethingitself.Butfromthefactthatwehappentoemployasingleword torefertoathing,andmakethatwordthegrammaticalsubjectofthe sentencesinwhichwerefertothesensibleappearancesofthething,itdoes notbyanymeansfollowthatthethingitselfisa'simpleentity',orthatit cannotbedefinedintermsofthetotalityofitsappearances.Itistruethatin talkingof'its'appearancesweappeartodistinguishthethingfromthe appearances,butthatissimplyanaccidentoflinguisticusage.Logicalanalysis showsthatwhatmakesthese'appearances'the'appearancesof'thesame thingisnottheirrelationshiptoanentityotherthanthemselves,buttheir relationshiptooneanother.55

17.Connectingsubstancewithreality
Despitemyargumentsinthischapter,thereisaconnexionbetweentherealityissue
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andacertainissueaboutsubstance.ItcertainlydoesnotlegitimizeBerkeley'sproven tendencytoidentifytherealityandsubstancequestions,butitmayprovideasound basistowhichBerkeleycouldhaveappealedthoughinfacthedidn'tforpartly expressingidealisminthesentence'Therearenomaterialsubstances'.Inexplaining thisconnexionbetweenthetwoissues,Ishallberepairingaseriousgapinmy publishedpaperonthistopicagapmadecleartomebyRobertM.Adams,towhomI ammuchindebted. Thesubstratumanalysisofpropertyinstantiation,oroftheconceptofsubstance,isa badattempttoansweraseriousquestion,namely:'Whatisitforanitemtobeathing ratherthanapropertyorattributeofathingoraprocesswhichathingundergoes?'This canbeexpressedintheform:'Whatisthedifferencebetweensubstancesand properties?'or'Whatarethecriteria ____________________ 55A.J.Ayer,Language, Truth and Logic(London,1964),p.42. 83

governingthesubstance/propertydistinction?'Onemaydismissthe'substratum'answer withoutobjectingtothequestionitself. Nevertheless,thequestionishard,ifnotimpossible,toansweratthatlevelof generality.Icanmakenoheadwaywiththeconceptofsubstanceexceptwithinsome areawhich,evenifextremelylarge,excludessomepossibletopicsofdiscourse.One suchareaisthatofwhatIcalltheobjectiverealm.Withinthis,wecanaskandatleast partlyanswerthequestion:'Whatarethecriteriaforthedistinctionbetween

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

something'sbeinganobjectorobjectivesubstanceanditsbeingapropertyofanobject oraprocesswhichobjectsundergo?'Consider,forexample,theborderlinecaseofa magneticfield.Thiscanberegardedasanobjectwhichiscreatedbyelectriccurrents etc.,andwhosepresencecausescompassesetc.tobehaveincertainways;butitis alsoplausibletosaythattheexistenceofthemagneticfieldconsists infactsaboutthe presenceofelectriccurrents,thebehaviourofcompassesetc.Theformerwayofthinking ofthemagneticfieldviewsitassubstantial,thelatterasnonsubstantialorattributive. Aconsiderationofthechoicebetweenthemmighthelpustoseewhatisgoingonin clearercases,suchasthesubstantialityofmyhandandthenonsubstantialityofthe whitenessofmyhand. Themagneticfieldexample,aswellassuggestingwhataseriousquestionoftheform 'Are...substantial?'mightbelike,pointsthewaytohowsuchquestionsshouldbe answered.Theinclinationtorefuseathinglikestatustomagneticfieldsconnects essentially,Isuggest,withthebeliefthatwedonotneedanysuchsubstantival expressionas'magneticfield';thatthefactswecanreportbymeansofitcanalsobe expressedinstatementswhosesubstantivalexpressionsreferonlytowires,dynamos, compassesandsoon;thatmagneticfields,inshort,canbefullyaccommodatedina languagewhichhandlesthemadjectivallyratherthansubstantivally.Onthiscriterionfor substantiality,ahouseissubstantialwhileafightisnot,becausewhatwesaywiththe substantive'fight'caneasilybesaidwithoutit.Wecanreplace'Thefightwasafierce one'bysomethinglike'Themenfoughtfiercely',andsoon;whereasnosuch replacementsseemtobeavailableforeverythingwemightsayusing'thehouse'. Thesuggestedcriterionforsubstantialityleavesaquestionopen:isanitemtobe deemednonsubstantialifthefactsaboutitcan,nevermindhow,beexpressedwithout asubstantival
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

84

expressionreferringtothatitem?Oristocountasnonsubstantialonlyifwecannot easilyoreconomicallyhandleitadjectivallywhilestillcoveringallthefacts?Thelatter alternativestillleavesquestionsopen(howeasily?withwhatsortsofeconomy?),but myconcerniswiththeformeralternative.Thatis,Iamconcernedwiththeideathatan itemcountsassubstantial,orasasubstance,onlyifwemusthandleitsubstantivallyin ourlanguageonlyifwecannotexpressthefactsaboutitwithoutavailingourselvesof asubstantivalexpressionreferringtoit. Thisratherstrongrequirementforsubstantialityhasfoundfavourwithsome philosophers,e.g.withSpinoza,LeibnizandKant.56Itgoeswiththinkingofsubstances asthebasicandfundamentalandirreduciblestuffofreality,asforexampleinthis:'The onlysubstancesarephysicalatoms.Thebasicfactsabouttheuniverseareallfacts aboutwhatatomsthereareandabouttheirvariouspropertiesandrelations;andthe thingswesayusingsubstantivalexpressionslike"house"and"duststorm"arereally justcomplexfactsaboutthequalitiesandrelationsanddispositionsofatoms.Given substantivesreferringtoatoms,andanunrestrictedrangeofnonsubstantival expressions,Icouldinprinciplesayallthatthereistobesaidaboutreality.'Thislineof thoughtillustratesasenseof'substance'whichisnotabsurd,whichhashadagooddeal ofcurrencyinthephilosophicaltradition,andwhichwemayconjecturetohaveexerted someinfluence,whetherrecognizedornot,uponBerkeley'susesoftheword'substance'. NowBerkeley'sidealismentailsthatfactsaboutmaterialobjectsare,orboildownto, factsabout'ideas'.Furthermore,heusuallythinksthatanystatementaboutsomeone's havinganideaisafactaboutthestatethepersonisin,afactexpressibleinaone
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

nounstatementwhosesubjecttermreferstoaparticularpersonormindor'spirit'.(That is,heacceptstheantireificationthesisof5,thoughhecertainlydoesnotseeallits implications.In6IaccusedBerkeleyofthinking,likeareifier,thatanideaofa trianglemustbetriangular;andsohedoes.Buthedoesnotreifyideasrather,he idealizesthings.)GiventhesetwoviewsofBerkeley's,hecould,using'substance' accordingtothestrongcriterionIhavesketched,saythattheonlysubstancesareminds ____________________ 56Spinoza,Ethics,Pt.I,definition3andpropositions8,12;Leibniz,Monadology 17; Kant,Critique of Pure ReasonA2423=B3001. 85

orspirits.Hecouldsaythatalthoughtherearechairsandtablesandhouses,suchitems astheseitemsincludingallmaterial'things'arenotsubstances;theyarenotpartof thebasicstoryofwhatthereis;forthebasicstorycanbetoldinalanguagewhich refersonlyto'spirits'andtheirsensorystates,andthenstatementsabout'chairs'and 'houses'canbeintroducedlaterasfaons de parlerasconvenientwaysofexpressing thebasicfactsratherthanasintroducinganewrangeoffacts. Sothereisaconnexionbetweensubstanceandrealityafterall.Forthereisa reasonablesenseof'substance'inwhichBerkeleycanexpressalargepartofhisclaim aboutrealityoraboutwhytheveilofperceptiondoctrineiswrongbysaying'Thereare nomaterialsubstances'.Itisimportantthattheword'substances'isdoingrealwork here.ThepositionisnotthatBerkeleycansay'Therearenomaterialitemsofanykind' andthencedrawtrivialcorollariesoftheform'TherearenomaterialFs'where'F'could
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

standfor'ducks'or'substances'oranyidlewordatall.Onthecontrary,Berkeleysays thattherearematerialitems,includingchairsandducksandhouses;andmuchofthe forceofhisoppositiontoLocke'sviewaboutrealitycanbebroughtoutbyhisadding'.. .butthesematerialitemsarenotsubstances.' IfBerkeleyappreciated,atsomelevelofhismind,thepossibilityofusing'substance'in thewayIhavedescribed,57thatwouldhelptoexplainhissayingsomeofthethingshe doessayandespeciallyhisthinkingthat'substance'hasacentralroletoplayinhis denialofLocke'stheoryofreality.Butthisexplanationhasnothingtodowiththe supposednotionofasubstratum.ThelegitimatewayinwhichBerkeleycouldhaveused 'Therearenomaterialsubstances'doesnotequatethiswith'Therearenomaterial substrata';and,indeed,itrequiresanunderstandingoftheterm'substance'whichhas nocoherentandstraightforwardconnexionwiththesubstratumanalysis.A fortiori, nothingintheforegoingpageshastheslightesttendencytojustifyBerkeleyandmany commentatorsinconfusingthequestionaboutideas/objectswiththequestionabout properties/substrata. (WhenBerkeleyaddresseshimselftothesortofsubstanceswhichhethinksdoexist, namelymentalorspiritualones,hedoesacceptathoroughlysubstratumtypeanalysis oftheconceptofsubstance[see45below].Thissuggeststhatheties'Thereare ____________________ 57SeePrinciples 91. 86

nomaterialsubstances'to'Therearenomaterialsubstrata'simplybecausehetakes
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

themtobesynonymousbecausehecannotseehowtoavoidasubstratumanalysisof theconceptofasubstance.Thiswouldimply,ironically,thatpassagesinwhichBerkeley isthoughttoattacktheveilofperceptiondoctrineandthesubstratumanalysisare reallyattacksontheformerintermsofBerkeley'swholeheartedacceptanceofthe latter.Theironyispleasing,buttheinterpretationwhichimpliesitiswrong:thetwo cleancutthrustsatthesubstratumanalysisarethere,andcannotbeignored.Itcan indeedbearguedthatBerkeleycaredverymuchabouttheveilofperceptiontheory,and verylittleaboutthesubstratumanalysis;butIthinkwehavetoseehimastryingto attackboththeseLockeandoctrines,andasconfusingthemwithoneanotherinthe waysIhavedescribed.) Ihavetriedtopresentalinkbetweentheconceptsofsubstanceandrealityalink whichmayberelevanttoBerkeley'sproceduresevenifhedidnotexplicitlyavailhimself ofit.Itisrelevantatall,asInotedearlier,onlyifBerkeleydoesregardideasas adjectivalonmindsorspirits;andsomewritershavesaidthathedoesnot,andthat Berkeleianideasareradicallyotherthanspirits,arenotmental,are'perceived'ina genuinelyrelationalway,are'immaterial'onlyinthesensethattheyarenotLockean 'realthings'.Thisinterpretationcreatesasensible,cheerful,likeableBerkeley,who 'restoresournativeconfidenceinoursenses'58(supposingthatwehadeverlostit),but whohasnoclaimonourattentionasphilosophers.Aswellasflatteningoutthedepths andcomplexitiesinBerkeley'smetaphysics,thedisputedinterpretationputsits adherentstosomedesperateshiftsonmattersofrelativedetail:theyhavetoconstrue 'ideasareinthemind'asmeaning'ideasareperceived'andnothingmore;since Berkeleyequates'idea'with'sensation'theyhavetosaythat'AsensationinBerkeley's usageis...anobjectsensed';59andtheycannotexplainwhyBerkeleyshouldsaythat 'unperceivedidea'isa'contradiction'.Thislastpointisrightlytreatedascrucialin
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Pitcher'sdefinitivetreatmentofthismatter,60towhichthereaderisreferredfor amongmanythingsadiscussionofthetwomainpassagesinBerkeleywhichdofavour thedisputed ____________________ 58A.A.Luce,'Berkeley's Existence in the Mind',Martinp.289. 59A.A.Luce,The Dialectic of Immaterialism(London,1963),p.191. 60Pitcher,'Minds and Ideas in Berkeley'. 87

interpretation.61IoughttomentionanentryinthePhilosophical Commentarieswhich hasbeenadducedinsupportofthedisputedinterpretation:'Nothingproperlybut personsi.e.consciousthingsdoexist,allotherthingsarenotsomuchexistencesas mannersofyeexistenceofpersons.62Againstthisentry,whichclearlyimpliesthat ideasarestatesofminds,Berkeleylaterputasignwhichmeans'Reject'or'False'orthe like;andthishasbeenadducedaspowerfulevidenceofhishavingfinallycometothe viewcreditedtohimbythedisputedinterpretation.63Evenifhedidarriveatthatview firmlyenoughtoputa'Reject'signinanotebook,thefactremainsthatallthe significantstructureofhisthoughtrequirestheassumptionthatideasareindeedstates ofmind.Andinanycase,the'Reject'signmeansmanythings:64thatBerkeleyhas cometothinkthattheentryisfalse,orthathenolongerapprovesofitswording,or thathehasdecidedforsomeotherreasonnottouseitinhispublishedwork.The quotedentry'suseof'existence'asanonabstractnounisquiteuntypicalofthe publishedwritings;andtheword'persons'isonewhichBerkeleylaterdecidedtoavoid
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

asfaraspossible,65andwhichinfactoccursnowhereinthePrinciples.Itislikely enoughthatBerkeleymarkedtheentryasnottobeused,forthosetwoquasistylistic reasons.66 ____________________ 61Principles 49;Third Dialogue,p.237.SeePitcher,op.Cit.pp.2013. 62Philosophical Commentaries,entry24. 63A.A.Luce,The Dialectic of Immaterialism,p.82. 64ThusLuce,inhisIntroductiontotheCommentaries.SeeThe Works of George Berkeley, vol. 2,p.4. 65Commentaries,entry713. 66Foranindignantrejectionofmyearlierpiece,seeM.R.Ayers,"'Substance,Reality, andtheGreat,DeadPhilosophers'",American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7(1970). Onemajorpointinthisismetinthepresentsection. 88

IV PRIMARYANDSECONDARYQUALITIES
18.Primaryqualitiesand'body'
LOCKEinheritedfromDescartes,orborrowedfromNewtonandBoyle,adistinction between'primary'and'secondary'qualities.1Hisattemptstodefineitingeneralterms areunsatisfactory,andfornowapairoflistsmustsuffice.Athing'sprimaryqualitiesare
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

its'solidity,extension,figure,motionorrest,andnumber';2anditssecondaryqualities areitscolour,temperature,smell,tasteandsound. Itisoftenthoughtthatthisdistinctionisashakyone,thatLockecertainlydidnotputit togooduse,andthatweowethesetwoinsightstoBerkeley.Ishallarguethatthe distinctioniswellgroundedandinteresting,thatLockehadgraspedanimportanttruth aboutit,andthatBerkeley'streatmentofthismatterisimpercipientandunhelpful. Berkeleyassimilatedtheprimary/secondarydistinctiontothatmonolithic'theoryof materialsubstance'whichhethoughthedetectedinLocke'swritings;andIshallargue thatthatisthedominatingfactabouthisfailuretodealcompetentlywiththedistinction betweenprimaryandsecondaryqualities. Lockehastwogeneral,truethingstosayabouttheprimary/secondarydistinction.One ofthemishisthesisthatprimaryqualitiesare suchasareutterlyinseparablefromthebody,inwhatstatesoeveritbe;and suchasinallthealterationsandchangesitsuffers,alltheforcecanbeused uponit,itconstantlykeeps;andsuchassenseconstantlyfindsinevery particleofmatterwhichhasbulkenoughtobeperceived.3 InmostofLocke'stheorizing,athing'sprimaryqualitiesaretakentoconsistinitsbeing (say)spherical,twofeetacross,and ____________________ 1Essay II.viii.926;xxiii.911;IV.iii.1113,28. 2Essay II.viii.9. 3Ibid.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

89

fallingrapidly;4butheretheyarethoughtofratherasathing'sbeingshaped,ofsome size,mobile,etc.Thatis,inthethesisthatprimaryqualitiesareoneswhichabody cannotlose,itisdeterminablequalitieswhichareinquestionandnotdeterminateones. Locke'sexamplereinforcesthisreading:'Takeagrainofwheat,divideitintotwoparts; eachparthasstillsolidity,extension,figure,andmobility:divideitagain,anditretains stillthesamequalities.'5Itisnotclearthat'solidity'isadeterminable,eitherinits normalmeaningorinLocke'sspecializedsenseinwhich'solid'means'impenetrable'.In thisrespect,asinotherswhichweshallmeetlaterinthissection,solidityisaspecial case.6 Lockehasagoodpointhere,butheoughtnottoexpressitasthoughitwerea predictionabouttheoutcomeofanexperiment,forreallyitisapointaboutthemeaning oftheword'body',orabouttheconceptofabodyoraphysicalthing.Hedoesinfact knowthis:'People[mean]bybodysomethingthatissolidandextended,whoseparts areseparableandmovabledifferentways.'7Indeedtheword'primary'forLockepartly meansthatthesearequalitiesathingmusthavetocountasa'body'.(Hisother accountofwhat'primary'meansisindefensible.8) Locke'sdiscussionsoftheconceptofbodyinvolvedetailedpoints(e.g.against Descartes)whichareofsomeinterestbutwhichliebeyondmypresentscope.His generalthesisthattherawmaterialswhichconstitutetheconceptofbodyaretobe foundwithintherealmofprimaryqualities,andthatsecondaryqualitiesareconceptually inessential,seemssafeenough.YetBerkeleyapparentlydeniesit:'Itisnotinmypower toframeanideaofabodyextendedandmoved,butImustwithalgiveitsomecolouror
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

toframeanideaofabodyextendedandmoved,butImustwithalgiveitsomecolouror othersensiblequality...Inshort,extension,figure,andmotion,abstractedfromall otherqualities,areinconceivable.'9Thereisanuncertaintyofinterpretationhere,which isalsosuspiciouslypresentinthecorrespondingpassageintheDialogues.10The quotedpassageis,asitstands,true:athing'sbeingextended,oritstakingupspace, mustinvolvesome ____________________ 10First Dialogue,p.193. 4SeeJackson,"'Locke'sDistinctionbetweenPrimaryandSecondaryQualities'",pp.60 5. 5Essay II.viii.9. 6SeeC.J.F.Williams,"'ArePrimaryQualitiesQualities?'",Philosophical Quarterly,vol. 19(1969),pp.31418. 7Essay II.xiii.11. 8Essay II.viii.23. 9Principles10. 90

spatialregion'sbeingoccupiedbysomethingsomequalitymustbemanifestedinthat regionotherthanmereextension.Butthequalitycouldbesolidity,whichisonLocke's listofprimaryqualities.11IfBerkeleyreallyissayingonlythat'body'couldnotbe definedoutofextension,figureandmotion,withoutrecoursetosolidity,thenhispoint iscorrectbutitdoesnotcountagainstLocke,orhelpBerkeleywiththelargerclaimfor whichheisarguing,orjustifyhisclaimtobediscussing'figure,motion,and The rest of the primary or original qualities'(myitalics).Itis,indeed,apointwhichLockehimself
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

makesandinsistsupon,incriticismofDescartes'accountoftheconceptofbody.12 ButperhapsBerkeleyis,asheissometimesthoughttobe,makingastrongerclaimto theeffectthatsecondaryqualitiesareessentialtotheconceptofbody:hemaybe saying,alittlecarelessly,thatnothingcouldcountasexperienceofaworldofbodies whichhadprimarybutnotsecondaryqualities.Whathesays,onthatreadingofit,is certainlyrelevanttoLocke'sthesis;butitisalsoamanifestfalsehoodwhichcouldbe believed,Ithink,onlybysomeonewhohadlapsedintothinkingofperceptiontoo exclusivelyintermsofsight.Grantedthatwecouldnotseethingstohavesizesand shapeswithoutseeingthemtohave(notnecessarilychromatic)colours,thecrucialpoint isthatwecouldperceiveobjectstohavesizesandshapeswithouteverseeingthem and,itcanbeadded,withouteverhearingortastingorsmellingthemeither. ThatBerkeleydiscussesthisviewofLocke'sisnotduetohishavingsharplyseparatedit fromLocke'sotherclaimsaboutprimaryandsecondaryqualities.Onthecontrary:itis littlemorethananaccidentthatwecanfindinBerkeleyanargumentwhichgoesagainst thisLockeanthesisinparticular,andthepassagescontainingitarejammedinto discussionsofentirelydifferentmatters(see24below).Incontrastwiththat,Hume's section"'OftheModernPhilosophy'"isdevotedalmostexclusivelytoexpoundingand criticizingtheviewthattheconceptofabodycanbeadequatelybaseduponprimary qualitiesalone.OnenotablefactaboutHume'streatmentisitsemphasisuponthe primary ____________________ 11Essay II.viii.9.SeealsoA.M.Quinton,"'MatterandSpace'",Mind,vol.73(1964); N.Fleming,"'TheIdeaofaSolid'",Australasian Journal of Philosophy,vol.43(1965); D.Sanford,"'VolumeandSolidity'",Ibid.vol.45(1967).
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

12Essay

II.xiii.1115. 91

qualitysoconspicuouslyignoredbyBerkeleynamelysolidity.(Berkeley'spassing remarkthatsolidityis'plainlyrelativetooursenses',thoughitbearsonacertainview heattributedtoLocke,hasnothingtodowiththethesiswearenowconsidering.13) Humesaysexplicitlythattheprimaryqualitiesotherthansolidityareaninadequate foundationfortheconceptofbody,andthenarguesseparatelythattheadditionof soliditystilldoesnotsavethedayforLocke'sthesis.Theargumentaboutsoliditystarts likethis: Theideaofsolidityisthatoftwoobjects,whichbeingimpell'dbytheutmost force,cannotpenetrateeachother;butstillmaintainaseparateanddistinct existence.Solidity,therefore,isperfectlyincomprehensiblealone,andwithout theconceptionofsomebodies,whicharesolid,andmaintainthisseparateand distinctexistence.Nowwhatideahaveweofthesebodies?14 Humethenproceedstoarguethatthe'idea'neededtosupplementandgivecontentto thatofsoliditycannotbeaprimaryqualityone,forithasalreadybeenshownthatall theotherprimaryqualitiesneedsupplementationthemselves;andsoitmustbea secondaryqualityone,specificallyitmustbeanideaofcolour;andsoLocke'sthesisis wrong.AsHumeexpressesitalittlelater: Whatideadoweformofthesebodiesorobjects,towhichwesupposesolidity tobelong?Tosay,thatweconceivethemmerelyassolid,istorunonin
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

infinitum.Toaffirm,thatwepaintthemouttoourselvesasextended,either resolvesallintoafalseidea,orreturnsinacircle.Extensionmustnecessarily beconsider'deitherascolour'd,whichisafalseidea[accordingtoHume's understandingofLocke];orassolid,whichbringsusbacktothefirstquestion.

15

Humeissurelyrightthatthenotionofimpenetrabilityneedstobesupplemented,inthe samewayandforthesamereasonasdoesthenotionofextension.Thedifficultyabout getting"occupantofregionx'tostandonitsownfeetisequallyadifficultyabout 'occupantofxtotheexclusionfromxofeverythingelse'.YetHume'sclaimthatthe supplementationmustinvolvecolourisobviouslywrong,sinceitimpliesthatthe congenitallyblindcannot,withoutborrowingfromtherestofus,haveanyworkable, contentfulconceptofbodyorofoccupantofspace. ____________________ 13First Dialogue,p.191. 14Treatise,pp.2289. 15Treatise,p.229. 92

ToseewhereHumehasgonewrong,considerwhatthecongenitallyblindhaveattheir disposalwhichheimplicitlydeniesthemnamely,thesenseoftouch.Alittlemore adequately:ablindpersoncanbuildupanaccountofwhatbodiesthereare,whattheir shapesandsizesandpositionsare,andsoon,bymeanswhichfundamentallyconsistin hisknowingwhatimpedimentstherearetospecificmovementsof(partsof)hisown body.Thisrequireshimtohaveindependentknowledgeofhowhisownbodymoves,but

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

body.Thisrequireshimtohaveindependentknowledgeofhowhisownbodymoves,but thatisallright:hecanknowwherehisbodyisandhowitmovesbecausehemovesit anddoesnotmerelyobserveitsmovements.16So,Icontend,anadequatebasisfora knowledgeofbodiescanbeprovidedbysensorymeansinwhichhesenseoftouchplays alargepartandwhichneednotinvolveanyperceptionofthings'secondaryqualities. Humedeniesthis,onthebasisofaverypeculiarargument.Heseemstotakeitthat whathehastodenyisaviewwhichwetendnaturally'toaccept,namelythat'wefeel thesolidityofbodies,andneedbuttouchanyobjectinordertoperceivethisquality'. Hedeniesthisonthegroundsthat'tho'bodiesarefeltbymeansoftheirsolidity,yet thefeelingisaquitedifferentthingfromthesolidity;and...theyhavenottheleast resemblancetoeachother'.17Thisobscureutterancedoesnot,asitstands,giveusany helpatall,simplybecausethereisnot'theleastresemblance'betweenanyfeelingand anyquality.Still,onegetssomeideaofwhatHumemeansbythisdenialfromlookingat hisreasonforit:'Aman,whohasthepalseyinonehand,hasasperfectanideaof impenetrability,whenheobservesthathandtobesupportedbythetable,aswhenhe feelsthesametablewiththeotherhand.'18ApparentlyHumewantstodenythat tactualfeelingsrelatetosolidityasvisualsensedatadotocolours.Notonlydowesee colours,butHumewillsaythenotionofcolourispurelyvisualinitssensorybasis; thereisabiconditionalrelationship,atwowayflow,betweenfactsaboutvisualsense dataandfactsaboutsensebasedcolourjudgements.Bywayofcontrast,Humeis saying,judgementsaboutsoliditycanhaveeitheravisualoratactualbasis,aswitness themanwhohaspalsy.Sotactualfeelingsare'differentfrom'solidity;wedonot'feel thesolidityof ____________________ 16SeeS.Hampshire,Thought and Action(London,1959),pp.4755. 17Treatise,p.230.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

18Ibid.

93

bodies';andsoLocke'sthesiscannotberescuedbyinvokingthesenseoftouch. Thisargumentcompletelyfails.Fromthepremissaboutthemanwithpalsy,Humecan reachhislemmathattactualfeelingsareunlikesolidityonlyifheconstrues'Tactual feelingsresemblesolidity'asentailing'Tactualfeelingsarerequiredasasensorybasis forsolidityjudgements'.ButthedenialofthisdoesnotentailHume'sconclusion,which isadenialof'Tactualfeelingssufficeasasensorybasisforsolidityjudgements'.Hume hasmovedfromthepremissthatTisnotnecessaryforStotheconclusionthatTisnot sufficientforS,throughacloudylemmaexpressedinsuchwordsasthatT'hasnotthe leastresemblance'toS.

19.TheAnalyticThesis
Locke'sothergeneralclaimaboutthedistinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondary qualitiesismoreinteresting,thoughalsothesourceofmoreproblems,thanisthe meaningof'body'thesis. Briefly,andinLocke'swords,itistheclaimthatsecondaryqualities'arenothinginthe objectsthemselvesbutpowerstoproducevarioussensationsinus',19orthat'when trulyconsidered[they]areonlypowers,howeverweareapttotakethemforpositive qualities'.20
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

TosaythatxhasapowertoproduceSinmeistosay,amongotherthings,thatifx wererelatedtomeinacertainwaythenSwouldoccurinme.Ifthatwereallitmeant, thenLockewouldbesayingjustthatanystatementattributingasecondaryqualitytoa thingisequivalenttoacounterfactualconditionaloftheform: IfxstoodinrelationRtoanormalhuman,thehumanwouldhaveasensory ideaofsuchandsuchakind. Forexample,theclaimwouldbethat'xisgreen'meansroughlythesameas'Ifxwere sunlitandwereinthelineofvisionofanormalopeneyedhuman,hewouldhavea visualfieldofsuchandsuchakind'(Lockewoulddescribethevisualfieldas'green',no doubt;butnevermindthat). ____________________ 19Essay II.viii.10. 20Essay II.xxiii.37. 94

Butthenotionofa'powertoproduce',andthusLocke'scentralclaimaboutthe primary/secondarydistinction,havemorecontentthanthat.Locke'sclaimhasinfacttwo componentstheAnalytic Thesissketchedabove,andwhatIshallcalltheCausal Thesis, whichisaviewaboutwhatcausesustohavethesecondaryqualityideasthatwedo have.Sincethesearephilosophicallylinkedinacertainway,andaresointerwovenin Locke'stextthatIcannotciteanypassageexpressingonebutnottheother,Ipresent themascomponentsofasingle'centralclaim'ofLocke'saboutprimaryandsecondary qualities.Still,theyneedtobeexaminedseparately,andmypresentconcerniswiththe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Analytic Thesis. IstheAnalytic Thesistrue?Moreprecisely,doesitexpressatruthaboutsecondary qualitieswhich is not equally a truth about primary qualities?Theitalicizedclauseis vital.Lockewantedtocontrastthetwosortsofquality,andBerkeley'smaincriticism wasthatnocontrastwaseffectivelydrawnthatanythingtruethatLockesaidabout secondaryqualitiesisequallytrueofprimary.ThereissomeexcuseforBerkeley,inthat Locke'sargumentsareallratherpoorandsomeofhisformulationsaredownright misleading.Still,thereisalegitimatecontrastbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualities, andIcontendthatitisonewhichLockenoticedandtriedtoformulateanddefend. InhisargumentsfortheAnalyticThesis,Lockerepeatedlystressesthefactthatone's perceptionsofsecondaryqualitiesmayvarygreatlyaccordingtothestateofone'sbody andenvironment.21Berkeleyrepliedthatthatisequallytrueofprimaryqualities.22On thefaceofit,Berkeleyseemstoberight;butletussuspendjudgementuntilwehave considered,morecarefullythanBerkeleydid,whatmightbethoughttofollowfrom Locke'sperceptualvariationpoint.Nevermindwhetherityieldsacontrastbetweentwo sortsofqualitieswhatdoesitshowaboutanysortofqualityforwhichitdoeshold?As tothat,IconjecturethatLockehadhalfgrasped,andwasmovingtowardsexpressing, somethinglikethefollowingpoint.Weareallfamiliarwiththewayinwhichsomething whichtastessweettomostpeoplemaytastebittertoasickperson.Now,ifwereflect onthisphenomenon,andonsimilaronesinvolvingothersecondaryquality ____________________ 21Essay II.viii.21;xxiii11. 22Principles15;First Dialogue,pp.18891.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

95

perceptions,weshallseehowthoroughlycontingentitisthatweareinapositiontosay ofanythingthatitisbitterorgreenornoisyorthelike.Theoccasionalfailuresof agreementbringhometoushowdependentourpublicsecondaryqualityterminologyis uponthefactthatweusuallydoagreeinoursecondaryqualitydiscriminationsthe failureshelpustorealizethatournotionoftwothings'havingthesamecolour,say,is onlyassecureasourabilitytomusteranoverwhelmingmajoritywhoseethemas havingthesamecolour. PerhapsLockewasnowherenearhavingsuchthoughtsasthese.Anyway,theyyieldan argumentforhisAnalyticThesis;theyembodyatruthaboutsecondaryqualitieswhich doesnotholdequallyforprimaryqualities,andsotheyprovideabasisforthecontrast thatLockethoughthecouldestablishbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualities.The sectionthatfollowsisadefenceofallthis.23

20.Indefenceofadistinction
Iwanttocontrasttwokindsofsensoryaberration:inone,someone(C)seestwothings ashavingthesamecolourwheninfacttheyhaven't,andintheothersomeone(S)sees andfeelstwothingsashavingthesamesizewheninfacttheyhaven't. Cisconfrontedbyaredthingandawhitething,andsatisfiesusthatheseesthemas havingexactlythesamecolour.Hebelievesourclaimthattheyhavedifferentcolours; and,sincetheydifferinnootherway,wecouldifnecessaryprovetohimthatwecan seeadifferencebetweenthemwhichhecannot.Also,Ccoulddiscoverthatthetwo
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

objectsreflectlightofdifferentwavelengths,andmightknowthatwavelengthsusually correlatewithseencolours.Butifheignoreswhatotherssayaboutthetwoobjects,and ignoresesotericfactsofoptics,hemayneverlearnthathehasasensorydefect.A failureinsecondaryqualitydiscrimination,inonewhoisotherwisesensorilynormal,can andsometimesdoespersistunsuspectedthroughanyvariationsindistanceorangleof view,lightconditions,andsoon. ContrastthiswiththecaseofSwho,goingbywhatheseesandfeels,judgesacertain jugtohavethesamesizeasacertain ____________________ 23Forasomewhatsimilardefence,seeA.Sloman,"'PrimaryandSecondaryQualities'", Mind,vol.73(1964). 96

glasswhichisinfactshorterandnarrowerthanthejug.(Gricehasdiscussedthecase wherewhatheseessupportsonejudgementandwhathefeelssupportsanother.24)In thiscase,wecanplacetheglassinsidethejug;orfillthejugwithwater,andthenfill theglassfromitandthrowawaytheremainingwater;orplacebothvesselsonatable anddrawS'shandacrossthetopoftheglassuntilitisstoppedbythejug;andsoon. WhatarewetosupposehappenswhenSisconfrontedbythesemanipulationsofthe twoobjects?Therearejusttworelevantpossibilities.(a)Whenwemanipulatetheglass andjug,Stakesinwhatishappeningandthusquicklyrealizesthathewaswrongabout theirrelativesizes.(b)Eachtimewecontriveahappeningwiththeglassandthejug,S misperceivesitsothatwhatheseesandfeelsstillfitsinsmoothlywithhisoriginal
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

judgementabouttheirsizes. Toadopt(a)isjusttoabandontheattempttoputsize'blindness'onalevelwith colourblindness.Ifthepointofthelatterwerejustthatsecondaryqualityperceptions canerr,thenwecouldsaythesameofprimaryqualityones.Whatgivesrelevanceand bitetocolourblindness,andtoitsanaloguesfortastesetc.,isthefactthatanysuch abnormalitycanpersistindefinitelywithoutthevictim'sgettinganycluetoitfromhis other,normalsensoryresponses.Thetrickswiththeglassandjugcouldbeperformed byShimself;theyinvolveordinarycommercewithfamiliardomesticobjects;andthey areinaverydifferentcasefromC'sattentiontowavelengthsortowhatotherpeople sayaboutthings'colours. Togetananalogybetweensize'blindness'andcolourblindness,then,wemustadopt supposition(b).ThisrequiresustocreditSwithsuchinabilitiesasthefollowing.He cannotseeorfeelthattheglassisinsidethejug(orthatthejughasnotstretchedor theglasscontracted);hecannotseeorfeelthattheglassisfullofwater(orthatwater remainsinthejugaftertheglasshasbeenfilledfromit);hecannotseeorfeelthathis handistouchingtherimoftheglass(orthathishandisstoppedbythesideofthejug). ItwillnotdotosupposethataseachtrickisperformedSseesandfeelsnothing:the analogywithcolourblindnessrequiresthatheshallhavenoreasontosuspectthat ____________________ 24H.P.Grice,"'SomeRemarksabouttheSenses'",inR.J.Butler(ed.),Analytical Philosophy(Oxford,1962),pp.14951. 97

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thereisanythingwrongwithhim,andsohisvisualandtactualstatesthroughoutmust presentnochallengetohisbeliefthatheishandlinganordinarypairofvesselswhich areofthesamesize.Thisisbadenough,butthereisworsetofollow.Smustnotonly failtoseeorfeelthewaterleftinthejugaftertheglasshasbeenfilledfromit,buthe mustalsohavecompensatingsensoryaberrationswhenthewaterisusedtodousea candleortodissolvesugar,orwhenitisthrowninS'sface.Similarlywithanyofthe othersensoryaberrationswithwhichwepropuptheinitialone:eachrequiresfurther propswhichdemandothersintheirturn,andsoonindefinitely. Theanalogyhascollapsedagain.C'scolourblindnesswasnotcluedbyhisothersensory responsesalthoughthesewerenormal;buttokeepSinignoranceofhisinitialsensory failurewehavehadtosurrounditwitheverwideningcirclesoffurtherabnormalities. Strictlyspeaking,itisnotquitetruethatC'ssinglefailureofcolourdiscriminationcould remainuncluedbyhisother,normalsensoryresponses.Ifheseesnodifferencebetween RwhichisredandWwhichiswhite,howdoesheseeathirdthingR* whichisinfact red?IfhisonlysensoryfailureconcernsRandW,thenwemustsupposethathe efficientlyseesRandR* ashavingthesamecolourandseesalargedifferenceof colourbetweenWandR* .Sinceex hypothesiheseesRandWashavingthesame colour,thisisimpossible;andtosalvagethestorywemustsupposeCtobeblindto colourdifferencesbetweenredthingsandwhitethingsgenerally.Thisstilldoesnot restoretheanalogywithsize'blindness',however.C'ssinglered/whitefailurespreads onlyintootherred/whitefailures;whereasS'sinitialfailuretodiscriminatesizeshadto bebackedbyfailuresalsoofshapediscrimination,movementdetection,sensitivityto heat,etc.,ramifyingoutendlesslyintovirtuallyallhisperceptionsofhisenvironment. Wehavelostouranalogybeyondrecall;andwearelosingourgriponaninitialdatumof thesize'blindness'case,namelythatwecanagreewithSabouttheidentityofacertain
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

glassandjug,whilesilentlynotinghiserrorabouttheirrelativesizes.Fornowwefind thatSdisagreeswithusaboutcountlessvisibleandtangibleaspectsofour environment,sothatitisnolongerclearthatwesharewithhimasensoryawarenessof asingleobjectiveworld. 98

Fromtheforegoingdiscussionthereemergetwocloselyrelatedcontrastsbetween primaryandsecondaryqualities. 1. Therearecountlessexotericgeneralfactsabouthowathing'sprimaryqualities connectwithitswaysofinteractingwithotherthings:oftworigidthings,the smallercannotcontainthelarger;onethingcannotblockanother'sfallwithout touchingit;acubecannotrollsmoothlyonaflatsurface;acirculardisc'simprinton waxwillbecircular;andsoon,indefinitely.Itistruethatathing'scolour,say,may alsoconnectwithitsbehaviourinrelationtootherthings:brownapplesareusually moresquashablethangreenones,blueflamesboilwaterfasterthanyellowones,a redsurfacereflectslightwavesofdifferentlengthsfromthosereflectedbyablue surface,andsoon.Butforcoloursandothersecondaryqualitieswecannotmake, aswecanforprimaryqualities,alongtallyofobvious,familiar,inescapable connexionsoftherelevantkind. 2. Justbecauseathing'sprimaryqualitiescorrelateinsomanyobviouswayswithits modesofinteractionwithotherthings,wecannotintelligiblysupposethatthese correlationsmightpersistentlyfail.Therecouldbenopointincreditingsomething withashape,say,whichwasbeliedbyenoughofitsinteractionswithotherthings. Asagainstthis,therecouldbeapointincallingathingredevenifthiswerebeliedby
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thewavelengthsofthelightreflectedfromit,orbyitsflavour,hardnessorchemical composition.Ifsomething'scolourwereinsunlightindistinguishablefromthatofthings agreedtobered,thisfactcouldreasonablybereportedinthewords'Thatthingisred', evenifwehadtoaddriderssuchas'thoughitslightreflectingpropertiesareatypicalfor red',or'...thoughitstasteisatypicalforredwine',or'...thoughitstemperatureis atypicalforrediron'.Sincewavelengthsofreflectedlight(withintherangetowhich humansaresensitive)docorrelatewiththecoloursseenbymostpeopleinsunlight,we donotneedtodecidefororagainstdefiningcolourwordsintermsofhowthingslook andtreatingassociatedwavelengthsasmereempiricalcorrelatesofcolours.Butifwe hadtodecide,wecouldchoosetogiveourcolourterminologyapurelyvisualbasisand stillhaveitdoingmostoftheworkitdoesforusnow.Analogousremarksapplytothe othersecondaryqualities. 99

Notso,however,forprimaryqualities.Theinterrelationsbetweenthingsinrespectof theirprimaryqualitiesaremanyandvariedandtightlyinterlocked,sothatwecannot isolateasubsetofthemandsupposethatjust thosemightcontinuetoholdwhileall therestfailed.A fortiori,wecannotdescribeapartialbreakdown,thesurvivorsofwhich wouldsupportaworkingvocabularyofprimaryqualities.Theonlykindofbreakdownwe couldhopetodescribewithoutlosingcontrolwouldbeoneinvolvingthecollapseofall butoneofthenormalcorrelatesofsomeprimaryquality:forexample,aworldinwhich 'thesizeofx'hadtobedefinedsolelyintermsofthevisualfieldpresentedbyxtoan observertenyardsaway,withnoneoftheotheractualcorrelatesofsizecontinuingto hold.Thissuppositionisclearlyselfdefeating;foritbases'size'on'distance'while makingitimpossibletomeasuredistance.Thatspecialfeatureapart,however,itisclear
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatnosuppositionofthisgeneralsortcanpreserveaminimalsenseof'size'analogous tothepurelyvisualsenseof'colour'.Anysuchsupposition,incuttingawaysomuchof whatordinarilygoeswithsize,leavesnobasisforalanguageofphysicalobjects. Offeringusaminimalsenseof'size',itrobsusofeverythingthatcouldhaveasize.

21.Corollaries
WearenowinapositiontoseethatLocke'sAnalyticThesisdoesexpressatruthabout secondaryqualitieswhichisdecisivelynottrueofprimaryqualities. PartofthepointisthattheAnalyticThesisequatesx'sbeinggreen,say,withthetruth ofaconditionalstatingthatundercertaincircumstancesaspecific,characteristickindof sensorystatewouldoccur.Now,itmaybetruethatxwillbedeemedsquare,say,ifand onlyifoursensorystatesinrespectofitaresuchastowarrantitsbeingdescribedas square,butthisfactcannotbeexpressedbypickingonsomespecifickindofsensory stateandsayingthattheoccurrenceofthatinspecifiedconditionsismoreorless definitiveofathing'ssquareness.Thereasonwhythisissoisbroughtout,Ibelieve,by myanalysisintheprecedingsection.Itisjustthatathing'sbeingsquare,orhavingany otherspecificprimaryquality,consistsinitsrelatingtomanyotherkindsofthingsin specificways,andallofthesearecomprised 100

inthenotionofoursensorystates'beingsuchastowarrantourdescribingthethingas square.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Butmyanalysisisalsorelevantinadifferentway.TheAnalyticThesissaysthata thing'shavingagivensecondaryqualityisits havingacertainpower;andjustthis, prescindedfromanyquestionofwhatsortofpower,isinapplicabletotheprimary qualitiesofthings.Wecanidentifyaglass,say,whileremainingignorantoforin disagreementoveritssecondaryqualities;andsowehavethenotionofthe glassasan objectwhich,amongotherfactsaboutit,hascertain'powers'toaffectusinwayswhich areourbasisforcreditingitwithcolour,tasteetc.Butwecannotidentifyaglass independentlyofallitsprimaryqualitiessuchaslocation,size,shape,etc.;andsowe cannothavethenotionofthe glassasanobjectwhich,amongotherfactsaboutit, affectsusinwayswhichareourbasisforcreditingitwithprimaryqualities.Grantedthat everythingwesayabouttheglassisbasedonsensorystatesitcausesustohave,itis stillmisleadingtospeakofitspowertomakeusperceiveitashavingacertainshape, size,etc.;forthatwayofspeakingsuggeststhatwehavesomenotionofitsomeway ofidentifyingandstudyingtheglassindependentlyof,andasapreliminaryto, discoveringwhatitsprimaryqualitiesare.Myanalysisshowswhywecannothavethis. Thereisanotherpointonwhichalittlelightcannowbethrown.Itisoftenthoughtthat whateversignificantdifferencestherearebetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesarein somewayduetoanunderlyingdifferenceexpressedbythis: (A)Eachkindofsecondaryqualityisassociatedwithjustoneofoursenses, whereaseachkindofprimaryqualityisassociatedwithtwosightandtouchin everycase.25 Thereispresumablyatruthlurkingbehindthis,but(A)asstateddoesnotcaptureit;for onecanknowthatthestarter'sgunismakinganoisebecauseoneseesthesmoke,and discoverthattheappleisgreenbytastingit,andsoon.Nodoubt(A)canbemodified
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

soastocopewiththesecases,butjustwhatmodificationsareneededinordertoturn (A)intosomethingpreciseandtrue,andhowinterestingitwouldthenbe,Idonot know. ____________________ 25SeeR.Sartorius,"'ANeglectedAspectoftheRelationshipbetweenBerkeley'sTheory ofVisionandhisImmaterialism'",American Philosophical Quarterly,vol.6(1969). SeealsoPhilosophical Commentaries,entry57. 101

Mymainpoint,however,isthatneither(A)noranythinglikeitcanexplainthe differencesbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualitieswhichcametolightthroughmy contrastbetweensize'blindness'andcolourblindness.Forthesedifferenceswouldhave emergedjustaseasilyifthesize'blind'manhadbeenblind.Deprivinghimofsight altogetherwouldnothavehelpedustoentertainthehypothesisthathemistookthe relativesizesofthejugandtheglassandmaintainedthatmistakethroughaseriesof downtoearthtransactionswiththetwoobjectsinquestion.Thathypothesiswould, indeed,beblockedbyeveryoneofthesampleobstaclespresentedintheoriginalstory. SothefactsaboutprimaryqualitiestowhichIwascallingattentioncannotbelinked withanyfactsaboutvisioninrelationtoprimaryqualities;whenceitfollowsa fortiori thatthecontrastIwasdrawingbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesdoesnotarise fromanythingexpressedbythethesis(A)oranymodifiedversionofit. Ifonecouldexplainthedifferencesbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesbyadducing factsabouttheirrespectivesensorybasesorcorrelates,Isuspectthatthecruxofthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

explanationwouldturnouttobethefactthatthesenseoftouchorratheroftouch andmovementisinvolvedinalltheprimaryqualitiesinawayinwhichitisn'twithany ofthesecondary.Butthatisonlyasuspicion.Someoneshouldwriteabookonthe epistemologyofthesenseoftouch.

22.TheCausalThesis
TheCausalThesisaboutprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesisthis:inaperfectedand completedscience,alloursecondaryqualityperceptionswouldbecausallyexplainedin termsoftheprimaryqualitiesofthethingsweperceive.Forexample,ourcolour discriminationswouldbeexplainedbyatheoryrelatingthecolouraspectsofvisual sensedatatothesubmicroscopictexturesofseensurfaces.Whileadmittingthatwedo notinfacthavethetheory,ofsetoftheories,whichwouldyieldtheseexplanations, Lockeisimmenselysurethatthisisonlybecauseofourignorance.Hedoesnotdoubt thatsometheoryofthiskindistrue. Thisconfidenceisprimafaciepuzzling.Thestateofseventeenthcenturyphysiology surelydidnotwarrantit.Thesuccessof 102

Newtonianphysicsinotherareasmight,ofcourse,haveinducedanoptimismaboutits chancesofeventuallyexplainingeverything.Consider,forexample,thisargumentof Locke'sforhiscentralclaimaboutsecondaryqualities: Poundanalmond,andtheclearwhitecolourwillbealteredintoadirtyone,

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andthesweettasteintoanoilyone.Whatrealalterationcanthebeatingof thepestlemakeinanybody,butanalterationofthetextureofit?26 Thisarguesthatanalmond'scolourandtastearemereupshotsorsymptoms ofitsprimaryquality'texture',sincethelatterisallthatcanbealteredby pounding.Itisinvalid:theassumptionthatpoundingcancauseonlyprimary qualitychangesintheobjectpoundedisfalse,asisshownbywhathappens whenanalmondispoundedwithapestle.Still,Locke'susingtheargument doessuggestthathewasencouragedinmaintainingtheCausalThesisbya generalfaithinthepowerandcomprehensivenessofapurelyprimaryquality physics. Butthatisnotall.Locke'sadvocacyoftheCausalThesiscanbepartlyexplainedonthe basisofhisacceptanceforgood,fumbledreasonsoftheAnalyticThesis.Thereisa verynaturalintellectualroutefromonetotheother,andLockecomesintosharperfocus ifwesupposethathefollowedit. Bywayofintroduction,IcallattentiontothreefeaturesoftheAnalyticThesis.(1) Accordingtoit,secondaryqualitiesaredispositional:'xisgreen'isequivalenttoa counterfactualconditional.(2)Itrepresentssecondaryqualitiesasrelational:'xisgreen' meanssomethingaboutitems(people)otherthanx,andcouldbecomefalsejust becauseofamonadicchangeinthoseotherthings.(3)Itrepresentssecondaryqualities asinvolvingsomethingmental:'xisgreen'meanssomethingabouttheoccurrenceofa certainkindofidea.Puttingthesethreefeaturesinanutshell:accordingtotheAnalytic Thesisasecondaryqualityofathingisitspowertoinduceinsomething elseanidea. Thethreefeaturesarequitedistinct.Theygenerateeightpossiblekindsofproperty, whichareexemplifiedbythefollowingeightadjectives:green(1,2,3),poisonous(1,2),
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

depressive(1,3),explosive(1),stinging(2,3),indebted(2),worried(3),square.One noteswithpleasurethatofthethreefeaturescreditedtothesecondary ____________________ 26Essay II.viii.20. 103

qualitygreenness,noneiscreditedtotheprimaryqualitysquareness.Eachofthese featuresofsecondaryqualitieswillhelptoexplaincertainaspectsofLocke'shandlingof theAnalyticThesis.Istartwiththefirstofthem,i.e.withthefactthatsecondary qualitiesaredispositional,whichisjusttosaythatsecondaryqualityattributionsare equivalenttocounterfactualconditionals.Itissometimessaidthatanythingofthisform: 1. IfxwereF,itwouldbeHmeansthesameas,orshouldbeanalysedinto, somethingofthisform: 2. Thereissomenondispositionalsuchthat:xis,anditisacausallawthatif anythingisbothandFthenitisH. Ibelievethat(2)doesmorethanbringoutthemeaningof(1).Still,westernsciencehas forcenturiesproceededontheassumptionthatwherever(1)istrue(2)willbetruealso; andthisassumptionorregulativeprinciplehasclearlybeeninstrumentalinscientific advance,e.g.byimplyingthatifsomethingissolubleinwaterithasachemical, structuralpropertywhichexplainsitssolubility.ItwouldbeastonishingifLocke,withhis feelingforandunderstandingofthewesternscientifictradition,hadnotassumedthat dispositionsarealwayscausallyrootedinnondispositionalproperties.Ifhedid,thenhe wouldthinkthatwheneversomethingofthisformistrue: 1. Ifxwerefacedinsunlightbyanormalhuman,thehumanwouldhaveaGidea,then
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

2.

thecorrespondingstatementofthisformwillalsobetrue: Forsomenondispositional:xis,anditisacausallawthatifanythingwhichis isfacedinsunlightbyanormalhuman,thehumanhasaGidea.

Thiscomescloseenoughtosayingthatx,byvirtueofsomenondispositionalproperty thatithas,willcauseaGideain...etc.WehavenearlygotLockeasfarastheCausal Thesis. Notquite,though,fortheCausalThesissaysthatour 104

secondaryqualityperceptionsaretobeexplainedthroughtheprimaryqualitiesofthe perceivedobjects.Toexpressthis,wemustreplace'Forsomenondispositional...' bythestronger'Forsomeprimaryquality...'.Butofcoursethatstrengtheningwillbe acceptabletoLocke:ofthetwosortsofqualitiesofobjectsathisdisposal,onesort, secondaryqualities,havealreadybeendeclaredbytheAnalyticThesistobe dispositional;andsotheonlycandidateshehasfortheroleofnondispositional propertiesareprimaryqualities.AndsowehavearrivedatthefullstrengthCausal Thesis. NoticethattheonlygroundsIcangiveLockeforsayingthatoursecondaryquality perceptionsaretobeexplainedintermsofthings'primaryqualitiesisjustthede facto absenceofanyothersuitablecandidate.Soifmyconjectureaboutthemovementofhis thoughtisright,heoughttoconcedethatthetruecausalexplanationsmightturnoutto involvenotprimaryqualitiesbutqualitiesofsomenowunknownkind.Andsohedoes: 'Secondaryqualities...depend...upontheprimaryqualitiesof[objects']minuteand
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

insensibleparts;or,ifnotuponthem,uponsomethingyetmoreremotefromour comprehension.'27 IhaveremarkedthatLockearguespoorlyforhisviewaboutprimaryandsecondary qualities.Thisfactcanbeexplained.ThetroubleisthatLockehadafalsebeliefabout whatsortsofconsiderationswereneededtosupporthiscentralclaim.Knealesays:'The distinctionbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualitieswasaphilosophicaldiscovery,and Lockewasmistakenwhenhewroteofitasthoughithadbeenestablishedby experimentsunfamiliartoplainmen.'28Knealepresumablythinksofthedistinctionas 'established'bywhateversupportstheAnalyticThesis;andIagreewithhimthatthisis aphilosophicalthesiswhosesupportinvolvesnorecherchscientificinformation,no appealstomicroscopyorthelike,butonlytotheunexcitingkindofempiricalmaterialto befoundin20aboveremindersassembledforapurpose.Thefurthermovetothe CausalThesisdoesnotneedstrenuousargument:itisreallyjustamatterofcombining theAnalyticThesiswithahighlyrespectableregulativeprincipleorscientificworking assumption.ButLocke,havingfailedtodistinguishtheAnalyticfromtheCausalThesis, seesthelatteras ____________________ 27Essay IV.iii.11. 28W.C.Kneale,On Having a Mind(Cambridge,1962),p.38. 105

needingargumentativesupport;and,sinceithasimplicationsforscience'sfuture,Locke naturallythinksthatitssupportmustcomefromscience'spastandpresent.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

23.Theotherversions
Lockehastwoothercontrastsorwaysofdrawingthecontrastbetweenprimaryand secondaryqualities.Ishallargue,withregardtoeachofthese,thatitisintelligibleonly ifregardedasafumbledattempttoexpressthecentralclaimwithwhichIhavealready creditedLocke. Thefirstofthetwoisfairlyplainsailing.Hereisatypicalexpressionofit: Theideasofprimaryqualitiesofbodiesareresemblancesofthem,andtheir patternsdoreallyexistinthebodiesthemselves,buttheideasproducedinus bythesesecondaryqualitieshavenoresemblanceofthematall.Thereis nothinglikeour[secondaryquality]ideas,existinginthebodiesthemselves.
29

Sinceideascannotresembleeitherbodiesorqualitiesofbodies,thismustbeeither discardedortransformed.Theonlyplausibletransformationisintosomethinglikethe following:incausallyexplainingideasofprimaryqualities,oneusesthesamewordsin describingthecausesasindescribingtheeffects(shapeideasetc.arecausedby shapesetc.);whereasincausallyexplainingideasofsecondaryqualitiesonemust describethecausesinonevocabularyandtheeffectsinanother(colourideasetc.are causedbyshapesetc.).IfthisisnotwhatLocke's'resemblance'formulationsofthe primary/secondarycontrastmean,thenIcanfindnomeaninginthem. SupposethattheydomeanwhatIhavesuggested.SomeonemightchallengeLocke: 'Whyshouldwenotexplaincolourideasetc.intermsofthecoloursoftheobjectswhich areseen?'Hewouldhavetoreply:'Wecould,butthatwouldnotbetogivethemost
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

basickindofcausalexplanationofsecondaryqualityideas.'Insayingthis,hewouldbe reiteratingtheCausalThesis.Andthatmakesmymainpointaboutthese'resemblance' formulations:iftheypresentuswithanythingwecangetourteethinto,itistheCausal Thesis.Thereseemstobenootherreadingof ____________________ 29Essay II.viii.15. 106

them,nootherwayofrepresentingthemasmorethanmereparagraphs,inertword sequenceswithwhichwecandonothing. TheoneremainingkindofthingLockeoftensaysabouttheprimary/secondary distinctionistotheeffectthatsecondaryqualitiesarenot'reallyin'thebodiestowhich wethoughtlesslyattributethem.Hisremarksinthisveinhavethreeseparatesources, correspondingtothethreethingstheAnalyticThesissaysaboutsecondaryqualities thattheyaredispositional,relational,andmindinvolving. Thefirstoftheseisnotveryimportant,butthereisatleastoneexampleofit: 'Yellownessisnotactuallyingold,butisapoweringoldtoproducethatideainusby oureyes,whenplacedinaduelight...'30Thisuseof'idea'isunsatisfactory:the phrase'thatidea'seemstoreferbacktoyellowness,butyellownessisaqualityandnot anidea!LockeisinadifficultyherewhichIshalldiscussshortly.Mypresentconcernis withthefirstdozenwordsinthequotedpassage.Iftheydon'texpressacrude inconsistency(yellownessisnotingoldbutisingold),thenIthinktheymustinvolve theactual/potentialdistinction.Isuggest,thatis,thatLockewantstosaythat
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

yellownessisonlyadispositionor'power'ofthegoldandnotanondispositionalor 'actual'propertyofit.Onthatreading,theremarkprimarilyexpressesoneaspectofthe AnalyticThesis,anddoesnotintroduceanynewlineofthoughtwhichneedsseparate consideration. Thesecondofthethreefeaturesloomslarger.Thatis,Locke'stendencytospeakof secondaryqualitiesas'notintheobject'seemstobeingoodmeasureduetohis preoccupationwiththefactthataccordingtotheAnalyticThesissecondaryqualitiesare relational.Considerthispassage: ...allwhichideasarenothingelsebutsomanyrelationstoother substances;andarenotreallyinthegold,consideredbarelyinitself,though theydependonthoserealandprimaryqualitiesofitsinternalconstitution, wherebyithasafitnessdifferentlytooperate,andbeoperatedonbyseveral othersubstances.31 Againtheuseof'idea'issloppy.Thevitalphrase,however,is'notreallyinthegold, considered barely in itself':Locke'spointisthatthegold'sbeingyellowdependsnotjust uponitbutalso ____________________ 30Essay II.xxiii.10. 31Essay II.xxiii.37. 107

uponotherthings(people),sothatyellowness,ratherthanbeing'in'thegold,isina
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

mannerofspeakingbetweenthegoldandtheclassofnormal,sightedhumans.Locke,I suggest,goestoofarhere.Thenotionof'where'asecondaryqualityis,ismetaphorical andsoperhapsharmlessinitself;butLockeseemstobecashingthismetaphor,and goingtoofar,whenhesaysthatsecondaryqualitiesarecalled'qualities'only'tocomply withthecommonwayofspeaking'.32 Ithinkhewouldbepreparedtoarguesomewhatasfollows:agivenkindofsubstance mightbebitteratonetimeandtastelessatanother,simplybecauseintheinterim therehadbeenasuitablechangeinthetastebudsofhumans.Insuchaneventuality, thesubstancewouldhavelostitsbitternesswithout changing in itself;buttochangeis simplytoundergosometurnoverinthequalitiesthatonehas;andsoitfollowsthatthe substancewouldhavelostitsbitternesswithoutlosinganyofitsqualities.Sobitterness isnotaqualityandsimilarly,mutatis mutandis,forothersecondary'qualities'and indeedforrelational'qualities'generally. Thatargumentisnotvalid.Forinthesituationenvisaged,thesubstancewouldhave undergoneachange,namelyachangeinitstaste.Itisnaturaltoprotestthatfora substancetoloseitsbitternessinthatwayisnotforittochangeinitself;buttheforce ofthatisjustthatbitternessisarelationalpropertywhichisthepointfromwhichwe started. ThethirdsourceofLocke's'notintheobject'remarksaboutsecondaryqualitiesisbyfar themostimportant.Herearetwoexamples: Thesamewater,atthesametime,mayproducetheideaofcoldbyonehand andofheatbytheother:whereasitisimpossiblethatthesamewater,if thoseideaswerereallyinit,shouldatthesametimebebothhotandcold.33
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thesensiblesecondaryqualities,which,dependingon[theprimary],are nothingbutthepowersthosesubstanceshavetoproduceseveralideasinus byoursenses;whichideasarenotinthethingsthemselves,otherwisethanas anythingisinitscause.34 NoticethatinthesepassageswhatLockesaysisnotthatsecondary qualitiesare'not in'theobjects,butratherthatsecondary-quality ____________________ 32Essay II.viii.10. 33Essay II.viii.21. 34Essay II.xxiii.9.Seealsoviii.24. 108

ideasarenotintheobjects.Howthendoesthismarkacontrastbetweensecondaryand primary?Thereareonlytwoassumptionsonwhichitcandoso. a. Primaryqualityideasare,literally,intheobjectstowhichprimaryqualitiesare attributed.Ifthiswereso,thentheclaimthatsecondaryqualityideasarenotin objectswouldindeeddistinguishprimaryfromsecondaryqualityideasandtothat extentmarkadistinctionbetweenthetwosortsofquality. b. Thereisnodistinctionbetweensecondaryqualitiesandsecondaryqualityideas.If thatwereso,thenthedenialthatsecondaryqualityideasareinobjectswould implyadenialthatsecondaryqualitiesareinobjects;and,sinceprimaryqualities arereallyintheobjectstowhichtheyareattributed,thiswouldmarkadistinction betweenprimaryandsecondaryqualities.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Ofthesetwoquitedifferentpossibilities,(a)seemstomethemoreobviouslyuntenable asaninterpretationofLocke'sthought.Wehaveseenthathisellipticuseof'idea'to mean'quality'doessometimesrunawaywithhim;andithasbeenpointedouttome thatLockesometimesuses'sensation'insteadof'idea',butneverwhenprimaryquality ideasareinquestionafascinatingfactwhichisprimafacieevidenceofhiswantingto getprimaryquality'ideas'outofthemindandintotheobject.ButIjustdonotseehow tocarrythisinterpretationthrough,andIamcontenttojettisonitsincethereisamuch moreplausiblealternative. For(b)isathoroughlyplausiblereadingofthe'notintheobject'remarkswhichIhave justquoted.Sometimes,itseems,wemustadmitthatLocketendstoidentifysecondary qualitieswithideasofthem,aswhenhesaysofporphyrythat'itisplainithasno colourinthedark'.35Consideralsothispassage: Sweetnessandwhitenessarenotreallyinmanna;[forthey]arebutthe effectsoftheoperationsofmanna,bythemotion,size,andfigureofits particles,ontheeyesandpalate:asthepainandsicknesscausedbymanna areconfessedlynothingbuttheeffectsofitsoperationsonthestomachand guts,bythesize,motion,andfigureofitsinsensibleparts...36 Havingjustremarkedthat'everyonereadilyagrees'that'theseideasofsicknessand painarenotinthemanna',Lockenowarguesthatweoughttosaythesameabout tasteandcolour;andhis ____________________ 35Essay II.viii.19. 36Essay II.viii.18.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

109

wordingforcesustoconstruehimasidentifyingsecondaryqualities('sweetnessand whiteness')withsecondaryqualityideas('theeffects'). Inthusidentifyingsecondaryqualitieswithideasofthem,Lockesinsbothagainsthis clearlyannounceddistinctionbetweenqualitiesofbothsortsandideas,andagainsthis centralclaimthatsecondaryqualitiesarepowerstocauseideas.Howdidhegethimself intothisselfcontradictorysituation?Why,whenhewaspossessedofthetruththat secondaryqualitiesarepowerstocauseideasinhumans,shouldLockegivecountenance totheconflictingandfalsethesisthatsecondaryqualitiesareideasinhumans? Hisdriftfromtruthintoerrorcanbeexplainedasarisingfromthreedistinctmis handlingsofthetruth. Thefirstofthemconsistsinmovingfrom'notintheobject'to'inthemind'.Ofcourse thismoveisinvalidifsecondaryqualities'being'not[actually]intheobject'isso understoodthatitfollowsfromtheirbeingdispositionalorfromtheirbeingrelational; butIsuggestthatLockemayhavebeeninclinedtomakeit,andthatthishelpsto explainhissometimesimplyingthatsecondaryqualitiesareideas. ThesecondexplanationcanbeapproachedthroughLocke'scomparisonofsecondary qualitieswithpains,sickness,etc.Thiswholelineofargumentarose,Isubmit,because Lockesawthathehadflushedoutaproblembutthenproceededtomisidentifyit.The problemarisesthus:wecanreportathing'spowertocausecertainstatesinusby callingit'sweet','white','warm',etc.,whileitspowerstocauseotherstatesinusare notreportableinsingleadjectivesexceptclumsy(andexplicitlycausal)compoundslike
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

'sickmaking'and'paincausing'.Whydowedrawthatlinebetweenthetwoclassesof statesofourselves,andthusbetweenthetwoclassesofpowers?Lockeassumes,far tooboldly,thatwecannothaveagoodreasonfordrawingthelinejustthere;andhis conjectureaboutourbadreasonfortheline'slocationreallywillnotbearscrutiny.37But hisrealtroubleisthathehasmisunderstoodwhatsortoflineitis.Seeingthathis AnalyticThesisaboutsecondaryqualitiesraisesaquestionabouthowsecondary qualitiesrelatetopainsandsickness,hehascompletelymisunderstoodwhatquestion ofthissortitraises.TheAnalytic ____________________ 37Essay, II.viii.25. 110

Thesisimpliesthat'green'meansCapttocauseGideas',whichisstructurallylike'apt tocausesickness'.Butthatdoesnotevenprimafaciethreatentoput'green'onapar with'sick',orgreennesswithsickness.Itputs'green'onaparwith'sickmaking',and whatitputsonaparwith'sick'is'havingaGidea'.TheAnalyticThesisaboutsecondary qualities,whenproperlystated,doesnotposeanyproblemoftheform'Whydowetreat greennessdifferentlyfrompainintherespectthat...?',andsoitdoesnotraisethe questiontowhichLockeaddressedhimself,namely'Whydoweregardgreennessbutnot painasintheobject?'Still,itisnotbewilderingthatLockeshouldthinkthatheis confrontedbythisquestion;fortheAnalyticThesisdoesraiseagenuineproblemwhich, beingoftheform'Whydowedrawthelinejustthere?'andalsoinvolvingpainsand secondaryqualities,couldfairlyeasilybemistakenforthepseudoproblemwhichLocke raises.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ThethirdmistakewhichmaycontributetoLocke'stendencytoassimilatesecondary qualitiestoideasofthemisasfollows.HisCausalThesisimpliesthatasecondary qualityofxisapowerwhichxhasbecauseofitsprimaryqualitiesasathingmaybe soluble because ofitschemicalcomposition.Also,inseeingxasgreenonehasanidea whichoccursbecauseofx'sprimaryqualitiesasathingmaydissolve because ofits chemicalcomposition.Thesearedifferenttypesofdependence;butthefactthatthey canbeexpressedinthesamewordsmayhavehelpedLockenottonoticewhenhewas slippingfromonesortofdependenttotheother. RecalloncemorethethreefeatureswhichIstressedin22:secondaryqualitiesare dispositional, relational,andinvolvedwithsomethingmental.InthepresentsectionI havearguedthatLocke'sremarksaboutsecondaryqualitiesas'notintheobject'arefed byeachofthesesources.Becauseasecondaryqualityisdispositionalitisonlyapower, andisthereforenotanactualityintheobject,andistherefore'notactuallyinthe object'.Becauseitisrelationalitis'notintheobjectconsideredbarelyinitself'.And (thoughhereIcompresstheargument)becauseitisobliquelymentalitis'notinthe object'becauseitisinthemind.Theseusesofthe'notintheobject'languageareall deplorable,buttheirinterrelationsarepartofthestructureofLocke'sthought. 111

24.Berkeley'sconflation
Berkeley'sattackonthispartofLocke'sworkwasaddressedtotheworstofallLocke's formulations.WhatBerkeleyattackedwasthethesisthat,whileprimaryqualitiesarein objects,secondaryqualitiesarenotbecausetheyareideasandarethereforeinthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

mind.Inthistwopartthesis,whathedissentedfromwasthepartaboutprimary qualities:Locke'smistake,accordingtoBerkeley,layinhisnotsayingaboutprimary qualitieswhathedidsayaboutsecondary,namelythattheyare,ideasinthemind. BerkeleydidnotasIonceinexplicablyalleged38endorseLocke'sargumentsforthe mentalnatureofsecondaryqualities;butheusedthemad hominemagainstLocke,and thoughtthathehadvalidargumentsforthesameconclusion.RemarkingthatLocke's arguments'maywithequalforce,bebroughttoprovethesamethingofextension, figure,andmotion'astheypurporttoproveaboutsecondaryqualities,Berkeleyaddsa disclaimer: Thoughitmustbeconfessedthismethodofarguingdothnotsomuchprove thatthereisnoextensionorcolourinanoutwardobject,asthatwedonot knowbysensewhichisthetrueextensionorcolouroftheobject.But[my own]argumentsplainlyshewittobeimpossiblethatanycolourorextension atall...shouldexistinanunthinkingsubjectwithoutthemind,orintruth, thatthereshouldbeanysuchthingasanoutwardobject.39 ThisdoesnotadequatelydescribetheshortcomingsofLocke'sargumentsinthisvein e.g.theargumentthatwatercouldnotfeelwarmtoonehandandcoldtotheotherif 'thoseideas'werereallyinthewater,andtheargumentaboutsweetnessandwhiteness inrelationtosicknessandpain.Berkeley,however,doesnotcaretoexaminethose argumentsthoroughlybecausehesolikestheirconclusion:heagreeswithwhathe thinksLockeissayingaboutsecondaryqualities,andcomplainsonlyoverLocke'sfailure tosayitaboutprimaryqualitiesalso. IshouldmentioninpassingBerkeley'streatmentofnumber.40This,thoughIhave
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

carefullyneglectedit,doesoccuronLocke'slistofprimaryqualities;andBerkeleydeals withitthrougha ____________________ 38J.Bennett,"'Substance,RealityandPrimaryQualities'",Martinp.109. 39Principles15. 40Principles12. 112

specialargumentwhichdoesnotfollowthegeneralpatternoutlinedabove.Weoweto Fregeanimportantinsightabouttheconceptofnumber,namelythatgivenanystretch ofrealitythereisnonumberexpressionwhichisabsolutelytherightonetoapplytoit.

41Itmay,forexample,beonebook,orsixtypages,ormillionsofmolecules.Berkeley

hadsomeunderstandingofthis,buthemishandledit.Hesaid:'Thesamethingbearsa differentdenominationofnumber,asthemindviewsitwithdifferentrespects',from whichheinferredthat'numberisentirelythecreatureofthemind'.Butthisiswrong. Theitemobjectivelyisonebook,andobjectivelyissixtypages,andnobody'smindhas anythingtodowithit.Ifsomeoneasksofsomepartoftheworld'Whatnumber?',the questioncannotbeanswered:itmustbereplacedbyaquestionoftheform'What numberofFs?'ButBerkeleyimpliesthattheoriginalquestioncanbeansweredinmore thanoneway,andthatwecannotknowwhichanswertogiveuntilweknowsomething aboutthequestioner'sframeofmind.Inshort,hethinksthatthequestionrequires psychologicalratherthanlogicalcompletion.Frege'spointdisinclinesonetoclassify numberasaprimaryquality,butnotforanyreasonthatsupportsBerkeleianidealism.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Berkeley'streatmentofnumber,althoughspecialinitsargumentativetactics,isinits conclusionjustlikehishandlingoftheothermembersofLocke'slistofprimaryqualities. Thepoint,Berkeleythinks,isthatallofthesequalitiessharethefeatureofsecondary qualitiesstressedbyLockenamely,theyareinthemindratherthanintheobject.How canweassesstheadequacy,exegeticalorphilosophical,ofthispartofBerkeley'swork? Locke's'notintheobject'remarksaboutsecondaryqualitiesare,aswehaveseen, flimsyandunstructuredandinconsiderable;wecannotexplainthemexceptthroughhis havingsomehowdriftedfromhiscentralinsight,theAnalyticThesis;andreallythatis allthatcanbesaidaboutthem.IftheyincludestraysentenceswhichBerkeleycan adoptasexpressing(partof)agenuinephilosophicalviewofhisown,thatisjusta typographicalaccident.Whenonehasseenwhattheprovenanceisofthe'notinthe object'remarkswithinLocke'sthinkingaboutprimaryandsecondaryqualities,onewill notregardthemasexpressionsofanysolidphilosophicalposition. ____________________ 41G.Frege,The Foundations of Arithmetic(NewYork,1953),4554. 113

Inthinkingotherwise,Berkeleyerred.Theerror,however,isnotinitselfaninteresting one.Istherenothingelsewecansay? Well,thereisapointofsomeimportance,arisingfromthis: HYLAS:Iwonder,Philonous,ifwhatyousaybetrue,whythosephilosophers whodenythesecondaryqualitiesanyrealexistence,shouldyetattributeitto theprimary.Ifthereisnodifferencebetweenthem,howcanthisbeaccounted

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

for?PHILONOUS:Itisnotmybusinesstoaccountforeveryopinionofthe philosophers.Butamongotherreasonswhichmaybeassignedforthis,it seemsprobable,thatpleasureandpainbeingratherannexedtotheformer thanthelatter,maybeone.42 Philonousisherechallengedtoexplainthemistake,supposedlymadebysome philosophers,ofdistinguishingsecondaryqualitiesfromprimaryinrespectofthe possessionof'realexistence'(asdistinctfrom'idealexistence',i.e.existenceinthe mind).Herightlyassumesthattoexplainthisonemustpointtosomegenuine differencesbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesbutthenlookatwhatheactually offers!Aswellasbeingfarfromthecentreoftheprimary/secondarydistinction,itisnot eventrue.InsupportofitBerkeleymightpointoutthat'hot'isusuallymorerelevantto painthan'round'is,butwhatabout'sweet'ascomparedwith'sharp'or'hard'or'large'or 'rapid'? Berkeleyhintsthathecouldsaymore('amongotherreasons'),butthisdismally inadequateofferingisallthatheactuallyproduces.Apparentlyhecouldnotfindin Locke'sworkthemakingsofanylegitimatecontrastbetweenprimaryandsecondary qualities.Sohecanandshouldbecriticizednotjustforoverdignifyingthe'notinthe object'remarks,butalsoforoverlookingormisestimatingtheother,betterpartsof Locke'sdiscussionsoftheprimary/secondarydistinction. ThereisafurtherpointaboutBerkeley'sprocedureswhichisessentialforan understandingofLockeandofthetruth,ifnotofBerkeleyhimself.WhenBerkeley approvesLocke'ssayingthatsecondaryqualitiesareinthemind,anddeploreshis refusaltosaythesameofprimaryqualities,heisthinkingabouttheconflictbetween hisandLocke'stheoriesofreality.InBerkeley'sview,Locke'sdoctrineonsecondary
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

qualitiesisthethinedgeofawedgewhichcanbeusedtodislodgetheentireveilof perceptiondoctrine.WhenPhilonoushascoaxedHylasoutofapre ____________________ 42First Dialogue,p.191.SeealsoPhilosophical Commentaries,entry692. 114

Lockeanpositionandintoagreeingthat'allsensiblequalitiesbesidetheprimary...are onlysomanysensationsorideasexistingnowherebutinthemind',hesketchesthe nextpartofhisstrategyasfollows: PHILONOUS:Youarestillthenofopinion,thatextensionandfiguresare inherentinexternalunthinkingsubstances.HYLAS:Iam.PHILONOUS:But whatifthesameargumentswhicharebroughtagainstsecondaryqualities,will holdgoodagainstthesealso?HYLAS:WhythenIshallbeobligedtothink, theytooexistonlyinthemind.43 Berkeley,then,seesLockeashavingaviewaboutsecondaryqualitieswhichrestrictsor partlyretractstheveilofperceptiondoctrine,andathesisaboutprimaryqualitieswhich affirmsarestrictedversionoftheveilofperceptiondoctrine. ThisisagravelywrongpictureofhowLocke'scentralclaimaboutprimaryandsecondary qualitiesrelatestohisveilofperceptiondoctrine,asIshalltrytoshow.'ButBerkeley didn'tintenditasapictureofLocke'scentralclaimonlyofhisperipheral"notinthe object"version'thatdefenceofBerkeleyisanoversimplification,butevenifitwere perfectlyvalidmypointswouldstillneedtobemade.IcontendthatLocke'scentral
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

claim,whichismadeupoftheAnalyticandCausalThesesfusedtogether,hasnothing todowiththeveilofperceptiondoctrine:itdoesnotembodyaversionofthatdoctrine, oraqualificationoforrivaltoit.ThedoctrineisjustLocke'smishandlingofthe scepticalquestionaboutwhethertheobjectiverealmisinanywayatallasitappearsto be;andIcontendthatthisquestionmustbeansweredaffirmatively,onthebasisof routinetrustinthesenses,beforeonecanbegintoexpoundanddefendLocke'scentral claimabouttheprimary/secondarydistinction.Thesecontentionsarenontrivial,inthat theirfalsityisimpliedinvirtuallyeverycommentaryonthispartofBerkeley'swork.This canbesoonlybecausemostcommentatorsdoatleastpartlygraspLocke'scentral claim,andarenotcompletelyinthralltothelanguageof'notintheobject,becausein themind'.Ibelievethattheyhavebeenledastraybecausethecentralclaimitself,even ifnotexpressedinthe'notintheobject'form,canseemtobeconnectedwiththeveil ofperceptiondoctrine.Thispseudoconnexionismymainpresentconcern. Onelastreminder:theAnalyticThesisrepresentssecondary ____________________ 43First Dialogue,p.188. 115

qualitiesasdispositional,asrelational,andaslogicallyconnectedwithsomething mental.Ofthesethreefeatures,itisthethirdwhichnowassumesamajorexplanatory role.Becauseofthatthirdfeature,thefollowingpictureisplausible:theveil ofperceptiondoctrinesaysthatstatementsaboutobjectsarelogicallydissociatedfrom statementsaboutideas,andtheAnalyticThesisreaffirmsthisforprimaryquality

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

attributionsbutconcedesthatitdoesnotholdforstatementspurportingtoattribute secondaryqualitiestothings.Ifthiswereright,itwouldfullyjustifyBerkeley'stactics againstLocke;butitisinfactwhollywrong. Ifitwereright,theAnalyticThesiswouldbeabore.Obviouslysomepredicatesof objectsarelogicallyconnectedwithmentalpredicates:noonewoulddoubtthatwe implysomethingaboutstatesofmindswhenwesaythatcastoroilisnastyorthat warmbathsaresoothing.IftheAnalyticThesisweresignificantonlyasconcedingthat somepredicatesofobjectsarelogicallyconnectedwithmentalpredicates,itwouldhave nosignificanceatall.Whatgivesitinterestisnotitssaying(a)'Somepredicatesof objectshavesomelogicalconnexionswithmentalpredicates',butratheritssaying(b) 'Secondaryqualitypredicateshavetheselogicalconnexionswithmentalpredicates'. Now,(b)doesnottendtosupporttheviewthatallpredicatesofobjectsarelogically connectedwithmentalpredicates:Locke'sviewaboutthestatusofsecondaryqualities isnomoreasteptowardsidealismorphenomenalismthanistheNazivaluationof Aryansasteptowardsabeliefintheworthanddignityofallmen. JustasLocke'sclaimaboutsecondaryqualitiesisnotasignificantrestriction,sohis claimaboutprimaryqualitiesisnotarestrictedversion,oftheveilofperception doctrine.Ifto(a)'Somepredicatesofobjectshavesomelogicalconnexionswithmental predicates'weaddtherider'butprimaryqualitypredicatesdon't',theresultisindeeda formoftheveilofperceptiondoctrine,anddoescontradictidealismand phenomenalism.Butifto(b)'Secondaryqualitypredicateshavetheselogicalconnexions withmentalpredicates'weaddtherider'butprimaryqualitypredicatesdon't',theresult saysonlythatprimaryqualitypredicatesarenotconnectedwithmentalpredicatesin the waysecondaryqualityonesare.ThisdoesnotchallengeBerkeleyoranycompetent phenomenalist:myfenceofitin20concedednothingtotheveilofperception
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

doctrine. 116

EventhosewhorejectBerkeley'sidealism,andphenomenalismaswell,agreethathis principalservicetophilosophylayinhiscriticismsofLocke'saccountofrealityhis insightintowhatgoeswrongifthedistinctionbetweenappearanceandrealityis mishandledincertainways.Soitislamentablethatheshouldhavemuddiedthese watersbystirringinmaterialsdrawnnotjustfromthesubstratumtheorybutalsofrom Locke'sviewsaboutprimaryqualities.Here,forexample,allthreeingredientsare presentinconcentratedform: Inprocessoftime,menbeingconvincedthat...secondaryqualitieshadno existencewithoutthemind,theystrippedthissubstratumormaterial substanceofthosequalities,leavingonlytheprimaryones,...whichthey stillconceivedtoexistwithoutthemind,andconsequentlytostandinneedof amaterialsupport.44 Themixupdoesleadtopositiveerror,ofwhichIcitejustoneexample.Itiscommon groundamongallphilosopherswhoattachvaluetotheprimary/secondarydistinction thatobjectsdohaveprimaryqualities;theveilofperceptiondoctrineallowsthat,just conceivably,'realthings'mayhavenoneofthepropertiesweattributetothem;and substrataassuchcannothaveanypropertiesatall.SoBerkeleyispreparedtosay:'By matter...wearetounderstandaninert,senselesssubstance,inwhichextension, figure,andmotion,doactuallysubsist,'45andalso:'Thematterphilosopherscontend for,isanincomprehensiblesomewhatwhichhathnoneofthoseparticularqualities,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

wherebythebodiesfallingunderoursensesaredistinguishedonefromanother.'46 BerkeleyisnotherepinpointinganinconsistencyinLocke,butrathercommittingan inconsistencyofhisownwhichisgeneratedbyhismisunderstandingofLocke's problems. Thecommentariesdonotyieldthesamerichharvestofthorough,gladcommissionsof thismistakeastheydooftheonediscussedinChapterIII.47Mostcommentators (againArmstrongisanexception)merelytakeBerkeley'swordforitthattheveilof perceptiondoctrineisintegrallyconnectedwiththeprimaryqualitythesis,andslide quicklyoverthegapwheretheconnexionissupposedtobe. ____________________ 44Principles73. 45Principals9. 46Principles47. 47ButseeA.C.Fraser,Berkeley(Edinburgh,1909),p.54;G.D.Hicks,Berkeley( London,1932),p.104;C.R.Morris,Locke, Berkeley, Hume(Oxford,1931),pp.345, 3840;J.Collins,The British Empiricists(Milwaukee,1967),pp.1821. 117

25.Theconflation'ssourcesinLocke
IcanfindnoevidencethatLockesawhistheory,ortheories,aboutprimaryand secondaryqualitiesasonthesamelevelastheveilofperceptiondoctrine.Positive evidencetheotherwayoccurswhenheinterruptshisdiscussionofprimaryand
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

secondaryqualitiesinordertosay: Ihaveinwhatjustgoesbeforebeenengagedinphysicalinquiriesalittle furtherthanperhapsIintended....IhopeIshallbepardonedthislittle excursionintonaturalphilosophy;itbeingnecessaryinourpresentinquiryto distinguishtheprimaryandrealqualitiesofbodies,whicharealwaysinthem. ..etc.48 Inalaterpassagehedeniesthatany'correspondenceorconnexion'canbefound betweenoursecondaryqualityideas'andthoseprimaryqualitieswhich(experience showsus)producetheminus'.49ItistruethatLocketriestoconfutethescepticby covertappealstoempiricalevidence;butevenhewouldseethatinthecontextofthe antiscepticaldebatetheveilofperceptiondoctrineopenreferencesto'physical inquiries'andtowhat'experienceshowsus'wouldbemerelygrotesque. NordoesLockeconfoundhisprimary/secondaryviewswiththeissueaboutsubstratum substance.Inhisprincipalexpositionoftheformer,theword'substance'doesnotoccur once.50 Still,someaspectsofLocke'swritingsservetoexplain,ifnottoexcuse,theconflation byBerkeleyandothersoftheprimaryqualitytheorywiththetheoryofreality. OneoftheseisthepartplayedinLocke'sdiscussionsofprimaryandsecondaryqualities bythenotionofanidea'sresemblinganobjectoraqualityofanobject.Hesometimes saysthatthereissucharesemblanceinthecaseofprimaryqualityideasbutnot secondaryqualityones;andthiscouldtemptBerkeleytoseetheprimary/secondary thesisasassertingtheveilofperceptiondoctrineforprimaryqualitieswhiledenyingit
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

forsecondary. But'resemblance'playsonlyaminorroleinLocke'sformulationsofthe primary/secondarythesis;andhisstandardwayofpresentingtheveilofperception doctrine,ortheissueover ____________________ 48Essay II.viii.22. 49Essay IV.iii.28. 50Essay II.viii.926. 118

scepticism,isnotintermsofresemblancebetweenideasandrealthings.The argumentsIhavequotedin12,indeed,provethatLockeseesthescepticalquestion tobeneutralasbetweenprimaryandsecondaryqualities.Thescepticalquestionasks: 'Areallourideasjusthallucinationsordreamstatesorthelike?',andtheBerkeleian exegesiswouldhaveLockereply:'Notallourideasonlythesecondaryqualityones.' ButintwoofLocke'smostconsiderablediscussionsofscepticismhedefendsthe veridicalityofourideasagainstthescepticintermsofjustfourexamplesthetasteof wormwood,thesmellofarose,theheatofafire,andthewhitenessofapage!51 ThatalonemakesBerkeley'sexegesisinexcusable.Still,perhapsweshouldhuntout somemoreofitspossiblesourcesinLocke'stext. Locke'sunsatisfactoryclassificationofideasinto'real'and'fantastical'mightenticeone intoBerkeleianerrors.52Hesaysthat'real'ideasdo,while'fantastical'onesdonot,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

'haveaconformitywiththerealbeingandexistenceofthings,orwiththeirarchetypes'.
53Thismightliewithintheareaoftheveilofperceptiondoctrine,e.g.bybeing

connectedwithLocke'snotionof'realknowledge'.54Yetitisnotclearthatthatisright. TheideasLockecalls'fantastical'areones'madeupofsuchcollectionsofsimpleideas aswerereallyneverunited,neverwerefoundtogetherinanysubstance:v.g.arational creature,consistingofahorse'shead,joinedtoabodyofhumanshape...'55Thatis, theyareideaswhichfailinanordinaryeverydaywayto'conform'to'reality'.Isthere roomhereforeventheprimafaciepossibilitythatallourideasmightbe'fantastical'? Thereal/fantasticaldistinctionisinfactarathermuddledpieceofphilosophicallogic, concerningideasintheirroleasmeaningsratherthanassensedata,sothatits relationswiththeveilofperceptiondoctrineareboundtobecloudy. Evenifthetwoweretightlylinked,though,thereal/fantasticaldistinctionwouldsupport Berkeley'sexegesisonlyifLockealsosaidthatprimaryqualityideasare'real'while secondaryqualityonesare'fantastical'.Butthissecondstepisexplicitlyruledout: ____________________ 51Essay IV.ii.14;xi.2. 52SeeGibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,ch.668. 53Essay II.xxx.1. 54Essay IV.iv.45. 55Essay II.xxx.5. 119

'Oursimple ideasareallreal,allagreetotherealityofthings:notthatthey
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

areallofthemtheimagesorrepresentationsofwhatdoesexist;thecontrary whereof,inallbuttheprimaryqualitiesofbodies,hathbeenalreadyshown.. .[The]ideasofwhitenessandcoldness...arerealideasinus,...the realitylyinginthatsteadycorrespondencetheyhavewiththedistinct constitutionsofrealbeings.Butwhethertheyanswertothoseconstitutions, astocausesorpatterns,itmattersnot;itsufficesthattheyareconstantly producedbythem.56 Thereis,then,nosupportforBerkeleyinthedistinctionbetweenrealandfantastical ideas. Locke'stheoryaboutreal essencescouldalsoleadtomisunderstanding.Whilepouring scornon'thosewho[use]thewordessencefortheyknownotwhat',57Lockegivesto thephrase'realessence'asensewhichhebelievestobelegitimate: Theotherandmorerationalopinionisofthosewholookonallnaturalthings tohave[a'realessence'inthesenseof]areal,butunknown,constitutionof theirinsensibleparts;fromwhichflowthosesensiblequalitieswhichserveus todistinguishthemonefromanother,accordingaswehaveoccasiontorank themintosorts,undercommondenominations.58 FromnowonIshalluse'realessence'tomean'realessenceofthekindLockeapproves', i.e.themicrophysicalprimaryqualityconstitutionofathingfromwhichflowallitslarge scalequalities,primaryandsecondary.Thetheoryofrealessencesis,then,integrally boundupwithLocke'sCausalThesisaboutprimaryandsecondaryqualities. Locke'snotionofrealessenceisoneofthefinestthingsintheEssay,andhehandlesit
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

almostflawlessly.Yetacarelessreadermightassimilateittothetheoryofreality,orto thatofsubstance,becauseofLocke'sinsistenceonhowlittleweknowaboutreal essences: Thoughthefamiliaruseofthingsaboutustakeoffourwonder,yetitcuresnot ourignorance.Whenwecometoexaminethestoneswetreadon,ortheiron wedailyhandle,wepresentlyfindweknownottheirmake;andcangiveno reasonofthedifferentqualitieswefindinthem....Whatisthattextureof parts,thatrealessence,thatmakesleadandantimonyfusible,woodand stonesnot?Whatmakesleadandironmalleable,antimonyandstonesnot?59 ____________________ 56Essay II.xxx.2. 57Essay III.iii.1517;vi.113,3540. 58Essay III.iii.17. 59Essay III.vi.9. 120

Hereheispreparingtoarguethatrealessencesarenotinfactourbasisfor classification:theycannotbe,sinceweknowsolittleaboutthem.60Butthepassage hasalargerpurposewhichshouldalsobementioned.Withcharacteristicintelligence, insightandhumility,Locketookeverypossiblechanceofwhichthequotedpassageis onetostressthegapbetweentheintellectualcontrolwhichwedoimposeontheworld andthescienceplusconceptualschemewhichwemightfindappropriateifwe'curedour ignorance'.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Sometimes,however,hegivestheimpressionofthinkingthatrealessencesarenotjust mainlyunknownbutinprincipleunknowable.Forexample,hesaysthat'wearesofar frombeingadmittedintothesecretsofnature,thatwescarcesomuchaseverapproach thefirstentrancetowardsthem',anddefendsthisinafinepassagewhichstartsthus: Wearewonttoconsiderthesubstanceswemeetwith,eachofthem,asan entirethingbyitself,havingallitsqualitiesinitself,andindependentofother things;overlooking,forthemostpart,theoperationsofthoseinvisiblefluids theyareencompassedwith,anduponwhosemotionsandoperationsdepend thegreatestpartofthosequalitieswhicharetakennoticeofinthem.61 Againstthiscommonassumption,Lockemaintainsthatindividualthingsarecontinually proppedup,sotospeak,bytheircausalrelationswithotherthings: Taketheairbutforaminutefromthegreatestpartoflivingcreatures,and theypresentlylosesense,life,andmotion.Thisthenecessityofbreathinghas forcedintoourknowledge.Buthowmanyotherextrinsicalandpossiblyvery remotebodiesdothespringsoftheseadmirablemachinesdependon,which arenotvulgarlyobserved,orsomuchasthoughton;andhowmanyarethere whichtheseverestinquirycanneverdiscover?62 Heconcludesinhisnextsectionthat,aswellasthedifficultyofdiscoveringthe'size, figureandtexture'ofthe'minuteandactiveparts'ofbodies,thereistheproblemof finding'thedifferentmotionsandimpulsesmadeinanduponthembybodiesfrom without';butthesemotionsandimpulsesarealsopartoftherealessencesofbodies, foruponthem'depends...thegreatestand
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 60SeealsoEssay III.vi.2. 61Essay IV.vi.11. 62Ibid. 121

mostremarkablepartofthosequalitiesweobserve'inbodies;andso'thisconsideration aloneisenoughtoputanendtoallourhopesofeverhavingtheideasof[bodies']real essences'.63 IsLockeherepresentingrealessencesasnecessarilyunknowableasa'somethingwe knownotwhat'orasomethingbeyondtheveil?Ifso,thatmightlinkthenotionofa realessence,andthustheprimary/secondarytheorycontainingit,witheithersubstrata orthe'realthings'oftheveilofperceptiondoctrine.Theanswertothequestionis'No'. EvenwhenLockeisathismostpessimisticaboutourprospectsofdiscoveringthereal essencesofthings,hispessimismisreasonable,argued,andunabsolute.64Whathe saysisnotthatrealessencesareinprincipleunknowable,butonlythatthereare reasonsforsuspectingthatfullknowledgeofthemwouldrequirescientificinquiriesofa depthandscopethatliebeyondourcapacities. ItwouldbeinthespiritofLocke'stheoryofessencestosuggestthatwemight,as scientificknowledgeincreases,eventuallygiveupallourpresentwaysofdescribingand classifyingphysicalthings.Thissuggestioncould,unhappily,beexpressedbysaying 'Perhapsnothinginthephysicalworldisinanyrespectwhatitseemstobe';butthis sentence,whenitcarriesthatmeaning,hasnothingtodowiththeveilofperception
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

doctrine.Berkeleynotwithstanding,itdoesnotexpressa'sceptical'position,nordoesit inanysignificantsense'depredateourfaculties,andmakemankindappearignorantand low'.65Berkeley'sinabilitytodojusticetothisaspectofLocke'sthoughtseemstohave beenamatteroftemperamentasmuchasofintellectapparentlyhecouldnotget himselfintotheframeofmindofsomeonewho,withoutjeeringattheignoranceof othersorbewailinghisown,thinksitlikelythatsciencehassofarbarelyscratchedthe surfaceofthereal. Anotheraspectofthetheoryofrealessencescould,atahastyglance,seemtoconnect itwiththesubstratumdoctrineinparticular.WhatLockestressesisthedifficultyof discoveringtherealessencesofsubstances;andsomeonemightinferfromthisthatreal essencesaresupposedtobeunknowableinthesameway,andperhapsforthesame reason,thatthe'nature'ofsubstratum ____________________ 63Essay IV.vi.12. 64SeeGibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,ch.712. 65Principles101.Cf.Essay II.xxiii.12. 122

substanceisunknowable.Thistoowouldbeamisunderstanding.Lockeisinterestedin thedistinctionbetweenrealand'nominal'essences,andthisdistinctionworksonlyin applicationtosubstancesafactwhichLockerecords,notverysatisfactorily,bysaying thatthenominalessenceofapropertyormodeisalsoitsrealessence.66Thebasic pointunderlyingthisdarksayingis,Ithink,asfollows.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thenominalessenceofaredthing(quared)isjustthemeaningof'red'ortheideawe associatewiththatword.Therealessenceofaredthing(quared)isthatprimary qualitytextureofitwhichcausesittolookasitdoesandthusqualifyforthedescription 'red'.Todiscoverarealessence,then,wemuststartwithameaningoran'idea',and thendigforcertainempiricalfactsabouttheitemsthesubstanceswhichcorrespondto it.Considernowthepropertyofredness.Itsnominalessenceisjustthesameasthatof anyredthing(quared),thatis,itisdeterminedwhollybythemeaningoftheword'red'. Andthatisallthereistobesaidaboutthepropertyitself,asdistinctfromthethings thathaveit.Theonlywayofgoingbeyondwhatwemeanby'red'orby'redness'the onlywayoffillinginrelevantempiricalfactsisbygoingfromrednesstoredthings, frompropertiestosubstances.(Locke'sownaccountofthematteriscloudedbyhis speakingnotof'properties'butof'simpleideasandmodes',andbyhisimplicitly contrasting'triangles[ofthesortstudiedingeometry]'withtriangularthingsor substances.IfIwasrightin15aboutwhyhechoosesgeometrical'triangles'as paradigmmodes,thenwecantakehimtobecontrastingthepropertyoftriangularity withactualtriangularthingsorsubstances;andthenhisbasicpointisasIhave expoundedit.) Locke'spoint,onthisreadingofit,isperfectlycorrect;thereisnomysteryaboutit;and ithasnothingtodowithsubstrata.Forexample,whenherefersto'theunknown essenceofthatsubstance',67allhemeansis'themicrophysicalconstitutionofthat lumpofstuff'or'...ofthatkindofstuff'.Heis,quiteharmlessly,usingthelanguageof hisexcellenttheoryofrealessences. ____________________ 66Essay II.xxxi.11,14;III.iii.18. 67Essay II.xxiii.3.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

123

V BERKELEYONREALITY:AGAINSTLOCKE
26.Twospecificarguments
BERKELEY'Sattackontheveilofperceptiondoctrineraisesmethodologicalissueswhich areworthashortchapter.Itisinterwovenwithhisattacksonthesubstratumand primary/secondarytheories,buteachpassageIshallcitecanberead,withtheaidof 14and24above,asacleancutthrustattheveilofperceptiondoctrinealone. Philosophersintheempiricisttraditionoftendisclaimanyintentionoftheorizing, preferringplaincommonsensetotheperverselyintricatetheoriesoftheiropponents. ThusBerkeleyhasPhilonoussay:'Idonotpretendtoframeanyhypothesisatall.Iam ofavulgarcast,simpleenoughtobelievemysenses,andleavethingsasIfindthem.'1 Berkeleydoeshaveatheory,though.Hedefendsageneral,controversialthesisusually calledidealismaboutthenatureofobjectivityconcepts,themeaningsofstatements abouttherealorexternalworld.MuchofhisattackonLockestemsdirectlyfrom idealism,butmypresentconcerniswithtwovalidargumentsinwhichidealismisnot presupposed. ThefirstrebutsLocke'sclaimthatideasresemblerealthings.Againstthis,Berkeley objectsthat'anideacanbelikenothingbutanidea',sothatourideascouldbe'the picturesorrepresentations'ofLockeanrealthingsonlyifthelatterwerethemselves
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ideas,inwhichcaseLocke'sdoctrinewouldcollapse.2 Thisargument,aswellasgoingagainstsomethingLockesaysaboutprimaryqualities, alsorefutestheveilofperceptiondoctrineinsofarasthelatterclaimsthatideas 'resemble'realthings.Wehaveseen,though,thatthisclaimisneitheraweightynora centralpartofthedoctrine;itisnotrequiredforthethesisthatideas'represent'real things;sothatthisargumentofBerkeley'shasaseverelylimitedscope. ____________________ 1Third Dialogue,p.229. 2Principle8. 124

Itspremissthatanideacanbelikenothingbutanotherideaistrue.Sinceitiswrong toreifysensedata(see5above),avisualsensedatumcannothaveshape,colour, etc.,andsocannotresembleaphysicalthinginshape,colour,etc.Thesentence'Ihave (apprehend,perceive)asquaresensedatum'canonlybeabadshorthandfor'Itiswith measthoughIwereseeingsomethingsquare',whichdoesnotimplythatthereis anythingsquare.Berkeley,however,standsthispointonitshead.Tothereasonable viewthatonlyperceivableitemscanhaveempiricalproperties,headdstheidealist thesisthatonlyideasareperceivable(see30below),andthenceinfersthatonly ideasorsensedatacanhavesuchempiricalpropertiesassquareness.Thisgivesanodd twisttohishandlingofthetruththatonlyideascanresembleideas: Buthowcanthatwhichissensiblebelikethatwhichisinsensible?Canareal thinginitselfinvisiblebelikeacolour;orarealthingwhichisnotaudible,be
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

likeasound?Inaword,cananythingbelikeasensationoridea,butanother sensationoridea?3 PerhapsLockean'realthings'areinvisible;butnotforthereasonthattheydon't resemblecoloursoradifferentpointwhichBerkeleytakestobethesameonethat theydon'tresembleideas. Berkeley'sothersubstantialargumenttellsagainsttheveilofperceptiondoctrineitself, notjustagainstoneversionofit.Hedeploysthisargument,too,inthelightofatheory ofhisown,butperhapslessdamaginglythaninthepreviouscase. Lockedefendshisdoctrineasareasonableexplanatoryhypothesis:manyofmysensory statesareforcedinonme,inorderlyanddependableways,andthisfactcanbe explainedonlyby'thebriskactingofsomeobjectswithoutme'.4Berkeleyrightly objects.5The'explanatoryhypothesis'defenceofthedoctrinetreats'objectswithout me'ascauses,whereasBerkeleyhasatheorythatonlyamindcanbeacause(see42 below).Thisisimplausible,butBerkeleyalsohasasounderbasisforhisattack. Considerhowwedodiscoverwhatweordinarilycall'causal'connexionsandwhat Berkeley,refusingthemthatlabel,calls'lawsofnature':'TheLaws of Nature...we learnbyexperience,whichteaches ____________________ 3First Dialogue,p.206.SeealsoPrinciples8. 4Essay IV.xi.5. 5Principles1820,3032,5153,8687;Dialogues,pp.21620,2423. 125
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

usthatsuchandsuchideasareattendedwithsuchandsuchotherideas,intheordinary courseofthings.'6Thatisthecrucialpoint.Wehavetolookfor'causal'explanationson thissideoftheveilofperception,seekingtoconnectappearanceswithother appearances.Suchasearchcouldnotrevealanylinkbetweenappearanceasawhole andasupposedrealmof'realthings'towhichwehavenodirectaccess. Thismodeofattack,whichunderlies12aboveandwhichrunsthroughmuchof Berkeley'spolemicagainsttheveilofperceptiondoctrine,isthevitalcoreofhisnegative position.Itcanbegeneralizedintotheclaimthatnoempiricalevidencecouldbearon theexistenceofLockeanrealthings:'Asforallthatcompagesofexternalbodieswhich youcontendfor,...youcannoteithergivemeanyreasonwhyyoubelieveitexists,or assignanyusetoitwhenitissupposedtoexist.'7Thismayimplythatthethesisthat thereareLockeanrealthingsismeaningless.Itcertainlyimpliesthatthatthesisis empty,dead,negligible. Atheorywhichlacksempiricalcontentshouldnotbeattackedonempiricalgrounds. Berkeleyseemstodojustthat: Itisgrantedonallhands(andwhathappensindreams,phrensies,andthe like,putsitbeyonddispute)thatitispossiblewemightbeaffectedwithall theideaswehavenow,thoughnobodiesexistedwithout,resemblingthem. Henceitisevidentthesuppositionofexternalbodiesisnotnecessaryforthe producingourideas:sinceitisgrantedtheyareproducedsometimes,and mightpossiblybeproducedalwaysinthesameorderweseetheminat present,withouttheir[sc.bodies']concurrence.8
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thisargumentlooksvulnerabletothefollowingdilemma.Theargumenttakesdreamsto beideasequenceswithnocorresponding'bodies':if'bodies'doesmean'Lockeanreal things'thenBerkeleycannotknowthatbodiesareabsentindreaming,andifitdoesn't thentheargumentisirrelevanttotheveilofperceptiondoctrine.Berkeley,however, mightrebutthefirsthornofthisdilemma.Hemightsaythatthepremiss'Indreams therearenobodiesor"realthings"correspondingtoone'sideas'isnotsomethinghe asserts,butmerelysomethingheusesad hominembecauseitis'grantedonallhands' bytheLockeans.Asforhissayingthatitis'beyonddispute':hecandefendthattoo,on thegroundsthatiftheveilofperceptiondoctrineistobeeven ____________________ 6Principles30. 7Principles22. 8Principles18. 126

remotelyplausibleitmust,attheveryleast,beofferedasexplainingthedifference betweendreamingandnormalwakingexperience. Infact,ifdreamsseemtoberelevanttothedisputeitisaspartofthecaseforLocke's position,because'realthings'mayseemtoexplainorelucidatethemanifestdifference betweendreamsandnormalperceptions.Thisapparentrelevanceisillusory,ofcourse. Thedistinctionbetweendreamsandwakingexperience,justbecausethereareempirical criteriaforitsapplication,cannotbeareitherwayonLocke'semptytheory.IntheThird DialogueBerkeleyhandlesthispointimpeccably.Heintroducesdreamsasprimafacie

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

favouringLocke,andthenmakesPhilonoussay: Thereis...nodangerofconfounding[wakingexperience]withthevisionsof adream,whicharedim,irregular,andconfused.Andthoughtheyshould happentobeneversolivelyandnatural,yetbytheirnotbeingconnected,and ofapiecewiththeprecedingandsubsequenttransactionsofourlives,they mighteasilybedistinguishedfromrealities.Inshort,bywhatevermethodyou distinguishthingsfromchimerasonyourownscheme,thesame,itisevident, willholdalsouponmine.Foritmustbe,Ipresume,bysomeperceived difference,andIamnotfordeprivingyouofanyonethingthatyouperceive.9 Here,aselsewhere,Berkeley'srejectionofthe'explanatoryhypothesis'defenceof Locke'sdoctrinehintsatthestrongerclaimthatthedoctrinehasnoempiricalcontent. OneepisodeinBerkeley'sattackrequirescomment:'Whatreasoncaninduceusto believetheexistenceofbodieswithoutthemind,fromwhatweperceive,sincethevery patronsofmatterthemselvesdonotpretend,thereisanynecessaryconnexionbetwixt themandourideas?'10ThispresumablytakesupLocke'spointthatthings'primary qualitiesdonotnecessitatetheideastheycauseinusthatthecorrelationsbetween qualityandideaareGodordained,anddonot'standtoreason'.(Lockesaysthisofall ourideas.InmypublishedarticleIrestrictedthepointtoideasofsecondaryqualities, havingmisunderstoodaLockeansubtlety.11)Whenthinkingabout'realthings'rather thanaboutprimaryqualities,Lockewouldprobablyhavesaidthesamething:'real things'causeourideasbutdonotnecessitatethemin ____________________ 10Principles18.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

11J.Bennett,"'Substance,RealityandPrimaryQualities'",Martinp.107;Essay

IV.iii.

13. 9Third Dialogue,p.235. 127

astrong,logicalsenseof'necessitate'.ButthisdoesnotprovideBerkeleywithan argumenthecanfairlyuse.Hedoesnotthinkthatcauses'necessitate'either,andsohe isnotentitledtotreatthefactthat'thepatronsofmatterdonotpretend...etc.'asin anywayweakeningtheirposition.

27.'Meaningless'and'contradictory'
Idealismimpliesthatqualitiesareideas;andideasmustbeinminds;whenceitfollows thattheveilofperceptiondoctrineisdownrightselfcontradictoryorlogicallyfalse: Thesensiblequalitiesarecolour,figure,motion,smell,taste,andsuchlike, thatis,theideasperceivedbysense.Nowforanideatoexistinan unperceivingthing,isamanifestcontradiction;fortohaveanideaisalloneas toperceive...12 BerkeleyofteninfersfromidealismthatLocke'sdoctrineinvolves'acontradiction'or meaningthesamething'arepugnancy'.13Thispresupposesthatheknowswhatthe doctrinemeansbutdoeshe?Isuggestedin12thatthedoctrineavailsitselfofa distinctionbetweenappearanceandrealitywhichcannotbeourordinaryone,yetdoes notexplainwhatunordinaryoneitis;andthissoundslikethechargethatthedoctrine
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

istoouncleartobeassessedfortruth,orperhapseventhatitismeaningless.Berkeley sometimessaysthistoo,aswhenhespeaksof'thevagueandindeterminatedescription of...corporealsubstance,whichthemodernphilosophersarerunintobytheirown principles',14orremarksthat'thewordsmaterial substance[have]nodistinctmeaning annexedtothem'.15 Inthisvein,hetypicallygivesthedoctrineasmuchelbowroomaspossible,inviting Locketoexplaintheunusualbutlegitimatesenseinwhichhiskeytermsarebeingused: Iwouldfainknowhowanythingcanbepresenttous,whichisneither perceivablebysensenorreflexion,nor[etc.,etc.]Thewordsto be present, whenthusapplied,mustneedsbetakeninsomeabstractandstrange meaning,andwhichIamnotabletocomprehend.16 ____________________ 12Principles7. 13e.g.inPrinciples4,17,76. 14Principles11. 15Principles17. 16Principles68. 128

Whatthereforecanbemeantbycallingmatteranoccasion[ofourideas]?This termiseitherusedinnosenseatall,orelseinsomesenseverydistantfrom itsreceivedsignification.17

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Evenmoreexplicitly,againstthesubstratumtheory: HYLAS:Youstilltakethingsinastrictliteralsense:thatisnotfair,Philonous. PHILONOUS:Iamnotforimposinganysenseonyourwords:youareatliberty toexplainthemasyouplease.OnlyIbeseechyou,makemeunderstand somethingbythem.Youtellme,mattersupportsorstandsunderaccidents. Howlisitasyourlegssupportyourbody?HYLAS:No;thatistheliteralsense. PHILONOUS:Prayletmeknowanysense,literalornotliteral,thatyou understanditin.18 Thistactic,thoughadmirablydeployed,doesnotsquarewiththechargeof inconsistency.Inparticular,thereissomethingwronghere: Asforallthatcompagesofexternalbodieswhichyoucontendfor,Ishallgrant youitsexistence,thoughyoucannoteithergivemeanyreasonwhyyou believeitexists,orassignanyusetoitwhenitissupposedtoexist.Isay, thebarepossibilityofyouropinion'sbeingtrue,shallpassforanargument thatitisso.19 Lockecannot'giveanyreason...orassignanyuse...'preciselybecausehisdoctrine hascutitselfloosefromtheordinaryappearance/realitydistinction;thatcondemnsitas meaningless,oratleastasfatally'vagueandindeterminate';whichinturnprotectsit fromthechargeofinconsistency.Berkeleyhopestobasethatchargeonidealism,but thelatter,evenifitweretrue,couldhardlyturnameaninglessdoctrineintoalogically falseone. Usually,though,Berkeleydoesbetter.Heknowsthatachargeofcontradiction
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

presupposesagraspofmeaning: Whenwordsareusedwithoutameaning,youmayputthemtogetherasyou please,withoutdangerofrunningintoacontradiction.Youmaysay,for example,thattwicetwoisequaltoseven,solongasyoudeclareyoudonot takethewordsofthatpropositionintheirusualacceptation,butformarksof youknownotwhat.20 ____________________ 17Principles69. 18First Dialogue,p.199.SeealsoPrinciples1617. 19Principles22;seealso20. 20Principles79.SeealsoSecond Dialogue,pp.2256. 129

Andhisarguments,whentheydonotdependdirectlyonidealism,havetheform:if Locke'sdoctrineuseswordsintheirordinarysensesitisselfcontradictory;no unordinarysensesareoffered,andapparentlynonecouldbewhichwouldsavethe doctrine;andsothelatterisanarrayofwordswhich'markouteitheradirect contradiction,or elsenothingatall'.21Thisdisjunctiondoesnotreflectindecisiveness. Rather,itshowsthatBerkeleyislaunchingacreativeattack.Insteadofmerelysaying 'Well,IdonotunderstandLocke'sdoctrine',hemeetsithalfway,triestoputittowork, andcondemnsitbecauseitsstructurerendersitobstinatelyidle. Onemightthinkthatnologicaloperationscanbeperformedonsomethingwhichis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

eventuallydeclaredtobemeaningless.Thatwouldbeamistake,butnotanobvious one,sothepointdeservesexpansion. WhenPhilonousisaskedwhyhedisbelievesin'matter',hereplies: Itistomeasufficientreasonnottobelievetheexistenceofanything,ifI seenoreasonforbelievingit.Butnottoinsistonreasonsforbelieving,you willnotsomuchasletmeknowwhatitisyouwouldhavemebelieve,since yousayyouhavenomannerofnotionofit.Afterall,letmeentreatyouto considerwhetheritbelikeaphilosopher,orevenlikeamanofcommonsense, topretendtobelieveyouknownotwhat,andyouknownotwhy.22 Thisseemsright:untilthedoctrine'smeaningisestablishedwecannotconsiderwhether ornottobelieveit,forthereisnoittobelieve.YetelsewhereBerkeleyseemstobelie this:'Butthoughitwerepossiblethatsolid,figured,moveablesubstancesmayexist withoutthemind,correspondingtotheideaswehaveofbodies,yethowisitpossible forustoknowthis?'23IfLocke'stheoryreallyismeaningless,whatrighthasBerkeley tosaythatevenifitweretruewecouldnotknowthatitwas? Perhapsheisherethinkingofthetheorynotasmeaninglessbutaslogicallyfalse.But evenifheisregardingitasmeaninglesshecanbeentitledtosaythatifitweretruewe couldnotknowthatitwas.Thisisbecausethedoctrine,evenifmeaningless,isnot unconstruablegibberish:ithasalogicalstructure,issupposed ____________________ 21Principles24,myitalics. 22Second Dialogue,p.218.SeealsoPrinciples45.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

23Principles18.

130

todocertainwork,isclaimedtohavecertainlogicalrelationswithotherstatements; andsoonemaybeinapositiontosaythatitsauthor,onhisownshowing,mustadmit thatevenifitweretruetherecouldbenoevidenceforit. ThepointgoesfarbeyondBerkeley.Consider,forexample,howonecanapplytoa sentenceStheclaimthatwhatever is not empirically verifiable is therefore meaningless. DoesonetakeStoexpresssomepropositionP,thendiscoverthatPisunverifiable,and thenceconcludethatSismeaninglessandthusdoesnotexpressP(oranythingelse) afterall?Thatisquiteincoherent,whichispresumablywhyAyerresortstothenotionof whatS'purports'toexpress: Asentenceisfactuallysignificanttoanygivenperson,if,andonlyif,heknows howtoverifythepropositionwhichitpurportstoexpressthatis,ifheknows whatobservationswouldleadhim,undercertainconditions,toacceptthe propositionasbeingtrue,orrejectitasbeingfalse.24 Thisisstillunsatisfactory,foritimpliesthatSmaybeuniquelyassociatedwithP,by thepurportingtoexpressrelation,thoughwithoutsucceedinginactuallyexpressingit. Still,itisaseriousattempttosolvearealproblem,namelytheproblemofavoidinga purelypassivehandlingoftheverifiability(oranyother)criterionofmeaningfulness.If Ayerappliedthecriterionintheform:'Sisnotsignificant,becauseIcannotconstrueit sothatitexpressessomethingverifiable',hewouldbeusingitpassivelyratherthan
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

creativelysayingsomethingwhichwouldapplyequallytoLocke'sveilofperception doctrineandtosuchgibberishas'Fridaysareascomplexasmountainsaresoulless'.But asentenceexpressingLocke'sdoctrineisnotmeregibberish:thereismoretobesaid aboutitthan'Idon'tunderstandit,andnooneelsewilleither';foritadmitsoflogical operationswhicharewarrantedbythenormalmeaningsofsomeoftheconstituent words,orbywhattheauthorofthesentenceclaimsforit,orboth. Forexample,thesubstratumtheoryisdefectiveastomeaning,butwecanstillsaywith confidencethatsubstrataassuchcannothavea'nature',i.e.thattherecanbenoFsuch thatnecessarilyxisasubstratumsubstanceifandonlyifFx.Itwillnotdotosay ____________________ 24A.J.Ayer,Language, Truth and Logic(London,1949),p.35. 131

thatwediscoverthisbyexaminingthepropositionwhichthetheory'purports'to express;butthelanguageof'purportingtoexpress'doesatleastregisterthefactthat whenphilosophersspeakofmeaninglessnessinthewayinwhichitisnaturaltolevel thechargeata'theory'or'thesis'ratherthanata'sentence'or'paragraph'theyarenot merelyreportingade factofailuretoconstrue. Berkeleydoesnottheorizeaboutthesematters,butinpracticehishandlingofthemis impressivelysound.Inatleastonepassageheusesboth'Itismeaningless'and'Ifit weretruewecouldnotknowit',andholdstheminadelicateandsatisfactoryrelation withoneanother.25
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

28.Meaninglessbeliefs
InoneplaceBerkeleyfumblesthenotionofmeaninglessnessinaninterestingway. Accusedofdenyingwhat'thewholeworld'believes,hereplies: Uponanarrowinquiry,itwillnotperhapsbefound,somanyasisimagineddo reallybelievetheexistenceofmatterorthingswithoutthemind.Strictly speaking,tobelievethatwhichinvolvesacontradiction,orhasnomeaningin it,isimpossible:andwhethertheforegoingexpressionsarenotofthatsort,I referittotheimpartialexaminationofthereader.Inonesenseindeed,men maybesaidtobelievethatmatterexists,thatis,theyactasiftheimmediate causeoftheirsensations,whichaffectsthemeverymomentandissonearly presenttothem,weresomesenselessunthinkingbeing.Butthattheyshould clearlyapprehendanymeaningmarkedbythosewords,andformthereofa settledspeculativeopinion,iswhatIamnotabletoconceive.Thisisnotthe onlyinstancewhereinmenimposeuponthemselves,byimaginingtheybelieve thosepropositionstheyhaveoftenheard,thoughatbottomtheyhaveno meaninginthem.26 Ishallignorethephrase'involvesacontradiction',andshallpursuethispassageonthe assumptionthatBerkeleyreallydoesregardLocke'sdoctrineabbreviatedto'Matter exists'asmeaningless.CanBerkeleyconsistentlysaythis,andalsosaythatmenact asthoughitweretruethatmatterexists? Onthefaceofit,hecannot.Someonewhosays'Menactasthoughitweretruethat matterexists'isnotdiscussingthesen
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 25Principles778. 26Principles54. 132

tence'Matterexists'butisusingit;andifitismeaninglessthensoiswhathesays usingit.Asentencewhichisunintelligibleconsideredasexpressinga'speculative opinion'doesnotgainmeaningjustbybeingrelegatedtoasubordinateclause. Astatementlike'HeactsasthoughIwerehisenemy'wouldordinarilymean'Heactsas thoughhebelievedIwerehisenemy';andweprobablyoughttoconstrueBerkeley's 'Menactasthough...'analogously,ifonlybecausethepassageasawholecentreson belief.ButevenifwetakeBerkeleytobesayingthatmenactasthoughtheybelieved thatmatterexists,heisstillintrouble.IfmenactasthoughtheybelievethatP,it mustbepossibleforsomeoneactuallytobelievethatP;andBerkeleyhimselfsaysthat 'strictlyspeaking,tobelievethatwhichhasnomeaninginitisimpossible'.Andisn'the rightaboutthat?Itispeculiartosay'Smithbelievesthat...'withacompletionwhich oneregardsasmeaningless,asthoughtorepeatmyearlierpointnonsensecould becomeintelligiblejustbyoccurringinasubordinateclause. Still,onemight'unstrictlyspeaking'say'Smithbelievesthat...'withameaningless completion.Onemightsay'Smithbelievesthatmatterexists',meaningthatSmith believesthat'Matterexists'expressessomethingtrue;ormeaningthatthereissome sentencewhichholdsthesamepositioninitslanguageas'Matterexists'doesin English,andwhichSmithbelievestoexpresssomethingtrue.This'unstrict'useof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

'believesthat'canbecriticizedformaskingthefactthatSmith'sbeliefisabouta sentence.Still,itisapossiblesenseandapparentlytheonlyonefortheform'x believesthat...'withameaninglesscompletion.SoletusconstrueBerkeley accordingly. Nowwehavehimsayingthatmenactasthoughtheybelievedthat'Matterexists' expressedsomethingtrue.Toactlikethat,though,wouldbetoproduceargumentswith 'Matterexists'aspremissorconclusion,toutter'Matterexists'assertively,tobuy Locke'sbooksandburnBerkeley's,andsoon.ThiscannotbewhatBerkeleymeans,for thesewouldbetheactionsofsomeonewithatheoreticalinterestincertain philosophicalissues,notofthecommonmanofwhomBerkeleyisspeaking. Furthermore,ifsomeonedidactinthosewaysweshouldhavenoreasontosaymerely thatheactedasthoughhebelievedthat'Matterexists'expressedsomethingtrue. 133

SoBerkeley's'Menactasthough...'makessenseonlywhensoconstruedthatitsays somethingfalsewhichisn'twhatBerkeleywantstosay.Therearetwopossibleaccounts ofwhathedoeswanttosay.(1)WhenBerkeleysaysthatmen'actasif[theybelieved that]theimmediatecauseoftheirsensations...weresomesenselessunthinking being',hemeansthattheyactasthoughtheydidnotbelievethatGodcausestheir sensations.Onthatreading,wecanseehowBerkeleythinksactionfitsintothepicture: 'Itisdownrightimpossible,thatasoulpiercedandenlightenedwithathoroughsenseof theomnipresence,holiness,andjusticeofthatAlmighty Spirit,shouldpersistina remorselessviolationofhislaws.'27Butthenthepassageunderdiscussionmustbe judgedasillwrittenandbadlythoughtout,ifonlybecauseBerkeleydoesseehow
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

someonecanholdthenonexistenceofGodasa'settledspeculativeopinion'.(2)Iam inclinedtothinkthatBerkeleyhasslippedintoconcedingthat,theologyapart,thereare ordinarymodesofconductwhichreflectLockeanassumptions.Ifthiswereeven possible,hismaincaseagainsttheveilofperceptiondoctrinewouldfail.Hearguesthat nothinginexperiencecouldcountfororagainstthedoctrine;whichimpliesthatthere cannotbewaysofhandlingtheempiricalworldwhicharemoreappropriatetothe doctrine'struththantoitsfalsity,or,therefore,waysofhandlingtheempiricalworld whichare'asifoneacceptedratherthanrejectedthedoctrine.28 ____________________ 27Principles155. 28SeeR.H.Popkin,'David Hume: his Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism', Chappell,pp.849. 134

VI BERKELEYONREALITY:IDEALISM
29.Idealismandphenomenalism ISHALLintroduceBerkeley'sidealismbycontrastingitwithwhatIcallphenomenalism. ThelatteranswersthesamequestionsasdoLocke'sandBerkeley'stheoriesofreality; and,thoughitisdistinctfromboth,itisanaturaldevelopmentoutofidealismandan improvementonit.Phenomenalism,ifnottrue,liesbetweenidealismandthetruth.I maintainthisjudgementevenwhen'phenomenalism'isdefinedbythetheoriessocalled
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

maintainthisjudgementevenwhen'phenomenalism'isdefinedbythetheoriessocalled inthetwentiethcentury.1Thechiefdefectsofthosetheoriesconsistinlingering remnantsofBerkeleianidealism,whiletheirbestmeritsclearlyconstituteadvanceson Berkeley.Whentheyarecleansedoftheiridealistmistakesthereisaresidueoftruth which,Ithink,stillwarrantsthename'phenomenalism'.Thelabelitselfdoesnot matter;butitisimportanttodistinguishtheseveralstrandsinthetheoriesinquestion, sothatwecanassessandsifttheargumentswhichpurportto'refutephenomenalism'. Idealismandphenomenalismagreethattheveilofperceptiondoctrineiswrong. Denyingthatthereisagapbetweenappearance(ingeneral)andreality(ingeneral) whichcanbecrossedbyempiricalarguments,theyrejectLocke'sgroundsforconfidence thatthereare'realthingswithoutus';anddenyingthatthereisinunbridgeablegap betweenappearanceandreality,theyrejectalsothescepticalconclusionwhichLocke soughttoavoid.Bothofthemaffirmthatthe'gap'canbebridgedbylogicalora priori means;byattentiontomeaningsorconcepts;bygettingclearaboutwhatitmeansto saythatsomethingisobjectivelythecase.Igivenoprimacytoanyoneofthese formulations,nordoIstressanydistinctionstheremaybeamongstthem.Thingslike thisaresometimessaid:'Acompetentgraspofobjectivityconceptsinvolvesareadiness tobasestatementsaboutwhatisobjectivelythecaseontruthsaboutwhatappearsto bethecase,butthelattercanneverentailtheformer.'Or:'Therelationship ____________________ 1SeeDavis,"'BerkeleyandPhenomenalism'". 135

betweenappearanceandrealityisa prioributnotlogical'or'...butnotanalytic.'Such
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

remarkspresupposedistinctionswhichwedonothaveinasufficientlyclearcutformto justifythishightheoreticaluseofthem. Idealism,then,shareswithphenomenalismaviewaboutthenatureofobjectivity concepts,oraboutthemeaningsofstatementsabouttheobjectiverealm.Underlying thisviewisageneralempiricismaboutallmeanings:tounderstandanystatement,I mustbeabletoconnectthedifferencebetweenitstruthanditsfalsitywithsome differenceitcouldmaketomesomedifferenceinthedata,therawchunksofreality, withwhichIamconfronted,i.e.inthesensorystateswhichIhaveor,asBerkeleywould say,intheideasIperceive.Ifthisisevenroughlycorrect,thenLocke'sproblemabout 'realthingswithoutus'shouldnotarise.Someonewhosays:'WhateverIknowaboutmy sensorystates,thereremainsthefurtherquestionofwhetherthereisreallyaworldof thingsoutsideme'hasmisunderstoodthequestion'Istherereallyaworldofthings outsideme?' Sketchyasthisis,itexhauststheoverlapbetweenphenomenalismandidealism.The overlapthesis,asonemightcallit,couldbeexpressedthus:anystatementaboutthe objectiverealmhasameaningwhichcouldbeexpressedinstatementsabout'ideas'or appearancesorsensedata.Therewouldbesomehistoricalwarrantforsayingthatthe overlapthesisdefines'phenomenalism';butthenBerkeley'stheorywouldbeoneformof 'phenomenalism',anditdoesn'tsuitmetousethelabelinthatway.Iwanttocontrast Berkeley'sidealismwitharivaltheorywhichaddstotheoverlapthesisalittlethat Berkeleydoesnotadd,andwhichomitsagreatdealwhichisincludedinBerkeley's theory.Ireservethetitle'phenomenalism'forthisrivaltheorymainlyasanexpository convenience,thoughthereishistoricalwarrantforthisusagetoo. Phenomenalismsaysthatanystatementabouttheobjectiverealmhasameaningwhich
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

couldbeexpressedinsomeset(notnecessarilyaconjunction)ofstatementsabout sensedata,anditaddsthatanysuchsetwillbelongandcomplexandwillcontain membersoftheform'Ifitwerethecasethat...,thensuchandsuchsensedatawould behad'.Oneshortwayofsayingthatanyobjectivitystatementisequivalenttoasetof statements,includingcounterfactualconditionals,aboutsensedata,istosaythat 136

Objectsarelogicalconstructionsoutofsensedata.AccordingtoBerkeley'sidealism,on theotherhand,objectsarecollectionsofsensedata: Asseveral[ideas]areobservedtoaccompanyeachother,theycometobe markedbyonename,andsotobereputedasonething.Thus,forexample,a certaincolour,taste,smell,figureandconsistencehavingbeenobservedtogo together,areaccountedonedistinctthing,signifiedbythenameapple.Other collectionsofideasconstituteastone,atree,abook,andthelikesensible things.2 Thedifferencebetweencollectionsandlogicalconstructions,asexpressedinthe contrastbetweenthatpassageandphenomenalism,makesitselffeltthroughout Berkeley'sthought.3Mypresentconcernistocontrastthetwoinasabstractand structuralawayaspossible. Beforeproceedingwiththat,IshouldpointoutthatIassumenothingaboutwhat 'logicalconstruction'hasmeantinthetwentiethcenturyphilosophicalliterature.Myuses ofthephrasewillbebasedsolelyuponthestipulativedefinitionIhavegiven.Myuses
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

of'collection',ontheotherhand,areanswerabletotheword'snormalEnglishmeaning. SomeonewhosaysthatFsarelogicalconstructionsoutofGsimpliesthatanygiven statementaboutanFisequivalenttosomesetofstatementsaboutGs;butallhe commitshimselfto,regardingthisset,isitsbeinglongandcomplexanditsincluding counterfactualconditionals.ButthestatementthatFsarecollectionsofGs,aswellas implyingthatanygivenFstatementisequivalenttosomeGstatement(s),setsquite severelimitsonwhatGstatementscanbeequivalenttoagivenFstatement.Theword 'collection'istoowideandvaguefortheselimitstobestatedprecisely,andwemust notexaggeratetheirseverity.Itisnotimplied,forexample,thatifSassertsthata givenFisthenSisequivalentto(S1&S2&...)whereeachconjunctassertsthata givenGis;forafootballteam,whichisacollectionofplayers,maybeunbeatable eventhoughnooneofitsmembersisunbeatable.Still,somelimitsclearlydoobtain. Notably,thethesisthatFsarecollectionsofGs,if'collections'istakenseriously, impliesthatFstatementsrelatetoGstatementsinsuchawaythatThere are Fsentails There are Gs.(Forexample, ____________________ 2Principles1. 3SeeDay,"'GeorgeBerkeley'",pp.2701. 137

There are football teamsentailsThere are football players,andthereasonwhythis entailmentholdsisjustthatitisafactaboutthemeaningof'team'thatateamisa collectionofplayers.)Andfromthisitfollowsbyelementarylogicthat,foranygiven

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

propositionP,If there are Gs then PentailsIf there are Fs then P.Neitherofthese entailmentsfollowsfromtheclaimthatFsareinmystipulatedsense'logical constructions'outofGs. LetusapplythesepointstoBerkeley.HisidealistthesisthatObjects are collections of ideas,togetherwiththepremissthatIf there are ideas then someone is in a sensory state,impliesthatIf there are objects then someone is in a sensory state.Hecould avoidthisconclusiononlybyrejectingthesecondpremissandthusallowingthatthere canbeideaswhichnoonehas.Thepremissinquestionisentailedbytheanti reificationthesisof5above,andBerkeleyacceptsit,moreorlessforthatreason.So hewillsaynotonlythatifthereareideasthensomeoneisinasensorystate,but furtherthatNo idea can exist unless someone has it;whichyieldsthefurtherconclusion thatNo object can exist unless each of its memberideas is had by someone. Now,oneofthemainspringsofBerkeley'sidealismisthedesiretoconnect'whatthere is'with'whatisperceived'.Soitisnaturalandinevitablethatheshouldequatex has an idea belonging to object Owithx perceives O.Thisequation,togetherwiththefinal conclusionoftheprecedingparagraph,yieldsBerkeley'smostfamousconclusion,namely thatNo object can exist unless it is perceived by someone: Itisindeedanopinionstrangelyprevailingamongstmen,thathouses, mountains,rivers,andinawordallsensibleobjectshaveanexistencenatural orreal,distinctfromtheirbeingperceivedbytheunderstanding.[Butthis opinioninvolves]amanifestcontradiction.Forwhataretheforementioned objectsbut...ideasorsensations;andisitnotplainlyrepugnantthatany oneoftheseoranycombinationofthemshouldexistunperceived?4
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ThethesisthattherecannotbeunperceivedobjectswillbefullydiscussedinChapter VII.MyaimherehasbeenmerelytoshowthatBerkeleyiscommittedtothisthesisjust bythetruththattherecannotbeunownedideas,togetherwith'Objectsarecollections ofideas'andthenaturalcorollarythattoperceiveanobjectistohaveoneofits memberideas.If'collectionsof'were ____________________ 4Principles4. 138

replacedby'logicalconstructionsoutof',theargumentwouldnotgothrough. Thelogicalconstruction/collectionlinedoesnotcorrespondtotheanalytic/syntheticline oranythinglikeit.A'logicalconstructions'statementmustbeaboutmeaningsor concepts,whilea'collections'oneneednotbe('Veterans'associationsarecollectionsof reactionaries').Buta'collections'statementmaybeofferedasaclaimaboutmeanings, orasanecessarytruthwarrantedbymeanings('Footballteamsarecollectionsof players').Berkeleycertainlysawidealismasaconceptualtheory:hesaysthatitwillbe acceptedby'anyonethatshallattendtowhatismeantbythetermexistwhenapplied tosensiblethings',5andoftencharacterizesthedenialofitas'repugnant'oras'a contradiction'.Therehavebeentheorieswhich,thoughtheyinterestusasconceptual analyses,werethoughtbytheirauthorstobesomethingelse,somethingmorelikenews aboutwhattheworldcontains;butBerkeley'sidealismisnotoneofthem.6

30.'Onlyideasareperceived'
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

WhydoesBerkeleysaythatobjectsarecollectionsofideas?Hereisapossible argument:(a)objectsarecollectionsofqualities,and(b)qualitiesareideas,therefore (c)objectsarecollectionsofideas.Although(a)connectswiththesubstratumissue,I stillmaintainthatthelatterisirrelevanttoourpresentconcerns;7fortheabove argumentdoesnotexplainBerkeley'sposition.Ifweaskwhyheaccepts(b),theanswer isthathederiveditfromidealismandhisidealismisjustwhatwearetryingto explain. AnoncircularexplanationishintedatinapassagetowhichIalludedearlier.Iquoted Berkeleyassaying'Whatareobjectsbut...ideasorsensations?',buthereisthe clausewiththegapfilled:'Whatareobjectsbutthethingsweperceivebysense,and whatdoweperceivebesidesourownideasorsensations'?8Itisfundamentaltohis thoughtthatBerkeleyrepeatedlyexplains'sensiblethings'or'objects'asthingswhich canbeperceived,andcontendsthatnothingcanbeperceivedexceptideas. ____________________ 5Principles3. 6SeeA.R.White,"'ALinguisticApproachtoBerkeley'sPhilosophy'",Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,vol.16(19556). 7Foravigorouslyarguedopposingview,seeE.B.Allaire,"'Berkeley'sIdealism'", Theoria,vol.29(1963). 8Principles4. 139

ThiscontentionofBerkeley'sneedstobeexplained,and,sincehearguesforitat
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

length,thereisnoshortageofrawmaterialsforanexplanation.Letusstarthere: PHILONOUS:Inreadingabook,whatIimmediatelyperceivearetheletters, butmediately,orbymeansofthese,aresuggestedtomymindthenotionsof God,virtue,truth,&c.Now,thatthelettersaretrulysensiblethings,or perceivedbysense,thereisnodoubt:butIwouldknowwhetheryoutakethe thingssuggestedbythemtobesotoo.HYLAS:Nocertainly,itwereabsurdto thinkGodorVirtuesensiblethings,thoughtheymaybesignifiedand suggestedtothemindbysensiblemarks,withwhichtheyhaveanarbitrary connexion.PHILONOUS:Itseemsthen,thatbysensible thingsyoumean[asI do]thoseonlywhichcanbeperceivedimmediatelybysense.HYLAS:Right.9 Certainly,ImaybeputinmindofsomethingbyreadingaboutitwhetheritbeGodor virtueora'sensiblething'likethePentagonwithoutperceivingitimmediatelyorinany otherway.WecanalsograntpartofBerkeley'snextstep,inwhichPhilonousgetsHylas toagreethat: Bysensible thingsImeanthoseonlywhichareperceivedbysense,and... thesensesperceivenothingwhichtheydonotperceiveimmediately:forthey makenoinferences.Thededucingthereforeofcausesoroccasionsfromeffects andappearances,whichaloneareperceivedbysense,entirelyrelatesto reason.10 Imayindeedperceivesomethingwithoutperceivingitscauses,aswhenIseeabook withoutseeingthepressitwasprintedon.PerhapsI'deduce'by'reason'thatitwas printedonapress,butthatinferenceformsnopartofmypresentperception. InagreeingwithBerkeleyonthestrengthofmyexamples,Iammisrepresentingthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

muchmoreconstrictinglinewhichhewantstodrawaroundwhatis'immediately perceived'.Justafterthepassagelastquoted,itisfurtheragreedthat:'[Wedonot] immediatelyperceivebysightanythingbesidelight,andcolours,andfigures:orby hearing,anythingbutsounds:bythepalate,anythingbesidetastes:bythesmell, besideodours:orbythetouch,morethantangiblequalities.'11These immediatelyperceivableitemsareallsupposedtobequalities,andshortlythereafterthe equationofqualitieswithideascomesintoplay; ____________________ 10First Dialogue,pp.1745. 11First Dialogue,p.175. 9First Dialogue,p.174. 140

butthatlineofargument,wehaveseen,doesnotilluminatethestructureofBerkeley's thought.AmorepromisingpassageoccurswhenHylas,afterbeinghustledinto acceptingidealism,recants: HYLAS:Ididnotsufficientlydistinguishtheobjectfromthesensation.Now thoughthislattermaynotexistwithoutthemind,yetitwillnotthencefollow thattheformercannot.PHILONOUS:Whatobjectdoyoumean?theobjectof thesenses?HYLAS:Thesame.PHILONOUS:Itisthenimmediatelyperceived. HYLAS:Right.PHILONOUS:Makemetounderstandthedifferencebetween whatisimmediatelyperceived,andasensation.12

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Hylasfails,ofcourse,andhisattemptisratherunhelpful:heallowsthattheobjectin questionisan'unthinkingsubstance';andPhilonous'objectionstothatpartlyconcern thesubstratumtheoryandarethusirrelevant,andpartlyrestongeneralidealist considerationsandthusbegourquestion. Wearestilllookingforanargumentfromuncontroversialpremissestotheconclusion thatonlyideascanbeperceived,ortothedoubleconclusionthatonlyideascanbe immediatelyperceivedandthatall(genuine)perceptionisimmediate.Webegintoget itafewpagesfurtheron,whenPhilonoussays(omittingHylas'limpaffirmatives): WhenyoubeholdthepictureofJuliusCaesar,doyouseewithyoureyesany morethansomecoloursandfigureswithacertainsymmetryandcomposition ofthewhole?...Andwouldnotaman,whohadneverknownanythingof JuliusCaesar,seeasmuch?...Consequentlyhehathhissight,andtheuse ofit,inasperfectadegreeasyou....Whencecomesitthenthatyour thoughtsaredirectedtotheRomanEmperor,andhisarenot?Thiscannot proceedfromthesensationsorideasofsensebyyouthenperceived;sinceyou acknowledgeyouhavenoadvantageoverhiminthatrespect.Itshouldseem thereforetoproceedfromreasonandmemory:shoulditnot?13 Knowingthatoneisconfrontedbya picture of Julius Caesar,then,involvesnotjust visualintakebutalso'reasonandmemory',i.e.backgroundknowledgeandtheabilityto relateittothesensorypresent.Butthesearealsoinvolvedinknowingthatoneis confrontedbya picturethatis,byaphysicalobjectwhichcanbetouchedandmoved around,whichwouldlookdifferentinvariouslights,andsoon.Berkeleyexplicitlysays this,notabout
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 12First Dialogue,pp.1945. 13First Dialogue,pp.2034. 141

thepicturebutaboutasimilarexamplewhichatlastgivesustheexplanationwehave beenlookingfor: Igrantwemayinoneacceptationbesaidtoperceivesensiblethings mediatelybysense:thatis,whenfromafrequentlyperceivedconnexion,the immediateperceptionofideasbyonesensesuggeststothemindothers perhapsbelongingtoanothersense,whicharewonttobeconnectedwith them.Forinstance,whenIhearacoachdrivealongthestreets,immediatelyI perceiveonlythesound;butfromtheexperienceIhavehadthatsuchasound isconnectedwithacoach,Iamsaidtohearthecoach.Itisnevertheless evident,thatintruthandstrictness,nothingcanbeheardbutsound:andthe coachisnotthenproperlyperceivedbysense,butsuggestedfromexperience. Solikewisewhenwearesaidtoseearedhotbarofiron;thesolidityandheat oftheironarenottheobjectsofsight,butsuggestedtotheimaginationby thecolourandfigure,whichareproperlyperceivedbythatsense.Inshort, thosethingsaloneareactuallyandstrictlyperceivedbyanysense,which wouldhavebeenperceived,incasethatsamesensehadthenbeenfirst conferredonus.Asforotherthings,itisplaintheyareonlysuggestedtothe mindbyexperiencegroundedonformerperceptions.14
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thissubtlymixesshrewdtruthwithseriouserror.Ishalltrytoseparatethem. Aminorpoint:Imaybe'saidtohearthecoach'evenifappropriatetactualandvisual correlatesarenot'suggestedtomymind',foryoumayproperlysay'Hethinksheis hearingathunderstorm,butreallyheishearingacoach'.Still,itistrueandwecan takethistobewhatBerkeleymeantthatifIthinkthatI'hearacoach'thenImust havenotjustmypresentauditory'ideas'butalsocertainkindsofbackgroundknowledge aswell. Anotherpreliminarypoint:BerkeleymaythinkthatwhathappensisthatIputtogether mypresentauditorystateandmymemoriesofpastexperiences,andthen,perhaps extremelyquickly,inferthatI'hearacoach';orhemaythinkthatmypastexperiences have'programmed'meinsuchawaythatmypresentauditorystatecausesmeto believethatI'hearacoach'.Theformeraccountwouldbewronginmostcases;the lattermight,forallIknow,alwaysberight;butneitheriswhatBerkeleyneeds.The vitalpointisthatmybeliefthatI'hearacoach'isanswerabletofactsaboutwhatI shallorshouldexperienceunderdifferentconditions,andthatitcouldbedefended ____________________ 14First Dialogue,p.204. 142

by'reasonandmemory',i.e.byadisciplinedappealtothewaysinwhich,inthepast, certainvisualandtactual'ideas'havebeenassociatedwithauditorystateslikemy presentone.ThatiswhatBerkeleyneedsforthispartofhisargumentananalytic thesisaboutthemeaningof'hearsacoach',notageneticoneabouthowanyonecomes

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

tobelievethathehearsacoach.Berkeleyisright,then,inthinkingthat'xperceivesO att',whereOisnotan'idea',reportsmorethanjustwhatx'ssensorystatewasatt. Wemayevenconcedethat'xperceives[nonidea]att'isaconjunctionof(a)something oftheform'xhas[idea]att'and(b)astatementaboutideashadattimesotherthant and,perhaps,aboutwhatideaswouldhavebeenhadatvarioustimesifcertain conditionshadobtained.WhereBerkeleyerrsisinthinkingthat(a)isagenuine perceptionstatementwhile(b)isnot.Onceweallowthat(a)isaparadigmofa perceptionstatement,wecanhardlyavoidsayingthatonlyideasareperceived,and thenceconcludingthat'sensiblethings'areideasorcollectionsofideas.Inatleastfour differentwaysBerkeleygivesthiserroraspeciousplausibility,andsorendersiteasier toacceptortomakeinthefirstplace. 1. Thereisapointoftactics.Berkeleybeginsbysayingthatwhatisonly'mediately' perceivedisnotgenuinelyperceivedatall,andheillustratesthiswithan uncontroversialexample:weallagreethatGod,truthandvirtuearenotperceived evenwhenweseewordswhich'suggest'them.Heconvenientlyoverlooksthefact thatinsuchacasenoonewouldsaythatGodetc.are'mediately'perceivedeither. Thatis,theexampledoesnot,asitpurportsto,concernauseof'perceive'which we do havebutwhichonreflectionweagreetobeun'strict'becausetheperception involvedisonlymediate.ItturnsoutthatBerkeleywantstoconstrue'mediate perception'sothatitcoverseveryuseof'reasonandmemory'toconnecttheideas hadattwithotheractualandpossibleideas;andthatdoesimplythatsomeofour ordinaryperceptionstatements,suchas'xhearsacoach',reportonly'perceptions' oftheallegedlysuspect,'mediate'variety.Butthatoughtnottobeallowedtogain plausibilityfromthe'God'example,forthelatterdrawsthemediate/immediateline inadifferentplace.ThisisshownbythefactthatBerkeley'sfinalpositionactually condemnshishandlingofthe'God'example.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

143

HesaysthatwhatweperceiveimmediatelyarenotGod,truthandvirtue,butonly words;butthenitturnsoutthatallweperceiveimmediatelyareourownvisual ideas,andthatthewordstheinkportionswhichcouldbeseenatothertimesand byotherpeoplearethemselvesperceivedonlymediately. The'coach'passageitselfhasafalseplausibility.Onedoesnotshrinkfromsaying that'Ihearacoach'means'Ihearasoundmadebyacoach',andonemightthink thatthatistograntBerkeleyhismainpoint.Itisn't,though.Evenifweconcede thatanystatementabouthearinganobjectought,'strictly',tobeexpressedasa statementabouthearingasoundwhichissomehowassociatedwithanobject,this stilldoesnotgiveBerkeleywhathewants.Forhewantstheimmediateaccusatives oftheverb'tohear'tobeauditory'ideas',andasoundisnotan'idea'.Asoundis objective,physical,spatiallylocated,interpersonallyperceptible;whileanauditory ideaorsensedatumisnoneofthese.Berkeleyregularlyconfusesobjectivesounds withauditorysensedata,andthisgivesaspeciousplausibilitytohisthesisthat strictlyspeakingonecanhearnothingbutasound;wherehemusttake'sound'to mean'auditoryidea',butweareinclinedtoagreewithwhathesaysbecausewe take'sound'tomeansound.Thisequivocationwith'sound'apparentlycannotbe reproducedfortheothersenses,exceptperhapsforthesenseofsmell.Thereasons forthisseemtobecomplexandinteresting,butadiscussionofthemwouldtake metoofarafield. Berkeley'susesofthecognatesof'strict'areprobablyahelptohim:'intruthand strictness,nothingcanbeheardbutsound...',and'[onlyideas]areactuallyand strictlyperceived...'.Theseturnsofphrasearedangerousbecause'strict'is ambiguous.Touseaword'strictly'maybetouseitnarrowly,ortouseitinan
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

unusuallycarefulandcorrectway;andonemightbetemptedinBerkeley'sdirection byadriftfromonesenseof'strict'totheother. Theexpressions'perceivebysense'and'seewithyoureyes'arealsorelevant.Itis nottruethatwhatIperceiveattisdeterminedwhollybymysensorystateatt;but theotherrelevantfactsliewithintheprovinceof'reasonandmemory',andwecan understandBerkeley'sthinkingitsafetodenythattheseotherfactshaveany bearingonwhatIperceiveby senseatt.Asfor'seewithyoureyes':ofcoursethere isnootherwayofseeing,butI 144

thinkthatBerkeleyusesthisexpressioninanattempttobolsterhisviewthatany accountofwhatoneseesmustconsistwhollyoffactsaboutone'svisualintake ('Seeingissomethingyoudowithyoureyes,notwithyourearsoryourfingertips') whenceitfollowsthatonecannotseeatangiblecoach.

31.ThesourceofBerkeley'serror
HaveIexplainedBerkeley'swillingnesstosaythatallwe'strictly'perceiveareideasand thusthatobjectsare(collectionsof)ideas?Hardly.ThepointsIhavemademighthelp ustounderstandBerkeley'sfidelitytoidealismevenwhensomeofitsimplausibilities begintoshowthrough,buttheydonotexplainwhatpositive,substantialreasonshe hadforentertainingidealisminthefirstplace. Thismightexplainit:seeingthatLocke'spositionwasuntenable,Berkeleysoughtan accountofperceptionwhichwouldshowthatwedoperceiveobjectsandwouldexplain howwecanknowthatwedo;andtheonlyaccounthecouldfindwasidealism,which
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

saysthatweperceiveobjectsbecauseobjectsareideas. Thatexplanationismoderatelysatisfying.IfBerkeleysawidealismastheonly alternativetotheinaccessibleworldofLockean'realthings',hissplendidlyclearviewof thedefectsofLocke'spositionwouldofcourseleadhimtooptforidealismandto maintainitinthefaceofalmostanydifficulty.ButtheexplanationsaysthatBerkeley couldseenoviablealternativetotheveilofperceptiondoctrineotherthanidealism andonemightaskforthattobeexplained.Specifically,giventhatphenomenalismis muchmoreviablethanidealism,whydidBerkeleyoptforthelatter?This,whichisthe last'Why?'inmycurrentsequence,willbeansweredinthepresentsection. TheanswercannotbethatitdidnoteveroccurtoBerkeleytousetypically phenomenalisticformsinelucidatingstatementsaboutobjects.Apartfromhiscovertly phenomenalistictheoryabout(Berkeleian)'realthings',tobediscussedin34below, therearetwoisolatedphenomenalisticpassages.Inoneofthem,heelucidatesthe statement'Theearthmoves'byaphenomenalisticuseofconditionalswhich,hadhe thoughthardaboutit,hecouldscarcelyhaveavoidedcarryingoverintotheanalysisof 145

'Thereisaplanetinsuchandsuchanorbitaroundthesun',andthenceintotheanalysis ofstatementsabouttheexistenceofobjectsgenerally: Thequestion,whethertheearthmovesorno,amountsinrealitytonomore thanthis,towit,whetherwehavereasontoconcludefromwhathathbeen observedbyastronomers,thatifwewereplacedinsuchandsuch circumstances,andsuchorsuchapositionanddistance,bothfromtheearth

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andsun,weshouldperceivetheformertomoveamongthechoirofthe planets,andappearinginallrespectslikeoneofthem.15 Inhisoneotherpassageinthisvein,Berkeleyadumbratesaphenomenalisticanalysisof astatementwhichisexplicitlyabouttheexistenceofanobject: ThetableIwriteon...exists,thatis,Iseeandfeelit;andifIwereoutof mystudyIshouldsayitexisted,meaningtherebythatifIwasinmystudyI mightperceiveit,orthatsomeotherspiritactuallydoesperceiveit.16 SoBerkeleywascapableonoccasionoftakingaphenomenalistline.Whathastobe explainedishisnotbuildingonsuchpassagesasthesehisoptingforatheorywhich, preciselybecauseitexcludesconditionals,spawnsthehostofdifficultieswhichIshall examinein33.TheexplanationmightbethatBerkeleyjustdidn'tseeinhisoccasional phenomenalistremarksthemakingsofatheoreticalalternativetoidealism;andthis, thoughnotinteresting,couldbecorrectandcouldalsobealltheexplanationthereis.If Berkeley'sinattentiontophenomenalismwasasheeroversight,itwouldbean honourableandunderstandableone,andwemightbecontenttoleavethematterthere. However,Ishalltakethematterfurther.Foronething,Berkeley'sunpublished Philosophical Commentariesprovideconsiderableevidencethatatanearlystagehenot onlyenvisagedphenomenalismasatheoreticaloptionbutwasstronglyinclinedto acceptit(see41below).AndinanycasetherearereasonsforthinkingthatBerkeley waspushedawayfromphenomenalismbyhisviewsaboutmeaning.Thelattersetup pressureswithinhissystemwhichyieldthebestexplanationwhetherasarivaltothe 'oversight'explanationorasadeepeningofitofBerkeley'schoosingidealism.Itisn't importanttoknowwhetherBerkeleyeverconsideredespousingphenomenalismandthen
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

decidednot ____________________ 15Principles58. 16Principles3. 146

tobecause...etc.Butthelogicalrelationshipswithinhisphilosophyareimportant:my mainpointisthenonbiographicalonethatBerkeleycouldnothaveembraced phenomenalism,andthoughtitsconsequencesthrough,withoutbeingforcedtorevise radicallycertainassumptionsofhisaboutmeaning.Inowproceedtodefendthis. Letusgrantthat'xperceivesOatt'canbespelledoutintostatementspurelyaboutthe havingofideas,andthatwhenthusspelledoutitreportsonlyoneactualhappening-att,namelyx'shavingacertainideaatt.If'xperceivesOatt'hasanyfurthercontentit mustconcernideashadattimesotherthantorideaswhichwouldbehad,attorother times,ifcertainconditionsobtained.Berkeleytakesthistoimplythattheonlyclear, cleanphilosophicallydefensiblesensewecangiveto'xperceivesOatt'isthesense expressedby'xhas[idea]att',i.e.thesensewhichpicksouttheonerelevant happeningatt. Supposewedenythis.Supposeweinsistthatthereisnothingwrong,shallow,or misleadingaboutsoconstruing'xperceivesOatt'thatitisequivalenttoasetof statementswhichincludenotonly'xhas[idea]att'butalsoonesoftheform'IfCwere thecaseatt * then[idea]wouldbehadatt * '.(Indicativestatementsaboutideashadat timesotherthantwillbediscussedin33,andarehereignored.)Berkeley,Ithink,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

wouldobjecttothisalongthefollowinglines: 'Ifallfactsaboutsensiblethingscanbeexpressedinthelanguageofideas,youought tobeabletocompletetheequation"Ois..."inthelanguageofideas.Butyourclaim, that"xperceivesOatt"saysthingsaboutwhatideaswouldbehadifcertainconditions obtained,preventsyoufromthuscompletingtheequation.Obviously,itrulesout"Ois theideawhichxhasatt";andwhatalternativesareyouleftwith?Allyoucansayis thatOconsistsoftheideawhichxhasatttogetherwithotherpossibleideas,ideas whichwouldbehadifcertainconditionsobtained.Butthatispreposterous.Itseems quitewrong,andiscertainlynothelpful,tosaythatwhatxperceivesattisaclassof possibleideasofwhichone,andperhapsonlyone,isactual.' Wemightcompletetheequationbysaying'Oisalogicalconstructionoutofideas'.This reallyevadesBerkeley'schallengethough,anditwouldbebettertosay:althoughall thefactsaboutobjectscanbeexpressedinthelanguageofideas,theequation 147

'Ois...'cannotbecompletedinthatlanguage.Toanalyseobjectivityconceptsinthe languageofideas,wemustforgosuchformsas'"table"means...'or'Atableis...', andadoptsuchformsas'Tosaythatthereisatableistosay...'and'Tosaythatone perceivesatableistosay...'.Theseformsmakeroomfortheconditionalswhichlet usadmititcannotbecapturedbytheformwhichBerkeleywouldinsistuponusing. Thisisnottoadmitthatourobjectivityconceptsarepeculiarorunsatisfactory;but Berkeleywouldthinkthatitis,becauseheisincompletelyliberatedfromLocke'stheory ofmeaning.HeseemstohavesharedwithLockeandwithotherphilosophersaview

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

aboutmeaningwhich,thoughnotessentialtothe'synchronousmentalactivity'analysis ofmeaning,isanaturalaccompanimentofit.Thisistheviewthattheunitofmeaning istheindividualword:notjustthatoneunderstandsasentencebyunderstandingits constituentwords,butthemuchstronger,falseviewthatthewholestoryaboutwhata wordmeanscanbetoldwithoutimplyinganythingabouthowitcanbeputtogetherwith otherwordstoyieldmeaningfulsentences.Accordingtothisview,discreteword meaningsarejudiciouslyassembledtoyieldsentencemeaningsjustaswordscanbe juxtaposedtoyieldsentencesorbrickstoyieldbuildings.Anyonewhoacceptsthis pictureofhowwordmeaningrelatestosentencemeaningisboundtothinkofa clarificationoranalysisastypicallyhavingasinglewordononesideandaphraseonthe other.Atheoryofmeaningwhichconnectsthemeaningofawordwiththerolesitcan playinsentences,ontheotherhand,removestheblinkersandenablesustoseethat ananalysismayhavetohaveawholesentenceononesideandoneormoresentences ontheother.AsImentionedin8above,Berkeleyhimselfsometimescountenances analysesofthiskind;butheregardsthemasaspecialcasenamelythespecialcase whereanexpressionhastobeexplainedinthismannerbecauseitdoesnotstandfor anythingintheworld.ThereisclearlynoencouragementthereforBerkeleytoadoptthis patternofanalysisforobjectivityconceptsgenerally. (AgainsttheLockeanviewabouthowwordmeaningrelatestosentencemeaningwe couldbringtheslogan'Themeaningofawordisdeterminedbyitsuseinsentences'; andagainsthisgeneral'mentalcorrelate'analysisofmeaningwecouldbringtheslogan 'Themeaningofaword(orotherpartoflanguage)isitsuse'. 148

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

EachsloganexpressesapositionowingmuchtoWittgenstein,thoughtheformerowes moretoFrege;17eachdeniessomethingacceptedbyLocke;itishardtorejecteither withoutrejectingtheother;anditisnaturaltoexpressboth,oncetheirdistinguishing emphaseshavebeenremoved,bythesinglesentence'Themeaningofawordisitsuse inthelanguage'.Havingbeenplaguedbymyowntendencytogowrongaboutthis,I thinkitmaybeworthwhiletosay:wehaveheretwopositions,notone;answerstotwo quitedifferentquestions,notone.) Ourquestion,itwillberecalled,was'WhydidBerkeleynotexploithisconditionalizing passagesanddevelopsomethinglikephenomenalism?'The'sheeroversight'answer, eveniftrueasintellectualbiography,isunhelpfulbecauseittellsusnothingaboutthe logicalstructureofBerkeley'sphilosophy.Butwedolearnsomethingaboutthisstructure ifthe'oversight'explanationisreplacedorsupplementedbyanexplanationdrawingon thepointsIhavebeenexpounding:EvenifBerkeleyconsideredgivingtheoretical significanceto'Ishouldsayitexisted,meaningtherebythatifIwasinmystudyImight perceiveit',hewouldbedeterredbyhisinabilitytogettheforceofthisconditionalinto anequationoftheform'Thetableinmystudyis...'withacompletionexpressedin thelanguageofideas.Hemightwellbeattractedbyaphenomenalisticaccountof'The tableinmystudyexists'or'Thereisatableinmystudy';buthewouldhavetoregard anyelucidationofsuchsentencesasjustanupshotofthemorefundamentalelucidation whichisrequired,namelythatoftheword'table';anditisthiswhichhecouldnotgive withoutdesertinghisuseofconditionals. Thepatternisthis:awrongviewinthetheoryofmeaningengendersanarrowedviewof whatshapeananalysisormeaningelucidationmayhavetohave;andthisinturn engendersfaultyanalyses.InChapterXIIIweshallseethissamepatterninHume's treatmentofthesameproblem.ItisworthnotingthatKantwasmuchfreerthaneither
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

BerkeleyorHumefromLockeanassumptionsaboutmeaning,andthathecamemuch nearerthantheydidtoformulatingphenomenalismasatheoreticalposition.Thesetwo facts,Isubmit,areconnected.18 ____________________ 17G.Frege,The Foundations of Arithmetic(NewYork,1953),p.x.SeealsoZabeeh, Hume,pp.834. 18SeeJ.Bennett,Kant's Analytic(Cambridge,1966),42. 149

32.Ananti-phenomenalistskirmish
Thissectionisanaside.InitIshalldiscussthefollowingremarkablebutseldom remarkedpassage: HYLAS:Yes,Philonous,Igranttheexistenceofasensiblethingconsistsin beingperceivable,butnotinbeingactuallyperceived.PHILONOUS:Andwhat isperceivablebutanidea?Andcananideaexistwithoutbeingactually perceived?19 Thisfragmentis,sofarasIknow,Berkeley'sonlyexplicit,publishedconsiderationof phenomenalismasatheoreticalalternativetoidealism.WecansupposethatHylas recallsthepassingremarkaboutthetableinthestudy,andisinvitingPhilonoustobuild itintohistheorybyreplacing'Thetableexistsonlyifitisperceived'bythemore generousprinciple'Thetableexistsonlyifitisperceivedorperceivablei.e.wouldbe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

perceivedifcertainconditionsweresatisfied'.PhilonousrepliesnotthatHylas'principle iswrongbutthatitisnotreallymoregenerous.Hesays,ineffect,thatalthough phenomenalismlooksmoreliberalitturnsouttobeequivalenttoidealismafterall. AsBerkeleystatesit,Philonous'replypresupposesthatonlyideasareperceivable;and thatbegsourquestion.Buttheargumentdoesnotdependuponthiswecanbanish 'perceive'fromitandstillhavesomethingleft.Hylas'proposal,with'perceive'removed, isthatforasensiblethingtoexistisforcertainideastobehador havable.Philonous' reply,Isuggest,canbeamplifiedintothefollowing.'Theadditionof"...orhavable" makesnodifference.Astatementendingwith"...kicked"mighthaveitstruth conditionschangedifweadded"...orkickable";butthatisbecausekickablethingscan existwithoutbeingkicked,e.g.unsoldfootballs;whereastheonlyitemswhichare "havable"intherelevantsenseareideas,andanideacanexistonlyifitisactuallyhad. Therearenohavableideaswhicharenotactuallyhadbysomeone,andsoinreplacing "had"by"hadorhavable"youhaveleftthingsexactlywheretheywere.' Philonousisinerror.Herightlythinksthathadorhavable'candifferinforcefrom'had' onlyif'havablebutnothad'makessense;andherightlythinksthateveryactualideais had;buthewronglyinfersfromthisthateveryhavableideais ____________________ 19Third Dialogue,p.234. 150

had.Ifeveryactualideaishad,theneveryFideaishad,where'F'standsforapredicate whichpicksoutasubclassofideasofsomekind;but'havable'isnotapredicateofthis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

kind.Hereisanotherwayofputtingthesamepoint.Hylassuggeststhat'Oexists'might beentailedbyastatementaboutwhatideasarehavable,i.e.bysomethingoftheform: 1. IfP,thenanideaofkindKishad. 2. Philonousequates(1)with ThereisanideaIofkindKsuchthat:ifP,thenIishad. Therestisplainsailing:ifthereissuchanidea,thenthatideaisactuallyhad;so theantecedentoftheconditional'IfP,thenIishad'isidle;andthewholeof(2)is notweakerthan AnideaofkindKisactuallyhad, whichisthesortofstatementwhichBerkeley'sidealismsaysmustbeusedto expressthecontentof'Oexists.'Themistakehere,ofcourse,istheequationof(1) with(2),whichisonaparwithequating'IfIdrinkthisIshallhaveaheadache'with 'ThereisaheadachewhichIshallhaveifIdrinkthis'. Thesetwoglossesimposeaheavyloadonapairofrhetoricalquestionstotallingamere sixteenwords;butIsubmitthattheydolaybarethestructureofBerkeley'sthoughtin thequotedpassage.Theydon'tdohimmuchcredit,butthenIdon'tofferthislineof thoughtassolidlyexplainingBerkeley'ssteadyavoidanceofphenomenalism.The deepestreasonforthatavoidance,expoundedafewpagesback,wouldbearonHylas' proposalasfollows.Hylasissuggestingthat'Oexists'maybeentailedbysetsof statementsoftheform IfC1obtained,I1wouldbehadIfC2obtained,I2wouldbehad...etc. Facedwiththis,Berkeleyisunderpressuretoreply:'ButthenwhatistheobjectO?
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

3.

pdfcrowd.com

PresumablyitisthesetofideasI1,I2,...;butiftheseareactualideasthenthey areactuallyhad,andyourconditionalsareidle.Ifontheotherhandtheyaremerely possibleideas,thenhowcanasetofthembeanactualobject?Inshort,your conditionalanalysisof"Oexists"won'tletyousaywhattheobjectOiswon'tletyou honestlycompletetheequation"Ois..."inthelanguageofideas.'True,butthe conditional 151

analysisisnonetheworseforthat.Inthinkingotherwise,Berkeley,wouldbemakinga mistake,butnotonethatcouldproperlybeviewedwithcondescension. Forthosewithaninterestinintellectualbiography,Iofferthefollowingunimportant conjecture:Berkeleyeventuallynoticedthathistwophenomenalisticremarksaboutthe earth'smovementandthetableinthestudymightbethoughttopointtoatheoretical alternativetoidealism,andhetriedtodosomethingaboutthis.Ibasethisconjecture ontwosetsoffacts. Firstly,thetworemarksinquestionoccurinthePrinciples.IcannotfindthatBerkeley lapsesintophenomenalisticconditionals,evenbriefly,anywhereintheDialogues; exceptthathistheoryabout'realthings'(see34below)isavehicleofakindof phenomenalismwhichruns,presumablyentirelyunrecognized,allthroughbothworks. Secondly,Berkeley'sonlyexplicitconsiderationofthephenomenalisticalternativeisin thefleeting'perceived/perceivable'argumentwhichIhavequotedfromtheDialogues. Hiseffortstoisolateanotionof'immediateperception'(see30above),andto distinguishwhatis'perceived'fromwhatismerely'suggested',werefirstundertaken,for
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

aratherlimitedpurpose,intheNew Theory of Vision;thereisverylittleliketheminthe Principles;butthentheyoccurinastrenuousandextendedformintheDialogues,where theylookverymuchlikeaconsciousendeavourtoshowthatthephenomenalist approachiswrong.

33.SomeconsequencesofBerkeley'serror
Ifobjectsareideas,therecannotbeunperceivedobjects.Idealismhasotherunwelcome consequencestoo,ofwhichIshallpresentthreehereandafourthin34.Ineverycase weshallfindBerkeleymeetingthechallenge,ifatall,inthesameway:byadmitting idealism'sapparentconflictwithsomeofourordinarywaysoftalkingaboutobjects,and thentryingtoexplainthecommonlocutionsinquestionnottodiscreditthembutto showthattheyconsistofaBerkeleiancoreplusanapparentlynonBerkeleianperiphery. Therelationshipoftheperipherytothecoreissupposedtoshowthatsuchlocutionsdo notreally 152

conflictwithidealism,ornotinawaywhichtellsagainstidealism. Thistactic,Ishallargue,doesnotwork.Inalegitimatestatementaboutasensible thing,themaincontentisnotapurelyBerkeleianstatementaboutanidea:what Berkeleyrelegatestotheperipheryisneverassuperficialorassimple,andistherefore notasperipheral,ashethinksitis.Toseethisistoseesomethingaboutwhy phenomenalismisanadvanceonidealism.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Firstly,then:Icannot'perceive'attacollectionofideassomeofwhichdonotexistat t;sowhatIperceiveattmustbeacollectionoftdatedideasnomemberofthat collectioncanexistatanothertime;soIcannotperceiveoneobjectonseparate occasions;soobjectscannothavehistories. HowwouldBerkeleyhavetreatedthispointifithadoccurredtohimasadifficulty?20 Hemighthavesaid(i)thatobjectsdohavehistoriesandthatstrictlyspeakingallIcan perceiveattisatemporalpartofanobject,afewmembersoftheideacollectionwhich constitutestheenduringobject.Buthewouldbemorelikelytosay(ii)that'intruthand strictness'Icannotperceivethesameobjecttwice,andthatourusesof'thesamething again'areinaccuratethoughexcusablefaons de parler. Eitherway,heoughttostatethecriteriafortwononcontemporaneousideas'counting whetherinstrictBerkeleiantheoryorinunstrictordinaryspeechasperceptionsofa singlething.Berkeleywouldprobablytry:'I1andI2areideasofthesamethingifand onlyiftheyaresufficientlyalike';butthatisdoublyinadequate.Afterseeingthatapple yesterday,Iateit,sothatmypresentvisualfieldthoughjustlikeyesterday'sisnota seeingofthesameapple.Ontheotherhand,thatclownhasjustchangedhisclothes, makeupandposture:mypresentvisualfield,thoughenormouslyunliketheoneIhad tenminutesago,isaseeingofthesameman.IfBerkeleyistodojusticetoour ordinarynotionof'thesamethingagain',hemustbepreparedtograpplewith complexities.Thisisimportant,forthefollowingreason. (i)SupposethatBerkeleyadmitsintohistheorythenotionof'perceivingthesamething twice'.Sincethiswouldbeanattempttoavoidaconflictwithordinarylanguage, achievedonlybycreatingadifferentconflict('Strictlyspeakingalloneperceives
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 20SeePrinciples95. 153

attisatemporalpartofanobject'),itwouldbepointlessunlessitprovidedforthe notionof'perceivingthesamethingtwice'whichwedoinfacthavenotmerelysome notionwhichcouldbethusexpressed.Furthermore,Berkeleywouldbeobligednotjust togiveusgeneralpermissiontocarryonspeakingaswehavebeenaccustomedto doing,buttostateexplicitcriteriaforideas'belongingtoasinglecollectionor pertainingtoasingleobject.Butexplicitcriteriaforourordinarynotionof'perceivingthe samethingtwice'wouldhavetomakeitclearthatthetruthof'I1andI2belongtothe samecollection(pertaintothesameobject)'maydependnotjustuponhowI1andI2 relatetooneanotherandtootheractualideas,butalsouponwhatideaswouldhave occurredif...AssoonasBerkeleyallowsthatkindofthinginto his theoryheiswellon thewaytodroppingidealisminfavourofphenomenalism:hecannolongertake seriouslyandstrictlyhisthesisthatobjectsare'collections'ofideas. (ii)SupposethenthatBerkeleytakestheotherline:strictlyspeakinganobjectisa collectionofcontemporaneousideas,andvulgarusesof'thesamemanagain'etc.can beexplainedbyidealismbutarenotreallysanctionedbyit.Itisnotveryplausibleto say:'"Objectshavehistories"and"Isawittwice"arejustfaons de parler.Theyareall rightintheirwayoneseeswhatpeoplemeanbythembuttheyaren'tstrictlytrueas theystand.'ButtheimplausibilityofthispositionmatterslessthanhowBerkeleywould havetodefendit.Hewouldhavetosaythat'IseethemanIsawanhourago'mainly reportswhatmyvisualfieldswerelikenowandanhourago,andperipherallyaddssome
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

extradetailwhichinthecarelessvernacularissummedupintheclaimthatIsaw'the sameman'onbothoccasions.ThecontentwhichBerkeleywouldthusrelegatetothe periphery,however,couldhardlybesketchedinlessthanfifteenpages,andthatistoo muchtotreatasamerescatteroflimbsandoutwardflourishesaroundtheBerkeleian core.Inshort,theapproachwhichIhaveguessedBerkeleywouldtaketothisproblem andwhichhedoestaketorelatedonesvastlyunderestimatestheweightand complexity,andthusthecentrality,ofthoseaspectsofordinaryspeechandthought whichprima facieconflictwithidealism. Theseconddifficultyisthis:Icannot'perceive'anideawhichsomeoneelse'perceives'; soeitherIneverperceiveawholeobjectbutonly'myshareofit',i.e.thosemembersof itwhich 154

occurinmymind,orobjectsarenotinterpersonallyperceivable.Eitherway,idealism conflictswithordinaryspeechandthought.21 Berkeleydoesgrapplewiththisone.WhenHylasasks'Doesitnotfollowfromyour principlesthatnotwocanseethesamething?',Philonousreplies: Ifthetermsamebetakeninthevulgaracceptation,itiscertain(andnotatall repugnanttotheprinciplesImaintain)thatdifferentpersonsmayperceivethe samething;orthesamethingorideaexistindifferentminds....Butifthe termsamebeusedintheacceptationofphilosophers,whopretendtoan abstractednotionofidentity,then,accordingtotheirsundrydefinitionsofthis notion(foritisnotyetagreedwhereinthatphilosophicidentityconsists),it
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

mayormaynotbepossiblefordiverspeopletoperceivethesamething.But whetherphilosophersshallthinkfittocallathingthesameorno,is,I conceive,ofsmallimportance.22 Philonousadds,ineffect,thatwemaysay'YouandIseethesamething'meaning'Our visual fields are alike',orwemaysay'YouandIcannotseethesamething'meaning 'YouandI,sincewearedistinctfromoneanother,cannotshareavisualfield'.This,he thinks,istheendofthematter: Whoseesnotthatallthedisputeisaboutaword?towit,whetherwhatis perceivedbydifferentpersons,mayyethavethetermsameappliedtoit?... Supposeahouse,whosewalls...remainingunaltered,thechambersareall pulleddown,andnewonesbuiltintheirplace;andthatyoushouldcallthis thesame,andIshouldsayitwasnotthesamehouse...Wouldnotallthe differenceconsistinasound?23 Isupposethat'philosopherswhopretendtoanabstractednotionofidentity'areones whowouldsay:'xwouldordinarilybesaidtobethesameasy,butisxreallythesame asy?';or'Nevermindhow"same"isnormallyusedIwanttoknowthetruemeaningof "same"'or'...Iwanttoknowwhatsamenessreallyis'.Theword'abstracted' gratuitouslydragsLockeintothisunattractivecamp,butBerkeley'spointitselfisa soundone. Hedrawsfromit,though,themoralthatoncethefactsareagreedonthereremainsonly anegligibleverbalquibble,adisputeabout'asound'.Thatdoesnotfollow,forthe residual ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

21SeeD.Braybrooke,"'BerkeleyontheNumericalIdentityofIdeas'",Philosophical

Review,vol.64(1955). 22Third Dialogue,p.247. 23Third Dialogue,p.248. 155

'verbal'dispute,farfrombeingtrivial,maybeaseriousconceptualdisagreementwith philosophicalconsequencesdependingonit.OtherwisewecoulddeflateBerkeley's attackontheveilofperceptiondoctrinebysaying:'Thedoctrinelacksempiricalcontent; sothedisputecannotconcernthefacts,andmustthereforebemerelyverbal.'Infact, Berkeleyrightlytakessome'verbal'questionsseriously: HYLAS:Iownindeed,theinferencesyoudrawmeinto,soundsomething oddly;butcommonlanguage,youknow,isframedby,andfortheuseofthe vulgar:wemustnotthereforewonder,ifexpressionsadaptedtoexact philosophicnotions,seemuncouthandoutoftheway.PHILONOUS:Isitcome tothat?Iassureyou,Iimaginemyselftohavegainednosmallpoint,since youmakesolightofdepartingfromcommonphrasesandopinions;itbeinga mainpartofourinquiry,toexaminewhosenotionsarewidestofthecommon road,andmostrepugnanttothegeneralsenseoftheworld.24 Berkeleycoulddefendhisoffhanddismissalofthedisputeabout'same'bymaintaining thatalthoughsomedisputesaboutwordsarenottrivialthisparticularoneis.Insupport ofthishemayandIthinkhewouldsaythatitisperfectlyclear(a)whatitmeansto saythatyouandIperceivethesameobject,(b)whatitmeanstosaythatwecannot,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

and(c)thatitisentirelylegitimatetouse'same'ineitherway;andsimilarlywith'the samehouse'.ThisbringsustotheheartofBerkeley'serrorinthepassageinquestion. Hewantstosaythatstrictlyspeakingtwopeoplecannotperceivethesamething,and toregard'YouandIseethesamething'as,thoughallrightinitsway,a'vulgar'ornon theoreticaluseof'same';butheispreparedtocountenancethevulgarusagebecause hethinkshecaneasilyexplainitsmeaninginstrictornonvulgarterms.Thatiswhyhe isimpatientwiththisdebateasonemightbeimpatientwithanargumentoverwhether twopeoplecanhave'thesamenastyexperience'. Well,Berkeleymaythinkiteasy,buthegetsitwrong.Hisreferenceto'theuniformness ofwhat[is]perceived'impliesanequationof'YouandIseethesamething'with'Your presentvisualfieldisuniformwith,orsimilarto,mine'.Thelatterisneithernecessary norsufficientforthetruthofthe'vulgar'statement'YouandIseethesamething',and itsanaloguesfortheothersensesareequallywideofthemark.Toreplacethemby ____________________ 24First Dialogue,pp.1823. 156

somethingviable,Berkeleywouldhavetocopewithcomplexitieswhichwouldforbidhim todismissthismatterwithawaveofthehand. Inshort,Berkeleyassumesthatcertainordinarylocutionswhichseemtoconflictwithhis theorycanbeeasilyexplainedintermsofit;butthisisbecausehehasgrossly underestimatedthecomplexityofthevulgarconceptof'perceivedbytwopeople',andof thefactswhichthatconceptisdesignedtohandle,whichinitsturnimpliesan

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

underestimateoftheconcept'simportancetousinourintellectualhandlingofourdata. OnesymptomofthisunderestimateisthefactthatBerkeley,whiletryingtostandback fromthenotionof'perceivedbytwopeople',unwittinglyhelpshimselftoitwhenhe scoffsatthedisputeabout'whetherwhat is perceived by different persons,mayyet havethetermsameappliedtoit'. InthestrictBerkeleiantheory,then,a'collection'ofideaswhichconstitutesasingle objectmustberestrictedtoideaswhich(1)alloccuratthesametime,and(2)alloccur inthesamemind.Wenowshrinkthe'collection'stillfurther. Thethirddifficultyisasfollows.IfwhatIseemustbeavisualidea,andwhatItoucha tactualidea,thenwhatIseecannotbewhatItouch.Generalizingthepoint:twoideas belongingtodifferentsensescannotbemembersofasingleobjectconstituting collection,eveniftheyoccurinonemindatonetime.ThisfinallyreducesBerkeley's sensiblethingsto'collectionsofideas'whicharesopovertystrickenthattheycanhardly containmorethanonemembereach. HereagainBerkeleyhastwooptions.Hecouldsay(1)thatwhatIseeisnotthewhole ofanobjectbutonlyitsvisualpart,i.e.thevisualmembersofthecollection;orhe might(ii)standbyhisthesisthatwedonot'immediatelyperceivebysightanythingbut lightandcoloursandfigures'etc.,andtreat'Isawitandheardit'asavulgarlocution whichcanbeexplainedintermsofstrictBerkeleiantheorybuthasnoplaceinit.Aswe havealreadyseen,Berkeleytakesoption(ii):since'intruthandstrictness,nothingcan beheardbutsound',itfollowsthatifI(asweshouldvulgarlysay)'hearacoach'whichI neithertouchnorsee,'thecoachisnotthenproperlyperceivedbysense,butsuggested fromexperience'.25
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 25First Dialogue,p.204. 157

Berkeleydoesnotsaythatthecoachwehearisdistinctfromanycoachwemighttouch orsee,butrathersaysthatwedonothearthecoach.Heisassuming,notunnaturally, thatifthephrase'thecoach'istobeconnectedwithonlysomeofthesenseswhich wouldcommonlybethoughtrelevant,sightandtouchhaveastrongerclaimthan hearing.Inshort,Berkeleytakes'thecoach'tobethevisibleandtangiblecoach. Visibleandtangible?Heisnotentitledtothat.Heoughtalsotodrawalinebetween sightandtouch,sayingthatwhenI(asweshouldvulgarlysay)'seeacoach'without touchingit,'thecoachisnotthenproperlyperceivedbysenseisnotthenactuallyseen butisonlysuggestedfromexperience'.Or,evenlessattractively,hemightequate'the coach'withwhatisseen,anddenythatstrictlyitcanbetouchedbutIdoubtifhe wouldtakethatoption.26 Berkeleymakesthingstooeasyforhimselfinthecoachpassage,bystressingthe hearing/sightandtouchlinetotheneglectofthesight/touchline.Hesplits'whatis heard'offfromtheobjectitself,andmakesthislookreasonable:bothbecause,asnoted in30above,heexploitsthefactthata'sound'maybeeitheranobjectivesoundoran auditorysensedatum;andalsothisbeingmypresentpointbecausehekeepsus comfortableabouttheobjectitself,i.e.thecoachIdonotstrictlyhear,byrepresenting itasaratherfullyfledgedcoachwhichcanatanyratebeseenandtouched.Inthe wholepassage,Berkeley'scommitmenttodrivingawedgebetweensightandtouchis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

acknowledgedonlyonce:'Whenwearesaidtoseearedhotbarofiron,thesolidityand heatoftheironarenottheobjectsofsight.'Thepointaboutheat,liketheoneabout sound,canbegrantedwithoutmuchdiscomfort;but'solidity'issomethingelseagain, andBerkeleyavoidsacrisisofconfidenceoverthispointonlybywhiskingitpastthe reader'seyessoquicklythatitishardlynoticed.Also,aswellasbeingtooskimpy,the remarkismisleading:grantedthatthesolidityisnotanobjectofsight,isthetangible barofironanobjectofsight?Ifitis,howcanitalsobeanobjectoftouch?Ifitisnot, letBerkeleysaysonotjustinthesafercontextoftheNew Theory of Vision,wherethe pointisindeedstressed,butalsohereinthecontextofanattempttoargueforoutright idealism. ____________________ 26SeeNew Theory of Vision,46. 158

Hereasbefore,though,themainpointisnottheimplausibilityofBerkeley'sclaimthat 'Isawitandtouchedit'belongstothenotstrictlytruefringeofourlanguage,butrather theinadequacyofhisaccountofhowtheperipheryrelatestothecentre.Option(i) wouldhaverequiredhimtostatecriteriaforthestricttruthof'Isawitandtouchedit', andoption(ii)confrontshimwithessentiallythesametask:hemustexplainin'strict' idealisttermswhatsuchvulgarlocutionsmean,orelselosehiscomplacencyovertheir apparentconflictwithhistheory. Justtokeepthepressureup,itisworthnoticingthatBerkeleyhimselfusesthesevulgar locutions,andindeedusesthemtorecommendhistheory:

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Isitnotasufficientevidencetomeoftheexistenceofthisglove,thatIsee it,andfeelit,andwearit?27 ThetableIwriteon,Isay,exists,thatis,Iseeandfeelit.28 Ifattableallwhowerepresentshouldsee,andsmell,andtaste,anddrink wine,andfindtheeffectsofit,withmetherecouldbenodoubtofitsreality.

29

ItisessentialthatBerkeleyelucidatetheseremarks,buthowcanhedoso? Inthe'coach'passagehesaysonlythatideasoftwosensesareordinarilysaidtobeof asinglethingbecauseofa'frequentlyperceivedconnexion'betweenideasofthetwo kinds.'FromtheexperienceIhavehadthatsuchasoundisconnectedwith[thetactual ideaswhicharecentraltoourordinarynotionof]acoach,Iamsaidtohearthecoach.'

30Thisviewisexpressedagainlater:

Acherry...isnothingbutacongeriesofsensibleimpressions,orideas perceivedbyvarioussenses:whichideasareunitedintoonething(orhave onenamegiventhem)bythemind;becausetheyareobservedtoattendeach other.Thuswhenthepalateisaffectedwithsuchaparticulartaste,thesight isaffectedwitharedcolour,thetouchwithroundness,softness,&c.Hence, whenIsee,andfeel,andtaste,insundrycertainmanners,Iamsurethe cherryexists,orisreal.31 Thisisdismallyinadequate.Itrulesout'Itastedonecherrywhileseeinganotherand touchingathird';andtherearehostsofother

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 27Second Dialogue,p.224. 28Prriciples3. 29Principles84. 30First Dialogue,p.204. 31Third Dialogue,p.249. 159

'vulgar'locutionswhich,thoughentirelysatisfactoryintheirownway,arebeliedorat leastnotcoveredbyBerkeley'sformulaaboutideaswhichare'observedtoattendeach other'. So,hereasintheearliercases,Berkeleyassumesthatacertainkindofvulgarlocution caneasilybeexpressedintermsofhistheory;butheiswhollywrongaboutthis;andso heisnotentitledtoclaimthathistheoryexpressestheclean,hardcoreofourlanguage aboutthethingsweperceive.

34.Appearanceandreality
Wedistinguishwhatisreallythecaseinone'sownimmediateenvironmentfromwhat appearstobethecasegoingbywhatonesees,feels,hearsetc.;weallowthatonemay erraboutwhatanobjectislikeonthebasisofone's'ideas'ofit.Thisdistinctionseems tohavenoplaceinBerkeley'stheory,forthereaperceivedobjectturnsouttobea singleidea,andBerkeleydoesnotthinkonecanerrabouttheideasoneactuallyhas. Hereishisattempttodealwiththisproblem:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

HYLAS:Since,accordingtoyou,menjudgeoftherealityofthingsbytheir senses,howcanamanbemistakeninthinking...anoar,withoneendinthe water,crooked?PHILONOUS:Heisnotmistakenwithregardtotheideashe actuallyperceives;butintheinferenceshemakesfromhispresent perceptions....Whatheimmediatelyperceivesbysightiscertainlycrooked; andsofarheisintheright.Butifhethenceconclude,thatupontakingthe oaroutofthewaterheshallperceivethesamecrookedness;orthatitwould affecthistouch,ascrookedthingsarewonttodo:inthatheismistaken.... Buthismistakeliesnotinwhatheperceivesimmediatelyandatpresent(it beingamanifestcontradictiontosupposeheshoulderrinrespectofthat)but inthewrongjudgmenthemakesconcerningtheideasheapprehendstobe connectedwiththoseimmediatelyperceived:orconcerningtheideasthat, fromwhatheperceivesatpresent,heimagineswouldbeperceivedinother circumstances.32 This,apartfromitsclaimthatthemandoesperceivesomethingcrooked(see5 above),isunexceptionable.ItraisesaproblemforBerkeley,though.Hissketchofthe ordinarydistinctionbetween'theoar'srealshape'and'theoar'sapparentshape'is acceptablebecause,andonlybecause,itexplains'Theoaris ____________________ 32Third Dialogue,p.238. 160

crooked'asafalsestatementaboutwhatideaswouldbehadifcertainconditions
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

obtained;butifconditionalsenterintotheanalysisof'Theoariscrooked'whenthisis false,theymustalsoenterintoitsanalysiswhenitistrue.SoBerkeleyherecommits himselftoaphenomenalisticaccountofthewholevulgardistinctionbetween'apparently F'and'reallyF'. Now,Berkeleyhasadecisiontomakeaboutthisdistinction,oraboutthelocutions whichembodyit.Aretheytobe(i)partofhistheory,or(ii)relegatedtotheperiphery treatedaspermissiblebutunstrictidiomswhichacarefulspeakermightprefertoavoid? IfBerkeleytakesoption(ii),then'seentwice'and'seenbybothofus'and'seenand touched'arejoinedontheperipheryby'(not)reallycrooked'.Butthislastisona continuumwith'(not)reallyanoar':iftheconditionalelementin'Theoarlooksbentbut isn'treally'makesthisstatementamerefaon de parler,thenthesamegoesfor'There appearstobeanoarherebutreallythereisn't'andfor'Notonlydoesthereappeartobe anoarhere,buttherereallyisone'.ThiswouldcommitBerkeleytosayingnotthat Locke'stheorymishandlesthedistinctionbetweenappearanceandreality,butrather thatthereisnosuchdistinction,oratleastnonethatiscentraltoourthoughtand language.Thisistoomuch.Berkeleyclaimsthathisphilosophydoesjusticetoallour centralbeliefsaboutobjects,e.g.thatthe'sensiblethings'ofhistheoryarethetables andmountainsofdailylife.Furthermore,asweshallseeinChapterVII,idealism's supposedabilitytohandletheappearance/realitydistinctionisreckonedbyBerkeleyas oneofitschiefmerits.Itwouldbeintolerableifhis'sensiblethings'turnedoutafterall tobeofsuchakindthatanyhavingofanideawastheperceivingofasensiblething. Ontheotherhand,ifBerkeleytakesoption(i),andallowsintohistheoryof'sensible things'theimplicationsofthequotedanalysisof'notreallycrooked',thenthatanalysis isaTrojanhorsewhichwillsmugglephenomenalismintothecity. WhenBerkeleysays'Themoreamanknowsoftheconnexionofideas,themoreheis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

saidtoknowofthenatureofthings',33wehavehisdilemmainanutshell.If(i)he takeswhat'issaid'intohisowntheory,thenhisaccountofsensiblethingsbecomes thoroughlyphenomenalistic.If(ii)what'issaid'isexcludedfromhistheory,thenthe latteromitsallthecoreofourtalkabout'the ____________________ 33Third Dialogue,p.245. 161

natureofthings',rightdowntoourtalkaboutwhatthingstherereallyare. Thistime,Berkeleychooses(i)inconsistencyratherthan(ii)bankruptcy.Althoughhis officialaccountof'sensiblethings'isthoroughlyidealist,hemovestowards phenomenalismwhendiscussing'realthings'.Hedoesnotthinktherearetwosortsof thingssensibleandrealbutheuses'real'whendiscussingthedifferencebetween genuineperceptionontheonehandanddreams,hallucinations,etc.,ontheother.In therestofthissection,IshallexamineBerkeley'stheoryof'realthings'. Itstartsfromthefact,ofwhichLockealsomademuch,thatsomeofourideasare forceduponuswhetherwelikeitornot: IfindIcanexciteideasinmymindatpleasure,andvaryandshiftthescene asoftasIthinkfit....ButwhateverpowerImayhaveovermyown thoughts,Ifindtheideasactuallyperceivedbysensehavenotalike dependenceonmywill.WheninbroaddaylightIopenmyeyes,itisnotinmy powertochoosewhetherIshallseeorno,ortodeterminewhatparticular
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

objectsshallpresentthemselvestomyview;andsolikewiseastothehearing andothersenses,theideasimprintedonthemarenotcreaturesofmywill. Thereisthereforesomeotherwillorspiritthatproducesthem.34 ThelastsentenceintroducesanargumentforGod'sexistencewhichIshalldiscussin ChapterVII.MypresentconcerniswithBerkeley'suseofpassivitytoexplainwhat'real things'are.Itwouldbeabsurdlyimplausibletosaythateveryideawhichcomestoone unbiddenisa(perceptionof)arealthing,formanydreamsandhallucinationsareclear casestothecontrary.NordoesBerkeleysaythat.Rather,heequates'realthings'witha subclassofinvoluntaryideas: TheideasimprintedonthesensesbytheAuthorofNaturearecalledreal things...Theideasofsenseareallowedtohavemorerealityinthem[than theideasofimagination],thatis,tobemorestrong,orderly,andcoherent thanthecreaturesofthemind...Theyarealsolessdependentonthespirit, orthinkingsubstancewhichperceivesthem,inthattheyareexcitedbythewill ofanotherandmorepowerfulspirit.35 Apreliminarydifficulty:Berkeleydoesnotdefine'ideaofsense',andnodefinitioncould entirelylegitimizehisuseofthephrase. ____________________ 34Principles289. 35Principles33. 162

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thepointisnotvital,andthereasonsarecomplex,soIshallmerelysaydogmatically thatwehadbetterconstrueBerkeleynotasusing'ideaofsense'toexplain'(ideaof)a realthing',butratherasintroducingbothexpressionstogether:'Thereisaclassofideas whicharestrong,orderlyandinvoluntary.Thesearecalled"ideasofsense".Theyare also,perhapsmoreinterestingly,called"realthings".' Nowwecanapproachthemainproblemraisedbythepassage.Berkeleyherepurportsto beaddingsomethingtoatheoryaccordingtowhichallweperceive'intruthand strictness'areideas.Thistheorydeniesthatwestrictlyseeanythingwetouch;it puritanicallybanishesfromthemainlandofourlanguageofperceptionanything involving'reasonandmemory';andsoonthroughalltheotherfeaturesofthetheory whichcommitittoequatingsensiblethingswithsingleideasratherthanwithcollections ofthem.InthequotedpassageBerkeleydoesnotretractanyofthat.Rather,heclaims tobedescribingasubclassofideas,eachmemberofwhichis(theideaof)arealthing; asthoughtheupshotwerejusttheoriginalsensiblethingstheorywithacertain refinementaddedtomarkoffrealsensiblethingsfromhallucinationsandthelike. Butconsiderwhatthe'refinement'is!Wantingtoknowwhetheracertainideais(of)a realthing,IaskBerkeleyforhelp.Hetellsmetodiscoverwhethertheideacametome unbidden,andwhetheritis'strong'(healsosays'vivid','distinct',lively');andIreport thatitpassesboththesetests.Berkeleyrightlythinksthatthatisnotenough:ideas countas(ideasof)realthings,hesays,onlyiftheyarealso'orderlyandcoherent', 'regular','constant','steady','notexcitedatrandom','connected'.36Butthese expressions cannot intelligibly be applied to a single idea.Tobringthemtobearona presentvisualideaofmine,Imustconsiderwhetherthatideatogetherwithotherpast (andfuture?andpossible?)ideas,ofvisual(andother?)kinds,hadbymyself(andother people?)formsapatternorsequenceorsetofideaswhichisorderly,regularandsoon.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

WhateverBerkeleydoesabouttheissuesraisedinthoseparentheses,hemustconcede that'Inowperceivearealthing'partlyconcernsmypresentidea'srelationswithideas whichIamnotnowhaving.Soafterallhehastoagreethatacertainkindofperception ____________________ 36AllfromPrinciples30,33,andThird Dialogue,p.235. 163

statement,whichhedoesnotrelegatetothe'vulgar'periphery,involvesconsiderations of'reasonandmemory',ofwhatis'suggestedtothemind'ratherthansensorilypresent toit.37Hehasbeenforcedintophenomenalismbythesheerpressureofhisneedto copewiththedistinctionbetweenappearanceandreality. TheclashbetweenBerkeley'sanalysisof'realthing'andtherestofhistheorycanbe broughtoutbyconsideringhisthesisthatnoobjectcanexistwhileunperceived.The onlyreasonsBerkeleyhasfordenyingthatanobjectcanexistwhilenotperceivedare oneswhichdependupon'Anobjectisacollectionofideas,andsocanexistonlyso'long asitsconstituentmembersexist,i.e.arehadorperceived'.Butthisisnolonger availabletohim.Itimpliesthat,inacasewhereIperceiveanobjectatt,anaccountof whatIperceivecanbegivenwithoutgoingoutsidemysensorystateatt;andthathas beenthrownoverboardbytheanalysisof'realthing'. ____________________ 37SeeR.H.Popkin,"'TheNewRealismofBishopBerkeley'",Pepperpp.1416. 164
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

VII BERKELEYONGODANDSCEPTICISM
35.Thepassivityargument
WEhavebrieflymetanargumentofBerkeley'sfortheexistenceofGod,whichIshall callthepassivityargument.Itgoeslikethis: a. Myideasofsensecomeintomymindwithoutbeingcausedtodosobyanyactof mywill; b. Theoccurrenceofanyideamustbecausedbyanactofthewillofsomebeingin whosemindtheideaoccurs; therefore a. Myideasofsenseoccurinthemindof,andarecausedbyactsofthewillof,some beingotherthanmyself. Thisargumentusesthedubiousnotionofan'actofthewill',andpresupposesthatonly willscanbecauses;butIdeferdiscussionofthesepointsuntilChapterVIII.Also,the argument'sconclusionfallsshortoftheism,letaloneChristianmonotheism;butthatis amatterofroutineapologeticswhichIshallnotdiscussatall.1 Thepresentchapterwillbeentirelyexegetical.TounderstandBerkeley'swritingsone mustdisentanglecertainstrandsinhisthoughtwhicharenotproperlyseparatedinany commentaryIhaveseen.Thepassivityargumentisinvolvedinallthisinseveralways. Mostimmediately,itraisesasmallquestionwhichcanserveasoneendofathread whichwillleadusthroughthetangle.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thequestionisthis:whydoesBerkeleyassumethateverychangeofsensorystatemust havesomecause,disregardingthepossibilitythatan'ideaofsense'mightjusthappen withoutanycause?PerhapsBerkeleyisoneofthosewhofinditselfevidentthatevery 'Why?'questionhasananswer,thatwhateverhappensiscausedtohappen.Warnock seeshimlikethis: ____________________ 1SeeThomson,'G. J. Warnock's Berkely',p.429n.;R.H.Hurlbutt,'Berkeley's Theology',Pepper;Principles57,72,151. 165

Thetruefoundationofhisviewis,Ibelieve,theconvictionthattoholdthat eventsmerelyoccur,withoutanypurposeandvolitionbehindthemoranything analogouswithpurposeandvolition,istosaysomethingwhichisreallyquite unintelligible.2 Thisismildlyconfirmedbyapassagewhere,fromthepremissthatcertainideas'arenot creaturesofmywill',Berkeleymovesstraighttotheconclusionthat'Thereistherefore someotherwillorspiritthatproducesthem'.3 Later,though,Berkeleymakesthatsamemovethroughalemma: ThosethingswhicharecalledtheworksofNature,thatis,thefargreaterpart oftheideasorsensationsperceivedbyus,arenotproducedby,ordependent onthewillsofmen.Thereisthereforesomeotherspiritthatcausesthem,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

sinceitisrepugnantthattheyshouldsubsistbythemselves.4 Thelastclauseofthisoffersareasonwhyeveryideamustbecausedbyaspirit,namely thatideascannot'subsistbythemselves'.InBerkeley'snormalusagethiswouldmean thatideascannotexistwithoutbeinghadbysomeone:thatisapointaboutthe ownership,notthecausation,ofideas,anditdoesnotimplythateveryideamustbe caused.Still,Berkeleydoeshereofferanargument,albeitaninvalidone. YetWarnockmaywellberight,forBerkeleycouldbegratuitouslyofferingargumentative supportforsomethingwhichhedoesnotseriouslyregardasneedingit.Whetherornot Berkeleyattachedweighttoit,however,theargumentisstructurallyinteresting.Ihave accusedBerkeleyoftreating'Ideascannotsubsistbythemselves'bywhichheusually means'Ideasmustbeowned'asthoughitentailed'Ideasmustbecaused';buthow couldhehavemadesogrossamistake?Iftheonlyansweris:'Philosophersdomake mistakes,andthiswasoneofBerkeley's',thenthisnonsequiturisabouttwiceasbad, twiceascrudeandabruptandunstructured,asanythingelseinthePrinciples. Fortunately,thereisanotheranswer.Withoutvalidatingtheargument,itrenders Berkeley'sacceptanceofitintelligible. Considerthefollowinghypothesis:Berkeleyfrequentlyuses'depend'anditscognatesto expressrelationsbetweenideasand ____________________ 2Warnock,Berkeley,p.123. 3Principles29. 4Principles146. 166
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

mindsorspirits;insomeoftheseuses'IdependsonS'means'IishadbyS',inothers itmeans'IiscausedbyS';andBerkeleyisneverawareofthisambiguity.5 Ifthisistrue,thenwecanexplainBerkeley'snonsequitur.Theclueishissayingthat someideas'arenotproducedby,ordependenton'thewillsofmen.Theword'will' pointstocausation;butitdoesnotentirelyinsulate'dependent'fromaninterpretation intermsofownershipratherthancausation,becauseforBerkeley'wills'and'spirits'are nottwosortsofitembothwordsrefertothinkingsubstances,theformerstressingtheir capacitytoactandthelattertheircapacitytoperceive.Ifmyhypothesisabout Berkeley'suseof'depend'etc.isright,thenwecandiagnosehisnonsequituras follows.Fromapremisswhichhedoeshave: Someideasarenotdependentupon(=causedby)anyhumanmindtogetherwith anotherpremisswhichhedoeshave: Everyideaisdependentupon(=hadby)somemind,heslidestotheconclusionhe wants: Someideasaredependentupon(=causedby)somenonhumanmind. Itdoesnotmatterwhetherthisdiagnosisiscorrect.Itdoesmatterwhetherthe underlyinghypothesisistrue,andInowproceedtoprovethatitis.

36.Berkely'susesof'depend'
IhavetoshowthatBerkeleyuses'dependon'etc.ambiguouslyasbetween'ownedby'
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

and'causedby',andthatheisunawareofthisambiguity.Somegenerouscollaborators inCambridgehavepossessedmeofeveryoccurrenceof'depend'anditscognates throughoutthePrinciplesandDialogues.Thefactsareasfollows. Thereisanunclassifiableuseof'dependent'inBerkeley'saccountofnumber.6Inhalfa dozenplaces'depend'isusedlogically:onetheorydependsuponanother,adifficulty dependsuponaprejudice,andsoon.Inadozenotherstheitemswhose ____________________ 5TheambiguityhasbeennotedbyDay,'George Berkeley',p.448;andbyD.Grey, "'TheSolipsismofBishopBerkeley'",Philosophy,vol.2(1952),p.344. 6Principles12. 167

'dependence'isspokenofarenotideas:Godisindependentofeverything,weare dependentonGod,andsoon.AndinthreeplacesBerkeleyunclearlyuses'depend'etc. whenputtingwordsinLocke'smouthratherthanexpressinghisownviews.7Noneof theseoccurrencesisrelevanttomyhypothesis.Oftheremainder,allbutfourfall squarelyandwithalarmingsymmetryintooneorotheroftwoclasses. THEOWNERSHIPUSES.OneightoccasionsBerkeleyuses'independent','dependent' (once)and'independency'(once)tosaysomethingabouttheownershipofideas.8In thesepassages,anidea'sindependenceofamindisitsnotoccurringinthatmind,and thequestionofwhatcausesitissimplynotraised. THECAUSATIONUSES.OneightotheroccasionsBerkeleyuses'depend'etc.in
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

THECAUSATIONUSES.OneightotheroccasionsBerkeleyuses'depend'etc.in discussingwhatcausesideastobehadbyminds.9Inthesepassages,anidea's 'independence'ofagivenmindisitsnotbeingcaused,orwilledintoexistence,bythat mind.Theownershipsenseispositivelyexcludedinmostofthesecases,whereanidea issaidnottodependuponamindinwhichitdoesoccur. Sotheambiguityisthere.IsBerkeleyawareofit?Ishissilenceaboutitduemerelyto hishavingnoreasontoremarkupontheambiguitybecausenothinginhisworksinany wayinvolvesit?No,forsomethinginhisworksdoesinvolveit(theitalicsaremine): Menknowingtheyperceivedseveralideas,whereoftheythemselveswerenot theauthors,asnotbeingexcitedfromwithin,nordepending ontheoperation oftheirwills,thismadethemmaintain,thoseideasorobjectsofperception hadanexistenceindependent of,andwithoutthemind,withouteverdreaming thatacontradictionwasinvolvedinthosewords.10 Thisallegesthatacontradictionhasbeeninferredfromatruepremiss,byanargument whichmustthereforebedeemedinvalid.Theflawintheargument,asstated,isthatin thepremiss'notdependingon'means'notcausedby',whileintheconclusion 'independentof'means'notownedor"perceived"by'.But ____________________ 10Principles56. 7Principles10;Dialogues,pp.205,216. 8Principles6,89,91;Dialogues,pp.195,200(twice),213,261. 9Principles26,29,33,106;Dialogues,pp.196(twice),214,235. 168
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Berkeley,fondasheisofdiagnosinghisopponents'errors,doesnotremarkonthis ambiguity.Hisfailuretopointitout,evenwhenactivelyengagedincriticizingafallacy whichitmayhavehelpedtoengender,irresistiblysuggeststhatBerkeleyistotally unawareoftheambiguityasapotentialsourceofdanger.MyhypothesisthatBerkeley wasunawareoftheambiguityisalsosupportedbymyuseofitin35above.The hypothesisletsusexplainsomethingwhichisotherwiseinexplicable,namelyBerkeley's grossmovefrom'cannotsubsistbythemselves'to'mustbecaused';andthisfactis evidenceforthehypothesis.Thereisnocircularityinthis.Imentionedfourrelevant occurrencesof'depend'etc.whichIexcludedfrommytwopartclassification;andwe shouldkeeptrackofthese.Oneistheoccurrenceof'dependenton'intheversionofthe passivityargumentdiscussedin35,andasecondistheoccurrenceof'dependingon' and'independentof'inthepassagelastquoted.Thesestandoutsidemyclassification becausetheyinvolvetheambiguity.Thethirdunclassifiedoccurrenceisinawidely misunderstoodpassagewhichIshalldiscussin39;andthefourthisinanotherof Berkeley'sargumentsforGod'sexistence,towhichInowturn.

37.Thecontinuityargument
Thefamouslimericksabout'thesycamoretreeinthequad',likemostcommentaries, implythatBerkeleyalsoarguedforGod'sexistencelikethis: a. Nocollectionofideascanexistwhennotperceivedbysomespirit; b. Objectsarecollectionsofideas; c. Objectssometimesexistwhennotperceivedbyanyhumanspirit; therefore a. Thereisanonhumanspiritwhichsometimesperceivesobjects. Thecontinuityargument,asIshallcallit,provesnothing,ifonlybecauseitsidealist
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

premiss(b)isfalse.Also,itsconclusionisveryweak.If(c)werereplacedbyastronger premissexpressingthe 169

wholecontentoftheplainman'sassumptionsaboutthecontinuityofobjects,astronger conclusionwouldfollow;butitwouldstillnotbeChristianmonotheism.Thesepoints, however,arenotmymainconcern. WhydoesBerkeleythinkheisentitledtopremiss(c)?Theidealismexpressedin(b) impliesthatnobodycouldhaveempiricalevidencefortheexistenceofanobjectata timewhennohumanperceivesit,andthisimplicationseemstooobvioustobe overlooked.11Ithasbeensuggestedtomethatanidealistmightaccept(c)ongrounds ofsimplicity,i.e.onthegroundsthatouraccountofwhatthingsthereareandhowthey behaverunsmoresmoothlyifwepostulatethatobjectscanandusuallydoexistduring thegapsinourperceptionsofthem.ButIcanfindnoevidenceofBerkeley'sfavouring thislineofthought,anditwouldhavebeenoutofcharacterifhehad.Isuggest, indeed,thathewouldhavebeenboundtoregardthe'simplicity'defenceof(c)asa mereconfusionbetweentruthandconvenience.12Toseethatitcouldbemorethan that,oneneedsadeepertheoryofmeaningthanBerkeleyeverhad.Sothepuzzle remains. AsolutiontoitisfoundwhenweseehowBerkeleywordsthecontinuityargument: HYLAS:Supposingyouwereannihilated,cannotyouconceiveitpossible,that thingsperceivablebysenseMaystillexist?PHILONOUS:Ican;butthenit
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

mustbeinanothermind.WhenIdenysensiblethingsanexistenceoutofthe mind,Idonotmeanmymindinparticular,butallminds.Nowitisplainthey haveanexistenceexteriortomymind,sinceIfindthembyexperiencetobe independentofit.Thereisthereforesomeothermindwhereintheyexist, duringtheintervalsbetweenthetimesofmyperceivingthem:aslikewisethey didbeforemybirth,andwoulddoaftermysupposedannihilation.13 Thelasttwosentencesofthis,Isuggest,exploittheambiguityof'independent'. Berkeleytakesthepremissthatsomeideasareindependentof(notcausedby)my mind,muddleshimselfintotreatingitasthepremissthatsomeideasareindependent of(notownedby)mymind,andsoinfersthatsomemindhasideaswhen ____________________ 11SeeW.R.Dennes,'Berkeley's Dilemma',Pepperp.184;G.D.Hicks,Berkeley( London,1932),pp.1301. 12SeeA.Myerscough,"'BerkeleyandtheProofsfortheExistenceofGod'",Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy,vol.1(1961),pp.6970. 13Third Dialogue,pp.2301. 170

Idonot.Howelsecouldweexplainhissayingthat'Ifindbyexperience'thatsome ideasare'exterior'tomymindinasensewhichimpliestheirexisting'duringthe intervalsbetweenthetimesofmyperceivingthem'.Themistakeisabadoneanyway; butmydiagnosisshowshowitcouldrepresentnotchildishincompetencebutrather Berkeley'sfallingintoatraplaidbyhisownterminology.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Whenthisiscombinedwiththediagnosisofthepassivityargumentin35above,a pleasingpatternemerges.Berkeley'sbasictenetsallowthat(1)everyideaisownedby somemind,andthat(2)someideasarenotcausedbymymind.Theambiguityof 'depend'etc.letshiminterchange'owned'and'caused'withoutnoticingthatheisdoing so.Byputting'caused'for'owned'in(1),hestealsthepremissheneedsforthe passivityargument;andbyputting'owned'for'caused'in(2),hestealsthepremisshe needsforthecontinuityargument. ExplanationslikethesecouldnotaccountfullyforBerkeley'sholding,asamatterof settledbelief,anyviewstowhichheisnotentitled;andIdonotclaimthattheydo.In mostversionsofthepassivityargumentBerkeleyassumeswithoutargumentthatwhat isnotcausedbymymindmusthavesomeothercause.Warnockisprobablyrightinhis conjecturethatBerkeleyheldtheprinciple'Everyhappeningiscaused'asan unchallengeableaxiom.Thiswouldcreatenoconflictwithhisbasicposition,andwould alignhimwiththemajorityofphilosophersuptohistime. Whatofthecontinuityargument?Idealismisconsistentwiththethesisthatobjects existwhennohumanperceivesthem,butitclamoursforthelattertobejustified.My pointabout'depend'explainsBerkeley'sattempttojustifythethesisinoneshort passage,butitcannotexplainhisadoptingitasapermanentintellectualpossession. Whatcanexplainthis? Nothing;forthereisnosuchfacttobeexplained.Berkeleydoesnotregularlyassume thatobjectsexistwhennohumanperceivesthem;heisnotmuchinterestedinwhether theydo;andthecontinuityargument,whichassumesthattheydo,isabsentfromthe PrinciplesandoccursintheDialoguesonlyinthetwosentencepassagewhichIhave quoted.ThatpassageisrightoutoflinewitheverythingelseBerkeleysaysaboutthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

continuityofobjects,andshouldbedismissedasamomentaryaberration. 171

Theseareunorthodoxclaims.Comparethem,forexample,withWarnock'sviewofthe matter: Berkeley...knowsthatanyplainmanwouldinsistthatthefurnitureinan unoccupiedroomactuallydoesexist,notmerelythatitwouldexistiftheroom wereoccupied;andhehimselfthinksthatitwouldbemerelyabsurdto questionthis.14 Thisisthestandardview.LetustestitagainstwhatBerkeleyactuallywrote.

38.Berkely'sindifferencetocontinuity
Berkeley'sfirstpublishedreferencetothe'continuity'issue,bywhichImeanthe questionofwhetherobjectscanexistwhennohumanperceivesthem,isinhis declaration: that...allthosebodieswhichcomposethemightyframeoftheworld,have notanysubsistencewithoutamind,thattheirbeingistobeperceivedor known;thatconsequentlysolongastheyarenotactuallyperceivedbyme,or donotexistinmymindorthatofanyothercreatedspirit,theymusteither havenoexistenceatall,orelsesubsistinthemindofsomeeternalspirit.15 Thesearenotthewordsofonewhowouldadd:'Objectsdoexistwhennotperceivedby
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

creatures,sotheremustindeedbeaneternalspiritwhichperceivesthem.'Thenatural continuationisrather:'Unlesswecanshowindependentlythatthereisaneternalspirit, wedonotknowthatobjectsexistwhennotperceivedbycreatures.'16 Themaintextualevidence,however,mustbepresentedinthelightofBerkeley'stheory of'realthings'andof'reality'.AgainstacertainchargeofscepticismBerkeleydefends himselfstrenuouslyandoften,sayingthathissystemdoesnotdetractfromthe'reality' ofthings,andexplaining'reality'intermsofstrength,orderandinvoluntariness(see 34above).Justasareminder: ____________________ 14Warnock,Berkely,p.115.Seealsoibid.p.125;T.E.JessopinThe Works of George Berkely,vol.2,p.81n.;I.Hedenius,Sensationalism and Theology in Berkely's Philosophy(Oxford,1936),pp.1223;A.A.Luce,'Berkeley's Existence in the Mind', Martinpp.2912;K.MarcWogau,'Berkeley's Sensationalism and the Esse est Percipi Principle',Martinp.325(alsoinEngle). 15Principles6. 16Cf.A.A.Luce,The Dialectic of Immaterialism(London,1963),p.184. 172

TheideasimprintedonthesensesbytheAuthorofNaturearecalledreal things....Theideasofsenseareallowedtohavemorerealityinthem,that is,tobemorestrong,orderly,andcoherentthanthecreaturesofthemind. Theyarealsolessdependentonthespirit,orthinkingsubstancewhich perceivesthem,inthattheyareexcitedbythewillofanotherandmore

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

powerfulspirit.17 Thisiswhollyintheregionofthepassivityargument:itconcernsideaswhichexist althoughnotcausedbyme,andhasnothingtodowithideaswhichexistwhennothad byme. Berkeleykeepstothis.Aswefollowhimthrough,weshallfindthat:(a)histext sustainsasurprisinglysharpdistinctionbetweenstrength/order/involuntarinessonthe onehandandexistencewhennotperceivedbyhumansontheother;(b)heis remarkablyfaithfultohisofficialaccountof'reality',alwaysdefining'real'intermsofthe strengthetc.ofideaswhichonedoeshave,andthuspositivelydivorcingthereality questionfromthecontinuityquestion;(c)hisreiteratedclaimthathecandojusticeto the'reality'ofthingsisstressedandvalued,ashisanswertoaseriousaccusationand ashisbasisforanimportantargumentforGod'sexistence;and(d)wheneverheremarks thathisprinciplespermitcontinuity,thetemperatureisalwayslowBerkeleydoesnot attachweighttothispoint,eitherasphilosophicaldefenceorastheologicalattack. HereisBerkeleytakingseriouslythechargeofscepticism: Itwillbeobjectedthatbytheforegoingprinciples,allthatisrealand substantialinNatureisbanishedoutoftheworld...Allthingsthatexist, existonlyinthemind,thatis,theyarepurelynotional.Whattherefore... mustwethinkofhouses,rivers,mountains,trees,stones...?Areallthese butsomanychimerasandillusionsonthefancy?Toallwhich...Ianswer, thatbytheprinciplespremised,wearenotdeprivedofanyonethingin Nature.Whateverwesee,feel,hear,oranywiseconceiveorunderstand, remainsassecureasever,andisasrealasever.Thereisareturn natura,and
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thedistinctionbetweenrealitiesandchimerasretainsitsfullforce.Thisis evidentfromSect.29,30and33,wherewehaveshewnwhatismeantbyreal thingsinoppositiontochimeras,orideasofourownframing.18 Thequestionof'reality'isherereferredbacktoearliersectionswherethematterhas beendiscussedsolelyintermsofstrength,orderandinvoluntariness.Throughout sections30to44,indeed, ____________________ 17Principles33. 18Principles34. 173

Berkeleydiscusses'reality','chimeras'andscepticismnotonlywithoutmentioning continuitybutpositivelyforcingitasidebydiscussingonlythestrengthetc.ofideas whichhumansdohave. Berkeley'snextfoursections(458)doconcerncontinuity.Heintroducesthisasanew issue:'Fourthly,itwillbeobjectedthatfromtheforegoingprinciplesitfollows,things areeverymomentannihilatedandcreatedanew'(45);andlater(48)herefersbackto 'theobjectionproposedinSect.45'notto'theobjectiondiscussedthroughoutthepast fifteenormoresections.'Nowletusseewhathappensinthesectionsoncontinuity. Berkeleyisaccusedofimplyingthat'thingsareeverymomentannihilatedandcreated anew...Uponshuttingmyeyesallthefurnitureintheroomisreducedtonothing,and barelyuponopeningthemitisagaincreated.'Ratherthenreplying'Ofcoursethatwould
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

beabsurd,butIamnotcommittedtoit',Berkeleycounterattacks: If[myaccuser]canconceiveitpossibleeitherforhisideasortheirarchetypes toexistwithoutbeingperceived,thenIgiveupthecause:butifhecannot,he willacknowledgeitisunreasonableforhimtostandupindefenceofheknows notwhat,andpretendtochargeonmeasanabsurdity,thenotassentingto thosepropositionswhichatbottomhavenomeaninginthem.19 Onlyafterarguingthroughtwooveringenioussectionsthat'thematerialiststhemselves' arecommittedtotheintermittencyofobjectsdoesBerkeleyremarkthatheisnotthus committed: Forthoughweholdindeedtheobjectsofsensetobenothingelsebutideas whichcannotexistunperceived;yetwemaynothenceconcludetheyhaveno existenceexceptonlywhiletheyareperceivedbyus,sincetheremaybesome otherspiritthatperceivesthem,thoughwedonot.Whereverbodiesaresaid tohavenoexistencewithoutthemind,Iwouldnotbeunderstoodtomeanthis orthatparticularmind,butallmindswhatsoever.Itdoesnotthereforefollow fromtheforegoingprinciples,thatbodiesareannihilatedandcreatedevery moment,orexistnotatallduringtheintervalsbetweenourperceptionof them.20 Thecrucialexpressionsare'wemaynothenceconclude','theremaybesomeother spirit','itdoesnotthereforefollow'.ThereisnohintofBerkeley'sthinkingthathis accusersareright,orthat ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

19Principles45. 20Principles48.

174

itisimportanttohimtoshowthathecanconsistentlyagreewiththem,aboutthe continuityofobjects. Hedoesnotevensayanythinglikethis:'Myaccusershavenogroundsfortheircorrect beliefthatobjectsarecontinuous.Myprinciplesshowthatthebeliefcanbejustified onlyontheologicalgrounds;inaway,itisitselfacovertlytheologicalbelief.Iwonder howmymaterialisticopponentslikethat!'Thatwouldbeoneversionofthecontinuity argument;itcriesouttobeusedbyanyidealistwhothinksthatobjectsarecontinuous orevenrespectsthecommonbeliefthattheyare;andthisistheplaceforit.Butapart fromthebrieflapsewhichIdiscussedin37above,Berkeleynowhereshowsthe slightestinclinationtoargueinsuchaway. ThereremainsaproblemaboutBerkeley'ssections4548.Hestartsbyimplyingthatthe commonviewaboutcontinuityisoneof'thosepropositionswhichatbottomhaveno meaninginthem',andendsbysayingthattheviewisconsistentwithhisprinciples whichimpliesthatithasmeaninginitafterall.Ishallexplainthisin40below;but isn'titclearalreadythatnoexplanationislikelytohelpthestandardaccount? AmongthosewhoattributetoBerkeleyacareforthecontinuityofobjects,afewhave atleastnoticedthatthesesectionsofthePrinciplesneedsomeexplaining.21Others havebeenlesscautious,includingonewhowrites:'Itwould,[Berkeley]says,beabsurd
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

tosuggestthat"thingsareeverymomentannihilatedandcreatedanew".'22Thequoted clausecomesfromthesectioninwhich,aswehaveseen,Berkeleyelaboratelyrefrains fromcallingthesuggestionabsurdandflingsthechargeofabsurditybackintothefaces ofhisaccusers. Movingonnow,wefindBerkeleylaterdenyingthathehassoemptiedtheuniverseasto beinconflictwithholywrit,andarguesentirelyfrom'thisbusinessofrealandimaginary [which]hathbeenalreadysoplainlyandfullyexplained'.23Thesesections, ____________________ 21G.D.Hicks,Berkely(London,1932),p.136;A.A.Luce,'Berkeley's Existence in the Mind',Martinp.290n.;A.A.Luce,Berkeley's Immaterialism(London,1945),pp. 1202. 22Warnock,Berkeley,p.115.SeealsoF.Bender,George Berkeley's Philosophy Reexamined(Amsterdam,1946),p.69;A.C.Fraser,Berkely(Edinburgh,1909),p. 87;E.A.Sillem,George Berkeley and the Proofs for the Existence of God(London, 1957),p.132. 23Principles 84. 175

andtheearlieronestowhichtheyexplicitlyreferback,allconcerninvoluntariness,order, etc.,withnotawordaboutobjects'existingwhennotperceivedbycreatedspirits. TheonlyotherreferencetocontinuityinthePrinciplesoccursinBerkeley'saccountof themeaningof'external':

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thethingsperceivedbysensemaybetermedexternal,withregardtotheir origin,inthattheyarenotgeneratedfromwithin,bytheminditself,but imprintedbyaspiritdistinctfromthatwhichperceivesthem.Sensibleobjects maylikewisebesaidtobewithoutthemind,inanothersense,namelywhen theyexistinsomeothermind.ThuswhenIshutmyeyes,thethingsIsaw maystillexist,butitmustbeinanothermind.24 'External',wemightsayinshorthand,maymeaneither'real'or'continuous';butthe linebetweenthetwoisnotsmudged,forthelatterisexplicitlycalledanothersenseof 'external'(or'withoutthemind').Thepassagegivesnosupporttothestandardaccount ofBerkeley'shandlingofcontinuity.Hedoesnotinsistthatobjectsare'external'inthe secondsense;stilllessdoeshearguefromthistoanytheological.conclusion.Quite uncombatively,hecontentshimselfwithremarkingthatthethingsIsawmaystillexist butiftheydoitmustbeinanothermind. Inshort,thecontinuityissuebywhichIalwaysmeantheissueaboutobjectsexisting whennotperceivedbyanyhumanreceivesscantattentioninthePrinciples.Thisfact tellsagainstthestandardaccount,andthecontentofthefewremarksBerkeleydoes makeaboutcontinuitytellsevenmorestrongly. WhatofcontinuityintheThree Dialogues?Apartfrompassagesalreadymentioned,and onetobediscussedin39below,thereisonlythefollowingdifficultywhichHylas raises:'Isitnot...accordingtoyouplainlyimpossible,theCreationofanyinanimate creaturesshouldprecedethatofman?AndisnotthisdirectlycontrarytotheMosaic account?'25Philonous'replyissurprising:theMosaicaccountisconsistentwithidealism because'createdbeingsmightbegintoexistinthemindofothercreatedintelligences, besidemen'.Perhapstryingtofreehimselffromentiredependenceonangels,healso
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

toyswithanessentiallyphenomenalistlineofthought:'Things,withregardtous,may properlybesaidtobegintheirexistence,orbecreated,whenGoddecreed ____________________ 24Principles90. 25Third Dialogue,p.252. 176

theyshouldbecomeperceptibletointelligentcreatures...Youmaycallthisarelative, orbyhypothetical existenceifyouplease.'26Theimplicationsofthis,iffollowed through,wouldclearlyconflictwithotherpartsofBerkeley'sphilosophy.(Theywould alsodeprivehimofanychanceofusingthecontinuityargument.IfO'sexistingcan consistinthefactthatifahumandidsuchandsuchhewouldperceiveO,thenO's existingwhennohumanperceivesitdoesnotentailthatsomenonhumanperceivesit.) Butthatisnotmypresentpoint. WhatdoesconcernmeisthatPhilonoustriestodealwiththefirstfivedaysofcreation intermsofangels,andofphenomenalism,buthedoesnotsuggestthatthecreationof theinanimateworldmighthaveconsistedinthings'comingtobeperceivedbyGod,orin ideas'comingintothemindofGod.Whynot?Wecannotanswer:'Becausethatwould reduceGod'screationoftheinanimateworldtoamereconjuringupofideasinhisown mind';forBerkeleydemonstrablydoesallowthelatteractivityasakindofcreation.27 TherightansweristhatBerkeleyisherecrampedbyaspecificallytheologicalbelief.The followingsentences,thoughsomeappearinthetextasrhetoricalquestions,clearlyall expressBerkeley'sownconvictions:'Godknewallthingsfrometernity...Consequently
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

theyalwayshadabeingintheDivineIntellect...Therefore,nothingisnew,orbegins tobe,inrespectofthemindofGod.'28BecausetherearenochangesinGod'smind,the notionofadatablecreationmustbeconstruedassomethingotherthan'comingintothe mindofGod'or'comingtobeperceivedorimaginedbyGod'.HenceBerkeley'sstruggles tofindanotherconstruction. Letustakeseriouslythisreasonfornotconstruingthecreationoftheinanimateworld asanactofthedivineimagination,andseewhatitimpliesforthestandardaccount.If theideacontentofGod'smindisthesameatanytimeasatanyother,thenGod's presentperceptionscannotsecurethepresentexistenceofthebookcaseonwhichI havejustturnedmyback;or,rather,God'spresentperceptionscansecurethisonlyif theyalsosecurethepresentexistenceofthebookcasewhichIdestroyedthreeyears ago,andoftheonewhichwillsomedaybemadeformygrandsonoutofplankscutfrom atreewhichhasnotyetbeenplanted. ____________________ 26Third Dialogue,p.253. 27Philosophical Commentaries,entry830. 28Third Dialogue,p.253. 177

WehaveseenthatBerkeleydoessometimesremarkthatthecontinuityofobjectscan bemaintainedonlywithhelpfromanappropriatetheology;andmyconcernhasbeen onlytodenytherestofthestandardaccountnamelythatBerkeleycaresaboutobject continuityandthatheacceptsitasapremissinaconsideredargumentforGod's

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

existence.Butnowweseethathistheologyforbidshimeventherelaxedand unargumentativeremarkswhichheclearlydoesmake.IftheideacontentofGod'smind neverchanges,thennofactaboutGod'spresentperceptionscanimplythepresent existenceofagivenobjectunlessallobjectsaresempiternal.(Thereisaformally adequateescapehatch,namelypostulatingthatGod'sideashavebuiltindates,soto speak,sothatwecancreditGodwithalwayshavingtheideaofmybookcaseatt1, alwayshavingtheideaofmybookcaseatt2,andsoon.Butthiswouldbetotallyun Berkeleian.Foronething,itwouldtrivializeBerkeley'spictureofthecontinuityofan objectasbeingsecuredbyGod'sperceivingtheobjectwhileIdonotperceiveit.Also,it woulddivorcetheterm'idea'fromallBerkeley'smainexplanationsandexplanatory paradigms.)Whatismore,justapageortwoearlierBerkeleyhassaidasmuchhimself: AllobjectsareeternallyknownbyGod,orwhichisthesamething,havean eternalexistenceinhismind:butwhenthingsbeforeimperceptibleto creatures,arebyadecreeofGod,madeperceptibletothem;thenarethey saidtobeginarelativeexistence,withrespecttocreatedminds.29 Thereisnoroomhereforthecontinuityargumentbasedonanythinglikeacommon sensecontinuitypremissi.e.apremisswhichsaysthatmysuitcasesdoexistnow althoughnocreatureperceivesthem,butwhichdoesnotsay,andindeedpositively denies,thatmysuitcaseshaveaneternalexistence. Themainimportanceofthisisasfollows.Ihaveasked'HowcouldBerkeleythinkhewas entitledtothepremissthatobjectsexistwhennotperceivedbyanyhuman?',implying thathecouldn't.Someonemightobject:'YoutaketoonarrowaviewofBerkeley's thought.Hehadatheologyaswellasaphilosophy,andreallydidacceptcertainBiblical doctrineswithoutargument,amongthemtheMosaicaccountofthecreation.Youmay
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

think ____________________ 29Third Dialogue,p.252. 178

thisintellectuallydisreputable;butitisatact,anditBerkeley'sthoughtistobe understoodthefactmustbetakenseriously.'Now,Idoubtifrevealedtheologydid penetrateBerkeley'sphilosophytotheextentthatthisimplies.Butifitdidifweareto giveweighttoBerkeley'sunarguedacceptanceofcertaintheologicaltenetsthenamong thethingswemustgiveweighttoisthedoctrinethatnochangesoccurintheidea contentofGod'smind. Thelatterdoctrineis,asIhavepointedout,inconsistentwithremarksBerkeleydoes makeaboutcontinuity.Butifthoseremarkswerestrengthenedsoastoconfirmthe standardaccount,then,ashasbeennotedbyArmstrongbutbynoothercommentator thatIcanfind,30theinconsistencywouldbeevengrosserandmoreconspicuous;and thisisanotherobstacleinthewayofthestandardaccount. TheMosaicaccountofcreationisdiscussedintheDialoguesonlyinthepassagetreated above,andinthePrinciplesnotatall.InthePhilosophical Commentariestherearejust fourentriesonthetopic:oneproposingasolutionintermsof'homogeneousparticles', whichIdonotunderstand;anotherproposingtocombinea'homogeneousparticles' solutionwithanessentiallyphenomenalistone;athirdwhichmerelysaysthatthe problemcanbesolved,butdoesnotsayhow;andthis:'Imaysayearth,plantsetc werecreatedbeforeMantherebeingotherintelligencestoperceivethembeforeMan
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

wascreated.'31Theplural'intelligences'makesitfairlyclearthatBerkeleyisthinkingof nonhuman,createdintelligences.Itlooksasthough,whenheisinaframeofmindto takeexistencewhennotperceivedbyhumansseriously,namelyaBiblicalframeof mind,Berkeleyisalsoreluctanttoallow'ideasinthemindofGod'asevenapossible solution. Imentionedinpassingthatphenomenalismunderminesthecontinuityargument, becauseitdestroysthepremissthatobjectscanexistonlywhenperceivedbysome spirit.ItmaybeworthremarkingthatevenonaphenomenalisticbasisBerkeleycould havefoundsomeworkforGodtodoinconnexionwithcontinuity,onlyitwouldnotbe theperceptualworkwhichis ____________________ 30D.M.Armstrong(ed.),Berkeley's Philosophical Writings(NewYork,1965),p.22. 31Philosophical Commentaries,entry723.Theotherthreeentriesare60,293,339. 179

stressedbythestandardaccount.Accordingtothephenomenalistorconditionalizing analysis,thecontinuousexistenceofobjectsconsistsinthecontinuingtruthofsuitable conditionals;theirtruthrestsonthecontinuationoflawlikenessorregularityinthe occurrenceofourideas;andthatregularityaccordingtoBerkeleyistheworkofthe causeofourideas,namelyGod.Sothecontinuityofobjects,onthephenomenalist accountofwhatitinvolves,issecurednotbyGod'scontinuingperceptionsbutbyhis dependablemaintenanceoforder.Idonotknowwhetherthisfacthelpstoexplain anythinginBerkeley'stexts.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

OneotherpointaboutphenomenalismandGodshouldbementioned.Ifsomeone acceptedaconditionalizinganalysisofstatementsabouttheexistenceofobjects,and alsoequated'IfitwerethecasethatP,thenaKideawouldbehad'with'ThereisaK ideawhichwouldbehadifitwerethecasethatP',thenbemightthinkthatthe continuityofobjectsrequiredacontinualperceiver.Forifthatequationheld,the existenceofOnowwouldrequirenotmerelythetruthofacertainconditionaltothe effectthatifitwerethecasethatPthenIwouldbehad,butalsotheexistenceofI now;andsoOcouldexistnowonlyifIwerenowbeinghad,whichistosayonlyifO werebeingperceivednow.Andso,startingfromaphenomenalistaccountofcontinuity, wereachGodasaguarantorofcontinuitythroughcontinualperceptions.Butofcourse wereachthisthroughanequationwhichisquitewrong,asIarguedwhenwefirstmetit in32above.OneexpositorofBerkeleycreditshimwithaconditionalizingaccountof theexistenceofobjects,andafirmconvictionthatGod'scontinuingperceptionsare neededtosecureobjectcontinuity;andheseemstothinkthesetwoareconsistent.The keyremarkisthat,accordingtoBerkeley,'Godisthehomeoftheperceivablewhenitis unperceivedbyman',32which,ifitexpressesanything,surelyexpressesthemistake aboutconditionalswhichIhaveexpoundedabove.Ihavenoevidencethatthismistake playedanypartinBerkeley'sownthinkingaboutcontinuity.

39.'Afalseimaginaryglare'
ThereisapassageintheSecondDialoguewhichisoftenadducedasevidenceforthe standardaccount,andindeedcited ____________________ 32A.A.Luce,Berkeley's Immaterialism(London,1945),p.75.SeealsoJ.Collins,The British Empiricists(Milwaukee,1967),p.78.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

180

asanoccurrenceofthecontinuityargumenti.e.theargumentfromthecontinuityof objectstotheexistenceofaspiritwhoperceivesobjectswhilehumansdonot.Ishall contestthisreadingofthepassageinquestion. Philonousasksrhetorically:'Howshouldthoseprinciplesbeentertained,thatleadusto thinkallthevisiblebeautyofthecreationafalseimaginaryglare?'heisdramatizing thechargethathisprinciplesimplythisconclusion,notrailingagainstLocke.33Hylas, bynowconvertedtoidealismasheunderstandsit,repliesstoically:'Mycomfortis,you areasmuchascepticasIam.'Philonousdeniesthatheiscommittedtoscepticism, andoffersarestatementofhispositioninthecourseofwhichhesays: Tomeitisevident,forthereasonsyouallowof,thatsensiblethingscannot existotherwisethaninamindorspirit.WhenceIconclude,notthattheyhave norealexistence,butthatseeingtheydependnotonmythought,andhavean existencedistinctfrombeingperceivedbyme,there must be some other mind wherein thy exist.34 Ofthesetwosentences,thefirstcertainlyconcernstheownershipofideas.Ifthe seconddoestoo,thenthewholepassageisaversionofthecontinuityargument: objectscannotexistoutofallminds,butdosometimesexistoutofmymind,andmust thereforesometimesexistinanothermind.Evenifthisinterpretationwereright,sothat thecontinuityargumenthadtobeawardedfoursentencesinBerkeley'swritingsrather thantwo,mythesisof378wouldbeonlymarginallyembarrassed;butinfactthe interpretationiswrong.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Considerwhatleadsuptothequotedsentences.Philonoussaysthathisprinciples wouldobligehimto'denysensiblethingsanyrealexistence'ifHylaswererightintaking 'therealityofsensiblethings'toconsistin'anabsoluteexistenceoutofthemindsof spirits'.Hethencontinues: ButIneithersaidnorthoughttherealityofsensiblethingswastobedefined afterthatmanner.Tomeitisevident,forthereasonsyouallowof,that sensiblethingscannotexistotherwisethaninamindorspirit.WhenceI conclude...etc.35 Theargumentisnot:objectscannotexistoutofallminds,yetdosometimesexistout ofhumanminds,andmustthereforesometimesexistinanonhumanmind.Rather,itis thatobjectscannot ____________________ 33Second Dialogue,p.211. 34Second Dialogue,p.212. 35Ibid. 181

existoutofallminds,butareundoubtedlyreal,andtherefore'real'mustnotbedefined as'capableofexistingoutofallminds'.Theownershipofideasisrelevantonlybecause ofHylas'wrongdefinitionof'real'. IammaintainingthatPhilonoussays'theydependnotonmythought'asaquickwayof

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

saying'theyarereal,inthecorrectsenseof"real"whichIhaveexplained'.(Thisisthe lastofthefourrelevantoccurrencesof'depend'etc.whichIleftunclassifiedin36 above.Itakeittobeacausationuse,butIdidnotclassifyitthenbecausethepointis controversial.)Berkeley'sconceptofreality,however,involvesmorethan involuntariness,andIhavetoexplainwhyheletsPhilonousomitanymentionof strengthandorder. Well,thiswholestretchoftheDialogueisanattempttoshowthatthereissomething behindtheveilofperception,somethingwhoseexistencedoesnotmerelyconsistina setoffactsaboutideas.Berkeleyinferstheexistenceofsuchasomething,namelyGod, fromtheexistenceofrealthings;buttheexistenceofsomespiritualsubstanceother thanmyselfis,inBerkeley'sview,entailedbytheoccurrenceofanyinvoluntaryideas, howeverweakordisorderly.Detailsregardingwisdom,beneficence,divinityetc.might requirepremissesaboutthe(strengthand)orderofsomeofourinvoluntaryideas,but themerefactthatsomeofourideascometousunbiddenisenough,forBerkeley,to showthatthereisaspiritualsubstanceotherthanourselves.Sothepassageasawhole canachieveitspurposebystressinginvoluntarinessalone,i.e.byPhilonous'saying'they dependnotonmythought'andmeaning'depend'initscausalsense. Philonousfinisheswith'...theremustbesomeothermindwhereintheyexist'isnot thisclearlyapointertowardstheareaofthecontinuityargument?Ithinknot.Ifitis, thenitmustbereadasmeaning'...whereintheyexistattimeswhentheyarenotin mymind',whichreallyisn'tveryplausible.Ifwemustintroduceanexpansion,wecanas welluse'...whereintheyexistandwhichcausesthem'.Onthatreading,Berkeley's pointisthatwhenIinvoluntarilyhaveanideaImustbesharingitwithwhateverspirit hascausedit.Thisisanownershippointoccurringasadetailwithinanessentially causationlineofthought,andBerkeleyputsitinjustthatwayofacoupleofpages
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

furtheron,whenhesaysthatsincesomeofmyideasareinvoluntary'They 182

mustthereforeexistinsomeothermind,whosewillitistheyshouldbeexhibitedto me'.36Thefirstclauseinthatsentenceisaboutownership,butnotaboutthe perceptionsofideasbyGodattimeswhentheyarenotperceivedbyme. TheotherthingIhavetoexplaininthetwosentencepassageIammainlydiscussingis Philonous'saying:'...seeingtheydependnotonmythought,and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me...'Thedifficultyhereisthatthesecondclause lookslikeareferencetoownership,ratherthanarewordingofthefirstwhichconcerns involuntariness.Ihavetoguessthatthesecondclausedriftedinthroughcarelessness onBerkeley'spart:onmyinterpretationtheclause,thoughitmayhelptoexplainwhat immediatelyfollowsit('...theremustbesomeothermindwhereintheyexist'),isidle. Thatisapointagainstmyinterpretation,butconsiderwhatitsrivalthestandard accounthastocopewith!Itmustputownershiprightatthecentre;restweighton 'haveanexistencedistinctfrombeingperceivedbyme';representBerkeleyas introducingGod,inaconsideredway,bymeansofthecontinuityargument;anddoall thisinawaywhichgivesthetwosentencesinquestionanintelligiblerelationtowhat immediatelyprecedesthem.Thislastrequirement,Isubmit,doomsthewhole endeavour. Norcouldtherivalexegesismakesenseofwhatcomesnext.Immediatelyafter'... theremustbesomeothermindwhereintheyexist',Philonoussays:'Assuretherefore asthesensibleworldreallyexists,sosureisthereaninfiniteomnipresentspiritwho
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

containsandsupportsit.'37Here,theword'really'pointstomyinterpretation.Those whodonotfindthepointingunequivocalmustbetreatingBerkeley'susesof'real'and itscognatesasvaguegesturesinthedirectionofstrength/order/ involuntariness/continuity;buttheinclusionofthelasttermsmudgesalinewhich Berkeleydrawssharplyandadherestorigidly. Next,HylasremarksthatPhilonous'positionamountsonlytowhat'IandallChristians hold',namelythatGod'knowsandcomprehendsallthings'.Philonousreplies: Ay,buthereliesthedifference.Mencommonlybelievethatallthingsare knownorperceivedbyGod,becausetheybelievethebeingofa ____________________ 36Second Dialogue,21415. 37Second Dialogue,p.212. 183

God,whereasIontheotherside,immediatelyandnecessarilyconcludethe beingofaGod,becauseallsensiblethingsmustbeperceivedbyhim.38 HedoesnotsaywhenobjectsmustbeperceivedbyGod,orrelatetheargumenttothe commonbeliefthatobjectsexistwhennohumanperceivesthem.Andwhenherepeats theargumentafewlineslaterstilldiscussingwhetherobjects'really'existheisstill silentonthesepoints. Alittlefurtheronstilltheownershipissueisraisedagain,butonly,asbefore,in

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

connexionwithanimproperaccountofwhat'real'means.Philonouschallengesthe 'abettorsofimpiety'toshow'howanythingatall,eithersensibleorimaginable,can existindependentofamind'andhere'independent'certainlyhastheownershipsense.

39Buthedoesnotsay:'Youthinkthatobjectsexistwhennohumanperceivesthem,

buttojustifythisyoumustpostulateanonhumanspirit.'Hischallengeisaperfectly generalone:'Makesense,ifyoucan,ofanypositionotherthanidealism.'Berkeley clearlythinksthisisrelevanttoGod'sexistencebuthow?Bywayofthecontinuity argumentorthepassivityargument?Toanswerthatwemustconsultthewholepassage inwhichthisepisodeisembedded,andthen,Ihaveargued,wefindnotthecontinuity argumentbutoverandoveragainthepassivityargument. Finally,HylasdragsthediscussionoffcoursebycomparingPhilonous'positionwith'a notionentertainedbysomeeminentmoderns,ofseeing all things in God'.Philonous laboriouslytriestopartcompanyfromMalebranche,whoisthe'eminentmodern'in question,thentiresofcomparisonsandseeksoncemoretomakeclearhisview: Takehereinbriefmymeaning.ItisevidentthatthethingsIperceivearemy ownideas,andthatnoideacanexistunlessitbeinamind.Norisitless plainthattheseideasorthingsbymeperceived,eitherthemselvesortheir archetypes,existindependentlyofmymind,sinceIknowmyselfnottobe theirauthor,itbeingoutofmypowertodetermineatpleasure,whatparticular ideasIshallbeaffectedwithuponopeningmyeyesorears.Theymust thereforeexistinsomeothermind,whosewillitistheyshouldbeexhibitedto me.40 ____________________ 38Second Dialogue,p.212.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

39Second

Dialogue,pp.21213.SeealsoThird Dialogue,p.235. 40Second Dialogue,pp.21415. 184

ThisisPhilonous'finalattempttoclarifywhathehasbeensayingallalong.Itisthe clearestpossiblepresentationofthepassivityargument.

40.Berkeleyand'theMob'
Thestandardaccountmustalsocopewithotherobstacles.Inpresentingthem,and meetingcertainobjectionstomyownview,IamtemptedtosaywithBerkeley:'Letmy adversariesansweranyoneofmineI'llyieldIfIdon'tanswereveryoneoftheirsI'll yield.'41 Why,accordingto'myadversaries',doesthecontinuityargumentnotoccurinthe Principles?BecauseBerkeleychosetoomitit?Whyshouldhe?Andifhedidthinkofit, whydoesitnotoccureveninhisprivatenotebooks,thePhilosophical Commentaries? Didhethenfailtothinkofit?Hewasawareofalltheneededlogicalconnexionsand avowedlywrotethePrinciplesagainstatheismsohowcouldhebeguiltyofsuchan oversight? Ifthecontinuityargumentisusedconsideredly,deliberately,intheDialogues,whydoes itoccurthereonlyonce,orifthestandardaccountcancapturethe'falseimaginary glare'passageonlytwice,occupyingatmostfoursentencesembeddedindiscussionsof quitedifferenttopics?AndwhyisitwhollyabsentfromAlciphron,whichisBerkeley's
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

mostextendedworkofapologetics? Thepassivityargumentiscelebratedas'thisgreattruth',42andissalutedbyHylas: 'TheproofyougiveofaDeityseemsnolessevident,thanitissurprising.'43The continuityargument,inbothitsoccurrenceanditspseudooccurrence,slidesbywithout theslightestfanfare.Why? IfBerkeleydidassumethatobjectssometimesexistwhennotperceivedbyhumans, thismustbebecausehewantedto'sideinallthingswiththeMob';44andsohemust haveassumed,withthe'vulgar'or'theMob',thattheclosingofeyesetc.willnever annihilateanordinaryobjectwhichiswhatthestandardaccountalwaystakeshimto assume.SothecontinuityargumentconcludesthatGodperceivesobjectswhenwedo not,whilethepassivity ____________________ 41Philosophical Commentaries,entry349. 42Principles149. 43Second Dialogue,p.215. 44Philosophical Commentaries,entry405. 185

argumentconcludesthatheperceivesthemwhenwedo.Thetwoareexactly complementary:withoutoverlapping,theyenableGod'sperceptionstocoverthewhole territory.Thus,Berkeleyissupposedtohaveaperfectlyeconomicaltwopart'proof'of God'somniscience,oratleastofhisperceptualomnipresence;andthetwopartsofit

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

correspondtothetwofunctionswhichBerkeleyallowstoanyspirit,namelyperception (continuity)andwill(passivity).Yetheissilentonthisbeautifulpatterninnatural theologycreditedtohimbythestandardaccount.Why? Aprimafaciepossibleansweristhis:'Berkeleydidnotseethetwoargumentsas complementarybecausehedidnotclearlyseethemasdistinct.'Wehaveseenhow sharplyBerkeleydistinguishedcontinuityfromreality.Hediscussedtheintimate relationsbetweenperceptionandwill,e.g.consideringwhetheraspiritcouldhaveone withouttheother;buthedidnotfailtomake,andwasindeedalmostobsessedby,the distinctionbetweenthem.45SoarelevantfailuretodistinguishonBerkeley'spartcould notconcerntherawmaterialsforthetwoarguments.Itwouldthereforehavetoconcern theargumentsthemselves,i.e.therawmaterialsasassembledinthoseparticularways. Furthermore,anasymmetrywouldhavetobegranted;forwheneverBerkeleydeploys thepassivityargumentitisquiteclearthatheknowsexactlywhatheisdoingand hasn'tanytendencytomuddlethisargumentwiththecontinuityone.Soallthatcanbe leftofthe'failuretodistinguish'thesisisthis:whereBerkeleyactuallywritesdowna versionofthecontinuityargument,heisnotclearinhismindaboutthedifference betweenwhatheiswritingdownandthepassivityargument.Ithinkthatthisisfalseas itstands;butifitweretrue,itwouldsupportmypositionandcompletelyrefutethe standardaccount;foritisjustonewayofsayingthatBerkeleydoesn'treallyhavethe continuityargument. SinceBerkeleyclaimsto'sideinallthingswiththeMob',thereisjusticeintheremark: 'Itisprima faciehardlylikelythatBerkeleyshouldbeconcernedabouttherealityof sensiblethings,butindifferenttotheircontinuity.'46Theunlikely,ofcourse,is sometimestrue.Also,althoughBerkeleywasaselfappointedplainman,hewasnota slavetothemob:hedefendedviewswhichheknewthecommonmanwoulddismissout
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ofhandsuchas ____________________ 45Philosophical Commentaries,entries645,659,672a,674,708,841. 46E.J.Furlong,"'BerkeleyandtheTreeintheQuad'",Martinp.402(alsoinEngle). 186

thatonlyaspiritcanbeacause,nottomentiontheviewthatweeatanddrinkideas andhesaidthat'receivedopinions...arenotalwaysthetruest'.47ButIdon'twantto say'Itisunlikelybuttrue',or'Itisn'tveryunlikely'.Forthefactisthatitwouldbe utterlyastonishingifBerkeley,oncehisfinalidealistpositionwasdeveloped,hadnot beenindifferenttothemob'spressureonthecontinuityquestion.Thetextualfacts whichdoomthestandardaccount,sofarfrombeingsurprising,arejustwhatshouldbe expectedbyanyonewhounderstandsidealism.Alloneneedsistheassumptionthat Berkeleyhonestlymeant what he said:wheninhisnonphenomenalisticvein,hereally didthinkthatobjectsarecollectionsofideas;andsohereallydidthinkthattheplain untheologicalmanwhoasksaboutthecontinuityofobjectswill,ifheclearshismind, seethatthereisnothingintelligiblethathemeansbyhisquestion.Someonewhohas understoodandacceptedidealismcangivesensetothequestion,namelythesenseof 'Canobjectsexistinnonhumanmindswhennohumanperceivesthem?'ButBerkeley's writingswerenotaimedata'plainman'whohadgotasfarasthat. ThisexplainsBerkeley'shandlingoftheobjectionthat'fromtheforegoingprinciplesit follows,thingsareeverymomentannihilatedandcreatedanew'.48Hefirstimpliesthat theobjectionhas'nomeaning',andthenlaterhegivesitameaningandarguesthat
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whenthusconstrueditdoesnotholdagainstidealism.Thereisnohonestwayfor Berkeleytomakecapitaloutofthispoint.Thetwodishonestwaysinwhichhemightdo soarethetwocentralmythsofthestandardaccount.(1)Hemightsay:'Yourobjection wasprimafaciedamaging;itwouldbeaseriousdefectinmysystemifitruledout continuity;buthappilyitdoesnotdoso.'Buthedoesnotthinktheobjectionisprima faciedamaging.Hethinks,andclearlysays,thatitisprimafaciemeaningless:themove whichshowshowitcanmeansomethingafterallisthemovewhichshowsthatitdoes notholdagainstidealism.(2)Hemightproducethecontinuityargument:'Now,yousee, youarecommittedtoGod'sexistencebyoneofyourmostdeeplyrootedbeliefs,namely thatobjectsexistcontinuously.'Butthiswouldpretendthattheplainmanisentitledto usehisassumptionsaboutcontinuityasapremissfromwhichtoinferGod'sexistence; andonBerkeley'sprinciplesthatwouldbemerecheating.Hecannot ____________________ 47Principles52. 48Principles458. 187

regardthebeliefincontinuityasfullyintelligibleandasworthytobeacceptedexcepton thebasisofanacceptanceofidealismandabeliefinGod'sexistencearrivedatonother grounds. Itwon'tdotosay:'Berkeleycouldnotattachsenseto"objectexistingwhennospirit whatsoeverperceivesit",buthecouldallowthatthismakessensetoanonidealist.' Idealismwouldbeacuriousdoctrineindeedifitsacceptancerenderedunintelligible

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

somethingwhichpreviouslymadesense;andthatisclearlynothowBerkeleyseesit.He propoundsitasatruetheoryaboutwhateverybodymeansby'objectexistingwhen...' andthelike;andheseesthedifferencebetweenhimselfandanonidealistasthe differencebetweenonewhocanandonewhocannotseethat'objectexistingwhenno spiritwhatsoeverperceivesit'issenselessorselfcontradictory.Sohehasan overwhelmingreasonforshowingnodeferencetoandnotthinkingitimportantto accommodatehispositiontotheplainman'sviewthatobjectsexistwhennotperceived byhumans.Formostplainmenwillholdthisbecausetheybelieve,morestrongly,that objectsdooratleastcouldexistwhennotperceivedbyanyspiritwhatsoever;and thosewhodon'tholdthisstrongerviewarealreadyentirelyonBerkeley'ssideandhe hasnothingtosaytothem. Inshort,itisbecauseBerkeleyisseriousaboutidealismthathebrushesoffthemob's protestsaboutcontinuity,andhasnoconsidereduseforthecontinuityargument.There isnoproblemhere;buttherewouldbeoneifthestandardaccountwerecorrect.The standardaccountmisrepresentsnotonlythetextualdetailsbutalsothebroadoutlines ofBerkeley'sthought.

41.Continuityinthe'Commentaries'
Whenmythesisofthischapterwasfirstpublished,itdrewareplyfromE.J.Furlong,49 whodiscernsthreestagesinBerkeley'sthoughtsaboutcontinuity:(1)Earlyinthe Philosophical Commentaries,theviewthatidealismisinconsistentwithcontinuity;(2) LateintheCommentaries,andinthePrinciples,theviewthatidealismiscompatible withcontinuity'becauseGodmayperceivethingswhenwedonot';(3)IntheDialogues, theacceptanceofthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 49J.Bennett,"'BerkeleyandGod'";E.J.Furlong,"'BerkeleyandtheTreeintheQuad'"; bothinMartinandinEngle. 188

continuityofobjectsasapremiss,andtheargumentfromittotheexistenceofGod.50 InSupportof(3),Furlongtakesthe'falseimaginaryglare'passagetoexpressthe continuityargument.Heexplainsitsunclaritywhenthusconstrued,andalsoBerkeley's failuretohighlightthecontinuityargument,bysuggestingboththat'Berkeleysawthe continuityandpassivityargumentsastwocomplementaryportionsoftheoneproof'and that'Berkeleydidnotthinkofthecontinuityargumentasclearlydifferentfromthe passivityargument'.51Thesesuggestionshave,Ithink,beensufficientlydiscussedin 40.Inreplytothequestion'HowcouldBerkeleyhavethoughthimselfentitledtothe continuitypremiss?',FurlongsaysthatBerkeleycouldthinkthisbecausehehadan (invalid)argumentforit.ThisreferstoBerkeley'ssayingintheoneindisputable occurrenceofthecontinuityargument,discussedin37abovethat'Itisplainthey haveanexistenceexteriortomymind,sinceIfindthembyexperiencetobe independentofit'.52Isubmitthatthatlittleplayon'independent'isaltogethertoo slighttobearsuchaloadastheconsideredbeliefincontinuitywhichisattributedto Berkeleybythestandardaccount. Thatstages(1)and(2)bothoccurred,Idon'tdeny.ButIcanfindnoevidencethat(2) showsupintheCommentariesifwetake(2)asinvolvingthebeliefthatidealismis compatiblewithcontinuitybecauseGod might perceive things when we do not.Thatis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

onematteronwhichIshallargueagainstFurlong. Thereisalsoanother.FurlongcontendsthatallalongBerkeleycaredverymuchabout continuity:hesays,forexample,thatBerkeleymovedfromstage(1)tostage(2)with 'relief'.53HisremarkthatBerkeleywouldbelikelytocareaboutitbecausethemob careshasalreadybeendiscussed.HealsosuggeststhatBerkeley'sapparentlyagnostic remarksaboutcontinuity'thethingsIsawmaystillexist'etc.arethe understatementsofamanwho,althoughhecaresverymuch,thinkshispositionisso stronghecanaffordtopullhispunches.Suchanexplanation,thoughitmightservefor anisolatedpassage,couldhardlycarryconvictionifithadtobeappliedtoallBerkeley's mentionsofcontinuity.TherewouldhavetobesomeindependentevidenceofBerkeley's attachingrealimportancetothecontinuityissue ____________________ 50Furlong,op.cit.Martinp.405. 51Ibid.pp.408,407. 52Third Dialogue,p.230. 53Furlong,op.cit.pp.404,407. 189

butisthere?Well,FurlongthinksthereissomeintheCommentaries,andthatisthe otherpointofhiswhichIshallcontest. EveniftheCommentariesshowedBerkeley'soverwhelmingconcernwithcontinuity despairinthinkingthatidealismrulesitout,joyatthediscoverythatitdoesnotthis wouldnotrefutemyaccountofwhatgoesoninthePrinciplesandDialogues.Itwould

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

informusofBerkeley'sstateofmind,andmakeuswonderwhyitwassoimperfectly realizedinhispublishedworks.Butthatproblem,ifwehadit,mightbesolvedby supposingthatBerkeleychangedhismindthathecametoseethatheoughtnotto haveagonizedovercontinuity.Theproblemwouldnotbehelpfullysolvedbyinsisting thatBerkeleydidnotchangehismindandthatthepublishedworksmust,despiteall appearancestothecontrary,meanwhatthestandardaccountsaystheymean. SoIdon'thavetoargueonthatpoint;andtheotherone,regardingwhenBerkeleyfirst thoughtofGodasapossibleguarantorofcontinuity,mattersevenlesstomyexegesis andislessimportantinitself.(Thetwoareconnectedtothisextent:ifthe CommentariesdonotshowBerkeleymovingfrom(1)to(2)atall,thenafortioritheydo notshowhimdoingso'withrelief'.)Itisembarrassingtowrangleoverinessentials, especiallyagainstacourteousandconsiderateopponent;butIshallproceed,because myrealtargetismuchlargerthanthetwopointsIhavementioned.Itisanoverall patternofmisinterpretationoftheCommentaries'treatmentofcontinuityasetof misinterpretationswhichareacceptedbyFurlongandbymanyothersandwhichare,ina specialway,privileged.StudentsofBerkeleyowetotheRev.A.A.Luceamongmuch elsethefirstsatisfactorytextoftheCommentaries,namelythewonderfuldiplomatic editionofthework,andalsotheonlygoodtextofitwhichisstillgenerallyavailable.54 Lucehasaccompaniedthesetextswitheditorialnotesinthediplomaticeditionvery extensiveonesmanyofwhicharehelpfulinthehighestdegree,butsomeofwhich ratherconfidentlygivedisputableinterpretations.Thelatterincludeanexegesis,whichI thinkIcandisprove,ofBerkeley'streatmentofthecontinuityissue. ThatfaultyexegesisoftheCommentarieswouldtend,causally, ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

54GeorgeBerkeley,Philosophical

Commentaries,diplomaticeditionbyA.A.Luce( Edinburgh,1944);also,alongwithothermaterial,inThe Works of George Berkely, vol.1,editedbyA.A.Luce(London,1948). 190

toinduceacceptanceofthestandardaccountofcontinuityinthePrinciplesand Dialogues;butthatisnotmyonlyreasonfordiscussingit.BytakingissuewithFurlong andLuceovertheCommentaries,Igetachancetoincludeinmybookonesampleofthe sortofchallengewhichthatfascinatingworkofferstoanyonewantingtogettogrips withBerkeley'smind. Ishallmentionbynumber,inthetextorthenotes,everyentrywhichbearsdirectlyon theexistenceofobjectswhennotperceived,orwhennotperceivedbyhumans.Ishall ignoreentriesconcerning'reality'ratherthancontinuity,andoneswhich,although implyingthatBerkeleymighthaveaproblemaboutcontinuity,shownothingabouthis attitudetoitorevenwhetherhewasawareofit. Entry60,notedtowardstheendof38above,proposestosolvethe'creation'formof thecontinuityproblembyinvoking'homogeneousparticles'(seealsoentry293).I cannotconnectthatwiththepresentdebate.NorshallIsaymoreaboutentry723, whichIshowedneartheendof38tobetheworstpossiblespringboardforthe standardaccount.Withthoseentriesoutoftheway,wecantaketherestinroughly theirorderofoccurrenceintheCommentaries. Firstly,agroupofmoreorlessphenomenalisticentries,whichalloccurinthefirsthalf ofthework.55Thisisfairlytypical:'TheTreesareinthePark,thatis,whetherIwillor
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

nowhetherIimagineanythingaboutthemorno,letmebutgothither&openmyEyes byday&Ishallnotavoidseeingthem.'56Accordingtothis,anobject'sexistingnow mayconsistinthefactthatifIactedthusandsoIshouldhavesuchandsuch perceptions;whichimplies,ofcourse,thatanobjectcanexistnowevenifnospirit whatsoeverperceivesit.Essentiallythesameviewissometimesexpressedlikethis: 'Bodiesetcdoexistwhetherwethinkof'emorno,theybeingtakeninatwofoldsense. Collectionsofthoughts&collectionsofpowerstocausethosethoughts....'57Thisis theconditionalizingapproachinadifferentguise.Tosaythatabodyisacollectionof 'powerstocausethoughts'istoimplythatabody'sexistingnowmayconsistinthe truthofcertainconditionalsaboutwhatpeoplewouldperceiveifthey ____________________ 55Philosophical Commentaries,entries52,98,185,185a,282,293,293a. 56Entry98. 57Entry282. 191

didcertainthings.(Thelanguageof'powers'alsooccurselsewhere.58) Intwoofthesephenomenalistpassages,Berkeleyweakensthepositionalittle:'Mem: toallowexistencetocoloursinthedark,personsnotthinking&cbutnotanabsolute actualexistence.'59ThoughagainstthatentryBerkeleylaterrecordedanapparent changeofmind,adecisiontoretracttheweakeningrider:'Coloursinyedarkdoexist reallyi.e.weretherelightorassoonaslightcomesweshallseethemprovidedwe openoureyes.&thatwhetherwewillorno.'60Inentry293Berkeleyseemstoimply

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatbodiestakenas'combinationsofpowerstoraisethoughts'mayexistwhennot perceived;andthistimecautionisintroducedintheafterthoughtentry293a,wherehe says(confirming,incidentally,that'powers'andconditionalsareallofapiece):'Bodies takenforPowersdoexistwnnotperceiv'dbutthisexistenceisnotactual.wnIsaya powerexistsnomoreismeantthanthatifinyelightIopenmyeyes&lookthatwayI shallseeiti.eyebody&c.'Fortunately,weneednotlingerontheunpromising distinctionbetween'existence'and'actualexistence'.Eachoftheseconditionalizing passages,strongorweak,sayssomethingoftheform:'EvenifnoonenowperceivesO, thefactthatifsomeonedidAhewouldperceiveOissufficienttoguarantee...'To guaranteewhat?Ifitguaranteesthat'Oexistsnow',withthisconstruedstrongly enoughtoanswerthequestionthrownupbythecontinuityissue,thenwehaveherea downrightphenomenalistsolutiontothecontinuityproblem;andsuchasolution,asI havepointedout,removesallneedtoinvoketheperceptionsofnonhumansto guaranteethecontinuityofobjects.Ifontheotherhandwhatisguaranteedbythe conditionalissomethinglessthanananswertothetypicalcontinuityquestion,then whatisbeingsaidissimplyirrelevanttothecontinuityofobjects. Curiouslyplacedinthemiddleoftheseconditionalizingpassagesthereoccursentry194: Onaccountofmydoctrinetheidentityoffinitesubstancesmustconsistin somethingelsethancontinuedexistence,orrelationtodetermin'dtimeand placeofbeginningtoexist.theexistenceofourthoughts(wchbeingcombin'd makeallsubstances)beingfrequentlyinterrupted,&theyhavingdivers beginnings,&endings. ____________________ 58Entries41,80,84.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

59Entry185. 60Entry185a.

192

Wemight,withalittlestretching,construethe'...butnotanactualexistence' passagesasalsosayingthatidealismisincompatiblewithcontinuity,i.e.withthe continuityofobjects''actualexistence'.Thatwouldgiveusatotalofthreesuch passages;butthefactremainsthatentry194istheonlydirectevidenceofBerkeley's havingasked'Giventhatobjectsareideas,cananobjectexistwhennoneofusperceive it?'andansweredflatly'No'.Doesthepassagemanifestanxiety,regretorintellectual distressaboutthisanswer?Onthecontrary:theentrynotesthatBerkeleyhasa technicalproblemtosolve,namelythatoffindingacceptablecriteriaforthere identificationofobjects;61andtherelevantpointaboutcontinuityoccursmerelyasone halfofasubordinateclause. Nextwemeetacoupleofentrieswhichimplythat194iswrongandthatcontinuitycan beallowedafterall.Oneofthemabruptlylists,butdoesnotexplain,'4Principles wherebytoanswerobjections',ofwhichthefirstis'Bodiesdoreallyexistthonot perceiv'dbyus'.62Whatarewetomakeofthis?Dothewords'byus'suggestthat bodiesexistwhennotperceivedbyGod?Thatinterpretation,besidesbeingwilfulinthe extreme,wouldnotyieldwhatthestandardaccountwants.Fortheentrysaysnotthat bodiesmaybutthattheydoreallyexistwhennotperceivedbyus;sothatonthe suggestedinterpretationitrepresentsthepositionBerkeleyisclaimedtoholdinthe Dialogues,notthepositionheisagreedtoholdinthePrinciples.IntermsofFurlong's account,itrepresentsBerkeleyasatstage(3)beforehehasreachedstage(2).
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Ignoringthemysteriousandunhelpfulentry339,thenextonethatcontradicts194is this: Imustbeveryparticularinexplainingwt ismeantbythingsexistingin Houses,chambers,fields,cavesetcwnnotperceiv'daswellaswnperceiv'd.& shewhowtheVulgarnotionagreeswithminewhenwenarrowlyinspectinto themeaning&definitionofthewordExistencewchisnosimpleideadistinct fromperceiving&beingperceiv'd.63 WhateversolutionofthecontinuityproblemBerkeleyhasinmindhere,itcannotbethe oneheeventuallysettlesforinthePrinciples.Ifitwere,weshouldhavetoacceptthat inhisfirstextendedentrybasedonthedistinctionbetween'notperceived' ____________________ 61Seealsoentry192. 62Entry312. 63Entry408. 193

and'notperceivedbyhumans'hewrotetheformerphraseandmeantthelatter!Idonot claimtoknowwhatline(s)ofthoughtBerkeleydidhaveinmindinthetwoentrieslast quoted,whereheapparentlyclaimstohavesolvedthecontinuityproblemwithout sayinghow. Thenextrelevantentryis472:

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Youaskmewhetherthebooksareinthestudynowwnnooneistheretosee them.Iansweryes.youaskmearewenotinthewrongforimaginingthings toexistwntheyarenotactuallyperceiv'dbythesenses.Ianswerno.the existenceofourideasconsistsinbeingperceiv'd,imagin'dthoughton whenevertheyareimagin'dorthoughtontheydoexist.Whenevertheyare mention'dordiscours'doftheyareimagin'd&thoughtonthereforeyoucanat notimeaskmewhethertheyexistorno,butbyreasonofytveryquestion theymustnecessarilyexist. OnecanhardlycreditthatBerkeleywassatisfiedwiththisargument,andyetapparently hewas,forhepublishedittwice.64IntheCommentaries,however,hefolloweditby somethingwhichheunderstandablychosenottopublish: ButsayyouthenaChimaeradoesexist.Iansweritclothinonesense.i.eitis imagin'd.butitmustbewellnotedthatexistenceisvulgarlyrestrain'dto actuallperception.&thatIusethewordExistenceinalargersensethan ordinary.65 Thatadmission,whenfollowedthrough,showswhytheargumentof472issobadand sounavailabletoBerkeley.Italsoenablesustoshowthattheargumentdoesnot supportthestandardaccountofBerkeley'sviewsoncontinuity,asfollows.WhenIaska typicalcontinuityquestionsuchas'Dotheworksofmywatchexistnow,whenIdonot [actually]perceivethem?',eitherIuse'exist'inBerkeley's'largersense'orIdon't.IfI don'tthen472doesnotanswermyquestion.IfIdouse'exist'inthelargersense,then 472answers'Yes,theworksofyourwatchdoexistnow';butitgivesthisanswer because'byreasonofthatveryquestiontheymustnecessarilyexist',i.e.becauseof whatI'imagine'or'thinkon'inaskingthequestion,andnotbecauseofwhatanyother
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

spiritperceives. ____________________ 64Principles23;First Dialogue,p.200.SeealsoPhilosophical Commentaries,entry 518. 65Entry473. 194

Soitmaywellbethat472purportstosolvethecontinuityproblem;butthis'solution' cannotbeseenasaversionof,orasastagealongthewayto,thesolutionwhich invokesGod'sperceptions.IfBerkeley'sthoughtsaboutcontinuityunderwenta rectilineardevelopment,thetwoentrieslastquoteddonotstandanywhereontheline.

66

Therearejustthreemoreentriestobediscussed. Inentry477BerkeleychallengestheCartesiansabouttheirbeliefin'Bodies',andinthe afterthoughtentry477awhichisourpresentconcernhecorrectsthistoachallenge abouttheirbeliefin'Matter',for'bodies&theirqualitysIdoallowtoexist independentlyofOurmind'.ThisistheearliestentrywhichFurlongexplicitlyclaimsto expressthePrinciplespositiononcontinuity:'Berkeleyis,byimplication,distinguishing between"Ourmind"andthoughhedoesnotsayso,butwhatelsecanitbe?God's mind.'67Whatelsecanitbe?Well,itcouldbe'otherintelligences'68ifindeed'Our mind'isbeingusedinadistinguishingwayatall.Luce'snoteonthisentrysays:'Note thecapital"Our",distinguishingthehumanmindfromthedivine.'Thisstrikesmeas rashlydogmatic.Theword'Our',withacapital,appearstwiceintheCommentaries:this
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

may,likesomeofBerkeley'sothervariationsintheuseofcapitals,havenosignificance atall;oritmaymeansomethingspecial,butnotofadistinguishingkind;oritmaygive 'Our'adistinguishingforce,butnotthatofthehuman/divinedistinction;oritmaymean whatLucesaysitdoes.IcannotfindashredofevidencetosupportLuce'sinterpretation asagainstitsthreerivals;andthereisonepieceofevidenceagainstit,namelythatthe otheroccurrenceof'Our',towhichIshallcomeinamoment,cannotembodythe human/divinedistinction. Also,ifentry477aistoberelevanttocontinuityat all,itmustbeusing'independently' intheownershipratherthanthecausationsense;andthereisnoevidenceforthat either. Nextwecometoentry801,ofwhichFurlongmakesmuch.Afterclaimingthatbytheend oftheCommentariesBerkeley'hadfoundaway,bydistinguishingbetweenourmindand someother ____________________ 66Forfullerdiscussionsofthem,seePrior,"'BerkeleyinLogicalForm'";andThomson, "'G.J.Warnock'sBerkeley'".AlsoK.MarcWogau,"'Berkeley'sSensationalismandthe EsseestPercipiPrinciple'",Martin339. 67Furlong,op.cit.pp.4034. 68Seeentry723. 195

mind,of..."sidingwiththeMob"andatthesametimeretaining[idealism]',Furlong continues:'Andhestatesthisachievementasapointinhisfavourascomparedwiththe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Cartesians.Thisisnottheclaimofonewhowasunconcernedaboutintermittency.'69As evidence,hecitesentry801:"IdifferfromtheCartesiansinthatImakeextension, ColouretctoexistreallyinBodies&independentofOurMind.Allyscarefully&lucidly tobesetforth.'Sothisentryhastododoubleduty:itistoserveasevidencethat Berkeleyhasthoughtofthe'God'sperceptions'solutiontothecontinuityproblem,and asevidencethathecaredaboutcontinuity.Asregardsthelatterpoint:weare presumablyinvitedtoreadtheopeningwordsasselfcongratulatory,andasrevelatory of'concern';butIdon'tseewhyweshould.Ofcourseitisvirtuallytautologicalthatx prefershisviewtoy'sdifferentone,andtothatextentregardshishavingitas'apoint inhisfavour';butitdoesn'tfollowthattheviewmustbeaboutamatterwhichisof greatconcerntox,orthatitisaviewxarrivedat'withrelief'. Butnevermindthat.Themainpointisthatentry801cannotbeaboutcontinuityatall. Tosupposethatitisrequires(a)thewhollyunwarrantedsuppositionthatitisusing 'independent'intheownershipsense,and(b)thatBerkeley thought that Cartesians did not allow that bodies can exist when no human perceives them.Thatwasnota Cartesianview,andBerkeleycannothavethoughtthatitwas.Infaceofthisinsuperable difficulty,thea prioriassertionthattheentrymustconcerncontinuity,because'Our' mustbemeanttodistinguishhumanmindsfromGod's,hardlycarriesconviction. AnacceptablereadingmustmaketheentrydrawacontrastonewhichBerkeleycould sanelyhavethoughttobegenuinebetweenBerkeleyandtheCartesians.Suchareading isavailable:theentrycouldbesayingthatBerkeleyallowsto'colour'thesamesortof mindindependencethatheallowsto'extension'.Thisgenuinelycontrastshisposition withthatoftheCartesians,whoheldLocke'skindofviewaboutthedistinctionbetween primaryandsecondaryqualities.Itmakessenseoftheentry'sreferringnotto'Bodies existingindependentofOurMind'butto'extension,Colouretc'existing'reallyinBodies
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

&independentofOurMind'.AnditfitswiththefactthatBerkeleyhasmarked ____________________ 69Furlong,op.cit.p.404. 196

entry801withamarginal'P',whichmeans,accordingtohisownexplanation,thatits topic is 'Primary & Secondary Qualities'! Thereisjustoneentrytogo,namely802.Thishasamarginal'P',butalsoan'M'this means'matter',andoccursagainstmanyentriesconcerningtheexistenceofbodies, reality,continuityandsoon.Soentry802hasatleastachanceoffallingwithinthe continuityarea.Hereitis:'NottomentiontheCombinationsofPowersbuttosaythe thingstheeffectsthemselvestoreallyexistevenwnnotactuallyperceiv'dbutstillwith relationtoperception.'Lucesaysthatthe'powers'theory'isvirtuallydiscardedin802in favourofthepositiontakenupinPrinc.458,whereintermittencyandthecompanion doctrinesarestatednottofollowfrom[Berkeley's]principles'.70Thisimpliesareading, whichFurlongalsoaccepts,ofentry802asrejectinganyappealtoconditionalsor 'combinationsofpowers',andasclaimingthatneverthelessobjectscanexistwhen humansdonotperceivethemthisclaimbeingbasedonthepossibilitythatGodmay perceiveobjectswhenhumansdonot. Thisreadingof802impliesthatBerkeleyhasfailed,infourdistinctwaysinone sentence,tosaywhathemeant.(1)IttakesBerkeleytohavewritten'nottomention.. .'whenhemeantsomethingmuchstronger.Yetwhenhesays'Imustnotmention...'
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

inentry441hemeansjustthat.(2)ItconstruesBerkeley's'whennot...perceived'to mean'whennot...perceivedbyhumans',althoughthedifferencebetween'perceived' and'perceivedbyhumans'issupposedtobethewholepointoftheentry.(3)Itmakes Berkeley'suseof'actually'idle,unlessheissupposedtoassumethathuman perceptionsareactualwhiledivineonesarenot.(4)IttakesBerkeleytohavesaid'but stillwithrelationtoperception'whenhemeant'butstillperceivedbySomeone',whichis nowordierandismuchclearerandmoredirect. ThesedifficultieswouldentitleonetorejecttheLuceFurlongreadingofentry802,even ifwehadnoalternativeinterpretationofit.Butthereisatleastonequiteplausible alternative,namelythefollowing.Entry802,likeentry441withits'Imustnotmention. ..',showsBerkeleyinhisroleasawriterwhoisplanningabookandthinkingabout problemsofexposition.Heintendstogiveaphenomenalisticorconditionalizingaccount oftheexistenceofbodieswhentheyarenotperceived,sayingthat ____________________ 70A.A.Luce,noteonentry52inbotheditions.Seealsonoteonentry802. 197

theycanexistwhen'notactuallyperceived'iftheyhavethe'relationtoperception' expressedinphenomenalisticconditionals;andin802heisprimarilyremindinghimself 'nottomentionthecombinationsofpowers',i.e.nottousethetechnicalterm 'combinationsofpowers'eventhoughitisonevehicleofthephenomenalistapproach whichheiscontemplating.71 ThisinterpretationassumesthatBerkeleywascapableofdealingwithcontinuitythrough

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

conditionalsaslateasthis;butweknowthathewas.72Itassumesthathehad difficultieswiththeexpression'combinationsofpowers'whichwerenotjustdifficulties withtheunderlyingphenomenalism;butweknowthathehad.73Itassumesthat Berkeleyknewthathisuseof'combinationsofpowers'wasequivalenttoa phenomenalistuseofconditionals;butweknowthathedidknowthis.74 TheinterpretationIhavesuggested,then,hasBerkeleysayingsomethingwhichhe couldverywellhavebeensaying:anditrelatesreasonablytothetextof802itself, encounteringnoneofthefourobstaclestotheLuceinterpretation.Evenifmysuggested readingiswrong,itissurelybetterthanonewhichtakesBerkeleytohavewritten'when notactuallyperceivedbutstillwithrelationtoperception'whenhemeant'whennot perceivedbyhumansbutstillperceivedbyGod'. Thepositioncanbesummedupasfollows.Lucesaysthatbyacertainstageinthe writingoftheCommentaries'[Berkeley]hascometorealizethatimmaterialismis strengthened,notweakened,bytheadmissionofsensiblebodies,perceivedbyGod whennotperceivedbyman.'75ThefirstbitofthisresemblesFurlong'sclaimthat Berkeleymoved'withrelief'tothePrinciplespositiononcontinuity;andIcanfindno evidencewhatsoeverforit.Supposewedeleteit,andtakeLucetohavesaidonlythat whilewritingtheCommentariesBerkeleybecame aware of the possibilitythatbodies mightexistwhennotperceivedbymenbecausetheyareperceivedbyGod.Thisclaim, whichisweakenedtothepointwhereitdoesnotconflictatallwithmycentralthesisin thepresentchapter,stillgoestoofar:itisnotsupportedbyanysingleoneofthenearly ninehundredentriesinthePhilosophical Commentaries. ____________________ 71SeeGrave,"'TheMindanditsIdeas'",p.303;J.D.Mabbott,"'ThePlaceofGodin
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Berkeley'sPhilosophy'",Martinp.374. 72Principles3. 73Philosophical Commentaries,entries84and282(end). 74Entry293a. 75A.A.Luce,noteonentry52,inthediplomaticedition(1944)only. 198

VIII ACTIVITYANDCAUSALITY
42.Berkeleyoncausation
THEpassivityargumentrequiresthepremissthatnothingcanbeacauseexcept(the willof)aspirit.Thisimpliesthatfiresdonotmakekettlesboil;andonewonderswhy Berkeleyshouldacceptanythingsoimplausible. Oneexplanationisthathefoundthefollowingargumentcompelling:objectsare collectionsofideas;andideas'arevisiblyinactive,thereisnothingofpoweroragency includedinthem';1soobjectsareinactive,arepowerless,arenotcauses.This argumentisunattractive.Itsfirstpremissisfalse,anditssecondistremendously unclear. Berkeley'sview,however,hasanothersourcewhichdoesnotinvolveidealism.Whenever thevulgarsaythatsomethingcausedormadeorproducedsomethingelse,alltheyhave
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

togobyalltheyarereallyentitledtoreportisasequenceofeventswhich instantiatesafamiliarpattern.Roughlyandbriefly:thevulgarreport'causes'although theyhaveobservedonlyregularities.Berkeleytakesthistoimplythatthevulgarsay morethantheyshould: Theconnexionofideasdoesnotimplytherelationofcauseandeffect,but onlyofamarkorsignwiththethingsignified.ThefirewhichIseeisnotthe causeofthepainIsufferuponmyapproachingit,butthemarkthatforewarns meofit.2 BerkeleythinksthatvisualideasareGod'sfuturetenselanguageaboutthetangible world,andsohemeans'themarkthatforewarnsme'literally.Mysightofthefireis God'swarningtomethatifIstepforwardIshallbeburned.Thepassageiscloudedby Berkeley'shavingtoidentify'thefirewhichIsee'withmysightofthefire,butstillthe mainpointisclearenough:therelationshipbetweena'mark'and'thethingsignified'is takentobejustaGodordainedconcomitanceandthereforenottobecausal. ____________________ 1Principles25. 2Principles65. 199

InoneplaceBerkeleydistinguishescausesfromregularaccompanimentsbycreditingthe word'occasion'withtwosenses:it'signifies,eithertheagentwhichproducesanyeffect, orelsesomethingthatisobservedtoaccompany,orgobeforeit,intheordinarycourse

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ofthings'.3Hisdescriptionofscience('naturalphilosophy')makesthesamepoint: Thedifferencethereisbetwixtnaturalphilosophersandothermen,withregard totheirknowledgeofthephenomena...,consists,notinanexacter knowledgeoftheefficientcausethatproducesthem,forthatcanbenoother thanthewill of a spirit,butonlyinagreaterlargenessofcomprehension, whereby...agreementsarediscoveredintheworksofNature,andthe particulareffectsexplained,thatis,reducedtogeneralrules.4 Thedenialsinthesepassagesgoagainstthemob'sassumptionsaboutwhatcanbea cause.Berkeleyknowsthis,but: Insuchthingsweoughttothink with the learned, and speak with the vulgar. [Copernicans]saythesunrises,thesunsets,...andiftheyaffecteda contrarystyleincommontalk,itwouldwithoutdoubtappearveryridiculous.A littlereflexiononwhatisheresaidwillmakeitmanifest,thatthecommonuse oflanguagewouldreceivenomannerofalterationordisturbancefromthe admissionofourtenets.5 Still,inspeakingwiththevulgarweshallbesayingwhatisnotliterallytrue: Intheordinaryaffairsoflife,anyphrasesmayberetained,solongasthey exciteinuspropersentiments,ordispositionstoactinsuchamannerasis necessaryforourwellbeing,howfalsesoevertheymaybe,iftakeninastrict andspeculativesense.Naythisisunavoidable,sinceproprietybeingregulated bycustom,languageissuitedtothereceivedopinions,whicharenotalways thetruest.6
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ThepointaboutCopernicansisthis:whenthevulgarsay'Thesunrises',thisisallright becauseitunambiguouslymarksoutaparticularkindofphenomenon;butastronomical discoverieshavebeenmadewhichshowthatthesundoesnot,strictly,rise.Topreserve theanalogy,thepointabout'cause'willhavetobethis:thevulgarhaveaserviceable useof'Thefirecausedthekettletoboil'andthelike,butdiscoverieshavebeenmade whichshowthatfiresdonot,strictly,causeanythingtohappen.What ____________________ 3Principles69. 4Principles105. 5Principles51. 6Principles52. 200

discoveriescanthesebe?Despiteoccasionalphrasessuggestingthecontrary,Berkeley doesnotthinkhehasmadeanempiricaldiscoveryaboutwhatcausesthereare:the basisofhispositionisinfactaviewaboutthemeaningof'cause'namelythatnothing couldstrictlyqualifyasa'cause'exceptthewillofaspirit.Thispartlyspoilstheanalogy withtheCopernicans.ItalsositsuneasilywithBerkeley'sprofessedrespectforordinary language;heseemstobesayingthatthecommonmeaningof'cause'isnotitscorrect meaning;andoneistemptedtoask,nastily,whetherheisimposingonusa 'philosophic'and'abstractednotionofcause'.7 Hemightreply:'Iamnotaslavetocommonparlance,fromwhichIhavealready departedbydenyingthatonecan,strictly,seeatangiblething.'Now,Berkeleyhad
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

reasonsforsayingthatfrompremisseswhicheveryonewouldacceptitfollowsthata tangiblethingcannotbeseen;sothatthevulgar,inclaimingto'seeandtouchthe coach',arebeingunfaithfultotheirownbasicperceptionconcepts;fromwhichitdoes perhapsfollow(Ihereslideoveracontroversialarea)thatsuchvulgarlocutionsare 'falseiftakeninastrictandspeculativesense'.ButcanBerkeleytakeasimilarline about'cause'?Hecertainlyneedsto.Ifhispositionisnottoremainamystery,hemust maintainthatcertainaspectsofwhatweallmeanby'cause',orcertaincommon assumptionsaboutwhatcausesmustbelike,doimplythatobjectscannotbecauses evenifmostpeopledonotseetheimplicationordonothonouritintheirordinarytalk. IthinkBerkeleywouldmaintainsomethinglikethis.Specifically,Ithinkhewouldclaim thatthevulgarwouldagreethatregularityisnotenough.Whenheinsiststhat'Thefire madethekettleboil'reportsonlythatthiskettledidandthatkettlesordinarilydoboil shortlyafterbeingplacedonthefire,heseemstoexpectustosay:'Ifthatisallthere istoit,thencertainlythefiredidnotmakethekettleboil.'Thispresupposesthatweall expecta'cause'tohavesomefeaturewhichislackedbymereregularitiesbutpossessed bythewillsofspiritsthevoluntaryordeliberateorpurposivedoingsofpersons.What couldBerkeleyhavesupposedthisfeaturetobe? Well,hestressesthecontingencyoftheobservedregularities,andnotesthatwecan easilysupposethatanyparticularoneofthemmightfailtoobtaininagivencase. Havingsaidthatthe'set ____________________ 7Cf.Third Dialogue,pp.2478. 201
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

rules'wherebyGod'excitesinustheideasofsense'arecalled'lawsofnature',Berkeley thinksitworthwhiletoadd:'Thesewelearnbyexperience,whichteachesusthatsuch andsuchideasareattendedwithsuchandsuchotherideas,intheordinarycourseof things.'8Inthenextsection,contingencyandnecessityareexplicitlycontrasted:'That toobtainsuchorsuchends,suchorsuchmeansareconducive,allthisweknow,notby discoveringanynecessaryconnexionbetweenourideas,butonlybytheobservationof thesettledlawsofNature.'9OfthelawofgravityBerkeleysays:'Thereisnothing necessaryoressentialinthecase,butitdependsentirelyonthewillofthegoverning spirit.'Andinthenextsection: Byadiligentobservationofthephenomenawithinourview,wemaydiscover thegenerallawsofNature,andfromthemdeduce[=inferinsomeway]the otherphenomena,Idonotsaydemonstrate[=inferdeductively];forall deductionsofthatkinddependonasuppositionthattheAuthorofNature alwaysoperatesuniformly,andinaconstantobservanceofthoseruleswe takeforprinciples:whichwecannotevidentlyknow.10 DoesBerkeleythink,then,thatagenuinecausalconnexionmustbeknowablea priori? Isthiswhyhethinksthatthevulgarwouldagree,iftheyclearedtheirminds,that objectscannotbecauses?Ithinknot;forthiswouldalsodebarspiritsfrombeing causes,onBerkeley'sownaccountoftheactivitiesofspirits. Berkeleystressesthecontingencyoftheregularitieswhichthevulgarcall'causes',I suggest,soastohighlighttheinductivenatureofourknowledgeaboutthem.Hewants tostressthatallweknowaboutfiresinrelationtokettlesisthatacertainpatternhas beenobservedinthepast,towhichwecanaddonlyahopeor'asupposition'thatthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

patternwillcontinuetoholdinthefuture.Thisinductivenessorbackwardlookingnessis arguablyabsentincasesof'thewillofaspirit'.IfIknowthatIamabouttoscratchmy elbow,havingjustdecidedtodoso,itisplausibletosaythatmyknowledgethough nota priori,notknowledgeofalogicallynecessaryconsequenceofmydecisionisnot inductivelybasedeither.Becausethisisplausiblewefindcontemporarywriterssaying: 'Therearetwopossiblekindsofcertaintyaboutone'sownfutureactionsinductive certainty,andcertainty ____________________ 10Principles107. 8Principles30. 9Principles31. 202

baseduponreasons,whichisdecision.'11Myconjecture,then,isthatBerkeleythinks thatagenuinelycausalconnexionmustenableustopredictnon-inductivelyastateof affairsfromanearlierstateofaffairs,andthattheonlysuchconnexionweknowofis thatbetweenadecision('volition')andthesubsequentactionofa'spirit'. ThatwouldexplainBerkeley'sthinkingthatobjectscannotbecauses,andthatspirits can.Woulditexplainhisthinkingthatonlyspiritscanbecauses,i.e.that'Wecannot possiblyconceiveanyactivepowerbuttheWill'?12Yes,itwouldexplainthistoo,given theidealistpremissthatideas(someofwhichareobjects)andspiritsaretheonlykinds ofitemtherecanbe.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thereis,however,afeatureofBerkeley'suseoflanguagewhichmighthelptoexplain thepositionhetakes,oratleasttheconfidencewithwhichhetakesit.Thispartial explanationhasnothingdirectlytodowithidealismorwiththesupposedcontrast betweencausesandregularities. OneofBerkeley'sstandardwaysofsayingthatsomethingis(not)agenuinecauseisto saythatitis(not)an'agent'.Thisisnaturalenough,forthereareetymologicaland semanticlinksbetween'agent'and'active'and'act',andthelastofthese,especiallyin expressionslike'actupon',iscloselyconnectedwithcause'.InEnglishtoday,however, theword'agent'tendsinmostcontextstosuggestpersonalagencynotjustsomething activebutsomeonewhoacts.IhavecaughtmyselfinlecturescreditingBerkeleywith theviewthat'onlyagentscanbecauses',meaningthatonlyspiritscanbecauses;andI thinkthatitisnaturalthustoassumethat'agent'excludeseverythingofaninanimate kind.IsuspectthatthiswasalsonaturalforaspeakerofEnglishinBerkeley'sdays; and,ifthatisright,Berkeley'suseof'agent'alsoasasynonymfor'cause'couldatleast tendtoconfirmhiminhisviewthatonlyspiritsorpersonscanbecauses. BerkeleysometimesexpectsevenLockeanstoagreethatmatteris'inactive',despite thefactthattheconcessionwouldrobthemofaconclusiontheywant: PHILONOUS:Dothnotmatter,inthecommoncurrentacceptationoftheword, signifyanextended,solid,moveable,unthinking,inactivesubstance?HYLAS: Itdoth.PHILONOUS:Andhathitnotbeenmadeevident, ____________________ 11S.HampshireandH.L.A.Hart,"'Decision,IntentionandCertainty'",Mind,vol.67( 1958),p.4.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

12Philosophical

Commentaries,entry155. 203

thatnosuchsubstancecanpossiblyexist?Andthoughitshouldbeallowedto exist,yethowcanthatwhichisinactivebeacause;orthatwhichis unthinkingbeacause of thought?13 IsuggestthatHylasissupposedcalmlytoallow'inactive'becausethisfollowsfrom 'unthinking',i.e.thatBerkeleyisatthispointconnecting'active'with'agent'andtaking thelattertomean'sentientbeingwhichactswithreasons'orthelike;andthat,having extractedHylas'concession,Berkeleythenfallsbackontheotherwayofusing'active', inordertoarguethatsincematterisinactiveitcannotbeacause. Analternativeexplanation,suggestedtomebyRichardSorabji,isthatthesupposed passivenessofmattermighthavebeenaresiduefromcertaindoctrinesofAristotle's; andthatseemstomelikely.ButIthinkthatthepeculiarityof'agent'alsoplaysapart, especiallywhenBerkeleysays:'Whenwetalkofunthinkingagents,...weonlyamuse ourselveswithwords.'14 AnotherstrandinBerkeley'sthinkingaboutcausesoughttobeteasedout.Ihave quotedarhetoricalquestionofBerkeley'swhichimpliesthatanunthinkingthingcould notcausethoughtandthisisnotofferedasamerecorollaryofthestrongerviewthat anunthinkingbeingcouldnotcauseanything.DoesBerkeleyfinditobviousthatathing whichisnotFcannotcauseanythingelsetobeF?Well,hesaysthis:'Itis... extravaganttosay,athingwhichisinert,operatesonthemind,andwhichis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

unperceiving,isthecauseofourperceptions,withoutanyregardeithertoconsistency, ortheoldknownaxiom:Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself.'15 Theclause'withoutanyregard...itself'wasomittedinthethirdedition.Still,the thoughtitexpressesmayhaveothersymptomsinBerkeley'swritings:wecannot realisticallyassumethathewouldomiteverythingwhichhewasinfactledtounderthe influenceofthe'oldknownaxiom'andanywaythe'axiom'isinterestinginitself. Thereis,ofcourse,absolutelynowarrantforthe'oldknownaxiom';anditispartofa lineofthoughtwhichcan,thoughitprobablydoesnotinBerkeley,leadtogravetrouble. Oneerrortowhichitcanleadand,Iconjecture,hasledisundueinsistenceupon certainsortsof'conservation'law.Whyweresomanyphilosophersandscientists reluctanttoacceptgravitation ____________________ 13Second Dialogue,p.216. 14Principles28. 15Third Dialogue,p.236. 204

asafundamentaltypeofphysicalphenomenon?Partly,ofcourse,becauseitinvolves actionatadistance;butalsobecauseitinvolvesonebody'sactinguponanotherina waywhichcannotbedescribedasone'slosingwhattheothergains.ThusFaraday:'That abodywithoutforceshouldraiseupforceinabodyatadistancefromit,istoohardto imagine;butitisharderstill,ifthatcanbepossible,toaccepttheideawhenwe considerthatitincludesthecreation of force.'16MaryHesse'sForces and Fields,from

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whichthatquotationcomes,providesfurtherevidenceofthepowerwhichthe'oldknown axiom'hashadoversomemen'sthinking. The'axiom'thatathingwhichisnotFcannotcauseanythingtobeFhasanevenmore damagingfirstcousin,namelytheviewthatitstandstoreasonthatathingwhichisF willcauseotherthingstobeF.Thelatterviewimpliesthatthefactsaboutheattransfer, say,hardlyhavethestatusofcontingentfacts:'Ofcoursethewater,incoolingtheiron, itselfbecomeshotter:inthiscasetheironisonlypassingontothewatertheheatit alreadyhas.'Locke,forexample,saysthatourobservationofobjectsgivesusnoideaof 'apowerintheonetomovetheother'save'byaborrowedmotion',17andimpliesthat thisideaisnottherockbottomideaofpowerpresumablybecauseitisonlytheideaof motiontransferandthusofsomethingwhichstandstoreasonorgoeswithoutsaying. Heputsthepointmorefullyhere: Activepower...isthemorepropersignificationofthewordpower... Bodies,byoursenses,donotaffordussoclearanddistinctanideaofactive power,aswehavefromreflectionontheoperationsofourminds...For, whentheballobeysthemotionofabilliardstick,itisnotanyactionofthe ball,butbarepassion.Alsowhenbyimpulseitsetsanotherballinmotionthat layinitsway,itonlycommunicatesthemotionithadreceivedfromanother, andlosesinitselfsomuchastheotherreceived...Theideaofthebeginning ofmotionwehaveonlyfromreflectiononwhatpassesinourselves.18 Theimplicationsof'itonlycommunicates'aretoomultifarioustobefollowedoutin detailhere.ButisitnotapparentthatLockeholds,a priori,theviewthatmotion originationneedstobe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 16QuotedinMaryB.Hesse,Forces and Fields(London,1961),p.223.Seealsopp.157 63and2225. 17Essa II.xxiii.28. 18Essay II.xxi.4. 205

explainedasmotiontransferdoesnot?Humeunderstoodallthisperfectly.19

43.BerkeleyandHumeonvolitions
Acertaintheoryaboutvoluntaryaction,i.e.thatactivityofspiritswhichBerkeleythinks istheonlygenuinelycausalactivity,isimpliedhere:'IfindIcanexciteideasinmymind ...Itisnomorethanwilling,andstraightwaythisorthatideaarises...Thusmuchis certain,andgroundedonexperience.'20ThatistheonlypublishedpassageIcanquote, butitsgeneraltenorisconfirmedbyseveralentriesintheCommentaries: WnIaskwhetherAcanmoveB.ifAbeanintelligentthing.Imeannomore thanwhetherthevolitionofAthatBmovebeattendedwiththemotionofB,if AbesenselesswhethertheimpulseofAagainstBbefollow'dbyyemotionof B.21 WhatmeansCauseasdistinguish'dfromOccasion?nothingbutaBeingwch willswntheEffectfollowsthevolition.22
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ThereisadifferencebetwixtPower&Volition.Theremaybevolitionwithout Power.ButtherecanbenoPowerwithoutVolition.Powerimplyethvolition& atthesametimeaConnotationoftheEffectsfollowingtheVolition.23 Strangeimpotenceofmen.ManwithoutGod.Wretchederthanastoneortree, hehavingonelythepowertobemiserablebyhisunperformedwills,these havingnopoweratall.24 Allthesepointtothesameaccountofhowaspiritacts:itperformsavolition,andan upshotensuesperhapsalittlelaterorperhaps,asthewords'straightway'and 'attended'suggest,attheverysametimeasthevolition.Howeverthedetailsarefilled in,itseemsclearthatthevolitionandtheupshotaresupposedtobetwodistinct eventsrelatedinsomewaywhichBerkeleydoesnotexplain.Itlooksasthoughthe relationisonewhichcanbeknowntoholdonlyinductively:Ifind'byexperience'that certainvolitionsareattendedorfollowedbycertainupshots,andItrust(inGod)that thiscorrelationwillcontinuetoholdinfuture.Onthatviewofthematter,though, Berkeley'swholeaccountofcausation ____________________ 19Treatise,pp.11112.SeealsoLeibniz,Monadology7;J.Laird,Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature(London,1932),pp.98101. 20Principles528. 21Philosophical Commentaries,entry461. 22Entry499. 23Entry699. 24Entry107.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

206

ishopelesslycompromised,forallithasdoneistorelocatetheinductiveregularity. Mymainpurposeinthissection,though,istoexaminethevolitionandupshotaccount ofdeliberate(intentional,voluntary)action,notinrelationtoothertheoriesof Berkeley'sbutjustonitsownmerits. Theclaimthatanyvoluntaryordeliberateactioninvolvesavolitionandanupshotmight beofferedas(1)ananalysis,anaccountofwhatitmeanstosaythatadoingwas deliberate,voluntary,intentionalorthelike;oras(2)acontingentthesisaboutthe mechanicsofdeliberatedoings,athesiswhichrepresents'Igetmyheadscratchedby firstperformingavolition'aslogicallyonaparwith'Igetthelightonbyraisingthe switch'.Offeredas(2)contingent,thevolitionandupshottheoryismerelytiresome: thereisnoevidenceforit,andnophilosophicalreasonforcaringwhetheritistrueor not.SoIshallconfinemyselftothetheoryconsideredas(1)ananalysisofthegeneral notionofintentionalnesswhichIsuspect,andshallassumewithoutproof,tobethe versionofthetheorywhichattractedBerkeley. Thetheorydoesnotwork.Purportingtoexplain'xdidAforareason,orintentionally,or deliberately',allitoffersusis'Aoccurredbecausexperformedavolition'.Butif 'performingavolition'or'performinganactofthewill'istobeintelligibletousas referringtoadoing,thenitinitsturnreraisesthequestionaboutintentionalness.Did heperformthevolitionso thathisfingerswouldmoveinsuchawayastorelievethe itchinhisscalp?Ifhedid,thenthenotionofintentionwhichistiedto'sothat'has notbeenanalysedorexplained,butmerelyrelocated.Ontheotherhand,ifsuchnotions
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

asintentiondon'tapplytovolitions,doesnotthatconcedethatvolitionsarenot performedafterall,butmerelyhappen?Andinthatcasetheanalysisimpliesthatno oneeverreallydoesanything:whatwecallactionsarereallyjusttheupshotsof happenings.25 Berkeleymayhavethoughtof'volitions'asepisodicwantsordesires('thevolitionofA thatBmove'soundslike'thedesireofAthatBmove').Onthatmodel,itmightindeed berighttosaythatthequestionoftheintentionalnessorvoluntarinessofvolitionsdoes notarise;forwecannotsensiblyaskwhy,orwithwhat ____________________ 25G.Ryle,The Concept of Mind(London,1949),p.67. 207

intention,someoneunderwentaspasmofdesire.Butthenonthatmodelthewhole analysiscollapses:itisobviouslyfalsethatwhathappensinintentionalactionisthat (a)onewantscertaineventstohappen,and(b)inconsequenceofthatwanteventsdo happen.BymerewantingIcannomoregetmyfingerscrossedthanIcanmove mountains.Onlybadphilosophicaltheorycouldleadanyonetodenythisveryobvious truth. Hume'streatmentofthevolitiontheoryhaspointsofinterestwhichmightbementioned here.Hethinksthatknowledgeofthefuturecanonlyhaveaninductivebasis,andsohe seesthevolitiontheoryasthelocusofapossiblethreat.Specifically,heseesitasa possiblebasisfortheviewthatourdeliberatedoingsgiveusdirectexperienceofakind of'power'or'necessity'bindingoneeventtoanother,i.e.bindingthevolitiontothe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

upshot.(Hewasslowtonoticethethreat.Abriefdiscussionofitissqueezedintothe AppendixoftheTreatise,26whereasinthefirstEnquiryitoccupiesnearlyhalfthe section'OntheIdeaofNecessaryConnexion'.) Someofthetime,Humeseemstoagreethatany'activityofaspirit',touseBerkeley's phrase,involvesavolitionandanupshot,andtodisputeonlytheclaimthatthesetwo putativeeventsarenoninductivelyconnected.Hehintsatanacceptanceofthevolitions theoryintheTreatise,andintheEnquiryhegoesmuchfurther: Theinfluenceofvolitionovertheorgansofthebody...isafact,which,like allothernaturalevents,canbeknownonlybyexperience,andcanneverbe foreseenfromanyapparentenergyorpowerinthecause,whichconnectsit withtheeffect,andrenderstheoneaninfallibleconsequenceoftheother.The motionofourbodyfollowsuponthecommandofourwill.Ofthisweareevery momentconscious.Butthemeans,bywhichthisiseffected...mustforever escapeourmostdiligentenquiry.27 Somewhatlater,afterarguingthatexternaleventsyieldonlybrutefactsequences,so thatourpredictionsinthatrealmmustrestonourfaiththatregularitiesdiscoveredin thepastwillcontinuetoholdinthefuture,Humecontinues: Thesamedifficultyoccursincontemplatingtheoperationsofmindonbody whereweobservethemotionofthelattertofollowuponthe ____________________ 26Treatise,pp.6323.Seealsop.12. 27Enquiry52.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

208

volitionoftheformer,butarenotabletoobserveorconceivethetiewhich bindstogetherthemotionandvolition,ortheenergybywhichthemind producesthiseffect.28 EventhosewhoagreewithHumeabouttheinductivebasisofallpredictionsarelikelyto bediscontentedwithhisaccountofdeliberateaction.Itiseasytoseewhy.Theyagree with(i)Hume'sdenialthatadeliberatedoinginvolvesavolitionwhichisnoninductively relatedtoanupshot,butdissentfrom(ii)hisimpliedaffirmationthatadeliberatedoing doesinvolveavolitionandanupshot.Allheneeds,todefendhistheoryofcausation,is thedenial(i);andtheimplausibilityofcertainpartsofhisdiscussionstemswhollyfrom hisaffirmation(ii).Thelatter,incidentally,occursmainlyatthebeginningandendof thediscussion;throughoutmostofthemiddlestretchHumeconfineshimselftothe denial.

44.Activityandpassitivity
Berkeleyconfidentlyappliestheactive/passivedichotomytohumanspirits,inways whichraiseproblems. Hisusualparadigmofactivityisthevoluntaryconjuringupofideas:'IfindIcanexcite ideasinmymindatpleasure,andvaryandshiftthesceneasoftasIthinkfit.'29The capacityforthiskindofimaginingletuscallit'imaging'isnotessentialtothehuman condition,andsomepeoplelackitentirely.Berkeleycantakeimagingasaparadigmof activityonlybecausehevirtuallyequatesitwiththinking.HisLockeanapproachto
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

meaningandunderstandingencouragesaLockeanviewofthinkingasthemental manipulationofideasorimages;andsoBerkeleyhastothinkthatactiveimagingisa vitalpartofthelifeofanywholeman. Sometimes,indeed,hewritesasthoughhethinksthattheactive/passivelinecoincides exactlywiththethinking/perceivingline:'ButwhateverpowerImayhaveovermyown thoughts,IfindtheideasactuallyperceivedbysensehavenotalikedependenceonMy will.'30Andthereisalsothiscuriouspassage: Thoughtsdomostproperlysignifyoraremostlytakenfortheinterior operationsofthemind,whereinthemindisactive,thoseyt obeynot ____________________ 28Enquiry58. 29Principles28. 30Principles29. 209

theactsofVolition,&inwchthemindispassivearemoreproperlycall'd sensationsorperceptions,Butyt isallacase.31 Thephrase'allacase'means'allone'or'allthesame'.Thepassageasawhole,Ithink, meansthis: Theword'thoughts'isproperlyorusuallytakentosignifytheinterior operationsofthemind,whereinthemindisactive.Mentaloperationsthat

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

obeynottheactsofvolition,andinwhichthemindispassive,aremore properlycalled'sensations'or'perceptions'.Butthecontentofwhatgoesonis justthesameinbothcases. ThisreflectsBerkeley'sgeneraltendencytoassimilatetheintellectualtothesensory: thoughtsandperceptionsarebothtransactionswithideasofasinglekind,andthetwo labelsmerelymarkthedifferencebetweentheactiveandthepassivecommercewith ideas. Foracontrast,considerKant'sposition.Hedidnotregardthedistinctionbetween thoughtsandperceptionsasasuperficialone,andsoa fortiorihedidnotdefineitas thedistinctionbetweenactiveandpassiveengagementwithideas.Butalthoughhe enforcedafundamentaldistinctionbetweenthoughtsandperceptionsbetween 'concepts'and'intuitions'Kantthoughtthathumansareinfactactiveintheirthinking andpassiveintheirintakeof'intuitions'orrawdata.Thisledhimintodifficultieswhich Icannotfollowouthere:forexample,intounprofitablespeculationsaboutwhether somenonhumanbeingsmighthave'activeintuitions',i.e.mightbeactiveinrespectof theirintakeofdataasweareinrespectofourintellectualoperationsupondata. MypresentconcerniswithwhatKantandBerkeleyhaveincommon.ForBerkeleyitisa merelyverbalmatter,anupshotofthestandardmeaningsof'thought'and'perception'; whileforKantitisadeeptruthaboutthehumanmind;buttheydoatanyrateagree thatweareactiveinrespectofourthoughtsandpassiveinrespectofourperceptions. Thethesisthatweareactiveinallourthoughtsmightbedeniedonthegroundsthat thoughtssometimesjustcome,andsometimes'runawaywith'thethinker;butIshall notpursuethatpoint.Whatoftheconversethesis?Berkeleydoesnotquitesaythatthe onlythingweactivelydoistothink;buthisillustration
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 31Philosophical Commentaries,entry286.Seealsoentry821. 210

oftheactive/passivedichotomyisalwaysthinking/sensingandneverswimming/sensing whichmakesonewonder.Physicalactivity,indeed,isneverprominentinBerkeley's pictureofthehumancondition,anditdropsalmostcompletelyoutofsightwhenthe active/passivedistinctionisatwork. Thatfactgivesgroundsforsuspicions,andtheseincreasewhenweturntothe'passive' sideoftheantithesis.Berkeleysaysthatwearepassiveinrespectofallour 'sensations'or'actualperceptions';andthiscommitshim,asdoeshistheoryof'real things',totheconclusionthatpassivityisasine qua nonofanyperceptionofa'real thing'orobjectivestateofaffairs.Thisconclusionisfalse,however,andlookstrueonly ifonethinksaboutthenoninterferingonlookerandforgetstheactive,physically involvedobserver.LikeKant,Berkeleyneglectsthefactthathumanshavebodies. Eveninpassiveornoninterferingobservationstheremaybearelevantkindofphysical activity.Berkeleydoespaysomeattentiontothis,forexamplebydistinguishingmy activityindrawingairinthroughmynosefrommypassivityinrespectoftheolfactory sensationwhichIthenhave.32Theinterplaybetweenactivityandpassivity,however, goesmuchfurtherthanthis. WhenIseearealarmgoingup,myvisualintakeistheperceptionofa'realthing',and Berkeley'stheoryimpliesthatIampassiveinrespectofit.Butifthearmismine,and
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

goesupbecauseIvoluntarilyraiseit,thenIamnotpassiveinrespectofitsgoingup; andso,onewouldhavethought,Iamnotpassiveinrespectofthechangeofmyvisual stateasIseeitgoingup.BerkeleymaysaythathereIaminvolvedbothactivelyand passively,butassoonasheaddsanydetailstothisheisintrouble.33 SupposehesaysthatI(a)activelyraisemyarmbut(b)passivelyundergothe correspondingchangeofvisualstate.Thatwillbenouseunless(b)passivityistakento covernotonlythevisualbutalsothetactualandothersensorystateswhichwould countasperceptionsofmyarm'supwardmovemente.g.whatIfeelwhenmyhand touchestheceiling.Butthenthiswayofdistinguishingtheareaofmyactivityfromthat ofmypassivityimpliesadistinctionbetween(a)myarm'sgoingupand(b)any'ideas' whichwouldordinarilycountasperceptionsofmyarm's ____________________ 32First Dialogue,p.196. 33SeeD.M.Datta,"'Berkeley'sObjectiveIdealism'",Steinkrauspp.11418. 211

goingup.IthinkitisclearthatthisflatlycontradictsBerkeley'sidealismandtakeshim agiantstridetowardstheveilofperceptionaccountofwhatitisforsomethingreallyto bethecaseintheobjectiverealm,e.g.foranarmreallytogoup. Berkeley'sonlyalternativeistosaythatIamactiveinrespectofmyvolitionand passiveinrespectoftheupwardmovementofmyarm.Thathewouldtakethiswayout ofthedifficultyissuggestedbyhisremarkthat'manwithoutGod'wouldbewretched becauseofhis'unperformedwills'.Takingthislatterphrasetomean'volitionsnot

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

followedbythewilledupshot',thisimpliesthatwhatdoesactuallyhappen('withGod') isthatIactivelywillandthattheupshotiswhollyinGod'shandsandthuswholly outsidethescopeofmygenuineactivity.Anevenmorestrikinginstanceofthislineof thoughtwillbediscussedinmynextsection. IhavealreadynotedthatthisversionofthevolitiontheorycommitsBerkeleytogiving causalstatementsaninductivebasisafterall;butthereismorewrongwithitthanthat. Thetheorywassupposedtoexplainwhatitisforamovementtoconstitutemyactively doingsomething,ortobeacaseoftheactivityofaspirit;butnowwefindthatno bodilymovementeverisacaseofaspirit'sactuallydoingsomething.AllIeverdoisto will,andwhathappenstomybodyisnotreallyuptome,sothatBerkeleyisnoteven entitledtohismodestasseverationthat'WemoveourLegsourselves'.34Inthis versionofit,thevolitiontheoryisselfdefeating,foritimpliesthenonexistenceofthe veryclassofphenomenaitwasdesignedtoexplain. Berkeley'sdifficultiesovertheactive/passivedichotomyresultfromtheintersectionof hispremisseswithaconceptualtanglewhichpresentsaproblemtoeveryphilosopher. Thereisatheoryneutralquestionabouthowtheactive/passivedistinctionshouldbe broughttobearuponcasesofphysicalactivity,andIdonotpretendtoknowhowto answerit.

45.Spirits
Berkeleyhasaspecialproblemaboutthephysicalactionsofotherpeople.Itisnatural toconstruethepassivityargumentof35aboveassaying'Anychangeinmysensory statewhichis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 34Philosophical Commentaries,entry548. 212

notmydoingisGod'sdoing',whichimpliesthatyourideaswhenyouperceivemyraising myarmarecausedsolelybyGod.Berkeley,however,construesitotherwise: Thoughtherebesomethingswhichconvinceus,humanagentsareconcerned inproducingthem;yetitisevidenttoeveryone,that...thefargreaterpart oftheideasorsensationsperceivedbyus,arenotproducedby,ordependent onthewillsofmen.Thereisthereforesomeotherspiritthatcausesthem.35 Thecruxoftheargument,itseems,iswhatis(not)causedbymenratherthanwhatis (not)causedbyme.InchapterVIIIdeliberatelysuppressedthisissuebyusingboth formulationsinterchangeably,butnowitistimetoprisethemapart. ThisrequiresustoexamineBerkeley'suseof'spiritotherthanmyself',whichrequiresus firsttolookinto'spirit'. AftermuchwaveringintheCommentaries,Berkeleysettlesinthepublishedworksfora viewofspiritsasmentalsubstances,whichhetakestobesubstrata: Thingorbeingisthemostgeneralnameofall,itcomprehendsunderittwo kindsentirelydistinctandheterogeneous,andwhichhavenothingcommonbut thename,towit,spiritsandideas.Theformerareactive,indivisible substances:thelatterareinert,fleeting,dependent beings,whichsubsistnot
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

bythemselves,butaresupportedby,orexistinmindsorspiritualsubstances.
36

Theword'supported',likethephrase'substanceorsupport'furtheron,37ominously echoestheLockeansubstratumanalysisoftheconceptofsubstance.Butthereismore herethanjustaverbalecho.Berkeley'streatmentofspiritualsubstancehasadeep structuralfeaturewhichbringsitunderthesameaxeastheLockeansubstratumtheory, namelyitsdividingthementalworldintotwokindsofitemideasandspirits,mental propertiesandmentalpropertybearers.38TheobjectionIbroughtagainstthe substratumanalysisin11aboveisperfectlygeneral:itcondemnsanyonewhosays 'Propertybearersareitemsofakind',andcondemnshimnolessifhealsosays,as Berkeleydoes,'Therearenopropertiesexceptmentalones'. Berkeleyisclearlyinadifficultyhere;and,sincehehimself ____________________ 35Principles146. 36Principles89. 37Principles135. 38Foradifferentview,seeTipton,"'Berkeley'sViewofSpirit'". 213

hasattackedthesubstratumanalysisinLocke'sversionofit,hehasaproblemabout consistency.Ishalltrytoshow,partlyusingmaterialsinChapterIIIabove,howwecan resolvethiswellknowntensioninBerkeley'sthoughtinamannerwhichleaveshimifnot

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

triumphantatleastintelligible. Berkeleyhimselfseesthat'spirit'needsspecialdefence,primarilybecauseheregards 'spirit'asanintelligibletermalthoughonecouldnothaveanideaofspirit.Inthe followingpassagetheprimafacieproblemisstatedbadlybecauseofunderlyingbad theory,andBerkeley'shandlingofitisalsounsatisfactoryforareasonIshallexplain later: Surelyitoughtnottobelookedonasadefectinahumanunderstanding,that itdoesnotperceivetheideaofspirit,ifitismanifestlyimpossiblethere shouldbeanysuchidea.Andthis,ifImistakenot,hasbeendemonstratedin Sect.27:towhichIshallhereaddthataspirithasbeenshowntobetheonly substanceorsupport,whereintheunthinkingbeingsorideascanexist:but thatthissubstancewhichsupportsorperceivesideasshoulditselfbeanidea orlikeanidea,isevidentlyabsurd.39 Berkeleyhereargues:spiritsarenotideas,sospiritscannotresembleideas,sothere cannotbeanideaofspirit.Thepremisesistrue,andperhapsitentailsthelemma;but thelemmadoesnotentailtheconclusion,foritisjustnottruethatanideaofxmust resemblex.Whatevertheimpedimentistotherebeinganyideasofspirit,itcannotbe that.Noticealsothecuriouslyblusteringnatureofthepassage:Berkeleysays imperiouslythatof coursetherecanbenoideaofspirit,asthoughhewereupagainst someonewhothinksthattherecanbesuchanideaor,evenmoreabsurdly,someone whothinksitis'adefectinahumanunderstanding'thatitcannotformsuchanidea. Buttheseopponentsarestrawmen.Whathastobedealtwithistheadversarywho saysthatiftherecannotbeanideaofspiritthentheword'spirit'isillegitimateorat theveryleastthatwecannotknowthattherearespirits.Berkeleyhasananswerfor
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatadversarytoo,butinthequotedpassagehebypassestheanswerby misrepresentingthechallenge. Beforetryingtoimproveonthataccountofwhattheproblemis,letuslookatBerkeley's mainwayofsolvingit.Hiscorestatementonthesubjectisthis:'HowoftenmustI repeat,thatI ____________________ 39Principles135. 214

knoworamconsciousofmyownbeing;andthatImyselfamnotmyideas,but somewhatelse,athinkingactiveprinciplethatperceives,knows,wills,andoperates aboutideas.'40Inbrief:Iknowwhat'spirit'means,becauseIamaspiritmyself,andI knowwhat'I'and'myself'mean. InthisconnexionBerkeleyintroducestheword'notion'casuallyintheThirdDialogue,41 moredeliberatelyinthesecondeditionofthePrinciples.Stilltakinghimselforhismind ashisparadigmofaspirit,hesaysthatevenifhehasnoideaofspiritatleasthehasa 'notion'ofit,andthatthissufficestorendertheterm'spirit'alegitimateone. Thatwayofexpressinghispositionisnotquiteright,though.Berkeleyisnotsaying'I haveanotionofmyselfandthereforeunderstandtheword"myself"andknowtruths aboutmyself'.Ifhewere,wemightjoinsomewritersinregrettingBerkeley'snothaving toldusjustwhat'notions'are,42orwemightjoinothersinspeculatingaboutwhat deepinsightintomeaningisbeingconcealedbehindBerkeley'sreticenceabout'notions';
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

deepinsightintomeaningisbeingconcealedbehindBerkeley'sreticenceabout'notions'; 43butbothresponsesaremisguided.Berkeley'srealpositioncanbeexpressedthus:'I haveanotionofmyself,which is to saythatIcanunderstandtheword"myself"andcan knowtruthsaboutmyself',withorwithouttherider'...eventhoughIhavenoideaof myself'.Thatis,Berkeleydoesnothaveanunexplainedpremissabout'notions'from whichheinfersthathecanunderstand'myself'or'mymind'withouthaving correspondingideas.Rather,hehasthepremissthathedoesunderstand'mymind',yet hasnocorrespondingideas;andheexpressesthesefacts,oratleasttheformerof them,bysayingthathehasa'notion'ofhismind.Thisiswellconfirmedbythetext: Wehavesomenotionofsoul,spirit[etc.]inasmuchasweknowor understandthemeaningofthosewords.44 Inalargesenseindeed,wemaybesaidtohaveanidea,orratheranotionof spirit,thatis,weunderstandthemeaningoftheword,otherwisewecouldnot affirmordenyanythingofit.45 ____________________ 40Third Dialogue,p.233. 41Third Dialogue,pp.2312. 42R.Grossman,"'DigbyandBerkeleyonNotions'",Theoria,vol.26(1960);J.W.Davis, "'Berkeley'sDoctrineoftheNotion'",Review of Metaphysics,vol.12(1959).For furtherexamples,seereferencesbyDavis. 43I.T.Ramsey,"'BerkeleyandthePossibilityofanEmpiricalMetaphysics'",Steinkraus pp.1719;A.L.Leroy,"'WasBerkeleyanIdealist?'",Steinkrausp.136. 44Principles27. 45Principles140.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

215

Ihavesomeknowledgeornotionofmymind,anditsactsaboutideas, inasmuchasIknoworunderstandwhatismeantbythosewords.WhatI know,thatIhavesomenotionof.46 Soitisnotreallyrighttosay:'AccordingtoBerkeley,someunderstandingisbasedon ideas,someonnotions.'Itisbettertosay:'Berkeleyusestheword"notion"toexpress hisclaimthatnotallunderstandingisbasedonideas.' Berkeley'sbasicproblemabout'spirit',expressedinasunLockeanawayaspossible,is asfollows:itseemsplausibletosaythatifIamtohaveanydisciplinedtheoreticaluse foragivenclassificatoryterm,Imustknowwhatitwouldbeliketoencountersomething towhichthetermapplies:myunderstandingof'house',forexample,involvesmy knowinghowtodistinguishhousesfromnonhousesamongsttheitemswithwhichIam sensorilyconfronted.Butthissetsastandardwhichcannotbemetbytheterm'spirit'in Berkeley'ssenseofit,fornothingcouldcountasasensoryencounterwithaspirit. ThedifficultycouldbeputtoBerkeleyintheformofachallenge:'Whatrighthaveyou tothinkthatthereisanythingtowhich"spirit"applies?'Berkeley'sanswer,Ithink, amountstothis:'Ihaveideas;and,bydefinitionof"spirit",whateverhasideasisa spirit;soIamaspirit.Youcannotexpectmetotakeseriouslythesuggestionthat perhapsIdonotexistordonothaveideas.'Ifthechallengersaid:'Soyouthinkyoudo haveideasofspirit,fromyourencounterswithyourself?'Berkeley'sreplywouldbe:'No allmyconfrontationsareonesinwhichIconfrontsomething else.Iam,sotospeak,the receptaclewhichholdsallofmydata,anditdoesnotmakesensetotrytoinclude
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

myself,orthattowhich"I"refers,amongthesedata.Don'taskwhereyoucanfinda spirityouareone.' Thatexerciseinsympatheticmisinterpretationdoesseemtofitthebroadoutlinesof Berkeley'streatmentof'spirit'.Itcreditshimwithhavingaprimafacieproblemwhich could,thoughunhappily,beexpressedinthewords'Therecanbenoideaofspirit'.It creditshimwiththinkingthatadefenderof'spirit'musttakehimselfastheparadigm spirit.Anditcreditshimwiththeviewthatafullexplanationofwhy there cannotbean ideaofspiritcarrieswithitanexplanationofwhy it does not matter that there cannot beanideaofspiritthatis,whyitislegitimatetouse ____________________ 46Principles142. 216

'spirit',oratleast'I',evenifonehasnocorrespondingidea.Thesethreefeaturesofmy interpretationcorrespondtothreeofthemostconspicuousfeaturesofBerkeley'sown discussionsof'spirit'. OnthisaccountoftheproblemandofBerkeley'ssolutionofit,neithertheproblemnor thesolutionhasanythingtodowithsubstrata.Perhapsitdoesinvolvethenotionofa mindasaspiritualsubstanceanitemuponwhichideasareadjectivalandwhichisnot itselfadjectivaluponanythingbutitdoesnotinvolveBerkeleyinwronglyanalysingthe conceptofsubstanceintermsofnakedsubstrata.ItistruethatBerkeleydoesuse substratumlanguageintalkingaboutspirits,andthisgiveshima(bad)reasonfor sayingthatwecannothaveideasofspirits.But,whetherornotherealizedit,healso
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

hasamuchbetterreasonforthinkingthattheconceptofspirit,orofhimselfasa mentalorspiritualsubstance,isaspecialcasewhichneedsspecialexplanation;andhis treatmentoftheproblemiscoherentonlywhenseeninthelightofthatbetteraccount ofwhattheproblemis.Ifwecontinuetoseetheproblemas'Howcanwemakesenseof "kindofitemwhichsupportsmentalproperties"?',theansweristhatwecannotmake senseofthis,andBerkeley'sappealsto'Iknoworamconsciousofmyownbeing'areof noavail.Ifontheotherhandtheproblemis'HowcanImakesenseof"myself"orof "I",ifthesetermsdonotrefertoanitemwhichIcansensorilyencounter?',thensome ofBerkeley'sremarkscontainthemakingsofananswer. Now,whatabouttheconsistencyproblem?Berkeleydoes,asIhavementioned,usethe languageofthesubstratumanalysisintalkingaboutspirits,apparentlyassumingthatif therearesubstancestherearesubstrataitemsofakindthatcannothaveanydefining properties.Canhesquarethiswithhisperemptoryrejectionofthesubstratacanvassed byLocke?ThepointisforcefullymadebyHylas: Youadmit...thatthereisspiritualsubstance,althoughyouhavenoideaof it;whileyoudenytherecanbesuchathingasmaterialsubstance,because youhavenonotionorideaofit.Isthisfairdealing?Toactconsistently,you musteitheradmitmatterorrejectspirit.47 Philonousreplies: ____________________ 47Third Dialogue,p.232. 217
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Idonotdenytheexistenceofmaterialsubstance,merelybecauseIhaveno notionofit,butbecausethenotionofitisinconsistent,orinotherwords, becauseitisrepugnantthatthereshouldbeanotionofit...Inthevery notionordefinitionofmaterialsubstance,thereisincludedamanifest repugnanceandinconsistency.Butthiscannotbesaidofthenotionofspirit. Thatideasshouldexistinwhatdothnotperceive,orbeproducedbywhat clothnotact,isrepugnant.Butitisnorepugnancytosay,thataperceiving thingshouldbethesubjectofideas,oranactivethingthecauseofthem.48 Themovefrom'Ihavenonotionofit'to'thenotionofitisinconsistent',though problematicalinseveralways,isclearlyashiftfromtheattackonsubstratatothe attackonmaterialsubstancesthesebeingunderstoodasradicallymindindependent items,notnecessarilyasinvolvingthesubstratumanalysis.Inshort,Berkeleyisnow retroactivelychangingthewholestructureandstrategyofhisattackon'material substance',askingthereadertoignoretheattackonsubstrataassuchandtotakehim ashavingaddressedhimselfsolelytotheveilofperceptiondoctrine.Ineffect,Berkeley isnowclaimingtohavefollowedthestrategywhichIdescribedin17above. Berkeley'streatmentofthe'consistencyproblem'confirmsmythesisinChapterIII above,thatthesubstratumand'realthing'issuesaredifferentandthatBerkeleytended toconflatethem.ForwehavenowfoundBerkeleyretractinghiscriticismsofthe substratumanalysisassuch,andaskingthathisattackon'materialsubstance'be viewedwhollyasacriticismoftheveilofperceptiondoctrine.Itwouldbepleasantto contendthathehasinfactacceptedthesubstratumanalysisallthrough,butIdonot thinkthatcanbemaintained:Berkeley'sdiscussionsofLockedocontainthosefew cogentremarkswhicharegenuinelyaddressedtothesubstratumanalysisandnota
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

confusedmixtureofitwithotherdoctrines.Buttheyarefew,andareperipheralto Berkeley'smainantiLockeanconcerns;andthosefactsrenderhissubsequent acceptanceofthesubstratumanalysislesssurprisingthanitmightotherwisehavebeen. Now,atlast,wecanreturntothequestionof'otherspirits'.ItisnotclearthatBerkeley hasentitledhimselftothenotionof'spiritotherthanmyself'.Hisclaimtobeableto makesenseof'spirit'restsontheargument:Iammyself,soIknowmyself,so ____________________ 48Third Dialogue,pp.2323. 218

Ihaveanotionofmyself,soIhaveanotionofspirit.Itheistoapply'spirit'to anythingelse,heoughttoprovidefurtherexplanationswhichhedoesnot.Ishallnot pressthatpoint,however;formymainconcerniswithwhatBerkeleysaysaboutother spirits,i.e.histreatmentof'theproblemofotherminds',ofwhichhewasarguablythe discoverer.Hesays: Wecannotknowtheexistenceofotherspirits,otherwisethanbytheir operations,ortheideasbythemexcitedinus.Iperceiveseveralmotions, changes,andcombinationsofideas,thatinformmetherearecertainparticular agentslikemyself,whichaccompanythem,andconcurintheirproduction. HencetheknowledgeIhaveofotherspiritsisnotimmediate,asisthe knowledgeofmyideas;butdependingontheinterventionofideas,byme referredtoagentsorspiritsdistinctfrommyself,aseffectsorconcomitant signs.49
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Berkeleygoesontosaythatsometimestheagentcannotbeahumanone.Letthat pass:weshallgivehimGod,andmerelyaskwhatrightBerkeleyhastosaythatthe agenteverisahumanone. Heconcedesthat'wehaveneitheranimmediateevidencenorademonstrative knowledgeoftheexistenceofotherfinitespirits'butclaimsthat'thereisaprobability' thatsuchspiritsexistbecause'weseesignsandeffectsindicatingdistinctfiniteagents likeourselves'.50Theclaimis,then,that'Therearefinitespiritsotherthanmyself'is formeanexplanatoryhypothesis,aconjecturewhichexplainsmydatabetterthanany other:Ihavevisualideaswhichwouldordinarilycountasmyseeingyouraiseyourarm, andIspeculatethatthereisanotherhumanspiritwhoseactivityhelpstoexplainthe visualideasinquestion. Thisapproachtothe'otherminds'problemisnotoriouslyfullofdifficulties,andfor Berkeleytheyarepeculiarlyacute.ThevisualideasIseektoexplainbythehypothesis thatthereisanotherhumanspiritareperceptionsofreality,andBerkeleyisfirmly committedtosayingthattheyarecausedbyGod.Ifanotherhumanspiritistobe involved,itmustbelessdirectly:thespiritcausesxtooccur,andGodissomehow spurredbyx'soccurrencetocauseachangeinmyvisualstate. Berkeleyhimselfsaysasmuchinapassagewhereheapproachestheotherminds problembycontraposition,asitwere:bystressing ____________________ 49Principles145. 50Third Dialogue,p.233.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

219

theindirectnessofone'sexperienceofotherhumanspiritsheseekstoarguethatone perceivesGodinatleastasstraightforwardawayasoneperceivesotherhumans.Then heoverplayshishand,arguingthatwearemoreintouchwithGodthanwithone another,partlybecausehis'effects'are'infinitelymorenumerousandconsiderable,than thoseascribedtohumanagents',andalsothisbeingwhatgivesthegameaway becauseitisGodwho'maintainsthatintercoursebetween[human]spirits,wherebythey areabletoperceivetheexistenceofeachother'.51Thiscouldbetakenineitheroftwo ways,correspondingtothetwopossiblevaluesofxattheendofmypreceding paragraph.(1)Youcauseyourbodytomove,andGodcausesmetoperceiveits movementortoperceiveitasitmoves;or(2)youperformavolitiontomoveyourbody, andGodcausesyourbodytomoveandthereforecausesmetoperceiveitsmovement. EitherwayandneitherofthemsitshappilywithBerkeley'sbasicprinciplesGodisthe immediatecauseofanychangeinmysensorystateofwhichIamnotthecause. ButifGodistheimmediatecause,thenwhatisexplainedbythehypothesisthatthere isanotherhumanspiritinvolvedinthesituation?Berkeleywillsurelynotsaythatyour volitionoryourarmmovementcausesGodtocausethechangeinme;sopresumablyhe mustsaythatyouraction,whateveritis,servesasanoncausaltriggerwhichsomehow spursorpromptsGodtocauseachangeinme.WhatGodcandoonahint,though,he candoonhisowninitiative;soyourroleinthesituationisdispensable;sothereisno warrantformyconjecturethatyouhavearoleinthesituationor,therefore,thatyou existatall. Atthispoint,Berkeley'sdifficultiesareastonishinglylikeLocke'sovertheveilof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

perceptiondoctrine.ThereisapassageintheSecondDialoguewhereHylastriesto contendthatalthoughGodcausesourchangesofsensorystate,'matter'hasarole eitherashis'instrument'incausingthesechangesorasthe'occasion'ofhisdoingso.52 The'occasion'proposalamountstosayingthatGod,indecidingwhethertocausea givenideainmeatacertaintime,allowshimselftobeguidedbythefactsaboutwhat sorts ____________________ 51Principles147.SeealsoAlciphron IV,45. 52Second Dialogue,pp.218220.SeealsoG.D.Hicks,Berkeley(London,1932),p.148; andR.Jackson,"'Locke'sVersionoftheDoctrineofRepresentativePerception'",Martin p.139n. 220

of'matter'Iaminfactinthepresenceofatthattime.Philonous'crisplyefficient exposureoftheidlenessof'matter'inthistheory(asdistinctfromhisclaimsthatitis impioustosupposeGodwouldattendtounthinkingsubstance,andthat'matter'is meaninglessanyway)canbemodelledoverintoaproofthatinBerkeley'sowntheory 'otherhumanspirits'areidletothesamedegreeandforthesamereasons. Berkeleyisinfactdeeplycommittedtosaying:'IamaloneintheuniversewithGod. Therearesensiblethings,buttheseareasubclassofmymentalstatesandGod's; thereareperhapsmentalstateswhichGodhasandIdonot,andmanyofmymental statesmustbeGod'salso;buttherecannotbeanyreasonforsupposingthatthe universecontainsanyspirits,ormentalsubstances,otherthanthetwoofus.'There
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

maybeanescapefromthisthroughanappealtoGod'sbenevolence;butshortofthat, i.e.consideringtheexistenceofotherhumanspiritssimplyasexplanatoryofthegiven data,Berkeleyoughttosay'Idonotneedthathypothesis'. 221

IX EMPIRICISMABOUTMEANINGS
46.Ideasandimpressions
HUME'SviewofmeaningisessentiallyLocke's:tounderstandawordistoassociateit withakindof'idea',and'ideas'arequasisensorystates.ForHume,too,thinking consistsinmentallymanipulatingthesesame'ideas';andsoheshareswithhis predecessorsageneralpictureinwhichnoradicallinesaredrawnbetweenthinking, imagining,meaning,understanding.Theinclusionof'imagining'inthelistsuggeststhat Humewilldrawnosharpandabsolutelinebetween,forinstance,whatgoesonwhen onethinksoutaproblemandwhatgoesonwhenoneseesapotato.Thisisindeedthe case.Humedoeshaveaspeciallabel'impressions'forthesensedataofnormal perception,butherepresentsthedifferencebetween'ideas'and'impressions'asmerely oneofdegree: Thoseperceptions,whichenterwithmostforceandviolence,wemayname impressions;andunderthisnameIcomprehendalloursensations,passions andemotions,astheymaketheirfirstappearanceinthesoul.ByideasImean
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thefaintimagesoftheseinthinkingandreasoning.1 Thegenericword'perception'echoesBerkeley'sviewthatallwestrictlyperceiveare whathecalls'ideas',andalsoLocke'suseof'perceive'tocoverallmentalactivity(see 4above).AsHumesaysroundly:'Tohate,tolove,tothink,tofeel,tosee;allthisis nothingbuttoperceive.'2His'perceptions'areLocke'sandBerkeley's'Ideas';andhis distinctionbetween'ideas'and'impressions'marksthedifferenceinthedegreeof'force' or'vivacity'adifferencewhichwasequallyrecognized,thoughindifferentlanguage,by LockeandBerkeley.InHume,then,weagainhavetheassimilationoftheintellectualto thesensory. Iremarkedin4thatthisassimilation,orthedoubleuseof ____________________ 1Treatise,p.1.Seealsop.319andKempSmith,The Philosophy of David Hume,ch. 10. 2Treatise,p.67. 222

'idea'whichitgenerates,isrelevanttoLocke'sempiricismaboutmeanings,i.e.tohis theorythattounderstandaclassificatorywordonemusteither(a)havebeensensorily confrontedbyitemstowhichitappliesor(b)knowhowtodefineitbymeansofwords whichoneunderstands.Inparticular,thedoubleuseof'idea'makesmeaningempiricism looksimpler,andperhapsmoreobviouslytrue,thanitreallyis.Meaningempiricism, however,isalsoinfluencedbythesensory/intellectualassimilationinotherandsubtler

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ways,andin4781shalldiscusstheseastheyfigureinHume'swritings. Hume,asiswellknown,tookoverallthemainelementsofLocke'smeaningempiricism, exceptforthepartaboutabstractideaswhichhethoughtBerkeleyhadrefuted.Ichoose tofocusmydiscussionofmeaningempiricismonHumepartlybecauseitplaysamore activeroleinhisworkthaninLocke'spresumablybecauseHumesawmoreclearlyits potentialasaweaponofdestructivecriticism,orhadagreaterwilltouseitassuch. Confrontedbyanexpressionwhichhistheoryimpliestobemeaningless,Locke'susual responseisnottocondemntheexpressionbuttosoftpedalonthetheory.Humetries todobetterthanthis,andnevershrinksfromfollowingtheargumentwhereverit honestlyseemstohimtolead.Asthatwaveringaccountsuggests,Iamunsurewhether thebasicdifferenceisoneofinsightoroneofnerve.3 IcentrethediscussiononHumealsobecausehismindwastougherandmorepersistent thanLocke's;thepoweroftheintellectual/sensoryassimilationtogenerateerrorisseen moreclearlyinHumebecausehe,farmorethanLockeorBerkeley,abidesbyitanddoes hishardthinkingintermsofit.Thisiswhy,sofarasthethemesofthisbookare concerned,Humeisatoncethemostinstructiveandtheoftenestwrongofthethree philosophers. Thephrase'tougherandmorepersistent'needsqualification.Ishallexplainwhy, throughasmallcasestudywhichalsoaddsneededdetailsabouttheidea/impression dichotomy. Since'impressions'arebydefinitionnothingbutforcefulperceptions,Humecan reasonablythinkthatalloursensoryintakeinexperienceoftheobjectiverealmconsists of'impressions';butheoughtalsotoallowan'impression'statustomuchof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 3SeeGibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,pp.1011,28. 223

whatoccursinvividdreams,hallucinations,etc.Sometimes,however,heuses 'impression'asthoughitcoveredonlythedataofordinaryexperienceoftheobjective realm.Thisnarrowingtendency,althoughHumeexplicitlydisavowsit4andalthoughit conflictswithhisviewthatthereareimpressionsofreflectionaswellassensation,is stronglymanifestedinhispreparednesstotreatmeaningempiricismasaviewabout understandinginrelationtoexperience of the objective,whilealwaysexpressingitasa thesisaboutunderstandinginrelationtoimpressions.I'llreturntothisinamoment. Humebelievesthatthoughtisatransactionwithideas;buthisdefinitionof'idea'as 'faintperception'oughttodiscouragehimfromsayingconverselythateverytransaction withideasisacaseofthinkingunlessofcoursehefollowsDescartesandLockein using'thought'etc.tosprawloverthewholerangeofthemental.Yetwehaveseenthat hecallsideas'thefaintimagesof[impressions]inthinkingandreasoning',which stronglysuggeststhatanyhavingofideasistocountas'thinking'insomefairlynormal senseofthatword. Thetwoprecedingparagraphsyieldthis:Hume'sofficialpositionisthat(a)the impression/idealineisjustthelively/faintlinewithinperceptions;buthetendstoslip intotheassumptions,neitherofwhichsquarewiththat,that(b)impressionsoccuronly inexperienceoftheobjectiverealm,andthat(c)ideasoccuronlyinthinkingand reasoning.SupposethatallthesewerepresentinHume'smindwhilehewasconsidering
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whattosayaboutvividhallucinations.Hewouldbeledby(b)tosaythatsuch hallucinationsinvolveideas,notimpressions;(c)wouldlethiminferfromthisthat hallucinationsarecasesofthinking;andamemoryof(a)mightpersuadehimthatthey onlyjustqualifythattheyareclosetotheborderlinebetweenthinkingandnon thinking.ItisnotalibelonHumetosupposehecouldgetintosuchamuddle: Everyoneofhimselfwillreadilyperceivethedifferencebetwixtfeeling [impressions]andthinking[ideas].Thecommondegreesoftheseareeasily distinguished;tho'itisnotimpossiblebutinparticularinstancestheymay verynearlyapproachtoeachother.Thusinsleep,inafever,inmadness,orin anyveryviolentemotionsofsoul,ourideasmayapproachtoourimpressions.
5

____________________ 4Treatise,p.2n.SeealsoZabeeh,Hume,pp.3941. 5Trealise,pp.12. 224

EvenifIhavemisunderstoodthatpassage,Humedoestendtoequate'impressions' with'perceptionsoftheobjectiverealm'.Thatfactalonemakesmypoint,whichisthis: ifHumecombinedthatequationwithhisofficialaccountoftheidea/impression distinction,hewouldbeequating'experienceoftheobjectiverealm'with'intenseor violentsensorystates';andthis,consideredasanaccountofwhatitistoperceive somethingobjective,wouldbesimpletothepointofidiocy. Humewascapableofsuchoptimisticsimplifications;butthisisbecauseofadefectin

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

hisperipheralvision,sotospeak,andnotbecausehecouldnotdealincomplexdepth withaproblemwhenhehaditinfocus.Ihaveaccusedhimofonesimplificationabout thinkingandanotheraboutobjectivity.Sincehedidnotseethat'thinkingandreasoning' presentsaphilosophicalprobleminitsownright,Hume'sstrayremarksaboutitseldom riseabovethelevelofthequotedpassage.Buthedidaddresshimselfsquarelytothe analysisofobjectivityconcepts,andhistreatmentofsuchconcepts,althoughdeeply flawed,isapeerlessexampleofdisciplineddepthandcomplexity.

47.Hume'smeaning-empiricism
'Alloursimpleideas...arederiv'dfromsimpleimpressions,whicharecorrespondentto them,andwhichtheyexactlyrepresent.'6HumeadoptsLocke'sdistinctionbetween 'complex'and'simple'ideas,theformerlinkedwithdefinablewords,thelatterwith wordswhosemeaningsHumethinksmustbelearnedthroughconfrontationwith examples.Thesimple/complexantithesishasworkedmuchmischiefinthetheoryof meaninggenerally,butIshallnotharryithere. EachtimeHumedefendshismeaningempiricism,heclaimstohavetwoargumentsfor it.7Firstly,everyonewhohasagivensimpleideaalsohasoneormoreimpressions whichare'correspondent'toit,i.e.whichresembleitineverythingbutstrength.This cannotbecoincidence:'Suchaconstantconjunction,insuchaninfinitenumberof instances,canneverarisefromchance;butclearlyprovesadependenceofthe impressionsontheideas,oroftheideasontheimpressions.'8Furthermore,the impressionsmust ____________________ 6Treatise,p.4.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

7Treatise,pp.37;Enquiry1417. 8Treatise,pp.45.

225

causetheideas,andnotviceversa,sincetheideasnevercomefirst.Oursimpleideas, therefore,arecopiesofimpressionsi.e.theyarecausedbyimpressionsandresemble them.Secondly:'Ifithappen,fromadefectoftheorgan,thatamanisnotsusceptible ofanyspeciesofsensation,wealwaysfindthatheisaslittlesusceptibleofthe correspondentideas.Ablindmancanformnonotionofcolours;adeafmanofsounds.'9 Itisclearthatthiswillyieldonlyaspecialcaseofthefirstargument. Ifwetakethisatfacevalue,asatheoryaboutthepreconditionsforhavingunlively 'perceptions'orquasisensorystates,whatevidencecanHumehaveforit?Hemayclaim toknowabouthisownideasby'reflection',butwhatoftheideasofothers?Hespeaks oftheideasoftheblindandthedeaf,assertsthatthe'LaplanderorNegrohasno notionoftherelishofwine',10andconfidentlyuses'we':'Thatideaofred,whichwe forminthedark...','Wefind,thatanyimpression...isconstantlyfollowedbyan idea,whichresemblesit','Whenweanalyzeourthoughtsorideas...wealwaysfind thattheyresolvethemselvesintosuchsimpleideasas...'11Howcouldheknow? Arelatedquestion:whatwouldcountasevidenceagainstthetheorywhensoconstrued? OfhisthesisthateverysimpleideaisprecededbyacorrespondentimpressionHume says: Everyonemaysatisfyhimselfinthispointbyrunningoverasmany[ideas]as
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

hepleases.Butifanyoneshoulddenythisuniversalresemblance,Iknowno wayofconvincinghim,butbydesiringhimtoshew...asimpleidea,thathas notacorrespondentimpression.Ifhedoesnotanswerthischallenge,as'tis certainhecannot,wemayfromhissilenceandourownobservationestablish ourconclusion.12 Thetheory'struthis,indeed,todependsolelyuponwhetheranyonecan'shew'or 'produce'asimpleideanotprecededbyacorrespondentimpression: Thosewhowouldassertthatthispositionisnotuniversallytruenorwithout exception,haveonlyone,andthataneasymethodofrefutingit;byproducing thatidea,which,intheiropinion,isnotderivedfromthissource.Itwillthen beincumbentonus,ifwewouldmaintainourdoctrine,toproducethe impression,orlivelyperception,whichcorrespondstoit.13 ____________________ 10Enquiry15. 11Treatise,pp.3,5,andEnquiry14. 12Treatise,pp.34. 13Enquiry14. 9Enquiry15.SeealsoLocke,Essay II.ii.2. 226

Tobeabletoassessthetheory,then,wemustknowhowtogoabout'producing'an idea.14
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Clearly,Humewillnotbowtoanyfoolorknavewhoclaimstohaveacounterexample, anycongenitallyblindmanwhosays'Ihaveanideaofpurple'.To'produce'anideaone mustnotmerelysaybutshowthatonehasit;andHumeisconfidentthathis challengerswillfailinthislargertask,e.g.thatacongenitallyblindmanwhosays'I haveanideaofpurple'won'tbeabletogiveusreasonsforbelievinghim. Buttheblindmanmightwellsatisfyusthatheisnotlying,andthenHume'sonlyresort wouldbetosaythattheblindmandidnotknowwhat'purple'means.This,Isuggest,is thesourceofhisconfidence:heissurethatthecongenitallyblindmanwouldnotbe ableto'produce'anideaofpurplebecausehewouldnotbeabletosatisfyusthathe knewwhat'purple'means.Inshort,nooneistocountashavinganideaofpurple unlessheknowsthemeaningof'purple'orasynonymofitinsomeotherlanguage. Now,whatofthepeoplewhoseideasHumecountsaspositiveevidenceforthistheory? Hehasnotaskedthemwhatideastheyhave,andevenifhedidwhyshouldhebelieve theiranswers?Hemustsay:'Well,theyclearlyunderstandtheword"purple",andthatis goodenoughforme.'Ifhedoesnotsaythis,thenitisperfectlyobscurehowhecan haveanypositiveevidenceforhistheoryasappliedtoanyonebuthimself.Ifhedoes sayit,thenanyonecountsashavinganideaofpurpleifheunderstands'purple'ora synonymofitinsomeotherlanguage. Combiningthetworesults:someonecountsashavinganideaofpurpleifandonlyifhe understands'purple'orasynonymthereof.Hume'stheoryisnotthatideasprerequire impressions,butthatunderstandingprerequiresimpressions.15 Icouldhavejumpedtothisconclusion.'WhenHumespeaksof"ideas"hisrealtopicis meaningandunderstanding,forhisanalysisoftheseisbasicallyLockean.'Thelonger
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

route,however,displaysmoreofthelogicalstructure.Thesalientpointsarethatwhen Hume'stheoryistakenatfacevaluewecannotbringevidencetobearuponit;thatthe evidencewhichHumewouldprobablyhaveallowedhastheeffectofturningthetheory into ____________________ 14SeeZabeeh,Hume,pp.756;A.H.Basson,David Hume(PelicanBooks,1958),pp. 35ff. 15ThusD.G.C.MacNabb,David Hume(London,1951),pp.279. 227

onenotaboutideasbutaboutunderstanding;andthatthistransformationsolvesthe evidenceproblemonlybecauseunderstandingconsistsnotinhavingHumeanideasbut insomethingforwhichtherearepubliccriteria. SoweshouldseeHumeashavingatheoryabouthowimpressionsareprerequiredfor understandingwith'understanding'properlyunderstood.Hisofficialequationof 'understanding'with'havingideas',sinceitdictateshiswordingofthetheoryandalso affectsdetailsinhishandlingofit,cannotbeneglected;butthetheoryoughtnottobe seenasprimarilyoneaboutideas. Itcomesdowntothis.Wemaysay,inshorthand,thatHumeaccepts(1)'Ideasfollow impressions',(2)'Understandingishavingideas',(3)'Understandingfollows impressions'.Ifwesee(3)asinferredfrom(1)and(2),then(1)standsonitsownfeet andsocannotbeassessed,andthemeaningof(3)isdictatedby(2)sothat(3)cannot beassessedeither.Soweshalldobettertotake(3)asacceptedonitsownmerits,i.e.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

asatheorywhichreallyisaboutunderstanding.ThiscreditsHumewithknowingwhat understandingreallyis,andofcoursehedoesknowthis.Histheoreticalacceptanceof (2)whichleadshimtoexpress(3)as(1)isbeliedbyhispreparednesstoidentify casesofunderstandingonthebasisofthecriteriaweordinarilydoemploycriteriawhich lieinthepublicdomainanddonotconcern'ideas'.Thereisnothingmysterious,oreven unusual,aboutaphilosopher'smisdescribingaconceptwhichheiswellabletouse properly. TakingHume'stheorytohavetheform'YoucannotunderstandWunlessyouhavefirst. ..',westillhaveproblemsregardingit.Inowpresentthreeofthem. Understandingishavingcertainlinguisticabilities;wecantellwhethersomeone understandsagivenword;andwecoulddiscoveracaseofunderstandingwhichwasnot precededbyimpressionsofthesortdemandedbyHume'stheory.Whatsomeone understandsnowisnotlogicallytiedtowhatheunderwentearlier:theaccountof'newly born'adultsinShaw'sBack to Methusalehisaperfectlyconsistentfantasy.Hume himselfseeshistheoryasrefutablebycounterevidence,yethewillnotretractitatthe dropofahat.Afterdenyingthathehaseverhadanimpressionofanecessary connexionintheouterworld,heasks: 228

[ShouldItherefore]assert,thatIamherepossestofanidea,whichisnot precededbyanysimilarimpression?Thiswou'dbetoostrongaproofoflevity andinconstancy;sincethecontraryprinciplehasbeenalreadysofirmly establish'd,astoadmitofnofartherdoubt;atleast,tillwehavemorefully

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

examin'dthepresentdifficulty.16 Elsewhereheisevenstubborner,aswhenhearguesthatwecannotattachsenseto 'timeduringwhichnothinghappens': Thatwereallyhavenosuchidea,iscertain.Forwhenceshou'ditbederiv'd? Doesitarisefromanimpressionofsensationorofreflexion?...Ifyoucannot pointoutany such impression,youmaybecertainyouaremistaken,whenyou imagineyouhaveany such idea.17 HereandelsewhereHumeseemstotreatmeaningempiricismasa prioritrue,asnot afterallvulnerabletocounterexamples.Awelltestedempiricaltheoryhassomepower todiscreditanoccasionalputativecounterexample:'Helpfulasyouhavefoundhim,I doubtifSchmidtisreallyagoodpsychoanalystsincehehasn'thimselfbeenanalysed.' ButHumethinkshistheorycanfatallydiscreditwholeclassesofallegedcounter examples:hemainlyusesit,indeed,toarguethatnobodyhasan'idea'ofeventless time,necessaryconnexion,theselfetc.Whycan'thisopponentssaythattheseare preciselytheclassesof'ideas'forwhichthetheoryisfalse? ThereisanotherpuzzleaboutHume'sposition.Ifacongenitallyblindmanshowedthat heunderstood'purple',Hume'stheorywouldberefuted,andthiswoulddeprivehimof hismainargumentforsayingthatcertainexpressionsaremeaningless.Insuchan eventualityhewouldbecommittedtoconcedingthatperhapsthoseexpressionsare meaningfulafterall,andyetitseemsclearthatsuchaconcessionwouldreallybe misplaced:thelinguisticabilitiesofablindPatagonianareirrelevanttotheintelligibility of'eventlesstime'andtherest. Athirdpuzzle:Humeisconcernedwithwhethercertainexpressionsmakesense,or
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whetherweunderstandanythingbythem,andhethinksthatthesequestionshavesome importance.Butifitreallydoesmatternowwhetheragivenexpressionmakessense, thenitsmakingsenseornotoughttoshownow:weoughttobeabletosettlethe questionbyattendingtothepresentandthefuture.YetHume,intryingtoanswerthe questionthrough ____________________ 16Treatise,p.77. 17Treatise,p.65. 229

histheory,impliesthatitisbestansweredbylookingtothepastasthoughthebest wayofassessingapsychoanalystwerebyconsideringhowhewastrained. Summingupthesethreedifficulties:Humeoffersanempiricaltheoryasthoughitwere ana priorione;andthetheorywhichheoffersturnsouttobelargelyirrelevanttothe matterswhichhewantsittoilluminate.Inowproceedtoexplainwhy.

48.ThegeneticnatureofHume'stheory
ThecrucialtroubleisthatHume'stheoryisgeneticratherthananalytic:heexpressesit asatheoryaboutwhatmustoccurbeforetherecanbeunderstanding,ratherthanabout whatunderstandingis,oraboutwhatitisforanexpressiontohaveameaning. Hewouldhavedonebettertosaysomethinglikethefollowing.AnexpressionEinour publiclanguagehasameaningonlyifwecantellwhetheragivenpersonunderstandsit,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andourevidenceforthatmustconsistinhowheusesit.Supposeheusesitcorrectlyin statementswhosetruthvaluedoesnotdependuponthestateofhisenvironmentatthe timeofspeakinginverbaldefinitions,necessarytruths,contingentgeneralizationsetc. ThiswillassureusofhisunderstandingofEif,butonlyif,weknowthatheunderstands theotherwordsusedinthosestatements.Someone'ssaying'Redthingstendtoirritate bulls'or'Redthingsarealwayscoloured'isnotevidenceofhisunderstanding'red'ifhis graspof'bulls'or'coloured'isseriouslyindoubt.Thislookslikeaviciouscircle;andour onlyescapefromitisthroughthefactthat'usingEcorrectly'mayinvolverelatingE correctlynotonlytootherexpressionsbutalsotobitsoftheobjectiveworld.Thebasis forourcommonunderstandingofalanguageisourabilitytoagreeonstatementsofthe form'Thatisa...'where'that'referstosomethingaccessibletoallofus;andEcannot beaccountedasmeaningfulunlessitisorconnectswithexpressionswhichareusable instatementsofthatkind.Theconnexionsmaybelengthyandtenuous,andofcourse theyneednotconsistinstringsofverbaldefinitions;butifthereistobethepossibility ofevidencefororagainsttheclaimthatsomebodyunderstandsE,thentheremustbe somecoherentwayofconnectingEwiththeempiricalworldtheworldgiventous throughourimpressions. 230

ThatwouldpreservetheempiricistspiritofHume'stheory,whileturningitfroma geneticintoananalyticone.Thefirstdifficultymentionedneartheendof47would notnowarise.Thetheorywouldmakeclaimsaboutwhatitisforanexpressiontobe understoodortohaveameaning;andthesecouldberefutedonlybyphilosophical argument.Anallegedcounterexamplewouldbeaputativelymeaningfulexpression whichwasdeniedtobeconnectablewiththeworldintherequiredway;andanadherent

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ofthetheorywouldhavetodealwithsuchanexpressionbyconsideringwhetheritdoes haveameaningandwhetheritlacksempiricalconnexions.Ifitturnsouttohaveone andlacktheotherthenthetheoryisfalse;andinthatcaseitisobviouslyreasonableto demandaretrialfortheotherexpressionswhichhavebeencondemnedonthestrength ofthetheorywhichremovestheseconddifficulty.Furthermore,thescrutinyofa supposedcounterexamplewouldnotbeanexerciseinpersonalbiography:thedecisive factslieinthepresentandfuture,notinthepast;whichremovesthethirddifficulty. MuchofwhatHumesaysindeployinghismeaningempiricismcanbemodelledoverinto atheorywhichisnotgeneticandharkingbacktothefirstthemeof47notabout ideas.Thiscanbedone,indeed,toofarforittobeacoincidence.Idonotsaythat Hume'reallymeant'toofferananalysisofmeaningandunderstanding;butIdosuggest thatwhathesaidaboutideasascopiedfromimpressionsisexplained,somewhatand somehow,bythefactthathisremarkscanbe'translated'intoanalytictruthsabout meaningfulnessinrelationtoempiricalcashability.Letusexamineonestrikingexample ofhowfarsuchmodellingor'translating'cango. Togetaprotractedsoundfromatuningforkyoumustrapithardinthefirstplace;and, analogously,Humecouldthinkitobviousthatthefirstinaseriesofsimilar'perceptions' mustbe'lively'or'vivacious'ifitistolingeronintheformofconjuredupperceptionson lateroccasions.Hecertainlydoestake'vivacity'tobeaquantumwhichistransmitted, withsomeloss,fromanimpressiontotheideaswhichfollowit: Whenanyimpressionhasbeenpresentwiththemind,itagainmakesits appearancethereasanidea;andthisitmaydoaftertwodifferentways: eitherwheninitsnewappearanceitretainsaconsiderabledegreeofitsfirst vivacity,andissomewhatintermediatebetwixtanimpression
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

231

andanidea;orwhenitentirelylosesthatvivacity,andisaperfectidea.18 Now,thisviewof'vivacity'whichcomesrightfromtheheartofHume'stheoryconsidered asatheoryabouttheoriginsofideas,impliesareasonforsayingthatanysimpleidea mustbeprecededbyalivelyperception.ButIhaveremarkedthathetendstoequate 'impression'with'sensoryintakefromtheobjectiveworld':hedoesnotcarewhethera blindmancouldhaveavividhallucinationofsomethingpurple.Letustranslate'lively' into'pertainingtotheobjectiverealm',aswellasturningHume'stheoryintooneabout understandingratherthanideas,andconstruingitasanalyticratherthangenetic.Under thisthreefold'translation',thestatement'Ideasmustbeprecededbylivelyperceptions' becomes'Whatisunderstoodmustbeconnectablewithexperienceoftheobjective realm'.Thestresson'lively',whichwasencouragedbytheprimitivefacevalueformof thetheory,reappearsasastresson'objective'.Thelatterstresscanbejustifiedwithin thetriplytransformedversionofthetheory:youcannotknowthatIunderstandEunless thereissomethingwecanbothconnectwithEthatis,somethinginterpersonaland thusobjective. (IdonotofferthesetransformationsasanactoffondindulgencetowardsHumean indulgencewhichIrefusedtoextendtoBerkeleywhenin10aboveIpointedouthow unWittgensteinianhisviewsonmeaningare.Thepointissimplythatitisprofitableto lookatHumeinthelightofthese'updating'transformationstheythrowlightonhis text,andhelptobringtothesurfacemanyinstructivecomplexities.Incontrastwith this,therepresentationofBerkeleyasWittgensteinianaboutmeaningflattensout complexitiesinthetext,aswellasabolishingtheexplanationwhichIgavein31of
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Berkeley'soptingforidealismratherthanphenomenalism.) Ihavenotlabouredtopresentafullyarticulatedtheoryaboutmeaningfulnessinrelation toempiricalcashability,forIdonotthinkthatHume'ssortofmeaningempiricismis muchhelpedbyaprecise,generaltheory.Berkeley,forexample,inhisexcellent criticismsoftheveilofperceptiontheory,needsnomagisterialprinciplesaboutthe limitsonintelligibility.HeshowsthatLocke'sdoctrinefailstoanswerthesetquestions, todrawthe ____________________ 18Treatise,p.8.Seealsopp.98,144. 232

neededdistinctions,toexplaintherelevantfacts,toconnecthelpfullywithother philosophicalproblems,ortobearinanywayuponpossibleexperience.Hiscasewould nothavebeenstrongerormoreinterestingifhehadadducedageneraltheoryof meaningtojustifythefurtherconclusionandthereforeLocke'sdoctrineismeaningless'. Hume,too,oftenproceedsbydetailed,downtoearthargumentratherthanbyblanket applicationsofhismeaningempiricism;andoftenenoughheisnotarguingfora conclusionaboutmeaninglessnessatall,butistryingtoseewhatanexpressionmeans byseeinghowitconnectswiththeempiricalworld. ItisfortunatethatHume'sworkisnottoodeeplyrootedinhistheory;forwheneverthe latteristakenassufficientinitselftheresultsarecalamitous.Forexample,his discussionof'emptyspace'and'empty[=eventless]time'isbadlywarpedbyhis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

simplemindedsearchfor'impressionsof,andbyhistrustinthespurious simple/complexdichotomy.19Fromthedefensiblepremissthatnothingcouldcountas animpressionofemptyspaceorofemptytime,Humeinfersthatneither'emptyspace' nor'emptytime'hasameaning.Ithinkthattherecouldbeemptyspaceandthatthere couldbeemptytime;20but,whetherIamrightorwrongaboutthat,thesearecertainly separateissueswhichrequiredifferentarguments. Iamnotsurethat.Hume'susesofthetheorysuffermajordamagefromitsgenetic nature.Manyphilosopherspresentanalyticclaimsinageneticguisewithoutbeing therebyledintofurthererrors.Still,geneticismcandoharm.Forexample, phenomenalismissometimestakentobethethesisthatweadvancefromsensedatum statementstoonesabouttheobjectiverealm;andthenitisopentoempiricalaswell asphilosophicalobjectionswhichhavenoforceagainstphenomenalismconstruedasan atemporalthesisaboutthelogicalrelationsbetweenobjectivitystatementsand statementsaboutsensedata. ItisworthnotingthatthetwoprincipaldefectsinHume'sstatementofmeaning empiricismareconnected:intwodistinctways,thestresson'ideas'isapositive encouragementintogeneticism. ____________________ 19Treatise I.ii.3. 20ProvedbyS.Shoemaker,"'TimewithoutChange'",Journal of Philosophy,vol.66( 1969). 233

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

First,superficially,itistemptingtothinkofideasascopiesofimpressions,and thereforetothinkthatimpressionsmustcomefirst.With'ideas'replacedby'capacities tousewordscorrectly'orthelike,thistemptationdisappears.Thesecondwayinwhich 'idea'encouragesgeneticismliesdeeper.Humewantstosettlecontroversialquestions oftheform'What,ifanything,doesEmean?'Becausehisanswersarecontroversialhe mustargueforthem;butifhisargumentsappealedexplicitlytocriteriahavingtodo withtheuseofEcriteriaonwhich,nodoubt,hesilentlyreliesinuncontroversialcases hewouldbeforcedtoseeandadmitthathisequationofmeaningwithideasis hopelesslywrong.Sohehastotacklethesecontroversialquestionsinawaywhich drawsourattention,andhisown,awayfromEitselfandtowardsissuesabout 'antecedentimpressions'whichareinfactirrelevanttothematterinhand.Takingthem toberelevantisespousingageneticratherthanananalyticformofmeaning empiricism. 234

X HUME'SPHILOSOPHICALLOGIC
49.Thegeneralpicture
HUMEclosestheEnquirywithafamousperorationaboutthedestructivepowerofhis 'principles'; Whenwerunoverlibraries,persuadedoftheseprinciples,whathavocmustwemake?If
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

wetakeinourhandanyvolume;ofdivinityorschoolmetaphysics,forinstance;letus ask,Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?No.Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?No. Commititthentotheflames:foritcancontainnothingbutsophistryandillusion.1 Asthisimplies,Humeworkswithadichotomy:thingswhichcanbesaidorthoughtor askedconcerneither'relationsofideas'or'mattersoffact'.2Thesephrasesare commonerintheEnquirythanintheTreatise,butbothworksarepermeatedbythe dichotomyandbyHume'sconvictionofitsimportance. Itis,infact,asimplificationofatrichotomy.Humesaysthatstatementsmaybebased upon'knowledge'or'proofs'or'probabilities': Byknowledge,Imeantheassurancearisingfromthecomparisonofideas.By proofs,thosearguments,whicharederiv'dfromtherelationofcauseand effect,andwhichareentirelyfreefromdoubtanduncertainty.Byprobability, thatevidence,whichisstillattendedwithuncertainty.3 Thebetterknowndichotomyputs'knowledge'ononesideofthelineand'proofsand probabilities'ontheother. 'Proofs'differfrom'probabilities'onlysuperficiallyinHume'sscheme:theformerare conclusive,thelatterinconclusive,causalarguments.Humethinksthateven'proofs' leaveroomfordoubtoruncertainty,butonlybecausetherearelimitsinprincipletothe strengthoftheevidencewhich'experienceaffordsus';andhepreferstoreserve 'probability'forthekindofevidencewhich ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

1Enquiry,finalparagraph. 2Enquiry20;Treatise,p.463. 3Treatise,p.124.

235

wouldcountasinconclusiveevenbyordinaryuntheoreticalstandards:'Onewou'dappear ridiculous,whowou'dsay,that'tisonlyprobablethesunwillrisetomorrow,orthatall menmustdye;tho''tisplainwehavenofurtherassuranceofthesefacts,thanwhat experienceaffordsus.'4Thescopeof'probability'isthusrestrictedindeferencetothe vernacular,andHumeadmitsthathesometimesforgetstodeferanduses'probability' tocovereverythingexceptwhathecalls'knowledge'. Noticethattwopeoplemightacceptasinglestatement,onebecausehehasa'proof'of itandtheotherbecausehefindsit'probable';andthatanythingacceptedas'probable' could,inprinciple,eventuallybegivena'proof'.Ishouldaddthattheassociationof 'probabilities'withinconclusivecausalargumentsisbeliedbyHume'sweakdiscussionof 'theprobabilityofchances';5butitholdsgoodintheareasofhisthoughtwhichconcern mehere. AlthoughHumeagreesthatbymundanestandardsthereisnodoubtthatthesunwill risetomorrow,hedoesnotthinkwehave'knowledge'thatitwill.Thisrestricteduseof 'knowledge'reflectstheviewthatonecannot'know'thatPifthereisanypossibilityat allthatnotP:IknowthatPonlyifthereisnopossibility,howeverremoteand theoretical,ofmybeingwrongaboutit.Letusconsiderthesourcesofthispopular mistake.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Itisnecessarilytruethatif'xknowsthatP'istruethensoisP.Someonemightwrongly inferfromthisthatif'xknowsthatP'istruethenPisnecessarilytrue:thiswould restrictwhatcouldbeknowntowhatisnecessarilytrue,andthusimplythatwecannot knowthatthesunwillrisetomorrow.Thisdiagnosishasbeenofferedforthenarrowed useof'know';but,althoughthemuddleisapossibleone,itseemstomeimprobable andIcanfindnoevidencethatanyonehaseverbeenguiltyofit. Anintrinsicallymoreplausiblediagnosis,whichseemstoreflectwhatgoesonwhen apprenticephilosophersareinducedtodenythatthey'reallyknow'thingswhichin unreflectivemomentstheywouldconfidentlyclaimtoknow,isthefollowing.Itisclearly wrongtosayanythingoftheform'IknowthatPbutImightbewrong';andthismight seemtoimplythatknowledgeisincompatiblewithpossibilityoferror;whenceit follows,sincethereisadmittedlysomepossibilityoferrorastothesun's ____________________ 4Treatise,p.124. 5Treatise I.iii.11. 236

risingtomorrow,thatwedonotknowthatthesunwillrisetomorrow. Whatiswrongwiththat'know'narrowingargument?Hereisapossibleanswer: Theargumenttakes'mightbewrong'and'possibilityoferror'toogenerously. Theinadmissibilityof'IknowthatPbutImightbewrong'dependsuponour taking'mightbewrong'asclaimingsomepossibilityoferrorwhichis

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

considerablebyeverydaystandards;buttheconclusionoftheargumenttakes ittoincludeeverysortofpossibilityoferror. Thisreplywon'tdo;foritwronglyconcedesthat'IknowbutImightbewrong'is admissiblejustsolongasthepossibilityoferrorinquestionisextremelyremote.The suggestedreplyisalsowronginsilentlyconcedingthat(1)'Itiswrongtosay"Iknow thatPbutImightbewrong"'doesentail(2)'Knowledgeisincompatiblewithpossibility oferror',justsolongas'mightbewrong'isgiventhesamedegreeofstrength,soto speak,as'possibilityoferror'.Infact,(1)doesnotentail(2)atall.Justas'PbutIdo notbelievethatP'isimproper,eventhoughtruthiscompatiblewithdisbeliefbyme;so also'IknowbutImightbewrong'isimproper,eventhoughknowledgeiscompatible withpossibilityoferror. Theimproprietyof'IknowbutImightbewrong'arisesfromthisfact:tosay'Iknow thatP'istosaythatPandtosayorimplythattherearenopossibilitiesoferrorworth mentioninginthepresentcontextwhichexplainswhyitiswrongtogostraightonto mentionpossibilitiesoferror. Thatapproach,Isubmit,showswhatisreallywrongwiththe'know'narrowingargument. Italsoexplainsthefactthat,forasingleP,itmaybeallrightformetosay'Iknowthat P'toonepersonbutwrongformetosayittoanother.Iftheirstakesinthematterare relevantlydifferent,Imaybeentitledtogivetoonebutnottotheotherthespecial kindofassuranceimpliedbytheclaimto'know'. Philosophersoftentry,andalwaysfail,tostatenecessaryandsufficientconditionsfor somethingtocountasacaseofknowledge.Isuggestthattheyfailbecausethereare no'casesofknowledge'inthesenserequiredbysuchanendeavour.Ifsomeonesays'I knowthatP'whenPisfalse,orhedoesnotbelieveit,orhehasvirtuallynoevidence
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

forit,thenindeedwemaysay 237

thathisknowledgeclaimisfalse,thathedoesnotknowthatP,thatthisisnotacase ofknowledge.Butthatkindofrebuttalofaknowledgeclaimissomarginalastobe almostajoke:imagineactuallysayingtosomeone'Youdidn'tknowthatP'onthe groundsthatPwasfalse,orthathedidnotbelievethatP.Mostreallifeassessmentsof firstpersonclaimstoknowledgeconcernwhetherthespeakeroughttohavesaidthatP intheform'IknowthatP'whetherhewasentitledtogivethatkindofassuranceto thatheareronthatevidence.Suchassessmentsdependuponfactorsmanyofthem nonepistemicwhichcouldnotbecapturedinastatementofnecessaryandsufficient conditionsforknowledge. Whateverthephilosophicalmistakeswhichexplainit,wecanaffordtotakeHume'suse of'knowledge'asamereoddity,andattendonlytowhathebringsunderthislabel:'By knowledge,Imeantheassurancearisingfromthecomparisonofideas.'Theword 'comparison'reflectsLocke'stheorythatallrelationsstemfromcomparisons(see2 above).WecantakeitthatHumean'knowledge'is,ashesometimesexplicitlysays, whatwegetbydiscoveringrelationsamongstideas.Furthermore,since'ideas'hereare meanings,Humean'knowledge'thatPinvolvesestablishingP'struthpurelyonthebasis ofthemeaningsofthewordsinwhichitisexpressed;sothatanalyticorlogically necessarytruthsaretheonlyonesthatcanbe'known'. SoHume'sdichotomysplitsthebasesonwhichstatementsmaybeacceptedinto(1) analysis,and(2)theadducingofcausalevidence.Nowwemustgetdowntodetails.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

50.Intuitionanddemonstration
WhenHumesparesfromtheflamesany'abstractreasoningconcerningquantityor number',heimpliesthat'quantityornumber'istheonlyobjectof'knowledge',theonly topicaboutwhichwecandiscovertruthsby'comparingideas'.Hisconsideredviewis indeedclosetothis,andonewonderswhytheprovinceofknowledge,orofnecessary truths,shouldbethuslimited.Ishalltrytoexplain. HumeinheritedfromDescartes,throughLocke,adistinctionbetweenintuitionand demonstration.HereisLocke'saccountofit: 238

Themindperceivesthatwhiteisnotblack,thatacircleisnotatriangle,that threearemorethantwo...Suchkindsoftruthsthemindperceivesatthe firstsightoftheideastogether,bybareintuition;withouttheinterventionof anyotheridea:andthiskindofknowledgeistheclearestandmostcertain thathumanfrailtyiscapableof...[Butsometimes]thoseideas,concerning whoseagreementordisagreementtheinquiryismade,cannotbythemindbe soputtogetherastoshowit.Inthiscasethen,whenthemindcannotso bringitsideastogetherasbytheirimmediatecomparison...toperceivetheir agreementofdisagreement,itisfain,by the intervention of other ideas(one ormore,asithappens)todiscovertheagreementordisagreementwhichit searches...Wheretheagreementanddisagreementisbythismeansplainly andclearlyperceived,itiscalleddemonstration.6
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thisdistinguishesselfevidentanalytictruthsfromoneswhichneedproof.Hereisan example,inlanguageasLockeanasIcanmakeit(for'number'throughoutread'number >2').Adullschoolboycannotseethatnoprimenumbercanbethesuccessorofaprime number:hedoesnot'perceivethedisagreement'betweentheideasofprime number andsuccessor of a prime number.Histeacherinviteshimtoplacenexttohisideaofa prime numbertheideaofnumber not divisible by 2,andtojuxtaposethatwiththeidea ofodd number,andthatinitsturnwiththeideaofsuccessorofanevennumber.The schoolboyseesthateachoftheseleadstothenext,andthatthelastofthem 'disagrees'withtheideaofsuccessor of a prime number;andthusheachievesby demonstrationtheknowledgewhichintuitionwouldnotgivehim. ThisexamplemasksaflawinLocke'stheory.RememberingthatLockeassumesthatany twoideaseither'agree'or'disagree',considerwhathecanmeanbytheseterms. (1)Hisexamplesofdisagreeingpairsofideasarewhite/blackandcircle/triangle,which suggestthatanideadisagreementcorrespondstoapredicateinconsistency.Butthen anideaagreementcorrespondstoapredicateconsistency:theideaofwhite'agreeswith' thatofsquare,forinstance.ThisleavesLockewithnowayofexpressingthenotionof entailment.Theschoolboyseesthateachidea'leadsto'thenext,butLockecannotsay whatthis'leadingto'consistsin.Itcannotbemere'agreement',ifagreementis consistency;for,fromthefactthateachideaisconsistentwiththeonebeforeand 'successorofaprime'is ____________________ 6Essay IV.ii.13. 239
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

inconsistentwiththelast,itdoesnotfollowthat'successorofaprime'isinconsistent withthefirst. (2)Theword'comparison',andthereportingofideadisagreementsintheform'xisnot y',suggestthatxagreeswithyonlyifxisidenticalwith(or,perhaps,entails)y.Then theideaofwhite'disagreeswith'thatofsquare,becausetheformer'isnot'thelatter; buttheideaofreddoesperhaps'agreewith'thatofcolour.Onthisinterpretationan ideaagreementcorrespondstoapredicateidentityorentailment,andadisagreement istheabsenceofsuchanentailmentrelation.ThiswouldenableLocketosay,inthe schoolboyexample,thateachidea's'leadingto'thenextisits'agreeingwith'thenext; butnowhecannotsayhowtheideaof'successorofanevennumber'relatestothatof 'successorofaprime'.Tosaymerelythatthey'disagree'is,onthepresent interpretation,tosaythatneitherentailstheotherandthatdoesnotyieldthedesired conclusion. TheinferentialprocedureswhichLockecalls'demonstration'requiretworelations entailmentandrulingoutbutLockeallowshimselfonlythesinglerelationof 'agreement'.Itistruethat'PentailsQ'isequivalentto'PrulesoutnotQ'butcould Lockeusethatfacttorepairhisposition?Couldhe,forexample,takeoption(1)which correlatesideadisagreementwithpredicateinconsistency,andexpress'Redentails coloured'as'Reddisagreeswithnotcoloured'?No,becauseheisnotentitledto 'notcoloured'.Whatideacouldheclaimtocorrespondtothatexpression?Hesometimes implies,inothercontexts,thatwhatcorrespondsto'notcoloured'istheabsencefrom mymindofanyideaofcolour;butthatisobviouslyhopeless.Totakejustoneofits defects:howcanIhaveanideaofredinmymindandalsohaveforpurposesof comparison!anabsencefrommymindofanyideaofcolour?
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

WeshallseeinChapterXIthatsomeofHume'sdifficultiesconnectwiththatone,but mypresentconcerniswithotheraspectsoftheintuition/demonstrationdistinction. Humeusestheword'intuition'sparingly,buthedoessometimesdrawthelineinLocke's terms:'Threeoftheserelationsarediscoverableatfirstsight,andfallmoreproperly undertheprovinceofintuitionthandemonstration.'7Thedistinctionitself,however worded,runsallthroughhiswork.Totakeanexample ____________________ 7Treatise,p.70. 240

whichlinkswiththeopeningofthissection,whenHumesaysthat'thesciencesof quantityandnumber...maysafely...bepronouncedtheonlyproperobjectsof knowledgeanddemonstration',8heisnotdenyingthattherearenecessarytruths, knownsolelyby'comparisonofideas',outsidetherealmofmathematics.Hisviewis ratherthatonly'quantityandnumber'admitoflong,analyticallyvalidargumentsto conclusionswhich,becausetheyarenotobviouslynecessary,cancountas'knowledge' ofaninterestinganduntrivialsort.Inbrief:necessarytruthsabout'quantityand number'maybeknownbydemonstration,whereasallothernecessarytruthsareknown bysingleintuitions. Itisnottruethatonly'quantityandnumber'admitofprotractedchainsoflogicallyvalid reasoning.ButHume'sattemptstoexplainthisallegedfactthrowlightonthedangers ofconstruingproblemsaboutmeaningandnecessityintermsof'ideas'.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Hechangeshismindaboutwhathehastoexplain.IntheTreatisehetreatsgeometry aswhollyempirical:9thisisbecauseheequatesmeaningswithideas,takesideastobe fadedsensedata,andreifiessensedataanaccumulationoferrorswhichletshim arguethatwehavenoideaofinfinitelydivisiblespacebecausewehavenoinfinitely divisiblespatialideas!IntheEnquiryhedistinguishespurefromappliedgeometry,and allowsthattherecanbedemonstrativeproofsintheformer;Ineedn'tgointodetailson this,asthematterhasbeenfullytreatedbyFlew.10Ishalldiscusstheviewofthe Enquiry,thattheprovinceof'demonstration'iscoextensivewiththatofarithmetic, algebraandpuregeometry,thoughwhatIshallsaycouldeasilybeadaptedtofitthe Treatisepositionwhichexcludesgeometryaltogether. HereisoneofHume'sexplanationsoftheallegedfact(emphasesmine): Asthecomponentpartsofquantityandnumberareentirelysimilar,their relationsbecomeintricateandinvolved;andnothingcanbemorecurious... thantotrace,byavarietyofmediums,their equality or inequality,through theirdifferentappearances.Butasallotherideasareclearlydistinct and differentfromeachother,wecanneveradvancefarther,byourutmost scrutiny,thantoobservethisdiversity,and,byanobviousreflection, pronounceone thing not to be another.11 ____________________ 10Enquiry20,27;Flew,Hume's Philosophy of Belief,pp.613. 11Enquiry131. 8Enquiry131. 9Treatise,pp.702.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

241

Thephrase'byanobviousreflection'needscomment.Although'reflection'isHume's usualwordforintrospection,orlookingintooneself,an'obviousreflection'heremeans anobviousoreasyintuition.ForHumethisisnotanambiguityintheword'reflection', becausehethinksthatitisbyintrospection,bylookinginward,thatoneestablishes trivialnecessities.Ishalldiscussthisfurtherin52below. Inthequotedpassagetheitalicizedexpressionsshowtheinfluenceofthenotionof comparingideas.Outsidemathematics,oncewehaveestablishedsuchatruthasthat 'Blackisnotwhite'thereisnothingmorewecandowithit:wecannotlinkitwithothers toforma'demonstration'.Inmathematicsthecaseisdifferent.Itistruethatasquare isnotatriangle;butthatisnottheendofthematter,foritisalsotruethat,for instance,asquareiscomposedoftwotriangleswithcertainspecialfeaturesandinter relations.Itistruethatsixisnotfour;butitisalsotruethatsixiscomposedoffour andanothernumberwhosesquareisfour,andsoon.Factsliketheseenableustostring 'intuitions'togethertoform'demonstrations'ofuntrivialnecessarytruths.Such demonstrationsarewhollybasedoncomparisons(we'tracetheequalityorinequality'of ourmathematicalideas);buttheydonotstopdeadwith'xisnoty',becauseeven wherexandyaredistincttheymayhavepartsincommon('thecomponentpartsof quantityandnumberareentirelysimilar').Thatexplainswhy,inmathematics,wecan generateanetworkofassertionsanddenialsofidentity,startingwithjustonepairof ideasand their parts. Thenotionofanidea's'parts'isconnected,byHumeasbyLocke,withanidea'sbeing 'complex'.12Ifideasaremeanings,theircomplexityisofalogicalkind:theideaofman
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

iscomplexbecauseithasaspartstheideasofanimalandofrationality.Butideasare alsoimagesorsensedata,andthisgives'part'adifferentroletoplay:myideaofa manhasaspartsmyideaofahead,myideaofatorso,myideasoflegsetc.Thisis quitedifferentfromthelogicalinterpretationof'complex'and'part',andhasnoplacein anycoherenttheoryofnecessarytruth.YetHumereliesonitinthequotedpassage. Thatiswhy,inglossingatreatmentoftheideas(=meanings)involvedinmathematics, Iletmyselfsaythatasquareiscomposedoftwotriangles.Thatoughttohavebeen blatantlyirrelevant;butHumewouldhaveequateditwith'An ____________________ 12SeeGibson,Locke's Theory of Knowledge,pp.512. 242

idea(=image)ofasquareiscomposedoftwoideasoftriangles',whichinturnhe wouldhaveconstruedasastatementaboutthelogicalcomplexityoftheconceptof squarenessorthemeaningof'square'. Thereisworsetocome.Forallitsconfusions,wecangraspthebroadshapeofHume's explanation:therecanbedemonstrationsinmathematicsbecausethoseideasareinter relatedin'intricateandinvolved'ways,whereasnonmathematicalideasaresosimply relatedthattheycanenteronlyintodisconnectedtrivialitiestheyadmitonlyof separate'intuitions'whichdon'tinterlocktoyielddemonstrations.ButHumealsohas anotheraccountofwhydemonstrationisconfinedtomathematics:innonmathematical studies('moralsciences')wesoonreachtheendofwhatcansafelybesaidaboutthe interrelationsoftheideasinvolved,becausethefurtherourargumentsproceedthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

morevulnerabletheyaretoambiguity,unclarityandthelike: Thegreatadvantageofthemathematicalsciencesabovethemoralconsistsin this,thattheideasoftheformer,beingsensible,arealwaysclearand determinate,thesmallestdistinctionbetweenthemisimmediately perceptible,andthesametermsarestillexpressiveofthesameideas,without ambiguityorvariation.Anovalisnevermistakenforacircle,noranhyperbola foranellipsis...Butthefinersentimentsofthemind,theoperationsofthe understanding,thevariousagitationsofthepassions,thoughreallyin themselvesdistinct,easilyescapeus,whensurveyedbyreflection... Ambiguity,bythismeans,isgraduallyintroducedintoourreasonings:Similar objectsarereadilytakentobethesame:Andtheconclusionbecomesatlast verywideofthepremises.13 Thissaysthattherecanbedemonstrations(only)inmathematicsbecause(only) mathematicalideasare'clearanddistinct';wecannotreasonlongwithotherideas withoutriskingsubstantialerror.YetinhisotherexplanationHumesaysthatwithnon mathematicalideasthereisnolengthyreasoningtobedone,riskyorotherwise, preciselybecausenonmathematicalideasare'clearlydistinctanddifferentfromeach other'.Thetwoexplanationsconflictviolently;anditishardlysurprisingthatHume's oneattempttodeploybothatonceisadisaster.14 Thepassagelastquotedhasothersinisterfeatures,includingthe ____________________ 13Enquiry48. 14Ibid.,secondparagraph.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

243

implicationthattheonlynonmathematicaltopicsarepsychologicalones,andthe extraordinaryviewof'ambiguity'whichseemstobepresupposed.These,however,would takemetoofarafield.

51.Mattersoffact
TheotherhalfofHume'sdichotomycontains'proofsandprobabilities',whichhesays provideouronlybasisforstatementsabout'mattersoffact'.Thatphraseoccursmainly intheEnquiry,butitraisesproblemscommontobothworks.Theterms'proof'and 'probability',asIhaveremarked,distinguishtwokindsofbasisforastatement:thatI shallsleepwelltonightisamatterofprobabilityforme,butofproofforthemanwho hasjustslippedmeadoseofchloral.Butthelineseparatingproofsandprobabilities from'knowledge'isalinebetweentwoclassesofstatementthosewhichcannot,and thosewhichcan,beestablishedjustby'comparingideas'.Hume'slabel'matteroffact', whichhetakestocorrespondtohiscategoryofproofsandprobabilities,isveryclearly meanttomarkoffaclassofstatements.Humesaysthatallourbeliefsaboutmattersof factinvolvecausalconsiderations.Letusconsiderwhathemightmeanbythis. 1. Perhapshemeansthatanyargumentforaconclusionabouta'matteroffact'must involveanappealtocausallaws:'Whenitisasked,Whatisthenatureofallour reasoningsconcerningmatteroffact?theproperanswerseemstobe,thattheyare foundedontherelationofcauseandeffect.'15That,asitstands,isfalse;forone canhaveademonstrativeargumenttoa'matteroffact'conclusion,justsolongas ithas'matteroffact'premisses.IthinkHumewouldgrantthis,andthattheabove passagemisexpresseshisview.Letustryagain. Hume'sviewmaybethatthetotalgroundsforanybeliefabouta'matteroffact',
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

2.
PRO version

pdfcrowd.com

eveniftheyincludedemonstrativeelements,mustalsoinvolvecausal considerations:'Allbeliefofmatteroffactorrealexistenceisderivedmerelyfrom someobject,presenttothememoryorsenses,andacustomaryconjunction betweenthatandsomeotherobject.'16Thatis,ifIreasonablyholdabeliefabout a'matteroffact',afullaccountofwhyIholditwillmentionmyacceptanceofat leastonestatement ____________________ 15Enquiry28.Seealso22. 16Enquiry38. 244

aboutacausalconnexionor'customaryconjunction'.Thisalsoseemsfalse,as Humehimselfimplies: IfIaskwhyyoubelieveanyparticularmatteroffact,whichyourelate, youmusttellmesomereason;andthisreasonwillbesomeotherfact, connectedwithit.Butasyoucannotproceedafterthismanner,in infinitum,youmustatlastterminateinsomefact,whichispresentto yourmemoryorsenses;ormustallowthatyourbeliefisentirelywithout foundation.17 Sothegivingofreasonsmay'terminateinsomefact,whichisPresenttoyour... senses';butiftheoriginalquestionhadbeenwhyyoubelievethattobeafact, thenyoucouldhaveanswered:'BecauseIsee[feel,hear]it',withoutappealingto causalconsiderations.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

3.

IthinkthatHume'sthesisaboutthecausalbasisfor'matteroffact'beliefsismeant toapplyonlytobeliefswhicharenotwarrantedbythebeliever'spresent perceptionsandmemory.Humesometimesexpressesitinthatform: Allreasoningsconcerningmatteroffactseemtobefoundedontherelationof Cause and Effect.Bymeansofthatrelationalonewecangobeyondthe evidenceofourmemoryandsenses.Ifyouweretoaskaman,whyhebelieves anymatteroffact,whichisabsent...etc.18

Insimilarvein,ofasupposedpersonwholacked'theideaofcauseandeffect':'Sucha person,withoutmoreexperience,couldneveremployhisconjectureorreasoning concerninganymatteroffact,orbeassuredofanythingbeyondwhatwasimmediately presenttohismemoryandsenses.'19ThesepassagesshowthatHumeismainly interestedin'absent'mattersoffact,i.e.oneswhichgobeyondpresentperceptionsand memory;andIagreewithhimthatallbeliefsaboutthosemustbebasedoncausal considerations.Butthereremainstheproblemofwhy,ifHumewantedtosaysomething onlyabout'absent'mattersoffact,hesooftendropsthequalification'absent'orany equivalentofit. Theexplanation,Isuggest,isthatHumetendstoidentify'mattersoffact'with'absent mattersoffact'.Hecertainlydoesnotdothisoutright.Ifhedid,hisphrase'anymatter offactwhichisabsent'wouldbepleonastic.Butmuchofhistextwouldbeexplainedby thehypothesisthatHumetendsunconsciouslytomakethisidentification,tendstobe satisfiedofastatement's ____________________ 17Enquiry37.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

18Enquiry22. 19Enquiry35.

245

'factuality'onlyinproportionasitisnotwhollywarrantedbypresentperceptionsand memory. Ifthatseemsunbelievable,rememberthatthephrase'whollywarrantedbypresent perceptions'arguablydoesnotcoveranybeliefabouttheobjectiverealm,evenone aboutthepresentstateofacontiguousbitofitsuchasmybeliefthatInowseetrees throughmystudywindow.Thisisbecauseofthefact,onwhichphenomenalismisbuilt andwhichBerkeleyalsousedinhisaccountof'reality',thatmybeliefthatthoseare treesoutthereinvolvesbeliefsaboutwhatIshouldexperienceif...,whatIshall experiencewhen...,andperhapsalsowhatIdidexperiencewhen...Somybelief thattherearetreesouttherecouldbesaidtoconcern'amatteroffactwhichisabsent', inHume'ssense,andcouldalsoplausiblybesaidtohaveacausalbasis.Humeoften handlesobjectivitybeliefsuncritically;andhismoststrenuousattempttoanalysethem isnotveryphenomenalistic(seeChapterXIIIbelow);butthereisalsoacausal phenomenaliststrandinhisthinkingaboutthem.Insofarasheconstruesthem phenomenalistically,hehasgroundsforthinkingofthemasconcerning'absent'matters offactandforsayingthattheiracceptancealwaysdependsinpartoncausal considerations. Whatofstatementsorbeliefsaboutone'sownpresentinnerstate?Icanthinkofno reasonwhyHumeshouldclassifythesetooasinvolvingsomething'absent',andno
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

reasonwhyheshouldthinkthattheyarecausallysupported.Myconjecturethathe tendstoidentify'mattersoffact'with'mattersof"absent"fact',then,commitsmeto thefollowing:Humewouldtendtodeny,orwouldwanttodeny,thatstatementsabout one'sownpresentinnerstatereport'mattersoffact'atall.Implausibleasthisis,I standbyit. Itdoesnotmatterthat'Ihaveaheadachenow'stateswhatwouldordinarilybecalled'a matteroffact';iftheproprietyofthelabel'matteroffact'wereinquestion,thenI oughttohaveprotestedearlierthatitisintheordinarysense'amatterof (mathematical)fact'that29isaprimenumber.TheimplausibilityofthepositionIam takinghastodowithwhatHumeputsoneachsideofhisdichotomy,notwiththelabels heuses.If'Ihaveaheadachenow'doesnotfallonthesidelabelled'matteroffact', thenitmustfallontheothersideofHume'sdichotomy.Hume'sexplanationsand examplesmakeitclearthatthisothersidethe 246

onecomprisingstatementswhichcanbeestablishedby'comparingideas'includesall necessaryoranalytictruths;andIamsuggestingthatHumealsoincludesinitpresent tensestatementsaboutsensorystates,images,bodilysensationsandthelike.Isit evenremotelycrediblethat,inwhatHumethinkstobeatheoreticallybasicand powerfulclassification,oneclassshouldcontainsuchaheterogeneousmixtureasthis? Yesitis,asInowproceedtoshow.

52.Twokindsofsafety
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Someonewhothinksthatweestablishanalytictruthsbyexaminingour'ideas'islikely toseethisasanintrospectiveactivity:toknowthatredthingsinfuriatebullsImust attendtotheouterworld,buttoknowthatredthingsarecolouredIneedonlylook inwardsatmyideasofredandofcolour.ThuswefindHumesayingthat'reflection' meaning'introspection'canestablishsimplelogicaltruths. Thetroublecouldgoevendeeper.Itisarguablethatinreportingmypresentinnerstate Iamsafe.Itisplausibletosaythatinmakingsuchareport,sinceIclaimnothingabout thepastorfutureorabouttheobjectiveotherthanme,Irunnoriskofhonesterror.It isalsoplausibletosaythatlogicaloranalytictruthsaresafe;thatredthingsinfuriate bullscouldcometobeFalse,butthepropositionthatredthingsarecolouredthe propositionwhichwedonowexpressbythesentence'Redthingsarecoloured'mustbe trueforalleternity. Letusuncriticallyacceptthesetwothesesaboutsafety,inthesomewhatnaiveform theyhaveinmuchofthephilosophicalliterature.Myfirstpointisthattheyobviously involvetwodifferentkindsofsafety.ThatInowhaveaheadacheisnotaproposition whichhastobetrue,orwhichcouldnotturnouttobefalse.Thesafetywhichis commonlythoughttoattachtoitconsistsonlyinthefactthatifIthinkInowhavea headachethenIhaveonethepropositioncouldhavebeenfalse,butIcannothonestly beinerroraboutit.Thepropositionthatredthingsarecoloured,ontheotherhand,is notthelocusofanyspecialepistemologicalprivileges.Onecouldhonestlybeinerror aboutit(oratanyrateaboutlesstriviallogicaltruths),throughsheerconceptual ineptitude. 247

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thedifferencebetweenthesetwosortsofsafetysometimescalled'incorrigibility' deservesmoreattentionthanithasbeengiven.Descartesbegantoattendtoitinthe Meditations:tryingtoisolatepropositionswhichhecouldsafelyassert,heconsidered suchnecessarytruthsasthat2+2=4,andfoundnobasicsafetyinthembecausehe sawthathecouldraisethequestion'MightIbewronginthinkingthatitisanecessary truththat2+2=4?'Allthis,however,leadsintodeepwatersinwhichIamnot qualifiedtoswim.Itwillbegenerallygranted,Ithink,thatthetwosortsofsafetyare indeedtwo.20 Butthismightbedeniedbysomeonewhogaveanintrospectiveaccountoflogical discovery.SuchapersonmightthinkthatinestablishinganecessaryoranalytictruthI attendonlytomyown'ideas',i.e.tocertainofmyowninnerstates;andhemightinfer fromthisthatIamsafeinsayingthatallredthingsarecolouredforthesamereason, andinthesameway,thatIamsafeinsayingthatInowhaveaheadache. ThereisahintofthismistakeinanearlyworkofDescartes:'Eachofuscanseeby intuitionthatheexists,thathethinks,thatthetriangleisboundedbythreelinesonly. ..andthelike.'21ItistruethatDescarteshadapeculiarviewaboutthelogicalstatus of'Ithink'and'Iexist',buthedidnotarriveatituntilaftertheabovepassagewas written.Thepassage,Isubmit,doesshowDescartesjumblingintrospectivepsychology withlogic.Heisputting'Ithink'onalevelwith'Triangleshavethreesides',onthe groundsthateachisknownby'intuition',i.e.byinspectionofone's'ideas'. Lockeintroducestheintuition/demonstrationdistinctionpurelyintermsoflogicaltruths, andthenraisesaquestionaboutobjectivitystatements: Therecanbenothingmorecertainthanthattheideawereceivefroman
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

externalobjectisinourminds:thisisintuitiveknowledge.Butwhetherthere beanythingmorethanbarelythatideainourminds;whetherwecanthence certainlyinfertheexistenceofanythingwithoutus,whichcorrespondstothat idea,isthatwhereofsomementhinktheremaybeaquestionmade.22 ____________________ 20SeeA.J.Ayer,"'BasicPropositions'",inPhilosophical Essays(London,1954),pp. 1057. 21Descartes,Regulae III. 22Essay IV.ii.14.Seealsoix.3. 248

Lockeseesnoambiguityindescribingas'intuitive'myknowledgeofelementaryanalytic truthsandmyknowledgeofmypresentinnerstates.Andthenotionofsafetyis involved:Icanplaysafebystayingwithmeaningsandassertingnothingsynthetic,orby stayingwithmyinnerstatesandassertingnothingabouttheobjectiverealm. Now,Humeuses'idea'lessgenerouslythanDescartesandLocke:someoftheir'ideas' arehis'impressions'.ButthisisnosafeguardagainstthemistakeIamconsidering. Sinceimpressionsaresupposedtodifferfromideasonlyinvivacity,Humecannotsay thattheydifferinthedegreeof'evidence'withwhichtheycanbeknown.Nordoeshe tryto:'Sinceallactionsandsensationsofthemindareknowntousbyconsciousness, theymustnecessarilyappearineveryparticularwhattheyare,andbewhatthey appear.'23SoHumesaysthatIamsafeinreportinganyofmypresentinnerstates, whetherimpressionsorideas;andhemaythinkthatthishassomethingtodowiththe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

certaintyofnecessarytruths,sincetheseconcernideas.Thewayisopenforhimtojoin DescartesandLocke. Hedoesjointhem.Ofthefourkindsofrelationalstatementswhichcanbeknownby intuitionordemonstration,Humesaysthatthreethoseinvolvingresemblance, contrarietyanddegreesinqualityaremattersofintuitionratherthandemonstration. Hisdefenceofthisdriftsgraduallyawayfromtheareaofnecessarytruths,whichisthe homegroundoftheintuition/demonstrationdistinction,towardsthatoftruthsabout sensorystates: Threeoftheserelationsarediscoverableatfirstsight,andfallmoreproperly undertheprovinceofintuitionthandemonstration.Whenanyobjectsresemble eachother,theresemblancewillatfirststriketheeye,orratherthemind;and seldomrequiresasecondexamination.Thecaseisthesamewithcontrariety, andwiththedegreesofanyquality.[Withregardtothelatter,]tho'itbe impossibletojudgeexactlyofthedegreesofanyquality,suchascolour, taste,beat,cold,whenthedifferencebetwixtthemisverysmall;yet'tiseasy todecide,thatanyofthemissuperiororinferiortoanother,whentheir differenceisconsiderable.Andthisdecisionwealwayspronounceatfirstsight, withoutanyenquiryorreasoning.24 ____________________ 23Treatise,p.190. 24Treatise,p.70.DiscussedinZabeeh,Hume,pp.912. 249

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thephrase,'theeye,orratherthemind',whichshowsHume'ssuspicionthathis intendeddiscussionofnecessarytruthsisgettingoutofhand,isparticularlyenjoyable. Toseehowwildlyheletsthesubjectchange,considerthe'degreesofanyquality'. Supposethatxlookspuremaroon:Humeimpliesthatx looks redder than yiseasierto establishifylookspurplethanifylooksbluishmaroon.This,thoughtrue,hasnothing todowiththedifferencebetweenobviousandunobviousnecessarytruths.The necessityofA maroon thing is redder than a purple thingisnomoreobviousthanthatof A maroon thing is redder than a bluish-maroon thing.Ontheotherhand,evenifmy handkerchiefismaroonandmytiepurple,itisnotnecessaryatallthatMy handkerchief is redder than my tie.Ifthisstatementwerenecessary,itwouldnotbebecauseofthe (apparent)coloursofmyhandkerchiefandmytie,butbecauseofthemeaningsof'my handkerchief'and'mytie'.Humewouldusethephrase'theideaofmytie'tomeanboth 'afadedvisualappearanceofmytie'and'themeaningof"mytie"',andinthatfactlies hisbigmistake. Revertingbrieflytothetopicof51:IsuggestedthatwhenHumedistinguishes(a) whatcanbeknownbycomparingideasfrom(b)mattersoffact,heintends(a)tocover analytictruthsandfirstpersonsubjectivestatements,and(b)tocoverobjective syntheticstatements.Thismakes(a)averymixedbag,butwenowseethatHume toleratesjustsuchamixture.Andthataccountofthedichotomy,thoughIdonotinsist thatitiscorrect,wouldatleastexplainwhyHumesaysthateverythinginclass(b)has acausalbasis.

53.Amuddleaboutrelations
Hume'sconflationoflogicalwithpsychologicaltruthyieldsarichharvestoferrorina
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

paragraphwhichmeritsanalysis,bothforitsownsake,andasanobjectlesson.25 Thephrase'philosophicalrelation'whichoccursinitneedstobeexplained.Humesays that'relation'hastwosenses.26Firstly,atechnicalsense,forwhichHumeuses 'philosophicalrelation':anytruestatementoftheformxRyforexamplethatxisunlike yassertstheholdingofaphilosophicalrelationbetweenxandy. ____________________ 25Treatise I.iii.1,firstparagraph. 26Treatise,pp.1314. 250

Secondly,avernacularsense,forwhichHumeuses'naturalrelation':thereisanatural relationbetweenxandyonlyiftheplainmanwoulddescribethemas'related'or 'connected';andHumethinksthatrelationswhichqualifyas'natural'bythiscriterionare alsotheoneswhichhaveacertainroleinhistheoryaboutthe'associationofideas'(see 63below).Sophilosophicalrelationsarejustrelationsinthebroadestsense,and naturalrelationsformasubclassofthese:inthephrase'philosophicalrelation'the adjectivedoesnothaveanarrowingfunction.27Sincenaturalrelationshavenorolein theparagraphIwanttodiscuss,Icansafelyusetheunqualified'relation'tomeanwhat Humemeansby'philosophicalrelation'. Ourparagraphtreatsofadistinctionbetween(a)relationswhich'dependentirelyonthe ideas,whichwecomparetogether',and(b)relationswhich'maybechang'dwithoutany changeintheideas'.An(a)relationholdsbetweentwoideaspurelybyvirtueofwhat
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

eachseparatelyislike,andsoitcanceasetorelatethemonlyifoneofthemchangesin itself.A(b)relation'sholdingbetweentwoideasisnotsimplyanupshotofthenature ofeachideaseparately:itcouldhold,andthenlaternothold,betweentwoideas withouteither'salteringinitself. If'ideas'aremeanings,Humecouldbedistinguishing(a)analyticfrom(b)synthetic statements,asfollows.(a)ThestatementthatEverybrotherismaleexpressesa relationbetweentheideasofbrotherhoodandofmalenessonewhichmustholdjustso longasthesetwoideasremainastheyare.Todenythiswouldbetosaythat'Every brotherismale'couldbecomefalsewithoutanychangeinthemeaningof'brother'or 'male'.(b)ThestatementthatEverybrotherisintelligentcouldbetrue,andthenlater false,eventhoughneither'brother'nor'intelligent'hadchangeditsmeaning;sothe relationitexpressesbetweentheideasofbrotherhoodandofintelligencedoesnot 'dependentirely'onthenaturesofthosetwoideas.Thatiswhythestatementcould changetruthvaluewithoutanyrelevantsemanticchange. Thisisallslightlyunsatisfactory;forif'Everybrotherismale'didbecomefalsethrougha changeinthemeaningof'brother',weshouldn'twanttosaythattheideaof brotherhoodhad ____________________ 27ThusJ.A.Robinson,"'Hume'sTwoDefinitionsofCause'",Chappellp.138.ContrastB. H.Laing,David Hume(London,1932),pp.968;A.H.Basson,David Hume(Pelican Books,1958),pp.545. 251

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

changedimplyingthatthereisoneitem,theideaofbrotherhoodorthemeaningof 'brother',whichhasretaineditsidentityandmerelyundergoneanalteration.Itwouldbe morenaturaltosaythattherehadbeenachangeinwhichideacountedas'theideaof brotherhood'.Buttheformer,poorerformulationistheoneIhavehadtoadoptin fidelitytoHume'stext;soIadmitthattheinterpretationofthe(a)/(b)distinctionas theanalytic/syntheticdistinctioncanbemaintainedonlywithsomestrain.Idonot retracttheinterpretation,however,foritisclearthatHumedoeswantthe(a)/(b) distinctiontodistinguish(a)relationsbetweenideaswhichdoyieldanalytictruthsfrom (b)oneswhichdonot.28Thisisshownbyhisdescribing(a)astheclassofrelations 'whichdependingsolelyuponideas,canbetheobjectsofknowledgeandcertainty';29 anditisalsoshowninotherwaystowhichIshallcomeshortly. Now,Humearguesthat(a)containsonlyfourspeciesofrelations,whenceitfollowsthat everynecessarytrutheverythingintheprovinceof'knowledge'involvesarelation belongingtooneofthosefourspecies.Humehimselfdrawsthisconclusion,whenhe saysthatthesefourare'theonlyinfalliblerelations'.30Thiswouldbeanextremely importantandpowerfulresult,ifitweretrue;butinfactitisfalse.If'Everybrotheris male'expressesarelationshipbetweentheideasofbrotherhoodandmaleness,itisthe relationembodiedin'Every...is...';butthatrelationisassertedtoholdbetweenthe ideasofbrotherhoodandintelligencebythestatement'Everybrotherisintelligent'. Therearenogroundsforsayingthat'Every...is...'isambiguousasbetweenthese twostatements.Tocontrasttheminrespectofthe'relationsofideas'theyinvolve,we mustattendnottowhateachstatementassertsbuttothegroundsofitstruth:the analyticoneistruebecausetheideaofbrotherhoodincludesthatofmaleness,whereas neitherofthetwoideasinvolvedinthesyntheticstatementincludestheother.Butnow Humeisintroubleinadifferentway;fornon-inclusionbetweenapairofideasisjust asmuchasinclusionarelationwhichcanceasetoobtainonlyifoneoftherelated
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ideaschanges;sothatboththeserelationsfitHume'sformulafor(a)relations.Also, Humethinksthatthe(a)/(b)linedividesrelationsgenerally;butourlatestattempthas ____________________ 28ThusZabeeh,Hume,p.85. 29Treatise,p.70. 30Treatise,p.79.See alsopp.4634. 252

givenusonlyalinewithinclusionononesideandnoninclusionontheotherwith nothingsaidaboutanyotherrelationswhatsoever.SowemustconcludethatHume's linebetween(a)analyticand(b)synthetictruthsdoesnotcorrespondintheintended waytoanylinebetweentwoclassesofrelationsbetweenideas. InourparagraphHumedoesalsousethe(a)/(b)distinctiontodrawalinebetweentwo classesofrelations.Butthatisonlybecauseheusesitfortwodistinctpurposeswhose distinctnesshedoesnotsee.Inthissecondversionofit,thelinebetween(a)and(b) hasnothingtodowiththatbetween(a)analyticand(b)synthetic,orbetween(a) 'knowledge'and(b)proofandprobability.Itisinfactthelinebetween(a)reducibleand (b)irreduciblerelations,insensesofthesetermswhichInowproceedtoexplain. 'JamesisindebttoJohn'isarelationalstatement,andindebtednesstoJohnisthusa relationalpropertyofJames.Whatabout'Jamesisadebtor'?Thislackstheverbalform typicalofovertlyrelationalstatements;butadebtormustbeindebttosomeone,and thismakesitreasonabletocount'Jamesisadebtor'asarelationalstatementand indebtednessasarelationalproperty.Thefollowingrulelooksright:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Fisarelationalproperty=ThereisarelationRsuchthat,foranyx,Fx (There is a y such that y x and xRy). Thus,indebtednessisarelationalpropertywhileimpecuniousnessisnot;jealousyis, butdepressionisnot;fatherhoodis,butmalenessisnot. Giventhenotionofarelational property,Icannowdefine'reducible'and'irreducible'as theseapplytorelations: Risreducible=Forallxandy,therearenonrelationalpropertiesFandG suchthat(Fx& & Gy)xRy. Risirreducible=Risnotreducible. Thus,'iswarmerthan'expressesareduciblerelation,becausex is warmer than yis entailedbyx is at 42C. and y is at 17C.Otherexampleswouldbe'hasthesame shapeas'and'hasmorelegsthan'.Bywayofcontrast,'ismarriedto'expressesan irreduciblerelation:noconjunctionofstatementsattributingnonrelational 253

propertiestoJohnandtoMarycanentailthatJohnismarriedtoMary.(WhenLockesays thatrelationsare'notcontainedintherealexistenceofthings'butare'something extraneousandsuperinduced',hemaymeanthatallrelationsarereducible.31Similar remarksbyLeibnizcertainlyhavethatmeaningapointwhichisarguedbyRescherfrom whomIhaveborrowedtheterms'reducible'and'irreducible'and,withaslight modification,thedistinctiontheyembody.32)

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Now,Hume'sdistinctionbetween(a)relationswhich'dependentirelyontheideas,which wecomparetogether'and(b)relationswhich'maybechang'dwithoutanychangeinthe ideas'isintendedpartlyasthedistinctionbetween(a)reducibleand(b)irreducible relations.ThisissuggestedbythewordsinwhichHumeintroducesthedistinction.Itis confirmedbywhathesaysaboutwherethedistinguishinglinefalls.Hesaysthat(a) containsjustfour(speciesof)relations,namelyresemblance,contrariety,degreesin quality,andproportionsinquantityandnumber.Instancesofthesewouldbe, respectively,'hasthesamecolouras','hasadifferentcolourfrom','iswarmerthan'and 'hasmorelegsthan';andallofthesearereduciblerelations.Asforthethree(species of)relationswhichHumesaysexhaust(b):oneofthem,identity,issoobscurely handledthatImustsetitaside;buttheothertwocausation,andrelationsoftimeand placeareirreduciblerelations. Furthermore,someofHume'sexplanationsandexamplesofthe(a)/(b)distinctionmake senseonlyasappliedtothedistinctionbetween(a)reducibleand(b)irreducible relations.Forexample,heputsspatialrelationsin(b)because'therelationsof contiguityanddistancebetwixttwoobjectsmaybechang'dmerelybyanalterationof theirplace,withoutanychangeontheobjectsthemselvesorontheirideas';33andthis canonlybereadastheassertionthatspatialrelationsareirreducible,i.e.thatno conjunctionofnonrelationaldescriptionsofxandycanentail,say,thatxisamilefrom y.(Thisinterpretationassumesthatathing'shavingsuchandsucha'place'isa relationalpropertyofit,andsoindeeditis.) Thereducible/irreduciblelinedoesdividerelations,butnowwe ____________________ 31Essay II.XXV.8.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

32N.Rescher,The 33Treatise,p.69.

Philosophy of Leibniz(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.,1967),pp.715. 254

havedesertedrelationsbetweenideas.Humenearlyadmitsthisbyreferringto'the relationsofcontiguityanddistancebetwixttwoobjects'.Andwhenhesaysthata(b) relationcanceasetoholdevenifthereisnochangein'theobjectsortheirideas',there aresignsofstrain:heneedstosay'objects'buthascommittedhimselftosaying 'ideas'.Heoftenuses'ideaof'tomeansomethinglike'appearanceof',andhetendsto blurthelinebetweentheappearancesofanobjectandtheobjectitself.Thesetwofacts makeiteasierforhimtoslidebackandforthbetween'object'and'ideaofobject',but theydonotfalsifymyaccountofwhatitisinourparagraphthatforceshimintothis slide. SoHumeisdoingtwothingsatonce,andisledbyhisdoubleuseof'idea'tomiscount them.Withintheclassofstatementshedistinguishes(a)analyticfrom(b)synthetic, andwithintheclassofrelationshedistinguishes(a)reduciblefrom(b)irreducible;and hedoesnotrealizethatthesearetwodistinctionsandnotjustone.Immediatelyafter drawingwhathethinkstobehisonedistinction,Humesays: 'Tisfromtheideaofatriangle,thatwediscovertherelationofequality,which itsthreeanglesbeartotworightones;andthisrelationisinvariable,aslong asouridearemainsthesame.Onthecontrary,therelationsofcontiguityand distancebetwixttwoobjectsmaybechang'dmerelybyanalterationoftheir place,withoutanychangeontheobjectsthemselvesorontheirideas...
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

'Onthecontrary'heremeans'Ontheotherhand':Humewantstopresentanantithesis, somethingfromeachsideofasingledistinction.Butallheissayingis:'Itisanalytic thattheinternalanglesofatriangle=180,butontheotherhandspatialrelationsare irreducible.'Thisisnotverycreditable,butmyinterpretationdoesatleastmakeit intelligible:sinceHumeconflatestheanalytic/syntheticandreducible/irreducible distinctions,henaturallythinksthatanalytic/irreducibleexpressesapropercontrast. ThisinterpretationisreinforcedwhenHume,havingsaidineffectthatspatialrelations areirreducible,addsthatanobject's'placedependsonahundreddifferentaccidents, whichcannotbeforeseenbythemind'.Ofcoursetheforeseeabilityofanobject's'place' isirrelevanttotheirreducibilityofspatialrelations.Hume'spoint,Ithink,mustbethat truthsaboutwherethingsare'cannotbeforeseenbythemind'andarethereforenever analyticornecessary! 255

ThatHume'stwodistinctionsareentirelyindependentisshownbytheexistenceofthe fourcases: A maroon thing is redder thana purple

pdfcrowd.com

analytic/reducible:

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

thing. analytic/irreducible: synthetic/reducible: synthetic/irreducible: A subterranean thing is some distance away from a stratospheric thing. My handkerchief is redder than my tie. My cellar is at least a mile away from Telstar.

AsIremarkedearlier,itwouldbeveryinterestingtolearnthatonlyfourkindsof relationscanfigureinnecessarytruthsifitweretrue.Infact,anyrelationcanenter intoanalyticstatements,includingthecausalrelation:'Anyearthquakewhichcauses everyhousetofalldowncauseseverysmallhousetofalldown'isananalytictruth whosemainverbis'causes'.Itisnotaninterestingtruth,butitsexistenceshowsthatif Humeistoprovethatcausallawsarenotlogicallynecessaryhewillneedsomething subtlerthantheblockbustingclaimthateverystatementinvolvingthecausalrelationis synthetic.WemustsupposethatHumeagreeswiththis;forhedoesadduceother, muchsubtler,arguments.Thesewillbethethemeofmynextchapter. 256

XI HUMEONCAUSATION:NEGATIVE
54.Introduction
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

HUMEattackedcertainwronganalysesoftheconceptofcause,andpropoundedoneof hisown.1Beforediscussinghispositiveanalysisinmynextchapter,Ishalldevotethe presentonetohisnegativeworkonthetopicandtocertainissuesarisingtherefrom. Hume'stargetsareallaccountsofcausationintermsofthenotionofa'necessary connexion'betweentheobjectsorhappeningswhicharesaidtobecausallyrelated.He doeseventuallyallowakindofsensetothephrase'necessaryconnexion',butnota sensesuchthat'xisnecessarilyconnectedwithy'isaplainstatementoffactabouta relationwhichholdsbetweenxandy.ThroughoutthischapterIshalluse'necessary connexion'tomeananecessaryconnexionconsideredasobjectivelyholdingbetweenthe objectsoreventswhicharesaidtobecausallyrelated'.Humearguesthatwhenthe phrase'necessaryconnexion'istakeninthatwayitiscondemned,byhismeaning empiricismandcertainothertruepremisses,asmeaningless.Theargument,cleansedof itsgeneticismandofitsreferencesto'ideas',goeslikethis:sinceitcannotbeverbally defined,thephrase'necessaryconnexion'doesnothaveacomplexmeaning;andsince wedonotexperienceinstancesof'necessaryconnexion',thatphrasedoesnothavea simplemeaning;soithasnomeaningatall. ThatapplicationofHume'smeaningempiricism,thoughbetterthanhisownversions,is stillcrippledbyitsdependenceonthesimple/complexdichotomy,whichreflectsanaive viewofthewaysinwhichanexpressioncanbemeaningful.Consider,forexample,the claimthat'necessaryconnexion'cannotbeverballydefined.Humesayslittleindefence ofthisexcept:'Thetermsofefficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion,andproductive quality,areallnearlysynonimous;andtherefore'tisan absurditytoemployanyofthemindefiningtherest.'2Butonewantsthetwosidesofa definitiontobesynonymous!Hume'spointmustbethathislistcontainssinglewords eachofwhichis'nearly
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 1Treatise I. iii.19,14;Enquiry4861. 2Treatise,p.157.Seealsop.77. 257

synonymous'witheachoftheothers,sothatthelistdoesnotprovidethematerialsfor adefinitionwhichusefullyspellsoutthedefiniendum's'complex'meaningin'simpler' terms.Thelist,though,isacheat:insteadofthewords'necessity'and'connexion'it shouldcontainthephrase'necessaryconnexion',foritisonlythelatterwhichcan plausiblybedescribedas'nearlysynonymous'with'power','efficacy'etc.Nowthephrase 'necessaryconnexion',whichHumedoesoftentakeascentral,mightgivehisopponents roomtomanoeuvre: 'Connexion'makessensein'IhaveseveredmyconnexionwiththeCommunist Party',asdoes'necessary'in'Mathemeticaltruthsarenecessary';andsothe disputedphrasehasacomplexmeaningwhichiscaughtbythedefinitionof'x isanecessaryconnexion'as'xisnecessaryandxisaconnexion'. Thiswouldbeabsurd,ofcourse,butitisnotclearthatHumeisinapositiontosayso.I haveremarkedthathecondemnsnecessaryconnexion'onlywhenthephraseis supposedtorefertoarelationobjectivelyholdingbetweenpairsofobjectsorevents; andhemightcomplainthattheabsurddefinitionproposedabovedoesnotgivethe phraseameaningofthatsort.Thiscomplaint,thoughjustinitself,isnotavailableto Hume.Forthecomplaintpresupposesthattheissueabout'necessaryconnexion' concernswhetherthephrasecanlegitimatelybeusedtodocertainsortsofwork,and
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatdescriptionoftheproblemliesrightoutsidetheambitofHume'sofficialtheory aboutsimpleandcomplexideas. ThemoralofallthisisthatHume'sproblemabout'necessaryconnexion'islesssimply structuredthanhisformofmeaningempiricism,withitscrampinguseofthe simple/complexdichotomy,impliesittobe.Thedisputedphrasemightbemeaningful becauseithasanempiricalcashvalueofacomplexsort,evenifitcouldnotbeverbally definedbymeansofwordswhichareostensivelydefinable. Fortunately,Hume'spracticebelieshistheory.Heproducesagileandfreeranging argumentstoshowthat'necessaryconnexion'cannotdotheworkdemandedofitby thosewhoembodyitinwronganalysesoftheconceptofcause.Tograspthevalueof thosearguments,however,onemustseethatHume'sachievementinthisareadoesnot fitthenarrowprogrammedictatedbyhistheoryofmeaning. 258

Ineedtoexplain'theworkdemandedof"necessaryconnexion"bythoseembodyitin wronganalysesoftheconceptofcause'.Thisworkrequiresthat'necessaryconnexion' refertoarelationholdingobjectivelybetweeneventsandhappenings;buttosaythatis notenough,forHumeisnotinterestedindenyingthat'xisnecessarilyconnectedwithy' couldbetakentomean,say,thatxisamileawayfromy.Theothervitalaspectofthe criticizeduseisthis:ithasbeenthoughtthatonecouldbeentitledtosay,onanon inductivebasis,thingsoftheform'ThereisorhasbeenanF;Fsarenecessarily connectedwithGs;sotherewillbeaG.'An'inductivebasis'forapredictionisone involvingsomethinginthenatureofanunprovableassumptionanactoffaithorhope

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatsomeregularityorpatternwhichhassofarobtainedwillcontinuetoobtain.Anon inductivebasis,suchassomephilosophershavehopedtosecurebythediscoveryof 'necessaryconnexions',isonewhichsupportsapredictionwithoutinvolvinganymere assumptionaboutamatterofbrute,futurefact.Hume'snegativediscussionofcause, then,couldbedescribedasasetofargumentsfortheconclusionthatnopredictioncan haveastrongerthaninductivebasis,thattheelementofguessworkaboutthefutureis ineliminable.ObservethatinstatingHume'sconclusionwehavetodeserttheterms suppliedbyhistheoryofmeaning. Thethesisthattherearerelevant'impressionsofnecessaryconnexions'istheonlypart ofourtopicwhichcanbeexpressedinpurelyHumeanterms;andIshalldispatchitin 55.In56IshallpresentcriticismsincludingHume'softheviewthatweareentitled tohypothesizeorconjecturethatsomeobjectsorhappeningsare'necessarilyconnected' soastoyieldabetterthaninductivebasisforpredictions.Thesealleged'necessary connexions'willbeassumedtobeofferedassomethinglessthanlogicalnecessitations; butfortherestweshallnotinsistuponknowingexactlywhat'necessaryconnexion'is supposedtomeanhere.Mercifully,Humewaivessuchdemands,andadoptsthekindof tacticdescribedin27above,arguingthatonhisopponents'ownpartialexplanationof 'necessaryconnexion'nothingcouldqualifyforthatlabel.Thiswillbringusfinallytothe viewthatpredictionscanhaveanoninductivebasiswhichgivesthemthehighest possibledegreeofsecurity,becausetherearelogically'necessaryconnexions'between objectsorevents.Unlikesome 259

writers,IdonotthinkthatthispositionwassodecisivelyrefutedbyHumeastoneed
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

nofurtherdiscussion.

55.Impressionsofnecessaryconnexion
Dowehaveany'impressionsofnecessaryconnexion'betweenevents?Theonly plausiblebasisforanaffirmativeanswergoeslikethis:whenIactvoluntarily,Iam consciouswithinmyselfofanecessaryormorethaninductiveconnexionbetweenthe actofmywillandthewilledupshot.Humedeniesthis(see43above),andheisright todoso;butthefalsityofthepositionistheleastofitstroubles. LetusgobacktoLocke.3Hetriestoexplaintheempiricalbasisforourconceptof makingorproducingorcausing,whichhecallsour'ideaofpower': Poweralsoisanotherofthosesimpleideaswhichwereceivefromsensation andreflection.For,observinginourselvesthatwedoandcanthink,andthat wecanatpleasuremoveseveralpartsofourbodieswhichwereatrest;the effects,also,thatnaturalbodiesareabletoproduceinoneanother,occurring everymomenttooursenses,weboththesewaysgettheideaofpower.4 Onesourceoftheideaofpower,then,isourobservationofourowndoings.WhenLocke restateshisviewsomewhatlater,herefersinsteadtoourobservationofourown changesofinnerstate,includingchangeswhichwepassivelyundergoandbyimplication excludingourphysicalactivities.Inthisrespecttheearlierformulationisbetter,and truertothemainlinesofLocke'sthought.Thelaterone,however,doesbetteronthe secondallegedsourceoftheideaofpower.Hereiswhatitsays: Themindbeingeverydayinformed,bythesenses,ofthealterationofthose
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

simpleideas[=qualities]itobservesinthingswithout...;reflectingalsoon whatpasseswithinitself,andobservingaconstantchangeofitsideas, sometimesbytheimpressionofoutwardobjectsonthesenses,and sometimesbythedeterminationofitsownchoice;andconcludingfromwhatit hassoconstantlyobservedtohavebeen,thatthelikechangeswillforthe futurebemadeinthesamethings,bylikeagents,andbythelikeways, considersinonethingthepossibilityof[being]changed,andinanotherthe possibilityofmakingthatchange;andsocomesbythatideawhichwecall power.5 ____________________ 3FollowingGibson,Locke'sTheory of Knowledge,ch.5,1214. 4Essay II. vii.8. 5Essay II. xxi.1. 260

Theearlierversionsaysthatweobserve'theeffectsthatnaturalbodiesproduceinone another',whereasthelatterallowsusactuallytoobservein'thingswithout'onlytheir 'alterations'.Themorecircumspectversionisthebetter.Wedonotobserveproducings assuch,butonlyhappenings;andifweclassifysomeofthelatterasproducings,saying thatxhappened'because'yhappened,thequestionofwhyandbywhatcriteriawedo thisispreciselywhathastobeexplainedbysomeonetryingtolaybaretheempirical basisfor'theideaofpower'. AssemblingthebetterpartsofLocke'stwoversions,then,wegetthefollowing.Myidea

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ofpowerarisesinthefirstinstancefrommy'observingaconstantchangeof[my]ideas, ...bythedeterminationof[my]ownchoice',sincewhatIobserveinthesecasesis morethanmerechange;andIthenapplyitto'thingswithout',althoughallIobservein themaremerechanges,bysomekindoftransfer.Hume'srsumwillserve:'Somehave asserted,thatwefeelanenergy,orpower,inourownmind;andthathavinginthis manneracquir'dtheideaofpower,wetransferthatqualitytomatter,wherewearenot ableimmediatelytodiscoverit.'6Butthesupposedtransferisunintelligible.Locke couldnotsay:'Thestatementthatthe fire made the water boilisexactlyanalogousto thestatementthatImade my arm go up(bydeliberatelyraisingit)';forthatwould implythatthefireknowinglyanddeliberatelyboiledthewater.Hemustsay,then,that 'Thefiremadethewaterboil'ispartlyanalogousto'Imademyarmgoup':intheformer statement,'made'hasasensewhichinvolvesmorethanmerealteration,whichis directlycashableonlyinrespectofone'sowndeliberatedoings,butwhichcanalsobe appliedintheabsenceofdeliberatenessandevenofsentience.Comparethatwith: 'Treesmayhavepains,inasenseof"pain"whichdoesnotinvolvethehavingof consciousstatesthoughitcanbegraspedonlybythosewhohavepainsandare consciousofthem.'Ifoneisbetterthantheother,Lockedoesnotshowhow. Humechallengesthetransfer,butnotbecauseitmovesfromthepersonaltothe impersonal.Evenifwehadthedesiderated'ideaofpower'andcouldintelligiblyapplyit to'thingswithout',Lockewouldstillhavetoshowthatpowers,thusunderstood,doin factoperateintheobjectiverealm.(PerhapsLockeisgrappling ____________________ 6Treatise,p.632. 261
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

withthispointwhenhespeaksofour'concluding'fromourpatternedpastthatweshall haveapatternedfuture;butheoffersnoargumententitlingusto'conclude'this,nor doesheexplainhowtheconclusioncouldentitleustoapplytheideaofpowertoouter things.Hemayhaveinmindsomethinglikethis:'Wedoinferapatternedfuturefroma patternedpast;thisinferenceisinvalidunlesstherearepowerswhichsecuredthepast patternsandwhichguaranteefutureones;sotherearesuchpowers.'Onehesitatesto creditLockewithsocrudeanonsequitur,butthetextoffersnoclearalternative.)Hume scrutinizessomeargumentspurportingtofillthisgap,andshowsthemtobefaulty.He arguesfurtherthatnothingcouldcountas'powers'or'necessaryconnexions'which provideastrongerthaninductivethoughweakerthanlogicalbasisforpredictions;7and thatlineofargumentgoesthroughindependentlyofwhatexperientialbasisisclaimed fortheallegedideaofpower.Thisisonereason,thoughbynomeanstheonlyone,for rejectingoutofhandthenaiveviewthatexperimentalworksuchasMichotte'shas somehowprovidedevidenceagainstHume'spositiononcausation.8 'Doweexperiencewithinourselvesanyexerciseof"power",anykindofnoninductive basisforsayinghowweshallact?'Anaffirmativeanswertothis,Ihavemaintained,is notsufficientforanonHumeanaccountofcausation:becauseaselfbasedconceptof powercannotbeappliedtoinanimatethings;andalsobecausenoconceptofpower, howeverbased,couldprovideanoninductivebasisforpredictionabouttheobjective realm.Itremainsonlytoaddthatanaffirmativeanswertothequestionisnot straightforwardlynecessary,either,foranonHumeanaccountofcausation.AsHume implicitlyconcedes,someonemightmakeacaseforsaying'Objectiveregularitiesare explainedbytheoperationofpowers'withoutgivinganyindependentaccountofwhat 'power'means.Itisatleastprimafaciepossiblethattheword'smeaningmightbe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

adequatelyembodiednotinverbaldefinitionsorinostensionsbutratherinitsusein varioustheoriese.g.inatheory,iftherewereone,givingusgroundsforhypothesizing thattherearepowers.IfHume'stheoryofmeaningwerecorrect,itwouldbevitally importanttosearchfor'impressionsofnecessaryconnexion'or'...ofpower',andthis wouldrequire ____________________ 7SeeD.F.Pears,"'Hume'sEmpiricism'",Pears,pp.1315. 8A.E.Michotte,The Perception of Causality(London,1963). 262

ustoassesscertainviewsaboutwhatisexperiencedindeliberateaction.Sincethe theoryisnotcorrect,theimpressionhuntcanbecalledoffandtheseriousphilosophy canbegin.

56.Theconjecturetheory
'Observedregularitiesinthebehaviourofobjectsmakeitreasonabletosupposethat empiricalhappeningsareconnectedbysomekindofpowerornecessaryconnexion.The surfacefactthatFeventsareregularlysucceededbyGeventsisexplainedbythe conjecturethatFeventsproduceornecessitateGevents.'Thisview,whetherornot amplifiedbytheclaimthatwecanexperienceourownexercisesof'power',hasdefects whichHumeefficientlyexposes.Ishallpresenthistwomainobjections,andathird whichisnothis,tothis'conjecturetheory'.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

(1)Theconjecturethatempiricalorderistheobservableupshotofunderlyingpowersor necessaryconnexionshastheformof:'Everymajorscholarshipsince1960hasgoneto anEtoniantheexaminersmustbeprejudiced.'The'prejudice'guesscouldbea reasonableone,foritmightbetheonlyalternativetoahighlyimprobablelevelof Etonianexcellence;butwecannotanalogouslydefendthe'necessaryconnexion' hypothesisasbeingtheonlyalternativetosomethingweknowtobehighlyimprobable. Thatconnectswithanothervitalcontrastbetweenthetwocases:theconjecturethat theexaminersareprejudicedhascontentbecausewecoulddiscoverthattheyare indeedprejudiced(theyadmitit),orthatafteralltheyarenot(weseeforourselvesthe excellenceoftheEtonianscripts);butnothingcouldcountasindependentlyconfirming orrefutingtheconjecturethatobservedorderreflectsunderlyingnecessities. Therearemanyvariationsonthistheme.'Observedorder,ifnotduetoanunderlying necessity,mustbesheercoincidence;andnosanemanwouldacceptacoincidenceof suchastronomicalproportions.'Acoincidenceistheoccurrenceofoneormoreitems whicharebothFandG,wherethereisnocausalrelationbetweentheirbeingFandtheir beingGalthoughonemighthaveexpectedtheretobeonee.g.asetofhorseswhich win,andarebackedbyme,althoughmybetsarebasedonlyonmylikingforthehorses' names.Theaboveargumenthastheform:'Ifsomething'sbeingFdoesnotnecessitate itsbeingG,thenthe 263

FGassociationisjustacoincidence';butthisassumesthatifFnessdoesnot necessitateGnessthenitdoesnotcauseitwhichisjustthepointatissue.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thosecriticismsoftheconjecturetheoryare,Ithink,essentiallyHumean:forexample theyreflectthespiritofthemiddlepartofTreatise I. iii.6.TherelevantpartsofHume's text,however,arealittledifficulttohandlebecausetheycontainatrap,asourceof exegeticalandphilosophicalerror,whichIwanttodealwithrightaway.Thetroubleis thatHumerunstwoquestionsinthesameharness.Hewantstoknow:'First,Forwhat reasonwepronounceitnecessary,thateverythingwhoseexistencehasabeginning, shou'dalsohaveacause?Secondly,Whyweconclude,thatsuchparticularcausesmust necessarilyhavesuchparticulareffects...?'9Afterdevotingseveralpagestothe formerquestion,hesays:'Ifinditwillbemoreconvenienttosinkthisquestioninthe [latterone].'Twill,perhaps,befoundintheend,thatthesameanswerwillservefor bothquestions.'10Letusproceedwithcaution. Thetwoquestionsarequitedifferent:oneconcernsthestatusofaclaimaboutthe scopeofcausallaws,whiletheotherconcernstheanalysisoftheconceptofacausal law.Eitherquestioncouldarisewithouttheother'sdoingso.Someonemightthinkthat everyeventmusthaveacause,whilerejectinganecessitariananalysisoftheconceptof causeandseekingnothingstrongerthananinductivebasisforpredictions.Conversely, someonemightperhapsintheinterestsofmiraclesoroffreedomdenythatwhatever happensiscausedtohappen,whilebelievingthatwhensomethingiscausedtohappen thisinvolvesitsbeing'necessitated'insomestrongsense.Why,then,doesHumetake thetwoquestionstogether? Hedoessopartlyforthereasonhegives,namelythat'thesameanswerwillservefor both'.Weshallseein63thatHume'spositivetheoryofcausationwould,ifitwere true,explainboththebeliefthatdeterminismisnotmerelytruebutsomehow necessary,andthebeliefthatcausationinvolves'necessity'insomestrongsense.But thisisonlytosaythatHume'stwoquestionsareconnectedthroughafalsetheory:it
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

doesnotrevealanyreallinkbetweenthem. Thereisinfactareallink,ahumanone,betweenthetwo ____________________ 10Treatise,p.82. 9Treatise,p.78. 264

questions,thoughitisnottheoneimpliedbyHume'spositivetheory.Manypeople, whomwemaylooselylabel'rationalists',finditintolerabletosayofanythingthatit justisthecase:theycannottolerateabsolutelybrutefacts,andassumethatany questionoftheform'Whyisitso?',askedaboutalogicallycontingentstateofaffairs, musthaveananswer.Forarationalist,thethesisthatwhateverhappensiscausedto happenconvenientlyembodieshisassumptionthat'Whydidithappen?'canalwaysbe answered,namelybysomethingoftheform'Becauseitwascausedtohappenby...' Thatformofanswer,though,willnotsatisfytherationalistifpartofwhatitmeansis:'F eventsjustare,asamatteroffact,alwaysfollowedbyGevents';foronthatanalysis theansweractuallyincreasesthedoseofsheerunexplainedbrutefactwhichhastobe swallowed.Therationalistcastofmind,inshort,generatestheassumptionsboththat determinismmustbetrueandthatcausalexplanationsandcausallybasedpredictions cannothaveaninductivebasis. Humemayhavebeendimlyawareofthisconnexionbetweenhistwoquestions. Considerthispassage:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

The..mostpopularexplicationofthismatter,istosay,thatfindingfrom experience,thatthereareseveralnewproductionsinmatter,suchasthe motionsandvariationsofbody,andconcludingthattheremustsomewherebe apowercapableofproducingthem,wearriveatlastbythisreasoningatthe ideaofpowerandefficacy.But...reason,asdistinguish'dfromexperience, cannevermakeusconclude,thatacauseorproductivequalityisabsolutely requisitetoeverybeginningofexistence.11 Thisdeniesourrightto'conclude'ona priorigroundswhat?Thereisnoclearanswer, becauseHumecouldbeusing'cause'either(a)asavehicleofthenecessitarianism whichheisopposingor(b)asatheoryneutraltermwhoseanalysisisatissue.On interpretation(a),thepassagesaysonlythatwecannotprovethatobservedorder reflectsunderlyingnecessities;on(b)itsaysthatmuch('productivequality'),andalso says('cause')thatwecannotprovethateveryhappeninghasacause.Ononereading, thepassageisnotanargumentbutamerecounterclaim,whileontheotheritaddsto thecounterclaimanirrelevancy.Itisjustpossible,though,thatthepassageinvolves anunconsciousmixtureof(a)and(b)astumblingattempttolinknecessitarianismwith ____________________ 11Treatise,p.157. 265

dogmaticdeterminismthroughtherationalistcastofmindwhichisoftentheircommon source. (2)Hume'ssecondattackontheconjecturetheoryisaimedataversionofitwhichhe

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

expressesthus: Afterexperienceoftheconstantconjunctionofcertainobjects,wereasonin thefollowingmanner.Suchanobjectisalwaysfoundtoproduceanother.'Tis impossibleitcou'dhavethiseffect,ifitwasnotendow'dwithapowerof production.Thepowernecessarilyimpliestheeffect;andthereforethereisa justfoundationfordrawingaconclusionfromtheexistenceofoneobjectto thatofitsusualattendant.Thepastproductionimpliesapower:Thepower impliesanewproduction:Andthenewproductioniswhatweinferfromthe powerandthepastproduction.12 Waivingthedemandforaclearaccountofwhat'power'means,andthedemandfora proofthatthepastproductionimpliesapower,Humeoffersafurthercriticism: Ithavingbeenalreadyprov'd,thatthepowerliesnotinthesensiblequalities ofthecause;andtherebeingnothingbutthesensiblequalitiespresenttous; Iask,whyinotherinstancesyoupresumethatthesamepowerstillexists, merelyupontheappearanceofthesequalities?13 Theconjecturetheory,Humeiscontending,oughttorunlikethis:'WeobserveFevents tobefollowedbyGevents,andthenceconcludethatallthoseFeventshavehad,as wellasthesensiblequalitieswhichdefineFness,aninsensiblequalitywhichmightbe calledaGpower:anyeventwhichhasaGpowernecessitatestheoccurrenceofaG event.WhenweobserveanewFevent,wecanpredictaGeventonthenoninductive groundthatsincethisFeventhasaGpoweritmustbefollowedbyaGevent.'Buteven ifwegrantthatallthosepastFeventshavehadaGpower,Humeasks,whysaythat thisnewonehasaGpoweralso?Allweobserveinitarethosesensiblequalitieswhich
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

makeitanFevent.InassumingthatitalsohasaGpowerweareassumingthatthe pastassociationofFnesswithGpowerhascontinuedthroughintothepresentcase;and thatispreciselythekindofpasttofutureactoffaithwhichthe'power'theorywas supposedtofreeusfrom.Itwouldbemoreeconomical,andnolesssatisfactory,to jettison'Gpower'andmerelyassumethatthepastassociationofFnesswithGnesswill continuethrough ____________________ 12Treatise,p.90. 13Treatise,p.91. 266

intothepresentcase.Inmyjudgement,thisargumentofHume'sisflawless. (3)Theconjecturetheorycouldbeopentoafurtherattack.Humedoesnotuseit, probablybecauseitconcernsaformofthetheorywhichhedidnotenvisageanyone's actuallyadopting.Iwanttoexpoundit,inpreparationformatterstobediscussedinmy nextsection. Nevermindwhat'necessaryconnexion'or'power'mean;grantthatthepastproduction impliesapower;andgranttoothatwecanknowthatthisnewFeventhasaGpower; stillthereremainsadifficulty.Oratanyratethereisadifficultyifwecansaythismuch aboutthemeaningof'power':'xhasaGpower'providesastrongerthaninductive groundfor'xisfollowedbyaGevent',butnotalogicallycompellingground.(The strongerversion,inwhich'xhasaGpower'entailsthatxisfollowedbyaGevent,will bediscussedlater.)Onthisreadingof'power',italwaysmakessensetoask:'Granted
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatxoccursandhasaGpower,willaGeventactuallyensue?'Thisistoaskwhether theGpowerwillbeoperativeonthisoccasion,andtheanswermustbeinductively based:Gpowershavesofaroperatedunfailingly,andweguessorhopeortrustthat theywillcontinuetodoso.This,however,reestablishestheinductivebasisforthe prediction. InPeirce'sdefenceofthethesisthat'generalprinciplesareoperativeinnature',which heapparentlyconstruesasinantiHumeanviewwhichfreespredictionsfromaninductive basis,thegameisbeautifullygivenawaybytheclausewhichIitalicize: Withoverwhelminguniformity,inourpastexperience,...stonesleftfreeto fallhavefallen.Thereupontwohypothesesonlyareopentous.Either(1)the uniformitywithwhichthosestoneshavefallenhasbeenduetomerechance andaffordsnogroundwhatever...foranyexpectationthatthenextstone thatshallbeletgowillfall;or(2)theuniformitywithwhichstoneshavefallen hasbeenduetosomeactivegeneralprinciple,inwhichcaseit would be a strange coincidence that it should cease to act at the moment my prediction was based upon it.Thatposition,gentlemen,willsustaincriticism.Itis irrefragable.14 ThisreplacesaHumeanhopethatstoneswillcontinuetofallbyaPeirceanhopethat 'activegeneralprinciples'willcontinueto'act'. ____________________ 14C.S.Peirce,Collected Papers(Cambridge,Mass.,1934),vol.5,100. 267
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

57.Theshifttologicalnecessity
Theconjecturetheoryaimstogivepredictionsastrongerthaninductivebasis;butitcan offernofenceof(1)'PastFeventshavehadaGpower',andonlyinductivefencesof(2) 'ThisnewFeventhasaGpower'and(3)'Thisevent'sGpowerwillbeoperative'.These difficultiesarecumulative:neitherthesecondnorthethirdcanbecleanlyraiseduntilits predecessorhasbeenresolved.Still,letusmomentarilyforgetthefirsttwoproblems, andattendto(3). Thisdifficultywouldnotariseif'power'weresoconstruedthat'xhasaGpower'entails orleadsbylogicto'xisfollowedbyaGevent'.Forthenthequestion'Willx'sGpower beoperative?'or'GiventhatsomethingoccurswhichhasaGpower,willaGevent ensue?',wouldbeoftheform:'Giventhatx,andthatxentailsx,isitthecasethat x?'Thequestionmaybecalledimproper,orselfanswering,oranswerablebylogic;but certainlyitisnotonetobeansweredonaninductivebasis.Soletustakethetheoryto bethusmodified:wenowconstrue'xhasaGpower'asentailingthatxisfollowedbya Gevent. ButnowthetheorypurportstoexplainthefactthateverypastFeventhas been followed by a G eventbysayingthateverypastFeventhashadaGpower,meaning thatithas had some property its possession of which entails its having been followed by a G event.Butthisisnoexplanationatall,sinceitislogicallyequivalenttowhatis supposedtobeexplained. Ibasethisclaimonthegenerallogicalpointthat Allsare
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

islogicallyequivalenttoForsomef:allsaref,andbeingfentailsbeing. Thatthesecondentailsthefirstisobvious.Thatthefirstentailsthesecondisnoless certain;forifthefirstistruethenwehaveaguaranteedcandidatefortherequired 'somef'inthesecondnamelyitself.Sincethisequivalenceholdsasamatterof elementarylogic,onecouldneverexplainthefactthatallsarebysayingthatalls havesomepropertytheirpossessionofwhichentailstheirbeing. Toputthepointyetmoregenerally:whateverpropositionPmaybe,onecouldnever explainthefactthatPbysayingthat 268

somethingisthecasewhichentailsthatP.IfPistruethenof coursethereisatrue propositionwhichentailsPnamelyP.AndifyouwantPtobeentailedbysomeother trueproposition,thelattercanstillberoutinelyconstructedbyconjoiningPwithany truthyoulike. Applyingthisbacktoouroriginaltopic:ifeveryFeventhasbeenfollowedbyaGevent, thenitfollowstriviallythateveryFeventhashadapropertywhichentailsitshaving beenfollowedbyaGeventnamelythepropertyofbeingfollowedbyaGevent.Or,if youwanttoinvokesomeotherproperty,take'beingHandfollowedbyaGevent'where Hisanypropertyyoulikewhichtheeventhappenstohave. IfwewanttoexplainwhyitisthecasethatP,offeringagenuineexplanationinwhich thenotionoflogicalnecessityhasaworkingrole,thenthenecessitymustnotbeleft lurkinginthebackground:weshallhavetobepreparedtosaythatPisitselfalogically
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

necessaryproposition.Soifthenecessitariantheoryistoescapevacuityitmustcome rightoutandsayboldlythatitislogicallynecessarythatAll F events have been followed by G events.Thenecessitymustinhereinthatpropositionasitstands:we cannotsaythattheproposition,thoughitselfcontingent,istruebecauseofalogical necessity.Fromnowon,letusconstruethetheoryinthisboldformsincenothingless willdo. Inthisformofit,thetheorynolongerpostulatesa'Gpower'whichiscontingently associatedwithFnessandwhichsomehownecessitatestheensuingofaGevent.Inits earlierform,thestatement(1)'PastFeventshavehadaGpower'wasonewhichour necessitariancouldnotdefendindeedhecouldnotevensaywhatmightcountas cogentreasonsforit.Butinthepresentformofthetheory(1)means'Itislogically necessarythatpastFeventshavebeenfollowedbyGevents';weknowhowtogoabout establishingtruthsoftheform'Itislogicallynecessarythat...';andsothe necessitarian,whetherornothecanestablishtheoneshewantsto,atleastisnot doomedfromtheoutset.Tothatextenthisproblemover(1)issolved. Soishisproblemover(2)'ThisnewFeventalsohasaGpower'.Inthetheory'snew form,thereisnoquestionof(2)'sbeingdefendedoninductivegrounds:thereisnoact offaiththat'thepastassociationbetweenFnessandGpower'willcontinue,forthe theorydoesnotnowpostulateanysuch'association'. 269

IfitislogicallynecessarythatallpastFeventswerefollowedbyGevents,thenitis logicallynecessarythatallFevents,includingthisnewone,arefollowedbyGevents;
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andthatisallthereistosayaboutit.(NoticethatIcandealwith(2),now,onlyby absorbing(3)intoit.Iremarkedattheendof56thatthedistinctionbetween(2)and (3)dependsuponanonlogicalnecessityinterpretationof'Gpower'.Havingdropped thatinterpretation,welosethisdistinction.)Thestrategicpositionisthis.The conjecturetheorywasfacedwiththreeinsolubleproblems:nothingcouldcountas evidencefor(1),andonlyinductiveevidencecouldsupport(2)and(3).Bythesingle operationoftransformingitintoalogicalnecessitytheoryaccordingtowhich'AnF eventoccurs'supports'AGeventwilloccur'becauseitislogicallynecessarythatF eventsarefollowedbyGeventswehaveremovedallthreedifficulties.For(1)hasnow becomeastatementofakindwhichtherearewaysofestablishing,and(1)nowentails both(2)and(3).Sosomeonewhoseeksanoninductivebasisforpredictionsis, whetherornotherealizesit,undertremendousconceptualpressuretoadoptalogical necessityaccountofcausation. Humeseemstobehalfawarethathisopponentsareunderthispressure.Without explicitlysayingthatnothinglessthanlogicalnecessitywillserve,hefrequentlyslides intoassumingthathisonlyreallyserioustargetisthethesisthatpredictionscanbe licensedbylogicallynecessarytruths.Toapplythe'ideaofpower'inaparticularcase, hesays, Wemustdistinctlyandparticularlyconceivetheconnexionbetwixtthecause andeffect,andbeabletopronounce,fromasimpleviewoftheone,thatit mustbefollow'dorprecededbytheother.Thisisthetruemannerof conceivingaparticularpowerinaparticularbody...Nownothingismore evident,thanthatthehumanmindcannotformsuchanideaoftwoobjects,as toconceiveanyconnexionbetwixtthem,orcomprehenddistinctlythatpower orefficacy,bywhichtheyareunited.Suchaconnexionwou'damounttoa
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

demonstration,andwou'dimplytheabsoluteimpossibilityfortheoneobject nottofollow,ortobeconceiv'dnottofollowupontheother.15 Thereferencestowhatwecan'conceive'or'comprehenddistinctly'pointtoalogical necessityinterpretationof'power';andthehighlyexplicitlastsentencepointseven moreclearlyinthat ____________________ 15Treatise,pp.1612. 270

direction.IsuggestthatwhenHumespeaksof'thetruemannerofconceivinga... power'heisclaimingthatalthough'powers'arenotalwaysconstruedinthislogical necessitywaytheyoughttobesinceotherwisethe'power'theoryfallsatthefirst hurdle. Indiscussing'thewill,consideredasacause',Humesays: Thewillbeinghereconsider'dasacause,hasnomoreadiscoverable connexionwithitseffects,thananymaterialcausehaswithitspropereffect. Sofarfromperceivingtheconnexionbetwixtanactofvolition,andamotionof thebody;'tisallow'dthatnoeffectismoreinexplicablefromthepowersand essenceofthoughtandmatter.Noristheempireofthewilloverourmind moreintelligible.16 Thewords'essence'and'intelligible'herepointtothelogicalnecessityposition.When
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Humesaysthattherelationbetweenvolitionandupshotisnot'intelligible',hemeans notthatwecannotunderstanditbutthatwecannotseeitasnecessary. Ofmanyotherexampleswhichcouldbegiven,Iselectoneinwhich'conceive'and 'unintelligible'and'comprehend'playroleslikethosejustdiscussed: Thegeneralityofmankind[whenconfrontedby]themorecommonandfamiliar operationsofnature...supposethat,inallthesecases,theyperceivethe veryforceorenergyofthecause,bywhichitisconnectedwithitseffect,and isforeverinfallibleinitsoperation.They...hardlyconceiveitpossiblethat anyothereventcouldresultfromit...Butphilosophers,whocarrytheir scrutinyalittlefarther,immediatelyperceivethat,eveninthemostfamiliar events,theenergyofthecauseisasunintelligibleasinthemostunusual,and thatweonlylearnbyexperiencethefrequentConjunctionofobjects,without beingeverabletocomprehendanythinglikeConnexionbetweenthem.17 InthatpassageHumesetsouttodenythatweobserveanythingbutregularities,but slidesintodenyingthatwediscoverlogicallynecessaryconnexionsbetweencausesand theireffects. Animportantbyproductoftheshifttologicalnecessityisthatfromnowonweshallbe discussingtherelationsbetweencertainpairsofpropositions,namelytheantecedents andconsequentsofpredictionlicensingconditionals.Norelationofthiskindcanqualify asitselfbeingthecausalrelation,forthelatterholdsnotbetweenpropositions,orfacts reportedinpropositions,butbetweenevents.18Still,thediscussionwillbeindirectly relevant ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

16Treatise,p.632. 17Enquiry54. 18SeeD.Davidson,"'CausalRelations'",Journal

of Philosophy,vol.64(1967).

271

totheconceptofcause,inwayswhichwillemergeinmynextchapter.Theslightshift awayfromtheannouncedtopicofthepresentchapterisforceduponusbytheneedto staywithHume,andsoImakenoapologyforit.

58.Causallawsaslogicallynecessary
WenowapproachHume'sprincipaltarget,namelytheviewthat'AnFeventoccurs'can support'AGeventwilloccur'becauseitislogicallyimpossiblethatanFeventshould failtobefollowedbyaGeventor,inmoreHumeanlanguage,becausecausesleadto theireffectsbya'demonstrative'or'absolute'necessity.Humerejectsthisview,butit isnotperfectlyclearwhy. Hisbestknownargumentrunsasfollows.GivenanypairofeventtypesFandGwhich arethoughttobecausallylinked,itispossibleto'conceive'anF'soccurringnotfollowed byaG;andifthisisconceivableitislogicallypossible;sothatnopredictioncan,inthe waydemandedbythetheory,belicensedbyalogicallynecessaryproposition.InHume's words: Therecanbenodemonstrativeargumentstoprove,that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

experience.Wecanatleastconceiveachangeinthecourseofnature;which sufficientlyproves,thatsuchachangeisnotabsolutelyimpossible.Toforma clearideaofanything,isanundeniableargumentforitspossibility,andis alonearefutationofanypretendeddemonstrationagainstit.19 Thisisunclear.If'wecanconceive'means'itislogicallypossiblefortheretobe',then theargument'sconclusionappears,nakedandunadorned,amongstitspremisses.Hume probablyintends'wecanconceive'psychologically;butthentheconclusiondoesnot follow,forlogicalimpossibilitiescanbeandsometimesare'conceived',aswhenWells conceivedtravelintothepastandHobbesconceivedasquaringofthecircle.Knealehas pointedoutthatifpsychologicalconceivabilityimpliedlogicalpossibility,certain mathematicalproblemscouldbesolvedoutofhand.(1)Nooneknowswhether Goldbach'sconjectureistruethequestionofitstruthisanopenone;so(2) mathematiciansfindit'conceivable'thattheconjectureistrue;so(3)theconjectureis ____________________ 19Treatise,p.89.Seealsop.43. 272

logicallypossible;but(4)Goldbach'sconjectureisamathematicalstatementwhichis impossibleiffalse,andthereforetrueifpossible;andso,from(3)and(4),weget(5) Goldbach'sconjectureistrue!20Andasimilarargumentwillalsoyieldtheconclusion thatGoldbach'sconjectureisfalse.Theabsurdityoftheargumentliesinthemovefrom (2)to(3),thatis,itliesinHume'sprinciplethatwhatispyschologicallyconceivableis logicallypossible.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

IfwehadtoleavethemattertheresayingthatHume'sonlyargumentdependsupon theassumptionthatwhateverisnecessaryorimpossibleisobviouslysothenthispart ofHume'sworkwouldbeadownrightbore.Ishalleventuallyconcludethathisattackon necessitarianismdoesindeedhavelittlesolidcontent,butthisisnotaconclusionto reachsummarily.Foronething,inadditiontotheargumentfrom'conceivable'to 'possible'HumehasotherthingstosaywhichIshalldiscussin62below.Also,Iwant tothrowsomelightonthestillcommonbeliefthatHumedemonstratedasubstantive resultabouthowcausalityrelatestocontingency,abeliefimplyingthatthereissucha result(asindeedthereis),thatHumeaffirmedoratleastacceptedit(whichisdubious), andthathesuppliedgoodargumentsforit(whichiscertainlyfalse).Thereis,inshort,a tangleofissueshere. Thebestrouteintoitisthroughattemptedsalvage.Letusstartbyconstruingthe conceivable/possibleargumentinsuchawaythatitisneithergrosslycircularnorgrossly invalid,asfollows.Onecannotimagineanythingwhichiselementarilylogically impossiblesuchasafoursidedtriangle;anditisarguablethatanylogical impossibility,ifspelledoutinenoughdetail,involvessimpleimpossibilitiesofthis 'inconceivable'kind.ThisimpliesthatWellscould'conceive'oftimetravelonlybecause hedidsoschematically,leavingoutdangerousdetails.Icanimaginesomeoneworking athisdesk,shouting'Ihavefoundafractionequalto2!',receivingtheplauditsofan admiringworld,andsoon;butIcannotimaginethefractionhehasdiscoveredtogether withthecorrectcalculationwhichshowsittoequal2. Thisviewaboutdetailwhichseemstomerightwouldbebetterexpressedintermsnot ofimaginingor'conceiving'butofdescribing.Itcomestothis:ifSisalogically impossiblestory,thenitentailsobviouslogicalimpossibilitiesoritimpliesboththe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 20W.C.Kneale,Probability and Induction(Oxford,1949),pp.7980. 273

answers'Yes'and'No'tocertainquestions.TheimpossibilitymaynotbemanifestinS asstated,butitcanalwaysbedisplayedbyaskingtherightquestions.LetSbe 'Someonehasfoundvaluesofmandnsuchthatmandnhavenocommonfactorsand m/n=2.'Thenwecanask'Ismanevennumber?'Theanswermustbe'Yes',because ifmisoddthen(m/n)2isodd,which2isnot.Buttheanswermustalsobe'No',because ifmiseven(andn,sharingnofactorswithm,isodd),then(m/n)2isdivisibleby4, which2isnot.Theserockbottomcontradictionscorrespondtotheinconceivabilitieson whichHumerelies. Humewouldagreethatanylogicalimpossibilitycanbe'displayed':Iamsurehethinks thatany'demonstrative'truthcanbedemonstrated,anda'demonstration'issimplya judiciousassemblageof'intuitions'(see50above).Furthermore,inthequoted argumenthedoessay:'Toformaclearideaofanything,isanundeniableargumentfor itspossibility',andwemighttake'clear'asinvokingthenotionofconceivingindetail.It isevenmoreplausiblesotoconstruetheCartesianphrase'clearanddistinct',when Humesaysthat'whatevercanbeconceiv'dbyaclearanddistinctideanecessarily impliesthepossibilityofexistence'.21Sowemightconjecturallyreconstructhis argumentasfollows: LetSbeastatementtotheeffectthatanFeventoccursandisnotfollowed byaGevent(chooseanyFandGyoulike).ProbeSasyouwill,subjectitto
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

questionsassearchinglyhostileasyoucandevise,youwillneverdisplaya simplecontradictioninit;sothereisnoimpossibilityinit;soitisnotlogically necessarythatFeventsarefollowedbyGevents. Inthisversion,Hume'sargumentbridgesthegapbetweenthepsychologicalandlogical notionsof'conceivability';fornowthecrucialpremisssaysthatthefalsityofacausal laworpredictionlicensingstatementcanalwaysbe'conceived'inasmuchdetailas onelikes;andthisdoesimplythatitislogicallypossible. SomeantiHumeansrejectthepremissthatanylogicalimpossibilityisdisplayable. Knealesaysthatcausallawsexpressnecessitiesofthesamekindasareinvolvedin logicaltruths,butthatwecannotprovethema prioriwhichamountstosayingthat theircontradictoriesarenotdisplayablyimpossible.22Ifhemeansthatcausallawsare truebecauseofnecessitiesintheworld, ____________________ 21Treatise,p.43 22Kneale,op.cit.pp.71,7889. 274

withoutthemselvesbeingnecessary,thenheisopentotheobjectionscanvassedin 567above.Buthisviewmaybethatcausallawsarethemselvesnecessarilytruebut notdisplayablyso.Idonotknowhowtoarguefortheviewthateverynecessityor impossibilityisdisplayable,exceptfromacontroversialpremisswhichIshalltakeupin mynextsection.InthemeantimeImustleaveitatthat;ifsomelogicalnecessitiesare undisplayable,Hume'sargumentfails.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Also,conversely,ifalllogicalnecessitiesaredisplayable,Hume'sargumentgoes through.Fromthepremiss'NoimpossibilitycanbedisplayedinthesuppositionthatanF eventoccursandisnotfollowedbyaGevent'hecanvalidlyinfertheconclusion'The predictionthataGeventwilloccurbecauseanFeventoccurscannotbelicensedbya logicallynecessaryproposition'.Itistime,though,toaskwhatentitlesHumetothis premiss.Hislatterdaysupportersseemunawarethatthepremissneedstobebacked byarguments;andhisopponents,withnotablerestraint,alsoomittodemandits credentials.Thispuzzlingfactofcontemporaryintellectualhistoryconnectswithsome importantphilosophicalpoints,andisworthexplaining.Ihavebeentold:'Nobody arguesforthatpremissbecauseitisobviouslytrue'aremarkwhichdoesnotsolvethe problembutmerelyinstantiatesit.

59.'Causallawsaresynthetic':abadargument
ThereisaviewaboutlogicalnecessitywhichappearsinembryonicforminHume23and flowersintheworkofWittgenstein,namelythatlogicalnecessityderiveswhollyfrom factsaboutmeanings;orthattoknowwhetherPisnecessaryoneneedsonlytoknow factsaboutthemeaningsofthewordsinwhichPisexpressed;or,forshort,thatall necessary truths are analytic.Thisimpliesthatallnecessitiesaredisplayable,thoughit isnottheonlypossiblebasisforthatview.Anyway,myconcernwith'Allnecessary truthsareanalytic'hastodonotwithitsrelationtothedisplayabilitythesisbutrather withanotherrolewhichitplaysinourcomedy. Itiscommonlytakenasobviousthatifallnecessarytruthsareanalyticthennocausal lawsarenecessary,andsothedebateover
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 23ButseeW.A.Suchting,"'HumeonNecessaryTruth'",Dialogue,vol.5(19667). 275

theconsequenthasbeeningestedbythedebateovertheantecedent.Thosewhoaccept theanalyticitythesisapparentlythinkthatitsimplicationsforcausallawsaretoo obvioustoneedmentioning;whilethosewhothinkthatcausallawsarenecessary launchtheirmainattackagainsttheanalyticitythesis,asthoughtheirpositionwere obviouslydoomedunlessthatcouldberefuted. Hume'ssupportersandhisopponents,inshort,agreethatnocausallawsareanalytic.I agreetoo;buttheonlyargumentforthispositionwhichIcanfindintheliteratureis, thoughpopular,invalid.Beforeproceedingtoexpoundandcriticizeit,Ishallgiveita setting. Howcanweshowthatagiven(kindof)propositionisnotnecessary?Perhapsby showingthatitisfalse,butthismoveisnotavailablewhenthepropositioninquestion isacausallaw.Anothertechniqueisthis:wemayshowP'scontingencybydescribinga worldinwhichPisfalse,withenoughpertinentdetailtosatisfyeveryonethatifthere hadbeenalurkingimpossibilityitwouldhavebeendisplayedinthegivendescription. Thisprocedureisessentiallyindecisive:wemayrightlybecertain,butwecannotdirectly prove,thatthedescriptiondoesnotharbourastillundisplayedimpossibility.Also,the techniquecouldbeconvincinglyappliedtoourpresentproblemonlybydescribinginfine detailawholepossibleworldHume'ssnap'conceptions'arenowherenearadequate. Wemightbeabletodeviseatechniquebasedonthefollowingkindofproofwhichis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

usedinconnexionwithformalsystems.WecansometimesprovethatagivenformulaF isnotatheoreminagivensystemS,byshowingthatFlacksacertainpropertywhich is(a)possessedbyeachaxiomofS,and(b)hereditarywithrespecttotherulesofS whichistosaythatnoruleofScanleadfromaformulahavingtoaformulalacking. Forexample,ifS'saxiomsarealltautologies,andtautologicalnessishereditarywith respecttoS'srules,thenclearlythenontautology(P&Q)isnotatheoreminS;thatis, itcannotbereachedfromthoseaxiomsbythoserules.Itdoesnotmatterintheleast whatpropertyis,justsolongastheaxiomsallhaveitanditishereditarywith respecttotherules.Forexample,theremightbeasystemeachofwhoseaxiomshadan evennumberofsymbols,andwhoserulescouldnotleadfromaneventoanodd numberedformula;andthosetwofactsaboutthesystem,oncetheywereestablished, 276

wouldsufficetoprovethattheformula(P&P)wasnotatheoremofthesystem.Inthis casewouldbethepeculiarpropertyofhavinganevennumberofsymbols,butthe proofwouldbenonetheworseforthat. TodeviseastructurallyanalogousproofthatnopropositionsofkindKarenecessary,we shouldneedtofindsomepropertywhichverifiedboththegeneralpremiss: Everynecessarypropositionfollowsfrompropositionswhichhave,bymoves withrespecttowhichishereditary, andthespecialpremiss: NoKpropositionhas.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Givenbothpremisses,thedesiredconclusionwouldimmediatelyfollow. Thegeneralpremissisverifiedby=logicalnecessity;butforthatvalueofthe specialpremissisidenticalwiththeconclusion.Sowemustlookforsomeothervalueof whichverifiesthegeneralpremiss. Manyphilosophersthinkthatthegeneralpremissistrueforthevalue= uninformativeness.Iftheyareright,thenitfollowsthatnocausallawsarenecessary; forcausallawsarenot'uninformative'inanyreasonablesensewhichisjusttosaythat thespecialpremissistrueforthevalues=uninformativenessandK=causal.This instanceofthegeneralpremissthereforedemandsourscrutiny. Tosaythatthegeneralpremissistruewhere=uninformativenessistosaythatall necessarytruthsareuninformative;andthisisoftensaidtofollowfromthelately gainedinsightthatallnecessarytruthsareanalytic.Ifallnecessarytruthsareanalytic then,arguably,everynecessarytruthfollowsbytriviallyvalidmovesfromtrivially necessarypremisses;whereapropositionis'triviallynecessary'ifsomeonewho questioneditstruthwouldtherebyshowthathedidnotunderstandit,andamoveis 'triviallyvalid'ifthecorrespondingconditionalistriviallynecessary.Furthermore,wecan allowthatanytriviallynecessarypropositionisuninformative,lackscontent,tellsus nothingabouttheworld.Sowemaygrantthateverynecessarytruthfollowsfrom uninformativepremissesbytriviallyvalidmoves.Butthisisnotenoughtoverifythe generalpremissforthevalue= 277

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

uninformativeness;forwealsoneedthesecondlimbofthegeneralpremiss,namely thatuninformativenessishereditarywithrespecttotriviallyvalidmoves,i.e.thatone cannotgetbytriviallyvalidmovesfromuninformativepremissestoinformative conclusions.This,however,issimplyfalse.Todiscoverthatapropositionisnecessary byprovingitistoderivesomethinginformativefromsomethinguninformativebytrivially validmoves. Standardobjection:'Youareusing"informative"inapsychologicalsense,takinga propositiontobeinformativeifitcouldcomeasnewstoanintelligentperson,orcould befoundilluminatingorsurprisingorinteresting.Butphilosopherswhosaythatbecause necessarypropositionsareanalytictheyare"uninformative"or"withoutcontent"are usingtheseexpressionsinalogicalratherthanapsychologicalsense.'Well,whatisit forapropositiontobe,logicallyspeaking,devoidofcontent?Theusualansweristhata propositionislogically'contentless'or'uninformative'ifitis'consistentwithevery possiblestateoftheworld',or'couldnotberefutedbyanypossibleempiricaldiscovery', or'rulesoutnoneofthepossibilities',orthelike.Butthentheclaim'IfPisnecessary thenPlackscontent'isitselfnotjustnecessarybuttriviallyso:itisanelementary consequenceofwhat'necessary'meansthatanecessarypropositionmustbe 'contentless'or'uninformative'inthissense.Theclaimwasthat'Ifnecessarythen contentless'istobeacceptedonthestrengthof'Ifnecessarythenanalytic,andif analyticthencontentless',butnowitturnsoutthat'Ifnecessarythenanalytic'issimply irrelevant. Credenceisstillgiventothemyththat'Necessarytruthsareuninformative'expressesa truthwhich(a)stemsfromthepremissthatnecessarytruthsareanalytic,(b)represents arecentandinterestingdiscoveryaboutnecessarytruths,(c)wastaughttousby Wittgenstein,and(d)wouldhavebeendeniedbythe'rationalists'or'deductive
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

metaphysicians'ofthepast.Idenythat'Necessarytruthsareuninformative'expressesa truthofwhichanyof(a)to(d)aretrue.Asregards(d)inparticular:nophilosopher, whateverhisviewsastothenatureoflogicalnecessity,hasthoughtthatanecessary propositioncouldbeinconsistentwithsomepossibility,orcouldberefutedbysome possibleempiricaldiscovery.Thereisanextraordinarilypersistentdesiretoconvictthe rationalists,quarationalists,ofsomegeneralmistakeabout 278

whatcanbelearnedbya priorimeansorwhatcanbelogicallynecessary;butthereisno reasontothinkthatthedesirecanbesatisfied.Thereisonlytheillicitsatisfactionof accusingtherationalistsoferrorsofwhichtheywerenotguilty,forexamplebysaying thatDescartesdidnotknow,aswedo,thattheconclusionofadeductivelyvalid argumentis'implicitin'itspremisses.24Warnocksays:'ThisthesisofHume'sis sometimesreducedtotheformulathatempiricalpropositionscannotbelogically necessary:andthisbeingatruism,thoughdoubtlessnotatrivialonehasbeenvery widelyaccepted.Andrightlyso.'25Thisismuchbetterthanmosttreatments,butwhy doesWarnockallowthatthetruismis'notatrivialone'? Returningtoourmaintheme:thegeneralpremissisindeedtrueforthevalue= uninformativeness=logicalnecessity;butthisisjustawordyversionofourfirstfalse start,namely=logicalnecessity,andittoomakesthespecialpremissidenticalwith theconclusion.Thequestionofwhethercausallawsare'uninformative'inthissense thisunreasonablesenseisthequestionofwhethercausallawsarelogicallynecessary. Wehadhopedtosettleitbyargument,notbydogma.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

IfHume'sconclusionistobeestablished,then,weshallhavetofindafreshargument forit,suchastheonein61below.

60.Humeandthebadargument
DoesHumethinkthathehasasubstantiveprincipletotheeffectthat'Nonecessary truthhasfactualcontent'?Whetherornothethinksitfollowsfrom'Allnecessarytruths areanalytic',orthinksitimplies'Nocausallawsarenecessary',doesheatanyrate thinkthathehasit?Hesometimesseemsto: Alltheobjectsofhumanreasonorenquirymaynaturallybedividedintotwo kinds,towit,Relations of Ideas,andMatters of Fact.Ofthefirstkindarethe sciencesofGeometry,Algebra,andArithmetic;andinshort,everyaffirmation whichiseitherintuitivelyordemonstrativelycertain...Propositionsofthis kindarediscoverablebythemereoperationofthought,withoutdependenceon whatisanywhere ____________________ 24Forthisandotherexamples,seeJ.Bennett,"'AMythaboutLogicalNecessity'", Analysis,vol.21(19601).Foranimpeccablehandlingofthepoint,seeJ.Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis(EnglewoodCliffs,1953),pp.1312. 25G.J.Warnock,"'HumeonCausation'",Pearsp.60. 279

existentintheuniverse...Mattersoffact...arenotascertainedinthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

samemanner;norisourevidenceoftheirtruth,howevergreat,ofalikenature withtheforegoing.Thecontraryofeverymatteroffactisstillpossible; becauseitcanneverimplyacontradiction...26 Thislookslikethetwentiethcenturymyth,expressedastheclaimthatnecessarytruths neverstate'mattersoffact'.Butthesituationisnotassimpleasthat. Themythassumesthatwehaveapretheoreticnotionof'fact'whichsupportsacogent argumentfortheconclusionthatnonecessarytruthstatesamatteroffactorhas factualcontent.Hume,ontheotherhand,explains'matteroffact'onlythroughhis dichotomybetween'relationsofideas'and'mattersoffact'.Heseemsnottointendhis choiceofthelatterlabeltoembodyaweightyclaimtotheeffectthatnecessarytruths neverstate'mattersoffact'insomeindependentlyclearsense.Hemaybehintingthat anythingwhichwouldordinarilybedeemeda'matteroffact'willbefoundtolieonthat sideofthemethodologicaldivide,i.e.willbefoundtobeincapableofproofbya priori means;butheshowsnosignsofwantingtousethishintcombativelyor argumentatively. ItistruethatHumeconnects'matteroffact'with'cause',inwaysexaminedin51 above.Butthatconnexionhastheform'Iffactual,thencauseinvolving'.Itdoesnot havetheform'Ifcausalthenfactual,andiffactualthencontingent',whichisthe connexionallegedbymyth. ItisalsotruethatHumeusesthephrase'matteroffactand existence',andmaintains asageneralthesisthatnoexistentialstatementcanbelogicallynecessary:'Whatever ismaynot be.Nonegationofafactcaninvolveacontradiction.Thenonexistenceof anybeing,withoutexception,isasclearanddistinctanideaasitsexistence.'27This,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

however,doesnottarhimwiththebrushofthecurrentmyth,forthelatterhasno patentonthethesisthatallexistentialstatementsarecontingent.Hume'sreasonsfor thethesis,wemaynoteinpassing,arepeculiarlymurky.Inthelongpassagequoted above,hisuseof'whatisanywhereexistentintheuniverse'suggeststhatHumetends toequate(1)whatexistswith(2)whatexistsintheuniverse,andthiswith(3)what existsintheobjectiverealm,andthiswith(4)whatisthecaseabouttheobjective realm,andthiswith(5)what ____________________ 26Enquiry201. 27Enquiry132.SeealsoTreatise,p.94. 280

isthecaseaboutanythingbeyondourownideasandimpressions,andthisfinallywith (6)whatiscontingentlythecase.InthisHumeanroutefromexistentialnessto contingency,thecrucialmoveisthatfrom(4)through(5)to(6)amovewhoselogic, andwhoseindebtednesstothedoubleuseof'idea',Ihavediscussedin52above. These,however,aremattersofrelativedetail.ToseehowwrongitistoregardHumeas foreshadowingthetwentiethcenturyviewthatnecessarytruthsdon'tstatefacts,we mustexaminetheusewhichhedoesmakeofhisdichotomybetween'relationsofideas' and'mattersoffact'. ThefundamentalpointisthatHumeseesthedichotomyasexhaustive.Hewantstoask thehostilequestion'Iswhatyouaresayingofthiskindorofthat?',inordertoattack anyonewhoseonlyhonestanswertothequestionis'Neither'.Hethinksthatthe'school
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

metaphysician',forinstance,mustanswer'Neither':hecannotclaimthathisresultsare reachedby'demonstration'(asHumeunderstandsit)orbyempiricalmethods;andsohe isunderachallenge,whichHumethinkshecannotmeet,toexplainthenatureofhis inquiry.Now,inthissituationitisjustirrelevantthatHumehasthelabel'mattersof fact'formatterswhichareestablishedbyempiricalmeans.Heattacks'school metaphysics'and'divinity'throughthemethodologicalcontentsofthetwosidesofhis dichotomy,notthroughthelabelsthatheaffixestothem. Tousehisdichotomyinthemannerofthetwentiethcenturymyth,Humewouldhaveto arguenotfromthejointexhaustivenessbutfromthemutualexclusivenessofthetwo sidesofthedichotomy.Hewouldhavetoattacksomeonewho,whenasked'Towhich sidedoesthatstatementbelong?'answerednot'Neither'but'Both'.Butthisansweris harmlessifitmeansthatthestatementisbasedonamixtureofa prioriandempirical considerations.Theanswer'Both'couldfallfoulofHume'sdichotomyonlyifitmeant thatthebasisforthestatementis(a)whollya prioriand(b)partlyempirical;butwho wouldeverbesosillyastomaintainthat?ForHumetohaveanyrealtargetany opponentwhomhecanattackastryingillegitimatelytooccupybothsidesofthe dichotomyatoncehewillhavetodeserthisviewofthedichotomyasamethodological one.Insteadofseeingitasadivisionbetweentwowaysofestablishingtruths,hewill 281

havetoseeitasadivisionbetweenoneway of establishing truths('relationsofideas') andonekind of truth('matteroffact').Ifhedidthis,hecouldarguefromthelabel 'matteroffact'inthemannerofthecurrentmyth,sayingtohisopponent:'Youclaim thatyourconclusionisprovablea prioriyetstatesamatteroffact;butyoucan'thaveit

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

bothways.' ButHumesimplydoesnotdothis;andifhedid,itwouldbewhollycontrarytothespirit oftheusewhichhedoesmakeofhisdichotomy.Someproponentsofthetwentieth centurymythgiveHume'credit'forhavingbegunwhattheyhavecompleted.Isubmit thatthisisunfairtohim.

61.'Causallawsaresynthetic':anotherargument
Anycausallaworpredictionlicensingstatementmustentailconditionalsoftheform'If PthenQ',wherePisabouttheworldonlyuptotimetandQisabouttheworldatsome timelaterthantsothatattonecouldsay'Phascometrue,butwhatevermakesQ trueormakesQfalsehasnotyethappened'.Thisisanattempttocapturethevague notionof'predictingthefutureonthebasisofthepastandpresent'whichItaketobe thefocalpointofHume'sinquiryintowhathecalls'theideaofnecessaryconnexion'. ThenecessitarianthesiswhichHumedenies,then,isthatthefollowingispossible: P is not about the future, Q is about the future, and P entails Q. Ifthatformulationdoesnotembodythepointatissue,thenthepointeludesme entirely;butIthinkitwillbeagreedthatthecruxofthedisputeliessomewhereinthe regionindicated.Theformulationissovague,andtheregionthussowide,thatwe cannotmakemuchprogressuntilmoreprecisionisachieved.Butthatcanwaitalittle. Hereisanargumentativemoveagainstthenecessitarian.TosaythatPis not about the futureistoreportonP'scontent,oronwhatPsays.ThenecessitarianthinksthataQ whichisaboutthefuturemaybeentailedbyaPwhichisnot.OfsuchaPhemustsay
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatitscontent does not,butitslogicalconsequences do,reachintothefuture;orthat itdoes not saybutdoes entailsomethingaboutthefuture.Thispresupposesacertain kindoflinebetweenapro 282

position'scontentanditsconsequences.Therecannotbeacontent/consequenceslineof thepresupposedkind.Sothenecessiarian'sviewiswrong. Toexplainwhatkindofcontent/consequenceslinethenecessitarianneedsbutcannot have,Imustinvokethethesisthatallnecessarytruthsareanalyticorthatall deductivelyvalidtruthsareanalyticallyvalid.Accordingtothisthesis,onecannottrace outthelogicalconsequencesofapropositionunlessitisexpressedinasentence. Furthermore,totracethemoutistoassemblecertainfactsaboutthemeaningofthe relevantsentenceinrelationtothemeaningsofothersentences:knowingthat (premiss)(firstlemma)isknowingcertainfactsaboutthemeaningsofthosetwo sentences;similarlyfor(firstlemma)(secondlemma),andsoon.Theepistemological rawmaterialforentailmenttracking,then,isthesameasfordeterminingthemeaning ofsentencesorthecontentofpropositions.Thissuggeststhatitmaybehardto separatecontentfromconsequencesinsuchawaythatapropositioncanentail somethingaboutthefuturewithoutitselfbeingaboutthefuture. 'Butwedodistinguishcontentfromconsequences.'Indeedwedo.Forexample,ifIam toreportsomeoneinoratioobliqua,IneednotreproducehissentencesjustsolongasI producesentenceswhichmeanwhathisdid;butmyreportof'whathesaid'mustnot includeeverythingentailedbywhathesaid.Inshort,Imustreproducethecontentbut
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

nottheconsequencesofwhathesaid.Anotherexample:someonesays'Giventhat..., itdoesnotfollowthat...',withtheblanksfilledbySpandSqwhichstandardlymean thatPandthatQrespectively;andweknowthatPdoesentailQ.Ifwecouldnot distinguishcontentfromconsequencesweshouldhavetosaythatthispersonusesSp orSqnonstandardlye.g.thathewronglytakesSptoexpressnotPbutsomeother propositionwhichdoesnotentailQ.Butsometimes,ratherthandescribinghiserrorin thatway,wearecontenttosaythathewronglythinksthatPdoesnotentailQ.Thatis, wecredithimwithmeaningbySpandSqwhatwedo,usingthemtoexpressPandQ respectively,andaccusehimofbeinginerrornotaboutcontentbutabout consequences. Ourcontent/consequencesdistinction,however,isoneofdegree,anditcanbestopped fromslidingonlybysomewhatarbitrarydecisions.Someonewhosays'Giventhatxisa triangle, 283

itdoesn'tfollowthatxhasthreesides'isintroubleovercontentnotconsequences:if heissincere,andunderstands'follow'etc.properly,thenhemustbegivinganon standardmeaningeitherto'isatriangle'orto'hasthreesides'.Whatabout'xisa triangle'inrelationto'xhasthreeangles'?and'xhasasmanysidesasangles'?and'x ishalfaquadrangle'?Wewantalinesomewhere,butthereisnooneobviouslyright placetodrawit.Similarlywiththeoratioobliquaexample.Ifsomeonesays'Somemen inBorneoarecannibals',Icanfairlyifstiltedlyreport:'HesaidthatsomemeninBorneo eatthebodiesofmembersoftheirownspecies.'CanIalsosay:'Hesaidthatsomemen inBorneoeatthebodiesofothermen'?and'...eathumanflesh'?and'...eatflesh'?

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

and'...arecarnivorous'?Grantedthatthelasttwoomitpartofwhathesaid,dothey alsoaddtoit,goingbeyondthecontentintotheconsequences?Whenthequestionis thusraisedintheabstract,thereisnoobviouslyrightanswer;andwemaypreferone answeroranother,dependingonthespecialfeaturesofthesituation.Usually,I suppose,'HesaidthatsomemeninBorneoarecarnivorous'wouldberegardedasgoing beyondthemerereportingofcontent;butnotalwayse.g.notifonthereported occasionsomeonehadsaid'ThemeninBorneoareallvegetarians,youknow',andthe reportedspeakerhadsnappedback'SomemeninBorneoarecannibals!' Soour'intuitions'aboutthecontent/consequenceslinevarywithcontext,andthethesis thatallnecessarytruthsareanalyticexplainswhy.(Propositioncontentissentence meaning;andthelatter,accordingtotheanalyticitythesis,isonacontinuumwith propositionconsequence.)Theprospectslookbadforanyattempttodevelopanentirely general,contextindependent,personneutraldistinctionwhichwilllookreasonableinall itsapplications. Allthat,however,merelyprovidesasetting(notapremiss)forthefollowingargument whichshowsthatthenecessitariancannothavethekindofcontent/consequences distinctionthathewants. WhatsortsofPandQwillinterestthenecessitarian?Supposewepointoutthat(Sp)' Smithhasjusttakenalethaldoseofafastactingpoison'canbesoconstruedasto expressafalsehoodunlessSmithdiessoon,sothatPentails(Q)thatSmithwillsoon bedead.Thenecessitarianwilldismissthatasuninteresting.'Itdoesnotshowwhatan entailmentbasedpredictionislike.IfPentails 284
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Qinthiscase,thatisonlybecausePsayssomethingaboutthefuture,i.e.covertlysays thatSmithhasdonesomethingasaresultofwhichhewilldiesoon.'Wouldthe necessitarianbelessdisappointedbyanSpwhosemeaninginvolvementwiththefuture waslessobvious?IfheisthemanIwanttoarguewith,hewillsay:'No.Iwanta predictionQentailedbyaPwhichisnotaboutthefuture,notmerelyaPwhichseems nottobeaboutthefuture.'Supposethenthatwetrytoconstructacaseinwhich(1)P entailsQ;(2)Qisexplicitlyaboutthefuture;(3)partorallofSpsmeaningisequally expressedbySr,andSr'sbySt,andSt'sbySu,...andsothroughtoSq;and(4) inthissequencetheearliestsentencewhichexplicitlyexpressessomethingaboutthe futureisonewhichwouldnotordinarilycountasjustawayofexpressing(partof)what Spexpressese.g.wouldnotbeacceptableinanoratioobliquareportonanutteringof Sp.Thisisacaseinwhicheverythingwhichisexplicitly'aboutthefuture'will,by ordinarystandards,qualifyasaconsequenceofPratherthanaspartofitscontent.If thenecessitarianacceptsthisasafairsampleofanentailmentlicensedprediction,I havenoargumentwithhim. Butheisunlikelytoacceptit.Ifheseesthatthiscasediffersonlyindegreefromone whereSitselfexpressessomethingaboutthefuture,andrememberswhyhewanteda necessitariantheoryinthefirstplace,hewillsay:'Thisstilldoesn'texemplifyan entailmentlicensedpredictionQfromfactsaboutthepresentandthepast.Youinsist thatthefactsaboutthepresentandpastbereportedinasentence:I'llgoalongwith that,justsolongasyoudon'tmuddythewatersbychoosingasentencewhichjumbles factsaboutthepresentandpastwithclaimsaboutthefuture.ThesentenceSpmust haveameaningwhichinnowayreachesforwardintothefuture;itmustmakean absolutelycleancutacrosstheworldataparticulartime;forotherwisewecannotknow
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatPhascometrueatatimewhentheeventswhichverifyorfalsifyQstilllieinthe future.' Butifallnecessarytruthsareanalytic,thenecessitariancannothavewhathewants.To satisfyhimthatPentailssomethingaboutthefutureweshall,inevitably,haveto convictSpofhavingameaningwhichistaintedbythefuture. Thatcompletesmyargumentforsayingthatnonecessarypropositioncanlicensea prediction.Theconclusionisnottrivial: 285

itrestsontherelativelyrecentandpartlyWittgensteinianinsightthatallnecessary truthsareanalytic,anditdeniessomethingwhichhasbeenbelievedbysomeable philosophers.(Ithasinfactallthepropertieswhicharewronglyattributedtothethesis thatnonecessarypropositioncanhavecontent,beinformative,stateafactaboutthe world.)PhilosopherssuchasDescartesandLockereallydidthinkthataproposition might(a)beacceptablewithaspecialkindofassurancebecauseitconcernsonlythe pastandpresent,yet(b)leadbypurelylogicalanddemonstrativemeanstoaconclusion aboutthefuture;andtheymightwellhaveavoidedthismistakeiftheyhadseenmore clearlyhowmeaningrelatestonecessity.Tosaythisisnottolibelthem.Itisnottobe comparedwithaccusingthemofthinkingthatanecessarypropositioncanexcludea possibilityorberefutablebyapossibleexperience,orthatpremissescanentaila conclusionwhichisnot'implicit'inthem. Ihavenodecisionprocedure.Supposethenecessitarianadducesaplausibleexamplea Qwhichisaboutthefuture,andaPofwhichitisplausibletosaythatitentailsQand
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

plausibletosaythatitisnotinanywayaboutthefuture.Insuchacasewemayhave nogroundsforsaying'HeiswrongbecausePdoesnotentailQ'orforsaying'Heis wrongbecausePis,inaway,aboutthefuture'.Usually,eitherdiagnosiswillbequite reasonablewhichisjusttosaythateitherinterpretationofSpwillbereasonableandit willseldomifevermatterwhichisoffered.Theforceofmyconclusionisnottopickout aclassofpredictionlicensingstatementsandsaythatDescartesandotherswerewrong inthinkingthatanyofthosecouldbenecessary.Rather,itistocriticizethegeneral beliefthatapropositioncouldbothlicensepredictionsandbelogicallynecessary. (Analogously,theprinciple'Apurelydescriptivepropositioncannotentailanevaluative one'doesnotpickoutandcondemnparticulararguments.Ifanargumenthasan evaluativeconclusionandasemblanceofvalidity,wecanusuallychoosebetweencalling theargumentinvalidandcallingthepremissevaluative.Alltheprincipledoesisto rejectthegeneralthesisthataconditionalcanbothbelogicallynecessaryandhavea nonevaluativeantecedentandanevaluativeconsequent.Sincenoonehasever acceptedthatgeneralthesis,theprincipleisabore;butthatisnotmyproblem.) 286

Onelastpoint.Ourlanguageistheoryloaded,sothatitssentencesdonotsplitneatly intothosewhichdoandthosewhichdon'texpresssomething'aboutthefuture'or'about timeslaterthant'.Thatfact,whichexplainsourhavingthechoicereferredtointhe paragraphbeforelast,wasnotrecognizedbyHumeaswitnesshisassumptionsabout theatomisticwayinwhichlanguagerelatestoideas,andthustoimpressions,andthus totheworld.Now,whenaphilosophersaysthatsciencewilleventually'demonstrate'or showa priorithatgoldalwaysdissolvesinaquaregia,thismayexpressthe

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

necessitarianidealIhavejoinedHumeincriticizing,butitmayinsteadreflectareal understandingofwhatthelogicoftheoryladentermssuchas'gold'and'aquaregia' mightbeinamaturescience.Probablybothfactorswillbeinvolved:the necessitarianismwhichHumeopposesdoesexistintheliterature,butweoughtto rememberthatitdoesnotshowupinthelanguageasneatlyandunequivocallyasHume seemstosuppose.Toisolatelinguisticallythenotionofatemporalcutacrosstheworld isalaboriousandclumsytask,forreasonsofwhichHumewaslessawarethanmanyof hisopponents.

62.'Distinctideas'
TheargumentoftheprecedingsectionisnotonethatHumeexplicitlyadduces;butit reacheshisconclusionfromfairlyHumeanpremisses,andIthinkhewouldhave welcomedit.Apartfromthe'conceivability'argument,whichisincompleteevenonthe kindestinterpretation,Humereallyhasnoargumentsagainstcausalnecessitarianism. In5961IhaveimpliedapartialexplanationofwhyothershavethoughtthatHume decisivelyrefutednecessitarianism.InowwanttoexplainwhyHumehimselfthought this. Theexplanationcanstarthere: Allideas,whicharedifferent,areseparable...Itfollows...thatifthefigure bedifferentfromthebody,theirideasmustbeseparableaswellas distinguishable;iftheybenotdifferent,theirideascanneitherbeseparable nordistinguishable.28 Humeoftenaffirmsthebiconditional'differentseparable',thoughtheworkdonehere
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

by'different'isoftendoneby'distinct','other',and'two'.Hereisanotherexample: ____________________ 28Treatise,pp.245. 287

Everything,thatisdifferent,isdistinguishable;andeverything,thatis distinguishable,maybeseparated,accordingtothemaximsaboveexplain'd. [Andconversely]if...theybenotdifferent,theyarenotdistinguishable;and iftheybenotdistinguishable,theycannotbeseparated.29 Ifideasareconceptsormeanings,thenotionofthe'difference'or'distinctness'ofideas isapurelylogicalone:tosaythattheideaofsquarenessis'distinctfrom'thatof blacknessistosaythatasbetween'xissquare'and'xisblack'thereisnoentailment eitherway;or,perhaps,thatitisnotthecasethatthereisanentailmentbothways. (Thedifferencebetweenthesetwoversionsdoesnotmatterformypresentpurposes.) Andtosaythatoneideais'separablefrom'anotheris,apparently,tosaythatastateof affairscanbeimaginedtowhichoneideaisapplicablebutnottheother.Giventhese interpretations,thebiconditionalsaysthatIt is logically possible that (Fx & Gx) One can imagine an F which is not G.Thusconstrued,itisuninteresting:itisjustan expressionofmisplacedconfidenceinthe'conceivability'testforlogicalpossibility. Nowconsiderthis: Whateverisdistinct,isdistinguishable;andwhateverisdistinguishable,is separablebythethoughtorimagination.Allperceptionsaredistinct.Theyare,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

therefore,distinguishable,andseparable,andmaybeconceiv'dasseparately existent,andmayexistseparately,withoutanycontradictionorabsurdity.30 Thispurportstomovefromapremissaboutdistinctness,throughalemmaabout separability,toaconclusionaboutlogicalpossibility.If'distinct'hastobeexplained through'logicallypossible',thepremissisidenticalwiththeconclusionandthepassage coversnoground.YetIdonotseehowelseHumecouldexplainwhat'distinct'meansin thispassage.Certainly,weshallnotgetacluefromthepeculiarsentence'All perceptionsaredistinct'!ThepassageisinfactoneofseveralinwhichHume'moves' fromdistinctnessthroughseparabilitytopossibility,incontextswherehecouldexplain 'distinct'onlyintermsof'possible'.31Insimilarvein,Ihavebeentoldthatnofactcan entail'another'fact;andWarnockremarksthat'nothingthathappensintheworldcan be ____________________ 29Treatise,p.36.Seealsop.18. 30Treatise,p.634. 31Treatise,pp.867;Enquiry27. 288

connected...necessarilywithanythingelsethathappensintheworld';32butouronly criteriafor'otherness',orforahappening'sbeingsomething'else',aresuchasto trivializeboththeseclaims.Hereisthe'move'again,butthistimewithacertain difference:

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Asalldistinctideasareseparablefromeachother,andastheideasofcause andeffectareevidentlydistinct,'twillbeeasyforustoconceiveanyobjectto benonexistentthismoment,andexistentthenext,withoutconjoiningtoit thedistinctideaofacauseorproductiveprinciple.Theseparation,therefore, oftheideaofacausefromthatofabeginningofexistence,isplainlypossible fortheimagination;andconsequentlytheactualseparationoftheseobjectsis sofarpossible,thatitimpliesnocontradictionnorabsurdity;andistherefore incapableofbeingrefutedbyanyreasoningfrommereideas;withoutwhich'tis impossibletodemonstratethenecessityofacause.33 Ifideasaremeaningsand'distinctness'isalogicalrelation,then'Theideasofcause andeffectareevidentlydistinct'isfalse:itisanalyticthateverycausehasaneffect, andviceversa.PerhapsHumemeanstosaythat'theideasofcauseandbeginningof existencearedistinct'.Onthatreading,thepassagemovesfromthepremissthatthose twoideasare'evidentlydistinct'totheconclusionthat'Somethingbeginstoexist withoutacause'expressesalogicalpossibility.Oncemore,theoldtroublesome questionarises.CanHumesoexplain'distinct'thathispremissis'evidently'trueyet stillatadecentargumentativedistancefromhisconclusion? Idon'tthinkhecan.Butifwestandbackfromthequotedpassageandtrytosay roughlyandbrieflywhatitscentralcontentionis,thefollowingseemsright:'Humeis contendingthat,givenanypairofeventswhicharerelatedascauseandeffect,itis logicallypossiblethateithershouldhaveoccurredwithouttheother'soccurring.'Ifthat isright,thenitisn'tclearthatthephrase'distinctideas'belongshereatall.Hume's troubleinthefirstsentencemaybeduetothefactthatheistryingtousethelanguage of'distinctideas'whenhisrealconcerniswithpairsofdistinctevents.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Atanyrate,Humedoessometimesapplythenotionof'distinctness'nottoideasbut directlytoevents: ____________________ 32Warnock,loc.cit.SeealsoR.W.Church,Hume's Theory of the Understanding( London,1935),p.73. 33Treatise,pp.7980. 289

Themindcanneverpossiblyfindtheeffectinthesupposedcause,bythemost accuratescrutinyandexamination.Fortheeffectistotallydifferentfromthe cause,andconsequentlycanneverbediscoveredinit.Motioninthesecond Billiardballisaquitedistincteventfrommotioninthefirst;noristhere anythingintheonetosuggestthesmallesthintoftheother.34 TospellouteventdistinctnessintermsofideadistinctnesswouldbeaHerculeanlabour ofmisrepresentation.Weoughttoalloweventdistinctnesstostandonitsownfeet,as partlydefinedthus:ifAoccursearlierthanB,thenAisa'distinctevent'fromB.This explanationdoesnotrenderHume'spremissequivalenttohisusualconclusionthatA couldoccurwithoutB'soccurring.Whatwenowhaveisnotthetrivialityassociatedwith ideadistinctness,butratherthesubstantivethesisthattherecannotbeanentailment licensedpredictionor,rather,thatiswhatthepassagewouldcontainifHumehadthere clearlyandforcefullydrawnhisusualconclusion. HereisapassagewhereHumedoesdrawthestandardconclusionfromapremissabout thedistinctnessofevents(which,hereaselsewhere,hecalls'objects'):
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Nothingismoreevident,thanthatthehumanmindcannotformsuchanidea oftwoobjects,astoconceiveanyconnexionbetwixtthem,orcomprehend distinctlythatpowerorefficacy,bywhichtheyareunited.Suchaconnexion wou'damounttoademonstration,andwou'dimplytheabsoluteimpossibility fortheoneobjectnottofollow,ortobeconceiv'dnottofollowuponthe other:Whichkindofconnexionhasalreadybeenrejectedinallcases.35 ThisoccursinthethickofHume'sattackonnecessitarianism.Ithinkheisassuming thatifAcausesBthenAandBareobviouslydistinct,areobviously'two'events, becausetheyoccuratslightlydifferenttimes.(Forpresentpurposestheadverb 'distinctly'isaredherring.)Fromtheirdistinctnessinthatsense,Humeinferstheir logicalindependence,i.e.infersthateithercouldoccurwithouttheother.Theinference isnottrivial.Ratherthancomplainingthatthecorrespondingconditionalsaysnothing, wemustcomplainthatitsaysmorethanHumecanjustify. Wearebackatsquareone:Humewronglythinkshehasshown ____________________ 34Enquiry 25. 35Treatise,pp.1612. 290

thattherecannotbeanentailmentlicensedprediction.Butnowwecanatleastpartly explainhisthinkingthis.Isuggestthathehasmixedup(a)thetrivialtruththatif conceptC1is'distinct'fromC2becauselogicallyindependentofit,thentheyare

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

logicallyindependent,with(b)thesubstantivethesisthatifeventAis'distinct'fromB becausenonsynchronouswithitthentheyarelogicallyindependent.Thishelpsto explainwhyHumeletshimselfdownsolightly:hehasanindisputablytruethesis,anda substantivethesis,andhecannotdistinguishbetweenthem;sohenaturallythinkshe hasasinglethesiswhichisbothsubstantiveandindisputablytrue.Thisaccountis consistentwithHume'sknownintellectualcharacter;andIthinkithelpstoilluminate nearlyallhisusesof'distinct','other'etc.inthisarea,thoughthetaskofexpounding themallinorderlyfashionhasdefeatedme. ThismixupishelpedbythefactthatforHumean'idea'maybe(a)aconceptor meaning,or(b)adatablementaleventwhichdoesnotdifferimportantlyfroman impression.Whenhespeaksof'perceptions'as'distinct',heispoisedtosetoffineither oftwodirections.(a)Thinkingofthesubclassof'perceptions'whichare'ideas',and thinkingofthesenotasdatableoccurrencesbutasmeaningsorconcepts,hecouldbe ledtothenotionofconceptdistinctnessorlogicalindependence.(b)Thinkingof 'perceptions'asmentalhappenings,hecouldbeledtothenotionofeventdistinctness ornonsimultaneity.36Furthermore,Humecansee(b)asunrestrictedinscope:allwe knowabouteventsisknownthroughourimpressions,andsoHumecanthinkanyresult about'distinct'impressionswillimplyaresultabout'distinct'eventsofanykind whatever. Still,althoughHume'sbasichandlingof'idea'maythushaveencouragedthe assimilationof(a)to(b),itdidnotmakeitinevitable.Eventhemostcredulous acceptanceoftheviewthatideasarebothmeaningsandmentaloccurrencesstillleaves roomfortheneededdistinctionbetweenmeaningdistinctnessandeventdistinctness. Hume,evenwithhisbasicpremisses,couldhaveseenthatoneevent(temporal criterion)mightconsistinthehavingoftwoideas(logicalcriterion),aswhensomeone
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

hasideasofblacknessandsquarenessatt;andthattwoevents(temporalcriterion) mightconsistinthehavingofasingleidea(logicalcriterion),aswhensomeonehas ideasofsquarenessatt1andagain ____________________ 36SeeTreatise,pp.10,27,66. 291

att2.Hadheseenthatmuch,Humewouldnothaveconflatedthetwosortsof distinctness,andsowouldnothavejumbled(a)with(b).But,despiteoneflickering suggestiontothecontrary,37Idonotthinkthathedidseethatmuch. ____________________ 37Treatise,p.106,neartop. 292

XII HUMEONCAUSATION:POSITIVE
63.Whywepredict
HUMEthinksthatpredictionscanhaveonlyaninductivebasis.Ourbasisforpredictinga
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Gevent,giventhatanFeventhasoccurred,maybethefactthatinthepastFevents havealwaysbeenfollowedbyGevents.Oritmaybemorecomplex:therecentFevent maybetheonlyFeventweknowof;butwemightstillpredict'AGeventwilloccur' becausethisisentailedby'AnFeventhasoccurred'togetherwithsomesetofgeneral statementswhichhavebeenofteninstantiated,andnevercounterinstantiated,inthe past.Andperhapsthebasisforapredictionmaybemorecomplexstill.Thebasiclogic ofthesituation,however,iscapturedbythesimplestversion:Feventshavealways beenfollowedbyGones,andsowhenanewFeventoccurswepredictaGone.Onthe maxim'Don'tscratchwhereitdoesn'titch',Ishallnotstriveforarealisticaccountofour predictingbehaviour.ThecrucesofHume'stheorycanbehandledwhollyintermsofthe aboveoversimplification. Humeofferstoexplainthefactthat,whenwehavefoundFeventstobefollowedbyG events,weexpectanewFeventtobefollowedbyaGone.Theexplanationutilizestwo ofhistheories. Thefirstishistheoryabout'theassociationofideas'.1Offeredasembodyingasetof empiricalfactswhich'Ipretendnottoexplain',thistheorystatestheconditionsunder whichstatementsofthefollowingformaretrue:'IfxhasanFperceptionatt,thenhe tendstohaveaGperceptionthenorshortlythereafter.'Suchastatementwillbetrueif FperceptionshavebeenassociatedwithGperceptionsinx'spastexperienceusing 'associated'asastandinforanymemberofacertainsetofrelationslistedinthe theory.Thememberofthissetwhichmatterstousnowisthatofbeingfollowed closelyby:thetheoryimpliesthatifFperceptionshavebeenfollowedcloselybyG perceptionsinx'spast ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

1Treatise

I.i.4.Seealsop.283. 293

experience,andxhasanFperceptionnow,thenxprobablyhasorsoonwillhaveaG idea.Ininitiallyexpoundingthetheory,HumeomitstosaythatanFimpressiontends toinducealivelierGideathanwouldbeinduced,otherthingsbeingequal,byanFidea. Heimpliesthislater:'Whenanyimpressionbecomespresenttous,itnotonly transportsthemindtosuchideasasarerelatedtoit,butlikewisecommunicatesto themashareofitsforceandvivacity.'2Humeseemsalsotothinkthatthefrequencyof thepastFGassociationwilldeterminenotjusttheprobabilityofaGidea'soccurring nexttimebutalsoitslivelinessifitdoesoccur.3Thisisbackedbyaspeculative cerebralphysiologywhichcansafelybeignored.4 ThesecondcontributortoHume'sexplanationofwhywepredictishisanalysisofthe conceptofbelief.Abeliefisjustalivelyidea:thedifferencebetweenbelievingthat Londonisonfireandentertainingthethoughtofitsbeingonfireisjustthatbetweena moreandalesslivelyideaofLondonablaze: Asbeliefdoesnothingbutvarythemanner,inwhichweconceiveanyobject,it canonlybestowonourideasanadditionalforceandvivacity.Anopinion, therefore,orbeliefmaybemostaccuratelydefin'd,ALIVELYIDEARELATEDTO ORASSOCIATEDWITHAPRESENTIMPRESSION.5 ThefirstclauserecordsHume'sinsightthatonecanbelieve,disbelieve,entertainetc. thesameproposition.Hethinksthatthecommonpropositionalcontentwhichabelief,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

disbeliefetc.canshareisanidea,whichimpliesthatbelievingdoesnotdifferfrom disbelievingorwondering,say,intheideasthatareinvolved.Ininferringfromthisthat thedifferencecanonlyconsistin'themannerinwhich'theideasarehad,Humeis assumingthatsomeone'shavingacertainbeliefisjustafactaboutwhatideashehas andhowhehasthem.Thisassumptionisunwarranted,andtheresultantanalysisof beliefisbeyondredemption.Itimplies,forexample,thatthereisnodifferencebetween believingthattheSaharaiswarmandentertainingthethoughtthatitisextremelyhot! (Humelinkshisanalysisofbeliefwithsomesoundremarksabout'theideaof existence'.6Thesupposedconnexion ____________________ 2Treatise,p.98. 3Treatise I.iii.11,lastsentence. 4Treatise,pp.601. 5Treatise,p.96.Seealsop.86,andFlew,Hume's Philosophy of Belief,pp.1003. 6Treatise,pp.945.Seealsopp.667. 294

betweenthesetwotopicsisabadmistakewhichhasbeensetrightbyGeach.7) WhenHumestipulatesthatanideawhichistocountasabeliefmustbe'relatedtoa presentimpression',heispresumablyfocusingonthespecialcaseofabeliefforwhich onehaspresentsensoryevidence.Heisalsopavingthewayforhisaccountofwhywe predict.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Puttheanalysisofbelieftogetherwiththe'associationofideas'theory,andthedesired explanationofwhywepredictrollssmoothlyout.8IfmyFperceptionshavealwaysbeen closelyfollowedbyGperceptions,andInowhaveanFimpression,thenitfollowsbythe associationtheorythatIamvirtuallycertaintohavealivelyGidea,andthis,according totheanalysisofbelief,isthesameashavingabelief. WhatamIbelievingwhenIhaveasuitablylivelyGidea?Humemustanswer:'Youare believingthataneventwillsoonoccurwhich,ifyouobserveit,willinduceaG impressioninyou.'Thisshowsoptimismabouthowtheclassifyingofsensorystates relatestotheclassifyingofobjectiveevents;butIreservethattopicformylast chapter.Italsoshowsoptimismabouttenses:atmost,Humeisentitledto'You are believing that an event did/does/will occur . . .'Giventhathissoleaimistoexplainwhy wepredictaswedo,thisisnosmalldefect. Theexplanationisboundtofail,becauseHume'sanalysisoftheconceptofbeliefisso bad.His'associationofideas'theoryisanempiricalonewhichmaycontainsometruth, thoughreallyitistoovaguetobeevaluated.Evenifitiswhollytrue,itissimply irrelevanttoourpredictionsourbeliefsaboutthefuturebecauseHumeiswrongabout whatabeliefis.Inrejectinghisanalysisofbeliefwecutthepipelinethroughwhichthe explanationofwhywepredictissupposedtodrawfactualnourishmentfromthetheory abouttheassociationofideas;andsotheexplanationwithersaway.

64.'Necessaryconnexion'
Humebaseshisanalysisoftheconceptofcauseonhistheoryaboutwhywepredict. Fortunately,theanalysispartlysurvivestherejectionofitssupposedbasis.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 7P.T.Geach,"'Assertion'",Philosophical Review,vol.74(1965),pp.4589.Seealso Passmore,Hume's Intentions,pp.979. 8Treatise,pp.923. 295

AccordingtoHume,theconceptofcausehasthreeingredients.Oneofthem,spatial contiguity,wasoncecontroversialbutwouldnowbegenerallyagreednottobepartof theconceptofcause:'actionatadistance',whetherornotitactuallyoccurs,isatleast possible.9Thesecondallegedingredientintheconceptofcauseistemporalpriority. Humesoughttodefendthis,arguingthat'ifanycause[were]cotemporarywithits effect'theupshotwouldbe'theutterannihilationoftime'.10Hisargumentisinvalid, though.Atbest,itshowsthatsomecausesarenot'cotemporary'withtheireffects:it offersnoseriousobstacle,andIdoubtifanycanbeoffered,tothesuppositionthat somecausesaresynchronouswiththeireffects.Ofmoreinterestisthesuggestionthat acausemightoccurlaterthanitseffect:thissuggestionwasmadeIthinkforthefirst timeinseriousphilosophicalliteratureinaquiterecentpaperbyDummett.This provokedanenergeticresponse,whichstillcontinues.11 Thecomplexissuesraisedbythatliteraturecan,fortunately,beignoredwithout prejudicetothethirdingredientwhichHumefindsintheconceptofcause: Anobjectmaybecontiguousandpriortoanother,withoutbeingconsider'das itscause.ThereisaNECESSARYCONNEXIONtobetakenintoconsideration; andthatrelationisofmuchgreaterimportance,thananyoftheothertwo
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

abovemention'd.12 However,necessary'connexions'ofthesortHumeallowscannotgivepredictionsa strongerthaninductivebasis,noraretheyrelationswhichholdobjectivelybetweenthe 'objects'oreventswhichwetaketobecausallyrelated.Wemovefrom'posthoc'to 'propterhoc'ifandonlyiftheeventsinquestioninstantiatesomepatternwhichhas beenregularlyadheredtointhepast,but: Thereis...nothingneweitherdiscover'dorproduc'dinanyobjectsbytheir constantconjunction,andbytheuninterruptedresemblance ____________________ 10Treatise,p.76. 11M.Dummett,"'CananEffectPrecedeitsCause?'",Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society,suppl.vol.28(1954).SeealsoFlew,Hume's Philosophy of Belief,pp.126 30.ThereisafairlyfullbibliographyinJ.L.Mackie,"'TheDirectionofCausation'", Philosophical Review,vol.75(1966),p.442n. 12Treatise,p.77. 9SeeM.B.Hesse,Forces and Fields(London,1961),passim;Flew,Hume's Philosophy of Belief,pp.1256. 296

oftheirrelationsofsuccessionandcontiguity.But'tisfromthisresemblance, thattheideasofnecessity,ofpower,andofefficacy,arederiv'd.Theseideas, therefore,representnotanything,thatdoesorcanbelongtotheobjects,

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whichareconstantlyconjoin'd.13 Sothethirdingredient'necessaryconnexion'mustconcernwhathappensinthemind ofthepersonwho,observinganFevent,predictsaGevent. Toexplainhow,ImustmentionafactwhichIhavenotsofarstressed,namelythat Hume's'associationofideas'theoryisacausalone:ifFandGperceptionshaveoften enoughbeenassociatedinmypastexperience,andInowhaveanFimpression,Ican't helphavingaGidea.IftheFGassociationislesswellentrenched,Imaynotbe entirelyatitsmercy;andthemostHumewillsayoftheoverall'unitingprincipleamong ideas'isthatitis'agentleforce,whichcommonlyprevails'.14Butintheparadigm predictionsituation,hethinks,thepredicterisinthegripofsomething:heisforcedto havehislivelyidea,i.e.tomakehisprediction.Now,someonewhoisbeingbundled alonginthiswaymaynotunderstandwhatishappeningtohim;buthewillfeelit happen.Thereisacharacteristic'impressionofreflexion'whichgoeswithbeingcausally compelledor'determined'toexpectsomethingtooccur,andthisimpressionisthebasis fortheideaofnecessaryconnexion.Thus: Afterafrequentrepetition,Ifind,thatupontheappearanceofoneofthe objects,themindisdetermin'dbycustomtoconsideritsusualattendant,and toconsideritinastrongerlightuponaccountofitsrelationtothefirstobject. 'Tisthisimpression,then,ordetermination,whichaffordsmetheideaof necessity.15 Andagain: Therepetitionneitherdiscoversnorcausesanythingintheobjects,buthasan
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

influenceonlyonthemind,bythatcustomarytransitionitproduces:...this customarytransitionis,therefore,thesamewiththepowerandnecessity; whichareconsequentlyqualitiesofperceptions,notofobjects,andare internallyfeltbythesoul,andnotperceiv'dexternallyinbodies.16 ThisisHume'saccountofthe'ideaofnecessaryconnexion'whichcombineswiththe ideasofcontiguityandprioritytomakeuptheideaofcause. ____________________ 13Treatise,p.164. 14Treatise,p.10. 15Treatise,p.156. 16Treatise,p.166. 297

Humeexpectsresistance.Grantedthatanycausaljudgementimpliessomethingabout contiguityandpriority,andimpliessomethingelseaswell,itseemsimplausibletosay thatthe'somethingelse'concernstheeffectonthespeaker'sownmindofacertain eventorofotherslikeit.Itseemstousclearthatwhatweaddtothecontiguitypriority claimissomethingaboutafurtherrelationbetweenthetwoeventsthemselvesand couldwebewrongaboutthat?Humethinkswecould: Thiscontrarybiassiseasilyaccountedfor.'Tisacommonobservation,thatthe mindhasagreatpropensitytospreaditselfonexternalobjects,andtoconjoin withthemanyinternalimpressions,whichtheyoccasion,andwhichalways maketheirappearanceatthesametimethattheseobjectsdiscover
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

themselvestothesenses.17 Thisseemstoimplythatwhenwespeakof'causes'wemerelyprojectontotheworld ourcompulsiveexpectations,asthougharationalmanwouldalwaysreplace'Itmust happen'by'Imustexpectittohappen'.YetHumetriestoavoiddismissingcausal statementsasdisguisedautobiographyorasmanifestationsofauniversalneurosis;and ifmyexpositionsofarmakesthissurprising,thatisbecauseIhaveomittedpartofthe story.HereisHume'sfinal,official,consideredanalysisoftheconceptofcause: WemaydefineaCAUSE,tobe[1]'Anobjectprecedentandcontiguousto another,andwherealltheobjectsresemblingtheformerareplac'dinlike relationsofprecedencyandcontiguitytothoseobjects,thatresemblethe latter.'Ifthisdefinitionbeesteem'ddefective,becausedrawnfromobjects foreigntothecause,wemaysubstitutethisotherdefinitioninitsplace,viz.'A CAUSEis[2]anobjectprecedentandcontiguoustoanother,andsounited withit,thattheideaoftheonedeterminesthemindtoformtheideaofthe other,andtheimpressionoftheonetoformamorelivelyideaoftheother.'18 (Heassociatesthesewithcausation'srolesas(1)aphilosophicaland(2)anatural relation.Oneseeswhathemeans,butthesuggestionisbetterignored.)Definition(1) canbeseenasHume'sanswertothechargethathereducesallcausaltalkto statementsaboutcontiguityandpriorityplusmisleadinglywordedstatementsaboutthe speaker'sstateofmind.Butthedefenceisnotreallygoodenough. ____________________ 17Treatise,p.167. 18Treatise,p.170.SeealsoEnquiry60,andthegooddiscussioninA.H.Basson,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

David Hume(PelicanBooks,1958),pp.728. 298

Humehimselfknowsthat(1)willbeobjectedto,asimplyingthatthetruthof'xcauses y'dependsuponeventswhichoccurredyearsbeforexandy.Heknowsalsothat(2)will bedislikedbecauseitexcludesthepastonlybyintroducinganother'foreign'element, namelythespeaker'sstateofmind.Humechallenges'thepersons,whoexpressthis delicacy'to'substituteajusterdefinition'.Suchadefinitionwouldhavetocapture 'necessaryconnexion'inanetnowiderthantheconnectedeventsthemselves,i.e.one whichdidnotreachoutintothepastorintothespeaker'smind;andHume'snegative workmakeshimsurethatthiscannotbedone. Grantinghimthat,thereisstilladifficultyaboutHume'stwodefinitions.Ifhis explanationofwhywepredictiscorrect,thenanycasewhichisknowntosatisfy(1)will alsosatisfy(2),andperhapsHumecansafelyassumetheconverse;butthetwo definitionsarenotequivalenttheycannotbothbecorrectaccountsofwhatwemeanby 'cause'.19Furthermore,Humehasprovidednobasisforsayingthat(1)describeswhat wemeanby'cause':whenweobjectthatourcausalstatementsarenotmisleadingly wordedreportsonourownstatesofmind,Humecannotreply'Well,then,forgetabout (2),andtakemeaspropounding(1)asmyanalysisofyourtalkaboutcauses'.Granting forpurposesofargumentthat(1)istruewhenandonlywhen(2)istrue,Humemustsay thatwhatwemeanby'cause'isgivenby(2),sothatourcausalstatementsarerevealed asdisguisedintellectualautobiographyafterall;unlesshetakestheevenlessattractive optionofsayingthatourusesof'cause'aremeremouthingwhichweareforcedintoby thecausalfactorsalludedtoin(1)and(2).Soheisnotyetoutofthewood.What
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

oughttobeananalysisoftheconceptofcausestillhastheappearanceofanexpos.

65.Predictersasvictims
PartofthetroubleisthatHumeoffersacausaltheory.Idonotallegecircularity;ifitis wronginprincipletoelucidatecausallanguagethroughatheoryaboutwhatcausesusto useit,thatisnotbecausesuchaprocedureiscircular.20Thecomplaintis ____________________ 19SeeTreatise,p.400;andtheexchangebetweenJ.A.RobinsonandT.J.Richardson "'Hume'sTwoDefinitionsofCause'",inChappell. 20SeeD.G.C.MacNabb,David Hume(London,1951),pp.11215;Flew,Hume's Philosophy of Belief,pp.1213. 299

ratherthatcausestendtoshoulderasidereasons.Humedoesnot,simplybyassigning causesforourcausalbeliefs,implythattherearenoreasonsforthem;butbytreating onlyoftheircausesbyhissilenceaboutreasonsforthemhedoessuggestthatthese beliefscannotbesupportedbyreasons,andeventhattheyareunreasonable. Thisisnotmerelyamatterofsuggestion.Acausaltheoryisageneticone,andHume's geneticemphasisleadshimtodenigratecausalbeliefsinquitespecificways.In consideringanybelief'sintellectualstanding,allHumewilldoisdemandits birthcertificate;andso,confrontedbyabeliefforwhichtherearereasons,heasksonly whetheritisarrivedatthroughaconsiderationofreasons.Heoftenfindsthatitisnot.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Moreclearlythanmanyphilosophers,Humesawhowfewofourbeliefsarereached throughanyratiocinativeendeavours.Butthenheoffersanalternativeaccountofour routetomostofourbeliefs,andallowsthistodominatehisintellectualassessmentof them: Aperson,whostopsshortinhisjourneyuponmeetingariverinhisway, foreseestheconsequencesofhisproceedingforward;andhisknowledgeof theseconsequencesisconvey'dtohimbypastexperience...Butcanwe think,thatonthisoccasionhereflectsonanypastexperience...?Nosurely; thisisnotthemethodinwhichheproceedsinhisreasoning.Theideaof sinkingissocloselyconnectedwiththatofwater,andtheideaofsuffocating withthatofsinking,thatthemindmakesthetransitionwithouttheassistance ofthememory.Thecustomoperatesbeforewehavetimeforreflexion... Experiencemayproduceabeliefandajudgmentofcausesandeffectsbya secretoperation,andwithoutbeingoncethoughtof.21 Thatpassagerefersto'reasoning',butonlyintheverylargesenseinwhichHumecan alsosaythat'allreasoningsarenothingbuttheeffectsofcustom'.22'Reasoning'inthis sensemayconsistsimplyinarapidanduncontrollabletransitionfromanimpressionto abelief: Becausesuchaparticularideaiscommonlyannex'dtosuchaparticularword, nothingisrequir'dbutthehearingofthatwordtoproducethecorrespondent idea;and'twillscarcebepossibleforthemind,byitsutmostefforts,to preventthattransition.23 Morestronglystill:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 21Treatise,pp.1034. 22Treatise,p.149. 23Treatise,p.93. 300

Ourjudgmentsconcerningcauseandeffectarederiv'dfromhabitand experience;andwhenwehavebeenaccustom'dtoseeoneobjectunitedto another,ourimaginationpassesfromthefirsttothesecond,byanatural transition,whichprecedesreflection,andwhichcannotbepreventedbyit.24 Furthermore,Humethinksthatincausallyexplainingabeliefinthiswayheisfillinga gapcreatedbytheabsenceofanyreasonsforit: Wehavealreadytakennoticeofcertainrelations,whichmakeuspassfrom oneobjecttoanother,eventho'therebenoreasontodetermineustothat transition;andthiswemayestablishforageneralrule,thatwhereverthe mindconstantlyanduniformlymakesatransitionwithoutanyreason,itis influenc'dbytheserelations.25 Thisisquitewrong.Ifabeliefisreachedwithouttheweighingofreasons,wemay inquireintoitscausesorwemayprefertooffernoaccountofitsgenesis.Eitherway, thequestionofwhetherthere arereasonsforitremainscompletelyopen. TherearetworepliesthatHumemightmaketothis.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

(1)ThefirstisthatifIcouldnothelpacquiringagivenbeliefifIwasjustbeinghustled alongbyungentleforcesthenitdoesn'tmatterwhethertherewerereasonsforit.'I couldhavereacheditthroughdeliberationifIhadn'tbeenforcedtoitinanotherway' this,hemightsay,ischeapcomfort. Thatusestoobroadabrush.Theexistenceofreasonsforabeliefmayberelevanttomy acquisitionofitevenifIdidnotconsiderandapprovethosereasons.Inacquiringthe beliefImayhavebeenunreflectivelyapplyinganintellectualpolicywhichIsometimes subjecttoreflectivescrutiny.Oritmaybethatifthecircumstanceshadbeendifferent,I shouldhavedeliberated,weighedreasons,andconcludedagainstthebeliefinquestion. Inatleastthosetwoways,ifindeedtheyaretwo,reasonscanberelevanttowhat happensevenwhentheyarenotactuallyentertainedandassessed.Theacquiringofa beliefcanoccurunderthegovernanceofreasonevenifitdoesnotresultfromepisodic reasonings. Indeed,thisoftenhappens.Weoftenformanexpectation'immediately,without allowinganytimeforreflection',26without ____________________ 24Treatise,p.147. 25Treatise,p.92. 26Treatise,p.133. 301

beingcompletelythevictimsofourpasts.Inimplyingthecontrary,Humerepresentsour predictionsasvastlymoreinvoluntary,unreflectiveandinstinctivethantheyoftenare;
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andignoresallthecaseswherewedo,andtheotherswherewecouldbutdon't,pause andconsider. Hume'soverinsistenceonourintellectualpassivityalsoignoresthecausaljudgements whichlookinterrogativelyratherthanconfidentlytowardsthefuture.Weoftenadopt hypotheseswithlittlesupportfrompastexperience,inordertotestthemagainstfuture experience:'[We]approachnatureinordertobetaughtbyit,[not]inthecharacterofa pupilwholistenstoeverythingthattheteacherchoosestosay,butofanappointed judgewhocompelsthewitnessestoanswerquestionswhichhehashimselfformulated.'

27Hume,infact,doesnotaddresshimselftopredictionsingeneral,butonlytobeliefs

aboutthefuture;andhistheorydoesnotcovernoncredulous,tentative,interrogative predictions.Heclearlythinksthatbeliefsarethewholestory:'Wehavenoothernotion ofcauseandeffect,butthatofcertainobjects,whichhavebeenalways conjoin'd together,andwhichinallpastinstanceshavebeenfoundinseparable.'28Itmaybe notedthatingeneral,andnotjustinhistheoryofcausalbeliefs,Humeexaggeratesour intellectualpassivity.Theonebasicaspectofourconceptualschemewhichhecreditsto ourinitiativeisoneheregardsasamistake(see757below). (2)TheotherreplyHumemightmaketothechargethathewronglydeniesusreasons forourpredictionsisthatoursocalled'reasons'arenotreallyreasons.Wesometimesdo andoftencouldengageinwhatwecall'assessingandapprovingreasonsfora prediction',butthatdescriptionhemightsayiswrong.Foranysuch'reasons'must concernthepast,andcouldbearonapredictiononlythroughsomegeneralprincipleto theeffectthatthepastcanbeareliableguidetothefuture.Sincewecannotgive reasonsforanysuchprinciple,noneofourmorespecific'reasons'forspecificpredictions arereallyreasonsatall.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Theanswerswhichhavebeengiventothisconstitutetheliteratureon'theproblemof induction';forexample,theanswersufficientlyexplodedbyUrmsonthatwhatwe meanby'reasonforaprediction'isdefinedbythekindsofconsiderations ____________________ 27Kant,Critique of Pure ReasonBxiii. 28Treatise,p.93.SeealsoEnquiry32. 302

whichwedoinfactadduceasreasonsforaprediction.29Thereisoneanswerwhichis correctasfarasitgoes,anditgoesfarenoughformypresentpurposes.Humewrites asthoughsomeonemightbeawareofastreamofimpressionswhilemakingno predictionsaboutwhatliesahead;anditisagainstthisbackgroundthathecan representusashavingtomakepredictions,asthoughrefrainingfromthemwerean intelligiblealternativewhichwearepsychologicallypowerlesstoadopt.ButKanthas shownthatsomeonewhohasimpressionsandknowswhattheyarelikemustconstrue someofthemasperceptionsofanobjective,andthuslargelycausallyordered,realm. Thisisaclaimnotaboutpsychologicalcompulsionbutaboutthelogicalrequirementsfor selfconsciousness.Itimpliesthataselfconsciouscreaturemust,quaselfconscious, useconceptswhichcommithimtotreatingthepastasaguidetothefuture;butitis quitedifferentfromHume'sthesisthatweselfconsciouscreaturesarepsychologically unabletorefrainfromtreatingthepastasaguidetothefuture.Neitherthesisentails theother,butthetwomaybecombined.(Kant'sthesis,indeed,givessupportto Hume's;foritisimplausibletosuggestthatanyonecouldchoosetorelinquishthe beliefswhicharelogicallyrequiredforselfconsciousness.)Whentheyarecombined,the
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

resultantpicturedifferssignificantlyfromthatpresentedbyHume'sthesisonitsown. Fornowtherefusaltolinkpastwithfuture,whilestillsomethingwearenotcapableof, isalsosomethingwhichwouldconstituteanabdicationfromanyknowledgeofourown sensoryhistories.IntheKantianpicture,evenwithHume'sclaimadded,ourwillingness topredictthefutureonthebasisofthepastnolongerappearsasincurableshut mindedness,forthecontrasted'openmindedness'isnotastatethatwecanintelligibly supposethatwemightbein. SometimesHumehimselfexpressestheKantianinsight,orsomethinglikeit.For example,hesays:'Principleswhicharepermanent,irresistable,anduniversal,suchas thecustomarytransitionfromcausestoeffects...,arethefoundationofallour thoughtsandactions,sothatupontheirremovalhumannaturemustimmediatelyperish andgotoruin.'30Butheisnotfully ____________________ 29J.O.Urmson,"'SomeQuestionsConcerningValidity'",inA.Flew(ed.),Essays in Conceptual Analysis(London,1956). 30Treatise,p.225,slightlyrepunctuated. 303

consistentaboutthiscompare'permanent,irresistable,anduniversal'with'agentle force,whichcommonlyprevails'.31Also,the'ruin'of'humannature'towhichHume refers,ratherthanbeingaKantianlossofthelogicalprerequisitesforself consciousnessorthelike,maybemerelythelossofdispositionswhichareneededfor biologicalsurvivalinoursortofworld.Hume'swordsdonotpointunequivocallyineither

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

direction,andthatfactshowshowfarhewasfromhavingtheKantianinsightasa consciouslyhelditemoftheory.ItisalsorelevantthatHumedoesnotarguefroma principle'sbeing'irresistable'ortheliketoitsbeinginanywayjustified.Forfurther discussionofthiswholematter,thereaderisreferredtoPassmoreandtoanimportant paperbyWolff.32

66.Ananalyticsalvage
ThedifficultieswehavebeenmakingforHumemighthavebeenavoidedifhehadnot hadagenetictheoryinthefirstplace.Letusseewhathappenstohisanalysisof'cause' ifwesystematicallyremoveallitsimplicationsaboutwhatcausesorotherwiseleadsus tomakepredictions.Agoodstartwouldbetodeprivehimofthewords'habit'and 'custom'.Compare: 1. Itismyhabit,whenfacedbyanF,toexpectaG. 2. Itismycustom,whenfacedbyanF,toexpectaG. 3. WheneverIamfacedbyanF,IexpectaG. Amongthesethree,Isuggest,entailmentsrundownwardsbutnotupwards.Specifically, (1)addstothecontentof(3)astrongimplicationthatmypracticeofexpectingaG whenfacedbyanFhasariseninsomewayofwhichIhavenotbeentheconscious master,whichalsosuggeststhatIcannotnowrelinquishthepracticeatwill.(2)differs from(3)inthesamewaybutinlesserdegree.Forsomeabsorbingsemanticdetails,see theentryon'Habit'intheNew English Dictionary. TheproposaltostripHume'stheoryofitsgeneticisminvolvesreplacing(1)and(2)by (3)bystatementswhichreportwhat ____________________ 31Treatise,p.10.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

32Passmore,Hume's

Intentions,pp.401,546;Wolff,'Hume's Theory of Mental 304

Activity'.

peopledowithoutimplyinganythingaboutwhatleadsthemtodoit.Recentphilosophy hasprovidedausefullyclinicalandnongenetictermwhichfits(3)whilehavingthe grammarof'habit'and'custom',namelytheword'disposition'.Wecanexpress(3)inthe form'Itismydisposition,whenfacedbyanF,toexpectaG'.Thisistobeunderstoodin Ryle'sway:tocreditsomeonewithadispositionistospeaknotofwhathefeelslike doingbutonlyofwhatingeneralhedoesdoorwoulddoif...Hume's'habits',then, aredispositionsplusanimplicationaboutwhatcausesthem.Ifwereplace'habit'by 'disposition',theresultantstatementsareneutralaboutcausesandindeedaboutorigins generally.MydispositiontoexpectaGwhenfacedbyanFmightbeahabitora deliberatelyadoptedpolicyorsomethingelseagain. Withthisreplacementmade,Humenolongerhasanytheoryaboutwhatleadsusto predict,andsoa fortiorihedoesnothavethetheorythatwearecausedorcompelledto predict.Thislossissheergain,butitraisesaquestion.Hume'saccountofthe'ideaof necessaryconnexion'dependsupontheabolishedtheory:the'idea'isacopyofthat impressionofbeingcompelledor'determined'which,accordingtothetheory,wehave wheneverwemakeaninductivelybasedprediction.Ifthetheoryisdropped,whatisleft ofHume's'ideaofnecessaryconnexion'? Nothing.Andagoodthingtoo.33 Humecansaythatwearedisposedtomakeinductivelybasedpredictions,andcansay
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatthesedispositionsare,sotospeak,thehumanrealityunderlyingourusesofthe notionofcause.Hecanfurthersaythatanyparticularcausalstatement,whetherornot thespeakeriscausedtomakeitbypatternsinhispastexperience,isaboutoris answerabletoregularitiesinpastandfutureexperience;sothat'xcausedy'isa statementofauniversalkind.Morefully,tosaythatxcausedyistosayletus concedethatxiscontiguousandpriortoy,andisalsotobringthispairofeventsunder a rule. (ThisisanaturaloutgrowthofouroriginalimpoverishmentofHume'stheory,i.e.ofthe replacementof'habit'by'disposition'.IfIamdisposedtoexpectaGwhenfacedbyan F;andifIamnotutterlytheprisonerofthisdisposition,buthaveitpartlyasamatter ofintellectualpolicywhichIcanreflectonand ____________________ 33SeeWolff,op.cit.pp.11114. 305

criticize;thenthisamountstosayingthatIadoptaruletotheeffectthatwhenFsare foundGsaretobeexpected.AcasewhereIapplythisruleisjustonewhereIact accordingtothecorrespondingdisposition.) Onthisaccountofit,theconceptofcauseisarule.Thatisallright,foreveryother conceptisaruletoo.ForHume,aconceptisparadigmaticallyaquasisensory occurrence,an'idea'.Lookingforathirdingredientintheconceptofcause,and assumingthatitwouldhavetobesuchanoccurrence,hecouldfindonlythesupposed feelingofbeingcompelledtopredict.This,asherealized,makestheconceptofcause

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

outtobehighlypeculiar:causalstatementsturnouttoinvolveanelementofself reportingofanunsuspectedkind.Buttheonlyalternativewouldbetorepresent'x causesy'asastatementaboutxandyandindefinitelymanyotherevents.Thiswould alsointroducesomething'foreign'toxandy,andwouldprovidenocorrespondingquasi sensoryoccurrencenopicture,no'idea'.Tokeephisanalysisofcauseintouchwithhis theoryofmeaning,Humehadtocontinuetolookinwards,andthustoinsistthatthere isafeltcompulsiontopredict.Herightlyexpectedhisaccounttobeshocking,andnot justbydisappointednecessitarians;buttheshockisremovedassoonaswedrop Hume'stheoryofmeaningandarethusfreedtolookoutwardsinsteadofinwards. Summingallthisup:HumesaysthatIhavetheideaofcauseonlyifIhavecertain habits.Removethegeneticelement,andwehave:IhavetheconceptofcauseonlyifI havecertainintellectualdispositions.Ifan'idea'isaquasisensoryepisode,there seemstobenowayofconnectingitwithadispositionexceptbyconnectingitwith(how itfeelstobegrippedby)ahabit;butifwereplace'idea'by'concept'andunderstandthe lattertermcorrectly,weareonsafegroundagain.Indeed,wecangoastepfurther:to havetheconceptofcauseistohavecertainintellectualdispositions;andtoapplythe conceptinagivencaseis,deliberatelyoratleastcontrollably,torealizethedisposition inthatcase;whichisthesameasapplyingaruletothecase.34Onceweareliberated fromHume'stypeofmeaningtheorywecanseethatallthisisnormal,andthatithas thesamebasicstructureasacorrectaccountofwhatitistohaveandapplytheconcept ofrednessorofstupidity.Allourconceptsinvolveanelementof ____________________ 34SeeD.F.Pears,"'Hume'sEmpiricism'",Pearspp.289. 306
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

generality;overlookingthis,Humeadoptedthe'idea'theory;then,findingintheconcept ofcauseanelementofgeneralitywhichistooobvioustobeoverlooked,hehadto protecthis'idea'theoryfromitbythefruitlessmanoeuvreswhichhavebeenmytopicin thepresentchapter.

67.'TheHumeanview'
WhatwehavesalvagedfromHumeisverycloseto'theHumeanviewofcausation'asit isnowgenerallyunderstood.The'Humeanview'hasthefollowingform: Thedifferencebetween'e1causede2'and'e1precedede2'is thattheformerentailsthatthereisalawwhich... A'law',asIamusingtheword,isatrue,contingent,universallyquantifiedconditional statementwhichsatisfiescertainfurtherconditionstoruleoutvacuousness,triviality, eccentricityetc.whichnobodyhasyetsuccessfullyformulated.35Theproblem,of course,istostatetheconditionswithoutusinganysuchtermas'causal'andwithout appealingtocounterfactualconditionals.Ibelievethattheproblemcanbesolved, althoughGoodman'sworkhasshownthatasolutionmustbemuchmoreradicalthan mostadherentsof'theHumeanview'hadpreviouslythought.36Ishallhavenothing moretosayaboutit. TheaboveformulaisincompleteinadifferentwaywhichIdonowwanttodiscuss, namely,itsnotsayinghowtherelevantlawrelatestoe1ande2.Hereisonepossible position:anytruesingularcausalstatementmusthavetheform'TheFeventcausedthe Gevent'whereFandGstandforsuitablylawconnectedpropertiessothatfromthe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

singularcausalstatementwecanautomaticallyreadoffthelawbyvirtueofwhichitis true.Attheotherextremeisthethesisofpureextensionality:thestatementthate1 causede2istruenomatterhowitreferstoe1ande2justsolongasthosetwo eventsdoinfacthavepropertieswhichirelawconnectedintheappropriateway. Betweenthetwoextremestherearemanypossibleintermediatepositions,each ____________________ 35SeeW.Kneale,"'NaturalLawsandContrarytoFactConditionals'",Analysis,vol.10( 1950);reprintedinM.Macdonald(ed.),Philosophy and Analysis(Oxford,1954). 36N.Goodman,Fact, Fiction and Forecast(Cambridge,Mass.,1955). 307

layingdownmoreorlessweakconditionsonhowtherelevantlawmustrelatetothe languageusedinthesingularcausalstatement;butIdoubtifanyofthesehasmuchto recommendit.Thethesisofpureextensionality,whichhasbeenpersuasivelydefended byDavidson,seemstometoberight;37anditiscertainlyplausibleenoughtomotivate aninquiryintoitsrelationshiptoHume. Whenheisdefining'cause'inwayswhichcomenearesttothenowfavoured'Humean view',emphasizing'constantconjunction'etc.ratherthan'thedeterminationofthemind' etc.,Humesays: ...andwherealltheobjectsresemblingtheformerareplac'dinlikerelations ...tothoseobjects,thatresemblethelatter;38
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

...andwherealltheobjectssimilartothefirstarefollowedbyobjects similartothesecond.39 Tothesewemightalsoadd: ...andininlargingmyviewtoconsiderseveralinstances,Ifindonly,thatlike objectsareconstantlyplac'dinlikerelationsofsuccessionandcontiguity.40 Theseformulationssuggestpureextensionality,justsolongasweconstrue'resembling' and'like'and'similarto'tomean'resembling[etc.]in some respect'withnolimitation onwhattherespectis.IfHumehassomelimitationinmind,hedoesnotspecifyitandI cannotseewhatitcouldbe.Itcanhardlybe'inrespectofpropertiesreferredtointhe originalsingularcausalstatement',forHumedoesnotthinkofhistheoryasconcerning causalstatementsinthefirstplace. Asagainstthis,hesometimesseemstothinkofthemovefromthesingularcausal judgementtothecorrespondinglawasbeingentirelyautomatic.Indeed,hewritesas thoughthelawhadtodoonlywiththeverysamepairofevents('objects')whicharethe subjectofthesingularjudgement: Whenanyobjectispresentedtous,itimmediatelyconveystotheminda livelyideaofthatobject,whichisusuallyfoundtoattendit.41 ____________________ 37D.Davidson,"'CausalRelations'",Journal of Philosophy,vol.64(1967). 38Treatise,p.170. 39Enquiry60. 40Treatise,p.170.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

41Treatise,p.169.

308

Theremustbeaconstantunionbetwixtthecauseandeffect.42 ...anobjectfollowedbyanother,andwhoseappearancealwaysconveysthe thoughttothatother.43 Nodoubtthisiscarelesswritingratherthanbadtheory.Still,theseturnsofphrase discouragetheviewthatHumehadclearlyunderstoodandfirmlyacceptedthe extensionalthesis,oranypositionimplyingthatagivensingularcausaljudgement mightbebackedbyanyoneofarangeoflaws. InHume'sownwork,ofcourse,the'Humeanview'isembeddedinapsychological theory,andonemightwonderwhetherthelattermadeithardforhimtoacceptthe extensionalthesis.Idonotseehowitcanhavedoneso.IfIthinkthate1,causede2 ,Imust,accordingtoHume'spsychologicaltheory,feele1'seffectonmymind, wherebyitdeterminesmetoformavividideaofe2;butIneednotknowwhyelhas thiseffectonme.NodoubtImustknowthatithasthiseffectbyvirtueofsome propertythatithas;andperhapsImustalsoknowthatthispropertyhas,inmypast experience,beenlawconnectedwithsomepropertythate2has;butsinceIneednot knowwhateitherpropertyis,Ineednotbeinapositiontoformulatetherelevantlaw. SothepsychologicalhalfofHume'spositivetheoryofcausationalsoleavesitopento himtosaythatasingularcausalstatemententails that there is a relevant lawbutdoes notentail the relevant law.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

InjustoneplacethatIknowof,Humefairlyexplicitlyavailshimselfofthisoption: Thedifferenceintheeffectsoftworesemblingobjectsmustproceedfromthat particular,inwhichtheydiffer.Foraslikecausesalwaysproducelikeeffects, wheninanyinstancewefindourexpectationtobedisappointed,wemust concludethatthisirregularityproceedsfromsomedifferenceinthecauses.44 Byallowingusto'conclude'thatthereis'somedifference',Humeclearlyimpliesthatwe maybeinapositiontoassertasingularcausaljudgementbutnottoasserttherelevant law.Itmaybesignificant,though,thatHumeishereexpoundingapointofrelative detail,notstatinghiscentralposition.Anditissurely ____________________ 42Treatise,p.173. 43Enquiry60. 44Treatise,p.174. 309

significantthattheimmediatelyprecedingparagraphgoesinexactlytheoppositeway: Whereseveraldifferentobjectsproducethesameeffect,itmustbebymeans ofsomequality,whichwediscovertobecommonamongstthem.Foraslike effectsimplylikecauses,wemustalwaysascribethecausationtothe circumstance,whereinwediscovertheresemblance.45

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Therepeateduseof'wediscover'stronglysuggeststhatwecannotmakethesingular causaljudgementuntilweknowwhattherelevantlawis. Inshort:oneofHume'sparagraphscommitshimtotheextensionalthesis;mostofhis turnsofphrasesuggestthatheisfarfromacceptingthatthesis;yetthereisno obstacletohisacceptingit,eitherinhisexplicitstatementsofthe'Humeanview'orin theassociatedpsychologicaltheory.IconcludethatHumedidnotconsciouslyfaceupto theissueoverextensionalityorthemoregeneralissueoverjusthowthesingular causaljudgementmustrelatetotherelevantlawandsothereisnostraightanswerto thequestionIhaveraised. Howdoesthe'Humeanview'relatetoHume'snegativework?Afterattackingarangeof opponents,Humeisnowpropoundingatheorywhichincludesthetwoelements constitutingthe'Humeanview':thatasingularcausaljudgementcanbetrueonlyifa correspondinggeneralizationistrue,andthatthatgeneralizationiscontingent.Isthis doublethesisarrivedatthroughthenegativeworkdiscussedearlier?Itisusualand naturaltothinkofHume'spositivetheoryasarivaltotheviewshehasearlierrejected, allofthembeinganswerstoasinglequestionoratleasttocloselyrelatedquestions. Butisthisreallyso? Apartialaffirmativeanswercanbegivenstraightaway.AccordingtotheHumeanview, 'e1causede2'impliessomethingabouteventsotherthanor'foreignto'e1ande2 themselves,andHume'sdefenceofthisrestsonhisearlierrejectionof'impressionsof necessaryconnexion'(see55above).Giventhatrejection,hecanarguethatif causationisnotjustcontiguityandpriorityitmustinvolvesomeforeignelement;and thatconclusion,thoughnotasextraordinaryasHumethinks,isneverthelessa substantivepartofthe'Humeanview'.SoonepartofHume's
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

____________________ 45Treatise,p.174. 310

negativework,namelyhisdenialthatthereareimpressionsofnecessaryconnexionin theouterworld,doesrenderadefinitethoughminorservicetohispositivetheory. Isthatall?OnewouldhopetobeabletorepresentHume'sattackonnecessitarianism alsoashelpingtoclearthewayforhispositivetheoryofcausation. Thereis,however,anobstacletorelatingtheantinecessitarianpolemicto(the 'Humeanview'containedwithin)thepositivetheory.Itisthefact,notedattheendof 57above,thataccordingtothe'Humeanview'thecausalrelationholdsbetweenevents, whereastherejectednecessitarianismmakessenseonlyasathesisaboutrelations betweenthemembersofcertainpairsofpropositionsspecifically,betweenthe antecedentandconsequentofanypredictionlicensingconditional.Humedidnotclearly seetheneedtoconstruenecessitarianisminthisway,butthatfactisnohelp.Iwantto knowwhatconnexionsthereare,notmerelywhatconnexionsHumemighthavethought thatthereare,betweenantinecessitarianismandthe'Humeanview'. Soitisnohelptobetold,forexample,thatHumemighthavesoughttorelatethetwo asfollows:theattackonnecessitarianismshowsthatcausationisnotanecessaryor analyticrelation,andthepositivetheorytakesoverfromthere,givingdetailsabout whatsortofcontingentorsyntheticrelationitis.This,thoughHumemighthavesaidit, isunacceptable.Relationscannotbedividedintonecessaryandcontingent,andHume's attemptsotodividethemis,asIhaveshownin53above,ahopelessmuddle.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Letustryagain:Hume'snegativethesisimpliesthatcausalstatementsarecontingent, andhispositivetheoryaddsdetailsaboutwhatsortofcontingentstatementstheyare. Butthisisnouseifitmeansthatallcausalstatementsarecontingent,forthe'Humean view'rightlydoesnotdenythatmanycausalstatementsarelogicallynecessary.Itdoes saythatsomearecontingent,butcanwereallyseeHume'santinecessitarianpolemic asadefenceofthat?Arewetosupposethatheenvisagesanecessitarianopponent whodeniesthatthereareanylogicallycontingentcausalpropositions?Thisissurely wrong.JustasaHumeancanadmitthatanycauseeffectpairdoesinstantiatesome logicallynecessaryconditionals,soanecessitariancanadmitthatsuchapair instantiatescontingentconditionaltruths. Yetthoseofuswhothinkofourselvesasbroadly'Humean' 311

abouttheconceptofcauseareapttothinkthatweacceptsomenontrivialthesisabout causalityandcontingencywethinkthatinourtotalsystemofcausalpropositionsitis thecontingentonesthatcount,thatarethesourceoflife,orthelike.Howcanthis metaphorbeunpacked?TheonlysuggestionIcanmakeisthis:inourtotalsystemof causalpropositionsitisthecontingentonesthathavepredictive value. Ourcausalitycontingencythesis,onthisaccountofit,isjustaspecialcaseofthemore generalthesiswhichIsalvagedfromHume'santinecessitarianism,namelythegeneral thesisthattherecannotbeentailmentlicensedpredictions.SoifIhavehandledboth matterscorrectlywedohavethesoughtafterlinkbetweenthenegativeandpositive positions.Inonewaythelinkisperhapsatenuousone,foritconnectsthenegative
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

positionnotwiththeconceptofcauseassuchbutonlywithacertainusetowhich causalpropositionsmaybeputnamelylicensingpredictions.Still,itseemsreasonable toregardthisasaverycentralandimportantuseofcausalpropositions.Thereis significantsupportforthisinarecentpaperofDummett's,wherehecontinuesto explorethequestionofwhetheritmakessensetosupposethatonemightcause somethingtohavehappened.46Oneresultwhichemergesfromhisprobinginquiryis thateventemporallyreversedcausation,ifitmakessenseatall,doessoonlyon conditionthatitisgovernedbylawswhichhavepredictivevalue.Anyway,Idonotinsist thatHume'snegativethesisiscloselyandintimatelylinkedwiththe'Humeanview' aboutcausationallIhavewantedtodoistoshowwhatlinkthereis.Iftheresultis thatHume'stotalworkoncausationismorebrokenbackedthanonehadthought,sobe it. ____________________ 46M.Dummett,"'BringingaboutthePast'",Philosophical Review,vol.73(1964). 312

XIII HUMEONOBJECTIVITY
68.Theproblemstated
HUME'Ssectionentitled'OfScepticismwithregardtotheSenses'ishisprincipal discussionofobjectivityconcepts.1Itisextremelydifficult,fullofmistakes,andtaken
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

asawholeatotalfailure;yetitsdepthandscopeanddisciplinedcomplexitymakeit oneofthemostinstructiveargumentsinmodernphilosophy.2Onephilosophermightbe judgedsuperiortoanotherbecauseheachievedsomethingofwhichtheotherwas altogetherintellectuallyincapable.BythatcriterionHumesurpassesLockeandBerkeley because,andonlybecause,ofthisonesection. ThesectionisthesubjectofabookbyH.H.Price.3IadmireandowemuchtoPrice's penetratinganalysis;butifIamtolinkthispartofHume'sworkwiththerestofmy accountofthecentralEmpiricistthemes,Ineedtotackleitinmyownway.Thislast chapter,therefore,willbeadiscussionof'OfScepticismwithregardtotheSenses'. Humeaimstodiscover'whatcausesinduceustobelieveintheexistenceofbody',but fortunatelyhisaimispoor.Mostofthesectioncanbeseenasaddressedtothe question,whichisnotcausalandnotevengenetic,'Whatreasonsarethereforour beliefintheexistenceofbody?'IshallpretendthatthatisthequestionHumeisasking. Turnsinhisargumentwhichbeliethiswillbenotedastheyarise. Tobelievein'theexistenceofbody'istobelievethatthereareitemswhichare 'continuous'and'distinct'.Thequestionaboutcontinuityisjustthequestion'whywe attributeacontinu'dexistencetoobjects,evenwhentheyarenotpresenttothe senses'.Themeaningof'distinct'ismorecomplex:'UnderthislastheadIcomprehend [objects']situationaswellasrelations,theirexternalpositionaswellasthe independenceoftheirexistenceandoperation.'4 ____________________ 1Treatise I.iv.2.SeealsoEnquiry11723. 2ThusH.H.Price,"'ThePermanentSignificanceofHume'sPhilosophy'",p.11.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

3H.H.Price,Hume's

Theory of the External World.AllfurtherreferencestoPriceinthis chapterrefertothisbook. 4Treatise,p.188. 313

Letusget'external'outoftheway.Thewordismeantspatially:anobjectis'external' tomeifitandIareindifferentplaces.Since'Allbodiesarespatiallylocated'isanalytic, ananalysisof'body'mighthavetoexploretheconceptofspatiallocation.ButHume's realtopicisnotthebeliefthatthereare,specifically,bodies.Rather,itisthemore generalbeliefthatthereareobjectsobjectiveparticularswhichadmitofthedistinction betweenappearanceandreality,canexistunperceived,andsoon.Heisnotassuming thatweknowwhatitisforanitemtobeobjective,andasking:'Whatisitforan objectiveitemtobeabody?'Rather,heisasking:'Whatisitforanitemtobe objective?'5Perhapsthelatterquestionalsoinvolvesspatiallocation,sincearguably anyobjectiverealmmustbespatiallyorganized;butHumedoesnotargueforthisview, andseemsnottoholdit.Oronemightaskbothquestions:'Whatisitforanitemtobe objective?'andthen:'Whatisitforanobjectiveitemtobeabody?';butHumehere showsnointerestinthesecondofthese.Iconcludethatspatialexternalitydoesnotlie atthecentreofhisinquiry. Humeconcedesasmuch.InonepassagewhichIdonotunderstandheseemstobe givingawrongreasonforsayingthatexternalityneednotbediscussed.6Later,though, hedoesbetter.Heimpliesthat,justbecausehisprimeconcerniswithobjectivity generally,spatialexternalitydoesnotmeritacentralplaceinit:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Whenwetalkofrealdistinctexistences,wehavecommonlymoreinoureyetheir independencythanexternalsituationinplace,andthinkanobjecthasasufficient reality,whenitsBeingisuninterrupted,andindependentoftheincessantrevolutions, whichweareconsciousofinourselves.7 That,incidentally,isHume'slastmentionofspatialexternalityinthissection.From thereonheuses'external'onlytomean'objective',andnotwithanyspecificallyspatial connotations.8 Soourconcerniswithcontinuityandindependence.Thefewearlyepisodeswhere spatialexternalityhasarolewillbenotedastheyoccur. Itremainsonlytoexplain'independent'.Thisreferstoindependence'fromthe perception'oftheobserver:itseemsthat ____________________ 5ThusPrice,p.19. 6Treatise,p.188. 7Treatise,p.191. 8Treatise,pp.195threeoccurrences),199,205(three),21618(four). 314

'xexistsindependentlyofmyperceptionofit'means'Thatxexistsisnotduesolelyto thefactthatIperceiveit',whichpresumablymeans'xcouldexistwhenIwasnot perceivingit'.Tohaveanindependentexistence,itseems,isjusttobecapableof havingacontinuousexistence.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Itfollowsthatcontinuityentailsindependence,butIamnotpreparedtoadd,asHume does:'andviceversa,if[objects']existencebeindependentoftheperceptionand distinctfromit,theymustcontinuetoexist,eventho'theybenotperceiv'd.'9Theword 'must'makesthistoostrongtobeacceptedwithoutargument.Still,somethinglikeit canbedefended.Itisarguablethatone'sonlyhopeofshowingthatthereareno continuousobjectswouldbebyshowingthattherecannotbeanyi.e.thatthenotionof acontinuousobjectislogicallydefective.Butindependentobjectsare,precisely,ones whichcanbecontinuous;andsotheargumentwouldrunifthereareindependent objectsthenthereisn'ttheremotestchanceofanyone'sshowingthatthereareno continuousobjects.ThismightjustifyHumeinsayingthatcontinuityandindependence standorfalltogether.Later,weshallsee,heforgetsthisviewofhis:inthecentral mistakeinthewholesection,heapparentlytriestokeepindependenceuprightwhile allowingcontinuitytocollapse.

69.Arejectedanswer:thesenses
ThroughsomefourpagesHumearguesthat'thesenses...areincapableofgivingrise to'thebeliefinindependentandcontinuousobjects'TheBelief',forshort.Thegeneral ideaseemstobeasfollows. Whydopeoplebelievethattherearepains?ItisbothnaturalandHumeantothinkthat 'Becausetheyhavepains'isacompleteanswer:theexistenceofpainsisaraw, primitivedatumofexperience,notsomethingreachedbyinferencevalidorinvalidfrom ourprimitivedata.Painsarejustgiven;or,intheunhappygeneticmode,thebeliefthat therearepainsis'producedbythesenses'.Hume,Ithink,istryingtorebutan analogousaccountofTheBelief.Expressednongenetically,ourquestionis:'Whatfacts
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

aboutourexperienceenableustoapplyobjectivityconcepts?',andHumeseekstoshow thattheanswercannotbe:'Thefact ____________________ 9Treatise,p.188. 315

thattheexistenceofobjectiveitemsisjustgiven,orisarawdatumofexperience.'Let uslookatthedetails. Humefirstarguesthatthecontinuityofobjectscannotbearawdatumofsense experience,10forthatwouldrequire'thatthesensescontinuetooperate,evenafter theyhaveceas'dallmannerofoperation'.Fromthisherightlyinfersthatifthesenses unaidedaretoyieldanypartofTheBeliefitcanonlybethatpartwhichconsistsinthe beliefthatthereare(externaland)independentobjects. Thesensesmightbethoughtto'suggest[the]ideaofdistinctexistences'ineitherof twoways,ofwhichtheformerevokesLockeandthelatterisprobablysupposedto evokeBerkeley.HumedevotesoneparagraphtoexpoundingandrefutingtheLockean one.The'Berkeleian'alternativeisexpoundedinthesucceedingparagraphandthen rebuttedinthetwoafterthat. Couldthesenses,unaided,producethebeliefthatthereareexternalandindependent items'beyond'ourimpressions?Humerightlysaysthattheycouldnot:'Asingle perceptioncanneverproducetheideaofadoubleexistence.'Ishallnotlingeronthis.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Thereremains,then,onlytheprimafaciepossibilitythatthesensesconfrontuswith impressionsinsuchawayastomakeusbelievethattheytheimpressionsthemselves areexternalandindependent.11Humecontendsthatifoursensesdidthistheywould besubjectingusto'akindoffallacyandillusion'aboutourimpressions'notconcerning theirnature,butconcerningtheirrelationsandsituation'andhearguesthatsuchan illusioncouldnotoccur.Hisfirstargumentconcerns'ideasofselfandperson',andis quiteunsatisfactory.Thesecondisthis: [Itisnot]conceivablethatoursensesshou'dbemorecapableofdeceivingus inthesituationandrelations,thaninthenatureofourimpressions.Forsince allactionsandsensationsofthemindareknowntousbyconsciousness,they mustnecessarilyappearineveryparticularwhattheyare,andbewhatthey appear. Oneissuspiciousofthisconfidentclaimthatweareinerrantnotonlyabouttheinternal characteristicsofourinnerstatesbutalsoabouttheirsituation(spatialexternality)and relations(independence);butperhapsitdoesnotmatter,sincethistargetofHume'sis notanattractiveoneanyway. ____________________ 10Treatise,pp.188)9('Tobeginwiththesenses...andexternalexistences.'). 11Treatise,pp.189)90('Ifoursenses...mightbemistaken.'). 316

Ratherthanarguingfurtherthatthesensescannotdeludeusintobelievingindistinct items,Humesays,hewillmerelyarguethattheydonotdoso.Thismisrepresentswhat
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

follows,namely:athreeprongedattackononespecificargumentpurportingtoshow thatthesensesproducethebeliefinexternalitems;12andarepetition,whichIshall notdiscuss,ofhisearlierreasonsforsayingthatthesensescannotproducethebeliefin independentitems. TheargumentaboutexternalitytowhichHumeaddresseshimselfisthis: Ourownbodyevidentlybelongstous;andasseveralimpressionsappear exteriortothebody,wesupposethemalsoexteriortoourselves...In castingmyeyetowardsthewindow,Iperceiveagreatextentoffieldsand buildingsbeyondmychamber...Nootherfacultyisrequir'd,besidethe senses,toconvinceusoftheexternalexistenceofbody. Thesuggestionisthattheelsewherenessofbodiesissometimesarawvisual datum:wesimplyseethingstobeatadistance,andthat'sthat.This argument,uniquelyinthewholesection,concernsspatialexternalityand nothingelse;andjustforthatreasonitisperipheraltoHume'smaintheme. Still,twoofhisthreerepliestoitareinteresting. Thefirstreplyisthis: Properlyspeaking,'tisnotourbodyweperceive,whenweregardourlimbsand members,butcertainimpressions,whichenterbythesenses;sothatthe ascribingarealandcorporealexistencetotheseimpressions,ortotheir objects,isanactofthemindasdifficulttoexplain,asthatwhichweexamine atpresent. This,thoughillexpressed,hasavalidcore.Aninquiryintoourwholesystemof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

objectivityconceptsisnotentitledtotake'Ihaveabody',whichitselfexpressesaview abouttheobjectiverealm,asbothtrueandnotinneedofexplanation.Humeimplies thatIknowaboutmybodyonlybyobservingit,whichignoresthefactthatIalsomove mybody;butthisleaveshiscentralpointstanding. Hume'sopponentmightfairlycomplainthatwordshavebeencrammedintohismouth: hehasbeenmadetoconstrue'external'asmeaning(a)'somewhereotherthanwhere mybodyis'rather ____________________ 12Treatise,pp.190)1('Tobeginwith...rationalphilosophers.'). 317

than(b)'somewhereotherthanwhereIam'.Thesearedifferent,forthenotionof'where Iam'doesnotrequiremetohaveaspacefilling,objectivebody,sinceitcanbe adequatelybasedonmyperceptualslantontheworld,i.e.onthefactthatatanygiven timeIperceivetheobjectiverealmfromaparticularpointofview.Soathing'sspatial 'externality'mightbeunderstoodasitsbeingatadistancefrommyspatiallylocatedbut unextendedpointofview;andif(a)isthusreplacedby(b),Hume'sfirstcounterattack fails.Thereisanotherpoint.In68IarguedthatHumeoughtnottosetspatial externalityatthecentreofhisinvestigation,andthatpointholdsgoodoneither reading(a)or(b)of'external'.ButifHumeinsistsupon(a)thenthereisafurther reasonfordeposingexternality.Foraccordingto(a)thequestion'Arethereanyexternal items?'presupposesthatthere isatleastoneitem,namelythequestioner'sbody,to whichthewholerangeofobjectivityconceptscanbeapplied.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Hume'ssecondreplyalludesto'sounds,andtastes,andsmells'.Itisextremelyunclear, andisbestseenasadumbratinganunimpressiveargumentwhichhedeploysalittle laterandwhichIshalldealwithnow.13Wecandivideourperceptionsinto(1)those pertainingtoprimaryqualities,(2)thosepertainingtosecondaryqualities,and(3) 'painsandpleasures'and,onepresumes,'passions'generally.Ofthesethreeclasses Humesays: Bothphilosophersandthevulgarsupposethefirstofthesetohaveadistinct continu'dexistence.Thevulgaronlyregardthesecondasonthesamefooting. Bothphilosophersandthevulgar,again,esteemthethirdtobemerely perceptions;andconsequentlyinterruptedanddependentbeings. DespiteHume'sobscuringfailuretodistinguishthequalitiesofthingsfromour impressionsofthings,anargumentofakindcanbediscernedinthesetwoparagraphs. Humeproceedstosaythatsecondaryqualities,'asfarasappearstothesenses',are justasobjectiveasprimaryones,asisshownbythefailureofthevulgartodrivea wedgebetween(1)and(2).Butthen(2)secondaryqualitiesarealsoonaparwith(3) painsandtherest: Forastheyareconfesttobe,bothofthem,nothingbutperceptionsarising fromtheparticularconfigurationsandmotionsofthepartsofbody,wherein possiblycantheirdifferenceconsist?Uponthewhole, ____________________ 13Treatise,pp.1923('Toconfirm...theirexistence.'). 318
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

then,wemayconclude,thatasfarasthesensesarejudges,allperceptions arethesameinthemanneroftheirexistence. Thisargumentisuseless,becauseitassumesthatsecondaryqualitiesare'nothingbut perceptions',whichissimplyfalse(see23above).Humedoesinfactregularlycredit 'themodernphilosophy'withdiscoveringthatsecondaryqualitiesarenotinobjects becausetheyareinthemind.Forexample,hisargumentthatprimaryqualitiesaloneare notsufficientforaworkingconceptofbody(see18above)istheinterestingpartofa larger,shoddierargumentalongtheselines:bodiesdonotreallyhavesecondary qualities,soatmosttheyhaveprimaryqualities;buttherecannotbebodieswithonly primaryqualities;sotherecannotbebodies.Sincethefirstpremissiswholly indefensible,thereisnovalueinanyargumentdependinguponit. Hume'sthirdreplygoestotheheartofthematter:'Evenoursightinformsusnotof distanceoroutness(sotospeak)immediatelyandwithoutacertainreasoningand experience,asisacknowledg'dbythemostrationalphilosophers.'14Thisrelieson Berkeley'sthesisthatourspatialconceptsareprimarilytactualandkinaesthetic,and onlysecondarilyvisual,sothatthings''outness'isnotprimitivelygiventhroughthe visualsense.15'Wesometimesseethingstobeatadistancefromourselves'thisis true,butitislogicallynotabitlike'Wesometimesfeelpainstobeacute'.Thatmy presentvisualfielddoescountastheseeingofsomethingatadistanceisafactwhich involvesagreatdealmorethanmypresentsensorystate. AsIhavealreadymentioned,Humethenrepeatshisclaimthatthesensescannot producethebeliefinindependentobjects.Thisiswhereheconfessesthatspatial externalityisnotverycentraltohisconcerns,anddropsitforgood.Theparagraphafter
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thatisjustarsumofwhathasgonebefore.

70.Alsorejected:reason
Inonepregnantparagraph,HumearguesthatTheBeliefcannotbeproducedbyreason: Whateverconvincingargumentsphilosophersmayfancytheycanproduceto establishthebeliefofobjectsindependentofthemind,'tis ____________________ 14Treatise,p.191. 15Berkeley,New Theory of Vision46. 319

obvious...that'tisnotbythem,thatchildren,peasants,andthegreatest partofmankindareinduc'dtoattributeobjectstosomeimpressions,anddeny themtoothers.16 Thisargumentdependsonthegeneticformulation:thevulgararenotledto TheBeliefbyreasoning,becausetheyarenotgivento'weighing[their] opinionsbyanyphilosophicalprinciples'.AgainsttheanalyticthesisthatThe Beliefhoweverarrivedatisdefensibleonthebasisofreason,Hume's argumentispowerless. Idonotpretendtoknowwhat'onthebasisofreason'means.ThebestsalvageIcan offerforHume'sserialdiscussionof'thesenses','reason'and'imagination'asbasesfor
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

TheBeliefisasfollows.17'Thesensesarethebasis'meansthattheexistenceof continuousandindependentobjectsisaprimitivedatumofsenseexperience.'Reasonis thebasis'meansthattheexistenceofsuchobjectscanbevalidlydefendedby arguments fromsenseexperience.Havingrejectedthesetwo,HumeconcludesthatThe Belief'mustbeentirelyowingtotheimagination',whichItaketoimply,amongother things,thatitisillegitimatelyderivedfromorbaseduponthedeliverancesofthe senses.Thatis,HumewillexplainTheBeliefinamannerwhich,hethinks,willcondemn it. IfIhavethestrategyright,thenwemustprotestthat'reason'hasnothaditsdayin court.Aswellasitsdependenceonthegeneticformulation,Hume'sargumenthas anotherflaw.Heoftentakes'reasoning'tocovercausalreasoning.Hisremarkthat'our sightinformsusnotofdistance...withoutacertainreasoning'presupposesthis generoususeoftheword,andalsoconcedes,asHumemust,thatchildrenandpeasants do'reason'inthissense.Inourpresentparagraph,Humeuses'reasoning'narrowly,to coveronlythesophisticated'weighing[of]philosophicalprinciples';butinthatcaseare thepossibilitiesexhaustedby'thesenses','reason'and'imagination'? Humerestricts'reason'atthisstage,nodoubt,soastopostponehisdiscussionof whetherTheBeliefisbasedoneverydaycausalthinking;buthealsohasanothermotive forconcentratingonwhathecalls'philosophicalprinciples'.Hewantstocontendthat suchprinciplesdon'tjustfailtojustifyTheBeliefbutpositivelycontradictit: Forphilosophyinformsus,thateverything,whichappearstothemind,is nothingbutaperception,andisinterrupted,anddependent ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

16Treatise,p.193. 17Cf.Berkeley,Principles18.

320

onthemind;whereasthevulgarconfoundperceptionsandobjects,and attributeadistinctcontinu'dexistencetotheverythingstheyfeelorsee.This sentiment,then,asitisentirelyunreasonable,mustproceedfromsomeother facultythantheunderstanding. Thisneedsconsiderationonitsownmerits. Thevulgardoindeedattributecontinuityetc.to'theverythingstheyfeelorsee',but thisdoesnotimplythattheyattributecontinuitytotheirperceptions.Humethinksthat itdoes,because'everythingwhichappearstothemindisnothingbutaperception',by whichhemeansthat'theverythings[we]feelorsee'arethemselvesperceptions.The 'philosophy'which'informsus'thatonlyperceptions'appeartothemind'hasachoice. (a)If'appearingtothemind'issimplybeingperceived,thenwhatissaidisjustfalse. (b)If'appearingtothemind'iswhatBerkeleywouldcallbeingimmediatelyperceived, thenthisphilosophy'informsus'correctly,butwhat'appearstothemind'isdespite Berkeley'scontraryviewdifferentfromwhatisfeltorseen.Eitherway,Humeiswrong. Ishallreturntothismatterin78. Hume'sview,then,isthat'aslongaswetakeourperceptionsandobjectstobethe same'wecannotjustifyTheBeliefbyanappealtoreason:onthegroundjustgiven,and alsobecauseiftheyare'thesame'then'wecanneverinfertheexistenceoftheone fromthatoftheother'!Hethenproceedstocompoundtheerror:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Evenafterwedistinguishourperceptionsfromourobjects,'twillappear presently,thatwearestillincapableofreasoningfromtheexistenceofoneto thatoftheother:Sothatuponthewholeourreasonneitherdoes,norisit possibleitevershou'd,uponanysupposition,giveusanassuranceofthe continu'danddistinctexistenceofbody. HowwillHumedefendsolargeaclaim?Theansweristhat,asweshallseein78,he equates'distinguishingourobjectsfromourperceptions'with'puttingourobjects beyondtheveilofperception'.Ifwearenottoidentify'ourobjects'withour perceptions,hethinks,wemustrelatetheminthemannerofLocke'stheoryofreality; and,sinceheissatisfiedbyBerkeley'sargumentsagainstLocke,heconfidentlyasserts thatreasoncannotjustifyTheBeliefin'objects'construedinthatway. Inanutshell:thereareBerkeleian'objects',buttheyarenot 321

independentandcontinuous;Lockean'objects'wouldbeindependentandcontinuous, buttherecannotbegroundsforsayingthatthereareany;soTheBeliefcannotbe justifiedineitheritsvulgarorBerkeleianformoritsnonvulgarorLockeanform.Apart fromtheidentificationofthevulgarpositionwithBerkeley's,allthisisabsolutelyright. Buttertium datur.

71.Apartlyacceptedanswer
Sinceweattributecontinuityetc.tosomebutnotallofourimpressions,Humesays,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thereshouldbesomecommonfeaturemarkingoffthosetowhichweaccordthisdignity. Hestillwantstodescribe,thoughnotnowtojustify,ourdeploymentofobjectivity concepts.Sohehuntsforthecommonfeature.Afterpointingoutthatthe involuntarinessand'superiorforceandviolence'ofsomeofourimpressionsarenotthe wholestory,Humecontinues:'Thesevulgaropinions,then,beingrejected,wemust searchforsomeotherhypothesis,bywhichwemaydiscoverthosepeculiarqualitiesin ourimpressions,whichmakeusattributetothemadistinctandcontinu'dexistence.'18 WiththatheembarksonthreeparagraphswhichIshalldiscussthroughoutthepresent section.19Theydealwithcontinuityonly,independencebeingsilentlydropped. Allthoseobjects,towhichweattributeacontinu'dexistence,haveapeculiar constancy,whichdistinguishesthemfromtheimpressions,whoseexistence dependsuponourperception...[Thatistoostrong,for]bodiesoftenchange theirpositionandqualities,andafteralittleabsenceorinterruptionmay becomehardlyknowable.But...eveninthesechangestheypreservea coherence,andhavearegulardependenceoneachother.20 Constancyandcoherence,then,arewhattheimaginationfastensonwhenitselects certainimpressionsasbeing'of'somethingobjective. Somethinghasgonewrongalready.Thequestionwas:'Whatfeaturesofourimpressions inducetheimaginationtoobjectifysomeofthem?',butHume'sanswerspeaksofthe constancyand ____________________ 18Treatise,p.194. 19Treatise,pp.1947('Afteralittle...presenttomyperception.').
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

20Treatise,pp.194,195.

322

coherencenotofimpressionsbutofobjects.Theabovepassagetreadsdowntheneeded distinction,asdoesthis: Mybedandtable,mybooksandpapers,presentthemselvesinthesame uniformmanner,andchangenotuponaccountofanyinterruptioninmyseeing orperceivingthem.Thisisthecasewithalltheimpressions,whoseobjects aresuppos'dtohaveanexternalexistence;andisthecasewithnoother impressions. Ananalystofobjectivityconcepts,onewouldthink,shouldbemoresensitivetowhenhe isusingsuchconceptshimself.ButtheimpurityofHume'suseof'constant'and 'coherent'isnotfatal;forwecantakingcluesfromPricereconstructconstancyand coherenceasfeaturesofsetsofimpressions,asfollows.21Coherenceisjust orderliness:a'coherent'setofimpressionsisoneconformingtosomegeneralizationto whichmanyothersetsalsoconform.Constancyisaspecialcaseofcoherence:a 'constant'setofimpressionsisoneconformingtothegeneralization'Eachmemberof thesetisexactlyliketheprecedingmember'.Thisaccountallows,asHumeintends, thatasetofimpressionsmaybe'constant'evenifthereisagapbetweenmyhaving someofitsmembersandmyhavingtherest. Humenowaskswhytheimpressionsthatweassociatewithobjectsshouldbejustthe membersofconstantandcoherentsets.Asheunhappilyputsit,howdothosetwo features'giverisetosoextraordinaryanopinion'asTheBelief?Heanswersthrougha
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

complexexamplefromwhichIselecttwoepisodes:(1)Ihearacreakingnoiseand believethatadoorisopeningbehindme,and(2)Ireadaletter'fromafriend,whosays heistwohundredleaguesdistant',andI'spreadoutinmymindthewholeseaand continentbetweenus'. (Noticethat(2)concernsacontinentwhenIdonotperceiveitatall,while(1)concerns adoorwhenIatleasthearit.Humespeaksofthedoor'sbeing'open'dwithoutmy perceivingit',asthoughhearingitcreakdidnotcountasperceivingit.(1)isnot irrelevant,foritraisesthequestionofavisibleitem'sexistingwhenIdonotseeit;but allthesameHumehasoverlookedasignificantdifferencebetweenthetwoexamples.) Theseexamplesaretoillustratetheforceofconstancyandcoherence.Hereiswhat Humesays.aboutthedoor: ____________________ 21Price,pp.326,65. 323

Ineverhaveobserv'd,thatthisnoisecou'dproceedfromanythingbutthe motionofadoor;andthereforeconclude,thatthepresentphaenomenonisa contradictiontoallpastexperience,unlessthedoor,whichIrememberon t'othersidethechamber,bestillinbeing.22 Ishallarguethatthiscannotexemplifythekindofthinkingwhich'produces'TheBelief, becausewecannotregardanyphenomenonas'acontradictiontoallpastexperience' unlesswehavealreadyacceptedTheBelief.Alittlelater,Humesaysitagain:

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Iamaccustom'dtohearsuchasound,andseesuchanobjectinmotionatthe sametime.Ihavenotreceiv'dinthisparticularinstanceboththese perceptions.Theseobservationsarecontrary,unlessIsupposethatthedoor stillremains,andthatitwasopen'dwithoutmyperceivingit:Andthis supposition,whichwasatfirstentirelyarbitraryandhypothetical,acquiresa forceandevidencebyitsbeingtheonlyone,uponwhichIcanreconcilethese contradictions.23 Whatcontradictions?Thenotionof'contradiction'hasnoplacehereunlessIalready acceptalargebodyoftheory:thepropositionthatIinhabitaworldofobjects,many hypothesesabouttheirgeneralbehaviour,andsomehypothesesoftheform'Ihave perceptionsofkindKonlywheninthepresenceofobjectsofkindK* '.Givenallthis,and someparticularperception,Imayhavetopostulatetheexistenceofanunperceived objectorofavisiblebutunseenone,orthelikeonpainofcontradiction.ButHume's examplesaresupposedtoillustratethekindofthinkingwhichunderliesTheBeliefasa whole,anddownatthatlevela'perception'cannotthreatentocontradictanything whetheratheoryor,throughthetheory,otherperceptions.Wantingtoexplainhowwe answerthequestion'Arethereobjectsdoorsforinstance?'Humehasatbestexplained howweanswerthequestion'AmInowhearingadoor?'or'Isthereadoorbehindme now?',asaskedbysomeonewhoknowsthatthereareobjects,includingdoors,andwho knowsagooddealaboutthem.ThisisthegravestcaseyetofHume'sfailureproperlyto setthesceneforananalysisofobjectivityconcepts. Hesaysthisabouttheletter: 'TisevidentIcanneveraccountforthisphaenomenon,conformabletomy experienceinotherinstances,withoutspreadingoutinmymindthewholesea
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

andcontinentbetweenus,andsupposingtheeffects ____________________ 22Treatise,p.196. 23Treatise,pp.1967. 324

andcontinu'dexistenceofpostsandferries,accordingtomymemoryand observation.24 Humedoessometimesmention'contradictions'indiscussingthe'letter'example,andwe couldforcethatreadingontothequotedsentence,taking'accountfor,conformableto myexperienceinotherinstances'tomean'renderconsistentwithmyotherexperience'. Butwecouldinsteadtakeittomean'explain,withoutcontradictingmyother experience'.ThiswouldputHumeonfirmerground:spreadingouttheseaandthe continentisnolongerremovingacontradictionbutprovidinganexplanation. Thefollowingviewnowemerges:Ihaveaconceptualframeworkwhichletsmeconnect myvarioussensoryepisodestoformacoherentwhole:Ibringthebrute,disconnected factsofmysensoryhistoryunderatheoryintermsofwhichIcanadducesomeofthese factsasexplainingothers,canpredictfurtherones,andsoon.Thistheorydoesitswork onlybecause,throughit,statementsaboutpastperceptionscanimplystatementsabout presentandfutureones.Also,thetheoryisforreasonstobediscussedin72so structuredthatthroughitcertainperceptionstatementscanimplytheexistenceof objectswhenIdonotperceivethem.InagivensensorysituationImayhavetochoose between(a)acceptingthatthereissuchanobject,(b)relinquishingthetheoryandthus
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

myonlychanceofexplainingmysensorypresent,and(c)retainingthetheorywhile denyingthatthereisanobjectwhichIdon'tperceivethuscommittingmyselftoa falsehoodaboutmysensorypast.ThisisthecasewhereImustchoose(a)ifIamto 'accountfor[mypresentperception]conformabletopastexperience':ifIchoose(b)I cannot'accountfor'theperception,andifIchoose(c)myexplanationwillnotbe 'conformable'tomypastexperience. Humecouldhavetakenthesamelineaboutthedoor:Iwantto'normalize'myauditory experiencebyrelatingittootherexperiencesthroughatheorywhichincludesTheBelief. Thatwouldhaveimprovedonthequestionbeggingreferenceto'reconciling contradictions'. ThatHumeisguiltyoftheworseofthetwoaccountsiscertain,butIhavegivenonlya slimtextualbasisforthebetterofthem.Hereismore: ____________________ 24Treatise,p.196. 325

Thereisscarceamomentofmylife,whereinthereisnotasimilarinstance presentedtome,andIhavenotoccasiontosupposethecontinu'dexistence ofobjects,inordertoconnecttheirpastandpresentappearances,andgive themsuchanunionwitheachother,asIhavefoundbyexperiencetobe suitabletotheirparticularnaturesandcircumstances.25 Thecrucialwordsare'connect'and'union'.Thesamepointismadeearlier,whenHume

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

saysthatalthoughour'passions'havesome'coherenceorregularityintheir appearances',wedonotrelatethemtoobjectsbecause: Onnooccasionisitnecessarytosuppose,thattheyhaveexistedand operated,whentheywerenotperceiv'd,inordertopreservethesame dependenceandconnexion,ofwhichwehavehadexperience.Thecaseisnot thesamewith[impressionswhichwebringinto]relationtoexternalobjects. Thoserequireacontinu'dexistence,orotherwiselose,inagreatmeasure,the regularityoftheiroperation.26 Fromnowon,IshallholdHumetothisversion,ignoringthe'contradictionremoving' accountwhichsometimesintrudesintothetext. Atbest,Hume'sscenesettingisimperfect.Forexample,hespeaksofreadingaletter, ratherthanofhavingcertainvisualandtactualimpressions.Thiscouldbejustshort hand,awayofgettingonwiththeexample;butwhenoneremembersthatthroughout thispassageHumediscussesonlycontinuity,ignoringindependence,one'ssuspicions grow.Perhaps,ratherthansettingasidethenotionofanindependentobject,heis quietlyhelpinghimselftoit.Perhapshethinkshisproblemhastheform:'GiventhatI sometimesperceive(independent)objects,whydoIthinktheyexistwhenIdon't perceivethem?'Oneremarkmadeinhis'explanationproviding'veindoesseemto assumethatperceivedobjectsraisenoproblem:'Objectshaveacertaincoherenceeven astheyappeartooursenses;butthiscoherenceismuchgreaterandmoreuniform,if wesupposetheobjectstohaveacontinu'dexistence.'27Still,thisdoesnotprovethat Humeishelpinghimselftothenotionofaperceivedobjectmeaningaperceiveditem whichreallyisobjective.RecallthatheaimstoconsiderTheBeliefinitsvulgarformin which,hethinks,objectsareidentifiedwithperceptions.Ifhekeepstothisaim,the
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

question'Doesheassumetheexistenceofperceivedobjectsaswellasofperceptions?' ____________________ 25Treatise,p.197. 26Treatise,pp.1956. 27Treatise,p.198. 326

cannotevenberaised,sinceitimpliesadistinctionbetween'perceivedobjects'and 'perceptions'.Partlyoutoffidelitytothevulgar,butpartlyalsooutofsheer unthoroughness,Humeoftenfallstodrawthisdistinction.See,forexample,thequoted remarksaboutthepassions. ButifthisaspectofHume'sproceduredominatesourdiscussion,weshallgetnowhere. Atcertainpointsinthesectionherestsweightonhisviewthatthevulgarare committedtothinkingthatimpressionsexistwhennoonehasthem,andtheseepisodes shouldnotbeneglected.Butthesectionasawholehasalogicalstructureisbetter thanahandfulofcontradictionsfloatinginaseaoftautologiesonlybecauseHume doesnotconsistentlyidentifyobjectswithperceptions.Indiscussingcontinuityhe sometimesassumesobjectivity:hemakes,andfailstoanalyse,manystatements sayingthatweperceiveobjects.Independentobjects?Thereisnowayofsaying;but thestatementsinquestiondoassertthatweperceiveobjectsandnotjustthatwehave perceptions.Humemightwelldenythattheyinvolvemorethanthehavingof perceptions,buthewouldbewrong. Sofar,noneofthatmattersmuch.The'explanationproviding'accountcanbeadaptedto
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

coverallourbeliefsinvolvingobjectivityconcepts,includingonesaboutobjects meaningobjectswhichexistwhennotperceived.Schematicastheaccountadmittedly is,itseemstobeontherightlines;andsowemightthinkthatHumeiswithin measurabledistanceofcompletinghistask. Notabitofit!HewilleventuallyconcludethatthedesiretofindarationaleforThe Beliefisadiseaseforwhich'carelessnessandinattentionalonecanaffordusany remedy'.Thisdismalturnofeventsisexplainedbyapassage,thepivotonwhichthe wholesectionturns,whichwemustnowexamine.

72.Whymoreisneeded
Wehavebeforeusthemovefromcoherencetocontinuity:whatkindofmoveisit?The questionisHume's.Hewantstoknowwhetherthemove,asdescribedbyhim,isa specialcaseofsomemoregeneralintellectualphenomenon,somebroaderanddeeper 'principle'ormentaldisposition.Twocandidaciesarediscussed. 327

First,thereisthesuggestionthat'thisconclusionfromthecoherenceofappearances'is 'ofthesamenaturewithourreasoningsconcerningcausesandeffects'.Ithinkthatthis suggestioniscorrect,andsometimesHumedoestoo;28butnowherejectsitonthe groundsthatcausalreasoningis,whilethemovefromcoherencetocontinuitycannot be,amatterofhabit.29Insupportofthis,herepresentsthemovetocontinuityinthe followingway.Wehavenoticed'aconnexionbetwixttwokindsofobjectsintheirpast appearancetothesenses',but'arenotabletoobservethisconnexion'onaparticular

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

occasion;whereuponwe'suppose...thattheseobjectsstillcontinuetheirusual connexion,notwithstandingtheirapparentinterruption.'Insuchacase,thatis,we 'bestowontheobjectsagreaterregularitythanwhatisobserv'dinourmere perceptions';anditisthisregularityincreasingaspectofourprocedurewhich,Hume thinks,cannotbesquaredwiththeprocedure'sbeinganhabitualone.Hisreasonforthis isthat''tisnotonlyimpossible,thatanyhabitshou'deverbeacquir'dotherwisethanby theregularsuccessionof...perceptions,butalsothatanyhabitshou'deverexceed thatdegreeofregularity'.Nohabitcancarryusfromregularityinourperceptionstothe suppositionof'agreaterdegreeofregularityinsomeobjects',becausethatwould involve'acontradiction,viz.ahabitacquir'dbywhatwasneverpresenttothemind'. Thisargumentapparentlytradeson'habit',andwouldnotworkifwesubstitutedthe originneutralterm'disposition'.Butnevermindthat.Howistheargument,asitstands, supposedtowork?Grantedthatahabitmustarisefromsequencesofperceptions ('acquir'dbywhatwaspresenttothemind'),whycanitnotinsomewayreachout beyondtheperceptionswhichconstituteitsbasis('exceedthatdegreeofregularity')?I cannotseethatHumegivesanyanswertothis.Theargumentisalsodefectivein anotherway.Itsdescriptionofthemovefromcoherencetocontinuity,thoughextremely unclear,seemsfairlyclearlytodesertthebestpartsnamelythe'explanationproviding' emphasisinHume'searliertreatmentofthedoor,theletter,andsoon.Ishallreturn tothispointshortly. Havingshownhethinksthattheinferencetocontinuityis ____________________ 28Treatise,pp.74,108. 29Treatise,pp.1978('Buttho'thisconclusion...otherprinciples.').
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

328

notcausalintype,Humeexploresoneothersuggestion.Thisisthattheinferenceisan instanceofacertainprocedureofextrapolationwhichhesaysweoftenfollow.He describestheproceduremetaphorically,andillustratesitunclearly;buthissketchofthe inferencetocontinuity,whenthatisseenasaninstanceoftheextrapolatingprocedure, isclearandliteral: Objectshaveacertaincoherenceevenastheyappeartooursenses;butthis coherenceismuchgreaterandmoreuniform,ifwesupposetheobjectstohave acontinu'dexistence;andasthemindisonceinthetrainofobservingan uniformityamongobjects,itnaturallycontinues,tillitrenderstheuniformity ascompleataspossible.Thesimplesuppositionoftheircontinu'dexistence sufficesforthispurpose,andgivesusanotionofamuchgreaterregularity amongobjects,thanwhattheyhavewhenwelooknofartherthanoursenses.
30

Humedoesnotdenythattheinferencetocontinuityisinthiswayaspecialcaseofa generalkindofextrapolatingprocedure.Hisviewseemstobethatitisacaseofthat procedure,butthatthisfactisnotenoughtoexplainourpreparednesstomakethe inferencefromcoherencetocontinuity.The'principle'behindtheextrapolating procedure,Humesaysabruptlyanddogmatically,is'tooweaktosupportalonesovast anedifice,as[thebeliefin]theexistenceofallexternalbodies'.Andonthebasisof thisblatantlyunarguedassertionhesetsoffonanewtacknotexploringfurtherthe underlayofthemovefromcoherencetocontinuity,butdevelopinganentirelydifferent accountofthebasisforTheBelief.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Partoftheexplanationforthisextraordinarybehaviour,nodoubt,isjustthatHume doeshaveanalternativeaccountofhowwecomebyTheBelief,andheisdeterminedto workitinsomehow.Thisisallrightinitself,forthereisnoreasonwhyTheBelief shouldnothavetwodistinctbases.Humeoughtnottopretendthathemustfinda secondbasisifheis'togiveasatisfactoryaccountof'TheBeliefbecausethefirstbasis restsonaprinciplewhichis'tooweaktosupportalonesovastanedifice'etc.;butthis complaintisnotaveryseriousone. Still,somethinghasgonewrong.Humehasseenavaluablepartofthetruth;andyet thesectionwillendwithhistreatingTheBeliefasentirelyindefensible,becausehe thinkswemustchoosebetweentheLockeanandBerkeleianformsofitandhe ____________________ 30Treatise,p.198.Seealsopp.479. 329

seesthatneitherwilldo(see78below).Howdoeshemaintainthisviewofthe situationinfaceofhismanifestsuccess,inthe'door'passage,inshowingthatThe Beliefdoeshaveacertainkindoflegitimacy?Theanswerisnotjustthatheisgoingto turnhisbackonthatsuccess,butthathehasalreadymisrepresenteditasafailure. Consideragainhisopaqueaccountofhowthemovefromcoherencetocontinuitydiffers fromcausalreasoning.Isuggestthatunderlyinghispointabout'habit'thereisanon geneticpointthatcouldbeexpressedasfollows: Incausalinferenceswearguefromperceptionswhichwehavetootherswhich

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

wehave;whereasinmovingfromcoherencetocontinuitywegofrom perceptionswhichwehavetooneswhichwedon'thave,ortostatesofaffairs whichwedon'tperceive.Itfollowsthatthesetwosortsofintellectual transitionnevermindwhatdisposesustomakethemarethoroughly differentfromoneanother.31 Thisneedselucidation.Theinferencefromcoherencetocontinuityissaidtoinvolvea move'beyondtheperceptions'reportedinthepremisses.Butthenincausalinferences wegofromtheobservedtothenot-yetobserved,andinthatsensego'beyondthe perceptions'wehaveatthetimethepredictionismade.Hume'scontrastbetweenthese twomovementsofthemindrequireshimtorepresentthemovetocontinuityasamove fromtheobservedtotheneverobserved.Heisasking,ineffect,'Givenallthe perceptionsweeverhave,whydowemovetostatementsaboutperceptionswhich nobodyeverhas?' IfIamrightinthinkingthatHumeseeshiscontrastbetweencausalreasoningandthe inferencefromcoherencetocontinuityinthislight,hemustthinkitshowsnotmerely thatthetwo'areatthebottomconsiderablydifferentfromeachother',butthatthe lattercannotbejustifiedatall.Forifthereisthedifferenceindicatedabove,thebelief incontinuousobjectshasnobearingatallonanyoftheimpressionsweactuallyhave, andsocannotfacilitatetheintellectualhandlingofourexperience,andsoiswhollyidle. Thisviewofthebeliefinobjectcontinuityiswrong.Inshowinghow,Ishallassumethe correctnessofmyhypothesis ____________________ 31FollowingJ.W.Smith,"'ConcerningHume'sIntentions'",Philosophical Review,vol.69
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

(1960),pp.723. 330

thattheviewisonewhichHumehimselftendstoadoptbutIdonotwanttoinsist uponthis. Hume,onmyhypothesisabouthim,iscaughtupinanewformofanerrorwhichwe havealreadymet:byattendingonlytothosefragmentsofanobject'shistorywhenitis notbeingperceived,heimpliesthatnoneofourotherstatementsaboutobjects,i.e. statementsaboutobjectswhentheyareperceived,raisesanyproblemsforhimorlies withinthescopeofhisinquiry.Hewillsaythatsinceallthoseothersconcernperceived objectstheyarenotproblematic,becauseperceivinganobjectisjusthavinga perception.Buthewillbewrong.Thatclassofsupposedlyunproblematicstatements includesmanywhich,despiteHume'sdenial,doinvolveobjectivityconceptsofthesort heistryingtoinvestigate. WecangetanewangleonthiserrorofHume'sbyapproachingitthroughadetailinhis owntreatmentofcoherence.Hesays,accordingtomyhypothesis,thatourbeliefin continuousobjectshasnoexperientialcashvalue;buthowdoesthissquarewithhis viewthatwepostulatecontinuityinordertomakesomethingorother'moreuniform'? Thismustmeanthatthepostulationmakes'moreuniform'whatwesayaboutour experience;butthisisjusttoadmitthatitdoesfacilitateourintellectualhandlingof ourexperience,doeshaveexperientialcashvalue;andsoHumeiscaughtinan inconsistency. Butthatisanobjectionad hominem,whichHumecanescape.Letussupposethathe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

doessointheobviouswaybyretractingallhesaysaboutthe'door'and'letter' examples,anddecliningtoclaimthatanythingatallisachievedbythebeliefthat objectsexistwhenunperceived.Thenwecangettotherealrootandthereal instructivenessofhiserror. WhenIseeadoor,turnmyheadaway,andthenturnbackandseeitagain,mytwo visualimpressionsareconnectedbythestatementthateachistheseeingofadoor.For example,thejudgementthatthefirstistheseeingofadoorsupportstheprediction thatwhenIturnmyheadbackIshallhavethesecondvisualimpression.Inwayslike thisIbringobjectivityconceptstobearuponimpressionswhichIdohave;andHume shouldadmitthatsuchproceduresareuseful,andarebroadlycausalinnature.Ifhe concedesbothpoints,thenhecanhardlyavoidacknowledgingthattoperceiveanobject isnotjusttohavean 331

impression,andthusadmittingthatheoughtnotsimplytohavehelpedhimselftothe notionofaperceivedobject.Evenwithallthoseconcessionsmade,however,Hume mightstillsay:'Butthefactremainsthattheutilityof"perceivedobject"doesnothelp mewithmyproblemabouttheutilityof"unperceivedobject".Evenifitishelpfultobe abletosay"Inowseeadoor"bothatt1andt3,Ihaveshownthatitcannotbehelpful tosay"ThereisnowadoorwhichIdon'tsee"att2.' Butthebenefitsof'perceivedobject'comethroughatheoryofwhich'unperceivedobject' isanintegralpart:wecannotlopoffstatementsassertingtheexistenceofobjectswhile unperceived,whileretainingthe'useful'objectivitystatementswhichclassifysomeof

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ourperceptionsasperceptionsofobjects.Forexample,the'seaandcontinent'are supposedtoraiseaproblemformeonlyinrespectoftheirexistencewhenIdon't perceivethem;butthestatement'Thereisaseabetweenusnow'isconnected,through mygeneralworldtheoryandthusthroughtheconceptualframeworkwhichisitsbone, withstatementsaboutperceptionswhichIdohaveatsometimeorotherwhatIshall observeifItakeacertainjourney,whatIheardmyfriendsaywhenasked'Whatroute willyoutake?'andsoon.Ihavenowayoflinkingtheseperceptionsofminewhich doesn'tinvolvemyagreeingthattheseaisthererightnow. Hume'sprocedureisanalogoustothis:'Itisobviouslyusefultohaveanarithmetical theoryfornumberswhichweactuallyuse,butwhyshouldourtheoryalsomakeroomfor numberswhichnooneeverhasused,doesuse,orwilluse?Ournumbertheoryimplies thatthereisthenumber7,352,866,914,008,253andevenaddsthebaroque extravagancethatthissocallednumberisdivisiblebythree!Thetheorywouldbemore defensibleifwecleanseditofsuchexcrescences.'Thisisobviously,asHume'sisless obviously,aproposaltotrimthebodybyamputatingnotalimbbutsomethingmorelike thebonesortheveinsorthenerves. Perhapsitislogicallytruethatgenuinelyobjectiveitemsmustsometimesexist unperceived.ButIrestmycaseontheweakerthesisthattheonlywayIcanhelpfully bringobjectivityconceptstobearonmyimpressionsoryouonyours,orHumeonhisis throughatheoreticstructurewhich,togetherwiththegivenexperientialdata,implies thatobjectssometimesexistwhileunperceived.Theonlygroundwehaveforclaiming sometimesto 332

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

perceiveobjectsareequallygroundsforclaimingthatobjectssometimesexistwhenwe donotperceivethem. Itweequateperceivedobjectswithperceiveditemswhichare'independent',thenthe viewIhavebeenadvocatingechoesHume'sownclaimthatindependenceandcontinuity standorfalltogether.AsIremarkedattheendof68,itisapitythatatthiscrucial pointinthesectiontheclaimisforgotten.

73.Preliminarytoacompletion:identity
InhissecondexplanationofwhywehaveTheBelief,Humeconnectscontinuitywith identity.Hegetstheconnexionwrong,butinaninstructiveway. Healsobringsconstancyintothelimelight.Justbecauseconstancyisaspecialcaseof coherence,thelogicalstructureofhistreatmentofthe'door'and'letter'examplesis suchthatconstancycouldhaveplayedapartinthatdiscussionalongwithcoherence. Humesaysineffectthatconstancynowentersthepicture,butitwouldbeless misleadingtosaythatcoherencenowdropsoutofit. Humesketchestheargumentofhisnexttenpagesasfollows.32Consideralimitedcase ofconstancy:IhaveaperceptionP1,followedbyothersunlikeit,followedinturnbyP n whichisextremelylikeP1 ;aswhentobreakintoobjectivitylanguageIlookata door,turnawaybriefly,thenlookagain.ItisnaturalformetoidentifyPnwithP1,to thinknotmerelythatPnresemblesbutthatitisP1.Tohidefrommyselftheerrorof myways,Itryto'disguise'oreven'remove'the'interruption'whichhasoccurred betweenP1andPn,by'supposingthattheseinterruptedperceptionsareconnectedby
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

arealexistence'whichIdidnotperceive.To'suppose'somethingisjusttohavean idea,butiftheideaacquiresenoughvivacityitbecomesabelief.AndthisishowIcome tobelievethatthereissomethingwhichexistedthroughoutaperiodwhenIdidnot perceiveit. Ofthefourpartsinwhichthisistobeexpoundedanddefended,thefirstisageneral accountoftheconceptofidentity.33Humepacksagreatdealintothesepages,and somerelevantmaterial ____________________ 32Treatise,pp.199200('Whenwehave...thepropensity.'). 33Treatise,pp.2001('First,Asto...multiplicityornumber.'). 333

occurselsewhere.34IshalldevotethepresentsectionandthreemoretoHume's analysisofidentity. Whathonestworkcantheconceptofidentitydo?Humerightlyseesaproblemhere;but heexpressesitbadly,centeringitonthesentence'Anobjectisthesamewithitself'. Thedifficultyaboutthis,hesays,isthat(a)if'object'and'itself'standforthesame thingthenwehaveonlytheconceptofunityratherthanofidentity,while(b)ifthey standfordifferentthingsthesentenceexpressesafalsehood. Theseremarksdonotisolateaproblem.IthinkthatHumewantstopresentaproblem abouttheform'...isthesamewith...'or'...isidenticalwith...'generally.The problemisthat(a)iftheblanksarefilledinthesamewaytheresultisananalytictruth,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

while(b)iftheyarefilledindifferentwaystheresultisafalsehood;andso,apparently, therearenotruecontingentidentitystatements.Humehastriedtogeneralizeover everythingoftheform...isthesamewith...'bytakingthesinglesentence'An objectisthesamewithitself',butthegeneralizationdoesnotwork.Thatsentencejust isanalytic;or,inHume'sversion,itjustdoesinvolvetheconceptofunity;andwe cannotconstrueit,withlinguisticpropriety,insuchawaythatitexpressesafalsehood. Ifwearetohavesomethingwhicheasilyadmitsoftwosortsofhandling,eachopentoa primafacieobjection,wemustreplacetherigidanalytictruth'Anobjectisthesame withitself'bytheadaptablesentenceform'...isthesamewith...',inrespectof whichwecanchoosehowtofilltheblanks. MyversionoftheproblemdiffersfromHume'snotonlyinitspointoffocusbutalsoin regardtothecomplaintagainstalternative(a):whereIsaythat(a)rendersthe statementanalytic,Humesaysthatitintroducestheconceptofunityratherthanof identity.Butwhyshoulditnotinvolveboththeseconcepts?Why,indeed,assumethat theyaredistinctconcepts?Ifmyaccountoftheproblemisright,wearelookingfor contingentidentitystatements;thesemustnothavetheform'xisidenticalwithx';and wemightsaythatanysuchstatementmustinsomewayinvolvetwoitemsandnotjust one,ormustbegenuinelyrelational,orasHumehorridlyputsitmust'containa predicateandasubject'.Theseincreasinglypoorformulationsareheadedtowardsthe claimthatcontingentidentitystatementsmustnotbemere ____________________ 34Treatise,pp.2538. 334

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

unitystatements.This,Ithink,mustbewhatledHumetomisrepresentthesearchfor contingencyastheavoidanceofunity. IadoptthehypothesisthatIhavecorrectlydescribedHume'srealproblem,andshall expoundhimonthatbasis.Ifthehypothesisiswrong,Icannotexpoundhimatall. Hume'sproblemhasbeensolved.Ifweputisidenticalwith...'betweenapairof expressionswhich(a)havedifferentmeaningsyet(b)refertothesamething,theresult willbeanidentitystatementwhichavoidsboth(a)analyticityand(b)falsehood.Inthe terminologyofFrege,whofirstmadethismatterreallyclear,wecanformulatean identitystatementwhichisbothtrueandcontingentbyfindingapairoftermswith differentsensesbutthesamereferenceasin'TheProgressiveParty'scandidatefor mayoristhemanwhosupervisedthewiringoftheDreamlandTheatre'.35 Withthisinmind,considerhowHumesetstheproblemup.Hedescribesthe(a) alternativewhichIconnectwithanalyticityasthatinwhich'theideaexpressedby [onetermis]nowaysdistinguish'dfromthatmeantby[theother]',suggestingthatthe twotermshavethe same sense.The(b)alternativetheonethatleadstofalsityisnot explicitlydescribed;butHume'srejectionofit,onthegroundsthat'amultiplicityof objectscanneverconvey'theideaofidentity,suggeststhatthetwotermshave different references. IsHumeleadinguptotheFregeansolution?Ishepoisedtoremarkthat(a)and(b)are notexhaustivebecausetwotermsmightdifferinmeaningyetrefertoone'object'?Heis not.ThetrueFregeanlogicofthesituationmayhaveinfluencedsomelevelofhismind, inducinghimtoexpound(a)mainlywith'idea'and(b)whollywith'object';buthedoes notseethischoiceofterminologyasheraldingaclearthirdalternative.Thisfactcanbe
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

explained.Fromoneend:Humean'ideas'aremeanings,butarealsoaspeciesof 'perceptions'.Fromtheother:Humeoftenuses'object'tomeanmerely'itemthatcanbe referredto',andthinksthatperceptionsareouronlysubjectmatter,ouronly'objects'. So'idea'slidesinto'perception'whichisthenequatedwith'object'.Wenaturallypull 'idea'outtowards'sense',andpull'object'theotherwaytowards'reference',leaving clearFregean ____________________ 35G.Frege,"'OnSenseandReference'",inP.GeachandM.Black(eds),Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege(Oxford,1952). 335

spaceinbetween.ButthereareforcesinHume'sthoughtwhichdraw'idea'and'object' together,closingthegap. YetHumedoesapparentlythinkthatthedilemmacanbeescaped: Wecannot,inanyproprietyofspeech,say,thatanobjectisthesamewith itself,unlesswemean,thattheobjectexistentatonetimeisthesamewith itselfexistentatanother.Bythismeanswemakeadifference,betwixtthe ideameantbythewordobject,andthatmeantbyitself,withoutgoingthe lengthofnumber,andatthesametimewithoutrestrainingourselvestoa strictandabsoluteunity.36 Itakethistomeanthat'xisidenticalwithy'cansteeracoursebetweenfalsehoodand analyticity('number'and'unity')onlyifxisanitemexistentatonetimeandyisan
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

itemexistentatanother.Tounderstandandassessthis,wemustplaceitinawider setting.

74.Serialidentity-statements
FromnowonIshallbeconcernedonlywithcontingentidentitystatements.All subsequentusesof'identitystatement'shouldbeunderstoodastacitlyqualifiedby 'contingent'or'nonanalytic'. Anytrueidentitystatementwhichdoesnotusepronounsorpropernamesmustcontain twopartialdescriptions,neitherentailingtheother,ofsomeoneitem.Inasynchronous identitystatement,thedescriptionsrelateas'Fatt'doesto'Gatt';forexample,'The manwhohasbeenstandinginthecomeristheonewhohasbeenbiddingagainstyou forallthebestpieces'.Inaserialidentitystatement,theyrelateas'Fatt1'doesto'F attn'orto'Gattn';forexample,'ThecarIdrovetodayistheoneIdroveyesterday' or'...istheoneIwashedyesterday'.Inallowingserialidentitystatementsbutnot synchronousones,Humeomitshalfthestory.Myguessastowhyhedoessoisnot worthspace:ourrealconcernisnotwithhissuppressionofsynchronousidentity statementsbutwithwhathesaysaboutserialones. Insayingthatanidentitystatementcanbetrueonlyifitisaserialone,Humestrongly impliesthatsomearetrue,buthedoesnotquitesaythisoutright.Hemayinfactthink thatnoserialidentitystatementisstrictlytrue,whichviewbewouldshare ____________________ 36Treatise,p.201.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

336

withothers.CommentingontheanswerstoaproblemsetinAnalysis,Priorwrites: Theonewhollyexasperatingthinginthesixteenentriesisthetalkinoneor twoofthemofa'strict'senseof'oneandthesame'inwhichnoobjectexisting atonetimecanbethesameindividualasanobjectexistingatanothertime. ..Sofarfrombeingapeculiarly'strict'senseofthephraseinquestion,this seemstomeahideousmuddle...Tosaythatmysuccessiveinstantaneous statesarenotonestatebutseveralisonething,whiletosaythatIinthose statesamnotonebutseveralindividualsistosayquiteanotherthing,anda thunderingsillythingatthat.37 Still,thereissomeexcuse.Aserialidentitystatementdoesinvolvedistinctthingsata time.InthelanguageofQuine'sclassicdiscussionofidentity,suchastatementrefers todistinctthingstages.38(ForQuineathingisatimetakingprocesswhose'momentary parts'arethingstages,butIprefertoallowa'stage'totaketimealsoasmuchoras littleasisneededfortheanalyticpurposeinhand.)WhenIsay'ThecarIdrovetodayis thecarIwashedyesterday'Idorefertotwoitems,twocarstages,whicharecertainly distinctbecausetheirdurationsdonotevenoverlap.Sohowcanitbestrictlycorrectto saythatoneofthemistheother? Theanswertothisisthat'ThecarIdrovetodayistheoneIwashedyesterday'doesnot identifyonethingstagewithanother.Itsfirstfivewordsdonotrefertoacarstageat all,nordoitslastfive.Rather,theyreferthroughapartialdescriptionofitsstate duringpartofitshistorytoanenduringcar.39Wecanexpress'ThecarIdrovetodayis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

thecarIwashedyesterday'intermsofcarstages,butwemustbecarefultoexpressit notintheform TheFcarstageisidenticalwiththeGcarstage butratherintheform TheFcarstagehasrelationRtotheGcarstage; whereRistherelationofbeingsolinkedastoconstitutestagesofasinglecar.In short,serialidentitystatementsareinaway ____________________ 37A.N.PriorinAnalysis,vol.17(19567),pp.1223. 38W.V.Quine,"'Identity,Ostension,andHypostasis'",inFrom a Logical Point of View( Cambridge,Mass.,1953),pp.656. 39SeePrice,pp.478. 337

aboutthingstages,buttheydonotassertidentitiesbetweenthingstages. Humedoesnotsaythatserialidentitystatementsareneverstrictlytrue,butperhapshe oughtto.Inthepreliminarysketchreportedearlyin73hesays: Whenwehave...found,thattheperceptionofthesunorocean,for instance,returnsuponusafteranabsenceorannihilationwithlikepartsandin alikeorder,asatitsfirstappearance,wearenotapttoregardthese interruptedperceptionsasdifferent,(whichtheyreallyare)butonthecontrary considerthemasindividuallythesame,uponaccountoftheirresemblance.But asthisinterruptionoftheirexistenceiscontrarytotheirperfectidentity,and

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

makesusregardthefirstimpressionasannihilated,andthesecondasnewly created,wefindourselves...involv'dinakindofcontradiction.40 EvenifmyperceptionsP1andPnareverysimilar,Humeheresays,itiswrongformeto identifyP1withPniftheyaredissimilarfromtheinterveningperceptionsP2,...,Pn1 .ButitwouldbewrongtoidentifyP1withPneveniftheinterveningperceptionswere exactlylikethem;myperceptionP1att1isanepisodeinmysensoryhistory,andmy perceptionPnattnisanother:theyarenumericallydistinctjustbecausetheyare differentlydated,whateverhappenedintheintervalt2,...,tn1. Ifmysensorystateisqualitativelyuniformfromt1rightthroughtotn,wemightwish tosaythatIhavehadasingleperceptionlastingthroughthatperiod.Forexample (movingforidiomaticconveniencefromperceptionstopains),onemightsay'The headachethatisdistractingmenowistheverysameonethatmademelosemytemper anhourago'.Butthatistosaythatthetwopainepisodesarepartsofasinglelonger onewhichisdifferentfrom,andinconsistentwith,theclaimthattheearlieroneisthe laterone. SosomeonewhotriesasHumedoestorestricthimselftowhatcanbesaidintermsof one'sperceptionsorinnerstatesisalmostboundtocommithimselftodenyingthatany serialidentitystatementisstrictlytrue.Humeisthuscommittedbythepassagelast quoted,andalsobyhisinitialaccountoftheproblemabouthowtoavoidboth'unity' andfalsehoodanaccountwhichleavesnoroomforavalidescapebetweenthehornsof thedilemma.WhetherHumeacceptswhatheisthuscommittedtois ____________________
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

40Treatise,p.199.

338

anothermatter;butIaminclinedtoagreewithPricethatHumedoesthink,althoughhe doesnoteverexplicitlysay,thatnoserialidentitystatementisstrictlytrue.41 TheprincipalevidenceforthisisHume'saccountoftheparadigmidentitystatement,the kindwhichistrueifanyidentitystatementsaretrue.Eventhis,hesays,involvesa 'fictionoftheimagination'whichworksasfollows; 'Tisbymeansofit,thatasingleobject,plac'dbeforeus,andsurvey'dforany timewithoutourdiscoveringinitanyinterruptionorvariation,isabletogive usanotionofidentity.Forwhenweconsideranytwopointsofthistime,we mayplacethemindifferentlights:Wemayeithersurveythematthevery sameinstant;inwhichcasetheygiveustheideaofnumber,bothby themselvesandbytheobject;whichmustbemultiply'd,inordertobe conceiv'datonce,asexistentinthesetwodifferentspointsoftime:Oronthe otherhand,wemaytracethesuccessionoftimebyalikesuccessionofideas, andconceivingfirstonemoment,alongwiththeobjectthenexistent,imagine afterwardsachangeinthetimewithoutanyvariationorinterruptioninthe object;inwhichcaseitgivesustheideaofunity.Herethenisanidea,which isamediumbetwixtunityandnumber;ormoreproperlyspeaking,iseitherof them,accordingtotheview,inwhichwetakeit:Andthisideawecallthatof identity.42
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ItisjustafterthisthatHumesaysthatwecannot'inanyproprietyofspeech'formulate identitystatementsotherthanserialones.(Thequotedpassageisintroducedbytwo andahalfsentences,includingtheword'fiction',whichreferbacktoanearlier discussionandwhichraiseanextraordinarydifficulty.43Theydonothelpuswiththebit IhavequotedbutIsparethereaderthepagesofexegesiswhichareneededtojustify thisclaim.) Thepassageismostunclear.Foronething,indescribingwhatgivesus'theideaof number'Humeassumesthat'asingleobject'canlastthroughouttherelevantperiodof timeitisthisoneobjectwhichis'multiplied'whenwebringtwomomentsinitshistory togetherinasinglethought.Butthequestionofwhetheroneobjectcanlastthrough timeisjustwhatHumeoughttobeansweringoratleastanalysing.Theexistenceof enduringitemsisnotonlynecessarybutalsosufficientfortheretobetrueserial identitystatements;sowhatcanwemakeofapurportedanalysis ____________________ 41Price,pp.3941. 42Treatise,p.201. 43Treatise,p.65.Seealsopp.367. 339

ofidentitystatementswhichadopts,astrueandnotinneedofanalysis,the assumptionthatthereareitemswhichendure?Also,ofcourse,thereistheomnipresent difficulty:howmuchofanobjectivityloadisHumeputtingon'object'?Theanswerought tobe'None',becauseHumeisstilltryingtoexplainhowwearriveatobjectivity

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

concepts;butitisnotclearthathefullyrealizesthis. Forallthepassage'sopaqueness,though,onethingseemsclear:itpurportstodescribe amistakeinherentinallserialidentitystatements.Itlocatesan'idea'whichmaybethat of'number'orof'unity',Humevirtuallysays,accordingtowhichaspectsofthesituation weoverlook.AlittlelaterHumecomesevenclosertosayingthisoutright.44 Admittedly,thereisevidencetheotherway,aswhenHumesaysthat'theinterruptionof ourperceptions'is'theonlycircumstancethatiscontrarytotheiridentity',whichimplies thatifthereisnointerruptionagenuinelytrueidentitystatementcanbemade.Still, Hume'sconsideredviewmaybeweakerthanthat:hemaymeanjustthatthe 'interruption'isthe'onlycircumstance'thatstopsthecasefrombeingaparadigmcase ofidentity,withthereservationthatevenparadigmidentitystatementsarenotquite true.Similarly,whenheimpliesthatinsomecaseswecan'inproprietyofspeech'assert anidentitystatement,45hemaymeanthatthosearetheparadigmcasesinwhichwe doassertsuchstatements,whilestillthinkingthatwhatwethenassertistaintedwith falsehood.IknowofnothinginHume'sattitudetolinguisticnormswhichrulesoutthis interpretation. BecauseoftheimpatienceofHume'swritingandtheweaknessofitstheoretical underlay,onecannotbesurewhetherheseestheparadigmserialidentitystatementas strictlytrueormerelyasthebestwecando.Itisnotimportanttodecide.Butitis important,weshallfind,toseehowfirmlyHumeiscommittedtothe'merelythebest wecando'position:ithasaplaceinhisthought,ifnotinhismind.

75.Identityandobjectivity
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

WhatHumeneeds,ofcourse,istodistinguish'myperception'from'whatIperceive',for itisonlytheformerthatalwaysyields ____________________ 44Treatise,theparagraphonpp.2034. 45Treatise,p.201. 340

falsehoodwhenusedtofilltheblanksin'...att,isidenticalwith...attn,'.Hadhe workedwiththeform'WhatIperceiveatt1isidenticalwithwhatIperceiveattn',he wouldnothavebeencommittedtosayingthateveryinstanceofhisparadigmkindof identitystatementisfalse. Therewouldalsohavebeenotherconsequences.Humesaysthateachparadigm identitystatementconcernsanitemwhichis'invariable'throughouttheperiodspanned bythestatement.Heseemsreallytothinkthatthereissomethingsuspect,somefalling shortoftheparadigm,inanyserialidentitystatementwhichspansaperiodoftime duringwhichtheiteminquestionhasaltered,i.e.inanywhosetwodescriptionsrelate as'Fatt1'doesto'Gattn,'ratherthanas'Fatt1'doesto'Fattn'.Certainly,there isalimittohowmuch'variation'aserialidentitystatementcanstand:itcannotbetrue thatthepostagestampIhavejustlickedisthebookIreadlastnight.Butitdoesnot follow,andisnottrue,thatanitem'salteringalwaysmakesthereidentificationofit lesssecureorcorrect.WhydoesHumethinkotherwise? PartoftheexplanationliesinaminormistakeofhiswhichIneednotdiscuss;46but
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

anotherpartliesinhistakingashisparadigmastatementidentifyingoneperception withalaterperception.Thatfact,whichiswhatimpliesthateventheparadigmsare false,alsoexplainswhyheregardsany'variation'asafurtherdefect:anydissimilarity betweenthetwoperceptionsmakesitjustthatmuchmoreobviousthatitisamistake toidentifythemwithoneanother.Replace'perceptions'by'itemswhichareperceived', andthissourceoferrorImeantheerrorHumecommits,nottheonehedescribeswill evaporate. Buttodistinguish'myperception'from'whatIperceive'istoemployobjectivity concepts!AmIbeingunfair,then?AmIdemandingthatHume,inthecourseof explainingtheunderlayofallourobjectivityconcepts,useadistinctionwhichitself involvessuchconcepts?No.Myclaimisthat,justbecauseHumeoughtatthisstageto eschewobjectivityconcepts,heisnotentitledyettointroducetheconceptofidentity. Identityisanobjectivityconcept.IfFregeisright,wecanformulateanidentity statementonlyifweassigntwoormorepropertiestosomeitem,orcancreditsome itemwithahistory.Butthepursuitofobjectivityconceptslargelyconsistsinthe endeavourtodopreciselythose ____________________ 46Treatise,theparagraphonpp.2556. 341

twothings:theinadequacyofBerkeley'saccountofobjectivityemergedsharplyinhis inabilitytoexplainhowonethingcouldbeperceivedinmorethanoneway,oratmore thanonetime.

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

(InsayingthatidentityisanobjectivityconceptIamagreeingwithKantaboutthe conceptofpersonalidentityasappliedtooneself.AndIamsnubbingsuchdegenerate identitystatementsas'TheheadachethatisnowdistractingmeistheoneIhadan hourago',whichusesthelanguageofidentitybutcannotbeaccountedaseriousand centraluseoftheconceptofidentity.) Intryingtoanalyseidentitystatementswhiledeprivinghimselfofobjectivityconcepts, therefore,Humeisboundtorunintotrouble.Letuscredithimwiththinkingthatno serialidentitystatementisstrictlytrue.Wecanthengivehimcreditforseeingthe crucialdifficultyinwhichhehaslandedhimself,butwemustalsoaddthathehas turneditonitshead.Humedepictsusashavingtheconceptofidentity,wantingbut failingtogiveitagriponourperceptions,andthereforebeingledinwaysyettobe fullyexplainedtopostulatetheexistenceofobjectiveitemsasawayofgetting identitytowork.Itisasthoughsomeonesaid:'Wetooktodistinguishingthingssoas tohaveauseforourtechniqueofcounting.' Humeputsthecartbeforethehorse.Hisinquiryembodiesthefineinsightthatthereis adeepandintimateconnexionbetweenidentityandobjectivityassuch;buthedoesnot seethattheconnexionisofsuchakindthattheworstpossiblerouteintoobjectivityis throughidentity.

76.Theanswercompleted
Humenextproceedstoexplain'whytheconstancyofourperceptionsmakesusascribe tothemaperfectnumericalidentity,tho'therebeverylongintervalsbetwixttheir appearance'.Theexplanationoccupiesthreepages,47butitscorecanbestatedbriefly, asfollows.AccordingtoHume's'associationofideas'theorytherearevariousvaluesof
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Rsuchthat:iftwoideasarerelatedbyR,themindmovesnaturallyandeasilyfromone ofthemtotheother.OfthesevaluesofRthese'naturalrelations'themostpotentis similarity.TothisHumenowaddsafurtherprinciple,namelythatwetendto'mistake oneideaforanother'if ____________________ 47Treatise,pp.2014('Inowproceed...fortheother.'). 342

theyaresorelatedthatthereisasmoothmentalslidebetweenthem.Ittherefore followsthatwhenoneperceptionisextremelylikeanother,weactuallymistakeonefor anotherandsoassertanidentitybetweenthem.Thetendencytodothisissopowerful thatevenan'interruption'betweenthetwoperceptionsdoesnotdeterus: Aneasytransitionorpassageoftheimagination,alongtheideasofthese differentandinterruptedperceptions,isalmostthesamedispositionofmind withthatinwhichweconsideroneconstantanduninterruptedperception.'Tis thereforeverynaturalforustomistaketheonefortheother.48 AsHumeremarksinanimportantfootnote,therearetwopointshere:wemistakethe mind'smovementacrossan'interruption'foramovementwherethereisnointerruption, andthereforewemistakeacaseofsimilarityforoneofidentityormistakeoneideafor another. Humehandlesallthisverybadly,asheisboundtodo.Hisfailuretolookhardenough attheconceptofidentityshowsstrikinglyinhiswayofaskingwhatkindsofsituation
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

temptustoassertfalseidentitystatements: Nowwhatotherobjects,besideidenticalones,arecapableofplacingthemind inthesamedisposition,whenitconsidersthem,andofcausingthesame uninterruptedpassage...fromoneideatoanother?...Ifwecanfindany suchobjects,wemaycertainlyconclude,fromtheforegoingprinciple,thatthey areverynaturallyconfoundedwithidenticalones,andaretakenforthemin mostofoutreasonings.49 Whatever'objects'maybe,onehopesthatHumewouldnotsaythattheyareoftwo kindsidenticalandnonidentical!Buttocleansehistextoftheimplicationthatthisisa properwaytoclassifyobjects,hewouldhavetoworkdowntoadeeperlevel,and subjecttocriticalscrutinytheuneasyamalgamofphenomenalandobjectivetermswith whichheistryingtowork.Itwon'tdotosaythatIhavewished'identicalobject'onto Humewhenallheneedsis'identicalpairofobjects',forthelatterphraseisassillyas theformer.Inthestandardphrase'identityofindiscernibles'thefinal's'isalogical solecism. Inthismorass,letusconsiderjustonedetail:why,inHume'sview,doesan 'interruption'bring(oradd)falsitytoaserial ____________________ 48Treatise,p.204. 49Treatise,p.203. 343

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

identitystatement?Itisarguablethatanobjectiveitemexistingatt1andattnmust existthroughoutt2...tn1,butacogentargumentforthiswouldneedaclearer picturethanHume'sofwhatisinvolvedinanalysingobjectivityconceptse.g.itcould notblithelyequate'perceivinganobject'with'havingaperception'.Wecannotsee Humeasenteringintothatdebate.Hisreasonfordemandingcontinuityoperatesatan altogethermoreprimitivelevel. Hume'sviewabout'interruptions',asabout'variations',canbeexplainedonlyby referencetothefactthatevenhisparadigmidentitystatementsarenotstrictlytrue.If weseethatonHume'saccounteveryserialidentitystatementwronglyidentifiesone perceptionwithanother,wecanseethesignificanceofinterruptions:ifthetwo identifiedperceptionsareinterrupted,thisisanextrareminderofthefactthattheyare twoandthatidentificationofthemisthereforewrong.Humeoffersnoexplanationof whyinterruptionsmakesomuchdifference;andperhapshewouldhaverejectedthis one,denyingthatthereneedbeanyfalsityinaparadigmidentitystatement.ButIstill maintainthattheabovedoesinsomemannerexplainwhyHumesayswhathedoes aboutcontinuityinrelationtoidentity. Hesometimestriestogivesignificancetointerruptionswhilepresentingtheparadigm casesasstrictlytrue,bycontrasting'differentandinterruptedperceptions'with'one constantanduninterruptedperception'.Thelatterphrasesuggeststhatwherethereis nointerruptiontheidentitystatementreallyistrue,becauseitconcernsasingle,long lastingperception.Torepeatapointmadebrieflyin74:evenifIhaveonelong perceptionPlastingfromt1throughtotn,theparadigmidentitystatement,onHume's ownaccountofit,isstillfalse;foritidentifiesthepartofPoccurringatt1withthepart occurringattn,andthesepartsorsubepisodesaredistinct.Amongthepassages
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

whichfirmlycommitHumetoagreeingaboutthisistheonelastquoted.Hesaysthere thatintheparadigmcase,asinthe'interrupted'one,thereisan'uninterruptedpassage' ofthemind'fromoneideatoanother'.Thisisnotjustamomentarylapse:withoutit, Humehasnoaccountofwhywemistakeinterruptedcasesforparadigmones,andthus asweshallseeinamomentnoexplanationofwhywepostulatetheexistenceof objectswhentheyarenotperceived. 344

ThenextpartofHume'sexpositionisplainsailing.50An'interruption'betweenP1andP n 'seemscontrarytotheidentity'thefalsityofthestatementidentifyingP1 withPn staresusintheface.Yetiftheyaresufficientlyaliketheinclinationtoidentifythemis nearlyirresistiblewecan'neverwithoutreluctanceyieldup'theidentitystatement.In ordertoavoidyieldingitupweobliteratethereminderofitsfalsityintheonlywaywe can,namelyby'feigning'orpretendingthattherewasnointerruption. Atthispoint,HumeexplicitlyinsistsuponhisreadingofthevulgarformofTheBelief: wefeigntheexistenceofperceptionswhichwouldfillthegapnotbypretendingthat wehadsuchperceptions,butbypretendingthattheyexistedattherelevanttimeeven thoughnobodyhadthem.Humeanticipatestheobjectionthatwecouldnever'assentto sopalpableacontradiction'asthatofsupposing'aperceptiontoexistwithoutbeing presenttothemind'.51Hissurprisingreplynamelythatthisisnotacontradictionwill bediscussedinmynextsection;butfirstletusrushthroughtotheendofthestory. Itremainsonlytoshowhowour'feigning'becomesdownrightbelief.52Theexplanation issimple:thefeigningconsistsinhavingideasofunownedperceptions;andthese
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ideas,beingrelatedbothbycausationandbyresemblancetoimpressionswhichare actuallyhad,willborrowvivacityorlivelinessfromthelatter.Vivacitywillalsobe increasedbythesheerfrequencywithwhichthefeigningisperformed.Butaccordingto Hume'sanalysisofbelief,tohaveaverylivelyideaofsomething'sbeingthecaseisto believethatitisthecase.ThatcompletesHume'sexplanationofwhywebelievethat thereareitemswhichexistwhenwedonotperceivethem. ThisterminalepisodeinHume'spresentationofhis'system'requiresnocomment.

77.Unownedperceptions
Humesaysthat'theunthinkingandunphilosophicalpartofmankind,(thatis,allofus, atonetimeorother)'53assenttothepropositionthatsome perceptions exist when nobody has them,which ____________________ 50Treatise,pp.2056('Thepersons...morefullyafterwards.'). 51Treatise,p.206. 52Treatise,pp.20810('Butaswehere...bythatcircumstance.'). 53Treatise,p.205. 345

Ishallcall'P'.Ihavearguedin5thatPinvolvesalogicalorconceptualerror comparableto'Thereareinstancesofsquarenesswhichdonotconsistinsomething's beingsquare',andsometimesHumeseemstoagree.Inthepresentcontext,however,

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

hedeniesthatPislogicallydefective.54 HethinksthathehastodefendP'sconsistencyifheistomaintainitsnearuniversal acceptance;butreallyhisconsistency'proof'is,tacticallyspeaking,nousetohim.He virtuallyadmitsthatPlooksinconsistent,andtoshowitssupposedconsistencyhehas toresorttoarecherchargumentwhichcouldhardlybeamongtheintellectual possessionsof'theunthinkingandunphilosophicalpartofmankind'.SoHume's consistencyproof,evenifitwerevalid,wouldnotachievehispurpose;foritcouldstill beobjectedthatsincePseemstobea'palpablecontradiction'thevulgarareextremely unlikelytoacceptit. Tacticalmotivesaside,HumegivesreasonsforsayingthatPisfalsebutnotlogically so.AssumingforthemomentthatPiscontingent,whyshouldHumesaythatitisfalse? Hemaywellsaythatwehavenocogentevidenceforit,andthatweacceptitonlyto hideourfumblingswiththeconceptofidentity;buthegoesfurther,maintainingthatP isfalse.Why? TheanswerliesinHume'ssketchof'afewofthoseexperiments,whichconvinceus,that ourperceptionsarenotpossestofanyindependentexistence'or,a fortiori,ofany continuousexistence.55Someofthese'experiments',e.g.thoseinvolvingtheeffectof distanceuponapparentsize,merelyremindusthatfactsaboutsensorystatesdonot correlateoneforonewithstatementswemakeabouttheobjectiverealm:thevisual sensedatumpertainingtothetreeoccupieslessofmyvisualfieldthanitdid,butIdo notsaythatthetreehasshrunk.Whatsuch'experiments'showisnot'thatour perceptionsarenotpossestofanyindependentexistence',butonlythatourperceptions arenotpossessedofallthepropertieswecustomarilyattributeto'objects'.Humemay saythatthe'experiments'refuteTheBeliefinthenaiveforminwhichhethinkswehold
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

it,butthisis(1)falseand(2)irrelevant.(1)Whatthe'experiments'reallyshowisthat HumeiswrongabouttheforminwhichweholdTheBelief.Justbecausewedonotsay thatthetreehasshrunk,eventhoughthe ____________________ 54SeeJ.Cook,"'Hume'sScepticismwithRegardtotheSenses'". 55Treatise,paragraphonpp.21011. 346

relevantvisualsensedatumnowoccupieslessofthevisualfield,itiswrongtosaythat wetakeourobjectstobeourperceptions.(2)Evenifthese'experiments'didrefuteThe Belief,HumecouldnotarguefromthattothefalsityofP.Forhesaysrepeatedlythat TheBeliefisfalsebecausePisfalse,i.e.becausethereareinfactnounowned perceptions;andsoheneedsanargumentagainstPwhichdoesnothavethedenialof TheBeliefasalemma. Hume'sfirstandmostfullyexpounded'experiment'isthis: Whenwepressoneeyewithafinger,weimmediatelyperceivealltheobjects tobecomedouble,andonehalfofthemtoberemov'dfromtheircommonand naturalposition.Butaswedonotattributeacontinu'dexistencetoboththese perceptions,andastheyarebothofthesamenature,weclearlyperceive,that allourperceptionsaredependentonourorgans,andthedispositionofour nervesandanimalspirits. ThiscouldbejusttheargumentIhavebeencriticizing,butitcouldbesomethingelse.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

HumemayherebearguingthatsinceIcanmodifymyperceptionsbymodifyingmyself, myperceptionsarethereforedependentuponmyself.Unliketheotherargument,thisat leastseemstoheadinthedesireddirection;butittooisquiteworthless.Waiving severaldifficulties,wemightconcedethattheargumentshowsthatwhatperceptions are haddependsuponthestatesofthosewhohavethem;butwhathasthattodowith thethesisPthatperceptionsexistwhichare not had?56 Clearly,nothingcouldrefutePonceitisgrantedtobecontingent.IfPisnotlogically falsetherearenogroundsforcallingitfalseatallor,ofcourse,forcallingittrue. Somephilosophersinourcentury,assumingthattherecouldbeunownedperceptions, havedebatedwhetherthereareany;butthistiresomestretchoftheliteratureconfirms thatthequestionisempty. Hume'sargumentforP'scontingency,whichismuchmoreinteresting,restsontwo premisses.(1)ThereisHume'sanalysisoftheconceptofmentalidentity.Althoughthe detailsofthisreflectHume'sgeneralfailurewiththeconceptofidentity,itsmaindriftis clear.Againsttheview,whichseemstobeBerkeley's,thatamindconsistsofanaked substratuminwhichmentalqualitiesinhere,Humeopposeshisownclaimthatamindis 'nothingbutaheaporcollectionofdifferentperceptions,united ____________________ 56SeePrice,pp.11415;andCook,op.cit.pp.1214. 347

togetherbycertainrelations'.57(2)TheotherpremissisHume'sthesis,discussedin
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

62above,thatallperceptionsaredistinctor,asHumeheresays,that'Everyperception isdistinguishablefrom[every]other,andmaybeconsider'dasseparatelyexistent.' From(1)and(2)together,'Itevidentlyfollows,thatthereisnoabsurdityinseparating anyparticularperceptionfromthemind;thatis,inbreakingoffallitsrelations,with thatconnectedmassofperceptions,whichconstituteathinkingbeing.'58Whetherit does'evidentlyfollow'dependsuponhowweconstruethepremisses.Fortheargument togothrough,Ithinkwemustunderstanditspremissesthus: (1)ForsomeR:x is owned by a mindx hasRto some other perceptions. (2)FornoR:x existsx hasRto some other perceptions. Fromthesetwoitreallydoesfollowthat Itisnotthecasethat:x existsx is owned by a mind, whichisjusttosaythattherecanbeunownedperceptions. Whenwedemand(2)'scredentials,however,wefindthatithasnone.Thenearestthing toitthatHumehassofarintroducedisthemuchweakerprinciple: (2)Nopartialdescriptionofamindentailstherestofthedescriptionofit thisbeingwhatunderliesHume'santirationalistviewthatwhatIhaveobservedsofar cannotentailwhatIshallobservenext.Iherebypasstheproblem,discussedin59 62,ofhowtoprevent(2)fromslitheringintotriviality.Mypresentpointisthat(2), howevercharitablyinterpreted,doesnotimplythattherecouldbeunownedperceptions. Whatitsaysofanyperceptionxwhichishadbysomemindisthatxmightnothave
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

beenhaditsbeinghadwasnotentailedbythesetofpreviousfactsaboutthemindin questionandthisdoesnotimplythatxmighthaveexistedwithoutbeinghad.IfHume hastriedtoinferP'sconsistencyfrom(2),hehasineffectmovedfrom'Everyperception ispossiblyunowned'to'Possiblythereareperceptions ____________________ 57Treatise,p.207. 58Ibid. 348

whichareunowned'anonsequiturwiththesamestructureasthe 'perceived'/'perceivable'argumentofBerkeley'sdiscussedin32above.Ifontheother handHumehassoughttoinferP'sconsistencyfrom(2),thenheowesusadefenceof thepremiss.

78.Thedespairingconclusion
IntheclosingpagesofHume'ssectionhereapstheharvesthehassown.59Having arguedthatTheBeliefofthevulgarasheunderstandsitisuntenable,Humeassails whathethinkstobetheonlyotherformTheBeliefcouldtake,namelythe'philosophical hypothesis'thatthereareindependentandcontinuousobjectswhicharenot perceptions.Herejectsthisasanotherworthlessfiction,andthenceconcludesthatin neitherofitspossibleformsisTheBeliefintellectuallydefensible. Minuteexpositionisnotneeded:oncethefundamentalmistakeinthesepagesis
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

understood,theirdetailsfallintoplace.Iwantonlytodisplaythebasicmistaketo exhibititsstructureanditsrootsinthedeeperlevelsofHume'sthought. Forbrevity,Ishalluse'Objectsare[not]...'tomean'Thereareindependentand continuousitemswhichare[not]...' Hume,wehaveseen,creditsthevulgarwithholdingtheBerkeleianviewthatobjects areperceptions,andallhiscriticismsofthevulgarformofTheBeliefdependuponthis interpretationofit.IfoneistoavoidtheBerkeleianpositionwithoutdenyingthatthere areobjects,onemustsaythatobjectsarenotperceptions:thisisthe'philosophical hypothesis'whichHumealsorejectsbecauseheequatesitwithLocke'sview.Thatis, heassumesthatifobjectsarenotperceptionstheymustbeLockean'realthings'which areneverthemselvesperceivedandwhichhavetobeconjecturedtoexistbehindthe veilofperception. TheLockeanpositioniswrong,ofcourse,andHumehassomesharpandrelevantthings tosayaboutit.Forexample,sensoryfactscannotbeexplainedbythehypothesisthat unperceivableobjectsareactinguponus,because: Asnobeingsareeverpresenttothemindbutperceptions;itfollowsthatwe mayobserveaconjunctionorarelationofcauseandeffectbetweendifferent perceptions,butcanneverobserveitbetweenperceptionsand[Lockean] objects.'Tisimpossible,therefore,thatfrom ____________________ 59Treatise,pp.21118('Thenaturalconsequence...'totheend). 349
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

theexistenceoranyofthequalitiesoftheformer,wecaneverformany conclusionconcerningtheexistenceofthelatter.60 AlthoughinitsdetailsthisreflectsinadequaciesinHume'stheoryofcausality,itisa sound,Berkeleianmoveintherightdirection. HumeinsiststhattheLockeanposition,althoughitlooksmoresophisticatedthanthe Berkeleianone,isreallyitsinferior:it'hasnoprimaryrecommendation,eithertoreason ortheimagination',whiletheBerkeleianpositionatleastappealstotheimagination.61 NoonewouldhavecountenancedtheLockeanviewforamoment,Humeargues,ifwe werenotfirstseducedbytheimaginationintotheBerkeleianviewandthenpulledup shortbyreasonor'reflection': Theimaginationtellsus,thatourresemblingperceptionshaveacontinu'dand uninterruptedexistence...Reflectiontellsus,thatevenourresembling perceptionsareinterruptedintheirexistence...Thecontradictionbetwixt theseopinionsweeludebyanewfiction,...byascribingthesecontrary qualitiestodifferentexistences;theinterruptiontoperceptions,andthe continuancetoobjects.62 Our'newfiction'istheLockeanview.ItmeetstheoriginalobjectiontotheBerkeleian view,butfallsfoulofreasoninotherways:wecouldnothaveevidencethatthereare anyLockeanobjects,wecannotevenmeananythingbytherelevantexpressions,andso on.Furthermore,inmanoeuvringtomeetadifficultyintheBerkeleianpositionwehave thrownoutjustthatelementinitwhichwasattractivetotheimaginationnamelythe fictionofanunownedperceptionwhichwouldrestorecontinuity,andthusidentity,toa
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

pairof'resemblingperceptions'.Sowehavefloutedtheimaginationwithoutproperly placatingreason,andourlaststateisthusworsethanourfirst.Inoneplace,after sketchingthecaseagainst'ourpopularsystem'asheunderstandsit,Humeproceeds: 'Andastoourphilosophicalone,'tisliabletothesamedifficulties;andisoverand aboveloadedwiththisabsurdity,thatitatoncedeniesandestablishesthevulgar supposition.'63This,thoughunhappilyexpressed,clearlymakesthegeneralpointthat LockeisastepbackwardsfromBerkeley.TheenergyandelaboratenessofHume's argumentsonthispointshowirritationwithLockeanswhocondescendtoBerkeley. ____________________ 60Treatise,p.212. 61Ibid. 62Treatise,p.215. 63Treatise,pp.21718. 350

WhoaretheseannoyingLockeans?Mostofus,muchofthetime;orsoHumemust think.HedoesnotintroduceeitherLocke'snameorBerkeley's,buthecreditsthevulgar withaviewwhichisinfactBerkeley's,andassumesthattheonlyalternativetoitother thandenyingthatthereareobjectsisacertainpositionwhichisinfactLocke's.If theseoptionsexhaustthepossibilities,thenthecaseagainstLocketellsalsoagainst anyonewhosays:'Itwouldindeedbewrongtopostulateunownedperceptions,butthe objectstowhichweattributecontinuityarenotperceptions.'GivenHume'sbasicpicture, justasthevulgarare'allofusatonetimeorother',sotheadherentsofthe 'philosophicalsystem'mustincludenearlyeveryoneatsuchtimesashethinksabout

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

continuity.Humeattacksthe'philosophicalsystem'withsuchpersistence,Ithink,partly becausehethinksthatitisprettycommonpropertyatleastascommonasthe dispositiontosay'...buttheobjectstowhichweattributecontinuityarenot perceptions'. Thatbringsustotheimportantquestion:whydoesHumethinkthathehastochoose betweenBerkeley'spositionandLocke's?InansweringthisIshallreplacethegeneric 'perception'bythespecific'impression',justtoavoidacertainpossibilityofverbal confusion. Oneanswer,whichiscorrectasfarasitgoes,isthis:Humethinksthatonly impressions can be perceived.CombinethiswiththeBerkeleyrejectingthesisthatobjects are not impressions,andyougettheconclusionthatobjects cannot be perceived,i.e.thatthere areindependentandcontinuousitemsbutwecannotperceivethem.Thisconclusion containstheessentialerrorinLocke'sview. Thequestion'WhydoesHumeidentifythevulgarformofTheBeliefwithBerkeley's position?'admitsofthesameanswer:becausehethinksthatonly impressions can be perceived.Combinethiswiththecharacteristically'vulgar'viewthatobjects are perceived,andyougettheconclusionthatobjects are impressions.Thisconclusionis Berkeley's. So,whenwemaketheharmlessstatementwhichrejectsBerkeleywearethoughtto embraceLocke;andwhenwemaketheharmlessstatementwhichrejectsLockeand brandsusas'vulgar'wearethoughttoembraceBerkeley;andineachcasethe mediatingmistakeis'Onlyimpressionsareperceived'.Oncethisisdeleted,wecan makeboththeinnocuousstatementsatonce:objectsare
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

351

notimpressions,yetwedoperceiveobjects.Ratherthanjostlingforoccupancyofour minds,withonlyoneholdingswayatatime,theycannowbeseentobetwoelements inthesingleformofTheBeliefwhichweallholdallthetime. Thoseexplanationsdonotgoverydeep,however.SupposeweputittoHumethatwhat weperceivearenotimpressionsbutobjects,properlysocalled.Ifheacceptsthis,what willitcommithimto?Itimpliesthatheoughtinitiallytohaveusedonlythenotionof beinginasensorystate,orofhavinganimpression,andtohaveintroduced'perceive' anditsrelativesonlyafterexplainingwhatanindependentandcontinuousobjectis.But Humemightcheerfullycountenancethis.Hecouldsaythatthisrevisedprocedurewould stillallowhimtogetonwiththejob,merelyrequiringasystematicreplacementof 'perceivinganimpression'by'havinganimpression'andsoon.Therevisedstrategy mightlooklikemakingarealdifferenceinconnexionwith'Objectsaretheverythings wefeelandsee',fornowtherewouldatleastbeaquestionastowhetherthisvulgar beliefentailsthatobjectsareimpressions.Still,Humecouldanswerthequestion wrongly.Theconcessionthatwhatweperceivearenotimpressionsbutobjectsisnot enoughinitselftogetHumebackontotherails;for,havingmadethatconcession,he canstillsaysomethinglikethis: PerhapsIhavetoohastilyconstruedthevulgarviewasentailingthatobjects areimpressions,buthaveIconstrueditwrongly?Perhaps'perceivean impression'isdeviantEnglish,butdoesitrepresentorgenerateany fundamentalconceptualmistake?Theansweris'No'bothtimes.When someoneperceivesanobject,allthathappensisthathehasanimpression;
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

that'sallthereistosayaboutthesituation.Andso,givenanystatement abouttheperceivingofanobject,thereisanequivalentstatementaboutthe havingofanimpression.Fortherestofmyargumentinthesectiontogo through,perhapsslightlyreworded,isn'tthatallIneed? Obviouslywecannotrebutthisjustbysayingagainthatwhatweperceivearenot impressionsbutobjects.Wemustgodeeper. IhavesupposedHumetosay'...isn'tthatallIneed?'Therightanswertothatis:'It maybeallyouneed,butitismorethanyouareentitledto.'Hume'sbasicempiricist insightthatthereisnothingmoretoobjectperceivingthanimpressionhavingdoesnot implythat'xperceivesO'isequivalenttosomethingofthe 352

form'xhasI'where'I'namesanimpression.If'xperceivesO'istobeexpressedinthe languageof'impressions',itmustbeequatedwith'xhasIand...'followedbyalong conjunction,ordisjunctionofconjunctions,manyofwhoseconstituentpropositionswill beoftheform'If...hadbeenthecase,xwouldhavehadI* '.Thatistosay,object perceivingisalogicalconstructionoutofimpressionhaving;or,morebriefly,objectsare logicalconstructionsoutofimpressions. Hume,likeBerkeley,failedtoentertainthisphenomenalistalternativebecausehis theoryofmeaningwouldnotlethimdoso.Accordingtophenomenalism,theonlywayto elucidate'object'intermsof'impression'isbyspellingoutwholestatementsabout objectsascomplexstatementsaboutimpressions;itdoesnotallowonetocomplete'An objectis...'or'Perceivingis...'inthelanguageof'impressions'.ButHume's
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

atomisticwordbywordtheoryofmeaningdemandsjustsuchacompletion,andsohe hastosaythatanobjectisanimpressionandthatperceivingisimpressionhaving. Considerthe'seaandcontinent'passagediscussedin71above.Humetherecomes closetoatrueaccountofhowobjectivityconcepts,andbeliefsinvolvingthem,helpus intheintellectualmanagementofourimpressions.Inthataccount,themakingofan objectivityjudgementispresentedassomethingliketheapplicationofrule:itisan intellectualperformancewhichinvolvesoneingeneralizing,connnecting,predicting.But itleavesnoroomforapurelyphenomenalanswertothequestion'Whatistheobject whichisbeingsaidtoexistwhenIdonotperceiveit?'Allitanswersisthequestion 'WhatamIdoingwhenImakeaspecificstatementaboutanobject'sexistingwhenIdo notperceiveit?' ThatiswhyHumehastodeserthistrueaccountinfavouroftheuntruththatthe conceptofacontinuousobjectdoesnousefulwork.Hecannotdevelopthecorrect accountexplicitlyandindetail,forthatwouldrequirehimtodenysomethingwhichhe holdstoodeeply,andusestoooften,tobeabletosubjectittocriticalscrutiny.It wouldrequirehimtoacknowledgethataconceptorwordmeaningisnothinglikea quasisensorymentalepisodeandissomethingverylikearule. 353

BIBLIOGRAPHY
COLLECTIONS
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

IntherestoftheBibliographyandinfootnoteseachoftheseisreferredtobythe surnameofitseditororfirstnamededitor.MostofthematerialinChappell,Engle, MartinandSesonskeisreprintedfrombooksandjournals. V.C.CHAPPELL.(ed.),Hume: a Collection of Critical Essays(NewYork,1966). GALEW.ENGLEandGABRIELETAYLOR(eds.),Berkely's Principles of Human Knowledge: Critical Studies(Belmont,Calif.,1968). C.B.MARTINandD.M.ARMSTRONG(eds.),Locke and Berkely: a Collection of Critical Essays(NewYork,1968). D.F.PEARS(ed.),David Hume: a Symposium(London,1963). S.C.PEPPERetal.(eds.),George Berkely: Lectures Delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California(Berkeley,1957). ALEXANDERSESONSKE,andNOELFLEMING(eds.),Human Understanding: Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume(Belmont,Calif.,1965). WARRENE.STEINKRAUS(ed.),New Studies in Berkely's Philosophy(NewYork,1966).

BOOKSANDARTICLES
AlistofalltheworksIhavereferredto,orevenofthosewhichhavehelpedme,would besolongastobeuselessformostpurposes.Forstudentswhowantabasicreading courserelatingtothemaintopicsofthisbook,Ibypassavastamountofgoodmaterial andsuggestthefollowingtwodozen:
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

C.D.BROAD,"'Berkeley'sDenialofMaterialSubstance'",Martin,pp.25583(from Philosophical Review,vol.63,1954). JOHNW.COOK,"'Hume'sScepticismwithRegardtotheSenses'",American Philosophical Quarterly,vol.5(1968),pp.117. E.J.CRAIG,"'Berkeley'sAttackonAbstractIdeas'",Philosophical Review,vol.77( 1968),pp.42537. J.W.DAVIS,"'BerkeleyandPhenomenalism'",Dialogue,vol.1(19623),pp.6780. J.P.DEC.DAY,"'GeorgeBerkeley,16851753'",Review of Metaphysics,vol.6(19523), pp.83113,26586,44769,58396. ANTONYFLEW,Hume's Philosophy of Belief(London,1961). 354

JAMESGIBSON,Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations(Cambridge, 1960). S.A.GRAVE,"'TheMindanditsIdeas'",Martin,pp.296313(fromAustralasian Journal of Philosophy,vol.42,1964;alsoinEngle). REGINALDJACKSON,"'Locke'sDistinctionbetweenPrimaryandSecondaryQualities'", Martin,pp.5377(fromMind,vol.38,1929). NORMANKEMPSMITH,The Philosophy of David Hume(London,1949).
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

NORMANKRETZMANN,"'TheMainThesisofLocke'sSemanticTheory'",Philosophical Review,vol.77(1968),pp.17596. J.A.PASSMORE,Hume's Intentions(Cambridge,1952). GEORGEPITCHER,"'MindsandIdeasinBerkeley'",American Philosophical Quarterly,vol. 6(1929),pp.198207. KARLPOPPER,"'ANoteonBerkeleyasPrecursorofMachandEinstein'",Martin,pp.436 49(fromBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science,vol.4,1953;alsoinEngle,andin theauthor'sConjectures and Refutations,London,1965). H.H.PRICE,Hume's Theory of the External World(Oxford,1940). H.H.PRICE,"'ThePermanentSignificanceofHume'sPhilosophy'",Sesonske,pp.533 (fromPhilosophy,vol.15,1940). ARTHURN.PRIOR,"'BerkeleyinLogicalForm'",Theoria,vol.21(1955),pp.11722. GILBERTRYLE,"'JohnLockeontheHumanUnderstanding'",Martin,pp.1439(fromJ.L. Stocks(ed.),Tercentenary Addresses on John Locke,Oxford,1933). JAMESWARDSMITH,"'ConcerningHume'sIntentions'",Philosophical Review,vol.69( 1960),pp.6377. J.F.THOMSON,"'G.J.Warnock'sBerkely'",Martin,pp.42635(fromMind,vol.65,1956). I.C.TIPTON,"'Berkeley'sViewofSpirit'",Steinkraus,pp.5971.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

G.J.WARNOCK,Berkely(PelicanBooks,1953). ROBERTPAULWOLFF,"'Hume'sTheoryofMentalActivity'",Chappell,pp.99128(from Philosophical Review,vol.69,1960). FARHANGZABEEH,Hume: Precursor of Modern Empiricism(TheHague,1960).

ORIGINALTEXTS
InquotingfromLocke,BerkeleyandHumeIhavefollowedthetextsoftheleast modernizedofthereadilyavailableeditions,namely: A.A.LUCEandT.E.JESSOP(eds.),The Works of George Berkeley,publishedbyNelson inninevolumesbetween1949and1958. 355

A.C.FRASER(ed.),John Locke, An Essay, Concerning Human Understanding,two volumesreissuedbyDoverin1959.JohnW.Yolton'sedition,publishedbyEveryman,is inmanywaysbetter. L.A.SELBYBIGGE(ed.),David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,OxfordUniversity Press. L.A.SELBYBIGGE(ed.),David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, OxfordUniversityPress.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

ReferencestoLockeandtoBerkeley'sPrinciplesaregiveninaformwhichisvalidforany edition.ReferencestoHume'sTreatisearetopagesintheSelbyBiggeedition,whichis theonemoststudentswillown.ReferencestoHume'sEnquiryaretoSelbyBigge's marginalnumbersinhisedition.Thefollowingcorrespondencesshouldenablethese referencestobeappliedfairlyeasilytoothereditions(e.g.theexcellentonebyC.W. Hendel,publishedbytheLibraryofLiberalArts): HUME'S SECTION-NUMBERS I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 110 217 1819 2033 3445 467 4861 6281 825 86101 102115 116132 SELBY-BIGGE'S MARGINALNUMBERS

ReferencestoBerkeley'sThree Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonousposemoreofa problem,sinceeachDialogueisquitelongandtherearenoagreedsubdivisions.My referencesaretopagesinthestandardeditionbyJessop,listedabove.Othereditions wouldbemuchmoreusefuliftheywouldindicateintheirowntextswherethepage

PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

turnsoccurintheJessopedition.Sincethishasnotbeendone,othermeasuresare necessary.ForselectedpagesinJessop,herearethemostnearlymatchingpagesintwo populareditionsinwhichtheDialoguesarepublishedalongwithotherworkof Berkeley's: 356

JESSOP 174 177 182 188 192 194 196 200 205 213 216 218 222 224 230
PRO version

TURBAYNE (LIBRARYOF LIBERALARTS) 11112 115 1201 1278 1312 1334 1356 1401 1467 1545 158 1601 165 1678 1745

ARMSTRONG (COLLIER) 138 141 146 152 156 1578 15960 1634 1689 176 179 181 185 187 1923
pdfcrowd.com

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

230 232 235 238 242 245 247 249 252 261

1745 1767 180 1834 188 1912 1934 1956 199200 20910 357

1923 1945 197 2001 204 207 20910 21112 21415 2234

SUBJECTINDEX
LOCKE
abstraction,3,29,369,414,46,4850,155,223 causation,70,127,205f.,2602,286 classifying,2,36,9,65,121essences,1203 idea/quality,279,735,779,10711 intuition/demonstration,23840 meaning,1,22f.,4,36,10,148f.,209,222,227 meaningempiricism,26,44,223 modes,757,123 primary/secondary,43,59,71,1819,100,225,127,196 reality,27,59,1215,82,86f.,11436,145,161f,203f.,218,220f.,
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

232f.,316,321f,329f.,78 relations,16,238,254 simple/complex,43,225,242 substrata,11,1415,80,82,87,117f,122f.,131f.,141,213f.,217f. thinking/sensing,25,209,2224,248f.

BERKELEY
abstraction,22f.,29,6,8,57,155,201,223 Alciphron,39n.,46n.,54f.,185,220n. causation,1258,356,171,182,42 classifying,13f.,9 idea/quality,28f.,73f.,79,128,139 Introductiondraft,4953 mathematics,52,54f.,112f. meaning,1,46f.,10,1469,151f.,199,209,232 meaningempiricism,44,126f.,278,136,2147,232f. New Theory of Vision,152,158,319 passivity,66,162f.,165,172f.,182,185f.,44 Philosophical Commentaries,44n.,76n.88,101n.,114n.,146,179,185f., 41,203n.,206,210n.,212f. primary/secondary,71,8991,95,245,196f. reality(idealism),64,73f.,858,113,124f.,128,ch.VI,3741,199,203 ,232,246,316,321f.,329f.,342,78 reality(Locke),44f.,59,69,14,75,79,81,86f.,11420,122,ch.V,145, 156 220f.,321f.,.78 spirit,857,167,186,203,45,347f.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

substrata,14,75f.,79,81,86f.,117,124,129,139,213f.,217f.,347f. theoreticalterms,46f.,148,170 thinking/sensing,25,194,209f.,222f. will,166f.,186,423,219f.

HUME
abstraction,39n.,223 associationofideas,251,63,297,301,342 belief,63,302,333,345 causation,206,208,2446,254,256,ch.XI,ch.XII,320,32831 existence,280f.,294f. genetictheories,228,48,300f.,315,315,320,330 habit,300f.,66,328,330 identity,254,736,347f. intuition/demonstration,50,249f.,274 matteroffact,235,51,60 meaning,1,149,222,227f.,2314,259,262f,306f.,353 meaningempiricism,26,ch.IX,257f. primary/secondary,914,318f. reasoning,245,3002,319f. reality,64,149,224f.,246,ch.XIII relationsofideas,238,50,523,279f.,311 simple/complex,225,233,242f.,257f. thinking/sensing,25,30,2275 vivacity,40,2224,231f.,249,294,322,333,345 will,208f.,271
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

358

OTHERTOPICS
conceivability,57f.,2726,287f. conditionalfallacy,151,180,348f. contrasts,50,56f.,122,223,232,313 dispositions,710,19,101,1035,107,110f,305,328 embodiment,93,208211,317f. 'idea',doubleuseof,6f.,4,62,74,119,222f.,5,52,251,255,281,291 f.,335f.,353 imaging,22,31,3941,209 phenomenalism,68,29,312,116f.,153,1614,176f.,179f.,191f.,197 f.,233,246,352f. reification,5,38f.,41,69,80,85,87f.,125,138,160,241,346 resemblance,16f.,69,106,118f.,124f.,238,240,308,323,342f. touch,91,93f.,97,101f.,158f.,319 universals,1214,25,47,50f.,75f. words/sentences,2,19f.,46f.,1479,230,257f.,306,353 359

INDEXOFNAMES
Aaron,R.I.,61f. Adams,R.M.,83
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Allaire,E.B.,139n. Aristotle,204 Armstrong,D.M.,82,117,179 Ayer,A.J.,82f.,131,248n. Ayers,M.R.,88n. Basson,A.H.,notes227,251,298 Beardsley,M.C.,45n. Bender,F.,175n. Bennett,J.F.,25f.,29,70,112,127;notes149,188,279 Boyle,R.,89 Braybrooke,D.,155n. Broad,C.D.,82,354 Chomsky,N.,8f. Church,R.W.,289n. Collins,J.,117n.,180n. Cook,J.,346n.,347n.,354 Craig,E.J.,37n.,354 Cumnains,P.D.,69n. Datta,D.M.,211n. Davidson,D.,271n.,308 Davis,J.W.,135n.,215n.,354 Day,J.P.deC.,137n.,167n.,354 Dennes,W.R.,170n. Descartes,R.,25,8991,196,224,238,248f.,274,279,286 Doney,W.,11n. Dummett,M.A.E.,296,312 Faraday,M.,205
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Fleming,N.,91n. Flew,A.G.N.,54,241,354;notes11,29,294,296,299 Fraser,A.C.,117n.,175n. Frege,G.,113,149,335,341 Furlong,E.J.,31n.,186,41 Geach,P.T.,20n.,295 Gibson,J.,17f.,82,355;notes31,49,62,68,119,122,223,242,260 Goodman,N.,307 Grave,S.A.,198n.,355 Greenlee,D.,29n. Grey,D.,167n. Grice,H.P.,10f.,97 Grossman,R.,215n. Hampshire,S.N.,93n.,202f. Hart,H.L.A.,202f. Hedenius,I.,172n. Hesse,M.B.,205,296n. Hicks,G.D.,notes45,117,170,175,220 Hobbes,T.,272 Hospers,J.,279n. Hurlbutt,R.H.,165n. Jackson,R.,90n.,220n.,355 Jessop,T.E.,172n. Johnston,G.A.,31n. Kant,I.,11n.,85,149,210f.,3024,342 Katz,J.J.,5n. KempSmith,N.,222n.,355
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Kneale,W.C.,105,2725,307n. Kretzmann,N.,3n.,355 Laing,B.H.,251n. Laird,J.,39n.,206n. Leibniz,G.W.,62,85,206n.,254 Leroy,A.L.,215n. Linnell,J.,29n. Luce,A.A.,87f.,172n.,175n.,180,190f.,1958 Mabbott,J.D.,198n. Mackie,J.L.,296n. MacNabb,D.G.C.,227n.,299n. Malebranche,N.,184 MarcWogau,K.,172n.,195n. Mates,B.,34n. Maund,C.,29n. Michotte,A.E.,262 Moore,G.E.,35n. Morris,C.R.,29n.,81f.,117n. Myerscough,A.,170n. Newton,I.,89 O'Connor,D.J.,81 Odegard,D.,44n. Passmore,J.A.,295n.,304,355 Pears,D.F.,notes11,262,306 Peirce,C.S.,267 Pitcher,G.,87f.,355 Popkin,R.H.,134n.,164n.
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Popper,K.R.,47n.,355 Price,H.H.,16,313f.,323,339,355;notes80,337,347 Prior,A.N.,195n.,337,355 Quinton,A.M.,11n.,91n. Quine,W.V.,337 Ramsey,I.T.,215n. 360

Rescher,N.,254 Richards,T.J.,299n. Robinson,J.A.,251D.,299n. Russell,B.A.W.,12n. Ryle,G.,305,355;notes28,34,207 Sanford,D.,91n. Sartorius,R.,101n. Shoemaker,S.,233n. Sillem,E.A.,175n. Sloman,A.,96n. Smith,J.W.,330n.,355 Sorabji,R.,204 Spinoza,B.,85 Stillingfleet,E.,61 Suchting,W.A.,275n. Tanner,M.K.,41 Thomson,J.F.,355;notes45,165,195
PRO version
Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

Tipton,I.C.,213n.,355 Turbayne,C.M.,46n. Urmson,J.O.,302f. Warnock,G.J.,23,29n.,44n.,52,82,165f.,171f.,175,279,288f.,355 Wells,H.G.,272f. White,A.R.,139n. Williams,C.J.F.,90n. Wittgenstein,L.,7,10f.,15,17,19,24n.,502,10,149,275,278,286 Wolff,R.P.,304f.,355 Zabeeh,F.,355;notes224,227,249,252 361

[This page intentionally left blank.] 362

[This page intentionally left blank.] 363

[This page intentionally left blank.] 364

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com

[This page intentionally left blank.] 365

[This page intentionally left blank.] 366

PRO version

Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API

pdfcrowd.com