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Dharmakrti on pratyaka -Translations

(summarized by S.S. Liu/ Oct. 1 12 )

Pram av rttika Pratyakapariched PV 3 : 1-7, 123-133 (Singh 1984: 142-144) PV 3 : 1-10, 194-224 (Dunne 2004: 391-411)
English translations:

The Heart of Buddhist PhilosophyDinnaga and Dharmakrti: Appendix IV Dharmakrti on Sensation (pratyaka) (Amar Singh, 1984:142-4) Singh, Amar. (1984) The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy Dinnaga and Dharmakrti. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers

Japanese translations are available in:

(1979) : p. 55-68, 202-214.

Tosaki, Hiromasa Bukky-ninshikiron no kenky, vol.1: p. 55-68, 202-214) (2005) Dharmakrtis

For detail available translations check on: EAST -Epistemology and Argumentation in South Asia and Tibet

m na dvividha meyadvaividhy t aktya aktita | arthakriy y ke dir n rtho 'narth dhimok ata || (PV 3.1) [Singh] The means of knowledge is of two kinds, because there are two kinds of objects, as there is or is not a capacity for action towards an object. Hair and such things are not objects,

because there is no reliance on them of the kind that occurs towards objects. [Dunne] Instrumental cognitions are of two kinds because there are two kinds of objects. There are two kinds of objects because some objects are capable of telic function while others are not. [Illusions such as] the hairs [that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with cataracts] are not objects (arthas) because they are not considered to be objects sad sad atv c ca vi ay vi ayatvata | abdasy nyanimitt n bh ve dh sadasattvata || (PV 3.2) [S] And (also) because of similarity and non-similarity, because of being and not being within the scope of language, and because, when other signs (than the object) are present, intellect occurs with respect to one but not with respect to the other. [D] There are two objects because some are similar across instances and others are not similar; because some are the objects of words and others are not the objects of words; and because the cognition of some occurs when there are causes other than the object, and the cognition of others does not occur when there are causes other than the object. arthakriy samartha yat tad atra param rthasat |

anyat samv tisat prokta te svas m nyalak a e || (PV 3.3) [S] That object with respect to which (purposeful) action is possible is called the ultimate real, whereas the other is the conventionally real. These are respectively the unique particular and the universal. [D] In this context, that which is capable of telic function is said to be ultimately real. The other one is said to be conventionally real. They are, respectively, the particular arid the universal. a akta savam iti cet b j der a kur di u | d akti mat s cet samv ty stu yath tath || (PV 3.4) [S] If it is argued that nothing has a causal capacity, (we point out that) the causal capacity of seeds, etc. towards sprouts, etc., you may argue that the capacity is regarded to be merely conventional. So be it. [D] "But nothing is capable of telic function." We observe that things such as seeds have a capacity for telic function in the case of sprouts, and so on. "Such things are considered to have such a capacity conventionally, not ultimately." Let it be so in the way as you have said.

s sti sarvatra ced buddher n nvayavyatirekayo | s m nyalak a e 'd a cak ur p dibuddhivat || (PV 3.5) [S] If it is argued everything has causal capacity, we reply that there is none in universals, because of the not seeing of the cognition of logical agreement and non-agreement like the cognition of a visible object through the eye.* [D] "That capacity for telic function is found in all objects." It is not found in universals, which are not observed to have either positive concomitance [in which a universal necessarily exists when there is a cognition of a universal] or negative concomitance [in which such a cognition exists in the presence only and merely of a universal] with the cognition of a universal. An example in which these relations do occur is that of the eye faculty and the form perceived in relation to the cognition of that form. *Text with Prajnakaragupta reads: It is not seen of the cognition of agreement and non-agreement in the universal characteristic like the cognition of a visible object through the eye. etena samay bhog dyantara g nurodhata | gha otk epa as m nyasa khy di u dhiyo gat || (PV 3.6)

[S] By this (absence of causal capacity in the universal, its effect being mere knowledge) the notions of such things as a pot, upward motion, general characteristic and number are explained due to conformity with such things of the mind as convention, enjoyment, etc. [D] The fact that a universal is not invariably concomitant with the cognition of a universal explains cognitions of supposedly extra-mental entities, such as substantial wholes-i.e., a water-jug-projections, universals, numbers, etc. They are also not invariably concomitant with their cognitions because, like universals, the cognition of them follows from the presence of other factors, such as signs and mental effort. ke dayo na s m nyam anarth bhinive ata | jeyatvena grh d do o n bh ve u prasajyate || (PV 3.7) [S] Hair, etc. are not universal, because there is no desire for them of the kind that occurs towards real objects. In the case of absent things, there is no fault (of their having the features of a universal), because they are grasped as knowables.

[D] Things such as the hairs [that appear to a person with cataracts] are not universals because they are not considered to be objects [by persons who act upon them]. This fault does not ensue for absences because they are apprehended as knowable. te m api tath bh ve'prati edh t sphu bhat | j nar patay rthatv t ke d ti mati puna || 3.8 || [D] The fault also does not ensue for those hair-like appearances when they are apprehended in that fashion [i.e., as objects by some other awareness]. This is so because there is no reason to deny that they are apprehended as knowable objects. The clarity of the appearance of hairs in cognition is due to the fact that they are objects [i.e., particulars] in that they are of the nature of awareness. s m nyavi ay ke apratibh sam anarthaka | j nar patay rthatve s m nye cet prasajyate || 3.9 || [D] However, thoughts such as "These are hairs" have universals as their objects; but the appearance of hairs does not have any object. [PV3.8-9ab] tathe atv d ado a arthar patvena sam nat | sarvatra samar patv t tadvy v ttisam ray t || 3.10 || [D] "If a universal is also a [real] object in terms of having the nature of awareness, then you would have to conclude that it is a particular."

Since we do indeed assert that a universal is a particular/ your statement poses no problem for us. But in terms of having the nature of other objects, it is a universal in that it has the same form for all [the objects that it seems to qualify]. It has that same form because it is based upon their exclusion [from other objects that do not have the expected causal characteristics]. [PV3.10]

* PV3: 123-133 Singh pratyak a kalpan po ha pratyak e aiva sidhyati | praty tmavedya sarve vikalpo n masa raya || 123|| 123. Sensation, which is free of conceptualization (imagining), is established only by means of sensation itself. The conceptualization (imagining) of all (beings), which is cognized individually (subjectively) is dependent on names. sa h tya sarvata cint stimiten ntar tman | sthito 'pi cak u r pam k ate s k aj mati ||124|| 124. One who remains with a tranquil mind, having withdrawn his thought from all (concepts), looks at a visible object with his eye: that thought is born of sensation. punar vikalpayan ki cid s d vo kalpaned | iti vetti na p rvokt vasth y m indriy d gatau ||125||

125. Then, forming a judgment he knows There was something like my (present) imagining . There is no access of the sense-organ to the situation just stated. ekatra d o bhedo hi kvacin n nyatra d yate | na tasm d bhinnam asty anyat s m nya buddhyabhedata ||126|| 126. For a particular observed in one place is never seen elsewhere. Therefore, it is not the case that owing to a nondifference in cognitions there exists another, a universal which is separate (from the particular). tasm d vi e avi ay sarvaivendriyaj mati | na vi e e u abd n prav tter asti sambhava || 127|| 127. Therefore, every thought born of sensation has a particular as its object. There is no possibility of the functioning of words with respect to particulars. ananvay d vi e sa ketasy prav ttita | vi ayo ya ca abd n sa yojyata sa eva tai ||128|| 128. Particulars have no agreement (with words) because no convention

functions: and the object of words may be connected with them (with words, not with particulars), asyedam iti sambandhe y v arthau pratibh sinau | tayor eva hi sambandho na tadendriyagocara || 129|| 129 For when there is a relationship of the form this (expression) is of that (object) , the relationship is between only those two objects, which are imaginings; then it is not within the range of the senses. vi adapratibh sasya tad rthasy vibh van t | vij n bh sabhedo hi pad rth n vi e aka ||130|| 130. Then, because there is no (longer) a discovery (as in sensation) of an object with a clear image, a difference of form in consciousness is what distinguishes objects. cak u o 'rth vabh se 'pi ya paro 'syeti a sati | sa eva yojyate abdairna khalv indriyagocara || 131|| 131. Even when an object appears through the eye of which one says: It is other than that only that (conception, imagining) is connected with words, surely not the range (object) of the senses.

avy p tendriyasy nyav m tre vic ra t |

na c nuditasambandha svaya janaprasa gata || 132|| 132. Because there is no discovery, that which is not engaged with the senses merely through the other word and an unexpressed relationship (between word and object) itself is not connected with cognition. manasor* yugapadv tte savikalpavikalpayo | vim ho laghuv tterv tayor aikyamvyavasyati || 133|| 133. (If) there were a simultaneous functioning of without-imagining (sensation) and with-imagining (sensation), affecting the mind, (then) there would be bewilderment. Or (If) their functioning were extremely rapid their unity would tend to result (they would appear in the mind to be the same, resulting in the same confusion).

PV3: 194-224 Dunne

[ka. ak gamakatv t pratyak am] sacita samud ya sa s m nya tatra c k adh |

s m nyabuddhi c va ya vikalpen nubadhyate || 3.194 || "That which is aggregated (sa'f!lcita) is a conglomerate (samudaya), and in that sense it is a universal (samanya). [According to Buddhists such as Vasubandhu], one has perception of such things. Furthermore, any cognition of a universal is necessarily associated with conceptuality. [Hence, it is wrong to say that perception is free of conceptuality]." atr ha arth ntar bhisambandh j j yante ye ' avo 'pare | ukt s te sacit s te hi nimitta j najanmana || 3.195 || Due to a relation with other things [i.e., other particles], infinitesimal particles that are different than their own previous moments arise [from their own previous moments such that they can produce an awareness]. In that sense, they are said to be "aggregated," and as such, they are said to be a condition for the production of awareness. a n sa vi e a ca n ntare par na n | tadek niyam j j nam ukta s m nyagocara || 3.196 || Moreover, the distinctive quality that particles obtain does not occur without the other particles with which they are in proximity. Hence, since awareness does not have any necessary relation to a single particle, awareness is said to have a universal [in the sense of a group of aggregated particlesP as its object.

athaik yatanatve 'pi n neka d yate sak t | sak dgrah vabh sa ki viyukte u til di u || 3.197 || "Even though they occur in the same perceptual field, if they do not form a new, distinct substance, then those various particles are not observed simultaneously." Then how does one experience the simultaneous apprehension of small things such as sesame seeds that are disjunct [i.e., that are not forming a separate entity that is a whole]? pratyukta l ghava c tra te v eva kramap ti u | ki n kramagrahas tulyak l sarvv ca buddhaya || 3.198 || The objection that awareness occurs quickly and hence one mistakenly apprehends them as one entity has already been refuted [at PV3.I35]. And why would sesame seeds and so on that are falling down sequentially not be apprehended simultaneously? Moreover, all cognitions are equal in duration, so why would some have sequential conceptual appearances while others are simultaneous? One would be forced to conclude that the apprehension of any object is non-sequential. [PVJ.I98-199] k citt svakram bh s kramavatyopar ca kim | sarv rthagraha e tasm d akramoya prasajyate || 3.199 ||

kica (|) naika citrapata g di r pa v d yate katham |

citra tad ekam iti ced ida citratarantata || 3.200 || And how could one see a variegated form such as a multicolor (citra) butterfly? "That multicolor is a single real color." Then that multicolor is even more psychedelic than that multicolored butterfly! naika-svabh va citra hi ma ir pa yathaiva tat | nldipratibhsa ca tulya citrapa di u || 3.201 || There is no single entity, "multicolor," just as a form composed of an arrangement of jewels is not a single entity. This case is the same as the conceptual appearance of blue and so on in the observation of multicolored (citra) things such as cloths [that are composed of threads of different colors]. tatr vayavar pa cet kevala d yate tath | nldni nirasynya citra citra yadk ase || 3.202 || "In those cases where one sees a single color and not the multicolor, one is just seeing the color that is a part [of the whole]."If after eliminating the constituent colors such as blue, you can still see some multicolor that is other than those constituent colors, then what you see is indeed psychedelic! tuly rth k rak latvenopalak itayor dhiyo | n n rth kramavaty ek kim ek rth kram par || 3.203 || Two [cognitions, one of a manufactured butterfly made from different colored thread or paints and one of a natural butterfly,F are both determined to have the same

cognitive appearance of their object and to have the same duration. So why do you say that one is a sequential cognition of various objects and the other is a nonsequential cognition of a single object? vai var py ddhiy m eva bh v n vi var pat | tac ced ana ga keneya siddh bhedavyavasthiti || 3.204 || For we posit that things are various because cognitions are various; [and when one sees a variegated or multicolored (citra) object, the variegation remarked in cognition must reflect a variety of things that produce that cognition]. "The difference remarked in cognitions does not contribute [to establishing that things are different]." What then would establish that things are different? vij t n m an rambh d lekhy dau na citradh | anr patv n na sa yoga citro bhakte ca n raya || 3.205 || Because heterogeneous substances do not combine to form [a distinct substance, a whole], one would have no cognition of variegated color in the case of paintings and such. And the conjunction relation (sa'f!lyoga) [whereby the substances of the painting are held together] cannot itself be multicolored because it has no visible form. 8 Nor can conjunction serve as a locus of a metaphor because there is no variegation in the individual [parts of a painting]. It cannot serve as a metaphor also because there is no variegation in the individual [colors].9 [PVJ.205-206a] pratyekam avicitratv d g h te u krame a ca |

na citradhsa kalanam anekasyaikay'graht || 3.206 || And things that have been grasped sequentially cannot be conflated by a cognition that construes them as a singular multicolor because [on your view] that which is non-singular cannot be grasped by a single cognition. [PV 3.2o6b-cd] n n rthaik bhavet tasm t siddh 'to 'py avikalpik | vikalpayann ekam artha yato 'nyad api pa yati || 3.207 || Therefore, a single cognition that has various [simultaneous] objects should be established to occur. Hence, [perception, even though caused by multiple particles] is established to be non-conceptual, since when conceptualizing one object, what one sees is another. citr vabh se v atha u yady ekatva na yujyate | saiva t vat katha buddhir ek citr vabh sin || 3.208 || "If singularity is not possible in the case of objects [such as a butterfly's wing] that have variegated appearances, then how can there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearance is variegation?" ida vastubal y ta yad vadanti vipa cita | yath yath rth cintyante vi ryante tath tath || 3.209 || Those who analyze reality make a statement that is entailed by real things themselves-namely, that the way in which they think of objects is the way

in which those objects disappear."Might there be variegation in a single cognition?" ki sy t s citrataikasy na sy t tasy mat v api | yadda svayam arthn rocate tatra ke vaya || 3.210 || There should be no variegation in the cognition as well. But if one is contentto have this be the objects' essence, who are we to object to that? [PV J.209-2IO] tasm n n rthe u na j ne sth l bh sas tad tmana | ekatra prati iddhatv d bahu v api na sambhava || 3.211 || Therefore, neither the objects nor the awareness has a spatially extended appearance because, since that kind of property-svabhava [-namely, spatial extension-] has already been disproved in the case of a singular entity, it is also not possible in the case of what is many. [PV3.211]

paricchedontaranyo ya bh go bahir iva sthita | j nasy bhedinau bhinnau pratibh so hy upaplava || 3.212 || This part of awareness-namely, the one that is established such that it seems external-is different from the internal determination [which is the part of awareness that seems to be the subjectivity that apprehends that apparently external part]. Awareness is not differentiated, but its appearance is differentiated into two. That being

the case, that dualistic appearance must be cognitive confusion. tatraikasy py abh vena dvayam apy avah yate | tasm t tad eva tasy pi tattva y dvaya nyat || 3.213 || The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness (tattva) of the awareness. tadbhed rayi ceya bh v n bhedasa sthiti | taduaplavabh ve ca te bhedopy upaplava || 3.214 || The definition (sa'f[lsthiti] of things as different is based on the difference between those [i.e., the object and the subject]. 16 If the awareness is erroneous (upaplava), then their difference is also erroneous. na gr hyagr hakak rab hyam asti ca lak a am | ato lak a a nyatv n ni svabh v prak it || 3.215 || There is no definition of things outside of the definition of them as either objects or subjects. [Those definitions do not ultimately make sense;] therefore, since things are empty of any definition, it is explained that they are essenceless.vy p rop dhika sarva skandh d n vi e ata | lak a a sa ca tattvan na ten py ete vilak a || 3.216 || All distinctive definitions of things such as the aggregates are delimited by activity. That activity is not ultimate; therefore, those things are also devoid of [ultimate] definition. yath sva pratyay pek d avidyopaplut tman m

vijaptir vitath k r j yate timir divat || 3.217 || & is the case with persons who have cataracts, those who are by nature confused by ignorance have cognitive presentations (vijiiapti) with false images that arise in dependence on their respective conditions. asa viditatattv ca s sarv paradar anai | asambhav d vin te gr hyagr hakaviplavai || 3.218 || The ultimate nature of the cognitive content [in perception] is not known by any [ordinary beings] whose vision is not supreme; they do not know that ultimate nature because it is impossible for them to experience that content without the error (viplava) of subject and object. tad upek itatattv rthai k tv gajanim lana | kevala lokabuddhyaiva b hyacint pratanyate || 3.219 || Therefore, [the buddhas], ignoring the ultimate (upekfitatattviirtha), close one eye like an elephant19 and propagate theories that involve external objects merely in accord with worldly conceptions. nldicitravijne jnopdhir ananyabhk | a akyadar ana (3.220abc) ta hi patatyarthe vivecayan || 3.220d A color such as blue in a variegated or multicolored awareness is a quality contingent on awareness (jfiiinopiidhi)0 and as such it does not participate in any other awareness [such as the awareness of just blue]. Hence, it cannot be seen [as distinct from the variegation] because when analyzing it [as distinct], one is focusing on

the object (artha) [that produced the awareness, not the awareness itself]. yad yath bh sate j na tat tathaiva prak ate | iti n maikabh va sy c citr k rasya cetasi || 3.221 || An awareness is experienced in whichever way that awareness appears. 22Therefore, indeed (niima), the variegated or multicolored image in awareness should be simple. pa dir pasyaikatve tath sy d avivekit | vivekini nirasy nyad viveki ca nek ate || 3.222 || If the colors of a cloth and such also formed a simple or single entity, then they should not be analytically distinguishable from each other. And when the analyzed parts are eliminated, a remaining unanalyzable whole is not observed. ko v virodho bahava saj t ti ay sak d (: p thag) | bhaveyu k ra a baddher yadi n mendriy divat (: n tma) || 3.223 || And what is the contradiction if many [particles] that have the special characteristic [of producing awareness] when aggregated are not the cause of awareness individually, as is the case with the senses and such? hetubh v d te n ny gr hyat n ma k cana | tatra buddhir yad k r tasy s tad gr hyam ucyate || 3.224 || And except for something being a cause, there is nothing else that could constitute that thing's being the apprehended object. That is, the apprehended object of an awareness is said to be that in the image of which awareness arises.